Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus

Transcription

1 Knowlg in Plato's Thattus Human ings as ssntially knowing raturs is ntral to th Platoni onpt of slf. But what is knowlg, what ar w trying to know an what faultis o w hav to know thm? Th Thattus is an important xamination of ths qustions. Th ialogu rounts a onvrsation twn Sorats an a young gomtriian, Thattus, who is sai to rsml Sorats, at th hst of anothr gomtriian Thoorus. This ntir vnt is rount y Sorats to Euli, who writs it in a ook, whih is ra y an assoiat of his, Trpsio. Th ialogu starts with som xampls of knowlg for trying to om up with thr finitions of it. Plato sms to hav two ritria for juging whthr th finition is orrt: Th rality of th ojt w ar trying to gain knowlg of, an th infalliility of sai knowlg. Plato osn t sm to arguing that thr is no typ of ognition of things whih ar lss ral ut is finitly looking for th st form of knowlg humans an possss an a typ of knowlg that is infallil. Th first finition is that knowlg is sns-ata. H looks at two philosophrs of th tim an sts out to isprov thm. Th first of ths is Protagroas s rlativism: this stats that w an only hav knowlg of things in trms of ourslvs an hn vryon xprins thir own truth- an thrfor a prson is th masur of all things. Whn w mak a jugmnt, it is only th truth of our own xprin that w hav knowlg of, an all jugmnts ar orrt. If you say somthing is ol an I say that sam thing is hot w ar oth right. Plato sts out to show that this is not th as as som jugmnts ar monstraly fals. Th son is th flux thory of Hralits: th ssntial haratristis of vrything ar always moving from on to anothr- thr is no yarstik to masur anything against. This is stat in ontrast to th Parmnis otrin that thr is no hang at all. In th stion w ar going to ra h raws in argumnts to xamin whthr th prption w hav of ojts is th whol of knowlg an if physial ojts of our sns-prption ar infallil nough to all knowlg. Th son finition is that knowlg is tru lif: h xamins this y going ak to th two ways jugmnts an fals, in rspons to Protagoras stan that all jugmnt is orrt. Th first is thinking that on thing is anothr; an th othr, thinking that a thing is not. H looks at th onpt that knowlg is th aquaintan with somthing, a mmory of it an thn ralling this to our onsiousnss. H uss an analogy of mmory ing lik an aviary of irs- whn w try an rall somthing, w somtims mistak on pi of knowlg for anothr, an this is how w an mak fals jugmnt. Th stion w will ra looks at this onpt of knowlg ing xamin an how tru jugmnt annot knowlg, in rspons to this xamination of tru an fals lif.

2 2 184 Th thir is that knowlg is lif with an aount or xplanation. This sks to orrt th prolms in th prvious finition. H xamins an rfuts thr thoris to what this aount oul man. Th first h ismisss quikly xprssing a thought in sph: vryon an o this ut not auratly. Th son is that th aount of a thing xists in knowing its onstitunt parts ut this os littl mor than inrasing th amount of tru lifs w ha. Th thir is th way that our normal sns of finition works th aount shows us in what way this ojt is istinguish from othrs. This is th final stion w will ra. ******** "knowlg is sns prption" Sorats: Wll thn, Thattus, hr is a point for you to onsir. Th answr you gav was that knowlg is prption, wasn't it? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: Now suppos you wr ask: 'Whn a man ss whit or lak things or hars high or low tons, what os h s or har with?' I suppos you woul say 'With ys an ars'. Thattus: Ys, I shoul. Sorats: To us wors an phrass in an asy-going way without srutinising thm too uriously is not, in gnral, a mark of ill-ring; on th ontrary thr is somthing low-r in ing too pris. But somtims thr is no hlp for it, an this is a as in whih I must tak xption to th form of your answr. Consir: is it mor orrt to say that w s an har with our ys an ars or through thm? Thattus: I shoul say w always priv through thm, rathr than with thm. Sorats: Ys; it woul surly strang that thr shoul a numr of snss nson insi us, lik th warriors in th Trojan hors, an all ths things shoul not onvrg an mt in som singl natur a soul, 1 or whatvr it is to all with whih w priv all th ojts of prption through th snss as instrumnts. Thattus: Ys, I think that is a ttr sription. Sorats: My ojt in ing so pris is to know whthr thr is som part of ourslvs, th sam in all ass, with whih w apprhn lak or whit through th ys, an ojts of othr kins through th othr snss. Can you, if th qustion is put to you, rfr all suh ats of apprhnsion to th oy? Prhaps, howvr, it woul ttr you shoul spak for yourslf in rply to qustions, insta of my taking th wors out of your mouth. Tll m: all ths instrumnts through whih you priv what is warm or har or light or swt ar parts of th oy, arn't thy? not of anything ls. 1 Th wor us hr is psyh although Cornfor translats this as min, prsumaly aus Sorats is looking for som thinking agnt whih w might all min, w hav givn th mor litral translation of soul.

3 3 185a Thattus: Of nothing ls. Sorats: Now will you also agr that th ojts you priv through on faulty annot priv through anothr ojts of haring, for instan, through sight, or ojts of sight through haring? Thattus: Of ours I will. Sorats: Thn, if you hav som thought aout oth ojts at on, you annot having a prption inluing oth at on through ithr th on or th othr organ. Thattus: No. Sorats: Now tak soun an olour. Hav you not, to gin with, this thought whih inlus oth at on that thy oth xist? Thattus: I hav. Sorats: An, furthr, that ah of th two is iffrnt from th othr an th sam as itslf? Thattus: Naturally. Sorats: An again, that oth togthr ar two, an ah of thm is on? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: An also you an ask yourslf whthr thy ar unlik ah othr or alik? Thattus: No out. Sorats: Thn through what organ o you think all this aout thm oth? What is ommon to thm oth annot apprhn ithr through haring or through sight. Bsis, hr is furthr vin for my point. Suppos it wr possil to inquir whthr soun an olour wr oth salty or not, no out you oul tll m what faulty you woul us oviously not sight or haring, ut som othr. Thattus: Of ours: th faulty that works through th tongu. Sorats: Vry goo. But now, through what organ os that faulty work, whih tlls you what is ommon not only to ths ojts ut to all things-what you man y th wors 'xists' an 'os not xist' an th othr trms appli to thm in th qustions I put a momnt ago? What sort of organs an you mntion, orrsponing to all ths trms, through whih th priving part of us privs ah on of thm? Thattus: You man xistn an non-xistn, liknss an unliknss, samnss an iffrn, an also unity an numrs in gnral as appli to thm; an larly your qustion ovrs 'vn' an 'o' an all that kin of notions. You ar asking, through what part of th oy our min privs ths? Sorats: You follow m most amiraly, Thattus; that is xatly my qustion. Thattus: Rally, Sorats, I oul not say, xpt that I think thr is no spial organ at all for ths things, as thr is for th othrs. It is lar to m that th

4 4 186a min in itslf is its own instrumnt for ontmplating th ommon trms that apply to vrything. Sorats: In fat, Thattus, you ar hansom, not ugly as Thoorus sai you wr; for in a isussion hansom is that hansom os. An you hav trat m mor than hansomly in saving m th troul of a vry long argumnt, if it is lar to you that th min ontmplats som things through its own instrumntality, othrs through th oily faultis. That was in what I thought myslf; ut I want you to agr. Thattus: Wll, it is lar to m. Sorats: Unr whih ha, thn, o you pla xistn? For that is, aov all, a thing that longs to vrything. Thattus: I shoul put it among th things that th min apprhns y itslf. Sorats: An also liknss an unliknss an samnss an iffrn? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: An how aout 'honoural' an 'ishonoural' an 'goo' an 'a'? Thattus: Thos again sm to m, aov all, to things whos ing is onsir, on in omparison with anothr, y th min, whn it rflts within itslf upon th past an th prsnt with an y to th futur. Sorats: Wait a momnt. Th harnss of somthing har an th softnss of somthing soft will priv y th min through touh, will thy not? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: But thir xistn an th fat that thy oth xist, an thir ontrarity to on anothr an again th xistn of this ontrarity ar things whih th min itslf unrtaks to jug for us, whn it rflts upon thm an ompars on with anothr. Thattus: Crtainly. Sorats: Is it not tru, thn, that whras all th imprssions whih pntrat to th min through th oy ar things whih mn an animals alik ar naturally onstitut to priv from th momnt of irth, rfltions aout thm with rspt to thir xistn an usfulnss only om, if thy om at all, with iffiulty through a long an troulsom pross of uation? Thattus: Assurly. Sorats: Is it possil, thn, to rah truth whn on annot rah xistn? Thattus: It is impossil. Sorats: But if a man annot rah th truth of a thing, an h possily know that thing? Thattus: No, Sorats, how oul h?

5 5 199 Sorats: If that is so, knowlg os not rsi in th imprssions, ut in our rfltion upon thm. It is thr, smingly, an not in th imprssions, that it is possil to grasp xistn an truth. Thattus: Evintly. Sorats: Thn ar you going to giv th sam nam to two things whih iffr so wily? Thattus: Surly that woul not right. Sorats: Wll thn, what nam o you giv to th first on to sing, haring, smlling, fling ol an fling warm? Thattus: Priving. What othr nam is thr for it? Sorats: Taking it all togthr, thn, you all this prption? Thattus: Nssarily. Sorats: A thing whih, w agr, has no part in apprhning truth, sin it has non in apprhning xistn. Thattus: No, it has non. Sorats: Nor, onsquntly, in knowlg ithr. Thattus: No. Sorats: Thn, Thattus, prption an knowlg annot possily th sam thing. Thattus: Evintly not, Sorats. In, it is now prftly plain that knowlg is somthing iffrnt from prption. ******** "tru jugmnt 2 is knowlg" Sorats: But it striks m that a still strangr onsqun is oming in sight. Thattus: What is that? Sorats: That th intrhang of pis of knowlg shoul vr rsult in a jugmnt that is fals. Thattus: How o you man? Sorats: In th first pla, that a man shoul hav knowlg of somthing an at th sam tim fail to rognis that vry thing, not for want of knowing it ut y rason of his own knowlg; an nxt that h shoul jug that thing to somthing ls an vi vrsa - isn't that vry unrasonal: that whn a pi of knowlg prsnts itslf, th min shoul fail to rognis anything an know nothing? On this showing, th prsn of ignoran might just as wll mak us 2 In th txt th wor translat hr is oxa (an its ognats) - Cornfor uss th wor jugmnt, ut othrs translat it as opinion or vn lif.

6 6 200a know somthing, or th prsn of linnss mak us s if knowlg an vr mak us fail to know. Thattus: Prhaps, Sorats, w wr wrong in making th irs 3 stan for pis of knowlg only, an w ought to hav imagin pis of ignoran flying aout with thm in th min. Thn, in hasing thm, our man woul lay hol somtims of a pi of knowlg, somtims of a pi of ignoran; an th ignoran woul mak him jug falsly, th knowlg truly, aout th sam thing. Sorats: It is not asy to isapprov of anything you say, Thattus; ut think again aout your suggstion. Suppos it is as you say; thn th man who lays hol of th pi of ignoran will jug falsly. Is that right? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: But of ours h will not think h is juging falsly. Thattus: Of ours not. Sorats: No; h will think h is juging truly; an his attitu of min will th sam as if h knw th thing h is mistakn aout. Thattus: Naturally. Sorats: So h will imagin that, as a rsult of his has, h has got hol of a pi of knowlg, not a pi of ignoran. Thattus: Clarly. Sorats: Thn w hav gon a long way roun only to fin ourslvs onfront on mor with our original iffiulty. Our strutiv riti will laugh at us. 'You wonrful popl,' h will say, 'ar w to unrstan that a man knows oth a pi of knowlg an a pi of ignoran, an thn supposs that on of ths things h knows is th othr whih h also knows? Or os h know nithr, an thn jug that on of ths unknown things is th othr? Or os h know only on, an intify this known thing with th unknown on, or th unknown on with th known? Or ar you going to tll m that thr ar yt furthr pis of knowlg aout your pis of knowlg an ignoran, an that thir ownr kps ths shut up in yt anothr of your riiulous aviaris or waxn loks, knowing thm so long as h posssss thm, although h may not hav thm at han in his min? On that showing you will fin yourslvs prptually rivn roun in a irl an nvr gtting any furthr.' What ar w to rply to that, Thattus? Thattus: Rally, Sorats, I on't know what w ar to say. Sorats: May, my young frin, w hav srv this ruk, an th argumnt shows that w wr wrong to lav knowlg on on si an look first for an xplanation of fals jugmnt. That annot unrstoo until w hav a satisfatory aount of th natur of knowlg. 3 Prviously our grasp of th lmnts of knowlg was likn to a ag full of irs with th thinkr having to rah in an tak hol of on of th irs to ring any partiular lmnt into fous.

7 7 201a Thattus: As things now stan, Sorats, on annot avoi that onlusion. Sorats: To start all ovr again, thn: what is on to say that knowlg is? For surly w ar not going to giv up yt. Thattus: Not unlss you o so. Sorats: Thn tll m: what finition an w giv with th last risk of ontraiting ourslvs? Thattus: Th on w tri for, Sorats. I hav nothing ls to suggst. Sorats: What was that? Thattus: That tru lif is knowlg. Surly thr an at last no mistak in living what is tru an th onsquns ar always satisfatory. Sorats: Try, an you will s, Thattus, as th man sai whn h was ask if th rivr was too p to for. So hr, if w go forwar on our sarh, w may stuml upon somthing that will rval th thing w ar looking for. W shall mak nothing out, if w stay whr w ar. Thattus: Tru; lt us go forwar an s. Sorats: Wll, w n not go far to s this muh: you will fin a whol profssion to prov that tru lif is not knowlg. Thattus: How so? What profssion? Sorats: Th profssion of thos paragons of intllt known as orators an lawyrs. Thr you hav mn who us thir skill to prou onvition, not y instrution, ut y making popl liv whatvr thy want thm to liv. You an harly imagin tahrs so lvr as to al, in th short tim allow y th lok, to instrut thir harrs thoroughly in th tru fats of a as of rory or othr violn whih thos harrs ha not witnss. Thattus: No, I annot imagin that; ut thy an onvin thm. Sorats: An y onvining you man making thm liv somthing. Thattus: Of ours. Sorats: An whn a jury is rightly onvin of fats whih an known only y an y-witnss, thn, juging y harsay an apting a tru lif, thy ar juging without knowlg, although, if thy fin th right vrit, thir onvition is orrt? Thattus: Crtainly. Sorats: But if tru lif an knowlg wr th sam thing, th st of jurymn oul nvr hav a orrt lif without knowlg. It now appars that thy must iffrnt things. ***********

8 a "knowlg is tru lif with an xplanatory aount 4 " Sorats: Or shall w not onmn th thory yt? Prhaps th maning to givn to 'aount' is not this, ut th rmaining on of th thr, on of whih w sai must intn y anyon who fins knowlg as orrt lif togthr with an aount. Thattus: A goo rminr; thr is still on maning lft. Th first was what might all th imag of thought in spokn soun; an th on w hav just isuss was going all through th lmnts to arriv at th whol. What is th thir? Sorats: Th maning most popl woul giv: ing al to nam som mark y whih th thing on is ask aout iffrs from vrything ls. Thattus: Coul you giv m an xampl of suh an aount of a thing? Sorats: Tak th sun as an xampl. I ar say you will satisfi with th aount of it as th rightst of th havnly ois that go roun th arth. Thattus: Crtainly. Sorats: Lt m xplain th point of this xampl. It is to illustrat what w wr just saying: that if you gt hol of th iffrn istinguishing any givn thing from all othrs, thn, so som popl say, you will hav an 'aount' of it; whras, so long as you fix upon somthing ommon to othr things, your aount will mra all th things that shar it. Thattus: I unrstan. I agr that what you sri may fairly all an 'aount'. Sorats: An if, sis a right notion aout a thing, whatvr it may, you also grasp its iffrn from all othr things, you will hav arriv at knowlg of what, till thn, you ha only a notion of. Thattus: W o say that, rtainly. Sorats: Rally, Thattus, now I om to look at this statmnt at los quartrs, it is lik a sn-painting: I annot mak it out at all, though, so long as I kpt at a istan, thr sm to som sns in it. Thattus: What o you man? Why so? Sorats: I will xplain, if I an. Suppos I hav a orrt notion aout you; if I a to that th aount of you, thn, w ar to unrstan, I know you. Othrwis I hav only a notion. Thattus: Ys. Sorats: An 'aount' mans putting your iffrntnss into wors. Thattus: Ys. 4 Th wor hr translat as xplanatory aount is logos: this is a notoriously iffiult wor to fin a simpl English quivalnt ut ssntially what is ing suggst hr is that knowlg is a tru lif with a sris of logial trms strung togthr in orr to onstrut a supporting argumnt for that lif.

9 9 Sorats: So, at th tim whn I ha only a notion, my min i not grasp any of th points in whih you iffr from othrs? Thattus: Apparntly not. Sorats: Thn I must hav ha for my min on of thos ommon things whih long to anothr prson as muh as to you. Thattus: That follows. Sorats: But look hr! If that was so, how oul I possily having a notion of you rathr than of anyon ls? Suppos I was thinking: Thattus is on who is a man an has a nos an ys an a mouth an so forth, numrating vry part of th oy. Will thinking in that way rsult in my thinking of Thattus rathr than of Thoorus or, as thy say, of th man in th strt? Thattus: How shoul it? Sorats: Wll, now suppos I think not mrly of a man with a nos an ys, ut of on with a snu nos an prominnt ys, on mor shall I having a notion of you any mor than of myslf or anyon ls of that sription? Thattus: No. Sorats: In fat, thr will no notion of Thattus in my min, I suppos, until this partiular snunss has stamp an rgistr within m a ror istint from all th othr ass of snunss that I hav sn; an so with vry othr part of you. Thn, if I mt you tomorrow, that trait will rviv my mmory an giv m a orrt notion aout you. Thattus: Quit tru. Sorats: If that is so, th orrt notion of anything must itslf inlu th iffrntnss of that thing. Thattus: Evintly. Sorats: Thn what maning is lft for gtting hol of an 'aount' in aition to th orrt notion? If, on th on han, it mans aing th notion of how a thing iffrs from othr things, suh an injuntion is simply asur. Thattus: How so? Sorats: Whn w hav a orrt notion of th way in whih rtain things iffr from othr things, it tlls us to a a orrt notion of th way in whih thy iffr from othr things. On this showing, th most viious of irls woul nothing to this injuntion. It might ttr srv to all th sort of irtion a lin man might giv: to tll us to gt hol of somthing w alray hav, in orr to gt to know somthing w ar alray thinking of, suggsts a stat of th most asolut arknss. Thattus: Whras, if...? Th supposition you ma just now impli that you woul stat som altrnativ; what was it?

10 10 210a Sorats: If th irtion to a an 'aount' mans that w ar to gt to know th iffrntnss, as oppos to mrly having a notion of it, this most amiral of all finitions of knowlg will a prtty usinss; aus 'gtting to know' mans aquiring knowlg, osn't it? Thattus: Ys. Sorats: So, apparntly, to th qustion, What is knowlg? our finition will rply: 'Corrt lif togthr with knowlg of a iffrntnss'; for, aoring to it, 'aing an aount' will om to that. Thattus: So it sms. Sorats: Ys; an whn w ar inquiring aftr th natur of knowlg, nothing oul sillir than to say that it is orrt lif togthr with a knowlg of iffrntnss or of anything whatvr. So, Thattus, nithr prption, nor tru lif, nor th aition of an 'aount' to tru lif an knowlg. Thattus: Apparntly not.