UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. Brussels .-. ~.. '-., October 23, """"...,.-r... ~ ,~~..,.:?

Transcription

1 UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE Dar Josph: R E NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Brussls.-. ~., ri ~.. '-., Octobr 23, """"...,.-r... ~ p.c :.... ",i.j. J,~~..,.:? N0j L 0 l~, ~ Attachd is a copy of th spaking nots on r P. A. Sub - Rgistry (D D,) ~.,o.a. Â1J- oa,~\ poland that l usd at th Council mting Octobr 22 l am also snding copis df th spaking nots to my collagus for thir information. Attachmnt as statd Yours vry sincrly, far w. Taply Bnntt, Jr. Ambassador His Excllncy Josph M.A.H. Luns Scrtary Gnral North Atlantic Traty Organization Brussls This documnt consists of 8 pags. USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/ CyR _._, Documnt NOT to b rmovd from fil.

2 POLAND 1. Th polish domstic, political and conomic situation has bn in an unsttld stat for narly four months; whil th Kania ladrship still has tim to grappl with th multipl challngs facing it, Noscow and poland's othr Warsaw Pact Allis show signs of growing alarm ovr th fact that, dspit th strik sttlmnts, th numbr two country in th "Socialist Commonwalth" is in for a long priod of turmoil with no solution in sight. Consquntly, Warsaw's Allis, spcially th mor orthodox ons, ar bcoming lss rticnt in vnting thir frustration and constrnation ovr th impact of poland's prolongd crisis. 2. Asid from th frmnt swping th country and affcting virtually vry constituncy, what is particularly disturbing to Warsaw's Allis is th fact that th Polish party, whil not sparhading a procss of runaway libralization, is itslf dividd at th top and dmoralizd at th rank-and-fil lv1, rndring it lss abl to lad th country out of its prdicamnt. Thus, whil prssur from blow for changs chips away th alrady frayd party authority, significant factions within~ th party ar pushing for major conomic rforms and for injcting pluralist idas into th party as th inscapabl pri for rgaining public confidnc. 3. Kania himslf sms caught in th middl. H njoyd sorn succss at th Sixth Party Plnum (Oct. 4-6) in wding out discrditd figurs from th prvious rgim without bowing to rformist clamor for a hast y and prmatur schduling

3 -2- of an xtraordinary party congrss. Kania also sms to hav gaind additional tim to consolidat his position. Nvrth lss, it rmains to b sn whthr h will b abl to com up with a program for daling with th country's conomic wos in th fac of consrvativ opposition and continuing inflationary dmands of th workrs. 4. Th Indpndnt Trad Union movmnt poss by far th most difficult dilmma. It is a fact of lif, but its rgistration at th Warsaw Court has thus far foundrd on objctions involving such issus as th nd to includ in its chartr a dclaration of xplicit loyalty to party suprmacy, and whthr it should function rgionally or nationwid. Manwhil, th Official Cntral Council of Trad Unions has bcom a mr shadow of its formr slf as th rgim apparntly prpars th way for a nw umbrlla organization that would includ ail th old-styl "Indpndnt Autonomous' Trad Unions" as wil as th"solidarity" Fdration. 5. In our viw, th currnt Sovit approach to th Polish situation rflcts political, conomic, and military concrns: --Moscow's most obvious concrn is that th unchckd growth of political pluralism in Poland could lad to loss of ffctiv communist party control in Poland and ndangr th

4 -3- cohsion of th Warsaw Pact Allianc; --Nvrthlss, Moscow rcognizs th nd to hlp its ally ovrcom th dpning conomic crisis which ld to th labor unrst in th first plac; --Moscow is furthr concrnd that th continuing confrontation btwn party and govrnmnt and th workrs in Poland may produc srious xtrnal rprcussions: infction of workrs in othr Eastrn Europan countris with similar aspirations; incrasd friction within,~" and among communist partis in Wstrn Europ; and th possibility that unrst within th Sovit bloc will undrcut Sovit propaganda fforts on such issus as th TNP, d tnt in Europ, and th activitis of "U.S. imprialism," particularly in th Middl East. --In addition, th USSR may wil far th long-trm drain of Sovit and Eastrn Europan conomic rsourcs to aid Poland. 6. W hav, at bst, only sktchy information on how th Sovits ar approaching th crisis. Thr ar unconfirmd rports of rgular Sovit contact with th polish authoritis through party and diplomati channls. Othr than th fact that th Sovits rfus to accpt th ida of indpndnt trad unions, li ttl is known o"f th substanc of th con tacts. Ananlysis of th Sovit Mdia Suggsts: --Moscow supports th Kania rgim, but on th xpctation that it will rstor ordr in Poland with no srious NATO SECRET

5 -4- damag to party rul. (Pravda's unusual publication on Octobr 2 of th full txt of Kania's mssag of thanks to Brzhnv appard intndd to rmind th Polish rgim that it had pldgd falty to th Socialist ordr and to conomic and military allianc with th Sovit Union). --Th ida that th xistnc of Indpndnt Trad Unions in unaccptabl to Moscow on both political and conomic grounds, first surfacd in a Sptmbr 25 "book rviw" in Pravda, and has now bcom th foctis-o~ a major propaganda ffort in Sovit trad union organs and by Sovit-controlld or influncd for~gn unions. 7. W s no indications of larg scal mobilization, combat prparations, or dploymnts by Sovit forcs in aras nar Poland such as would b xpctd if Moscow wr planning a military intrvntion. It is our stimat that in an intrvntion, th Sovits would us at last thirty divisions, and prhaps 45 or mor if thy anticipatd that th Polish army of 15 divisions would rsist. A lssr numbr of divisions could b usd if th Polish govrnmnt, with snior military approval, invitd th Sovits to assist in controlling ~h country. Thr has bn a sigificant lvl of fild training of Sovit forcs in East Grmany and th wstrn USSR, not unusual this tim of yar, which puts th ground and air forcs in a bttr postur to tak military action. Troop rotation has startd in East Grmany, which mans that conscripts will b ntring th divisions. Nvrthlss, th

6 -5- intgrity of svral rgimnts within: ach division will probably b maintaind, so that th troop rotation' is not xpctd to ls sn th ffctivnss of th Sovit postur vis-a-vis Poland. W bliv th Sovit military rmain concrnd about th polish situation and ar maintaining a ncssary lvl of radinss in cas Moscow should dcid to tak military action. 8. W hav lookd carfully at a numbr of othr rcnt :-. dvlopmnts on th Eastrn Europan scn which hav hightnd gnral concrn about Sovit intntions with rgard to Poland. Ths hav includd intr alia th GDR's sharphiks in mandatory currncy xchang lvls, th cancllation of Causscu's visit to Canada, Husak's spch last wk to th Czchoslovak Cntral Committ attaching th Wst for trying to upst th unit Y of th socialist community, and most rcntly Honckr's Octobr 13 spch in which, xtmporanously or not, h said that "w and our frinds would mak sur that Pol and stayd firmly in th socialist camp". At th sam tim Poland's Warsaw Pact nighbors ar coming up with sorn conomic assistanc for poland which thy can ill afford thmslvs. 9. In our viw, th Eastrn Europans' pèlicis ar procding along thr paralll tracks. On th on hand thy hav a strong intrst in sing Kania succd in rstablishing th rol of th Polish party, thus forstalling Sovit intrvntion and limiting th dangr to thir own partis' positions. Thy

7 -6- ar prpard to contribut scarc rsourcs to that nd. At th sam tim thy want to mak it clar to thir own popl- and to th Polish ladrship--that thy will not tolrat any - slackning of th party's grip at hom. This xplains th tough propaganda lin which would portray. vnts in poland as th rsult of wstrn intrvntion and "anti-socialist" dissidnt lmnts in th socity. On a third lvl thy want to tak othr prvntiv masurs to avoid workr discontnt, which could grow ovr tim in th fac of th conomic squz ail fac in th months and yars ahad. This lads to cosmtic attntion to th Trad Union Movmnt and to fforts to improv conomic prformanc in thir own country without lssning th party's grip. 10. As usual, ths various tndncis tak diffrnt forms in diffrnt EE countris, with th GDR running th most scard and dmonstrating a willingnss to risk losing important conomic bnfits in ordr to put a lid on contacts with th FRG and th Wst in gnral. N s no sign as od: yt of an across-th-board Eastrn Europan ffort to draw back from ngagmnt with th Wst, but would xpct ths contacts to procd against a background of domstic vigilanc campaigns dirctd against th Wst. Il. It is a.lso possibl that Eastrn Europan countris rat th. possibility of Sovit intrvntion as high, and that th stps thy ar taking ar dsignd to prpar for this vntuality whil asing Sovit concrns about th scurity

8 .". q -7- of th rst of its domain. Indd, ail of th actions w hav notd ar consistnt with this intrprtation. 12. As is usually th cas, th missing lmnt in th intllignc pictur is any hard information on Sovit intntions. W do not bliv that Moscow would intrvn undr currnt circurnstancs. Howvr, if th situation continus to d triorat and if th party sms to b losing its grip, w bliv th Sovits would snd troops in rgardlss of th consquncs to thir othr domstic and forign policis. 13. W bliv it is xtrmly important to kp in clos touch with our allis and frinds on this subjct in th coming wks and to'shar information and stimats concrning th situation in Poland and Eastrn Europ.