On the Interaction Between Fear and Hatred

Transcription

1 Economics of Secuity Woking Pape Seies On the Inteaction Between Fea and Hated Apil 2009 Economics of Secuity Woking Pape 10 This publication is an output of EUSECON, a eseach poject suppoted by the Euopean Commission s Seventh Famewok Pogamme. Economics of Secuity is an initiative managed by DIW Belin

2 Economics of Secuity Woking Pape Seies The Economics of Secuity Woking Pape Seies combines outputs of Euopean Secuity Economics (EUSECON), a eseach poject suppoted by the Euopean Commission s Seventh Famewok Pogamme, with outputs of the Netwok fo the Economic Analysis of Teoism (NEAT), which is funded by the Euopean Commission s Diectoate eneal fo Justice, Feedom, and Secuity. Papes not funded by EUSECON o by NEAT can still be submitted fo inclusion in this Woking Pape Seies. Coect citation: Mushed, S. M. (2009). On the Inteaction Between Fea and Hated. Economics of Secuity Woking Pape 10, Belin: Economics of Secuity. Fist published in ISSN: Fo futhe infomation, please contact: Economics of Secuity, c/o Depatment of Intenational Economics, eman Institute fo Economic eseach (DIW Belin), Mohenst. 58, Belin, emany. Tel: +49 (0) eusecon@diw.de Website: Economics of Secuity is an initiative managed by DIW Belin

3 ON THE INTEACTION BETWEEN FEA AND HATED * Institute of Social Studies (ISS) PO Box LT The Hague, The Nethelands The Bimingham Business School Univesity of Bimingham Edgbaston, Bimingham B15 2TT, UK. Cente fo the Study of Civil Wa (CSCW) PIO, Oslo, Noway Mushed@iss.nl ABSTACT This pape models conflictual inteaction between a Euopean state and a domestic dissident immigant minoity goup, Muslims say, some of whom may esot to acts of teoism. Hee, identity is cucial and povides the mico-foundations of dissident behaviou by solving the collective action poblem; howeve, complex multiple identities ae possible. Militancy o hated of the West aises both because of the economic and social disadvantage expeienced by Muslims o hoizontal inequalities, as well as histoical gievances and contempoay foeign policy actions that disciminate against the Muslim wold. The fea of visible Muslim minoities among the Euopean host population may be a poduct of stident popaganda emanating fom cetain segments of Westen society. The innovation of the pape lies in modelling the inteaction between fea and hated. Excessive deteence against dangeous minoity goups may backfie, compaed to moe accommodative policies. Space needs to be ceated so that Muslim migants ae able to mege thei pesonal identities within thei adopted Euopean homelands. Also, the economic disadvantage expeienced by Muslims needs edessing. Keywods: Euopean Secuity, Conflict, Teoism JEL Classification Numbes: C72, D74, D81, H11. * The comments of paticipants at the CED Wokshop on Conflicts and Development, Univesity of Namu (Belgium), 5-6 th Mach 2009 ae acknowledged. My thanks also go to Aame Abdullah Syed fo eseach assistance, and the EU famewok 6 eseach poject (EUSECON) fo financial suppot.

4 1 INTODUCTION This pape pesents a model of conflict between a Euopean state and a domestic dissident immigant minoity goup, such as Muslims. Identity plays a majo pat in this, and Akelof and Kanton (2000) suggest that individuals obtain utility fom thei identity and by making themselves, as well as othes in thei goup, behave in confomity with goup noms. But it also has to be bone in mind that individuals often have multiple identities, as emphasised by Sen (2008). It is possible, theefoe, to be both Muslim and Euopean and believe in most values that chaacteise Westen humanism. The dislike of esident Muslim minoity goups amongst the majoity is not only pedicated upon eal danges of potential violence fom cetain Muslim goups, but is also a poduct of advese popaganda about them, some of which may be only patially tue. laese (2005) models the poduction of this phenomenon as an outcome of epetitive advese popaganda, which esults in distust, dislike and in this instance is something that can be labelled Islamophobia. In what follows I define this as fea. Segments of the minoity goup (fundamentalists) may feel hated fo the West. This hate is a esult of pesent-day socio-economic injustices against them in the Euopean counties, as well as histoical injustices and contempoay foeign policy actions. Dislike of the West manifests itself in a spectum of activities anging fom innocuous actions such as the expession of disageement, to making statements of diffeence via the adoption of dess codes (the weaing of the hijab o head scaf, fo example) which to some Westenes is an offensive ejection of Westen values (and a theat to Westen civilization), to acts of vandalism, such as the iots (looting, ca buning) in the sububs of Pais, and finally to the moe violent teoist actions such as the Madid tain bombings of Mach 2004, o the London bombings of July The inteaction between this fea of Muslims and Muslim hated fo the West may sometimes only poduce a disageeable atmosphee, but at othe times it can esult in fatal conflict. What tansfoms this latent dange into violence and teoism? Thee can be two explanations fo this. One is the inevitable clash of civilizations, as outlined by Huntington (1996)? Muslim acts of defiance may be a poduct of thei deep sense of histoic and pesent-day humiliation, as pointed out by Lindne (2001). These include histoical acts such as the wholesale expulsion of Muslims fom Spain (in the 16 th and 17 th centuies) and fom Sicily (14 th centuy), as well as events in the 20 th centuy in the Middle East, whee the Anglo-Fench Sykes-Picot pact 1 (duing the Fist Wold Wa) esulted in an unfai disposition of the fome Ottoman teitoies. Late, the emegence of what many egad as a colonial settle state, Isael 2, and the West s lack of even handed behaviou towads the potagonists in the Aab-Isaeli conflict spawned deep esentment. This is often blamed on Westen double standads towads the plight of Muslims compaed to othes. Othe peceived aeas of Muslim disadvantage in the ecent past include the unfai pationing of undivided India leading to the Kashmi poblem. Some Westen wites, such as Lewis (2003), also depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pide about thei histoical decline, with some filled with a viulent hated fo the West. 1 The novelist Athu Koestle descibed the Balfou declaation in 1917 pemitting a Jewish state in Palestine as an act whee "one nation solemnly pomised to a second nation the county of a thid." 2 An expession employed by the Fench wite, Maxime odinson. 2

5 The poblem with cultualist views is that it teats cultue as monolithic, and individual identity as a singula phenomenon, ignoing the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable to be simultaneously a Muslim, a Euopean citizen, a believe in democacy, as well as someone who espects diffeence and human ights. Contempoay acism is diven moe by dislike of a cultual identity such as Islam, athe than discedited notions about ace and colou, as in the past. acist messages that beed fea of minoities like Muslims can emanate fom attention seeking politicians, who campaign on a single issue that scapegoat a paticula goup fo all of society s ills (cime, unemployment and so on). Thei ability to influence policy ests with thei nuisance value as potential coalition patnes and attactiveness to a class of votes, which is geate in smalle Euopean states with electoal systems that have full popotional epesentation. In othe counties (such as Fance) they have geate influence in local politics. Accoding to suveys 3, negative peceptions about Muslims among non- Muslims have gown in Euope: in % in Spain, 50% in emany, 38% in Fance and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims, consideing them a theat to Westen civilization. Thus, in some Euopean nations it may be elatively less politically incoect to openly cast unqualified aspesions on Muslim pactices and Islam. 4 The same suvey indicates gowth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigants in Euope. It is widely believed that Islam is an intoleant and violent eligion, with its saced texts full of inflammatoy statements about its foes. Unfotunately, these notions ae based on selective and limited intepetation. What is much less well known is the toleant face of Islam, fo example the fact that the Islamic eligion, though its sciptue, the Quan, actually celebates acial divesity 5 and equies believes to acknowledge the authoity of ealie Abahamic Pophets. 6 Some of the sayings of the Pophet Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, duing Islam s ealiest phase ae testimony towads inclusiveness of acial goups and Muslim and non-muslim alike. 7 Histoically, Muslim ules in Aab Spain and the Ottoman Empie, fo In the UK, fo example, the viulently anti-muslim Dutch politician eet Wildes was pevented fom showing his anti-islam film in the Bitish House of Lods in Febuay 2009 on the gounds that it might incite acial hated; by contast, his populaity is said to be on the ise in his native Nethelands. 5 O mankind! Lo! We have ceated you male and female, and have made you nations and tibes that ye may know one anothe. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Quan: Anothe vese says: And of His signs is the ceation of the heavens and the eath, and the diffeence of you languages and colous. Quan: English tanslations of the Quan fom Mamaduke Pickthall s, The loious Quan, 6 Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is evealed unto us and that which was evealed unto Abaham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tibes, and that which was vouchsafed unto Moses and Jesus and the pophets fom thei Lod. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have suendeed. Quan: Conside an except fom Muhammad s Last Semon (cica 632 AD): O people, emembe that you Lod is One. An Aab has no supeioity ove a non-aab, no a non-aab supeioity ove an Aab; also a black peson has no supeioity ove a white peson, no a white peson any supeioity ove a black peson, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best among you is the one with the best chaacte. Listen to me. Did I convey this to you popely? People esponded, Yes. O messenge of od. The Pophet then said, each one of you who is thee must convey this to eveyone not pesent. Ali, the 4th Islamic Caliph, also the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad in a lette to Malik-e-Ashta, his goveno designate to Egypt (cica AD): "emembe, Malik, that amongst you subjects 3

6 example, showed geate toleance fo non-muslims than thei Euopean countepats did fo non-chistians, even Chistians of othe denominations. The impotant point is that a devout o pacticing Muslim must eschew acism in all foms, and should not hate Judeo-Chistian civilization and eject univesal values of toleation; athe the dislike of the West could emanate fom injustices pepetated theeof. Thus, the altenative explanation fo disguntled Muslim behaviou in Euope may lie in wide socio-economic disadvantage. Stewat (2008) has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim goups face in Euopean counties and woldwide (Muslims ae a fifth o moe of humanity). These ange fom economic discimination in tems of jobs and lowe incomes, to unde epesentation in public life. This phenomenon may be descibed as the hoizontal inequalities that Muslims suffe fom in contempoay Euope. Hoizontal inequality is goup-based inequality, athe than the inequality in an othewise cultually o ethnically homogenous society; see Stewat (2000) on this. Muslim citizens in Euope ae systematically pooe, suffe fom geate unemployment and ae less than popotionately epesented in public life (Stewat, 2008), in addition to the oppobium thei cultual identity attacts. Thus, some of the moe exteme foms of teoism and even othe non-violent acts, which make a statement of diffeence with the majoity community such as the weaing of hijabs, may have as thei oot cause, both the collective sense of injuy caused by the suffeings of Muslims globally (such as in Palestine, Iaq o Afghanistan), as well as the moe palpable economic, political and social discimination felt within the Euopean states that they eside in. In what follows I pesent a model of a clash between a Euopean state and a domestic dissident goup, who, on occasion, esot to acts of teoism. Hee, identity is cucial to the putative teoist; following Akelof and Kanton (2000) individuals deive utility fom thei identity, identity based actions and the elative social standing of thei goup. This povides the mico-foundations of dissident goup behaviou by solving the collective action poblem. Following Sen (2008) individuals ae allowed multiple (complex) identities; they may not always act in confomity with thei pimay identity. This is an innovation of the pape, going beyond Akelof and Kanton (2008). Hated fo the West emanates both fom hoizontal inequality poducing economic factos such as povety and geate unemployment, as well as exclusion (o less inclusion) in domestic political pocesses, and cultual factos such as Westen foeign policies in the Middle East and elsewhee. Thus, as Sen (2008) suggests, potentially violence poducing hate is a poduct of both economic and cultual factos. Anothe innovation of the pape is the combination of the hate felt by Muslim fundamentalists with the fea felt by those with stong Islamophobic tendencies. This fea can be said to be the esult, in pat, of fea poducing messages about the danges posed by Muslims that ae at least patially untue (laese, 2005). thee ae two kinds of people: those who have the same eligion as you have; they ae bothes to you, and those who have eligions othe than that of yous, they ae human beings like you. Men of eithe categoy suffe fom the same weaknesses and disabilities that human beings ae inclined to, they commit sins, indulge in vices eithe intentionally o foolishly and unintentionally without ealizing the enomity of thei deeds. Let you mecy and compassion come to thei escue and help in the same way and to the same extent that you expect Allah to show mecy and fogiveness to you." (Nahjul Balagha) 4

7 2 FEA AND HATED 2.1 ovenment (): The utility of the state o the majoity goup is given by: P C = π ( a, e) + (1 π )( ) C( a) (1) whee: P C = Y = Y T ( A) a = F ( A, µ ) + A whee A = pf + A whee A = cf c > p > 0, c + p = 1, π a, e > 0. ( A, µ ) T ( A) ( A, µ ) T ( A) (2) The supescipts P and C efe to states which ae moe peaceful and confontative, espectively. P and C coespond to budget constaints in the two states. Fo the govenment 8, utility is deived fom two public goods: geneal consumption (Y ) and secuity expenditue (A). The latte can be used in two ways: a component (F ) devoted to suppessing dissidents (via policing, suveillance and the pohibition of cetain pactices), and anothe element T, which is a tansfe to the dissident goup, which seves to assuage thei gievances. The tansfe can mean seveal things: inceased (boad-based) public expenditue, geate inclusion in public secto jobs, political epesentation and voice in the decision making pocess. eneally speaking, it is the pecuniay value of including the excluded. Obseve that thee is a tade-off between suppession (stick) and tansfes (caot). Note that stategies fo both govenment (a) and dissidents (e) ae in tems of peaceful behaviou, which is the invese of conflict, so a, e aise the pobability of peace, π. C efes to the cost of undetaking a by the state, C a > 0. These costs consist of pecuniay and non-pecuniay elements; the fist because of the cost of distotionay taxation to finance secuity, the latte because accommodating dissidents entails a political cost by alienating those opposed to the policies adopted. Violent acts occu in the confontative state, and the Nash equilibium to the game between the two sides occus along a continuum of peaceful actions by both sides. Equilibia with low levels of peace chosen by both sides ae confontative, enhancing the isk of ioting and teoism by the dissidents. The paamete µ epesents policies adopted by the govenment side towads cetain minoity goups, such as adical Muslims. A highe µ implies a moe confontative majoity that is less inclusive towads cetain minoities and moe esolved to combat thei dissidence, so in a way it is simila to militay efficiency (foce multiplie) modelled in Hishleife (1995). Its oigins ae, howeve, diffeent, because it is a esult of fictional o exaggeated hate poducing messages in the media, fed in by some politicians (laese, 2005). 8 Equation (1) epesents the pefeences of a median vote, o the outcome of a policy compomise. 5

8 Futhemoe, µ measues the sum of the signal sent to individuals in Euopean society egading the potential damage that could be inflicted by Muslim migants living in thei midst; it also incopoates pesonal costs of damage limitation (avoiding contacts with Muslims at wok and by moving to othe neighbouhoods). 9 Let us say this signal is sent out by a politician, whose cedibility is in doubt because he may be delibeately sending out a false hate message as a cheap way of advancing his own populaity. Its attactiveness to the public will depend on thei need fo scapegoats and thei own pesonal life expeiences of these minoity goups. Not all these signals will be believed: fo example, some hate mongeing politicians may be mistusted, the bette educated among the public may discount pat of the message and othes with geate knowledge of the minoities based upon pesonal inteaction may similaly disegad this signal. 10 Thee is a cost (z) to membes of the public of veifying the veacity of the signal though a seach pocess. Let φ be the pobability that the politician is sending out a false message and the Muslim goup in question is lagely is innocent; 1 φ is the pobability that they ae not, and will theefoe impose a net cost µ. An individual s Bayesian pio fo this is detemined in the following manne: ϕ ϕ + ( 1 ϕ) µ (3) The pio may be updated subject to the afoementioned seach cost z, and othe exogenous events like iots and acts of teoism (close to home) pepetated by Muslims The public is composed of two types: a high cost type (indexed by subscipt h) who both suffe moe potential damage (µ) and also have highe seach costs (z); and, a low cost type (subscipt l) who will suffe less fom Muslims and have lowe seach costs of finding out the tuth. The fome may include the less educated, the moe socio-economically disadvantaged, those who would like to find close to home scapegoats fo the isk of unemployment that the globalization of poduction bings, othes who wish to find a simple explanation fo the ise of cime, as well as those with an expeience of negative inteactions with Muslims. In geneal: V = y µ ( z)(1 ϕ) z( i) i = h, l i hz i µ (1 ϕ) > z i h and µ lz (1 ϕ) < zl Whee V epesents expected utility and y income of individuals of i = h,l types. Maximization of this expected utility with espect to seach (z) leads to the conditions descibed in the second and thid lines of (4) espectively. The high cost type of individual suffes both a geate loss fom Muslim dissidents (µ h ) and has a highe cost of veification of the signal (z h ). This is all the moe so, if the seach costs of veifying the signal entail a lumpy fixed cost. These individuals ae moe likely to abandon the costly seach fo tuth in favou of the hate message. Not only that, but they will clamou fo public action against the object of thei phobia. Even the low cost type individual (who will engage in the seach fo tuth) may at cetain times andomise the pobability of φ aound 0 o 1, if say equilibium φ 1/2 in (3), when 9 Despite a seeming similaity, the analysis hee diffes fom the taditional economics of discimination liteatue (Becke, 1971). 10 The PEW wold suveys indicate that dislike of Muslims in Euope is geate among the olde and less educated segments of the population; 6 (4)

9 the seach pocess itself is flawed (involving leaning ove multiple peiods, say). Also, afte majo iots involving (male) Muslim youths and teoist attacks like the London bombings, all individuals fom the majoity community may set φ to zeo fo a cetain time, effectively taing all Muslims with the same (teoist) bush. If enough citizens o votes believe the signal then public action will be called fo, and Islamophobia o fea of Muslims acquies the natue of a public good. Note that µ i = µ in equations (1) and (2). The state will be compelled to act at the taxpayes i expense (C), but some individuals within the govenment machiney may have esevations about totally suendeing to Islamophobia. It is instuctive, theefoe, to examine the govenment s stategic vaiable. Totally diffeentiating, a, the govenment s stategic choice vaiable in (2): TA T ( ) T ( ) da = da dµ 2 2 F F (5) A F µ All the patial deivatives in (5) ae positive. The secuity budget (A) can be utilised eithe to incease tansfes to the dissidents o fight them. Theein lies a tade-off; thus the tem in squae backets in (5) is ambiguous in sign. The second tem on the ighthand side of (5) is negative, because a ise in the confontativeness of the state o majoity (µ) causes it to be less peaceful. Fo a cetain type of govenment, the fist tem is positive; it pefes peace. 11 I utilise this taxonomy, because thee may be diffeent expenditue effects following an incease in the secuity budget depending on the type of govenment in diffeent counties (o even the same govenment at diffeent time peiods). The govenment side maximizes (1) with espect to a: P C π a[ (.) (.)] = Ca (6) Essentially, this means that the govenment equates the maginal utility of its stategic action (a) on the left-hand side of (6) to its maginal cost on the ight-hand side. 2.2 Dissident Minoities (): We need to distinguish between individual motivation to behave in accodance with a dissident goup, and the alienated goup dynamics leading to a clash with the state. As fa as individuals ae concened, following Akelof and Kanton (2000), I postulate that individuals diectly obtain utility fom thei identity, and the behaviou demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, an individual membe () of a potential minoity goup (say, Muslims in Euope) deives utility (U ) fom identity elated 11 ood examples could be given by contasting the pesent Spanish and Danish govenments. The latte s (o some of its coalition patnes) negative attitudes and explicit policies towads Muslims is well known; see By contast the Spanish govenment led by Pime Ministe Zapateo is fa moe conciliatoy towads Muslims, including illegal Muslim migants, and Zapateo called fo an intenational alliance of civilizations; see 7

10 actions in the following manne (othe aguments of the utility function such as consumption ae ignoed): U I = U ( s, s, I ) + U ( k ) j whee s = I ( s, s j j, θ ) o (7) Hee the paamete s efes to self-identity o pincipal identity based actions, and utility (U o ) fom othe identity based actions, k. These two ente individual utility in an additive and sepaable fashion. An individual, theefoe, is allowed to have a complex multiple identity (Sen, 2008), and coesponding to these ae additive sepaable actions o inputs into his utility function, which is an innovation of the model. The individual not only deives utility fom a vecto of his own actions (s ), but also simila actions of othe like-minded individuals belonging to his goup (s j ), and above all his own identity o self image (I ), which in tun depends on the actions (s, s j ) just descibed, as well as the invese of the goup s social standing, θ. As indicated ealie, this depends both on the goup s peceived economic hoizontal inequalities, and othe factos such as the West s foeign policy towads the Muslim wold. As defined, the highe is θ, the lowe is the goup s social standing, which as indicated ealie may be wose in some Euopean counties (Denmak, Nethelands) than othes (the UK). Thus an incease in θ is a eduction of social standing, but it will enhance utility fom own-identity based actions. It could be agued, howeve, that low social standing may encouage individuals to abandon thei pimay identity in favou of othe moe appoved of identities. Following Akelof and Kanton (2000), it is possible to show that many such individuals may be deteed fom this couse of action by thei pees, even if injuy to thei goup sense of self-esteem is insufficient to make them act in accodance with thei pimay identity. The budget constaint descibing input o actions to individual utility takes on the following fom (whee S efes to the total endowment of possible actions): S s ( µ, θ ) + ko (8) It is postulated that the attactiveness of inputs into own-identity type behaviou (s ) ises with µ and θ; an incease in both can be descibed as a fall in the elative pice of own-identity based actions elative to othe-identity based actions (k ). 12 Following Akelof and Kanton (2000) it is also possible to show that individuals deive disutility fom the non-confomity of othe goup membes, who do not act o behave in an appopiate manne; see also ates (2002) on ebel ecuitment and etention. Secondly, if the costs of so-doing ae sufficiently low compaed to the pain inflicted on eant membes, individuals of a goup will exet effot to bing back membes who have stayed fom ideal goup behaviou back to the fold, as analysed by Akelof and Kanton (2005). Such behaviou can also be said to descibe the stategies adopted by conflict entepeneus amongst Muslim minoity goups who ae bent on confontation. If anothe goup membe (j) suffes disutility (I j ) fom othe- 12 These could include actions which confom moe to the spiit of the law of the land, and othe actions that might be consideed by some to be at vaiance with the individual s pincipal identity. 8

11 identity based behaviou (k ) by peson, who is also close to him, they may lue the eant individual back to the fold povided that the cost of doing so to themselves (c j ) is not too lage and is less than the loss inflicted (l ) on the deviant goup membe. Typically, emonstating with someone who has made a conscious decision to act diffeently is not without pain to eithe emonstant o eant: c < I < l (9) j j The condition above is moe likely to hold amongst poo but cultually homogenous communities suffeing fom widespead unemployment, and who live poximately to each othe in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in many metopolitan locations thoughout Euope whee Muslim families elated to each othe live cheek by jowl in sub-standad housing). This is also typical of the hoizontal inequalities faced by many Muslim goups in Euope. Moeove, the dissident goup may use the behaviou denoted in (9) to solve the collective action poblem, as descibed by Olson (1965). Thus, goup gievances become individual gievances, and individuals act upon thei goup gievances. This, at the exteme, can include teoist acts, which ae acts of solidaity with the cause as descibed by Wintobe (2002). An act of solidaity is an all o nothing choice (cone solution) between individual autonomy and solidaity with the goup s cause. 13 Dissident goup behaviou is aived at afte summing the choices egading s fom individual utility maximization descibed in (7) above subject to individual constaints in (8): n s = 1 (10) Fo collective action to take place via the adoption of the goup stategy (e) 14, a citical theshold of aggegate own-identity based actions, s, must be chosen. This equies high enough values of µ and θ; condition (9) must also hold, it should not be too costly to dete non-own-identity based actions by individuals except that at high enough values of µ and θ condition (9) becomes moe elaxed, as moe self-enfocing own-identity based behaviou takes place via (8). The dissident goup, objective o utility function,, takes the following fom: P C = π ( a, e) + (1 π )( ) E( e) (11) whee: P C = T ( A) + pf = T ( A) + cf T ( A) e = F ( µ, θ ) ( µ, θ ) ( µ, θ ); F θ, F µ > 0 (12) 13 In Wintobe (2002), individual indiffeence cuves epesenting the tade-off between autonomy and solidaity ae concave, with cone solutions; small shifts in the budget line as a esult of moe containing policies by the state do not shift this all o nothing equilibium choice of exteme solidaity with the cause. 14 Not all goup actions ae violent; an incease in e indicates moe peaceful behaviou, the isk of violence inceases with declining e. 9

12 P and C descibe dissident goup endowments fo collective action, which can involve absobing the tansfe (T) o fighting (F ) the state. This choice suounds e (effot with egad to peace with the state); E descibes the aggegate cost function fo undetaking e, composed of psychic costs of capitulation to the state o the total losses and costs of inducing own-identity based behaviou in (9), with E e > 0. F epesents diect action against the state. As aleady indicated, θ denotes the alienated goup s histoical hateds and the lack of contempoay social standing based also on economic hoizontal inequalities. Diffeentiating the dissident goup s stategic vaiable (e) in (12) we find: TA T ( ) T ( ) de = da dθ dµ (13) 2 2 F (, θ ) F F µ θ µ The fist tem on the ight-hand side of (13) is positive, e ises with T, but falls with θ and µ. In othe wods, tansfes fom the state aise peaceful behaviou; economic disadvantage, a loss in social standing and govenment posciption inceases adicalization o deceases peaceful behaviou by the dissidents towads the state. The disguntled goup will maximise (11) with espect to e: P C [ (.) (.)] = E e π e (14) Thus, they equate the maginal benefit of its action (e) to its maginal cost. 2.4 eaction functions In ode to analyse vaiations in paametes we fist need to obtain a set of eaction functions in (a, e) space to captue govenment-dissident inteaction. Equations (6) and (14) fom the basis of the eaction functions fo the govenment and the dissidents, obtained by totally diffeentiating them with espect to a and e. Thus: C P aa [ ( ) ( ) ] P C [ ( ) ( ) ] de Caa + π = 0if π ae 0 da / π ae (15) and P C de π ae[ ( ) ( ) ] = 0if π 0 C P ae da / E + π ( ) ( ) ee ee [ ] (16) Note that π ae = π ea by symmety. Also even though π a, π e >0, π aa, π ee < 0, meaning thee ae diminishing etuns to peaceful behaviou. C aa, E ee > 0, P > C, P > C. We assume that the two stategies ae complements, π ae> 0. In othe wods moe peaceful action by one side leads to the same by the othe. The eaction functions will be positively sloped in Figue An incease in govenment militancy (a ise in µ): 10

13 An incease in govenment militancy (a ise in µ) may esult fom an incease in the vote bank of populist political paties that ae moe confontative, as the esult of an incease in the supply of epetitive hate-ceating stoies by politicians (laese, 2005) culminating in heavy handed policies such as laws banning head scaves, tighte immigation ules fom cetain counties, as well as a whole host of involuntay integationist policies. In Figue 1 the eaction function of the govenment 1 shifts leftwads to 2, as thee is less incentive to be peaceful (a) fo each level of e, see equations (1)-(5). A simila line of easoning applies to the dissidents, (equations (7)- (9)), and thei eaction functions shift down fom 1 to 2. The new equilibium will have shifted fom A to point B in Figue 1 with a decline in both a and e, peaceful behaviou by both sides to this quael, but a geate decline in a elative to e. The dissident goup s stock of collective action, given fom (7)-(9), has inceased because the pivate elative pice and maginal cost of own-identity based actions has fallen, and these ae now moe attactive. e Figue 1: Stategic Inteaction Between the ovenment and Dissidents A 2 B C 2.6 A ise in adicalization o the Intinsic Motivation to Fight the State (θ) An incease in the intinsic motivation to fight the state by the dissidents can aise because of two sets of easons. One is a the widening of economic, political and social hoizontal inequalities that disadvantage Muslims in Euopean counties as discussed by Stewat (2008), o a gadual eaction to laws that disciminate against Muslims (such as head scaf bans initiated by the state). The second elates to wold events, such as the invasion and occupation of Iaq and Afghanistan, and the situations in Palestine o Kashmi, that add to the collective Muslim stock of gievances. Fo example, the ecent Isaeli militay opeations in aza, and the peceived Westen suppot fo this incusion, which many egad as a dispopotionate eaction to Hamas activities, can only seve to incease esentment among Muslims. Eithe way, a 11

14 the dissident eaction function will shift down in Figue 1 indicating less e, and moe fighting against the state at point C, fo the easons outlined above. 2.7 Extenal Finance fo Dissident oups Seveal adical Muslim goups have alleged connections to global teoist netwoks like Al-Qaida, and ae said to eceive finance and technical suppot fom them. This, aguably, has mostly an effect on thei opeations o costs, not thei intinsic motivation. We may e-wite the dissident objective function in (11) as: P C = π ( a, e) + (1 π )( ) τe( e) (17) Whee τ epesents a cost shift paamete, inceases in τ indicate a ise in the cost of stategic action. The fist-ode condition fo optimal action (e) by the dissidents when τ ises, as a esult of extenal assistance is (note that the assistance is conditional on educing peaceful actions, e): e P C [ (.)] dτe e π (.) = (18) Thus the maginal cost of peaceful behaviou, on the ight-hand side of (18) has inceased, moe confontation is chosen by the dissident goup. Qualitatively, a movement fom point A to C in figue 1 is applicable, with a shift in the dissident eaction function indicating less e fo evey level of a chosen by the state. 3 CONCLUSIONS egading the potential danges of the inteaction between fea and hated, if points such as A in figue 1 may be descibed as uneasy, points such as B and C with less peaceful behaviou ae cetainly moe pecaious with a simmeing isk of iotous behaviou and teoism. I would like to conclude by fist aguing that Islamic fundamentalism (hate in this pape) feeds on the West s histoical and pesent ejection of Islam in its stuggle to achieve paity with westen Chistianity as an equally impotant wold eligion, as well as the pesent-day eal and peceived malteatment of Muslims and Muslim causes. I do not believe its distaste fo the West is based on pimodial hated; no is it the case that the pimodial fundamentalist objective is the obliteation of Westen values fom the planet. 15 athe, it is a political movement with political solutions. The vaious souces quoted in the intoduction also point to a moe toleant and inclusive side of Islam, which may moe widely e-suface given the ight conditions. The amelioation of objective injustices and glaing double-standads when it comes to the Muslim wold, apologies fo histoical injustices committed by the West, and of couse economic pogess by Muslims in Euope will take the wind out of the sails of fundamentalism. In this connection, it is inteesting to note that explicitly eligious paties aely get moe than a fifth of the vote in democatic Muslim counties. One of the enduing lessons of histoy is that economic development and pospeity modifies cultue, eligious beliefs and pactices. 15 As stated, fo example, by the fome Bitish Pime Ministe Tony Blai in an addess at eogetown Univesity, Washington D.C, on 26 th May

15 As fa as the policy implications ae concened, fist excessive deteence against potential dissidents may backfie, a point also made in Addison and Mushed (2005). This is because it poduces moe militancy and swells the anks of the disaffected, and inceases the dange of both vandalism and teoist violence. Secondly, space needs to be ceated so that most Muslim migants ae able to mege thei pesonal identities within thei adopted Euopean homelands. This includes developing a pesonal impeative to be toleant of diffeence. This will seve to incease the costs of admonishing othe goup membes fo adopting behaviou in confomity with the othe-identities that make up thei complex pesonal identity. Policies that make it difficult to be both Euopean and Muslim ae bound to be self-defeating, and voice needs to be given to a wide ange of Muslims, not just the Salman ushdies and Hisi Ayan Alis of Euope. Many of the pepetatos of the London bombings wee well integated second geneation immigants befoe becoming adicalized. Thidly, economic discimination, the hoizontal inequalities faced by Muslims in Euope, needs addessing. As Tadjoeddin and Mushed (2007) point out outine violence in Java, Indonesia (akin to the vandalism pepetated by Muslim iotes in Euope) ultimately declines with socio-economic pogess. Economic pogess will educe the powe of the ghetto by pemitting exit fom the ghetto; allowing individual Muslims to act moe on the basis of thei othe identities, and aise the costs of luing them back into distatsteful and dubious own identity based violence like ioting o teoism. Potest is ultimately motivated by exclusion. Finally, democacy povides no panacea against the ise to pominence and electoal success of abble-ousing nationalistic demagogues of vaious types, as Aistotle pesciently pointed out in his Politics moe than 2300 yeas ago. The message being that democacy, without effective checks and balances, isks poducing conflict and cises. A well-odeed decent society may be one that is toleant of diffeence; one that is at peace with itself and othes in the sense descibed by awls (1999); but even affluent advanced Westen democacies have still some distance to cove befoe achieving this ideal. EFEENCES Addison Tony and S. Mansoob Mushed (2005) Tansnational Teoism as a Spillove of Domestic Disputes in Othe Counties, Defence and Peace Economics, 16 (2): Akelof, eoge and achel E. Kanton (2000) Economics and Identity, Quately Jounal of Economics, 115(3): Becke, ay S (1971) The Economics of Discimination, Chicago: Univesity of Chicago Pess, 2 nd edition. ates, Scott (2002) ecuitment and Allegiance: The Micofoundations of ebellion, Jounal of Conflict esolution, 46(1): laese, Edwad L (2005) The Political Economy of Hated, Quately Jounal of Economics, 120 (1):

16 Hishleife, Jack (1995) Anachy and its Beakdown, Jounal of Political Economy, 103(1): Huntington, Samuel P (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the emaking of the Wold Ode, New Yok: Simon and Schuste. Lewis, Benad (2003) The Cisis of Islam: Holy Wa and Unholy Teo, London: Phoenix. Lindne, Evelin (2001) The Concept of Humiliation: Its Univesal Coe and Cultue-Dependent Peiphey, Univesity of Oslo. Olson, Mancu (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambidge MA: Havad Univesity Pess. awls, John (1999) The Law of Peoples, Cambidge MA: Havad Univesity Pess. Sen, Amatya K (2008) 'Violence, Identity and Povety', Jounal of Peace eseach, 45(1): Stewat, Fances (2000) 'Cisis Pevention: Tackling Hoizontal Inequalities', Oxfod Development Studies, 28(3): Stewat, Fances (2008) lobal Aspects and Implications of Hoizontal Inequalities (HIs): Inequalities Expeienced by Muslims Woldwide, mimeo. Tadjoeddin, Mohammad Zulfan and S Mansoob Mushed (2007) Socioeconomic Deteminants of Eveyday Violence in Indonesia: An Empiical Investigation of Javanese Disticts, , Jounal of Peace eseach, 44 (6): Wintobe, onald (2002) Can Suicide Bombes Be ational, Pape pepaed fo the DIW Wokshop on Economic Consequences of lobal Teoism, 14