The State and Islam in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan Managing religion in a secular environment

Transcription

1 The State and Islam in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan Managing religion in a secular environment Dr Zaniah Marshallsay School of Communication, International Studies and Languages University of South Australia zaniah.marshallsay@unisa.edu.au Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference 2009 Macquarie University September

2 The State and Islam in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan managing religion in a secular environment Abstract This paper examines the consequences of renewed interest in Islam in the post-colonial states of Central Asia, politically and socially, and the use of religious identity by the various regimes as an element of national assertion and as a means of legitimising the social bases of their political power. The ramifications of this Islamic revival among the general populace are issues of concern to the governments of these states which view interest in Islam, and particularly the expansion of militant Islamist groups, as threats to the integrity and stability of the state. This paper focuses specifically on two Central Asian states Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to explore the ways that the two states attempt to manage religion, specifically Islam, and its place in the political life of an explicitly stated secular state. It explores the strategies undertaken by the two states, which share a number of critical similarities and differences, as each state seeks to justify their control of Islamic political and social movements. This paper further argues that the regimes over-emphasis of a perceived Islamist threat and using it as the rationale for suppressing a wide range of domestic dissidents and human rights activists is detrimental to their own political survival. Instead, the governments should also be focussing on economic and social issues which are acutely felt by the population as an important means of ensuring social and political stability in their respective countries. Introduction The five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan 1, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) which were created in the early part of the twentieth century under Soviet rule and whose names are based upon the major ethnic groups in that nation-state, became independent states with the collapse of the Soviet Union in late With independence, questions relating to national, regional and religious identities together with issues of political power and control over social and economic resources were among major challenges faced by these states. Decades of Soviet rule over countries in this region, together with long years of Russian influence are major heritages in the political and social configuration of these states. In the post-soviet period, the region s strategic location, rich history, vast natural resources (oil and gas principally) have drawn the attention of Western powers as well as China who shares much of its western borders with three of the Central Asian states. More specifically, it was the perceptions and policies of the Bolsheviks towards Islam and its perceived role in the political life of these countries that continue to influence the policies and strategies of the current political leaders in post-soviet Central Asian states. In the immediate aftermath of independence, Central Asian leaders were enthusiastic in embracing and promoting elements that were deemed central to their nations sense of national identity, including religion, and specifically Islam. Nonetheless they also perceived any form of religious activities as manifestations of religious fundamentalism often described as Wahhabism (Zelkina 1999, 355), fearing that this will pose a serious threat to their nations political and social security. To some extent, this is a by-product of September 11 and subsequent events which have since linked Islamic militancy with international terrorism. In the post-september 11 environment, transnational terrorism is dominating the security 1 Kazakhstan was formally declared to be part of the region in the 1993 Central Asian Summit. Throughout Soviet rule, Kazakhstan was not classified as part of the region. 1

3 perceptions and agenda of many nations leading national governments to pass counterterrorism measures in the name of national security, in support of the US-led war on terror. The independent Central Asian states are no exception. In their case, Islamic militancy and its close linkage with terrorism has been used for cracking down on all dissent. This underscores their claim of embracing Islam as an element of national identity, but an Islam that is cultural in orientation, not political Islam. Cracking down on Islamic militancy is also consistent with legislation on hardline religious activities whose goal is to destabilise legitimate governments, as enshrined in the constitutions of Kazakhstan and Tajilistan. This paper focuses specifically on the relationship between Islam and the state in the post- Soviet independent Central Asian states, which are experiencing a revivalism of Islamic interest/consciousness among the general populace, an interest encouraged by the Soviet regime during the period of Perestroika during Gorbachev s reign. The specific focus is on Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which while sharing a number of similarities, among which are their shared history of foreign influences differ in their size, geographical location within the region, and these have influenced their perceptions and management of religion, specifically Islam, with independence. A historical-comparative approach is utilised in examining the issues raised in this paper as they relate to the strategies undertaken by the regimes towards the place of Islam in public life. To further understand the issues in question, the paper begins with an overview of the region, as the histories of these two states are intrinsically linked to the other states in the region. Specific attention will be given to the socio-cultural context of the region, and the place of Islam in the social and cultural life of the people in the region, and its management during the Soviet regime. This provides the background and framework for a further examination of the ways the two states manage and utilise Islam in their projection of a national identity and the dilemmas/challenges of balancing this with their perceptions of political Islam as a threat to national security. Questions that are pertinent to the discussion include: To what extent can the state grant Islam a key place while maintaining the principles of secularism? To what extent can the state control social and political movements that they consider dangerous, extremist or terrorist? How serious a threat to national security are the Islamist parties? The state and Islam in the Central Asian States Central Asia - background The five states, which are completely landlocked, are strategically located between China in the east, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran to the south, Russia to the north, and the Caspian Sea on the west. Historically, the region was an important urban and agricultural center and a nexus for long-distance trade, the famed Silk Road, connecting Europe and China (east and west), and also the southern routes connecting the Middle East to India and the northern forest steppes. The region thus had strong cultural heritages from both the Persio-Islamic traditions of the Middle East and the Mongol heritage of the steppes. In addition, the region s varied geography, comprising of high passes and mountains, deserts and grassy steppes have affected the lifestyles of the region. Its major rivers are the Amu Darya, Syr Darya and Hari River, which feed into the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea, both of which have shrunk in recent years. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya, in particular, have acted as geographical, cultural and political borders since historical time, with the Amu Darya dividing the nomadic Turkic and Mongol empires in Central Asia from the Persian Empire to the south, while the Syr Darya has protected Central Asian kingdoms from periodic invasions from Mongolia, Siberia and the Gobi desert (Rashid 2002, 16). The different landscapes largely determined the varied lifestyles, pastoral nomadism, sedentary agriculture, both of which characterised the history of the peoples of Central Asia. 2

4 Historically, from the 7 th to the 6 th centuries BC, the present Central Asian region was inhabited by tribes belonging to the Iranian ethnic groups who then spread to other areas. Iranian ethnos and Turkic ethnic groups provided the basis for the development of the peoples of contemporary Central Asia the Tajik, Uzbek, Turkomen, Kirgyrz, and Kazakh (Polonskaya & Malashenko 2008, 4-5). Hence, the diversity of the region. In addition, there are the Slaviks who came during the Russian conquest, and other smaller enclaves of people (Gunn 2003, 394). Languages spoken correlate to their ethnicity, although Russian is widely spoken and is the lingua franca of the elite. Further, while the names of present day Central Asian states generally reflect the largest ethnic groupings of the respective states, these ethnic names are arbitrary as clans within specific ethnic groups are also located in other nations (ibid, 394). Of importance too, as noted earlier, is it strategic location in the Silk Route linking Europe and China which had resulted in the region s conquest by various foreign powers, from Alexander the Great to the Mongols, Persians and Arabs. The Russians were the last to control the region, starting in the early 18 th century when Russia acquired present day Kazakhstan and the other states between 1864 and 1884 (Soucek 2000, 200). The Soviets inherited control of these states in 1917 and in its seventy years of reign, were responsible for much of the political and socio-cultural configuration of the region. Johnson (2007, 22) further noted that while Russian annexation of the region transformed it politically and demographically, bringing in Russian peasants to settle in Kazakhstan and the southernmost states, it was the Soviets that designed the borders of the Central Asian states in such a way that ethnic groups were divided and would become rivals. By 1924, the political map of contemporary Central Asia that was drawn up and which remains to this day, had the consequence of separating the ethnic groups into different territorial boundaries and enforce a sense of national identity where none existed before. In the pre-russian and Soviet periods, the peoples in this region identified themselves in a mix of religion, tribe, location, way of life or social status (Bernard 2004, 325). Since Soviet rule and into the independence period, national boundaries do not coincide with ethnic lines as noted above. An important point to note too is the relationship between pastoral-nomadic peoples of the steppe and the sedentary farming peoples of the agricultural oases to the south. While both groups are dependent on one another there is nonetheless tension in the relationship with periodic migration of nomadic peoples into sedentary society (Levi 2007, 16). In addition, the social structures of the various peoples there were influenced by their geographical location. On the northern steppes, the Tartars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyrz, Uighurs and other peoples were organised in family units and loose confederation, while in the sedentarised districts in the Ferghana Valley and other oases, they founded centralised states legitimised partly in Muslim and cosmopolitan cultural terms (Lapidus 2002, 355). More specifically, peoples in this region distinguished themselves according to clans and tribal lineages as well as by cultural and linguistic differences (Luong 2004, 7). Islam, although a common heritage of the peoples in the region, also exhibit diversity in the forms and ways it is practised by the people. Before the arrival of Islam, a number of religions which included Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Manichaen as well as worship of forces of nature and shamanism, were already well established and had contributed to the development of the people s worldviews, psychology, lifestyles and mentality (Polonskaya & Malashenko 2008, 4-19). Expansionist Arab armies brought Islam to the region in the seventh century, and over the next two centuries the urban population converted to Islam (ICG 2003, 1) although the form of Islam that was generally practised in the Central Asian region showed the adaptation and incorporation of the local spiritual substratum. Further, as a consequence of the region s geography, the arrival of Islam in this region led to the formation of three types of Islamic society. Among the Kazakhs, Islam became part of popular identity and belief, but not the basis of social organization. Among the tribal people 3

5 and in some oasis communities such as Kashgar, Sufi masters or Sufi lineages mediated, organised and sometimes governed. In large-scale organised societies, state-organised Islamic societies of the Middle Eastern type were developed (Lapidus 2002, 338). This is an important point to note as will be seen in the discussion on Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The majority of Central Asian Muslims are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi school of law, the most liberal in its accommodation of tradition and promotion of a tolerant relationship between the religious community and the state (ICG 2003, 1). In addition, Sufism has had an important role in Central Asian history, as Sufi missionaries were responsible for first introducing Islam among the Kazakhs and the Kirgyrz, and also in the resistance to the Russians during the Tsarist and Soviet eras (Mitcallef & Svanberg 1999, ). The role of Sufi tariqa (spiritual orders) in the maintenance of Islam during the seventy years of Soviet reign has been noted by a number of scholars. As noted by Polonskaya & Malashenko (2008, 33) the Sufi mystics interpreted Islamic principles in ways that were in tune with the traditions of tribal democracy resulting in nomads who had converted to Islam developing Islamic practices that enabled them to preserve their tribal organisation and nomadic way of life. Added to this is the degree of religious piety and ritual observances prevailing among the nomadic as opposed to the settled groups. The more settled groups Uzbeks and Tajiks were among the first in the region to have been Islamicised after Arab conquests during the seventh and eight centuries, while the nomadic peoples Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Turkmen, did not convert to Islam until the eighteenth century (Gunn 2003, ). Generally, for Central Asian Muslims, particularly in the period before the Russian conquest of the region, being Muslim meant being part of a community that saw itself as Muslim and had little to do with the mastery of the basic textual sources of Islam, including the Qur an. Muslim identity was asserted through elaborate myths of origin that assimilated elements of the Islamic ethical traditions with local norms and vice versa (Khalid 2007, 21). Further, for Central Asian Muslims, being Muslim distinguished them from others (non-muslims) and in this way Islam constitutes a part of their social identity similar to the way they conceive of their ethnicity, family, and mother tongue (Gunn 2003, 391). In general, for the people of Central Asia, a multitude of overlapping identities according to place (region and clan for oasis dweller) and lineage (tribe and tribal confederation for steppe inhabitants), cultural or ethnic (associated with Turkic or Persian), and Islam characterised their experience. Soviet rule which attempted to forge a supranational imperial identity had only limited success (Dannreuther 1994, 9) as demonstrated by the people s reclamation of their Islamic religious inheritance in the independent period albeit as part of their cultural and/or ethnic identity. The Soviets and state management of religion During their seventy years of rule, the Soviets proceeded with their plans for the economic and social transformations of Central Asia, through policies directed at the political, economic, social and cultural areas that profoundly affected the ordinary people, particularly the goal of creating modern citizens in Central Asia (Sahadeo & Zanca 2007, 230) by introducing national identities to replace other forms of affiliation (language, customs, religion). This was a crucial aspect of the nation-building project of the Soviets for the nations under their rule in that while each nation was to have their own national identities through their own languages associated with specific ethnic groups, a sense of common citizenship was to be instilled through universal education and military service (Khalid 2007, 94-98). In addition, customs and traditions were seen as signifying backwardness and 4

6 nations had to modernise by replacing these backward traditions with modern, enlightened Soviet ones (Khalid 2007, 99). All national languages were to be written in Cyrillic and Russian, universal education, and other social amenities were extended. What emerged was a nanny state where the state, led by the Communist Party provided extensive social services to the population, which included free elementary and secondary education as well as acting as employer, landlord, health care provider and banker education (McMann 2007, ). This was to lead to unmet-expectations among ordinary citizens in the post-soviet independent situation where similar social services were in short supply, leading to feelings of discontent with the state. At the political level, the Soviets proceeded with their goal of revolutionising society through the establishment of the soviet (local council at every administrative level), organising workers into trade unions, political mobilisation through education, and the creation of a new political class. These were the leaders at the local level who were entrusted with the role of running their respective republics and acting as mediators with the central authority. The new elites, created in Soviet institutions were to assume leadership of their republics at independence. Thus, independence from Soviet rule in 1991 did not mean a complete break from their Soviet past, but was to see the continuance of Soviet-style management and allocation of resources. In particular, the practice of utilising connections and exercising favours in vast networks of reciprocity based on personal friendships, family ties or common origins as discussed by Khalid (2007, 87), was to continue into the independent period. Another area of importance in the Soviet agenda of transforming the social fabric of Central Asian society was in their efforts at transforming traditional gender roles and attitudes towards women through law and revolutionary mobilization (Constantine 2007, 115; Khalid 2007, 73). In pre-soviet period, particularly among the sedentary populations, women s seclusion was a basic fact of the social order connected with concepts of honour, shame and respect, as well as other practices allowing for underage marriage, polygamy, payment of bride price (Khalid 2007, 74). However, while Soviet goals brought large numbers of women into productive labour and increased opportunities in public life, they did not change entrenched attitudes regarding gender difference deeming these to be natural. The effect was that women were unveiled and engaged in the workforce, but social life continued to be highly gendered (ibid, 133). In the post-soviet period, this was to have unlooked-for consequences where declining economic conditions and reactions to Soviet legacy and a move back towards traditional gender values became more prevalent (Constantine 2007, ). It was in their efforts at secularization of society that the Soviets were to bring about profound changes. Full-scale campaign against Islam proceeded as the Soviets deemed it to be part of a particular cultural tradition that was backward and had to be controlled, as well as being completely incompatible with communism and the Soviet state (Zelkina 1999, 357). Measures that were undertaken included the confiscation of religious properties, the closure of mosques and madrassas which were either turned into schools, clubhouses, or destroyed. Ulemas, traditionally regarded as representatives of formal scholastic learning, and the ones who organised education and judicial administration in Muslim societies, were seen by the Soviets as class enemies of the revolution and were ether arrested and sent to forced labour camps or were killed (Khalid 2007, 73; ICG 2003, 2). The results of the campaign against Islam were manifold. It de-islamised public debate by removing Islam and 2 Elizabeth Constantine provided first-hand observation of effects of Soviet policy and ideology on women s situation in contemporary Uzbek society, which is reflective of the general situation of women in Central Asian states today. 5

7 expression of Muslim piety and moral values from public debate, and instead anti-religious propaganda was used as a means of socialization in schools, the press and the army. Further, with the abolition of formal religious education, the transmission of religious knowledge and the observance of religious ritual were curtailed, and Islamic knowledge could only be transmitted orally in private. Most crucial for the development of Islam or lack of it in Central Asia was that the closed borders of the region isolated Soviet Muslims from the broader Muslim world, including the influence of political Islam. There was some let-up in Soviet assault on Islam, particularly during WWII in efforts to gain Muslim support and also to offset underground Muslim movements that would undermine their secularization efforts saw the establishment of the Spiritual Administration Board of the Muslims (SADUM) of Central Asia and Kazakhstan which allowed for limited religious activity under bureaucratic oversight as it was subordinated to the law on religious cults. These include the management of a number of madrassas and mosques and the issuing of fatwas (Khalid 2007, 67-68; Lapidus 2002, 706; Polonskaya & Malashenko 2008, 97). This was consistent with Soviet policies as the Soviets had made it clear from the outset of their reign that atheism was the state s official ideology, with Islam at the local level, subordinated to secular political institution. Islam s capacity to be mobilised as an organised mass movement was thus reduced (Luong 2004, 14). The regulation of Islam under government supervision was to continue into the independent period. What had emerged in addition to official or state-administered Islam was a form of unofficial Islamic religious activity known as parallel Islam which was particularly strong in the rural areas, led by Sufi brotherhoods. Alongside official-sanctioned mosques and madrassas were unregistered ones, while religious ceremonies continued to be performed in the privacy of homes, together with pilgrimages to shrines and saints graves (Lapidus 2002, 708). The continued practice of Islam were due in large part to the contribution of Sufi secret societies/tariqas and itinerant preachers, and women who sustained Islamic traditions and culture in the homes. In addition, some of the local Communist party officials continued to perform religious rites related to birth, marriage and death (Rashid 2002, 40). Thus, throughout the Soviet period, even though Islam was banned from the public sphere, it still continued to play a key role in sustaining Muslim religious life. The persistence of traditional beliefs, both Islam and pre-islamic animistic practices incorporating belief in spirits and shamanism, was to pay-off during the period of perestroika starting from 1985 and into the last years of the Soviet Union. The ideas of glasnost and democratization provided the opportunity for an openly renewed interest in Islam. This period saw the emergence of underground groups and private prayer circles. While spiritual self-discovery was an important aspect of this Islamic revival, in the initial phases of the independent period, it was also related to national struggle of the newly independent republics, and could be linked to the global Islamic revival of the 1980s. By the end of Soviet rule, there was in existence what was described by a number of scholars as three forms of Islam officially-approved Islam, traditional Islam organised around unofficial clergy, and reformist Islam separate from official and traditional Islam (Zelkina 1999, 358). In essence then, Islam in Central Asian became localised and being a Muslim was essentially a part of local identity, and adherence to custom and tradition rather than observance of Islamic ritual the essential criteria of this identity (ICG 2003; Khalid 2007, 82). This was the legacy of the independent Central Asian states, along with issues of statehood and nation-building, economic, social and security challenges. These were among the challenges that both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan faced as independent states. Kazakhstan & Tajikistan 6

8 Background Along with the other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan share a number of similarities particularly a shared history of Russian and Soviet influence which profoundly influenced their political development in the independent period. As independent states, both explicitly assert the secular nature of their states as enshrined in their respective constitutions. Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in August 1995 explicitly states that the Republic is a democratic, secular, legal and social state (Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995). Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan 1994 stated that the Republic is a sovereign, democratic, lawgoverned, secular, and unitary state ; and further under Article 8 that No ideology, including religious ideology, is granted the status of state ideology (Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan 1994). However, differences in terms of geographical location and climate have greatly determined the modes of settlement patterns of the people and these to a great extent influence the place of Islam in each country. In addition, since independence, there are also differences in the continued development of Islam at the political and at the popular levels of both countries. Of the five Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, the northernmost state is the largest in terms of size, and also has vast mineral resources and enormous economic potential. Its geographical landscape is diverse, encompassing heavily populated mountainous region of the east to the sparsely-populated energy-rich lowlands in the west. Its climate also varies from Siberian climate in the industrialised north to the arid, empty steppes of the center, to the fertile south. It shares borders with Russia on the north, China to the east, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan to the south and the Caspian Sea to the west. During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan was considered separate from the other Central Asian states, and it was only in 1993 that Kazakhstan was formally included in the designation of Central Asia. In large part, the long border that it shares with Russia has made it more accessible to direct Russian influence, most discernible in the make-up of the country s population. In the 1999 census, Kazakhs comprise over 53 percent, Russian 30 percent, and the rest Ukrainian, Uzbeks, Germans, Tartars, Uighers and others together constitute over 16.6 percent of the population. In addition, there is a clear geographical division between the Kazakh and European communities, with the Kazaks dominating the southern part of the country, while the Slav minorities are to the north (Dannreuther1994, 42). Tajikistan, the southernmost of the Central Asian states, is also the smallest in size with a population of over 7 millions almost half of Kazakhstan whose total population is over 15 millions. It is the most artificial of the Central Asian states that was created during the Soviet period, as part of Stalin s exercise of ethno-territorial delimitation (Dannreuther 1994, 25). The intention was to provide an enclave for the diverse Persian-speaking people but in effect led to the separation of ethnic groups, the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and the Persian-speaking Tajiks, who had co-existed in one region into two distinct territorial units, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 1924 delimitation not only designated all the major historical sites such as Khiva, Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara to Uzbekistan, but also most of the population in the region. In effect this left Tajikistan with the poorest and most mountainous parts of the region, a situation that was to fuel further feelings of resentment by the Tajiks towards the Uzbeks, both of whom lay claims to the land and culture of Central Asia (ibid 1994, 27). In addition, this territorial de-limitation became a factor in the competition for advancement within the Soviet system (Atkin 1994, 128) and all these were to contribute to the civil war in Tajikistan that occurred between 1992 and Of note to bear in mind is the geographical landscape of Tajikistan with the presence of high mountains and plateaus which has supported the development of culturally diverse ethnic groups comprising of large Uzbek communities, Arab, Jews, Kyrgyz and Russian as well as other Slavic peoples. While the indigenous peoples of Tajikistan are part of the Iranian 7

9 world, as with the other Central Asian states, distinction is also made between peoples of the plains in the north, and peoples of the plains in the centre, east and southwest who were more isolated and developed stronger regional and local identities (Uehling 2007, 129). It also has some of the most densely populated arable land and a predominantly agrarian population. Islam too is expressed differently in Kazakhstan compared to Tajikistan. While the vast majority of Kazaks are Sunni Muslims, Islam has been more of a cultural phenomenon than a religious one and is closely identified with ethnic identity (Trisko 2005, 377). This is due in large part to the fact that while Islam first arrived in the 9 th and early 10 th centuries when Arab armies conquered southern Kazakhstan and converted the local population, the rest of the country only became Islamized between the 13 th and early 19 th century. The nomadic lifestyle of the majority of people there did not facilitate the spread of a mosque-centered faith in the country. Thus, most Kazakhs practice a folk version of Islam which includes mystical beliefs, superstitions and cultural practices stemming from pre-islamic religions (Karagiannis 2007, 298). Seven decades of Soviet rule further modified and constrained the development of Islam in Kazakhstan. While Islam is the predominant religion in Tajikistan, the Muslim population comprised of Sunni majority (93 percent) and a Shia minority (7 percent). Further, many contemporary Tajiks consider Islam important but interpret this in a variety of ways, among the most important is that it is an important part of their national identity, their national pride, their way of life, and as an alternative system of values to the discredited Marxism-Leninism (Atkin 1994, 138). In this sense, the Tajiks differ from the Kazaks for whom Islam has been more related to an ethnic identity rather than a national identity. As in the other Central Asian states, the period of glastnost during Gorbechev s regime provided the opportunity for people in Central Asia to express an interest in the language, customs and religion of their past (Altoma 1994, 166). In Kazakhstan, these include efforts to revitalise the Kazakh language through the formation of literary and historical associations, and in the religious area, increased interest and consciousness of Islamic rituals such as mosque attendance, translation of the Qur an into Kazakh as well as Russian and Arabic versions of the Quran. In addition, efforts were also made to nationalise Islam and a separate muftiate (religious authority) for Kazakh Muslims was formed in 1990 and remains till today. This was the Spiritual Board for the Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK), separate from the original Central Asian spiritual boards. The major objectives of DUMK were to facilitate greater government influence over any process of Islamic revival taking place; and that independent muftiate was to act as a symbol of sovereignty (Altoma 1994, ) Similarly with Tajikistan during perestroika, where efforts were undertaken to revive Tajik culture through the commemoration of pre-islamic civilization, such as Zoraster and Zoroastrian writings as part of Tajik culture (Atkin 1994, 136). Interests in their Iranian cultural past also led some of the Tajik nationalists to look to Iran, although this did not mean that they wanted to be submerged in the much larger population of Persian-speakers beyond the Soviet border. As further pointed out by Atkin (1994, 141), what they wanted was at least to borrow selectively from the wider sphere in order to strengthen their cultural identity after decades of Soviet dominance. The concern with national identity in Tajikistan has been argued to be among the root causes of the civil war that broke out upon independence and lasting from 1992 till As has been argued by Dannreuther (1994, 30-31), many of the causes of the conflict were due to the upsurge in the rhetoric of liberalism, democracy and religious freedom which began during Gorbachev s glasnost and into independence period. To summarise the events 8

10 surrounding this conflict, it started off with contestation on the legitimacy of the presidency when a former leader of the Communist Party, Rahmon Nabiyev, was elected president. Tensions between the president s supporters and opposition groups escalated into civil war which lasted from 1992 till 1997 when a peace process initiated by the UN the 1997 General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord resulted in a political and military settlement based on power-sharing formula. As further argued by Uehling (2007, 129), the conflict was primarily a civil one in which different interest groups mobilised to wrest control of the state and its resources and to gain influence over the ideas and principles on which the newly independent country would be based, whether Tajikistan would be secular or Islamic, democratic or authoritarian. These different groups included the nationalist-democratic group, Islamist group, and the traditional ruling establishment 3. As noted earlier, Tajikistan s construction as a territorial unit during the Soviet period was an unsatisfying one in that different ethnic groups who had co-existed for generations were separated into different territorial units. Thus, issues of national identity were among the crucial issues confronting the Tajikistan government and peoples in the independent period. Of crucial importance in the subsequent political development of independent Tajikistan as a consequences of the civil war were that a radical politicised Islam emerged out of the chaos as the most effective opposition force; and it also provided a powerful demonstration effect for other Central Asian leaders on the necessity of protecting the powers of the state and to stifle any attempt that is considered a threat to the state s power (Dannreuther 1994, 31). In reality, this was the rationale for authoritarian rule utilised by the political leaders and governments in the Central Asian states, including Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In relation to Islam, the Islamist group used the political crisis to further advance their demands for the formation of an Islamic state, demands that became more vocal with the emergence of more radical Islamist elements. The State and Islam in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan How the state views Islam, and how it is viewed by the general population differs. For the general population of both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as it is for most Central Asian Muslims, Islam is a way of life that culturally defined every facet of the believer s existence (Haghayeghi 1995, 39), although there are variations in their perceptions of Islam. For the Kazakhs, with their close proximity to Russia and the co-existence of Slavic communities of whom the Russians form a major component, their Muslim consciousness coexists with a very secular perspective and outlook (Hassan 2008, 96). Thus, Islam is an important cultural element but does not play a major role in the lives of most Kazakhs, and in many ways a crucial element in differentiating them from other groups (non-muslims) in Kazakhstan. For the Tajiks, while their belief is based more on conservative traditional Islam they are not much interested in political activism (ICG 2003, 13). For the political leaders, a dualistic approach to Islam coloured their attitude to Islam as an important element of national identity, and at the same time religion as a potential threat to their power and authority underscored by the perception of Islam s ability to mobilise people 3 The main opposition parties were the national-democrats, particularly the Rastokhez and the Tajik Democratic Party; the main Islamist party was the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). While the conflict appeared to be an ideological one with the opposition groups pitted against the traditional ruling establishment whose allegiance was to communist ideology, the reality was that it was a regional power struggle. For a detailed discussion of the conflict, see Dannreuther 1994; and Khalid

11 under the unifying banner of the ummah. Hence, for the political leaders, Islam was to be controlled and regulated by the state, consistent with the requirements of a secular and democratic state. In effect, the measures undertaken by the regimes of the two countries were reminiscent of Soviet management of religion, particularly since the present regimes are continuance from the Soviet period of rule in their countries. Throughout the period of perestroika and in the immediate years of independence, power in the Central Asian republics remained in the hands of their former Communist rulers who had held positions as first secretaries of the local communist parties and the groups and clans supporting them (Polanskaya & Malashenko 2008, 142). The current president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, was formerly first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 1989, and then elected president in He was re-elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and in the 2005 election, has been re-elected for a further 7 years (BBC News 2009). Emomail Rakhmon, the current president of Tajikistan, was instrumental in the pro-communist efforts to remove Islamist rebels from Dushanbe (the capital) in the early 1990s, and was elected chairman of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan in 1992 after the country s first post-soviet leader was forced to resign. He was elected president in 1994, re-elected in 1999, and in 2006 won a third term of another seven years (BBC News 2009). Both have thus been able to remain entrenched as political leaders of their respective nations. Of note too is that all of the five current presidents have abandoned their atheism and have embraced Islam personally and on behalf of their nations. The president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, has also made concessions to the Islamic identity of the Kazakh population, demonstrating this by undertaking the haj, making public appearances at religious ceremonies as well as sponsoring the construction of mosques (Zelkina 1999, ). In the case of Kazakhstan, efforts have also been made to forge closer ties with countries in the Islamic world, although the political leaders have tended to be rather cautious and balanced in their external relations mindful of the necessity for maintaining balance in the relationship of state and the different religions and ethnicities in the country (Altoma, 1994, 171). The government of Tajikistan has used Islam symbolically as a tool of legitimation, but only selectively, preferring to employ historical symbols as the basis of national ideas rather than as pan-islamic concepts (ICG 2003, 14). In some ways, this was similar to the ways that Tajik nationalists during the Perestroika period used the cultural heritage they inherited from Iran to aid them in recovering and re-defining their identity as distinct people in their own right (Atkin 1994, 136). However, while the current leaders of both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have demonstrated their Islamic credentials, they have followed to varying degrees a modified Soviet model of state regulation of religion. Measures that have been taken include laws and regulations to control religion, promotion of official Islam, suppression of dissidents, particularly Islamists (Gunn 2003, 403). As noted earlier, the constitutions of both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan contain explicitly stated prohibitions on political parties formed on the basis of religion. In Kazakhstan, Article 5:1 of the Republic s Constitution explicitly prohibits the formation of public associations pursuing the goals or actions directed toward a violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity of the Republic, undermining the security of the state, inciting social, racial, national, religious, class and tribal enmity (Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995). Specific measures have been undertaken by the two states in regulating Islam, although the degree of control over religious activities varies in the two countries. In Kazakhstan, the Spiritual Board for the Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK) established in 1990, is the main body which has responsibility for the appointment of clerics as well as publishing topics for the Friday prayer sermons. Other government bodies dealing with religious affairs include the Council on Religious affairs and the Board on Relations with Religious Organizations under 10

12 the Government of Kazakhstan. However, government policy is to interfere minimally on religious matters unless there is a real threat to national security (ICG 2003, 32). Tajikistan, unlike Kazakhstan has technically no official Muslim spiritual board (muftiate), although all Islamic organizations report to the Islamic Centre of Tajikistan which is completely subordinate to the government (Khalid 2007, 186). The Centre controls the madrassas and the one Islamic institute in Tajikistan which is the main educational institution in the country. The lack of qualified teachers in religious education has also caused large numbers of Tajiks to go overseas, particularly to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, although this has lately been discouraged for fear of undue influence from radical Islamic teachings from those countries(icg 2003, 32). However, it is in the measures taken against what the regimes perceived as radical Islamic activities where the full weight of legal and coercive actions has been employed. In both countries, political activism by religious groups or associations that could undermine the security of the state is prohibited and specific clauses in their respective constitutions contain such prohibitions. Again, the situation in Tajikistan is instructive to an understanding of the attitude that the regimes in the region bear towards political Islam. It is the only Central Asian state that has allowed an Islamic political party (the Islamic Renaissance Party - IRP) to be registered although the party s position in the political system of the country is being undermined by the government. The IRP played a major role during the civil war of , and among its earlier goals was one of re-islamising society. Since the 1997 peace accords it has compromised with the government on a number of issues and has abandoned its campaigns for an Islamic state (ICG 2003, 20). The co-optation of the IRP into mainstream political system has thus de-radicalised the party and at the same time ensure that it loses support from ordinary people who may have seen the party as an alternative movement with genuine interest in improving their socio-economic situations. Not surprisingly, underground Islamic groups have been on the rise since the early 2000s with the Hizb ut Tahrir al-islami, the largest radical Islamist group gaining popular support from the people. Karagiannis (2006) in his study of the Hizb ut Tahrir s growing influence in Tajikistan, argues that it has been able to appeal to ordinary people at different levels. For the general populace who are confronted with the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the country, increases in unemployment, prostitution, alcoholism, drug abuse and human trafficking are issues where they perceived the government has failed to address. For those who suffered during the civil war, the lack of democracy in the country contrasts sharply with Hizb ut Tahrir s avowed non-violent methodology. As further argued by Karagiannis (ibid, 13-14) of consequence for the government is that for many people democracy has been discredited because while the regime claims to be democratic, the country is slipping back into authoritarianism. Nonetheless, as further noted by Gunn (2003, 401), while Hizb ut- Tahrir portrays itself as a non-violent organisation, its calls for the overthrow of corrupt governments in the region belies its stated agenda. Of note too is that the perceived failure of the government to address the country s deteriorating socio-economic situation has led to the revival of Islamic values such as polygamy, and growing numbers of women wearing the hijab, and government ban on women attending prayers at the mosque (Karagiannis 2006, 14). The failure of the governments to address socio-economic problems in their countries has thus led to greater appeal towards Islamist groups that are concerned with social welfare activities to address these problems, and may also lead some to be swayed by the arguments of organisations such as Hizb ut Tahrir on an alternative form of government where a more egalitarian share of economic resources is in place. In Kazakhstan, while the Islamists have played a negligible role thus far in challenging the integrity of the political system, they have nonetheless been active in the social sphere. Again, the dire economic conditions of the country in the independent period and the general 11

13 dissatisfaction of the majority of the people who believed that they have not benefited from the wealth from the booming oil sector have contributed to the growing appeal of Hizb ut Tahrir particularly in the southern part of Kazakhstan (Karagiannis 2007, 318). Thus far, the regimes in the two countries have not done much to put in place effective measures to address the populace concern with their dire economic situations. Understandably, in the immediate independence period, governments faced enormous challenges in the task of nation and state-building, and to ensure that institutional infrastructures in the economic and political spheres be in place. However, what appears to have taken place since then is a further bolstering of the regimes powers, and contrary to the assertion of being democratic and secular states as enshrined in their respective constitutions, authoritarianism has become more entrenched, and legal measures have been utilised to crack down on activities that are deemed to threaten the stability of the country. To a great extent, as argued by Trisko (2005, 380) this is related to the manner that the current regimes came to power. Both political leaders, as discussed earlier, became successors to the post-soviet nations having been part of the political elite in the Soviet era. Once they became leaders of the post-soviet states, they did not benefit from political legitimacy that usually arise from a struggle for independence (and thus) faced challenges on how to fill formal structures of autonomy with real power. What has happened then has been a reliance on the services of national security to ensure internal and external threat. Further, the post-september 11 security environment and the US-led war on terrorism has provided the regimes with the rationale to maintain their power by emphasising the Islamist threat to national security and turning to outside powers to increase their military capacity (ibid, 380). Of importance too is that support of the war on terrorism has provided national governments military and economic assistance from the US. Kazakhstan, for example, has cooperated by permitting American use of airspace and shipment lines as well as allowing coalition forces the use of military bases and airports during the invasion of Afghanistan, thus gaining the country prestige and international acknowledgement (ibid, 381). Underlying the regimes rhetoric of containing the Islamist threat in the name of national security is the concern with maintaining political power. Both presidents Nazarbaev and Rakhman, have respectively been in power since 1989 and 1992, and were key figures during the last years of Soviet rule. As discussed earlier, they gained wide powers to rule by decree with the force of constitutional law (Kubicek 1998, 29), and while democratically elected, there are questions as to the legitimacy of these elections. During the 2004 elections, Nazarbaev created an environment that discouraged any form of political opposition through the use of coercion and intimidation (Trisko 2005, 383). Issues of corruption and nepotism that are closely linked to the patronage system in place have further put a question mark on the rhetoric of democracy. In Kazakhstan where Islamist groups have not been allowed a role in the country s political system, President Nazarbaev has focused more on bolstering his power and patronage system rather than ending demands for democratic reforms. Further, there are indications that the president is grooming his daughter for the presidency (Khalid 2007, 198) and in this way ensuring the continuance of his power. Tajikistan, despite allowing for an Islamic party to participate legally in the country s political system, has faired no better. In addition, the policy of secularism central to the nation s political system and which should enable secular political parties to act freely has not been carried out if they are seen to pose a threat to the power of the presidential group (ICG). Again, notwithstanding the principles of democracy and secularism that the regimes have placed great emphasis, the reality is far from these. 12