fragility and crisis

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1 strategic asia fragility and crisis Edited by Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills Special Studies Terrorism: The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia Zachary Abuza restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact To purchase the print volume in which this chapter appears please visit < or contact 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington USA the national bureau of asian research

2 Terrorism 321 TERRORISM THE WAR ON TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Zachary Abuza ABSTRACT Southeast Asia has emerged as a key theater of operations for Al Qaeda through its regional affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, which has developed a powerful operational capability, culminating in the 2002 Bali bombings in which 202 people were killed. Jemaah Islamiyah, with its established leadership body, regional structure, and a network for recruiting and training, has been affected by the war on terror in Southeast Asia about 200 Jemaah Islamiyah members had been arrested by August 2003, including some top leaders. Yet most of its senior operatives remain at large. Jemaah Islamiyah is now less able to plan and execute terrorist attacks than in late 2001, but it maintains the capacity to hit soft targets and critical infrastructure. Although every state in Southeast Asia has joined the war on terror, they have done so only to the degree that it benefits them politically and diplomatically. The political will to fight the war has waned as many states in the region entered a year of important elections. Although bilateral cooperation has improved, there are still no effective multilateral tools for fighting terror. There has been little willingness to address terrorist funding in the region. Zachary Abuza is Assistant Professor of International Politics and the Director of the East Asian Studies Program at Simmons College.

3 322 Strategic Asia Introduction 1 Islam in Southeast Asia has traditionally been defined by tolerance, moderation and pluralism. Most of the Muslim inhabitants of Southeast Asia support the secular state, and only a small minority advocates the establishment of Islamic regimes governed by sharia (Islamic law). Most eschew the violence and literal interpretations of Islam that have plagued their fellow Muslims in South Asia and the Middle East. There have always been Muslim militants in the region, but the conventional wisdom is they were focused on their own domestic agenda. 2 That analysis, however, underestimates the degree to which radical Islamists in Southeast Asia have linked up with transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. The devastating attack on the Sari Nightclub in Bali, in which some 202 people were killed, was a wakeup call to governments in denial and skeptics in the region. The October 12, 2002 attack was Al Qaeda s second most deadly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, and drove home the point that Al Qaeda and its regional arms pose a grave threat to the safety and well-being of states. Though these militants represent a distinct minority of the population, their ability to cause political and economic instability means that we have to understand their motives and capabilities to wage a war of terror. Southeast Asian states, as well as foreign analysts, fundamentally underestimated the degree of penetration in the region by Al Qaeda operatives and their ability to develop local cells. There were two stages of denial first, the assumption that Southeast Asians were moderate and secular and second, the calculation that although there were Muslim militants in the region, they were home grown and many in fact predated Al Qaeda, and thus had no need for terrorist linkages. The avowed goal of Jemaah Islamiyah, to establish a pan-islamic state in Southeast Asia that spreads from southern Thailand through Indonesia and includes the southern Philippines, is unlikely to succeed. Yet Jemaah Islamiyah s determination necessitates greater security cooperation within Southeast Asia. The fact that there were no bilateral or multilateral security mechanisms in place prior to the Bali attacks in October 2002 that could counter terrorist operations further facilitated militant activities. The emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah also necessitates a significant shift in American foreign policy in the region. Since the 1991 closure of two U.S. bases in the Philippines, U.S. foreign policy has been driven by normative rather than strategic interests. The region remains critically important for U.S. national interests and, as terrorism has emerged as the single greatest threat to the region, counter-terrorism must be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy toward Southeast Asia.

4 Terrorism 323 Al Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia Al Qaeda has a number of clearly enunciated goals to rid the Holy Land of the United States, to defeat Israel, and to establish a pan-islamic state based on the seventh century caliphate. To that end, it seeks to degrade U.S. capabilities by waging jihad around the world. Al Qaeda was attracted to Southeast Asia for three main reasons: the growth of Islamic grievances within Southeast Asian states since the 1970s for socio-economic and political reasons, the Afghan connection to Middle Eastern extremists, and most importantly, the accessibility of Southeast Asian states as countries of convenience for international terrorists. These conditions enabled Al Qaeda to pursue its longer-term strategic goal of spreading jihad globally. Socio-Economic and Political Grievances Across the region, there has been an Islamic resurgence in the past few decades. Extremists represent a miniscule proportion of the populations; the potential for any Southeast Asian state to be taken over by a fundamentalist regime is small. The resounding defeat of the inclusion of sharia into Indonesia s constitution by the parliament is evidence of this. But Islamism s gradual acceptance into the mainstream of the region s social structures means that many are beginning to at least acknowledge that they share the extremists grievances, if not methods. And, in some countries, it has become politically incorrect or politically foolhardy to stand up to the extremists, who now comprise a small but vociferous minority with the power to shape the political and social agendas. 3 Many of the Muslim movements in Southeast Asia have legitimate grievances, whether they have been repressed, clamor for autonomy, or simply seek greater religious freedom. Economically, in all Southeast Asian countries the Muslim communities are less well off. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the growth of Islamic extremism around the world has less to do with theology than with the failure of the domestic political economies of their respective countries. Two of the most secular governments in the Muslim world were Malaysia and Indonesia, two of the fastest-growing economies from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Once their economies slowed and became mired in the Asian financial crisis (where the value of their currencies collapsed and public and private debt has soared, causing mass unemployment), Islamism was able to take root among the mainstream populace, whereas before it was on the fringes of society. Clerics were able to veil their political criticisms in Friday prayer sermons. Islam also became more radical because authoritarian secular governments did not give political space to religious elites and religious-based political parties, even

5 324 Strategic Asia as the leaders used these groups to buttress their own ascension to power. Religious elites and parties felt that they had been at best ignored or marginalized, and at worst repressed by governments who feared the Islamization of politics. Yet when it has served their purposes, these governments have turned to religion as a legitimizing force for their rule. In Malaysia, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has had to steadily become less secular in order to court Malay defectors to Parti SeIslam (PAS). 4 Islamists have been able to achieve these gains in part because of the spread of democracy in the region. Since the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, radical Muslim parties have been legitimized. Under Suharto, the lack of democratic institutions (political parties, freedom of assembly, and free speech) permitted Islamism to spread within a circumscribed environment only through the veiled language spoken in the mosques could political dissent be heard. The spread of democracy has opened politics to the extremists, giving them political platforms to express their pent-up grievances. Democratization in Indonesia also has meant a breakdown of central government control and law and order in the archipelago, a phenomenon that has allowed militant groups to step in and pursue their agendas unchecked. The breakdown of secular institutions, especially the educational and legal systems in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, created a vacuum in which non-secular institutions emerged. Increasingly, parents are turning to pesantren and madrassas to educate their children as state funding for the educational sector collapses. Sharia courts have become more prominent because of the absolute failure of the secular court system in adapting itself to changes in the political economy of a globalized world. 5 Southeast Asian madrassas are increasingly beyond state control. Of the 37,362 madrassas in Indonesia, only 3,226 (8.6 percent) are run by the state; and 81 percent of the 5.6 million students enrolled in madrassas attend privately-funded and privately-run Islamic schools. 6 In the Philippines, only 35 of 1,600 are controlled by the state, with alarming consequences. As one education official put it, the privately-funded madrassas tailor their curricula to the wishes of whoever subsidizes them. 7 The madrassas and pesantren in Southeast Asia that have been set up since the late 1980s have advocated a stricter, more intolerant brand of Islam and condemn the secular nation-state. They are the core of a growing and powerful radical Muslim movement and have established networks throughout the region and with the Middle East. There is now a critical mass of students studying in Islamic universities and madrassas who are reinforced in their conviction that Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao in the Philippines must become Islamic states in order to overcome the myriad socio-

Partners, Resources, and Strategies

Partners, Resources, and Strategies Cheryl Benard Supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation R National Security Research Division The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson