1 Introduction Buddhism: doctrinal diversity and (relative) moral unity

Transcription

1 1 Introduction Buddhism: doctrinal diversity and (relative) moral unity There is a Tibetan saying that just as every valley has its own language so every teacher has his own doctrine. This is an exaggeration on both counts, but it does indicate the diversity to be found within Buddhism and the important role of a teacher in mediating a received tradition and adapting it to the needs, the personal transformation, of the pupil. This diversity prevents, or strongly hinders, generalization about Buddhism as a whole. Nevertheless it is a diversity which Mahayana Buddhists have rather gloried in, seen not as a scandal but as something to be proud of, indicating a richness and multifaceted ability to aid the spiritual quest of all sentient, and not just human, beings. It is important to emphasize this lack of unanimity at the outset. We are dealing with a religion with some 2,500 years of doctrinal development in an environment where scholastic precision and subtlety was at a premium. There are no Buddhist popes, no creeds, and, although there were councils in the early years, no attempts to impose uniformity of doctrine over the entire monastic, let alone lay, establishment. Buddhism spread widely across Central, South, South-East, and East Asia. It played an important role in aiding the cultural and spiritual development of nomads and tribesmen, but it also encountered peoples already very culturally and spiritually developed, most notably those of China, where it interacted with the indigenous civilization, modifying its doctrine and behaviour in the process. Some scholars have seen this looseness and adaptability of its doctrinal base as a major weakness in Buddhism, contributing to its eventual absorption by a triumphant Hinduism in India and tending to syncretism when confronted by indigenous cultures. Étienne Lamotte (1958), in his Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, perhaps the standard work covering pre-mahayana Buddhist history in India, has bemoaned the way the Buddha left the order without master or hierarchy, and sees this as a major factor contributing to the eventual collapse of unity and the formation of sects. While Buddhists themselves lament the disappearance of the Dharma, the Doctrine, from its homeland, however, they tend to see this as an inevitable occurrence in an epoch when, as the Buddha predicted, spirituality is on the decline. From earliest times in Buddhism there was a strong tendency to portray the Doctrine not as a series of tenets to be accepted or rejected, but rather

2 2 MahÖyÖna Buddhism as a medicine for curing quite specific spiritual ills. Mahayanists in particular see adaptation, and perhaps even syncretism, as a virtue in the Dharma, enabling the teachings to be adapted to the needs of hearers, and thereby indicating the wisdom and compassion of the Omniscient Buddha. The importance of appreciating doctrinal diversity applies not just to Buddhism as a whole but to the Mahayana itself. There is a fallacy which I shall call the essentialist fallacy. It occurs when we take a single name or naming expression and assume that it must refer to one unified phenomenon. This is indeed a fallacy, as a little thought will show, but it is a peculiarly pervasive and deep-rooted fallacy, giving rise to the feeling that because we use the same word so there must be some unchanging core, perhaps a type of essence, to be identified by the relevant definition. Thus the same thing is expressed each time the utterance is used. Because the expression Mahayana (or its equivalent in the local language) has been used by Buddhists from perhaps as early as the first century BCE to the present day, from India through Tibet, Central Asia, Mongolia, China to Japan, Far East Asia and the Western world, so it must refer to some identifiable characteristics which we can capture in a definition. Surely the author must be able to define his subject, we are thinking, otherwise how does he know what he is talking about? Buddhist philosophy itself, from its inception, embodied a sustained criticism of this essentialist fallacy. As far back as we can trace the teaching of the Buddha we find a penetrating analysis by which unities are dissolved into their constituent parts and true diversity is revealed. An ability to look behind unities and see them as merely words, convenient but misleading linguistic constructs, has always formed an important factor in developing insight meditation, the spiritual cultivation which alone will lead to seeing things the way they really are, the sine qua non of nirvaua, enlightenment, the cessation of moral obscurations and ignorance. As far as we know the Buddha himself dissolved away the unity we call the human being, or person, into an ever-changing series of physical matter, sensations, conceptions, further mental contents such as volitions and so on, and consciousness. Thus there is dissolved away any real Self, any unchanging referent for the name, the word I. To understand this deeply and directly is to see things the way they really are, the practical repercussion of which is a complete cessation of egoistic grasping, attachment, and selfconcern. Thus the forces which lead to continued rebirth come to an end and thence ends, to quote the scriptures, this complete mass of frustration, suffering (Pali: dukkha). Such, as far as we can now tell, was the principal religious project of the Buddhist virtuoso monk at the time of the Buddha and in the early centuries after his death. As time went on, so those monks engaged in insight meditation took their analytical knives to the unities into which the human being had been dissolved, extending them to other beings, taking a closer look at the world around them and, as we shall see, in the Mahayana one tradition, the Madhyamika, set out to show that absolutely nothing, no matter how exalted, could resist this penetrating analysis, this analytic dissolution. So the critique of the essentialist fallacy was always an integral part of Buddhist philosophy and spiritual practice, although not all Buddhist traditions went as far as the

3 Introduction 3 Madhyamika in its application. It would be a good idea, I think, if we too could learn from the Buddhists at this early stage in our study of Mahayana to look behind linguistic unities and see them as simply constructions imposed by the use of a single naming expression. Mahayana is not, and never was, an overall single unitary phenomenon. It is not a sect or school but rather perhaps a spiritual movement (or, as Jan Nattier insists below, a vocation) which initially gained its identity not by a definition but by distinguishing itself from alternative spiritual movements or tendencies. Within Mahayana as a spiritual movement we find a number of doctrinal and philosophical schools and thinkers who cannot be placed so easily inside identifiable schools. Mahayana was, moreover, not a sudden phenomenon with a readily identifiable and unitary geographical or conceptual origin, it was not a planned movement spearheaded by a committee of geniuses (or fanatics). It developed over a number of centuries as an alternative and distinctive view of what Buddhism and the concern of some or perhaps even all Buddhists should ultimately be. Its growth and development in the early centuries was marked by, and from our perspective is all but identical with, the evolution of a new and distinctive canonical literature, the Mahayana setras. If we look at this enormous literature, claiming a disputed canonical authenticity, what we find in reality is a shifting mass of teachings with little or no central core, many of which are incompatible with each other and within which we can sometimes detect mutual criticism. There is scarcely a unitary phenomenon here, save in its eventual concern to identify itself as MahAyAna, as a great, superior path to religious fulfilment or perhaps the path to the greatest spiritual fulfilment distinguished from other religious tendencies which it considers to be inferior, that is, as HCnayAna. 1 It is for reasons like this that Jonathan A. Silk has suggested (in Williams 2005b: 377) adopting a minimalist approach to defining (or, better, specifying) Mahayana Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhists: Let us posit that Mahayana Buddhists were the authors of Mahayana scriptures, and a Mahayana community was a community of such authors. One immediate and fundamental result of this formulation is that we must stop referring, at the very least provisionally, to the Mahayana in the singular. Until and unless we can establish affinities between texts, and therefore begin to identify broader communities, we must provisionally suppose each scripture to represent a different community, a different Mahayana. Hence, Silk contends, we should thus be prepared to refer to Mahayanas rather than Mahayana. 2 In general what unifying element there is in Buddhism, Mahayana and non-mahayana, is provided by the monks and their adherence to the monastic rule. In the centuries after the death of the Buddha there arose a number of doctrinal schools and monastic sects. 3 The latter are primarily identified through their own Vinayas, or monastic codes. These do differ, and their differences indicate past schism and form fruitful fields of minute comparison for modern scholars. Monks in Sri Lanka are forbidden to handle money. In Tibet 4 monks were sometimes quite wealthy. Sri Lankan monks wear orange robes. Tibetan monks wear robes of heavy-duty maroon cloth, while Zen monks in Japan wear black.

4 4 MahÖyÖna Buddhism Heinz Bechert has pointed out that the Buddhist term usually translated as schism, satghabheda, literally splitting of the satgha, the monastic order, does not mean a schism in the sense known from Christian church history, where it nearly always implies dissensions in the interpretation of dogma. In Buddhist tradition, splitting of the Sangha always refers to matters of monastic discipline (Bechert 1982a: 65). Sects might as a matter of fact differ on doctrinal matters, and of course doctrinal differences might arise after schism has occurred, which could then differentiate further the groups thus formed. Nevertheless, differences of doctrine would seem to be a matter of the individual group attracted or convinced by them, rather than a monastic sect as such. In theory a monastery could happily contain monks holding quite different doctrines so long as they behaved in the same way crucially, so long as they adhered to the same monastic code. One of the major non-mahayana philosophical schools, the Sautrantika, seems to have had no monasteries and no separate monastic code. There were no Sautrantika monks, although there were monks who held Sautrantika views. We need to be cautious, however, about whether Bechert is right that satghabheda in ancient India was always a matter of monastic discipline, and could not be generated solely or primarily by doctrinal dispute. Recently Joseph Walser has argued that even in Theravada, at least if we can follow Buddhaghosa (fifth century CE), the term satghabheda can be found applied to cases of monks who teach what is not the Dharma (Doctrine) to be the Dharma, and not applied just to Vinaya matters (2005: ). And Walser recounts too a discussion in the Mahasatghika Vinaya that suggests disturbance in the institutional mechanism for scriptural reproduction as contributing to satghabheda, as well as Vinaya innovations (ibid.: 100 1). On the other hand Jonathan Silk says of the definition of satghabheda in the Vinaya of the Mahasatghika sect that it is constituted by a failure of all the monks resident in the same sacred enclosure (scma) to communally hold the uposatha rite. Differences over doctrine are not grounds for satghabheda in the Mahasatghika Vinaya. Silk is aware of an apparent contrast with some other sects, since he continues (in Williams 2005b: 380; italics original): In fact, what appears to be a contrast with the views of other sects, some of which allow doctrinal disputes to split the community (cakrabheda), has been shown by Shizuka Sasaki to be in reality a virtual universality of opinion that the only true cause of schism, at least in the times after the Buddha s nirvaua, is failure to hold joint rituals (karmabheda). Clearly, as Silk himself points out in a footnote, satghabheda and associated issues need further research. Although there are a number of different Vinayas that were formulated in ancient India, the differences, while important to the monks concerned, are nevertheless relatively insignificant. Moreover there was no Mahayana Vinaya as such produced in India. Indian Mahayana Buddhist monks and nuns all adhered to Vinaya rules which were formulated by the sects that originated during the early centuries of Buddhism in India. Outside India too, in ninth-century Tibet, for example, during the early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet,

5 Introduction 5 the king Khri lde gtsug brtan (pronounced: Tri day tsuk ten) decreed that monks should all adhere to the important monastic code of the Melasarvastivada, a sect and not in itself anything to do with Mahayana. As a result of this only the Melasarvastivada Vinaya was translated into Tibetan. The only complete Vinaya surviving in the original language is the Pali Vinaya of the Theravadins, the Buddhist tradition now associated with Sri Lanka and South-East Asia. 5 Other Vinayas are available in Chinese translation, and Chinese monks, nowadays and throughout most of history almost completely Mahayana in terms of their orientation and aspiration, generally adhered to the Sarvastivada and Dharmaguptaka Vinayas. In East Asia monks with Mahayana orientation sometimes produced texts modifying the spirit of the Vinaya, emphasizing the importance of a compassionate intention even if that might involve breach of the letter of the precept. But there was no significant attempt in India to construct and impose a systematic Mahayana Vinaya rivaling those of the sects of Nikaya Buddhism. Mahayana was not in origins, and really never was, a rival sect. It is unlikely therefore that as such it was a result of schism (satghabheda). 6 Mahayanaoriented monks, and monks with no interest in Mahayana whatsoever, could live without necessary discord in the same monastery so long as they held the same code, even though we have reason to believe that the non-mahayana monks may have viewed with some scorn the beliefs and private practices of the Mahayana monks and sometimes this scorn at least in the early days may have spilled over into more overtly antagonistic behaviour (see below). It is hence not surprising that some Chinese pilgrims to India, who left detailed accounts of their travels, not infrequently found monasteries containing both Mahayanaoriented monks and non-mahayana monks. Yijing (I-tsing), for example, writing at the very end of the seventh century CE, contrasts Mahayana and Hcnayana as follows: Both adopt one and the same discipline (Vinaya), and they have in common the prohibitions of the five skandhas ( groups of offences ), and also the practice of the Four Noble Truths. Those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the Mahayana SEtras are called the Mahayanists, while those who do not perform these are called the Hcnayanists. 7 It follows from this that it is possible for members of any Buddhist sect, any Buddhist tradition with a separate Vinaya, also to embrace Mahayana. Assuming the Pali expression vetullavada refers to Mahayana, then we know that there were quite early on followers of Mahayana in Sri Lanka within what would now be thought of as Theravada, who were suppressed by king Voharikatissa in the early third century CE. 8 Mahayana is held by its adherents to be the highest religious aspiration, the aspiration to full and perfect Buddhahood, to which is often added that this is for the benefit of all sentient beings. It is effectively the bodhisattvayana, the vehicle, path, or way followed by a Bodhisattva, one who is on the path to becoming a fully enlightened Buddha. As Jan Nattier puts it, with reference to one relatively early Mahayana setra: For the Ugra[paripVcchA SEtra]... the Mahayana is not a school, a sect, or a movement, but a particular spiritual vocation, to be pursued within the existing Buddhist

6 6 MahÖyÖna Buddhism community. To be a Mahayanist that is, to be a bodhisattva thus does not mean to adhere to some new kind of Buddhism, but simply to practice Buddhism in its most rigorous and demanding form. 9 It seems certain that this aspiration as a vibrant living option alongside the aspiration to simply one s own liberation, nirvaua, the state of an Arhat, originally took form across the boundaries of a number of Buddhist sects, and was no doubt in origin a generalization from an appreciation of the career of wisdom and compassion over many lifetimes of ]akyamuni, the historical Buddha himself. Research into the sectarian origins of putative early Mahayana setras (or of some versions of them) is very tentative and still very much in its infancy. But there is some evidence to support the suggestion that the UgraparipVcchA SEtra (Nattier 2003a: 80 1) or the RatnarAZi SEtra (Silk 1994: 32) may have originated among the Dharmaguptakas. It has also been suggested that the tathagatagarbha ( Buddha Nature ) teachings and therefore the TathAgatagarbha SEtra may have had something in origins to do with the Mahasatghika sect. 10 Moreover it may have been the case that the audience for the 25,000 Verse PrajñApAramitA SEtra and 100,000 Verse PrajñApAramitA SEtra was familiar with Dharmaguptaka teachings while the audience for the 8,000 Verse PrajñApAramitA SEtra was not (Walser 2005: 233 4). If we move outside the early Mahayana setras we find for example that the great compendium of Mahayana doctrine and practice known as the Dazhidulun (Ta-chih-tu Lun: *MahAprajñApAramitA }Astra) was almost certainly written by authors from a Sarvastivada or Melasarvastivada background (Demiéville 1973: 477). 11 The issue is however complicated since Nattier s work on the UgraparipVcchA has suggested that the setra may have circulated in a number of sectarian communities and been modified in accordance with sectarian context (Nattier 2003a: 129). Hence the actual sectarian origins of a setra may be elusive. That Mahayana was embedded in its origins and development in the Buddhist sects, not in themselves Mahayana, is supported by inscriptional evidence. With the exception of one inscription from perhaps 104 CE (Indian dating is an extremely precarious business), the earliest inscriptions containing recognizably Mahayana formulations date from as late as the fifth or sixth centuries CE. Moreover the earlier inscription, on a statue of Buddha Amitabha found in North India, while clearly Mahayana, also uses formulae characteristic of non- Mahayana epigraphy. As far as inscriptional and indeed artistic evidence is concerned, Mahayana appears to have been an uninfluential minority interest until well into the Common Era, originating firmly within the framework of other monastic traditions thought of as non- Mahayana (Schopen 2005: Chs 7 8). Summarizing the results of his extensive research into evidence for Mahayana in Indian inscriptions and art, Gregory Schopen (ibid.: 12) comments: The cumulative weight of the different evidences is heavy and makes it clear that regardless of what was occurring in China and although Mahayana setras were being written at the time, it is virtually impossible to characterise Indian Buddhism in the Middle Period the period from the first to the fifth century as in any meaningful sense Mahayana. In India it appears more and more certain that the Mahayana was not institutionally,

7 Introduction 7 culturally, or art historically significant until after the fifth century, and not until then did Mahayana doctrine have any significant visible impact on the intentions of Buddhist donors. Moreover Schopen also points out that the material evidence suggests that when Mahayana did emerge in India, perhaps in the fifth or sixth centuries, as a clearly named group with its own monasteries, this was in peripheral, marginal, areas where Buddhism had previously little or no presence or, alternatively, where it had declined (ibid.: 14). 12 The suggestion, then, is that Mahayana was in its origins and for many centuries in India almost exclusively the concern of a small number of monks and nuns originating from within the regular Buddhist sects, and as such subject to Vinayas that were not in themselves anything to do with Mahayana. Still, as David Seyfort Ruegg (2004: 16) has recently pointed out, absence of evidence for Mahayana in, e.g., art and inscriptions does not in itself indicate that Mahayana was not present, or how many followers of Mahayana there were: [E]arly Mahayana would appear neither to have been generally established as an organized institutional entity nor to have been constituted a socio-religious order separate and apart from the Nikayas [sects] of the ]ravakayana [i.e. non-mahayana Buddhism], which are better attested epigraphically at this early time. Accordingly, the absence from many a donative inscription of mention of either the Mahayana or the Mahayanist is perhaps just what might be expected in the circumstances....[a]n argument from silence can have force only if there exists a cogent reason for expecting a given document to refer to some thing had it in fact been in existence at the time of the writing of the document. Be that as it may, Schopen and Ruegg are both agreed that the idea of schism or radical break, and dramatic religious changes, simply fails to cohere with what we now know of Buddhist religious development as it occurred, not in texts but in actual practice in India, over a number of centuries. The relative moral unity provided by the Vinaya (at least for most of the Buddhist world) also has its parallel in the code for the laity. There are some differences, but generally speaking all over the Buddhist world someone will be deemed a particularly good Buddhist, a pious layperson, if he or she takes refuge in the Buddha, his Dharma, and the Community (satgha) usually or primarily the monastic order, although in Mahayana it can also include the wider community of committed practitioners and tries to adhere firmly and strictly to a renunciation of killing, stealing, sexual immorality, lying, and taking alcohol or mind-disturbing drugs. Thus in spite of the considerable diversity in Buddhism what we find is that Buddhism has a relative unity and stability in the moral code and in particular in the order of monks and (where they still exist) nuns. 13 The Indian background Richard Gombrich, in his companion volume to this one on TheravAda Buddhism (1988), has spoken of the councils after the death of the Buddha. Only the first two councils are

8 8 MahÖyÖna Buddhism accepted by all Buddhist traditions, although even here the details of their occurrence differ widely, so much so that it has been suggested that the First Council, supposedly held at Rajagvha immediately after the death of the Buddha, was in fact not held at all. Traditionally the reason for holding the First Council was a hint of moral laxity (that is, satghabheda) on the part of at least one monk, combined with the need to establish through recitation the Canon, to be transmitted in immaculate state to succeeding generations. The reciting and authorization by Arhats, those who had achieved enlightenment, of the texts of the Canon was the most important event of the First Council as far as Buddhist tradition is concerned. Indeed the event of the council was so important for succeeding generations that there is a Mahayana tradition which maintains that contemporaneous with the First Council which established the non-mahayana canon there was another council of Bodhisattvas, those beings who have vowed to become perfect Buddhas, superior to the Arhats. At this contemporaneous council the Bodhisattvas recited and authorized the collection of Mahayana setras. Thus the Mahayana setras, of debated authenticity, were given the prestige of antiquity and a respectable imprimatur. Nevertheless, with all due respect to Buddhist tradition, it really would be quite wrong to think that the Canon was settled and closed at this early date. There are works contained in the Pali Canon, for example, which date from many years after the death of the Buddha. In time different sects produced different canons, each claiming to be the one recited at the First Council. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that over a period of centuries there arose new texts also claiming to be the authentic word of the Buddha. We find a Sarvastivada source complaining, with reference to the three-fold division of the Canon, After the Nirvaua of the Buddha in the Setras, false Setras were placed; in the Vinaya, false Vinayas were placed; in the Abhidharma, false Abhidharmas were placed (Lamotte : 9; 2005b reprint: 193); and a later text: What can we do about it? The Master has entered Nirvaua, the Saddharma [True Doctrine] no longer has a leader. Many sects have formed which debase the meaning and the letter as they fancy (ibid.). Be that as it may, there is significant legendary evidence of dissension even at the time of the First Council. A monk named Puraua is reported to have commented that the Doctrine and the Discipline have been well chanted by the Elders; nevertheless, I maintain that I retain the Doctrine in my memory just as I heard it, just as I obtained it from the very lips of the Blessed One. (ibid.) It is important in looking at the development of Buddhism in India between the death of the Buddha and the rise of Mahayana to remember that we are dealing with centuries of doctrinal change combined with geographic dispersal over a subcontinent. It is easy to forget that while we can write in a few words about changes which took, say, 200 years, this is nevertheless to render artificially definite what was in reality a gradual shift not experienced, not lived through, by any one person. A series of gradual, almost imperceptible changes, from the perspective of the scholar who stands back and observes centuries in one glance, can indicate a massive change which no monk or layperson ever actually experienced.

9 Introduction 9 As with a painting by Seurat, for example, the picture is only visible from a distance. At the level of the canvas itself there is simply no picture at all. So too with changes in space. Buddhism probably spread within India and into Central Asia along trade routes, particularly the rivers, and the monks, who were by nature semi-nomadic, were natural missionaries. Nevertheless, India is a subcontinent with considerable regional, cultural, and geographic variation. In the days before fast public transport and telephones the spread of ideas was slow and ideas would necessarily undergo changes to suit local conditions and interests. It is quite wrong to think of Buddhism as an identifiable and homogeneous doctrine superimposed upon an identifiable and homogeneous Indian people. Time and space led to change and adaptation (without necessarily changing the fundamental moral and soteriological concerns). Moreover, in India after the time of the Buddha variations of time and space were compounded with considerable forces of political and social change. During the period from the death of the Buddha to an identifiable Mahayana we find, first of all, the breakdown of old monarchies and republics under forces of political unity and centralization, issuing in the first great national empire of ancient India, that of the Mauryas. With unification and strong central control, national and international trade and travel, society and ideologies too invariably changed. Richard Gombrich has devoted some space to discussing the importance for Buddhism of the great Buddhist Mauryan emperor Azoka (Asoka in Pali). Azoka (mid-third century BCE) seems to have extended the Buddhist cult of relic worship (contained in stepas, relic mounds), perhaps as a unifying factor for his fundamentally disunited empire, and to have encouraged Buddhist missionary activity. More importantly, he provided a favourable climate for the acceptance of Buddhist ideas, and generated among Buddhist monks certain expectations of patronage and influence on the machinery of political decision making. The historian A. L. Basham has argued convincingly that prior to Azoka Buddhism was a fairly minor factor in the religious life of India (Basham 1982: 140). Indeed one suspects that the impact of the Buddha in his own day was relatively limited. He is portrayed as an intimate of kings and nobles, and yet the friendship of the Buddha did not prevent the deposing of the king of the imperial power of Magadha, Bimbisara, by his crown prince. According to the legends this ungrateful son, Ajatazatru, even conspired with the Buddha s erring cousin Devadatta to kill the Buddha himself. It is a story of jealousy and enmity which suggests that the Buddha s charisma was not such as to banish all evil thoughts from the mind. According to Basham, archaeological evidence for Buddhism between the death of the Buddha and Azoka is scanty; after the time of Azoka it is relatively abundant. Unfortunately, however, the chronology and sequence of events in these centuries is extremely complex and obscure. Azoka sent various missionary-ambassadors abroad, and it has proved possible more or less to anchor chronologically the lifetime of Azoka in relationship to various Hellenistic kings apparently visited by these ambassadors. But this still gives rise to problems of how to relate the dates of Azoka to the time of the Buddha.

10 10 MahÖyÖna Buddhism The view found in the Southern (Singhalese) Buddhist tradition (at least, in its so-called corrected version) is that Azoka came to the throne 218 years after the death of the Buddha, and suggested correlations with Hellenistic rulers give the date of Azoka s accession at 268 BCE. Thus this gives 486 BCE for the death of the Buddha, and in the past this date has commonly been adopted by Western scholars. Azoka died in about 232 BCE. There are other ways of calculating the date of the death of the Buddha however, and in the Northern Buddhist tradition (found in, say, China) Azoka is said to have come to the throne just 100 years after the death of the Buddha. For his part Heinz Bechert (see Bechert 1982b: 30) favours the shorter Indian chronology. What this amounts to is that in common with certain earlier scholars Bechert advocates placing the death of the Buddha more than a century later than is usual, at roughly BCE. There is much to favour this later date, which would give just 100 years between the death of the Buddha and the reign of Azoka and would increase the value of the relatively abundant Azokan and post-azokan materials in understanding early Buddhism. Doubt as regards the accuracy of the 486 date is now so widespread among scholars that the one consensus that appears to be emerging is that the 486 BCE date commonly given in books on Buddhism is wrong. The death of the Buddha should be placed much nearer 400 BCE than 500 BCE. 14 Azoka himself advised monks on their reading matter and apparently purified the monastic order by expelling erring monks. This may have established a tradition in some circles of close contact between the monastic order and the secular arm. If so, perhaps this did not always have favourable results. But for our purposes what is significant here is the phenomenon of extensive lay patronage, with monks and laity drawing closer together. As we shall see, I do not hold to the theory that Mahayana Buddhism arose under direct lay influence and involvement. Nevertheless perhaps it is in the increasingly close relationship between monks and lay patrons, and the concern of certain monks with the spiritual welfare of as wide a social group as possible, that we can trace one way or another at least some of the formative elements of the Mahayana. Paradoxically, other formative elements of the Mahayana may lie in precisely a reaction against this growing involvement of the Buddhist satgha with what some seem to have considered excessively worldly concerns. And it may be from the time of Azoka that the forces issuing in the Mahayana, forces for an alternative conception of the spiritual path and goal (Nattier s vocation ), begin to crystallize. Étienne Lamotte has commented that if the Mauryan period, and particularly that of Azoka, marks the golden age of Buddhism, the two final centuries of the ancient era constitute a period of crisis (Lamotte 1958: 385). The Mauryan Empire fell within 50 years of the death of Azoka, seized by a Brahmin general, Puwyamitra ]uóga. There is a tradition that this general inaugurated a persecution of Buddhism, and it is from this time that it is possible to detect the growth of classical Indian devotional theism. Nevertheless Buddhist missionary activity continued, and the ]uóga period (second century BCE) also began the flowering of early Buddhist sculpture. With the decline of the ]uógas, North Indian history is dominated by invasions from Central Asia, by Greeks, Scyths (known as the ]akas in India), and the Yuezhi (Yüeh-chih). These Yuezhi were known in India as the Kuwauas, and their

11 Introduction 11 Indian empire was part of an extensive empire in Central Asia. The Kuwaua king Kaniwka (probably c. 127 CE) is said to have been an important patron of Buddhism, and in terms of patronage the age of invasions was significant for Buddhists, since the foreign invaders were among the most enthusiastic supporters of Buddhism. This was no doubt partly due to the willingness of monks to recognize kings as Bodhisattvas, or sometimes Universal Emperors (cakravartin), and also the fact that Buddhism is more readily able to accept foreigners than is orthodox Brahmanism, for which a foreigner is automatically an outcaste. Indeed, the interest of foreign kings and aristocrats in the possibility of being declared or declaring themselves to be Bodhisattvas may well have been one of the factors that made Mahayana itself particularly attractive to them, and it may be one factor too explaining the success of Mahayana forms of Buddhism outside India. The Bodhisattva is on the long path to Buddhahood. His or her model is that of the benevolent ]akyamuni who, over the many incarnations made widely familiar through the popular Jataka tales of the Buddha s previous births before becoming a Buddha, was often a king or prince, aristocrat, or rich merchant, but was always acting to benefit others. 15 Moreover since all agree that a Buddha is superior to an Arhat, so a monarch who is known to be a Bodhisattva may gain a reflected glory allowing him to claim or imply superiority over Buddhists on the path simply to becoming an Arhat, that is, most other Buddhists including the majority of Buddhist monks and nuns. It is perhaps in this context that we should understand the recently discovered Huviwka fragment, as well as a related recently discovered inscription from Endere, in Xinjiang in Central Asia. In both cases we have a king (including possibly the Kuwaua king Huviwka) described as having set forth on the Mahayana. The fragment dates from roughly the fourth century CE, although Huviwka reigned in the mid-second century (Braarvig 2002: ). The Endere inscription dates from about the middle of the third century CE, and has been related to a letter written on wood from about the same time, also from Central Asia, that refers to a local governor too as setting forth on the Mahayana (Walser 2005: 31 2, and references). Still, it seems to me one should be careful not to make too much of all this. We do not know what the content of the kings and other laypersons having set forth on the Mahayana amounts to, since we are very unclear what being a follower of the Mahayana then really meant in India, and particularly for a busy layperson. We lack a clear social and historical context for knowing what setting forth on the Mahayana actually involved at this time. What we can see, however, is that kings and other politically powerful lay dignitaries (especially perhaps foreign kings in India, and kings in wild foreign places outside India) were interested in declaring themselves to be Bodhisattvas. Of course, they could scarcely declare themselves Arhats. Given the Buddhist context, a king declaring himself or being declared a Bodhisattva as a price for patronage of Buddhism makes sense, and is perhaps not totally surprising. We know of places where it occurred elsewhere in Buddhist history in, e.g., what might be thought of as a Theravada context in Burma and Sri Lanka with no implications of any association with Mahayana ideas and practices. 16

12 12 MahÖyÖna Buddhism There is some reason to think that in India these foreign invasions may have engendered a sense of crisis in both orthodox and heterodox Indian traditions. According to Basham (1981: 46 7): The well known MArkaUReya Parvan, interpolated into the MahAbhArata, gives us an idea of how the time appeared to some at least of the orthodox brahmins. In the form of a prophecy,...we are told of impure barbarians overrunning the holy land of Bharatavarwa [India], slaughtering and looting, bringing in their wake insecurity of life and property, banditry, and the disintegration of the norms of family life. In these circumstances the sacrifices and rituals of orthodoxy are neglected, and the only religions to flourish are those of the heretics, who teach people to worship mounds (ereka) containing dead men s bones a clear reference to the Buddhists. Nevertheless, in Buddhism too invasion by foreigners seems to have been associated with legends and traditions of the final disappearance of the Buddha s teaching. There was a widely held view, found in the Canon, that the Buddhist Doctrine would last for only 500 years, but that it would have lasted for 1,000 years had it not been for the decision to admit women into the order. According to one scheme present in Indian Mahayana sources, however, after these 500 years the Dharma does not completely disappear. There remains a semblance or reflection of the Dharma. During this time Buddhist practice, and enlightenment, is not impossible but is much more difficult than it was during the first period. Eventually the Dharma becomes completely lost until its rediscovery by a future Buddha. 17 Not all sources are agreed on the figures of this eventual decline (see Lamotte 1958: 210 ff.). There is not infrequently a tendency to prolong each period. Nevertheless, an awareness of living in the last days, an era when things are on the decline, or are not what they were, life under siege, is common in early Mahayana sources, and (as we shall see in more detail below) it is possible that Mahayanists saw their own practices and beliefs in this context as bulwarks against this moral and spiritual decline. Factors that may have contributed to change I have argued that for Buddhism doctrinal differences are perhaps not always such a serious matter as they are for religions where salvation is based primarily on faith in certain tenets and dogmas. Schism, however, is classed as one of the most serious monastic offences, and we have also seen that the appearance after the death of the Buddha of setras deemed spurious was a source of concern to each school which considered its own Canon to be the sole complete and authentic testimony of the teaching of the Master. On the basis of accounts of his last days preserved in, e.g., the Pali MahAparinibbAna Sutta it is often said that the Buddha refused to appoint a successor, although the issue is complicated since there is also a widespread Buddhist tradition that it was Mahakazyapa who succeeded the Buddha as head of the Buddhist community, and tradition again has it that Mahakazyapa was responsible for the First Council and its codification of the teachings. 18

13 Introduction 13 Still, as far as we can tell from accounts of the last days of the Buddha, the Lord was at some pains to make sure before he died that his followers were united as a monastic body, and also united on, and fully understood, those practices which would lead to nirvaua, to Arhatship. It is possible that the Buddha did not think of his teaching as a massive and monolithic dogmatic structure but rather favoured a relative freedom for each disciple to go his or her way within the framework of Dharma thus laid down. At least, some such spirit may be reflected in the account of the Buddha s last days contained in this quotation from the Sarvastivada MahAparinirvAUa SEtra. The Lord gently told his attendant, fnanda: From the beginning, Ananda, I have taught you that whatever things are delightful and desirable, joyful and pleasing, these are subject to separation and destruction, to disintegration and dissociation. So Ananda, whether now or after my decease, whoever you are, you must remain as islands to yourselves, as defences to yourselves with the Dharma as your island and the Dharma as your defence, remaining unconcerned with other islands and other defences. If you ask the reason for this, then know that whether now or after my decease, whoever remain an island to themselves, as defences to themselves, with the Dharma as their island and the Dharma as their defence, not concerning themselves with other islands and other defences, such ones are the foremost of my questing disciples. (Snellgrove 1973: 401 2) We do not know, but perhaps the Buddha would not have been averse to later doctrinal innovation if it occurred within the fundamental structure of the Dharma, that is, if it was of spiritual benefit on the path to nirvaua. But what is to count as being of spiritual benefit? Perhaps it was the Buddha himself, but probably later tradition, who gave guidelines that culminated in the four great arguments/authorities (mahapadeza) for controlling doctrinal innovation. These provide criteria for appraising whether a teaching heard is a genuine word of the Buddha or not. A teaching heard can be judged authentic if it is received from the Buddha himself, or a satgha of elders, or a group of elders specializing in the transmission of Dharma, Vinaya or MAtVkAs (proto-abhidharma see below) or just one monk who specializes in those. But one can only appeal to the prestige of these four authorities if what is taught also coheres with what is known to be accepted already as scriptural tradition, i.e. it coheres with the Setras and the Vinaya. Other sources also add that such putative word of the Buddha should not contradict the way of things (dharmata). 19 Nevertheless, these criteria for doctrinal appraisal still leave room for a great deal of subjective interpretation. This subjectivity may have been exacerbated in some circles by a further group of four interpretive principles albeit by no means accepted universally the four reliances (pratizaraua). These specified that one should rely on the Dharma rather than the person teaching the Dharma, the meaning or point (artha) rather than the actual words used, setras that are definitive (nctartha) rather than those requiring interpretation in some

14 14 MahÖyÖna Buddhism further sense (neyartha), and rely on gnosis, direct insight ( jñana), rather than discursive everyday awareness (vijñana). If Buddhism as a whole lacked a hierarchical system with a leader at the top to whom finally all disputes could be referred, then this too might have encouraged the possibility of doctrinal divergence as each person or group, or regional satgha, or whatever remained an island to itself. In particular, compared with the early days subsequent centuries showed that much of the Master s teaching was unsystematized and perhaps sometimes ambiguous or, from a point of view favourable to innovation, flexible and open. From the perspective of later doctrinal concerns it was not always clear whether the Buddha had been talking in colloquial terms or within the framework of literal philosophical truth. For example, the school (or schools) known as the Vatscputrcya-Satmitcya taught the actual existence, in some sense felt to be stronger than simply a practical one, of a pudgala, a person (see Priestley 1999; Châu 2000). This appeared to its opponents to play a number of the roles given to a Self. In defence of this teaching the Vatscputrcya-Satmitcya quoted a setra in which the Buddha maintained that the five psycho-physical constituents (skandhas) which make up the human being are a burden, and the bearing (or bearer ; see Collins 1982: 164 5) of the burden is the person (pudgala) with this or that name. The person must therefore be an entity in addition to the psycho-physical constituents which other Buddhists accepted as the true analysis of the human being. Opponents objected that the Buddha was not speaking here literally but loosely. They insisted that the so-called person is not an ultimate reality but just a verbal object, a concept superimposed upon the psycho-physical constituents for practical purposes in the same way that the concept table is superimposed upon the table s parts. The need to elucidate and systematize, to list the phenomena which do indeed really exist and distinguish them from the conceptual constructions of our everyday life, eventually issued among the Buddhist schools and sects in the great lists and ontological disputes of the Abhidharma. It is important to remember, however, that all the schools and sects of Buddhism considered their teachings and traditions to be perfectly orthodox. They each tended to highlight passages of their canon which supported their own views while ignoring or reinterpreting passages which might be taken to support other schools. Let us note now some institutional factors in early Buddhism, in addition to the absence of one supreme head which, it has been suggested, may have promoted the development of rival traditions of interpretation and practice (see here, in particular, Dutt 1970: 42 50). First, there was the division of monks into bodies, each concerned with the recitation and preservation of particular sections of the scriptures. We know that from an early time there were specialists in the Setras, and specialists in the Vinaya. With time the setra specialists, for example, also tended to divide into groups specializing in particular sections of the Setra canon. With the rise of the Abhidharma as a systematic analysis of the totality into its constituents there undoubtedly followed groups of monks specializing in philosophical analysis, fragmentation of the everyday world into its ultimately or finally real elements.

15 Introduction 15 It is perfectly possible that the Sautrantika school, which appears to have rejected as such much of the Abhidharma and subjected it to trenchant criticism, favouring the setras, was composed of setra specialists and its opposition to the Abhidharma reflected such opposition between rival groups of scriptural recitation and exegesis. 20 Second, there was the grouping of monks around noted teachers, who were themselves specialists in particular branches of the teaching. The names of a number of the early schools appear to be derivatives from personal names Dharmaguptakas from a teacher named Dharmagupta, the Vatscputrcyas from Vatscputra, and so on. We hear in the Canon of personal disciples of the Buddha who were noted for their attainments in particular branches of the Doctrine. Thus we find reference to ]ariputra as the great philosophical analyst, and Upali as a specialist in the Vinaya. Third, we should note that initially there may have been a relative flexibility in the rules of discipline. According to Nalinaksha Dutt, the monastic rules were defined but not codified at the time of the Buddha, and there is evidence that the Buddha himself was willing to adapt the rules to fit in with particular personal or group circumstances. Adaptation was possible to suit particular local conditions and it appears that a well-controlled monk could under certain circumstances be permitted greater freedom than his ill-disciplined brethren. We know also that the Buddha permitted greater austerity in some cases, but resisted attempts to persuade him to require austerities of all monks. Indeed, as we shall see, as time passed and Buddhist monasticism became more complex, wealthy, and socially more closely integrated into Indian lay society an ascetic backlash an appeal to the virtues and even the necessity of such additional austere ascetic practices (in Sanskrit known as the dhetaguuas), such as always wearing robes made from rags from the rubbish heap, in order to be a good or serious Buddhist monk may have been an important factor in the rise of the Mahayana itself. Finally, it has been suggested that the Buddha s preference for preserving and teaching the Dharma in local languages rather than the pan-indian Sanskrit may have led to misunderstanding and differences between traditions. In some cases this might have happened, for we know that difficulties in sanskritization of Middle Indo-fryan (like Pali) expressions sometimes led to later confusion or different understandings. 21 But it is doubtful to my mind whether this would have been a major factor in promoting the growth of different doctrinal schools. Abhidharma Perhaps the most interesting doctrinal developments among the early schools were the growth of the Abhidharma on the one hand and the supramundane (lokottaravada) teachings on the other. Early Mahayana setras, particularly those of the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajñaparamita), show in general a certain animosity towards at least some trends in the Abhidharma which is not to say (as is often said) that they were antagonistic to the Abhidharma project as such. On the other hand it is possible to detect in the