CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER

Transcription

1 CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER 1 BRIEFING Vol.14 issue 5 december 2012 Uzbekista: What Chages ca be Expected? Alexey Malasheko Summary Tashket is tryig to coduct relatios with both its eighbors ad outside powers (Chia, Europe, Russia, ad the Uited States) from the positio of regioal leader. The situatio i Cetral Asia is largely determied by the developmets iside Uzbekista. The existig istitutios i Uzbekista the presidecy, parliamet, ad political parties are maily formal. The 1992 Costitutio is ostesibly democratic, but the coutry is really govered by oe perso: Presidet Karimov. However, it would be wrog to describe Uzbekista s actual political life as dyig, give the traditioal presece of iter-cla rivalry ad power struggles i the presidet s ier circle, as well as the existece of the illegal Islamist oppositio. A stable Islamist oppositio that icludes a multitude of factios appeared i Uzbekista right after the coutry gaied its idepedece. The Islamists mai goal is to create a supraatioal califate i Cetral Asia with the Ferghaa Valley servig as its territorial ucleus. The regime views the religious oppositio as the mai threat to its existece. Closer ties with Washigto agaist a backdrop of cautious distacig from Moscow is emergig as the leadig tred i Uzbekista s multi-vector foreig policy. The costat search for partership alteratives to Russia ad the desire to escape Russia s guardiaship, while ot turig dow its ecoomic ad political support, are evidet. Tashket is ot plaig to participate i Moscow-led iteratioal orgaizatios, cosiderig them a threat to its sovereigty. Uzbekista s key political issue is power successio. The ew leader s risky task of establishig himself will be accompaied by the elite s iteral struggle, which will be especially itese, sice Uzbekista lacks a sigle cla or iterest group that is able to impose its will o the etire elite. Exteral actors will ot play a particularly sigificat role i the trasitio of power. Uzbekista sees itself as a regioal Cetral Asia power. Ideed, the situatio i the regio is largely determied by Uzbekista s domestic situatio, ad it is precisely from the positio of regioal leader that Tashket is tryig to coduct relatios with its eighbors as well as with outside powers Chia, Europe, Russia, ad the Uited States. Hece, exteral iterest i the coutry s iteral political situatio ad i the aticipated chages withi its rulig elite is uderstadable. The mai source of itrigue is who will lead the coutry after its first presidet, Islam Karimov, ad o oe is able to predict the outcome. The situatio i Uzbekista has two compoets: formal ad traditioal. Such istitu-

2 2 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 5 ] Alexey Malasheko, professor, holds a doctorate i history ad is a member of the Caregie Moscow Ceter s Research Coucil ad co-chairma of its Religio, Society ad Security program. tios as the presidecy, parliamet, ad political parties represet formal politics. The Costitutio, adopted i 1992, outwardly appears reasoably democratic, but key decisios are made i the presidetial admiistratio, or rather by Karimov himself, who has bee head of state sice idepedece was gaied as a result of the Soviet Uio s dissolutio i The last such decisio ivolved the itroductio of amedmets to the Costitutio by the Uzbekista Seate o December 5, 2011, reducig the presidetial term from seve to five years. Some observers iterpreted these amedmets as a hit that Karimov would ot take part i the 2014 presidetial electio. Others, o the cotrary, argued that this chage provides him with a legitimate costitutioal framework to be elected for aother term. The third view was that the reductio of the presidetial term was a hit to the future presidet to be cotet with a five-year term ad ot cout o remaiig head of state virtually for life. The reductio of the presidetial term ca also be regarded as a message to the West that democracy is allegedly still ot alie to Karimov. 1 Ideed, i the speeches of the presidet of Uzbekista ad high-rakig officials, oe ca fid may passages cocerig respect for democratic values ad huma rights. From time to time the Uzbek leadership shows its mercy by freeig its oppoets from prisos. Usually this is doe durig periods of improvemet of relatios with the West ad o the eve of visits by high-rakig Americas. Thus, o the eve of the visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clito i December 2010, huma rights activist Norboy Kholhigitov was released, as well as Jamshid Karimov, who had bee detaied for five years udergoig compulsory psychiatric treatmet. I the summer of the same year, poet Yusuf Juma was released from the Jaslyk detetio facility. Karimov himself ot oly expressed his persoal ad profoud respect, but also declared that he was willig to take sigificat steps i the liberalizatio of the political system i order to leave this legacy to our childre ad gradchildre. 2 It is etirely obvious though that uder the curret presidet o sigificat liberalizatio will take place. The political system has log lost its competitiveess, there is o iflow of ew ideas, ad access to iformatio is restricted. The oppositio s foreig websites, the Uzbek BBC website, ad the site of the ifluetial Russia ewspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which publishes materials o Cetral Asia, are all blocked. 3 After the Iteret was used as a tool (albeit ot the mai oe) to overthrow several Arab regimes, the govermet of Uzbekista has bee actively moitorig social etworks. It is difficult to predict to what extet fears about the Iteret are justified. At the same time, it is well kow that the Iteret did ot play a role i the 2005 Adija evets, whe mass protests resulted i govermet troops firig ito the crowd ad causig hudreds of deaths. I oe of the reports of the Iteratioal Crisis Group, the political eviromet i Uzbekista is described as deterioratig. 4 Such a assessmet is justified i relatio to the activities of local parties, the isigificace of the Parliamet, ad the virtual lack of secular oppositio. However, give the presece of the traditioal compoet iter-cla rivalry, power struggles i the presidet s ier circle, ad the existece of the illegal Islamist oppositio Uzbekista s political life caot be see as dyig. There are several clas i Uzbekista: Samarkad (Samarkad-Bukhara), Tashket, Ferghaa, Karakalpaksta, Khorezm, ad Surkash (which comprises the atives of Surkhadaria ad Kashkadaria). The Tashket ad Samarkad clas are the most powerful i the coutry. Depedig o who you talk to, Islam Karimov himself has bee said to belog to either the former or the latter cla. However, it seems that Karimov s behavior is ot determied by his affiliatio with oe of the clas, but by his desire from the start to positio himself as a atioal leader. Karimov had to costatly prove his leadership while maitaiig the power that he iherited as a legacy from the Soviet era. I the 2000s, Karimov defiitively cosolidated his positio as atioal leader. The discussios about which cla the presidet belogs to have largely lost their importace. Exteral powers, such as Chia, Russia, ad the Uited States, o loger pay much attetio to the cla factor. For them it is o loger very importat which cla the ext presidet of Uzbekista represets. I the absece of secular oppositio, protest agaist the govermet ca oly take the form

3 Uzbekista: What Chages ca be Expected? 3 of appeals to Islam. From the very begiig of the existece of Uzbekista as a idepedet state, solid Islamic oppositio has emerged comprisig umerous factios, with Hizb ut-tahrir (HUT) ad the Islamic Movemet of Uzbekista (IMU) beig amog the largest. I additio to them, the Akromiya, Adolat Uushmasi, Islam Lashkari, Nur, Tovba, Izu Sokol, Ma rifatchitlar, ad Takfirshirlar movemets are active. Most Islamic orgaizatios are groups with small memberships, or eve circles. However, accordig to the oppositio leaders, more tha 100 thousad of these orgaizatios followers are kept i prisos. 5 This figure is possibly greatly exaggerated, but it must be recogized that Islamists have a broad social base. The mai goal of Islamists is to create a supraatioal caliphate i Cetral Asia with the Ferghaa Valley servig as its territorial ucleus. I essece, the pro-caliphate movemet primarily stads for struggle agaist the regime ad persoally agaist Islam Karimov, who, i the publicatios of HUT ad the IMU, is characterized as the devil icarate, a supporter of the West ad Zioism, ad also Moscow s accomplice i restorig the Soviet imperial space. Oe of the HUT leaflets stated that his soul is full of hatred to Islam he does ot like Islam. He is a ifidel, who does ot recogize Islam. 6 I practical terms what these factios mostly do is dissemiate propagada ad attract ew supporters. HUT s jourals Al-Va I (Cosciece) ad Al-Hadara (Civilizatio) are distributed i mosques, at uiversities, ad i public trasportatio. The authorities regularly seize hudreds of thousads of leaflets. The cotet of these leaflets, as well as of other publicatios, is primitive, but accessible to ordiary people. Egalitaria ideas ad social justice are emphasized. There are also may refereces to the Kora ad Hadith. The leaflets are prited i both Uzbek ad Russia. Terrorist acts committed by religious extremists are perceived egatively by people ad discredit the oppositio i their eyes. The most well-kow was a attempt o Presidet Karimov s life back i Several terrorist attacks occurred i 2004 i Tashket, the Tashket Oblast, ad Bukhara. The Islamic Jihad orgaizatio took resposibility for these acts. A few days before the Adija evets of 2005, there was a terrorist attack i Khaabad. 8 The fact that eve the radical IMU was ot ivolved i the evets i Khaabad ad Adija, as its head, Tohir Yo ldosh, declared immediately after the attacks, is very revealig. The IMU ad its leaders have repeatedly emphasized that their party rejects terrorism as a way to achieve the orgaizatio s goals. I terms of its policy toward Islam, the regime is focusig its efforts o two approaches. First, it attempts to use Islam as a tool to keep the regime i power, ad also as a key part It is etirely obvious though that uder the curret presidet o sigificat liberalizatio will take place. The political system has log lost its competitiveess, there is o iflow of ew ideas, ad access to iformatio is restricted. of the official ideology. Secod, it suppresses religious oppositio. I 1991, Karimov felt the power of the Islamists for the first time. Sice the, he has always feared them, cosiderig them the mai threat to his regime. Struggle with the Islamists has become a priciple of his domestic policy. Karimov s critics believe that the aggressive fight agaist the Islamic oppositio icreases its popularity ad that the Islamic threat itself is deliberately exaggerated by him. Islam Karimov has successfully merged atioalism ad Islam ito a official ideology ad made it part of the political life of the coutry. However, the questio is whether his successor will be able to maitai the balace betwee the two. Whether Uzbekista remais a secular state depeds upo whether this geeratio ad more importatly, subsequet geeratios work out the balace betwee religio ad atioalism. 9 The state of the ecoomy will also have a effect o the trasitio of power. O the oe had, the overall ecoomic stadig of the coutry is geerally positive. The atioal ecoomy is diversified. Idustry cotributes 24 percet to the coutry s GDP, services 44 percet, ad costructio 7 percet, while 18 percet of GDP is produced i agriculture (at least 20 percet of which is represeted by the productio of raw cotto). The World Bak believes that Karimov s govermet maaged to achieve macroecoomic stability, restrai iflatio by

4 4 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 5 ] The World Bak believes that Karimov s govermet maaged to achieve macroecoomic stability, restrai iflatio by pursuig tight credit ad fiscal policy, ad gradually reduce the atioal debt. pursuig tight credit ad fiscal policy, ad gradually reduce the atioal debt. 10 This ecoomic success was largely due to icreased state cotrol. However, it was the very same ivolvemet by the govermet i the ecoomy that created barriers to the developmet of a free market, hidered ecessary liberal ecoomic reforms, ad held back the emergece of small- ad medium-size busiesses. Apart from that, it also led to the proliferatio of corruptio. As a result, accordig to the America publicatio The Daily Beast, Uzbekista occupied fifth place of 183 coutries o the list of the most corrupt states. 11 The shadow ecoomy accouts for approximately percet of its GDP. Uemploymet remais oe of the biggest problems i Uzbekista. Accordig to the Miistry of Labor ad Social Security, i 2012 it accouted for 5 percet of the umber of employable people, ad the umber of uemployed has reached thousad. 12 I reality, uemploymet is much higher; the Europea Uio estimates it to be as high as 35 percet. 13 It must be oted that more tha 1 millio Uzbek migrat laborers work i Russia every year. These workers trasfer $4.3 billio to Uzbekista 14 (accordig to other sources, i 2011 they trasferred $5 billio). Thus, Uzbek Prime Miister Shavkat Mirziyayev s statemet that every year 1 millio jobs are created i the coutry 15 is highly questioable. Demographics cotribute to the icrease i uemploymet. A high birth rate ad the costat iflow to cities of youg people from rural areas lead to a permaet growth i social tesios. It will ot be possible to solve these problems i the ear future. A forecast, prepared by a iteratioal research ceter with the support of the Asia Developmet Bak ad the UN Developmet Program, estimates that Uzbekista s populatio will reach millio i 2025, 7 millio of whom will be uemployed. 16 The resolutio of these ad other problems will take a log time, stretchig over geeratios. It is impossible to overcome difficulties without exteral assistace. Therefore, cooperatio with foreig parters, first of all with Chia, Russia, ad the Uited States, ad recetly with Europe, especially with Germay, has become icreasigly importat for Uzbekista. Uzbekista s relatios with Russia ad the Uited States are full of itrigue, which, upo closer examiatio, has a simple ad uderstadable explaatio. Russia ad the Uited States are competitors i the struggle for ifluece i Uzbekista. Therefore, Uzbekista s multi-vector policy is largely based o the rivalry betwee these two coutries. From time to time Tashket either stregthes or dimiishes the liks with oe of them. However, the geeral tedecy i this balace is toward a closer rapprochemet with Washigto while slowly ad carefully distacig itself from Moscow. The whole twetyyear history of Uzbekista, as well as other former Soviet republics, is a cotiual search for parters that would provide a alterative to Russia. The former Soviet states wat to escape Russia s guardiaship, while ot turig dow its ecoomic ad political support. For Uzbekista, the shift toward the Uited States bega after 9/11. At the time, Karimov decided that it was precisely Uzbekista that had become the key parter i the regio for America i its fight agaist terrorism. However, ecoomic ad political divideds from this tured out to be less sigificat tha Tashket had expected. The allocated fudig proved to be much lower, while the Americas cotiued to criticize the regime for the absece of democracy ad violatios of huma rights. If the evets of 9/11 led to a rapprochemet betwee the Uited States ad Uzbekista, the 2005 violet crackdow o protests i Adija alieated Tashket from Washigto. Wester coutries adopted a umber of sactios agaist Uzbekista, with a ba o arms sales i particular. Islam Karimov was agai subjected to severe criticism. However, these measures could ot make a sigificat impact o the Uzbek regime, which did ot ited to chage its domestic policy ad had certaily o remorse for the methods used to suppress the Adija protest. As world experiece shows, the effect of sactios i geeral is very low. Besides, havig Russia as a ally, Uzbekista did ot have to worry about sactios at all.

5 Uzbekista: What Chages ca be Expected? 5 Moscow with few scruples fully accepted Uzbekista s official versio that the uprisig had bee allegedly provoked by local radicals with the support of iteratioal terrorism. Karimov adopted a wait-ad-see attitude, sice he was cofidet that sooer or later his actios would be forgotte ad sactios would be eased ad evetually dropped altogether. Time showed that he had chose the right tactics. Relatively quickly the Adija drama became history, eclipsed by other evets i Kyrgyzsta ad the Middle East. The mai factor that chaged the approach to Uzbekista was Barack Obama s decisio to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghaista i This ecessitated ievitable adjustmets to the U.S. policy i Cetral Asia, makig it subordiate to the mai Afgha goal ad requirig a more careful attitude toward U.S. parters i the regio. O September 22, 2012, the U.S. Cogress agreed to resume arms supplies to Uzbekista, liftig the ba itroduced i A delegatio led by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus made a visit to Tashket i order to determie what kid of weapos Uzbekista eeds. The so-called Mabus list was draw up, which icluded mie clearig, ight visio, terrai scaig, ad eavesdroppig devices, as well as equipmet makig it possible to cotrol the Iteret ad break ito social etworks. All these muitios ad techologies have a dual purpose. 17 I light of the fact that i the foreseeable future Uzbekista will most likely ot be cofroted with Taliba aggressio, the U.S. weapos that it expects to get are eeded primarily for the regime s iteral purposes; moreover, they are for the fight ot oly agaist armed Islamic radicals but also agaist ay discotet ad disset. Fially, they ca be used o Uzbekista s borders with its eighbors. Karimov s desire to obtai weapos from the Uited States is a demostratio to Moscow that Uzbekista ca do without Russia arms. Supplyig weapos remais oe of the ways of bidig Uzbekista to Russia. Karimov is more tha frak about this situatio. I 2009, at a meetig i Tashket with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burs ad the Advisor to the Presidet o Russia ad Eurasia Michael McFaul (who was later appoited U.S. Ambassador to Russia), Karimov argued, for example, that the Collective Security Treaty Orgaizatio (CSTO) was created as a couterweight to NATO. The CSTO, he emphasized, has three goals: to promote Russia domiatio i the post-soviet space; to provide multiatioal protectio i case of Russia attacks o such problematic coutries as Georgia ad Ukraie; ad to deploy Russia troops i Cetral Asia o a permaet basis. Karimov eve suggested that the attack o Adija was a sigal to force Uzbekista to joi the Collective Rapid Reactio Force (CRRF), 18 which had bee created withi the framework of the CSTO. The Uited States repeatedly advised Uzbekista to withdraw from the CSTO, declarig its willigess to provide it with military ad techical assistace i retur. However, Karimov cotiued to maeuver ad did ot let the America vector i his foreig policy work to the detrimet of the Russia oe. I 2012, a ew stage i the developmet of relatios with the Uited States bega. Whether it may be cosidered a strategic tur, oly time will tell. However, there are circumstaces i favor of that very coclusio. First, after the withdrawal of America troops from Afghaista i 2014, Tashket is coutig o fially becomig the mai parter i the regio for the Uited States. Secod, there are cocers i Uzbekista over Russia s activity i the regio, whose aim is the creatio uder its auspices of iteratioal orgaizatios that could limit the sovereigty of their participats. The Arab Sprig, which resulted i Islamists comig to power i several Muslim states, cotributed to the improvemet of relatios betwee Uzbekista ad the Uited States. Washigto eeds reliable parters i the Muslim world as ever before, ad Uzbekista is positioig itself as such a parter. Moreover, it has bee able to covice the Uited States of its sustaiability ad has show itself to be stroger tha the authoritaria regimes i Egypt, Libya, Tuisia, ad Yeme. It is also importat that hypothetically the alterative to the Uzbek regime is see to be ot moderate Islamism as i Turkey but rather religious radicalism. At the same time, while makig its choice i favor of the Uited States, Uzbekista does ot ited to cut off its relatios with Russia. Karimov has maaged to get Moscow accustomed to chages i its policy, payig o attetio to Moscow s displeasure. It must be oted that this irritatio has bee expressed by lowrakig Russia politicias, who oly rarely

6 6 BRIEFING [ VOL. 14 ISSUE 5 ] make commets o the escapades of the Uzbek top leadership, which are upleasat for them, while Karimov criticizes Russia sharply ad quite frequetly. Agaist the backgroud of itese political passios, Uzbek-Russia ecoomic relatios are developig i a relatively positive way. Accordig to the trade missios of both coutries, the trade turover betwee them reached $6.7 billio i 2011, which made Russia Uzbekista s top tradig parter. I 2011 it accouted for almost a quarter of the coutry s overall trade turover. 19 Uzbekista occupies fourth place amog Russia s CIS parters. Uzbekista supplies atural gas, automobiles, ad textiles to Russia. Gazprom purchases 13.5 billio cubic meters of gas aually. 20 Soyuzeftegaz, Lukoil, ad Traseftegaz also have projects i Uzbekista. 21 Lukoil is actively egaged i the Khauzak atural gas field, the projected capacity of which is estimated at 12 billio cubic meters. Lukoil plas to ivest $5.5 billio i the Uzbek ecoomy over the course of seve years. 22 Political relatios betwee Tashket ad Moscow are becomig more ad more complex. At the same time, it seems that both sides have become accustomed to this situatio. Tashket tries to build relatios with Russia strictly o a bilateral basis, cosiderig participatio Whoever succeeds Islam Karimov will have to fulfill the role of atioal leader ad bear persoal resposibility for the situatio i the coutry. i iteratioal orgaizatios created uder the auspices of Moscow a threat to its sovereigty. Uzbekista does ot wat to bid itself with ay other commitmets. While the CIS is cosidered a ievitable ad useless vestige of the post-soviet era, the CSTO is perceived by Tashket with suspicio. O the other had, the CSTO is of o use to Uzbekista. I the summer of 2012, Tashket oce agai declared that it would susped its membership i the CSTO. Give that the CSTO s Charter does ot provide for such a procedure, it meas that Uzbekista will withdraw. This decisio was ot uexpected, sice eve earlier Uzbekista expressed its disagreemet with a whole umber of CSTO decisios. I particular, it did ot agree with committig its troops i order to resolve iteral coflicts i member states ad, therefore, Tashket ref used to participate i the CRRF. Fially, Tashket did ot sig the agreemet uder which a military base of a third coutry ca be built o the territory of a CSTO member oly if approved by all members of the orgaizatio. Moscow s reactio to Tashket s decisio to withdraw from the CSTO was rather moderate. Apparetly, the Kremli, as metioed earlier, has already become accustomed to its ally s ustable behavior, or it came to the coclusio that the CSTO ca do without Uzbekista. Moscow is begiig to uderstad that its recurret attempts to pull Uzbekista ito the CSTO will make Moscow look like a suppliat. At the same time, the situatio highlights the CSTO s problems ad makes other members more critical of the orgaizatio. It was highly symbolic that the decisio to leave the CSTO was made just a few weeks after Vladimir Puti s visit to Tashket. The aim of Puti s visit was to egage Uzbekista i Russia s ew itegratio projects. There were eve rumors, iitiated by Moscow, that Uzbekista was iterested i joiig the Commo Ecoomic Space. However, the withdrawal from the CSTO uequivocally showed ot oly that Tashket will cotiue to give priority to buildig relatios o a bilateral basis but also that it is icreasigly orietig itself toward the West. The key issue of Uzbekista s iteral ad thus its foreig policy at the begiig of the 2010s is the issue of successio. The persoificatio of power is typical for all Cetral Asia states. Whoever succeeds Islam Karimov will have to fulfill the role of atioal leader ad bear persoal resposibility for the situatio i the coutry. The optio of turig Uzbekista ito a parliametary republic as has bee doe i Kyrgyzsta is ot feasible. Eve if such a system is suddely formed, it will oly serve as a cover for iter-cla struggles (the very idea of a parliametary republic has to a large extet bee discredited by the Kyrgyz experiece). The Uzbek regime will remai authoritaria. Its head will ot ejoy authority equal to that of Islam Karimov. I the eyes of the elites ad society, he will likely appear as a provisioal presidet represetig a compromise betwee various Uzbek clas. The ew leader will have to walk dow a risky path to es-

7 Uzbekista: What Chages ca be Expected? 7 tablish himself ad prove his right to leadership. This will be accompaied by a struggle withi the elite, which ca affect the situatio i the society at large. Uzbekista has either a cla or a iterest group capable of imposig its will o the political elite or becomig the oly support for the ew presidet. The ifluece of exteral actors o the trasitio of power will ot be very sigificat. Neither Chia, or the Uited States, ad still less Russia have their ow preferred cadidates. Beijig, Washigto, ad Moscow will accept whomever the local elites preset to them (regardless of whether he is appoited by Islam Karimov or determied by the cosesus of the local elites). Apart from that, they do ot have serious plas to chage the ature of the regime. The West recogizes that liberalizatio ca cotribute to the stregtheig of the Islamists. As for Russia, ay authoritaria regime is easier for it to deal with tha somethig more liberal (Russia criticism of the political situatio i Kyrgyzsta testifies to this). The ew leader will develop the mai strategic directios that were set by Karimov ad cotiue the multi-vector foreig policy, but with eve greater focus o the West, specifically o the Uited States. I case the trasitio of power is soft, Uzbekista might experiece a brief period of limited liberalizatio. This will represet aother gesture toward Europe ad the Uited States. The declie of Russia ifluece will edure ad will be accompaied by assuraces of friedship ad cooperatio, especially i the ecoomy. There certaily are t ay uambiguously pro-russia politicias i Uzbekista ay more, ad they are ulikely to appear. The future of relatios betwee Uzbekista ad Muslim coutries will be itriguig. Tashket will have to take ito accout the comig of Islamists ito power i several coutries ad the geeral icrease of the impact of the Islamic factor o iteratioal politics. Oe caot exclude the possibility that i that cotext the govermet will have to modify its approach to the Islamist oppositio, makig it more pragmatic ad recogizig the existece of a moderate wig withi it. Notes 1 Yadgor Norbutaev, Uzbekista: Chto pod aperstkami u Islama Karimova? [Uzbekista: What does Islam Karimova have uder the shells of his shell game?], 2 Yadgor Norbutaev, SSCHA-Uzbekista: Islam Karimov skazal imeo to, chto khotela uslischat Hillari Klito [Uzbekista: Islam Karimov said exactly what Hillary Clito wated to hear], article.php?id= Timur Yusupov, Ne vse vremya dlya Demokratii. Pochemu v TSA vryad li poyavitsya svoy Navaliy [Not all the time for Democracy. Why Cetral Asia will ot get its ow Navaliy] Oazis 166, o. 2 (Jauary 2012). 4 The Failure of Reform i Uzbekista: Ways Forward for the Iteratioal Commuity (A Iteratioal Crisis Group Asia Report, o. 76, Osh/Brussels, March 11, 2004), p. 5, 5 Sulta Khamadov, Ot togo, kak budut stroit v Uzbekistae otosheia s oppozitsiei, zavisit situatsia v regioe [The situatio i the regio will deped o how relatios with the oppositio i Uzbekista will be built], Bizes & Politika (Dushabe) (September 15, 2000). 6 Deyaia pravitelei v Uzbekistae [The acts of the rulers i Uzbekista]. Quoted from: Vitaliy Poomaryov, Islam Karimov protiv Hizb Ut-Tahrir [Islam Karimov vs. Hizb ut-tahrir] (Moscow: 1999), p There are differet versios of the reasos for the attack. Versio oe is that it was a cosequece of iter-cla strife, ad versio two is that it helped further stregthe the power of the presidet. 8 The Uio of Islamic Jihad, formerly kow as the Islam Jihad, took resposibility for the act. 9 Martha Brill Olcott, I the Whirlwid of Jihad (Washigto, D.C.: Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, 2012) p Ulugbek Olimov ad Yadgar Fayzullaev, Assessig Developmet Strategies to Achieve the MDGs i the Republic of Uzbekista (Coutry Study, Uited Natios Departmet for Social ad Ecoomic Affairs, March 2011),

8 The Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, with headquarters i Washigto D.C., is a private, oprofit, opartisa orgaizatio dedicated to coductig idepedet policy research ad advacig cooperatio betwee atios. I 1993, the Edowmet lauched the Caregie Moscow Ceter to help develop a traditio of public policy aalysis i the coutries of the former Soviet Uio ad improve relatios betwee Russia ad the Uited States. I 2007, the Caregie Edowmet aouced its New Visio as the first multiatioal ad ultimately global thik tak, addig operatios i Beijig, Beirut, Brussels, ad Almaty to its existig offices i Moscow ad Washigto. 11 Corruptio Perceptios Idex 2011 (Report by Trasparecy Iteratioal, 2011), org/cpi2011/results/. Accordig to aother source Uzbekista occupies 151st place out of 164 coutries i terms of corruptio, with the order established from the least to the most corrupt oes. (Kathlee Collis, Ecoomic ad Security Regioalism amog Patrimoial Authoritaria Regimes: The Case of Cetral Asia, Europe-Asia Studies [Glasgow] 61, o. 2 [March 2009]: 263). 12 Rate of uemploymet i Uzbekista makes up 5%, UzDaily.com, May 15, 2012, articles-id htm. 13 Mikhail Bushuev, Kazhdy tretiy v Uzbekistae bez raboty [Every third perso i Uzbekista is uemployed], Deutsche Welle, April 20, 2006, B9-%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%B2-%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B1%D 0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7- %D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%8B/a Emergig markets iformatio service. A product of ISI emergig markets, html?pc=ru&_id= &auto=1&query= percet Abdul Salimov, Vmesto ottepeli merzlota [Istead of a thaw, froze groud] Oazis 164, o. 24 (December 2011). 16 Uzbekistau grozyat golod i bezrabotitsa? [Is Uzbekista threateed by huger ad uemploymet?], Sgdaily.ru/2011/11/22/uzbekistau-groziat-golod-bezrabotica.html. 17 Yadgor Norbutaev, Broezhilet dlya Karimova [A Flak jacket for Karimov], php?id= Iz teksta sekretoy depeshi v Vashigto [From the text of a secret dispatch to Washigto] 05 Tashket of July 22, 2009, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Sept. 29, Tashket stal blizhe [Tashket has become closer], Rossiyskaya gazeta, Jue 19, Elea Ioova, Razvitie rossiysko-uzbekskikh otosheiy [The Developmet of Russia-Uzbek relatios], Rossiya i ovye gosudarstva Evrazii [Russia ad the ew states of Eurasia] (Moscow), o. 3 (2011): Lukoil vlozhit v ekoomiku Uzbekistaa okolo $5,5 mlrd Puti [Lukoil will ivest $5.5 bl ito the Uzbek ecoomy, says Puti], RIA Novosti, Jue 5, 2012, 23 It is very revealig that o the eve of withdrawal from the CSTO, Uzbekista refused to let military equipmet from Kazakhsta pass through its territory. The weapos were beig trasferred for participatio i the SCO s military exercise Missio of Peace 2012 (the equipmet wet to Tajikista through Kyrgyzsta, bypassig Uzbekista). This testifies to Uzbekista s reluctace to participate i multilateral cooperatio i the regio. This Briefig represets the author s persoal views ad should ot be cosidered as represetig the view of the Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace or the Caregie Moscow Ceter. Caregie Edowmet for Iteratioal Peace, /2 Tverskaya, Moscow Russia Tel: +7 (495) Fax: +7 (495) ifo@caregie.ru