Til Lise Elsker Dig for Evigt

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4 Til Lise Elsker Dig for Evigt

5 IRAQ People, History, Politics GARETH STANSFIELD polity

6 Copyright Gareth Stansfield 2007 The right of Gareth Stansfield to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act First published in 2007 by Polity Press Polity Press 65 Bridge Street Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK Polity Press 350 Main Street Malden, MA 02148, USA All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. ISBN-13: ISBN-13: (pb) A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in 10.5 on 12 pt Sabon by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate. Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition. For further information on Polity, visit our website:

7 Contentsx Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations and Glossary Map ix xi xvi Introduction: Artificiality, Identity, Dictatorship and State-Building 1 Four Key Debates 2 Analytical Theme 4 Book Outline 6 1 Legacies of Civilizations and Empires 10 Ancient Civilizations 11 The Islamic Conquest 17 The Arrival of the Ottoman Empire 23 2 State Formation, Monarchy and Mandate, The Artificiality Debate 26 The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire 30 Planning the Carve-Up 33 Occupation and Uprising 36 The Cairo Conference 43 The New State and Enduring Pathologies 46 The End of the Mandate 49

8 vi CONTENTSXX 3 Conceptualizing Political Mobilization in Iraq 51 The Identity Debate 52 Nationalism 55 The Sunni Shi i Divide 57 The Kurds 62 Turkmens and Assyrians 70 Identity and the State 74 4 From Authoritarian to Totalitarian State, The Dictator Debate 76 The Military in Political Life 81 The Role of the Military and the Communalization of Political Life 85 The Intensification of Anti-Imperialist Sentiment 88 Towards Totalitarianism 92 The Totalitarian State 96 5 Iraq at War, History of Iran Iraq Relations 100 The Kurdish War 103 The Decline into War with Iran 106 Iraq Advances 109 Iran Counterattacks 111 The Kurdish Threat 112 The Tanker War 116 The Political and Economic Impact on Iraq 118 Towards Kuwait The Pariah State, Towards War 124 The Invasion of Kuwait 126 Operation Desert Storm 128 The Uprisings 131 The Coalescing of Opposition Movements 136 Sanctions on Iraq 138 The Arrival of the Inspectors 141 Defection 143 The Failed Coups 143

9 XXCONTENTS vii The Opposition Defeated and Kurdistan Divided 147 Oil for Food 148 Sanctions Busting 150 Hide-and-Seek with UNSCOM 151 Towards Invasion 154 State and Society on the Eve of the Invasion of Iraq Regime Change, The State-Building and Democratization Debate 160 Operation Iraqi Freedom 163 The Chaotic Devolution of Political Authority 165 The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council 167 The Transitional Administrative Law 173 The Iraqi Interim Government 175 Shi i Rebellion and Sunni Insurgencies 176 January 2005 Elections 182 Constitutional Negotiations 184 The Referendum 185 December 2005 Elections 187 Staring into the Abyss 189 Conclusion: The Passing of Thresholds? 192 Making Sense of the Debates 192 The Government of Nouri al-maliki 199 The Passing of Thresholds 202 Epilogue 205 Notes 209 Chronology 221 Internet Links 229 Bibliography 232 Index 249

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11 Acknowledgementsx In this book I attempt to present an objective reading of Iraq s history and political development. With a subject so large, complex and increasingly controversial, I have found the advice and counsel of colleagues and friends to be of crucial importance. While I have benefited from the input of those I mention below, any errors of work remain solely my responsibility, of course. Several individuals were kind enough to share with me their own thoughts on the issues I attempt to cover in this book. Sajjad Rizvi guided me through the complexities of Iraq s Islamic history in addition to being an unrivalled source on contemporary Shi i politics. Hassan Abdulrazak gave expert commentary on the situation in Baghdad and Basra from 2003 onward, and Hashem Ahmadzadeh ensured that I remained informed regarding events in Kurdistan. Tim Niblock was always available with insights and references, and Liam Anderson remained a constant sparring partner with whom to discuss the latest developments in Iraq. Lastly, Brendan O Leary recommended that I attempt to adopt a thematic approach in analysing Iraq s development. The advice of each of these academics proved invaluable. I would also like to thank Tim Niblock, Michael Axworthy, Lise Storm, Hashem Ahmadzadeh, Faleh Jabar, Eric Davis, Robert Olson, Denise Natali, James Onley and Michael Gunter for (very) critically reading various drafts of chapters throughout the writing period. In addition, the advice of two

12 x XXACKNOWLEDGEMENTS anonymous reviewers undoubtedly improved the quality of the book, as did the expert and precise copy-editing skills of Jennifer Speake. I remain very grateful to them all for giving me the benefit of their expertise. Many of the ideas contained in this book can be traced directly to the searching questions asked by two consecutive classes of students (2004/5 and 2005/6) who took my module on The History and Political Development of Iraq in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. With their unerring ability to ask questions for which there are no easy answers, they forced me constantly to appraise and re-appraise my analyses and views, for which I am very much indebted. Similarly, regular meetings at Chatham House with fellow members of the Middle East Programme were as enjoyable as they were informative. Discussions with Ali Ansari, Mai Yamani, Nadim Shehadi, Rosy Hollis, Yossi Mekelberg, Claire Spencer and Rob Lowe assisted me in placing the post-2003 developments in Iraq in their wider regional context, while also providing me with a home-from-home in St James s Square. There are several people whose patience enabled me to complete the writing of this book and who ensured that other responsibilities were covered or allowed me the time to complete the work. These include Jane Clark, Ariel Edge, Catherine Bell, Jonathan Barry, Rasheed El-Enany and Khalid al-dhaheri. I am very grateful to all of you, and hope your patience has not been overly stretched. At Polity Press, Louise Knight and her assistant Ellen McKinley proved to be considerate and supportive editors, but also knew when to be pushy as well! They were a pleasure to work with, always on hand with advice and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their love and support, especially, my parents, Roy and Lynn and my wife, Lise. It was Lise who put up with my researching and writing Iraq from the signing of the initial contract and through to its final submission, and it is to her that I dedicate it.

13 List of Abbreviations and Glossaryx ADM Al-Qaeda AMS Anfal Ansar al-islam ayatollah Badr Army Ba th Party Assyrian Democratic Movement. Political party representing Chaldo-Assyrian community headed by Youndam Youssef Kanna. Sunni Islamist organization attacking foreign influences in Muslim countries, and the Shi i community in Iraq. Nominally headed by Osama bin Laden, but with nebulous organization and structure. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) headed by Abu Musab al-zarqawi until his death in June Association of Muslim Scholars. Political association representing Sunni Islamist trend headed by Dr Harith al-dhari. Codename of campaign in for systematic depopulation of rural Kurdistan. Anfal refers to the eighth sura of the Quran. Partisans of Islam. Kurdish Islamist group. Literally, Sign of God. Highest clerical rank in Shi i religious establishment. Military wing of SCIRI. Arab Socialist Ba th Party. Founded in 1947 as a secular Arab nationalist party

14 xii XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY by Michel Aflaq. Came to power in Iraq in 1963 coup, then again in CIA (US) Central Intelligence Agency. CPA Coalition Provisional Authority. Replaced ORHA. Headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III. Da wa Hizb al-da wa Islamiyya (Party of the Islamic Call). Shi i party formed in late 1950s under guidance of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-sadr. Fractured into several wings. Prominent leaders include Ibrahim al-ja afari and Nouri al-maliki. hawza More fully, hawza al-marja iyya. The religious establishment surrounding the leading clerical figures of Shi ism. GDP Gross Domestic Product. GNP Gross National Product. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency. ICP Iraqi Communist Party. Formed in IGC Iraqi Governing Council. Appointed by CPA to provide guidance and advice on governing Iraq between 13 July 2004 and 1 June IIG Interim Iraqi Government. Formed after the elections of 30 January Replaced on 3 May 2005 by the Iraqi Transitional Government. Dr Iyad Allawi served as prime minister, with Ghazi al- Yawer appointed president. IIP Iraqi Islamic Party. Sunni Arab Islamist party. Headed by Dr Muhsim Abdel Hamid until July 2004, then by Tariq al- Hashimi. IKF Iraqi Kurdistan Front. Political front formed in the late 1980s of leading parties based in Kurdistan. IMK Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Kurdish Islamist party headed by Mulla Ali Abd al-aziz.

15 XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY xiii INA INC ITF KDP KIU Iraqi National Accord. Political party largely representing dissident figures from the Iraqi military and Ba th party unwilling to join Shi i or Kurdish parties. Headed by Dr Iyad Allawi. Iraqi National Congress. Umbrella political organization established with US support in aftermath of Saddam s invasion of Kuwait. Headed by Dr Ahmed Chalabi. Iraqi Turkmen Front. Political party founded in 1995 to represent interests of Turkmen community. Supported by Turkey. Headed by Farouk Abdullah Abdulrahman. Kurdistan Democratic Party. One of the two main Kurdish parties in Iraq. Formed in Headed by Massoud Barzani. Kurdistan Islamic Union. Moderate Kurdish Islamist Party. Formed in 1994 under leadership of Salahadin Ba ahadin. KNA Kurdistan National Assembly. The 105- seat legislature of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. First assembled in KRG Mahdi Army marja al-taqlid MI6 MNF mujtahid Kurdistan Regional Government. Executive authority in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Divided into two following Kurdish civil war in mid-1990s. Reunified in Militia of movement of Muqtada al-sadr. Source of emulation. Honorific name given to the most important religious figures in Shi ism. UK Secret Intelligence Service. Multi-National Force. Title of Coalition forces in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. A scholar of Islam qualified to interpret Islamic law.

16 xiv neo-cons OECD OIP OPEC ORHA pasdaran peshmerga PKK PUK RCC Sadr Movement SAM Sarok SCIRI XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY Neo-conservatives. Right-wing ideological grouping in US advocating interventionist strategies in Middle East. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (UN) Office of the Iraq Program. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Kurdish fighters in general, but most often referring to the military wings of KDP and PUK. Kurdish: literally, those who face death. Kurdistan Workers Party. Formed in 1970s by Abdullah Öcalan. Aims to create independent Kurdish state in Turkey. Has fallen into conflict with both KDP and PUK. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. One of two main parties in Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Formed in 1975 and led by Jalal Talabani. Revolution s Command Council (Ba th Party). Highest legistative and executive authority in Iraq before Movement of Muqtada al-sadr, son of Ayatollah Sadiq al-sadr. Powerful force in post-2003 Iraq. Surface-to-air missile. President (Kurdish). Title of president of the Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani. Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Umbrella organization formed in Tehran in 1982 to bring together disparate Iraqi Shi i opposition groups. Headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-hakim until his assassination in Najaf

17 XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY xv SCR TAL TNA UAR UIA UNIKOM UNMOVIC UNSCOM vilayet WMD in August Succeeded by his brother, Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-hakim. (UN) Security Council Resolution. Transitional Administrative Law. Interim constitution signed on 8 March 2004 by the IGC. Transitional National Assembly. United Arab Republic. Formed by the union of Syria and Egypt in Collapsed in United Iraqi Alliance. Alliance of Shi i parties, supported by Ayatollah Sistani, to contest the elections of January UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. UN Special Commission. Ottoman Turkish territorial division, equating to a province. Weapons of mass destruction.

18 T U R K E Y Lake Van Lake Urmia CASPIAN SEA DOHUK Dohuk Mosul NINEVAH ERBIL Erbil KRG SYRIA Tigris R. Kirkuk KIRKUK Suleimaniyya SULEIMANIYYA IRAN Euphrates R. SALAHADIN Samarra DIYALA Baquba Baghdad Ramadi BAGHDAD JORDAN ANBAR WASIT Karbala Hilla BABIL Kut KARBALA Diwaniya Najaf QADISIYA MISAN Amara SAUDI ARABIA Supergiant oilfield NAJAF DHI-QAR Samawa Nasiriya MUTHANNA BASRA Basra 0 Kurdistan Regional Government border km KUWAIT Persian Gulf miles Eighteen governorates and the Kurdistan Regional Government region (as defined by the Transitional Administrative Law)

19 Introduction: Artificiality, Identity, Dictatorship and State-Buildingx By the spring of 2006, Iraq stood on the verge of civil war. Indeed, many observers believed that one had already started. 1 Suicide bombers commonly associated with the Sunni Arab insurgencies were able to target Shi i and Iraqi government targets with seeming impunity. Shi i militias responded by undertaking raids in Sunni Arab areas of Baghdad and its environs, more often than not in the guise of Ministry of Interior security personnel, and stood accused of committing grievous violence against their captives. 2 Religious edifices attracted particular attention, with worshippers attending Sunni mosques and Shi i Husseiniyyas alike being the targets of barbaric terrorist atrocities. The destruction of the Askariyya shrine in Samarra, a sacred site for Shi i, was followed by at least 1,000 deaths in a spate of killings at the end of January 2006 and served warning that violence in Iraq, often blamed upon criminal elements and opportunists, or nationalists of various hues fighting against collaborators, had now taken on an infinitely more dangerous and apocalyptic sectarian colouring. Complicating what was already a volatile situation was an additional ethnopolitical dynamic that threatened Iraq s territorial integrity. The Kurds, in their relatively peaceful northern stronghold, watched events unfolding in the south intently, perhaps waiting for the moment when they could no longer remain part of a failing, if not actually failed, state and therefore raise the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination.

20 2 INTRODUCTIONXX Faced with this plague of problems, the US and its allies seemed powerless to halt what was appearing to be an inexorable decline into conflict with an outcome nobody could predict. 3 Indeed, their direct involvement would probably have made matters much, much worse. Four Key Debates How did Iraq get into this position? Why were communities that once lived in seemingly peaceful harmony now subjecting each other to ever-increasing levels of brutality and indiscriminate violence? What possible bonds could those attempting to stabilize the situation appeal to in the face of such actions? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions have proved elusive. Some observers, particularly those who were opposed to the invasion of Iraq in the first place, focused upon the period immediately following the downfall of Saddam s government. For them, the actions of post-saddam Iraqi governments were responsible for the chaos, but the blame for creating the situation in the first place could be laid squarely on the US and UK for invading Iraq without adequately considering what the consequences of such an action would be. In so doing, the occupying powers were forced to act in an increasingly reactive and myopic manner as they struggled to cope with the post-invasion dynamics. Their reactivity was responsible for the creation wittingly or unwittingly of a political system under which religious and ethnically based parties could thrive (see, for example, Rangwala 2005). Others, while considering the US government to be responsible for the problems of post-2003 Iraq, viewed the real problem as being an innocent but disastrous failure to implement a pre-designed plan for the interim period during the occupation (see Klingner and Jones 2005: 146). A further approach was to contextualize what was happening within a wider historical analysis. With regard to recent historical events, the impact of UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s rightly received attention, with prescient

21 XXINTRODUCTION 3 observers warning before 2003 that the profound damage inflicted upon Iraqi society made it difficult to imagine a democratic transition being able to occur in the foreseeable future (see Niblock 2001: 219). Casting the historical net further back in time, other commentators delved into Iraq s history to see whether the reasons behind Iraq s turbulent post-saddam existence could be traced to the policies of the occupiers, or to something deeper, perhaps found within the pathology of the Iraqi state construct itself (see Anderson and Stansfield 2005). Rather than pursue any one of these foci at the expense of all others, the analytical theme of this book is assembled around four (very) interrelated debates that, to my mind, have been and remain prominent in the expansive discussion about Iraq s formation, history, society, politics, and indeed, future. I refer to these as (1) the artificiality debate, (2) the identity debate, (3) the dictator debate and (4) the state-building and democratization debate. To expand a little on these titles: 1 The artificiality debate focuses upon whether Iraq, at its founding, was an artificial state or not, and, if it was, how have the implications of any suggested artificiality at the time of state-building nearly a century ago affected statebuilding nearly a century later. 2 The identity debate revolves around the nature of identity in Iraq in essence, what it meant in the past and now means in the present to be an Iraqi. How powerful, as a mobilizing force, is the concept of Iraqi nationalism, compared to the power of religious association and ethnic solidarity? What were the causative factors of the reappearance of communal identities? Indeed, had they ever been hidden, or had they been merely glossed over by the combined effect of the transformative nature of modernity with the confining strictures of Saddam s government? 3 The dictator debate addresses the nature of political authority in Iraq, and questions how and why the modern history of Iraq has been characterized by the involvement of the military in political life, and the reasons behind Iraq s succumbing to an authoritarian method of governance that

22 4 INTRODUCTIONXX culminates with the totalitarian Ba thist regime dominated by the person of Saddam Hussein. Is the authoritarian/ totalitarian state merely an unfortunate, anomalous development in the history of Iraq that need not have happened? Is there something that predisposes the Iraqi state to being dictatorial in nature, or was this development a reaction to external pressures and influences? Perhaps the most important question to ask is what was the impact upon Iraqi society of decades of non-democratic politics and, at times, brutal and omnipotent state control? 4 The state-building and democratization debate in effect attempts to synthesize the arguments presented in the preceding three debates, and focuses upon the mechanics of state-building in plural societies and/or countries emerging from under the shadow of authoritarianism. Analytical Theme Together, the four debates form a moving analytical theme and overarching question. This is to construct an understanding of why, since the removal of Saddam s regime, Iraqi political life has been dominated by actors and organizations that are mobilized in terms of religious affiliation, ethnic origin or tribal association (and, at times, combinations of two or more of these), rather than secular nationalism or class-based identities that encompass all of Iraq s peoples inclusively and what this then means for Iraq s future. It is now clear that, for whatever reasons, the prevailing political forces in Iraq would now seem to be those associated with (a) Shi i religious trends (b) the Kurdish nationalist agenda and (c) a Sunni Arab position that has formed mainly in reaction to the first two forces. 4 Other communal poles are also apparent within the Turkmen and Christian (Chaldo-Assyrian) communities. None of these groups may be considered cohesive in terms of internal dynamics and even aims (with the Shi i religious establishment divided between different poles of authority, the Kurds notoriously politically divided and the Sunni Arab insurgency split between ex-ba thists, neo-ba thists and an array of Islamist

23 XXINTRODUCTION 5 groups), but, even so, their very existence is evidence of different conceptions existing within Iraq s society that promote contending, and at times exclusive, visions of the future of the country. It is important to note that this book is not intending to attempt to prove that Iraq is consigned to a future of civil war between religious sects and ethnic groups as they vie for power in the state, or secession from it. Rather, it seeks to ascertain why the elements of civil war began to coalesce in the post environment. As mentioned earlier, there are several interpretations of the evidence available: one is to focus upon events post-2003 and hold the US and UK to account for either their innocent lack of foresight or their gross negligence; another is to view the 1990s as being the decade in which Iraqi society was transformed by the grotesquely disfiguring impact of UN-imposed sanctions; the last takes a longer view and attempts to trace the pathologies of communal tension in Iraq s history. I contend that a middle ground can be found by combining elements of these interpretations. Such a synthesis views the emergence and consolidation of communally based political life in Iraq as being a product of resurgent or resurrected localized political forces (that were themselves transformed by Iraq s political, social and economic development and, at times, regression over the twentieth century, and especially in the sanctions decade of the 1990s) combined with the effects of US- and Coalition-led policies towards Iraq before and after Saddam s downfall. Communally based societal cleavages existed before the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown, but the clarity of such cleavages and the strength of political movements mobilized according to particular communal identities have varied at different moments in Iraq s modern history. Arguably, from 1958, a state-based civic nationalism emerged in Iraq due to improved education and enhanced socio-economic conditions as a result of investments made with funds derived from the country s oil wealth. However, the divisive policies of Saddam s regime, including his attempts to atomize Iraqi society by breaking the bonds between individuals and non-state organizations (Al-Khafaji 2003: 78 9), the re-empowerment of tribal structures

24 6 INTRODUCTIONXX (Zubaida 2000: 363), the traumatic events of the 1990s and especially the impact of the UN-sanctions regime (Graham- Brown 1999; Niblock 2001: ), culminating in the removal of Saddam s regime and followed by the chaotic political situation since 2003, have all acted to both uncover the fault-lines of ethnicity and sectarianism within Iraqi society and to polarize and strengthen these identities to the point that they are now the pre-eminent structures of political power in contemporary Iraq. In an attempt to defend myself from accusations of essentializing Iraqi society, I do not contend that the chaos we see today need have been the case, or that the terrible scenes occurring every day in Iraq mean that the country is now destined to fail and therefore split into different parts. It may well fragment. But the pressure imposed by regional powers to maintain Iraq s territorial integrity, combined with a definite domestic impulse from many Iraqis to find a mechanism by which their differences can be managed via a framework in which they can live in peace and harmony, free from the threat of state repression, means that the future of Iraq remains very much in the balance. Book Outline The purpose of this book is to provide a thematic political history of Iraq. As such, the chapters proceed in chronological order, but with one of the four key debates appearing at the appropriate moment. The modern history of Iraq commences in chapter 2 with an outline of the artificiality debate i.e. what is meant by the statement that Iraq is artificial? The chapter investigates the first episode in state-building in Iraq, and considers the reasons why Iraq was created in the aftermath of World War I, how its territorial parameters were identified and how the British set about constructing the state. It is argued that many of the attributes of the Iraqi state can be understood by considering how the British structured it to begin with, and then how British advisers attempted to influence Iraqi affairs in

25 XXINTRODUCTION 7 subsequent years. I contend that the British designed a political system that had the potential to nurture increasingly authoritarian approaches to government. But it was also the British that acted to make this potential into a reality, by continually meddling in Iraq s affairs and provoking a reaction in the form of a nationalist movement. Chapter 3 investigates what is one of the most contentious of issues when discussing modern Iraq, and that is how Iraqis identify themselves, and how they are identified by others. The identity debate considers how political mobilization in Iraq has been discussed primarily in Western academic literature, and presents the two most prominent models: the first focusing upon vertical cleavages in society (i.e. forwarding the saliency of communal association, whether sectarian or ethnic) and the second contending that horizontal cleavages of class and socio-economic status are more powerful forces that manage to transcend the ties of religion and ethnicity. Again, I contend that a middle ground, which is in effect a combination of these two approaches to conceptualizing political mobilization in Iraq, has greater explanatory value than either model applied in isolation. The chapter considers the interplay between Iraqi and Arab nationalism, before analysing the nature of the Sunni Shi i divide, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism and the situation of the Assyrian and Turkmen communities. The growth of the authoritarian state is taken up in the next chapter. Beginning with the dictator debate, definitions from the political science literature on non-democratic regimes are discussed in order to provide a framework by which Iraq s transition from authoritarianism to totalitarianism in the 1980s, and back to authoritarianism in the 1990s, can be understood. The essence of the debate itself focuses upon statements made by US government officials, including President George W. Bush, in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in An implicit (and, at times, explicit) assumption made at this time was that Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle of supporters were all that stood in the way of Iraq being democratic. Saddam was, therefore, an anomaly that needed to be removed. The counter to this argument is that,

26 8 INTRODUCTIONXX far from being anomalous in the history of Iraq, Saddam s regime was, in fact, a product and, logically, the conditions remain for Iraq to continue being governed by authoritarian/totalitarian regimes in the future. The chapter considers the role of the military in political life following the creation of Iraq, and how the military, with a distinctly Arab nationalist world-view, served further to communalize Iraqi society. The reaction of the military to the seemingly omnipresent British imperialist presence is considered, and viewed as a primary causative factor in the rise and consolidation of anti-imperialist and increasingly nationalist sentiment. The chapter concludes by considering the impact of increased oil revenue and the rise of the Ba th Party both of which would be important factors in the Iraqi state moving from being authoritarian to totalitarian in nature. The continued rule of Saddam Hussein is addressed in chapter 5, which focuses upon the events that would lead to Iraq coming into conflict with Western powers in the 1990s. Iraq s invasion of Iran in 1980 sees the beginning of a period which is still arguably ongoing, as a state of war has hung over the country since 23 September 1980, the date that Iraqi forces entered Iran. The complexity of the causative factors of Iraq s invasion of Iran are investigated, including the history of the trigger cause of the war the status of the Shatt al- Arab waterway and the role played by Kurdish rebel movements that had continued with their sporadic insurgency against the central government since the formation of the state itself. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the political and economic impact of the conflict, and how the invasion of Kuwait can be seen as being a consequence of the problems generated by the inconclusive but hugely destructive war with Iran. The 1990s are considered in chapter 6. The reasons why Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait are assessed, building upon the findings presented at the end of the previous chapter. The uprisings which then occurred following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the US-led Coalition of the Willing are then considered, followed by an assessment of the opposition groups that formed in the 1990s. The impact

27 XXINTRODUCTION 9 of the brutally comprehensive UN-imposed sanctions upon Iraq are then described, followed by how Saddam managed to survive several US-sponsored coup attempts. The emergence and institutionalization of the Kurdistan Region is also addressed, with the chapter concluding with the events that would lead to the US-led invasion of Iraq in The final substantive chapter addresses the political development of Iraq since the removal of Saddam s regime. The state-building and democratization debate explores how political scientists and other observers viewed the chances of Iraq successfully democratizing after Saddam s demise, and whether the empirical evidence points to a democratic or an authoritarian future for Iraq, or indeed whether it throws even the continued existence of Iraq into question. The chapter covers the major issues that have characterized post-2003 Iraq, including the political process started by the US that culminated in elections in December 2005, the communalization of political life, the emergence of insurgent groups from within the Sunni community, the strengthening of the Kurdistan Region and the appearance of a radical movement in the Shi i community. Before all of this, however, it is necessary to delve into history and reflect on Iraq before Iraq. The modern state was not created out of thin air indeed, the region that was brought together to form Iraq has perhaps the longest and richest civilizational history of anywhere in the world, with events of global importance taking place within its boundaries. To understand Iraq s modern history, one needs to commence by appreciating the legacies of ages past.

28 1 Legacies of Civilizations and Empiresx The modern state of Iraq, crafted by imperial powers following the defeat of the Ottoman empire in World War I, is merely the latest in a long line of political structures to have existed in and around the watersheds of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. Along with China, Egypt and India, Iraq has the oldest heritage of any state in the world. It is home to some of the earliest examples of agricultural activity, and its cities and rural areas alike display the remains of a palimpsest of ancient civilizations. Later, Iraq was the imperial centre of the Abbasid Caliphate, recognized as being the apogee of Islamic civilization and, before becoming part of the territories of the expansive Ottoman empire, famed for its cosmopolitan sophistication. Three elements of the past have been most important in forming collective memories in modern Iraq: the civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia, the Arab-Islamic conquests and heritage and the Ottoman empire (Marr 2004: 3 8). The mechanisms by which these elements have impacted on modern Iraq varies, with the most direct influences that have coloured, even structured, modern Iraq being those of Islam and the Ottoman empire. The Arab-Islamic heritage continues to shape social contours more than any other dynamic, particularly as its customs and traditions remain the most powerful of the forces governing social activity and interaction. The Ottoman empire is now consigned to history, but over a period of five centuries was responsible for ordering