PROCEEDINGS THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY EIGHTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION HILTON INN. Dallas, Texas APRIL 10 TO APRIL 14 NINETEEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE

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1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY EIGHTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION HILTON INN Dallas, Texas APRIL 10 TO APRIL 14 NINETEEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE VOLUME XLV

2 DIVREI TORAH IN MEMORY OF DR. ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL

3 A. J. Hesche!, Irenic Polemicis RABBI HAROLD STERN Congregaion Bnai Emunah Skokie, Illinois I am cerain ha here are many here his morning who have fond memories of Dr. Hesche! from heir days a he Seminary, from hearing him a one of his lecures or from sharing one of his Shabbos ishen. Our younger colleagues who did no know him personally have surely seen he phoographs or heard of his hisoric march wih he lae Marin Luher King, Jr. in Selma, Alabama. The impassioned address he delivered a a Rabbinical Assembly Convenion on he immoraliy of he war in Vienam is indelibly fixed in he minds of hose who were privileged o hear i. My memories of Hesche! are exremely varied. I remember him as my eacher of Medieval Jewish Philosophy a he Seminary whose ''mysicism'' I had o defend agains he criicism voiced by fellowsudens who boased of being sric raionaliss. I remember him as he sa a he head of he able and conduced his seminar, rapidly urning he pages of a loose-leaf noebook in which he hurriedly scribbled down okh kdei limud ideas which laer would appear in he books which brough him o he aenion of he communiy of philosophers and heologians. There is one impression which I believe I share wih everyone whose life he ouched: Hesche! was an irenic personaliy. He was passionae, commied, dedicaed, bu he was no offensive. If he differed wih you he never resored o srong language or ad hominem reors. Even before he serious coronary which slowed him down considerably, he projeced a peaceful, ranquil counenance. He walked sraigh as a ramrod, I should say he srode, more like a soldier han a philosopher of religion. Ye he had a winkle in his eye, and his speech was sof and ender. When I would mee him in he corridors of he Seminary he always greeed me before I could ranscend my awe of him and say shalom o him. I can sill hear he melody wih which he pronounced my name. I knew he would have preferred o call me Herschel, bu I had come o be known as Harold or Zvi. While Hesche! was an irenic person, we mus no overlook he fac ha he was a skilled polemicis as well. In our hase o deermine wha he had o say or in wha his original conribuion o Jewish philosophy and heology consised, we end o neglec he fac ha he consanly direced his sighs agains docrines which he considered 169

4 170 Rabbi Harold Sern false or inadequae o explain human realiy in general, and Jewish realiy in paricular. Admiedly, we jusifiably exol he unique conribuion which a hinker makes o a body of knowledge, and i is he exen of his adding o he corpus of hough which insures a hinker's fame and repuaion. Neverheless, i is no mean ask for a hinker o engage in a criique of he opinions of ohers, especially if he projecion of one's own ideas agains a background of opposing views may serve o clarify and render more peneraing he ideas one seeks o se forh. Hesche! excelled in his approach. He was familiar wih he whole of Wesern philosophy: Plao, Arisole, he medievals, he Briish empiriciss, he German idealiss, he pragmaiss, he logical posiiviss, he linguisic analyss, he exisenialiss (boh religious and aheisic), he phenomenologiss. There was no aspec of philosophy which he had no come o undersand. He combined his wih a horough acquainance wih Rabbinic hough, is sources as well as is classical and modern formulaions, and his special appreciaion of Hasidism, he earlier docrines of he Baal Shem Tov and he Maggid as well as he laer basidu of Pzyscha and Kozk. Is i any wonder ha he would find i necessary o ear down old fences in order o build a new edifice? He waned o presen an undersanding of Judaism which could serve o arac he searching minds and sensiive souls of hose conemporary Jews who were urned off from Judaism, because hey failed o find i adequae o heir philosophical sophisicaion and/or because hey considered Judaism an aniquaed religion sho hrough wih supersiion, myhology and chauvinisic ehniciy. The limis of his presenaion miigae agains any exhausive analysis of Heschel's oeuvre. I can only poin ou some insances of wha I choose o call his irenic polemicism. The demands of breviy limi my reamen o Man is no Alone, subiled: ''A Philosophy of Religion,'' published in His laer works in English, however, subjeced o similar analysis, would confirm my hesis. To almudiss and halakhiss I sugges he special ask of expliciaing he docrines Hesche! sough o refue in his Rabbinic wriings. I doub ha Heschel adoped a differen derekh when he engaged in he sudy of Rabbinics. One addiional remark. In consonance wih his irenic naure Heschel rarely specifies his opponens by name, reserving o he reader he challenge of idenifying he philosopher or heologian o whose view he places himself in opposiion. A imes i is no easy o be precise abou Hesche!' s adversary, and he casual reader is bound o skim over a passage which would become more renchan

5 A.}. Hesche!, Irenic Polemicis 171 when compared wih he philosophical posiion i seeks o challenge. Bu reading Heschel is a challenge in every respec. A he beginning of Man is no Alone, Heschel makes a claim which conradics he spiri of medieval philosophy based primarily on Arisole. I is an axiom of he Scholasics ha nohing is o be found in he inellec which is no firs mediaed hrough he senses. Nihil es in inellecu nisi prius in sensu. Tha is how he Lains formulaed his principle. Heschel, on he conrary, denies ha discursive reasoning or syllogisic hinking based on empirical observaion is man's sole source of knowledge. There is a dimension of realiy which is no permeable o he senses: he realm of he ineffable, ha which canno be alked abou. "Jus as he mind is able o form concepions suppored by sense percepion, i can derive insighs from he dimension of he ineffable.'' Furhermore, Heschel insiss ha since all men are capable of sensing he ineffable, human beings as such confron somehing or someone ouside of hemselyes, so ha man is no alone. Cerain moderns claim ha only ha which can be alked abou is real. Heschel, while agreeing ha he ineffable canno be alked abou, assers ha i can be poined o, provided ha he ype oflanguage used is indicaive raher han descripive. Linguisic philosophy holds ha being able o be expressed is a sine qua non of meaningfulness. Heschel, on he oher hand, considers he awe and reverence inspired by he ineffable as legiimae responses and allusions o meaning. Kan formulaed wo versions of his caegorical imperaive, boh of hem relaing o ehics. Heschel offers anoher caegorical imperaive, one jus as compelling: he compulsion o feel awe and reverence. The feeling of awe and reverence, oo, is universal. "There is no man who is no shaken for an insan by he eernal!" Why? Wha profi in i? We have no desire o feel awe. We may even supress such a desire. Ye we feel awe. I mus be because we are compelled o. And his compulsion akes he form of a ques for meaning which, conrary o commonly-held opinion, exiss ouside he mind and no in i. We do no revere wha we know, he familiar, he regular, menal consrucs, bu ha which surpasses our minds, ha which, in a sense, creaed our minds. Meaphysics, he invesigaion of being qua being is vain. Being as being is unavailable o us; he Ding-an-sich is inexricably hidden. Any dichoomy beween facs and meanings is specious. Every fac is endowed wih meaning independen of man's inellec. Man discovers he meaning in facs, he does no supply i.

6 172 Rabbi Harold Sern The work of Marin Heidegger looms behind much of wha Hesche! has o say abou being. When Hesche! defines "o be" as meaning "o sand for," one canno help bu conjure up Heidegger's Dasein (his erm for human realiy) which ex-siss, ha is, sands ouside as he paricular being who is concerned wih Being. I is rue ha Hesche! is referring o beings (wih a small "b"). Neverheless, when he says ha all beings are represenaive of somehing and sand for more han hemselves, he is claiming for all beings ha which Heidegger in his laer works will predicae of Dasein, namely, a projecion oward ranscendance (Being wih a capial "B"). Heidegger' s docrine of he self (he "I") as a correlaive wih he world and one of he consiuens of Dasein, is qualiy of "mineness," is expressly denied by Hesche!. He wries: I The essence of wha I am is no mine... I am ha I am no... in peneraing and exposing he self, I realize ha he self did no originae in iself, ha he essence of he self is in is being a non-self, ha ulimaely man is no a subjec bu an objec. I should no be necessary o indicae he revoluionary naure of Hesche!' s conenion ha man is no a subjec bu an objec. Of course, he does no mean ha man is an objec in he sense of a hing which is finished, once and for all, somehing o-hand, a ool o be manipulaed. Wha he means is ha man is an objec for somehing, specifically he ranscenden. Proving he exisence of God was a major concern of he medievals. Hesche!, who grealy respeced Maimonides, shows no desire o offend his maser by quesioning he validiy of hese proofs alhough he does conend ha all of hem, including he mos convincing of he "five ways," he argumen from design, conain suble fallacies. His argumen wih he medievals is no ha hey are invalid, bu ha he radiional proofs prove oo lile. A God derived from speculaion is a bes as much as our finie knowledge of he facs of he universe would demand.... Why should we be concerned wih Him, he mos perfec? We may, indeed, accep he idea ha here is a supreme designer and sill say: So wha? As long as a concep of God does no overpower us... i is no God ha we alk abou bu somehing else. Heschel rejecs he God of he Philosophers, bu he does no share Blaise Pascal's insigh. The of-quoed Pensee XIII, purporedly found in Pascal's habi afer his deah, begins: "God of Abraham,

7 A.}. Hesche!, Irenic Polemicis 173 God of Isaac, God of Jacob," no of he philosophers and he sages. "Ceriude, Ceriude, Senimen, Joy, Peace." Heschel asks a differen quesion: "Is here a God who collecs he ears, who honors hope, and rewards he ordeals of he guilless?" Or, as one of his sudens pu i: "Is here a God whom you can address as aenyu. ;> ' ' The quesion concerning he naure of religion is answered differenly by he various inellecual disciplines. Sociology sees religion as a social convenion designed o bring people ogeher for common needs and purposes. Psychology views religion in erms of a supposed need for an auhoriy figure. Marx, as is well-known, augh ha religion was an opiae of he masses derailing hem from he pah leading o he class sruggle. For Hesche!, religion has is roos in man's choosing "wha o do wih he feeling of mysery, wha o do wih awe, wonder or fear... (i) begins wih he feeling ha somehing is asked of us," ha we are obligaed. Wihin us here is an innae sense of indebedness. "Wihin our awe we only know ha all we own we owe.'' In German, a language Heschel knew well, "indebedness" and "guil" are expressed by he same word: Schuld. By punning on he word Schuld (did he assume ha his readers knew German?) Hesche! effecively conrass he Chrisian docrine of man's oal depraviy and guil before his Maker wih he auhenically Jewish idea expressed by he quesion of he prophe Micah: Wha doh he Lord require of hee? To sum i up, "Philosophy begins wih man's quesion; religion begins wih God's quesion and man's answer." Hesche! denies ha polyheism has no appeal o conemporary man. On he conrary, he sees manifesaions of polyheism refleced in he yearning of men for pagan forms. How else explain he fascinaion wih paganism which affliced he German people under Hiler? Probably here was no more inellecually sophisicaed people in he fories of his cenury han he Germans. Ye hey fell prey o he araciveness of naional myhs which affirmed values direcly opposed o hose esablished by heir scienific sociey and hose preached by he monoheisic religion hey professed in heir churches. I is, herefore, necessary o reasser monoheism. However, ha God is one, or ha here is only one God, mus be properly undersood. God's uniy is no a maer of mahemaics alone. To say ha God is one means ha He is unique. He is incomparable. He is he sole realiy, His is an inner uniy, boh beyond and here, boh in naure and in hisory, boh love and power, near and far, known and unknown, Faher and

8 174 Rabbi Harold Sern A Eernal... His is only a single way. His power is His love, His jusice is His mercy. Wha is divergen in us is one in Him. In anoher poignan passage Heschel explains why Genesis speaks of "a second day," "a hird day," and so forh, while i speaks of" one day" insead of "he firs day." Yom ebad does no mean one day; i means he day of uniy, "he day on which God desired o be one wih man... The uniy of God is a concern for he uniy of he world.'' For Heschel, "life is no a passive sae of indifference and ineria. The essence of life is inense care and concern." Behind his delineaion of he hree dimensions of human concern: he self, he fellowman and he dimension of he holy, lie he hree sages which Soren Kierkegaard disinguishes in he life of man: he aesheic, he ehical and he religious. Ye Heschel's mood is differen from ha of he melancholy Dane. Concern for he self, for one's fellow-man and for he dimension of he holy are all legiimae concerns ha are consiuen of he human being's concern wih one's self which becomes selfishness only when i is no referred o he ehical concern. The ehical concern iself, however, is no he ulimae. As he verse says: "Thou shal love hy neighbor as hyself; I am he Lord.'' I is his conclusion (ofen omied when he verse is quoed) ha conains he ulimae raionale for he commandmen. God's concern is designaed by Hesche! as "ransiive" as opposed o ''reflexive.'' God is no concerned wih Himself, bu raher wih wha He creaed. I is a coninuous concern, even (Cicero no wihsanding) when small maers are involved, for "o be is o sand for, o sand for a divine concern.'' Speculaive philosophy affirms he noion ha God is he perfec being. Ye Biblical wriers, Hesche! reminds us, do no refer o God as perfec. If here is one concep which could serve as a saring poin for deermining he meaning of he divine, i would be he idea of he one. This is a deparure poin which religion shares wih science, for science also begins wih a posulae ha here are unifying laws which govern naure; he world is a cosmos, no a chaos. Neverheless, despie is uniy, here are forces in naure which end o desroy ha uniy. There are conflics ha rage wihin naure; here is disharmony as well as harmony. Consequenly, we mus go beyond naure and is unifying laws and raise he quesion: Wha is he origin of hose laws? Cerainly we mus ry o discover he universal laws which govern naure, bu only when we go beyond hose laws and sense he divine uniy do he disharmonies of naure dissolve in a higher oneness. "God means: Togeherness of all beings in holy oherness.'' " e ( c f: e; rr w a< re sc nc h Ol fo w rec fa fa Tl lllj he be pe of de eac ol rec: o rna sn He

9 A.}. Hesclzel, Irenic Polemicis 175 Dealing wih he naure of faih, Hesche! akes issue wih hose who hold ha faih can be defined as an assen o hings unseen, ha o have faih means o express cerain convicions, judgmens, ruhs. For him, such expressions are in he sphere of creed raher han faih. Faih is an ac, somehing ha happens raher han somehing ha is sored away; i is a momen in which he soul of man communes wih he glory of God. More specifically, o have faih is o remember, o recollec pas evens, his recollecion being iself a holy ac. No leap is necessary o achieve faih (pace Kierkegaard); one mus open one's hear o he call o communal memory. Bu faih is no merely passive. I is also faihfulness, loyaly o a pas even, especially o he experience (and each of us had a leas one such experience!) which occurs a momens when we sense he realiy of God. Faih is o be conrased wih belief which relaes o proposiions acceped as rue. Faih is an ac of consen raher han assen. As Hesche! pus i, "(faih) is as reducible o an assen as love, and is adequae expression is no a sober asserion bu an exclamaion.'' Ye creeds, proposiional formulaions of wha we believe in, are necessary, despie he danger of confusing wha we believe in wih he ac of believing, which is faih. Creeds are required in order ha our insighs ino ulimae realiy be communicable o ohers. Therefore, any conflic beween faih and reason is specious since hey deal wih separae dimensions. If a conflic exiss, i would be beween reason and belief. In addiion, here is a muual dependence beween faih and reason: "Faih wihou reason is mue; reason wihou faih is deaf.'' The second par of Man is no Alone is eniled ''The Problem of Living.'' I akes us from he realm of hinking abou ulimae realiy o he concree acs of he human personaliy. Once again Hesche! begins wih a universal phenomenon of human being: he experience of needs. More precisely, needs as he awareness of a lack, of an unrealized or unsaisfied condiion. Man's predicamen derives in large par from he fac ha such needs are differen for each person, and ofen involve conflic wih he perceived needs of ohers. Ehics aemps, by means of he applicaion of human reason, o insruc us how o adjus our needs o hose of ohers, how o make wise judgmens, how o avoid he conflic of ineress. I may be successful in doing his, bu i fails o assure us ha our sruggle o aain universal harmony will be in he end successful. Hesche! holds wih Arisole in he laer's criique of Socraes'

10 176 Rabbi Harold Sern equaing knowledge wih virue. Knowledge of he good does no insure he doing of he good. The passions of man, his appeies and desires, are equally consiuen of his moral decisions. Moreover, needs are no sacred in he sense ha modern psychology assers i a sacrilege, so o speak, o suppress one's needs. There can be evil needs, needs which hem us in, make us slaves, oppress us. To ruly undersand he problem of man's needs i is necessary o go o heir roo, o undersand man, he subjec of hose needs, o come o see man as no only having needs, bu being himself a need. Kan's second caegorical imperaive ha one mus never use one's fellow man as a means ells us only how we should rea ohers, no how we should rea ourselves. If we consider ourselves as an end uno ourselves, we will of necessiy rea ohers as means. Evenually we will be led ino feelings of uselessness and ino despair. True happiness consiss in being needed. Bu who needs us? Naure? No! Our fellow-man? Only indirecly, if a all. "Man is needed, he is a need of God." The remainder of Man is no Alone consiss of a preliminary sudy of he naure of religion in general and of Judaism in paricular. These subjecs are reaed in greaer deail in God in Search of Man. The lecures which comprise he lile book eniled Who is Man? develop Heschel's anhropology even furher. In A Passion for Truh, published poshumously, he compares wo seemingly disparae concepions of religion and man: hose of Rabbi Menal)em Mendl of Kozk and of Soren Kierkegaard, demonsraing ha in many respecs hey are no so far apar. All of Heschel's works, which are a deligh o read, deserve careful sudy. An aemp should be made o provide a deailed delineaion of wha Heschel was agains. Such an inquiry would offer an effecive mehod of aaining o a deeper undersanding and appreciaion of his philosophical and religious sance. However, i would no be enough o specify wha Heschel opposed; sudens of Heschel should be concerned also wih how he relaed o his adversaries: wih digniy and respec, wih quie calm and dispassionae words. He was an example of a seeker afer ruh who does no aemp o exal himself by bringing ohers down. His wriing, hough ofen allusive, was never abusive. He proclaimed ha we praise God before we prove His exisence. As for he hinkers wih who.m hedisagreed, he praised hem oo, so o speak, before he ried o show heir deficiencies. For example, as a Jew, a brand plucked from he fire, he had a righ o relae negaively o Marin Heidegger whose Nazi sympahies are well-aesed despie his resignaion from he pos as Recor of he Universiy of Freiburg o which he was appoined during he Nazi regime. Ye, in Who is Man? J ' I f I n I h a n u J 0 J J a p Cl c1 Ic o: p u: G H m h n lu... h

11 A.}. Hesche!, Irenic Polemicis 177 Hesche} shows a disinc respec for he auhor of Being and Time who, perhaps as no oher beside Heschel himself, sough o answer he perplexing quesion which comprises he book's ile. Hesche} liked o end his lecures and seminars wih a sory. I was usually a pihy Hasidic maaseh, and i was lef for he lisener o ge he poin of he parable or he allegory. A he conclusion of his presenaion I have no Hasidic sory o ell o illusrae my hesis. Bu I do have a personal anecdoe o relae, b'didi haua uvda. When I was a suden a he Seminary, Hesche} assigned our class he wriing of a shor heme inerpreing he phrase from Isaiah 6:3: mlo khol ha-arez k 'vodo, usually ranslaed: ''he whole earh is full of His glory.'' When I received he assignmen I resolved o impress him. Afer all, he mus have had somehing profound in mind if he asked for an inerpreaion of such a ime-worn verse! So, applying my linguisic ben, I composed a heme in which I wroe ha he u~'ual ranslaion is wrong. If Isaiah had waned o express he idea ha he whole earh is full of God's glory, he would have said mol'ah or meleiah khol ha-arez k'vodo. (See Isaiah 11:9.) Mlo ha-arez means he ''fullness of he earh,'' so he meaning of he received ex is ha God's glory consiss of he fullness of he earh. Isaiah is calling aenion o a qualiy which he world possesses: fullness, compleeness, perfecion. Hesche! reurned my maserpiece wih no commen. Also wih no grade. Ye his aiude oward me did no change. He was he same swee person o me as previously. Only laer, many years laer, when I decided o engage in a serious sudy of basidu, did I undersand how irenic Hesche! really was. My inerpreaion mus have disurbed him no end. Do you realize ha I had in one fell swoop shown ha he conroversy beween he Vilna Gaon and he Rabbi of Ladi resed on a mere linguisic confusion? Here I was implying ha he quesion of he exen of God's imminence in he world which precipiaed such pain and anguish in he Jewish communiies of Easern Europe, divided families, disruped Jewish sociey, led o excommunicaions and even ~illul hashem derived from a simple misundersanding of grammar! All ha suros would have been avoided if he Aler Rebbe had known of my ranslaion! I recall his personal experience wih Hesche! ofen. I has helped o keep me humble o some degree. I serves as a consan reminder o me o ry o emulae he irenic polemicis who was my eacher. I have no always remained faihful o his charge, bu I have always been graeful for he inspiraion he gave me. I pray ha I may someday be worhy of being numbered among his disciples. Yehei zikhro barukh.