Little Bighorn LESSONS LEARNED. Notes:

Transcription

1 Bale Diges is made possible by he generous conribuions from your parners in defense... LESSONS LEARNED Sraegic/Operaional: Noes: 1) Sraegy Alhough Terry s overall campaign sraegy was sound moving hree muually supporing columns of force o converge on he rebellious ribes and heir village i failed in is execuion. Terry s plan relied on wo quesionable assumpions: one being a smaller oal number of Indians; he oher ha he was facing a less-deermined foe. To complicae he siuaion, Terry never had he advanage of Crook s assessmen of he enemy afer his ough figh a Rosebud Creek on he 17h, so no adjusmens were made. Then, of course, here was Cuser. Cuser s aack, wihou suppor from he larger force, deprived Terry of any chance a vicory. If Cuser and his 7h Cavalry had waied unil Gibbon s supporing column was in place, i is likely Terry s campaign sraegy would have succeeded. Fo re r I pr llu es s en ra an iv y EP en U do RP rs OS em ES en On ly of a h nd is do pr es od no uc 2) Mass Operaionally, Terry s bigges failure was his inabiliy o synchronize his hree columns o effecively mass his forces agains he enemy. His subordinae commander (Cuser) forced a bale ha allowed he Indians o mass heir superior numbers agains a smaller porion of his force. The judgmen of hisory has placed much of his blame on Cuser, bu senior commanders succeed by maneuvering heir forces in such a way o allow hem o apply srengh agains enemy weakness. In he final assessmen, Terry failed o do his. 3) Inelligence Failure The Army relied heavily on is Indian scous leading up o Lile Bighorn. These Crow, Arikara, and Pawnee wih heir knowledge of he errain, he habis and endencies of he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho were criical o he developmen of sraegy in he field. Official Army esimaes placed Indian numbers around 800. This seems o be he number ha boh Terry and Cuser had in mind. Bu he official esimaes failed o accoun for over 1,000 men who had come off he reservaion o join his renegade group for he summer buffalo hun. Failing o accoun for his large increase in enemy force size was a significan oversigh ha undoubedly affeced he oucome. To compound he problem, no informaion reached Terry abou Brig. Gen. Crook s bale wih an unexpecedly srong force of Indians jus 30 miles souheas of Lile Bighorn on he 17h. Eiher of hese imporan pieces of informaion migh have alered he plan. Tacical: 1) Cuser s Tacical Plan In Terry s wrien order, Cuser was given wide discreion o conduc acical acions. Cuser s plan o divide his forces, wih Reno s force as he hammer and his as he anvil, may have been appropriae agains a smaller foe, bu agains he overwhelming force of deermined Indians i was compleely inadequae. Even if Cuser worried abou losing he iniiaive, or feared he Indians migh escape, i was sill ill-advised o rush headlong ino an enemy ha ounumbered him by over 2 o 1. Addiionally, once he fighing sared Cuser failed o adjus his plan, consolidae his forces, or rerea o a more favorable posiion. In he end, Cuser s acical plan was faally flawed. Aacking a deermined, numerically superior force while his own forces were divided was a recipe for disaser. 2) Mission Command Terry failed o orchesrae his forces in accordance wih his inen. From his wrien order o Cuser, i is clear ha he inended for Cuser s force o operae wih suppor from Gibbon s force. Ye, his order gave Cuser he leeway o ac independenly if he saw he need which Cuser did. As noed above, he also coninued he campaign wihou any word from Crook. Obaining an assessmen from Crook on he size and disposiion of he enemy, or waiing for his hree columns o join up, migh have made all he difference. Cuser, oo, failed in his regard, unable o effecively adjus or synchronize his ounumbered forces afer he bale had begun. When Reno s aack broke down, Cuser compleely los his abiliy o maneuver his forces. Dividing his forces ino hree separae maneuver groups only made hings worse. As his subordinaes made adjusmens, his plan coninued o deeriorae. Reno s decision o suspend his charge, along wih Beneen s failure o execue Cuser s order o come o he commander s aid, boh illusrae he mission command challenges Cuser faced. Bu Cuser bears he responsibiliy for puing his forces ino posiions where hey were forced o reac o an enemy who behaved differenly han he expeced. 3) Overreliance on Surprise Cuser believed ha he elemen of surprise was criical. However, focusing on one advanage can blind commanders o ohers. Because Cuser incorrecly believed ha surprise had been compromised, he fel compelled o launch he aack early wihou waiing for Terry s and Gibbon s forces o srenghen he blow. Ironically, surprise ended up working agains Cuser. The surprised Indians were unable o quickly evacuae heir village. And wih heir subsanial number of well-armed warriors, i was possible o fend off Reno s iniial aack and wres he iniiaive from he 7h Cavalry. In he end, Cuser s fixaion on gaining surprise blinded him o oher imporan acical consideraions. 4) Overconfidence Cuser s overconfidence may have been his mos faal flaw. Leading up o Lile Bighorn, he had never los a bale by using acics he fel were proven. Bu he failed o fully accoun for, and respec, he difference in he new enemy he was facing, nor did he confirm for himself heir large numbers before his assaul. Furhermore, Cuser declined he offer of he Galing gun and even he addiion of exra roopers, assering ha boh would slow him down. Eiher of hese addiions may have changed he oucome. In his hase o bring on he bale, and win more personal glory for himself and his 7h Cavalry, he led many brave men o heir deahs. Endnoes, Maps, and Images This issue of BaleDiges was wrien by miliary hisorian and auhor Michael Haskew for he exclusive use of Trinsicore, LLC. Bale Diges (TM) is a rademark of Trinsicore, LLC. The conens of his publicaion are copyrighed by Trinsicore, LLC., excep as indicaed in Endnoes, Maps and Images. All righs are reserved. No par of his publicaion may be reproduced or ransmied in any form, or by any means, wihou he prior wrien permission of Trinsicore, LLC, excep for shor passages used for he purposes of review. To reques copies of his, or oher issues, please visi For more, visi us online a Endnoes: 1. Frederic F. Van de Waer, Glory-Huning: A Life of General Cuser (Lincoln: Universiy of Nebraska Press, 1934): 319; 2. Oie W. Reno, Reno and Apsaalooka Survive Cuser (Carnbury, N.J.: Cornwall Books, 1997) 143; 3. James W. Welch wih Paul Sekler, Killing Cuser, The Bale of he Lile Bighorn and he Fae of he Plains Indians (New York: W.W. Noron and Company, 1994) 156. Images: Map 1: Campaign Overview [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:cusermovemens.jpg]; Map 2: Troop Movemens [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/ uploads/lile-bighorn-bale-map.jpg]; Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/uploads/lile-bighorn-map.jpg]; Cuser: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Bale: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:charles_marion_russell_-_the_cuser_figh_(1903).jpg]; Siing Bull: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/siing_bull#/media/file:siing_bull_by_d_f_barry_ca_1883_dakoa_terriory.jpg]; Cavalryman: Wikipedia, public domain; Period weapons: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Balefield Naional Monumen: Wikipedia, public domain; Cuser graves: Wikipedia, public domain, [phoo by R. Sieben] Volume 1 H Issue 4 Lessons for Today s Leaders Early American Wars: Lile Bighorn opposing forces U.S. Army: 7h Cavalry Regimen (700 cavalry and scous) under he command of L. Col. George A. Cuser. (Cuser was a subordinae of Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he overall commander of he operaion wih a oal of 2,500 men.) Allied Plains Indians: Sioux (including Lakoa), Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians (esimaed 1,500-1,800 warriors) under he command of Chiefs Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall. Hisorical significance The Bale of Lile Bighorn, despie is relaively small size, was he wors defea for he U.S. Army in he Indian Wars. And alhough i was a clear acical vicory for he Plains Indians, i would be a significan sraegic seback for heir cause. The ourage caused by he Indian vicory only inensified effors by he U.S. Army and is Deparmen of he Missouri o pacify he Naive Americans and reurn hose who resised o heir reservaions. Wihin monhs of heir vicory a Lile Bighorn, he Plains Indians were defeaed in he Grea Sioux War of and heir lands in he Black Hills of he Dakoa Terriory were confiscaed. The conroversial career of George A. Cuser ended wih his deah during he bloody defea a Lile Bighorn, popularly remembered as Cuser s Las Sand. His acions have been scruinized ever since. DATE: June 25-26, 1876 LOCATION: Monana Terriory These were he source of heir susainmen, and wih heir pony herds, heir ransporaion. Insead of chasing down warriors, he would aack hese ceners of graviy wih converging columns as he had done previously. Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he Commandan of he Deparmen of Dakoa, was placed in charge of his operaion in he spring of Senior army commanders generally agreed ha he nomadic villages would evenually be in he area of he Yellowsone, Powder, Rosebud, and Bighorn rivers and creeks where game and oher resources were pleniful. Terry would ake independen columns (2,500 oal men), converge on his area, and force he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho back o he reservaion. (Map 1) On 1 April, Col. John Gibbon led he Monana column ou of For Ellis near Bozeman, Monana, wih 450 infanry and cavalry. On 17 May, Terry personally led he easern column ou of For Lincoln, wih over 900 men (mos of whom were in Cuser s 7h Cavalry Regimen). And on 29 May, he final column, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Crook, lef For Feerman, Cuser Wyoming Terriory, from he souh, wih 1,000 cavalry and infanry. (Crook would be sopped shor afer facing an aggressive aack on 17 June a he Bale of he Rosebud. Unforunaely, his message relaing he even did no reach Terry unil 30 June.) Sraegy & maneuver Acions by U.S. Army Afer he For Laramie Treay of 1868, he senior commanders of he Deparmen of he Missouri, he command echelon of he Army responsible for conducing Indian Affairs in he region, realized hey sill had a problem. Facions of Plains Indians refused o remain on he agreed-upon land of he Grea Sioux Reservaion in he Dakoa Terriory. Some Indian non-compliance was realiaion for whie encroachmen ino he Black Hills afer gold was discovered. Neverheless, afer he governmen declared hese Indian acions illegal, i was up o General Phil Sheridan, commander of he Deparmen of he Missouri, o force compliance. Sheridan had faced a similar challenge years before in he Souhern Plains War of He undersood ha he Indians cener of graviy were heir camps. Siing Bull Acions by he Sioux and Cheyenne The Plains Indians facion, under Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall, among oher leaders, sough o remain independen and refused o abide by he For Laramie Treay of No only were he Black Hills sacred lands, bu he whole concep of land ownership was foreign o hem. As hey ried o coninue heir nomadic way of life, however, hey faced he consan hrea of aack. While he mobiliy of he Indians was an inheren srengh in heir cones wih he U.S. Army, i was also an impedimen. Because heir villages were heir logisics hubs, hey were obliged o defend hem. This required hem o be consanly vigilan for hreas from any direcion and pu hem on he sraegic defensive hroughou he Grea Sioux War.

2 acics of he bale handle anyhing i mees, was his reply.1 He also refused he Galing gun deachmen of he 20h Infanry Regimen which would have vasly increased his firepower. Cuser s wachword was speed, and he feared any augmenaion of his force migh slow is progress. As Terry and Gibbon moved souhwes over he nex hree days, Cuser drove his men hard o he souh. (Map 2) Map 1: Campaign Overview The Bale of Lile Bighorn was Cuser s aemp o seize he iniiaive by quickly aacking his Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho adversaries before hey could aack him or flee. The resuling woday figh would end in complee disaser and defea for Cuser and his 7h Cavalry Regimen. As Cuser s iniial aack broke down in he face of superior Indian numbers, and his divided forces were unable o effecively suppor one anoher, he failed. 21 June: As Terry s hree columns converged, he linked up wih Gibbon s column from he wes on he 21s. (Map 2) Unforunaely, Terry would no have he advanage of informaion from Crook furher souh, who had faced a group of hese Indians on he 17h a Rosebud Creek. Crook found hese ribes unafraid o aack his large force and even able o push him back. Bu up norh, Terry s scous had seen smoke rising in he souh from he Lile Bighorn River along wih he discovery of an Indian rail leading ha direcion. 24 June: By he evening of he 24h, Cuser was 25 miles eas of he Indian village. Afer dispaching scous o deermine he exac locaion and srengh of he enemy, he learned ha he village had moved wesward oward he Lile Bighorn River. I appeared he Indians migh be hemmed in agains he sream if he bale were joined rapidly. The scous also poined ou ha i was perhaps he larges such village hey had ever seen. Laer ha nigh, Cuser moved his force forward o he Wolf Mounains, abou 12 miles away from he Indian village. Alhough Cuser iniially planned a second nigh march o close he gap for a dawn aack on he 26h which would have beer aligned wih his orders he changed his plan. Because he had relied heavily on 25 June: Suddenly fearing he would lose he iniiaive and be aacked by he Indians, or be he one who allowed hem o escape before Gibbon and Terry were in posiion, Cuser decided o aack. Employing acics ha had been successfully used previously, he divided his force ino hree primary elemens. Maj. Marcus Reno would lead he main aack squadron (hree companies, oaling 140 roopers) and move up he river oward he camp. A supporing squadron of hree companies (125 roopers oal) under Cap. Frederick Beneen was insruced o proceed souhward on a lef oblique in search of Indians and block any souheasward escape roue. Cuser would ake he five remaining companies (oaling 210 men) o maneuver around he Indians eas of he river o form his own blocking posiion o cach he Indians afer Reno s charge. One company would say behind o guard he 7h Cavalry s supply rain. Wih heir plan in place, Cuser, Beneen, and Reno moved oward he Indian village. I was jus before 1500 hrs., when Reno received orders from Cuser saing, The village is only abou wo miles above and moving away. Move forward a as rapid a gai as is pruden and charge aferward. The whole oufi will suppor you. 2 Wih ha, Reno splashed across he Lile Bighorn o advance on he village s souhern flank in he broad basin wes of he river. (Map 3) Alhough Reno surprised he Indians, hey reaced swifly. Bu he village was no on he move, as Cuser had believed, and i was full of warriors. Reno quickly deermined ha he could no charge successfully ino such a large camp. Insead, he haled his roopers and formed a skirmish line where his men sared firing a he hundreds of Indians now bearing down on him. In jus minues, his lef flank was already on he brink of collapse. He ordered a wihdrawal o a cluser of rees beside he river o ake emporary cover. Terry issued his orders he following day. Thinking he had found he main camp, he ordered Cuser o ake his regimen souh before swinging norh up he Lile Bighorn River. He would be he aacking force o drive he Indians ino Gibbon s forces, which would come down from he norh and form a blocking posiion o preven heir escape. Gibbon, wih slower moving infanry forces, would no be in place unil 26 June. Terry s plan appeared o res on he assumpions ha Indian numbers were smaller han hey were, and ha hey would probably ry o rerea as hey had done in previous engagemens. Wih hese assumpions, Terry used a classic hammer and anvil acic ha had proven effecive in he pas. From Terry s wrien order, i s clear ha he envisioned he wo forces working in muual suppor o preven he Indians escape. However, i is also imporan o noe ha Cuser was given wide discreion o ac as he siuaion unfolded. Prior o his deparure from he main force, Cuser was offered four companies of he 2nd Cavalry, bu he declined. The 7h can surprise in he pas, he was alarmed when he scous old him ha he Indians were probably aware of his presence. Map 2: Uni Movemens Furher pressed and wih mouning casualies, Reno rereaed again his ime eas of he river. As his men moved, many were cu down by Indians on horseback. When hey reached he high ground above he river, Reno gahered he remnans of his command and formed a hasy defensive posiion. Meanwhile, o he norheas, Cuser s force rode along he edge of a deep ravine called Medicine Tail Coulee o ge ino posiion o srike he Indian village from he norh and complee his rap. Evidence suggess, however, ha Cuser s norhward advance was inerruped by he sudden movemen of a band of Indians under Crazy Horse aemping o execue an envelopmen around Cuser s force. A his poin, Cuser moved o he high ground along a nearby ridgeline, bu wih Reno pinned down, he fury of he Indian response now fell upon Cuser. Page 2 Afer Cuser had reached he op of a nearby promonory and had probably seen for he firs ime he immensiy of he Indian village, he rode back o his command. His adjuan scrawled his follow-up order o Beneen and sen a lone courier on horseback o deliver i: Beneen. Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs. 3 Beneen and his hree companies had no encounered any Indians o he souh, bu wih he sound of gunfire downsream, he was already rying o locae Cuser. He reached he bluffs along he Lile Bighorn in ime o see Reno s soldiers fleeing in disorder. On a hill abou a mile and a half from Reno, Cap. Thomas Weir and elemens of Company D (from Beneen s force) observed large numbers of Indians approaching. Afer meeing Reno, who pleaded for assisance, Beneen rode o Weir s advanced posiion and hen ordered a reiremen o consolidae as much as possible wih Reno. Beneen and Reno hen formed a horseshoe perimeer and desperaely defended heir ground. As he bale raged, boh Reno and Beneen saw a large number of Indians veer o he norh oward Cuser. Alhough he deails of he ensuing bale are shrouded in conroversy, Cuser s five companies fough a running bale a firs, dismouning a several locaions. Company E moved agains he Indians along a series of seep ravines wes of he ridgeline and became hopelessly rapped. Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea Company F probably ried o ake a sand along he open ground in fron of he hillside where he las drama of he figh played ou. The bulk of Company I was caugh on he easern slope of he ridge and fough o he las man, while companies C and L had dismouned a he souhern end of he high ground and were annihilaed in a shor figh ha probably lased less han a half hour. The las sand occurred on a hill where up o 50 roopers, likely low on ammuniion, were surrounded and massacred by overwhelming numbers of Indians. Archaeological evidence suggess ha some of he soldiers, individually or in small groups, aemped o escape he slaugher. Bu each man was ridden down and killed sho, sabbed, or clubbed by incensed warriors. Meanwhile, Reno and Beneen coninued o hold heir defensive posiion unil dusk he following day (26 June). As he gunfire finally died down around 1600 hrs. and he smoke cleared, he surviving cavalrymen could see he Indian village on he move. When Terry and Gibbon arrived a he scene he nex morning (27h), hey saw only he remnans of he Indian village, along wih he carnage of he previous days comba. The acical disaser a Lile Bighorn had cos he 7h Cavalry 268 dead and 55 severely wounded.

3 acics of he bale handle anyhing i mees, was his reply.1 He also refused he Galing gun deachmen of he 20h Infanry Regimen which would have vasly increased his firepower. Cuser s wachword was speed, and he feared any augmenaion of his force migh slow is progress. As Terry and Gibbon moved souhwes over he nex hree days, Cuser drove his men hard o he souh. (Map 2) Map 1: Campaign Overview The Bale of Lile Bighorn was Cuser s aemp o seize he iniiaive by quickly aacking his Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho adversaries before hey could aack him or flee. The resuling woday figh would end in complee disaser and defea for Cuser and his 7h Cavalry Regimen. As Cuser s iniial aack broke down in he face of superior Indian numbers, and his divided forces were unable o effecively suppor one anoher, he failed. 21 June: As Terry s hree columns converged, he linked up wih Gibbon s column from he wes on he 21s. (Map 2) Unforunaely, Terry would no have he advanage of informaion from Crook furher souh, who had faced a group of hese Indians on he 17h a Rosebud Creek. Crook found hese ribes unafraid o aack his large force and even able o push him back. Bu up norh, Terry s scous had seen smoke rising in he souh from he Lile Bighorn River along wih he discovery of an Indian rail leading ha direcion. 24 June: By he evening of he 24h, Cuser was 25 miles eas of he Indian village. Afer dispaching scous o deermine he exac locaion and srengh of he enemy, he learned ha he village had moved wesward oward he Lile Bighorn River. I appeared he Indians migh be hemmed in agains he sream if he bale were joined rapidly. The scous also poined ou ha i was perhaps he larges such village hey had ever seen. Laer ha nigh, Cuser moved his force forward o he Wolf Mounains, abou 12 miles away from he Indian village. Alhough Cuser iniially planned a second nigh march o close he gap for a dawn aack on he 26h which would have beer aligned wih his orders he changed his plan. Because he had relied heavily on 25 June: Suddenly fearing he would lose he iniiaive and be aacked by he Indians, or be he one who allowed hem o escape before Gibbon and Terry were in posiion, Cuser decided o aack. Employing acics ha had been successfully used previously, he divided his force ino hree primary elemens. Maj. Marcus Reno would lead he main aack squadron (hree companies, oaling 140 roopers) and move up he river oward he camp. A supporing squadron of hree companies (125 roopers oal) under Cap. Frederick Beneen was insruced o proceed souhward on a lef oblique in search of Indians and block any souheasward escape roue. Cuser would ake he five remaining companies (oaling 210 men) o maneuver around he Indians eas of he river o form his own blocking posiion o cach he Indians afer Reno s charge. One company would say behind o guard he 7h Cavalry s supply rain. Wih heir plan in place, Cuser, Beneen, and Reno moved oward he Indian village. I was jus before 1500 hrs., when Reno received orders from Cuser saing, The village is only abou wo miles above and moving away. Move forward a as rapid a gai as is pruden and charge aferward. The whole oufi will suppor you. 2 Wih ha, Reno splashed across he Lile Bighorn o advance on he village s souhern flank in he broad basin wes of he river. (Map 3) Alhough Reno surprised he Indians, hey reaced swifly. Bu he village was no on he move, as Cuser had believed, and i was full of warriors. Reno quickly deermined ha he could no charge successfully ino such a large camp. Insead, he haled his roopers and formed a skirmish line where his men sared firing a he hundreds of Indians now bearing down on him. In jus minues, his lef flank was already on he brink of collapse. He ordered a wihdrawal o a cluser of rees beside he river o ake emporary cover. Terry issued his orders he following day. Thinking he had found he main camp, he ordered Cuser o ake his regimen souh before swinging norh up he Lile Bighorn River. He would be he aacking force o drive he Indians ino Gibbon s forces, which would come down from he norh and form a blocking posiion o preven heir escape. Gibbon, wih slower moving infanry forces, would no be in place unil 26 June. Terry s plan appeared o res on he assumpions ha Indian numbers were smaller han hey were, and ha hey would probably ry o rerea as hey had done in previous engagemens. Wih hese assumpions, Terry used a classic hammer and anvil acic ha had proven effecive in he pas. From Terry s wrien order, i s clear ha he envisioned he wo forces working in muual suppor o preven he Indians escape. However, i is also imporan o noe ha Cuser was given wide discreion o ac as he siuaion unfolded. Prior o his deparure from he main force, Cuser was offered four companies of he 2nd Cavalry, bu he declined. The 7h can surprise in he pas, he was alarmed when he scous old him ha he Indians were probably aware of his presence. Map 2: Uni Movemens Furher pressed and wih mouning casualies, Reno rereaed again his ime eas of he river. As his men moved, many were cu down by Indians on horseback. When hey reached he high ground above he river, Reno gahered he remnans of his command and formed a hasy defensive posiion. Meanwhile, o he norheas, Cuser s force rode along he edge of a deep ravine called Medicine Tail Coulee o ge ino posiion o srike he Indian village from he norh and complee his rap. Evidence suggess, however, ha Cuser s norhward advance was inerruped by he sudden movemen of a band of Indians under Crazy Horse aemping o execue an envelopmen around Cuser s force. A his poin, Cuser moved o he high ground along a nearby ridgeline, bu wih Reno pinned down, he fury of he Indian response now fell upon Cuser. Page 2 Afer Cuser had reached he op of a nearby promonory and had probably seen for he firs ime he immensiy of he Indian village, he rode back o his command. His adjuan scrawled his follow-up order o Beneen and sen a lone courier on horseback o deliver i: Beneen. Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs. 3 Beneen and his hree companies had no encounered any Indians o he souh, bu wih he sound of gunfire downsream, he was already rying o locae Cuser. He reached he bluffs along he Lile Bighorn in ime o see Reno s soldiers fleeing in disorder. On a hill abou a mile and a half from Reno, Cap. Thomas Weir and elemens of Company D (from Beneen s force) observed large numbers of Indians approaching. Afer meeing Reno, who pleaded for assisance, Beneen rode o Weir s advanced posiion and hen ordered a reiremen o consolidae as much as possible wih Reno. Beneen and Reno hen formed a horseshoe perimeer and desperaely defended heir ground. As he bale raged, boh Reno and Beneen saw a large number of Indians veer o he norh oward Cuser. Alhough he deails of he ensuing bale are shrouded in conroversy, Cuser s five companies fough a running bale a firs, dismouning a several locaions. Company E moved agains he Indians along a series of seep ravines wes of he ridgeline and became hopelessly rapped. Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea Company F probably ried o ake a sand along he open ground in fron of he hillside where he las drama of he figh played ou. The bulk of Company I was caugh on he easern slope of he ridge and fough o he las man, while companies C and L had dismouned a he souhern end of he high ground and were annihilaed in a shor figh ha probably lased less han a half hour. The las sand occurred on a hill where up o 50 roopers, likely low on ammuniion, were surrounded and massacred by overwhelming numbers of Indians. Archaeological evidence suggess ha some of he soldiers, individually or in small groups, aemped o escape he slaugher. Bu each man was ridden down and killed sho, sabbed, or clubbed by incensed warriors. Meanwhile, Reno and Beneen coninued o hold heir defensive posiion unil dusk he following day (26 June). As he gunfire finally died down around 1600 hrs. and he smoke cleared, he surviving cavalrymen could see he Indian village on he move. When Terry and Gibbon arrived a he scene he nex morning (27h), hey saw only he remnans of he Indian village, along wih he carnage of he previous days comba. The acical disaser a Lile Bighorn had cos he 7h Cavalry 268 dead and 55 severely wounded.

4 acics of he bale handle anyhing i mees, was his reply.1 He also refused he Galing gun deachmen of he 20h Infanry Regimen which would have vasly increased his firepower. Cuser s wachword was speed, and he feared any augmenaion of his force migh slow is progress. As Terry and Gibbon moved souhwes over he nex hree days, Cuser drove his men hard o he souh. (Map 2) Map 1: Campaign Overview The Bale of Lile Bighorn was Cuser s aemp o seize he iniiaive by quickly aacking his Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho adversaries before hey could aack him or flee. The resuling woday figh would end in complee disaser and defea for Cuser and his 7h Cavalry Regimen. As Cuser s iniial aack broke down in he face of superior Indian numbers, and his divided forces were unable o effecively suppor one anoher, he failed. 21 June: As Terry s hree columns converged, he linked up wih Gibbon s column from he wes on he 21s. (Map 2) Unforunaely, Terry would no have he advanage of informaion from Crook furher souh, who had faced a group of hese Indians on he 17h a Rosebud Creek. Crook found hese ribes unafraid o aack his large force and even able o push him back. Bu up norh, Terry s scous had seen smoke rising in he souh from he Lile Bighorn River along wih he discovery of an Indian rail leading ha direcion. 24 June: By he evening of he 24h, Cuser was 25 miles eas of he Indian village. Afer dispaching scous o deermine he exac locaion and srengh of he enemy, he learned ha he village had moved wesward oward he Lile Bighorn River. I appeared he Indians migh be hemmed in agains he sream if he bale were joined rapidly. The scous also poined ou ha i was perhaps he larges such village hey had ever seen. Laer ha nigh, Cuser moved his force forward o he Wolf Mounains, abou 12 miles away from he Indian village. Alhough Cuser iniially planned a second nigh march o close he gap for a dawn aack on he 26h which would have beer aligned wih his orders he changed his plan. Because he had relied heavily on 25 June: Suddenly fearing he would lose he iniiaive and be aacked by he Indians, or be he one who allowed hem o escape before Gibbon and Terry were in posiion, Cuser decided o aack. Employing acics ha had been successfully used previously, he divided his force ino hree primary elemens. Maj. Marcus Reno would lead he main aack squadron (hree companies, oaling 140 roopers) and move up he river oward he camp. A supporing squadron of hree companies (125 roopers oal) under Cap. Frederick Beneen was insruced o proceed souhward on a lef oblique in search of Indians and block any souheasward escape roue. Cuser would ake he five remaining companies (oaling 210 men) o maneuver around he Indians eas of he river o form his own blocking posiion o cach he Indians afer Reno s charge. One company would say behind o guard he 7h Cavalry s supply rain. Wih heir plan in place, Cuser, Beneen, and Reno moved oward he Indian village. I was jus before 1500 hrs., when Reno received orders from Cuser saing, The village is only abou wo miles above and moving away. Move forward a as rapid a gai as is pruden and charge aferward. The whole oufi will suppor you. 2 Wih ha, Reno splashed across he Lile Bighorn o advance on he village s souhern flank in he broad basin wes of he river. (Map 3) Alhough Reno surprised he Indians, hey reaced swifly. Bu he village was no on he move, as Cuser had believed, and i was full of warriors. Reno quickly deermined ha he could no charge successfully ino such a large camp. Insead, he haled his roopers and formed a skirmish line where his men sared firing a he hundreds of Indians now bearing down on him. In jus minues, his lef flank was already on he brink of collapse. He ordered a wihdrawal o a cluser of rees beside he river o ake emporary cover. Terry issued his orders he following day. Thinking he had found he main camp, he ordered Cuser o ake his regimen souh before swinging norh up he Lile Bighorn River. He would be he aacking force o drive he Indians ino Gibbon s forces, which would come down from he norh and form a blocking posiion o preven heir escape. Gibbon, wih slower moving infanry forces, would no be in place unil 26 June. Terry s plan appeared o res on he assumpions ha Indian numbers were smaller han hey were, and ha hey would probably ry o rerea as hey had done in previous engagemens. Wih hese assumpions, Terry used a classic hammer and anvil acic ha had proven effecive in he pas. From Terry s wrien order, i s clear ha he envisioned he wo forces working in muual suppor o preven he Indians escape. However, i is also imporan o noe ha Cuser was given wide discreion o ac as he siuaion unfolded. Prior o his deparure from he main force, Cuser was offered four companies of he 2nd Cavalry, bu he declined. The 7h can surprise in he pas, he was alarmed when he scous old him ha he Indians were probably aware of his presence. Map 2: Uni Movemens Furher pressed and wih mouning casualies, Reno rereaed again his ime eas of he river. As his men moved, many were cu down by Indians on horseback. When hey reached he high ground above he river, Reno gahered he remnans of his command and formed a hasy defensive posiion. Meanwhile, o he norheas, Cuser s force rode along he edge of a deep ravine called Medicine Tail Coulee o ge ino posiion o srike he Indian village from he norh and complee his rap. Evidence suggess, however, ha Cuser s norhward advance was inerruped by he sudden movemen of a band of Indians under Crazy Horse aemping o execue an envelopmen around Cuser s force. A his poin, Cuser moved o he high ground along a nearby ridgeline, bu wih Reno pinned down, he fury of he Indian response now fell upon Cuser. Page 2 Afer Cuser had reached he op of a nearby promonory and had probably seen for he firs ime he immensiy of he Indian village, he rode back o his command. His adjuan scrawled his follow-up order o Beneen and sen a lone courier on horseback o deliver i: Beneen. Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs. 3 Beneen and his hree companies had no encounered any Indians o he souh, bu wih he sound of gunfire downsream, he was already rying o locae Cuser. He reached he bluffs along he Lile Bighorn in ime o see Reno s soldiers fleeing in disorder. On a hill abou a mile and a half from Reno, Cap. Thomas Weir and elemens of Company D (from Beneen s force) observed large numbers of Indians approaching. Afer meeing Reno, who pleaded for assisance, Beneen rode o Weir s advanced posiion and hen ordered a reiremen o consolidae as much as possible wih Reno. Beneen and Reno hen formed a horseshoe perimeer and desperaely defended heir ground. As he bale raged, boh Reno and Beneen saw a large number of Indians veer o he norh oward Cuser. Alhough he deails of he ensuing bale are shrouded in conroversy, Cuser s five companies fough a running bale a firs, dismouning a several locaions. Company E moved agains he Indians along a series of seep ravines wes of he ridgeline and became hopelessly rapped. Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea Company F probably ried o ake a sand along he open ground in fron of he hillside where he las drama of he figh played ou. The bulk of Company I was caugh on he easern slope of he ridge and fough o he las man, while companies C and L had dismouned a he souhern end of he high ground and were annihilaed in a shor figh ha probably lased less han a half hour. The las sand occurred on a hill where up o 50 roopers, likely low on ammuniion, were surrounded and massacred by overwhelming numbers of Indians. Archaeological evidence suggess ha some of he soldiers, individually or in small groups, aemped o escape he slaugher. Bu each man was ridden down and killed sho, sabbed, or clubbed by incensed warriors. Meanwhile, Reno and Beneen coninued o hold heir defensive posiion unil dusk he following day (26 June). As he gunfire finally died down around 1600 hrs. and he smoke cleared, he surviving cavalrymen could see he Indian village on he move. When Terry and Gibbon arrived a he scene he nex morning (27h), hey saw only he remnans of he Indian village, along wih he carnage of he previous days comba. The acical disaser a Lile Bighorn had cos he 7h Cavalry 268 dead and 55 severely wounded.

5 Bale Diges is made possible by he generous conribuions from your parners in defense... LESSONS LEARNED Sraegic/Operaional: Noes: 1) Sraegy Alhough Terry s overall campaign sraegy was sound moving hree muually supporing columns of force o converge on he rebellious ribes and heir village i failed in is execuion. Terry s plan relied on wo quesionable assumpions: one being a smaller oal number of Indians; he oher ha he was facing a less-deermined foe. To complicae he siuaion, Terry never had he advanage of Crook s assessmen of he enemy afer his ough figh a Rosebud Creek on he 17h, so no adjusmens were made. Then, of course, here was Cuser. Cuser s aack, wihou suppor from he larger force, deprived Terry of any chance a vicory. If Cuser and his 7h Cavalry had waied unil Gibbon s supporing column was in place, i is likely Terry s campaign sraegy would have succeeded. Fo re r I pr llu es s en ra an iv y EP en U do RP rs OS em ES en On ly of a h nd is do pr es od no uc 2) Mass Operaionally, Terry s bigges failure was his inabiliy o synchronize his hree columns o effecively mass his forces agains he enemy. His subordinae commander (Cuser) forced a bale ha allowed he Indians o mass heir superior numbers agains a smaller porion of his force. The judgmen of hisory has placed much of his blame on Cuser, bu senior commanders succeed by maneuvering heir forces in such a way o allow hem o apply srengh agains enemy weakness. In he final assessmen, Terry failed o do his. 3) Inelligence Failure The Army relied heavily on is Indian scous leading up o Lile Bighorn. These Crow, Arikara, and Pawnee wih heir knowledge of he errain, he habis and endencies of he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho were criical o he developmen of sraegy in he field. Official Army esimaes placed Indian numbers around 800. This seems o be he number ha boh Terry and Cuser had in mind. Bu he official esimaes failed o accoun for over 1,000 men who had come off he reservaion o join his renegade group for he summer buffalo hun. Failing o accoun for his large increase in enemy force size was a significan oversigh ha undoubedly affeced he oucome. To compound he problem, no informaion reached Terry abou Brig. Gen. Crook s bale wih an unexpecedly srong force of Indians jus 30 miles souheas of Lile Bighorn on he 17h. Eiher of hese imporan pieces of informaion migh have alered he plan. Tacical: 1) Cuser s Tacical Plan In Terry s wrien order, Cuser was given wide discreion o conduc acical acions. Cuser s plan o divide his forces, wih Reno s force as he hammer and his as he anvil, may have been appropriae agains a smaller foe, bu agains he overwhelming force of deermined Indians i was compleely inadequae. Even if Cuser worried abou losing he iniiaive, or feared he Indians migh escape, i was sill ill-advised o rush headlong ino an enemy ha ounumbered him by over 2 o 1. Addiionally, once he fighing sared Cuser failed o adjus his plan, consolidae his forces, or rerea o a more favorable posiion. In he end, Cuser s acical plan was faally flawed. Aacking a deermined, numerically superior force while his own forces were divided was a recipe for disaser. 2) Mission Command Terry failed o orchesrae his forces in accordance wih his inen. From his wrien order o Cuser, i is clear ha he inended for Cuser s force o operae wih suppor from Gibbon s force. Ye, his order gave Cuser he leeway o ac independenly if he saw he need which Cuser did. As noed above, he also coninued he campaign wihou any word from Crook. Obaining an assessmen from Crook on he size and disposiion of he enemy, or waiing for his hree columns o join up, migh have made all he difference. Cuser, oo, failed in his regard, unable o effecively adjus or synchronize his ounumbered forces afer he bale had begun. When Reno s aack broke down, Cuser compleely los his abiliy o maneuver his forces. Dividing his forces ino hree separae maneuver groups only made hings worse. As his subordinaes made adjusmens, his plan coninued o deeriorae. Reno s decision o suspend his charge, along wih Beneen s failure o execue Cuser s order o come o he commander s aid, boh illusrae he mission command challenges Cuser faced. Bu Cuser bears he responsibiliy for puing his forces ino posiions where hey were forced o reac o an enemy who behaved differenly han he expeced. 3) Overreliance on Surprise Cuser believed ha he elemen of surprise was criical. However, focusing on one advanage can blind commanders o ohers. Because Cuser incorrecly believed ha surprise had been compromised, he fel compelled o launch he aack early wihou waiing for Terry s and Gibbon s forces o srenghen he blow. Ironically, surprise ended up working agains Cuser. The surprised Indians were unable o quickly evacuae heir village. And wih heir subsanial number of well-armed warriors, i was possible o fend off Reno s iniial aack and wres he iniiaive from he 7h Cavalry. In he end, Cuser s fixaion on gaining surprise blinded him o oher imporan acical consideraions. 4) Overconfidence Cuser s overconfidence may have been his mos faal flaw. Leading up o Lile Bighorn, he had never los a bale by using acics he fel were proven. Bu he failed o fully accoun for, and respec, he difference in he new enemy he was facing, nor did he confirm for himself heir large numbers before his assaul. Furhermore, Cuser declined he offer of he Galing gun and even he addiion of exra roopers, assering ha boh would slow him down. Eiher of hese addiions may have changed he oucome. In his hase o bring on he bale, and win more personal glory for himself and his 7h Cavalry, he led many brave men o heir deahs. Endnoes, Maps, and Images This issue of BaleDiges was wrien by miliary hisorian and auhor Michael Haskew for he exclusive use of Trinsicore, LLC. Bale Diges (TM) is a rademark of Trinsicore, LLC. The conens of his publicaion are copyrighed by Trinsicore, LLC., excep as indicaed in Endnoes, Maps and Images. All righs are reserved. No par of his publicaion may be reproduced or ransmied in any form, or by any means, wihou he prior wrien permission of Trinsicore, LLC, excep for shor passages used for he purposes of review. To reques copies of his, or oher issues, please visi For more, visi us online a Endnoes: 1. Frederic F. Van de Waer, Glory-Huning: A Life of General Cuser (Lincoln: Universiy of Nebraska Press, 1934): 319; 2. Oie W. Reno, Reno and Apsaalooka Survive Cuser (Carnbury, N.J.: Cornwall Books, 1997) 143; 3. James W. Welch wih Paul Sekler, Killing Cuser, The Bale of he Lile Bighorn and he Fae of he Plains Indians (New York: W.W. Noron and Company, 1994) 156. Images: Map 1: Campaign Overview [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:cusermovemens.jpg]; Map 2: Troop Movemens [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/ uploads/lile-bighorn-bale-map.jpg]; Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/uploads/lile-bighorn-map.jpg]; Cuser: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Bale: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:charles_marion_russell_-_the_cuser_figh_(1903).jpg]; Siing Bull: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/siing_bull#/media/file:siing_bull_by_d_f_barry_ca_1883_dakoa_terriory.jpg]; Cavalryman: Wikipedia, public domain; Period weapons: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Balefield Naional Monumen: Wikipedia, public domain; Cuser graves: Wikipedia, public domain, [phoo by R. Sieben] Volume 1 H Issue 4 Lessons for Today s Leaders Early American Wars: Lile Bighorn opposing forces U.S. Army: 7h Cavalry Regimen (700 cavalry and scous) under he command of L. Col. George A. Cuser. (Cuser was a subordinae of Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he overall commander of he operaion wih a oal of 2,500 men.) Allied Plains Indians: Sioux (including Lakoa), Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians (esimaed 1,500-1,800 warriors) under he command of Chiefs Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall. Hisorical significance The Bale of Lile Bighorn, despie is relaively small size, was he wors defea for he U.S. Army in he Indian Wars. And alhough i was a clear acical vicory for he Plains Indians, i would be a significan sraegic seback for heir cause. The ourage caused by he Indian vicory only inensified effors by he U.S. Army and is Deparmen of he Missouri o pacify he Naive Americans and reurn hose who resised o heir reservaions. Wihin monhs of heir vicory a Lile Bighorn, he Plains Indians were defeaed in he Grea Sioux War of and heir lands in he Black Hills of he Dakoa Terriory were confiscaed. The conroversial career of George A. Cuser ended wih his deah during he bloody defea a Lile Bighorn, popularly remembered as Cuser s Las Sand. His acions have been scruinized ever since. DATE: June 25-26, 1876 LOCATION: Monana Terriory These were he source of heir susainmen, and wih heir pony herds, heir ransporaion. Insead of chasing down warriors, he would aack hese ceners of graviy wih converging columns as he had done previously. Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he Commandan of he Deparmen of Dakoa, was placed in charge of his operaion in he spring of Senior army commanders generally agreed ha he nomadic villages would evenually be in he area of he Yellowsone, Powder, Rosebud, and Bighorn rivers and creeks where game and oher resources were pleniful. Terry would ake independen columns (2,500 oal men), converge on his area, and force he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho back o he reservaion. (Map 1) On 1 April, Col. John Gibbon led he Monana column ou of For Ellis near Bozeman, Monana, wih 450 infanry and cavalry. On 17 May, Terry personally led he easern column ou of For Lincoln, wih over 900 men (mos of whom were in Cuser s 7h Cavalry Regimen). And on 29 May, he final column, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Crook, lef For Feerman, Cuser Wyoming Terriory, from he souh, wih 1,000 cavalry and infanry. (Crook would be sopped shor afer facing an aggressive aack on 17 June a he Bale of he Rosebud. Unforunaely, his message relaing he even did no reach Terry unil 30 June.) Sraegy & maneuver Acions by U.S. Army Afer he For Laramie Treay of 1868, he senior commanders of he Deparmen of he Missouri, he command echelon of he Army responsible for conducing Indian Affairs in he region, realized hey sill had a problem. Facions of Plains Indians refused o remain on he agreed-upon land of he Grea Sioux Reservaion in he Dakoa Terriory. Some Indian non-compliance was realiaion for whie encroachmen ino he Black Hills afer gold was discovered. Neverheless, afer he governmen declared hese Indian acions illegal, i was up o General Phil Sheridan, commander of he Deparmen of he Missouri, o force compliance. Sheridan had faced a similar challenge years before in he Souhern Plains War of He undersood ha he Indians cener of graviy were heir camps. Siing Bull Acions by he Sioux and Cheyenne The Plains Indians facion, under Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall, among oher leaders, sough o remain independen and refused o abide by he For Laramie Treay of No only were he Black Hills sacred lands, bu he whole concep of land ownership was foreign o hem. As hey ried o coninue heir nomadic way of life, however, hey faced he consan hrea of aack. While he mobiliy of he Indians was an inheren srengh in heir cones wih he U.S. Army, i was also an impedimen. Because heir villages were heir logisics hubs, hey were obliged o defend hem. This required hem o be consanly vigilan for hreas from any direcion and pu hem on he sraegic defensive hroughou he Grea Sioux War.

6 Bale Diges is made possible by he generous conribuions from your parners in defense... LESSONS LEARNED Sraegic/Operaional: Noes: 1) Sraegy Alhough Terry s overall campaign sraegy was sound moving hree muually supporing columns of force o converge on he rebellious ribes and heir village i failed in is execuion. Terry s plan relied on wo quesionable assumpions: one being a smaller oal number of Indians; he oher ha he was facing a less-deermined foe. To complicae he siuaion, Terry never had he advanage of Crook s assessmen of he enemy afer his ough figh a Rosebud Creek on he 17h, so no adjusmens were made. Then, of course, here was Cuser. Cuser s aack, wihou suppor from he larger force, deprived Terry of any chance a vicory. If Cuser and his 7h Cavalry had waied unil Gibbon s supporing column was in place, i is likely Terry s campaign sraegy would have succeeded. Fo re r I pr llu es s en ra an iv y EP en U do RP rs OS em ES en On ly of a h nd is do pr es od no uc 2) Mass Operaionally, Terry s bigges failure was his inabiliy o synchronize his hree columns o effecively mass his forces agains he enemy. His subordinae commander (Cuser) forced a bale ha allowed he Indians o mass heir superior numbers agains a smaller porion of his force. The judgmen of hisory has placed much of his blame on Cuser, bu senior commanders succeed by maneuvering heir forces in such a way o allow hem o apply srengh agains enemy weakness. In he final assessmen, Terry failed o do his. 3) Inelligence Failure The Army relied heavily on is Indian scous leading up o Lile Bighorn. These Crow, Arikara, and Pawnee wih heir knowledge of he errain, he habis and endencies of he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho were criical o he developmen of sraegy in he field. Official Army esimaes placed Indian numbers around 800. This seems o be he number ha boh Terry and Cuser had in mind. Bu he official esimaes failed o accoun for over 1,000 men who had come off he reservaion o join his renegade group for he summer buffalo hun. Failing o accoun for his large increase in enemy force size was a significan oversigh ha undoubedly affeced he oucome. To compound he problem, no informaion reached Terry abou Brig. Gen. Crook s bale wih an unexpecedly srong force of Indians jus 30 miles souheas of Lile Bighorn on he 17h. Eiher of hese imporan pieces of informaion migh have alered he plan. Tacical: 1) Cuser s Tacical Plan In Terry s wrien order, Cuser was given wide discreion o conduc acical acions. Cuser s plan o divide his forces, wih Reno s force as he hammer and his as he anvil, may have been appropriae agains a smaller foe, bu agains he overwhelming force of deermined Indians i was compleely inadequae. Even if Cuser worried abou losing he iniiaive, or feared he Indians migh escape, i was sill ill-advised o rush headlong ino an enemy ha ounumbered him by over 2 o 1. Addiionally, once he fighing sared Cuser failed o adjus his plan, consolidae his forces, or rerea o a more favorable posiion. In he end, Cuser s acical plan was faally flawed. Aacking a deermined, numerically superior force while his own forces were divided was a recipe for disaser. 2) Mission Command Terry failed o orchesrae his forces in accordance wih his inen. From his wrien order o Cuser, i is clear ha he inended for Cuser s force o operae wih suppor from Gibbon s force. Ye, his order gave Cuser he leeway o ac independenly if he saw he need which Cuser did. As noed above, he also coninued he campaign wihou any word from Crook. Obaining an assessmen from Crook on he size and disposiion of he enemy, or waiing for his hree columns o join up, migh have made all he difference. Cuser, oo, failed in his regard, unable o effecively adjus or synchronize his ounumbered forces afer he bale had begun. When Reno s aack broke down, Cuser compleely los his abiliy o maneuver his forces. Dividing his forces ino hree separae maneuver groups only made hings worse. As his subordinaes made adjusmens, his plan coninued o deeriorae. Reno s decision o suspend his charge, along wih Beneen s failure o execue Cuser s order o come o he commander s aid, boh illusrae he mission command challenges Cuser faced. Bu Cuser bears he responsibiliy for puing his forces ino posiions where hey were forced o reac o an enemy who behaved differenly han he expeced. 3) Overreliance on Surprise Cuser believed ha he elemen of surprise was criical. However, focusing on one advanage can blind commanders o ohers. Because Cuser incorrecly believed ha surprise had been compromised, he fel compelled o launch he aack early wihou waiing for Terry s and Gibbon s forces o srenghen he blow. Ironically, surprise ended up working agains Cuser. The surprised Indians were unable o quickly evacuae heir village. And wih heir subsanial number of well-armed warriors, i was possible o fend off Reno s iniial aack and wres he iniiaive from he 7h Cavalry. In he end, Cuser s fixaion on gaining surprise blinded him o oher imporan acical consideraions. 4) Overconfidence Cuser s overconfidence may have been his mos faal flaw. Leading up o Lile Bighorn, he had never los a bale by using acics he fel were proven. Bu he failed o fully accoun for, and respec, he difference in he new enemy he was facing, nor did he confirm for himself heir large numbers before his assaul. Furhermore, Cuser declined he offer of he Galing gun and even he addiion of exra roopers, assering ha boh would slow him down. Eiher of hese addiions may have changed he oucome. In his hase o bring on he bale, and win more personal glory for himself and his 7h Cavalry, he led many brave men o heir deahs. Endnoes, Maps, and Images This issue of BaleDiges was wrien by miliary hisorian and auhor Michael Haskew for he exclusive use of Trinsicore, LLC. Bale Diges (TM) is a rademark of Trinsicore, LLC. The conens of his publicaion are copyrighed by Trinsicore, LLC., excep as indicaed in Endnoes, Maps and Images. All righs are reserved. No par of his publicaion may be reproduced or ransmied in any form, or by any means, wihou he prior wrien permission of Trinsicore, LLC, excep for shor passages used for he purposes of review. To reques copies of his, or oher issues, please visi For more, visi us online a Endnoes: 1. Frederic F. Van de Waer, Glory-Huning: A Life of General Cuser (Lincoln: Universiy of Nebraska Press, 1934): 319; 2. Oie W. Reno, Reno and Apsaalooka Survive Cuser (Carnbury, N.J.: Cornwall Books, 1997) 143; 3. James W. Welch wih Paul Sekler, Killing Cuser, The Bale of he Lile Bighorn and he Fae of he Plains Indians (New York: W.W. Noron and Company, 1994) 156. Images: Map 1: Campaign Overview [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:cusermovemens.jpg]; Map 2: Troop Movemens [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/ uploads/lile-bighorn-bale-map.jpg]; Map 3: Reno s Engagemen and Rerea [hp://npmaps.com/wp-conen/uploads/lile-bighorn-map.jpg]; Cuser: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Bale: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bale_of_he_lile_bighorn#/media/file:charles_marion_russell_-_the_cuser_figh_(1903).jpg]; Siing Bull: Wikipedia, public domain [hps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/siing_bull#/media/file:siing_bull_by_d_f_barry_ca_1883_dakoa_terriory.jpg]; Cavalryman: Wikipedia, public domain; Period weapons: Wikipedia, public domain; Lile Bighorn Balefield Naional Monumen: Wikipedia, public domain; Cuser graves: Wikipedia, public domain, [phoo by R. Sieben] Volume 1 H Issue 4 Lessons for Today s Leaders Early American Wars: Lile Bighorn opposing forces U.S. Army: 7h Cavalry Regimen (700 cavalry and scous) under he command of L. Col. George A. Cuser. (Cuser was a subordinae of Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he overall commander of he operaion wih a oal of 2,500 men.) Allied Plains Indians: Sioux (including Lakoa), Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians (esimaed 1,500-1,800 warriors) under he command of Chiefs Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall. Hisorical significance The Bale of Lile Bighorn, despie is relaively small size, was he wors defea for he U.S. Army in he Indian Wars. And alhough i was a clear acical vicory for he Plains Indians, i would be a significan sraegic seback for heir cause. The ourage caused by he Indian vicory only inensified effors by he U.S. Army and is Deparmen of he Missouri o pacify he Naive Americans and reurn hose who resised o heir reservaions. Wihin monhs of heir vicory a Lile Bighorn, he Plains Indians were defeaed in he Grea Sioux War of and heir lands in he Black Hills of he Dakoa Terriory were confiscaed. The conroversial career of George A. Cuser ended wih his deah during he bloody defea a Lile Bighorn, popularly remembered as Cuser s Las Sand. His acions have been scruinized ever since. DATE: June 25-26, 1876 LOCATION: Monana Terriory These were he source of heir susainmen, and wih heir pony herds, heir ransporaion. Insead of chasing down warriors, he would aack hese ceners of graviy wih converging columns as he had done previously. Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, he Commandan of he Deparmen of Dakoa, was placed in charge of his operaion in he spring of Senior army commanders generally agreed ha he nomadic villages would evenually be in he area of he Yellowsone, Powder, Rosebud, and Bighorn rivers and creeks where game and oher resources were pleniful. Terry would ake independen columns (2,500 oal men), converge on his area, and force he Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho back o he reservaion. (Map 1) On 1 April, Col. John Gibbon led he Monana column ou of For Ellis near Bozeman, Monana, wih 450 infanry and cavalry. On 17 May, Terry personally led he easern column ou of For Lincoln, wih over 900 men (mos of whom were in Cuser s 7h Cavalry Regimen). And on 29 May, he final column, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Crook, lef For Feerman, Cuser Wyoming Terriory, from he souh, wih 1,000 cavalry and infanry. (Crook would be sopped shor afer facing an aggressive aack on 17 June a he Bale of he Rosebud. Unforunaely, his message relaing he even did no reach Terry unil 30 June.) Sraegy & maneuver Acions by U.S. Army Afer he For Laramie Treay of 1868, he senior commanders of he Deparmen of he Missouri, he command echelon of he Army responsible for conducing Indian Affairs in he region, realized hey sill had a problem. Facions of Plains Indians refused o remain on he agreed-upon land of he Grea Sioux Reservaion in he Dakoa Terriory. Some Indian non-compliance was realiaion for whie encroachmen ino he Black Hills afer gold was discovered. Neverheless, afer he governmen declared hese Indian acions illegal, i was up o General Phil Sheridan, commander of he Deparmen of he Missouri, o force compliance. Sheridan had faced a similar challenge years before in he Souhern Plains War of He undersood ha he Indians cener of graviy were heir camps. Siing Bull Acions by he Sioux and Cheyenne The Plains Indians facion, under Siing Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall, among oher leaders, sough o remain independen and refused o abide by he For Laramie Treay of No only were he Black Hills sacred lands, bu he whole concep of land ownership was foreign o hem. As hey ried o coninue heir nomadic way of life, however, hey faced he consan hrea of aack. While he mobiliy of he Indians was an inheren srengh in heir cones wih he U.S. Army, i was also an impedimen. Because heir villages were heir logisics hubs, hey were obliged o defend hem. This required hem o be consanly vigilan for hreas from any direcion and pu hem on he sraegic defensive hroughou he Grea Sioux War.