5 Equality or Priority?l

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1 5 Equaliy or Prioriy?l Derek Parfi n his aricle 'Equaliy', Nagel imagines ha he has wo children, one healhy and happy, he oher suffering from a painful handicap. e could eiher move o a ciy where he second child could receive special reamen, or move o a suburb where he firs child would flourish. Nagel wries: This is a difficul choice on any view. To make i a es for he value of equaliy, wan o suppose ha he case has he following feaure: he gain o he firs child of moving o he suburb is subsanially greaer han he gain o he second child of moving o he ciy. He hen commens: f one chose o move o he ciy, i would be an egaliarian decision. is more urgen o benefi he second child, even hough he benefi we can give him is less han he benefi we can o he firs child. This urgency is no necessarily decisive. may be ouweighed by oher consideraions, for equaliy is no he only value. Bu i is a facor, and i depends on he worse off posiion of he second child. 2 My aim, in his lecure, is o discuss his kind of egaliarian reasoning. Nagel's decision urns on he relaive imporance of wo facs: he could give one child a greaer benefi, bu he oher child is worse off. There are counless cases of his kind. n hese cases, when we are choosing beween wo acs or policies, one relevan fac is how grea he resuling benefis would be. For Uiliarians, ha is all 81

2 82 Derek ha maers. On heir view, we should always aim for he greaes sum of benefis. Bu, for Egaliarians, i also maers how well off he beneficiaries would be. We should someimes choose a smaller sum of benefis, for he sake of a beer disribuion. How can we make a disribuion beer? Some say: by aiming for equaliy beween differen people. Ohers say: by giving prioriy o hose who are worse off. As we shall see, hese are differen ideas. Should we accep hese ideas? Does equaliy maer? f so, when and why? Wha kind of prioriy, if any, should we give o hose who are worse off? These are difficul quesions, bu heir subjec maer is, in a way, simple. is enough o consider differen possible saes of affairs, or oucomes, each involving he same se of people. We imagine ha we know how well off, in hese oucomes, hese people would be. We hen ask wheher eiher oucome would be beer, or would be he oucome ha we ough o bring abou. This suhiec we can call he eojics of disribuion. Some wriers rejec his subjec. For example, Nozick claims ha we should no ask wha would be he bes disribuion, since ha quesion wrongly assumes ha here is somehing o be disribued. Mos goods, Nozick argues, are no up for disribuion, or redisribuion.3 They are goods o which paricular people already have enilemens, or special claims. To decide wha jusice we canno look merely a he absrac paern: a how well off, in he differen oucomes, differen people would be. We mus know hese people's hisories, and how each siuaion came abou. Ohers make similar claims abou meri, or deser. To be jus, hese wriers claim, we mus give everyone heir due, and people's dues depend enirely on he differences beween hem, and on wha hey have done. As before, i is hese oher facs which are morally decisive. These objecions we can here se aside. We can assume ha, in he cases we are considering, here are no such differences beween people. No one deserves o be beer off han anyone nor does anyone have enilemens, or special claims. Since here are some cases of his kind, we have a subjec. f we can reach conclusions, we can hen consider how widely hese apply. Like Rawls and ohers, believe ha, a he fundamenal level, mos cases are of his kind. Bu ha can be argued laer. 4 There are many ways in which, in one of wo oucomes, people can be worse off. They may be poorer, or less happy, or have fewer opporuniies, or worse healh, or shorer lives. Though he difference Eq1laliy or Prioriy? 83 beween hese cases ofen maers, shall be discussing some general claims, which apply o hem all. To ask my quesions, we need only wo assumpions. firs, some people can be worse off han ohers, in ways ha are morally relevan. Second, hese differences can be maers of degree. To describe my imagined cases, shall use figures. Nagel's choice, for can be shown as follows: The firs child The second child Move o he Move o he suburb: 2S 9 Such figures misleadingly sugges precision. Even in principle, believe, here could no be precise differences beween how well off differen people are. inend hese figures o show only ha he choice beween hese oucomes makes much more difference o Nagel's firs child, bu ha, in boh oucomes, he second child would be much worse off. One poin abou my figures is imporan. Each exra uni is a roughly equal benef, however well off he person is who receives i. f someone rises from 99 o 100, his person benefis as much as someone else who rises from 9 o 10. Wihou his assumpion we canno make sense of some of our quesions. We canno ask, for wheher some benef would maer more if i came o someone who was worse off. Consider Nagel's claim ha, in his example, i would be more urgen o benefi he handicapped child. Nagel ells us o assume ha, compared wih he healhy child, he handicapped child would benef less. Wihou his assumpion, as he noes, his example would no es he value of equaliy. Nagel's conclusion is egaliarian because he believes ha i is he lesser benefi which maers more. For each exra uni o be an equal benefi, however well off he recipien is, hese unis canno be hough of as equal quaniies of resources. The same increase in resources usually brings greaer benefis o hose who are worse off. Bu hese benefis need no be hough of in narrowly Uiliarian erms: as involving only happiness and he relief of suffering, or he fulfilmen of desire. These benefis migh include improvemens in healh, or lengh of life, or educaion, or oher subsanive goods. s

3 84 DfTek Pari Wha do Egaliarians believe? The obvious answer is: hey believe in equaliy. On his definiion, mos of us are Egaliarians, since mos of us believe in some kind of equaliy. We believe in poliical before he law, or we believe ha everyone ineress should be hese kinds of equaliy are of grea no my subjec. r am concerned wih people's being To coun as Egaliarians, in my sense, his is he kind of equaliy in which we mus believe. There are wo main ways in which we can believe in equaliy. We may believe ha inequaliy is bad. On such a view, when we should aim for equaliy, ha is because we shall hereby make he oucome beer. We can hen be called Teleological or, for shor Telic - Egaliarians. Our view may insead be Deonologi[{ll or, for shor, Deonic. We may believe we should aim for equaliy, no o make he oucome beer, bu for some oher moral reason. We may believe, for example, ha people have righs o equal shares. migh of course have beliefs of boh kinds. We migh believe we should aim for equaliy boh because his will make he ouand for oher reasons. Bu such a view does no need a discussion. is We can firs consider Telic The Principle of Eqllaliv: is in iself bad if some oeoole are worse off han ohers. 8 n a fuller saemen of his principle, we would need o assess he relaive badness of differen paerns of inequaliy. Bu we can here ignore hese complicaions. 9 Suppose nex ha he people in some communiy could all be eiher (1) equally well off, or (2) equally badly off. The Principle of Equaliy does no ell us ha (2) would be worse. This principle is abou he badness of inequaliy; and, hough i would be clearly worse if everyone were equally worse our ground for his canno be To avnbin whu (')) TAT()11rl hp worse. we millh aooeal o Equaliy or Prioriy? 85 When people would be on average beer off, or would receive a greaer ne sum of benefis, we can say, for shor, ha here would be more uiliy. (Bu, as have said, hese benefis need no be hough of in narrowly uiliarian erms.) lf we cared only abou equaliy, we would be Pure Egaliarians. f we cared only abou uiliy, we would be Pure Uiliarians or wha are normally jus called Uiliarians. Bu mos of us a view: one ha appeals o more han one principle or value. On wha shall call he Pluralis Egaliarian View, we believe ha i would be beer boh if here was more equaliy, and if here was more uiliy. n deciding which of wo oucomes would be beer, we give weigh o boh hese values. These values may conflic. One of wo oucomes may be in one way worse, because here would be more inequaliy, bu in anoher way beer, because here would be more uiliy, or a greaer sum of benefis. We mus hen decide which of hese wo facs would be more imporan. ConSider, for example, he following possible saes of affairs: (1) Everyone a 1SO (2) Half a 199 Half a 200 Half a 101 Half a 200 For Pure Egaliarians, (1) is he bes of hese hree oucomes, since i conains less inequaliy han boh and (3). For (1) is he wors of hese oucomes, since i conains less uiliy han boh (2) and (3). (n a move from (1) o (3), he benefis o he half who gained would be slighly greaer han he losses o he half who los.) For mos Pluralis Egaliarians, (1) would be neiher he bes nor he wors of hese oucomes. (1) would be allhings-considered worse han (2), since i would be mllch worse in erms of uiliy, and only slighly beer in erms of equaliy. Similarly, (1) would be all-hings-considered beer han (3), since i would be much beer in erms of equaliy, and only slighly worse in erms of uiliy. n many cases he Pluralis View is harder o apply. Compare (1) Everyone a 1SO wih Half a N Half a 200. The is in iself beer if are beer off. f we are Pluralis for which values of N would we

4 86 Derek Parfi Equaliy or 87 believe (1) o be worse han (4)? For some range of values such as 120 o we may find his quesion hard o answer. And his case is unusually simple. Paerns of inequaliy can be much harder o assess. As such cases show, if we give weigh o boh equaliy and uiliy, we have no principled way o assess heir relaive imporance. To defend a paricular decision, we can only claim ha i seems righ. (Rawls herefore calls his view inuiionis.) have said ha, for Telic Egaliarians, inequaliy is bad. Tha seems o me he hear of his view. Bu shall keep he familiar claim ha, on his view, equaliy has value. would be pedanic o claim insead ha inequaliy has disvalue. We should nex disinguish wo kinds of value. f we claim ha equaliy has value, we may only mean ha i has good effecs. Equaliy has many kinds of good effec, and inequaliy many kinds of bad effec. f people are unequal, for example, ha can produce conflic, or envy, or pu some people in he power of ohers. f we value equaliy because we are concerned wih such effecs, we believe ha equaliy has insrumenal value: we hink i good as a means. Bu am concerned wih a differen idea. For rue Egaliarians, equaliy has inrinsic value. As Nagel claims, i 'is in iself good'. This disincion, as we shall see, is heoreically imporan. And i makes a pracical difference. f we believe ha, besides having bad effecs, inequaliy is in iself bad, we shall hink i o be worse. And we shall hink i bad even when i has no bad effecs. Nagel someimes blurs his disincion. He menions wo kinds of argumen 'for he inrinsic value of equaliyll0; bu neiher seems o deserve his descripion. The firs kind of argumen is individualisic, since i appeals o wha is good or bad for individuals. Nagel's example is he claim ha, when here is inequaliy, his weakens he self-respec of hose people who are worse off. Bu wha is claimed o be bad here is no inequaliy iself, bu only one of is effecs. Nor, o judge his effec bad, need we be egaliarians. Oher effecs we may hink bad only because our concepion of well-being is in par egaliarian. Thus we may hink i bad for people if hey are servile or oo deferenial, even if his does no frusrae heir desires, or affec heir experienced well-being. Bu hough such a view is, in one way, egaliarian, i oo does no claim ha equaliy has inrinsic value. As before, i claims only ha inequaliy has bad effecs. Nagel's second ype of argumen is communiarian. According o his argumen, he wries, equaiiy is good for sociey aken as a wiloie. is a condiion of he righ kind of relaions among is members, and of he formaion in hem of healhy fraernal aiudes, desires, and sympahies. For his o be a differen ype of argumen, i mus claim ha such relaions are no merely good for people, bu have inrinsic value. This, however, would sill no be he claim ha equaliy has inrinsic value. Wha would be claimed o be good would sill no be equaliy iself, bu only some of is effecs.!1 The difference can be shown like his. Consider wha shall call he Divided World. The wo halves of he world's populaion are, we can suppose, unaware of each oher's exisence. Perhaps he Alanic has no ye been crossed. Consider nex wo possible saes of affairs: Half a 100 Half a 200 (2) Everyone a 145 Of hese wo saes, (1) is in one way beer han (2), since people are on average beer off. Bu we may believe ha, all hings considered, (1) is worse han (2). ow could we explain his view? f we are Telic Egaliarians, our explanaion would be his. While i is good ha, in (), people are on average beer off, i is bad ha some people are worse off han ohers. The badness of his inequaliy morally ouweighs he exra benefis. n making such a claim, we could no appeal o inequaliy's effecs. Since he wo halves of he world's populaion are quie unconneced, he inequaliy in (1) has no bad effecs on he worseoff group. Nor does he equaliy in (2) produce desirable fraernal relaions beween he wo groups. f we are o claim ha (1) is worse because of is inequaliy, we mus claim ha his inequaliy is in iself bad. Suppose we decide ha, in his example, (1) is no worse han (2). Would his show ha, in our view, inequaliy is no in iself bad?

5 88 Derek This would depend on our answer o anoher quesion. Wha should be he scope of an egaliarian view? Who are he people who, ideally, should be equally well off? The Simples answer would be: everyone who ever lives. And, on he Telic View, his seems he naural answer. f i is in iself bad if some people are worse off han ohers, why should i maer where or when hese people live? On such a view, i is in iself bad if here are or have been, even in unrelaed communiies, and in differen cenuries, people who are no equally well off. Thus i is bad if nca peasans, or Sone Age huner-gaherers, were worse off han we are now. We may rejec his view. We may believe ha, if wo groups of people are quie unrelaed, i is in no way bad if hey no equally well off. This migh be why, in my example, we deny ha (1) is worse han (2). f ha is our reacion, migh we sill believe ha, when i holds beween relaed groups, inequaliy is in iself bad? This seems unlikely. Why is i only in hese cases ha we objec o inequaliy? would i make a difference if hese groups were no aware of each oher's exisence? The obvious answer is ha, in such cases, inequaliy canno have is usual bad effecs. would be coheren o claim ha inequaliy is in iself bad, bu only when i holds beween relaed groups. Bu, hough coheren, his view does no since i would involve a srange coincidence. claim, more plausibly, ha inequaliy is in iself bad, bu only when i holds wihin one communiy. Bu ha would suggess ha our real view is ha such inequaliy involves social And we may hen be Deonic Egaliarians. Le us now consider his second kind of view. Deonic Egaliarians believe ha, hough we should someimes aim for equaliy, ha is no because we shall hereby make he oucome beer, bu is always for some oher reason. On such a view, i is no in iself good if people are equally well off, or bad if are no. Such a view ypically appeals o claims abou i appeals o claims abou comparaive are unjusly reaed, in his comparaive sense, depends on wheher hey are reaed differenly from oher people. Thus i may be unfair if, in a disribuion of resources, some people are denied heir share. Equaliy or Prinrlvl 89 Fairness may ha, if such goods are o some, should be o all. Anoher kind of jusice is concerned wih reaing people as hey deserve. This kind of jusice is non-comparalive. Wheher people are unjusly reaed, in his sense, depends only on facs abou hem. is irrelevan wheher ohers are reaed differenly. Thus, if we reaed no one as hey deserved, his reamen would be unjus in he non-comparaive sense. Ru, if we reaed everyone equally unjusly, here would be no comparaive injusice. 12 is someimes hard o disinguish hese wo kinds of jusice, and here are difficul quesions abou he relaion beween hem. 13 One poin should be menioned here. Non-comparaive jusice may ell us o produce equaliy. Perhaps, if everyone were equally deserving, we should make everyone equally well off. Bu such equaliy would be merely he effec of giving people wha hey deserved. comparaive jusice makes equaliy our aim. When T said ha, in my examples, no one deserves o be beer off han ohers, did no mean ha everyone is equally deserving. mean ha, in hese cases, we are considering benefis ha no one deserves. So i is only comparaive jusice wih which we shall be concerned. There is anoher relevan disincion. n some cases, jusice is procedural. requires only ha we ac in a cerain way. For example, when some good canno be divided, we may be o conduc a fair loery, which gives everyone an equal chance o receive his good. n oher cases, jusice is in par subsmlive. Here oo, jusice may require a cerain kind of procedure; bu here is a separae crierion of wha he oucome ough o be. One example would be he claim ha people should given equal shares. There is an inermediae case. Jusice may require a cerain oucome, bu only because his avoids a procedural flaw. One such flaw is parialiy. Suppose ha we have o disribue cerain Jicly owned goods. f we could easily divide hese goods, ohers be righly suspicious if we gave o differen people unequal shares. Tha migh involve favouriism, or wrongful discriminaion. 14 We may hus believe ha, o avoid hese flaws, we should disribue hese goods equally. The same conclusion migh be reached in a slighly differen way. We may hink ha, in such a case, iy is he defaul: ha we need some moral reason if we are o jusify giving o some people more han we give o ohers. How does his view differ from a view ha requires equaliy for

6 90 Derek Parfl subsanive reasons? One difference is his. Suppose ha we have manifesly ried o disribue equally, bu our procedure has innocenly failed. lf we aimed for equaliy only o avoid he ain of or discriminaion, here would be no case for correcing he resul. S We can now redescribe my wo kinds of Egaliarian. On he Telic View, inequaliy is bad; on he Deonic View, i is unjus. may be objeced ha, when inequaliy is unjus, i for ha reason, bad. Bu his does no undermine his way of drawing our disincion. On he Deonic View, injusice is a special kind of badness, one ha necessarily involves wrong-doing. When we claim ha inequaliy is unjus, our objecion is no really o he inequaliy iself. Wha is unjus, and herefore bad, is no sricly he sae of affairs, bu he way in which i was produced. There is one kind of case which mos clearly separaes our wo kinds of view. These are cases where some inequaliy canno be avoided. For Deonic Egaliarians, if nohing can be done, here can be no injusice. n Rawls's words, if some siuaion 'is unalerable... he quesion of jusice does no arise.'16 Consider, for example, he inequaliy in our naural endowmens. Some of us are born more alened or healhier han ohers, or are more forunae in oher ways. lf we are Deonic Egaliarians, we shall no believe ha such inequaliy is in iself bad. We migh agree ha, if we could disribue alens, i would be unjus or unfair o disribue hem unequally. Bu, excep when here are bad effecs, we shall see nohing o regre in he inequaliies produced by he random shuffling of our genes. Many Telic Egaliarians ake a differen view. They believe ha, even when such inequaliy is unavoidable, i is in iself bady is worh developing here some remarks of Rawls. As have said, Rawls assumes ha injusice essenially involves wrongdoing. When he discusses he inequaliy of our inheried alens, he wries: The naural disribuion is neiher jus nor simply naural facs. Wha is jus and insiuions deal wih hese facs. This may sugges a... These are he way ha deonic view. Bu Rawls coninues: or Prioriy? 91 Arisocraic and case socieies are because... he basic srucure of hese socieies incorporaes he arbirariness found in naure. Bu here is no necessiy for men o resign hemselves o hese coningencies. S This use of he word resign seems o assume ha naural is bad. And Rawls elsewhere wries ha, in a sociey governed by his principles, we need no longer 'view i as a misforune ha some are by naure beer endowed han ohers'. These remarks sugges ha Rawls is in par a Telic Egaliarian. An objecion o naural is, one of he foundaions of his heory, and one of is driving forces. f Rawls denies ha such inequaliy is unjus, ha may only be because he wishes o preserve he analyic link beween injusice and wrong-doing. And, given he subsance of his heory, ha may be merely a erminological decision. Rawls's objecion o naural inequaliy is no so much ha i is bu ha i is morally arbirary. This objecion, as Rawls suggess, can be reapplied a several poins in one naural line of hough. We can sar wih exernal goods. n some cases, we enjoy resources whose availabiliy, or discovery, is in no sense due o us. Such resources simply appear, like manna falling from he sky. There will be inequaliy if such manna falls unequally on differen people. Le us call hese windfall cases. n such cases, he inequaliy is enirely due o differences in he bouny of naure. Such differences are, in he cleares sense, morally arbirary. f some people receive less han ohers, ha is heir bad luck. Since such inequaliies have his arbirary cause, we may conclude ha hey are bad. Or we may conclude ha we ough o redress hese inequaliies, by a redisribuion of resources. Consider nex cases in which we are no merely passive. We do some work, eiher in discovering resources, or in convering hem for use. We plan seeds, prospec and mine, or fish he sea; we ill he soil, and manufacure goods. Suppose ha we all work equally hard, and wih equal skill. n such cases, he human inpu is he same. Bu here may sill be inequaliy beween us, which resuls from differences in he naural inpu. These migh be differences in mineral wealh, or in he climae, or in he fruifulness of he soil, or sea. Because of such variaions, some of us may soon become much beer off han ohers. These are cases of producive luck.19 Some of hese cases hardly differ from pure windfalls. Perhaps we

7 92 Derek Parfi merely have o shake our rees, or sroll over o where he frui fell. And all hese cases may seem relevanly similar. Since we all work equally hard, and wih equal skill, he inequaliy is again due o differences in he bouny of naure, which we believe o be morally arbirary. Can he oher elemen, he equal human inpu, make his fac irrelevan? Can i iusify he resuling inequaliy? We may decide ha i canno, and ha such inequaliy also calls for redisribuion. Now consider inequaliy of a hird kind. n hese cases, here are no differences eiher in exernal resources, or in he effors people make. The inequaliy is enirely due o differences in people's naive alens. These are cases of geneic luck. 20 We may decide ha such geneic differences are, in he relevan respec, like differences in naure's bouny. As Rawls says, hey are no deserved. Our naive alens are inner resources, which. like manna, merely fell upon us. n some of hese cases, people receive greaer rewards simply for having cerain naural endowmens. These are like pure windfalls. Bu, in mos of hese cases, people develop and use he alens wih which hey were born. We mus ask again wheher his infusion of effor cancels ou he arbirariness of geneic luck. Can i jusify he resuling inequaliies? This may be he mos imporan quesion in his whole debae. people answer Yes. Bu, like Rawls and Nagel, we mayanswer No. We may conclude ha hese inequaliies should also be redressed. Consider nex a fourh kind of case. The naural inpu is he same, and we all have equal alens. Bu inequaliy resuls from differences in how hard we work. These are cases of differenial effor. We mus here noe one complicaion. There are wo unconroversial ways in which, when people work harder, hey should someimes be paid more. They may work for a longer ime, or in a more unpleasan way. n such cases, overime or hardship pay may be mere compensaion, which does no creae real inequaliy. These are no he cases ha have in mind. am hinking of people who enjoy working hard, and who, because hey do, become much beer off han ohers. Of hose who appeal o he arbirariness of he naural loery, many sop here. Differences in effor seem o hem o jusify such inequaliy. Bu we may press on. Such differences involve wo elemens: he abiliy o make an effor. and he decision o ry. We or ( J. 93 may decide ha he firs is merely anoher naive alen, which canno jusify inequaliy. This leaves only inequaliies ha are he resul of choice. To mos Egaliarians, hese inequaliies are of no concern. Tha is why some wriers argue for equaliy, no of well-being, bu of opporuniy for well-being. 21 Bu some of us may sill press on. We may decide ha i is bad if some people are worse off han ohers, even when his is merely because hese people do no enjoy working hard, or because, for some oher reason, hey make choices ha leave hem worse off. These may seem o be merely oher kinds of bad luck. The line of hough ha have jus skeched raises many quesions. shall make only hree brief commens. Firs, o some people his reasoning may seem a reducio. f hese people find he las sep absurd, hey may be led o rejec he ohers. Bu ha would be oo swif, since here could be grounds for sopping earlier. Second, we should sae more clearly wha such reasoning show. The reasoning appeals o he claim ha cerain kinds of inequaliy have a morally arbirary cause. Such a claim migh show ha such inequaliy is no jusified. Bu i may no show ha such inequaliy is unjusified, and ough o be redressed. These are quie differen conclusions. f such inequaliy is no jusified, people have no posiive claim o heir advanages, or o he resources which hey now conrol. Bu his conclusion only clears he decks. means ha, if here is a moral reason for redisribuion, hose who are beer off can have no principled objecion. would be a furher claim ha here is such a reason, and ha he aim of such redisribuion should be o produce equaliy.22 The difference can be shown like his. Uiliarians would also claim ha, if some disribuion of resources has an arbirary naural cause, i is no jusified. Since ha is so, hey would claim, here can be no objecion o redisribuion. Bu, on heir view, he bes disribuion is he one ha would maximize he sum of benefs. Such a disribuion would no be morally arbirary. Bu i may no be an equal disribuion. Third, Rawls regards Uiliarians as his main opponens. A he level of heory, he may be righ. Bu he quesions have been discussing are, in pracice, more imporan. f naure gave o some of us more resources, have we a moral claim o keep hese resources, and he wealh hey bring'! f we happen o be born wih greaer

8 94 Derek Par(! alens, and in consequence produce more, have we a claim o greaer rewards? n pracical erms, Rawls's main opponens are hose who answer Yes o such quesions. Egaliarians and Uiliarians boh answer No. Boh agree ha such inequaliies are no jusified. n his disagreemen, Rawls, Mill, and Sidgwick are on he same side. V have disinguished wo kinds of Egaliarian view. On he Telic View, we believe ha inequaliy is in iself bad, or unfair. On he Deonic View, our concern abou equaliy is only a concern abou wha we should do. Why does his disincion maer? has heoreical implicaions. As we shall laer see, hese views can be defended or aacked in differen ways. There are also pracical implicaions, some of which shall menion now. Each view has many versions. Tha is especially rue of he Deonic View, which is really a group of views. Telic and Deonic Views migh, in pracice, coincide. migh be rue ha, whenever he firs view claims ha some kind of inequaliy is bad, he second claims ha we should preven i, if we can. Bu when we look a he versions of hese views ha are in fac advanced, and found plausible, we find ha hey ofen conflic. The Telic View is likely o have wider scope. As have said, if we hink i in iself bad if some people are worse off han ohers, we may hink his bad whoever hese people are. may seem o make no difference where hese people live: wheher hey are in he same or differen communiies. We may also hink i irrelevan wha he respecs are in which some people are worse off han ohers: wheher hey have less income, or worse healh, or are less forunae in oher ways. Any inequaliy, if undeserved and unchosen, we may hink bad. Nor, hird, will i seem o make a difference how such inequaliy arose. Tha is implied by he very noion of inrinsic badness. f some sae is in iself bad, i is irrelevan how i came abou. f we are Deonic Egaliarians, our view may have none of hese feaures. Though here are many versions of he Deonic View, one large group are broadly conracarian. Such views ofen appeal o he ideas of reciprociy, or muual benefi. On some views of his kind, when goods are cooperaively produced, and no one has special f ~ Equaliy or Prioriy? 95 claims, all he conribuors should ge equal shares. There are here wo resricions. Firs, wha is shared are only he fruis of cooperaion. Nohing is said abou oher goods, such as hose ha come from naure. Second, he disribuion covers only hose who produce hese goods. Those who canno conribue, such as he handicapped, or children, or fuure generaions, have no claims.23 Oher views of his ype are less resricive. They may cover all he members of he same communiy, and all ypes of good. Bu hey sill exclude ousiders. l is irrelevan ha hose oher people may be far worse off. On such views, if here is inequaliy beween people in differen communiies, his need no be anyone's concern. Since he greaes inequaliies are on his global scale, his resricion has immense imporance. (Here is one way o make his poin. f Egaliarians oppose inequaliy only wihin paricular communiies, heir view may, on a global scale, call for less redisribuion han a Uiliarian view.) Consider nex he quesion of causaion. The Telic View naurally applies o all cases. On his view, we always have a reason o preven or reduce inequaliy, if we can. f we are Deonic Egaliarians, we migh hink he same. Bu ha is less likely. Since our view is no abou he goodness of oucomes, i may cover only inequaliies ha resul from acs, or only hose ha are inenionally produced. And i may ell us o be concerned only wih he inequaliies ha we ourselves produce. Here is one example. n a highly resriced way, Gauhier is a Deonic Egaliarian. Thus he wries ha 'f here were a disribuor of naural asses... we migh reasonably suppose ha in so far as possible shares should be equal.'24 Bu, when asses are disribued by naure, Gauhier has no objecion o inequaliy. He sees no ground o undo he effecs of he naural loery. On such a view, when we are responsible for some disribuion, we ough o disribue equally. Bu, when we are no responsible, inequaliy is no unjus. n such cases, here is nohing morally amiss. We have no reason o remove such inequaliy, by redisribuion. s his a defensible posiion? Suppose we are abou o disribue some resources. We agree ha we ough o give people equal shares. A gus of wind snaches hese resources from our hands, and disribues hem unequally. Have we hen no reason o redisribue? l makes a difference here why we believe ha we ough o disribue equally. Suppose, firs, ha our concern is wih procedural

9 96 Derek Parfi jusice. We believe ha we should disribue equally because ha is he only way o avoid parialiy. Or we believe ha equaliy is he defaul: wha we should aim for when we canno jusify disribuing unequally. When here is naural inequaliy, neiher belief applies. Naure is no discriminaory; nor is she an agen, who mus jusify wha she does. On such a view, if we disribue, we should disribue equally. Bu we have no ground for hinking ha we should disribue. f he disribuor is Naure, here has been no parialiy. Nohing needs o be undone. Suppose, nex, ha we are concerned wih subsanive jusice. Our aim is no merely o avoid procedural flaws, since we have a separae crierion for wha he resul should be. On such a view, we migh believe ha, wherever possible, we should inervene, o produce he righ resul. Bu, as before, ha belief need no be par of such a view. As in he case of procedural jusice, we migh believe only ha, if we disribue, we should disribue equally. When inequaliy arises naurally, our view may no apply. Things are differen on he Telic View, according o which such inequaliy is in iself bad, or unjus. On his view, we have a reason o redisribue. The onus of he argumen shifs. f people oppose redisribuion, hey mus provide conrary reasons. is worh menioning some of hese reasons. Some would claim even if we should disribue equally, once here has been a naural disribuion, i is wrong o inervene. Such a claim may seem o assume ha wha is naural is righ, or ha he saus quo is privileged - assumpions ha are now hard o defend. Bu here are oher ways in which people migh defend such claims. They migh appeal o he difference beween acs and omissions, or beween negaive and posiive duies, or somehing of he kind. 2s n some cases, such a view is plausible. Suppose ha some naural process hreaens o kill many people. We could save hem if we inervened, and killed one person as a means o save he many. Many believe ha, even hough he deahs of many would be a worse oucome han he deah of one, we ough no o inervene in such a way. We should allow his naural process o bring abou he worse of hese wo oucomes. Could we apply such a view o inequaliy? f some naural process has disribued resources in an unequal way, could i be similarly claimed ha, hough such inequaliy makes he oucome worse, we ough no o inervene'? Tha seems less plausible. n he case of killing, our objecion migh appeal o he special feaures of his or 97 ac, our relaion o he person killed, her righ no o be injured, or o he fac ha her deah is used as a means. There seem o be no such feaures when we correc a naural disribuion. f he wind blows more manna ino he laps of cerain people, and we concede ha, as an oucome, his is worse, here seems no ground for a consrain agains redisribuion. f we remove and redisribue hese people's exra manna, so ha everyone has equal shares, we do no injure hese people, or use hem as a means. may nex be claimed ha, once a naural disribuion has occurred, people acquire enilemens. n pure windfall cases, such a claim seems far-feched. The fac ha he manna fell on you does no make i yours. Bu similar claims are widely made. Thus i may be said ha you saked ou a valid claim o he ground on which he manna fell, and ha his makes i yours. Or i may be said ha, once you inerac wih he manna - or mix your labour wih i i becomes yours. Such claims may have some force if hey are made wihin some exising insiuional scheme, or agreemen. Bu we are here discussing a more fundamenal quesion. Wha should our insiuions, or agreemens, be? f such claims are no convincing, as answers o ha quesion, we may conclude ha, in pure windfall cases, we ough o redisribue. may hen be harder o defend such claims in cases of producive luck. f we rejec such claims here, i may hen be harder o defend hem in cases of geneic luck, and so on down he series. For hose who hold a Deonic View, here is no need even o make hese claims. On such a view, since naural inequaliy is no in iself bad, here is no argumen redisribuion; so here need no be an argumen agains. This, for conservaives, is a sronger posiion. v Le us now consider wo objecions o he Telic View. On he wides version of his view, any inequaliy is bad. is for example, ha some people are sighed and ohers are blind. We would herefore have a reason, if we could, o ake single eyes from some of he sighed and give hem o he blind. Tha may seem a horrific conclusion. f Egaliarians wish o avoid his conclusion, hey migh claim ha heir view applies only o inequaliy in resources. Bu, as Nozick

10 98 Derek Parfz says, such a resricion may be hard o explain. f naural inequaliy is in iself bad, why is ha no rue of he inequaliy beween he sighed and he blind? Should we be horrified by his conclusion? To se aside some irrelevan complicaions, le us purify he example. Suppose ha, afer some geneic change, people are henceforh born as wins, one of whom is always blind. And suppose ha, as a universal policy, operaions are performed afer every birh, in which one eye from he sighed win is ransplaned ino is blind sibling. Tha would be a forcible redisribuion, since new-born babies canno give consen. Bu am inclined o believe ha such a policy would be jusified. Some of us may disagree. We may believe ha people have righs o keep he organs wih which hey were born. Bu ha belief would no give us grounds o rejec he Telic View. Egaliarians could agree ha he Sae should no redisribue organs. Since hey do no believe equaliy o be he only value, hey could hink ha, in his example, some oher principle has greaer weigh. Their belief is only ha, if we all had one eye, ha would be in one way beer han if half of us had wo eyes and he oher half had none. Far from being monsrous, ha belief is clearly rue. f we all had one eye, ha would be much beer for all of he people who would oherwise be blind. z6 A second objecion is more serious. f inequaliy is bad, is disappearance mus be in one way a change for he beer, however his change occurs. Suppose ha hose who are beer off suffer some misforune, so ha hey become as badly off as everyone else. Since hese evens would remove he inequaliy, hey mus be in one way welcome, on he Telic View, even hough hey would be worse for some people, and beer for no one. This implicaion seems o many o be quie absurd. call his he Levelling Down ObjecionY Consider firs hose Egaliarians who regre he inequaliies in our naural endowmens. On heir view, i would be in one way beer if we removed he eyes of he sighed, no o give hem o he blind, bu simply o make he sighed blind. Tha would be in one way beer even if i was in no way beer for he blind. This we may find impossible o believe. Egaliarians would avoid his form of he objecion if wha hey hink bad is only inequaliy in resources. Bu hey mus admi ha, on heir view, i would be in one way beer if, in some naural disaser hose who are beer off los all of heir exra resources, in a way ha benefied no one. Tha conclusion may seem almos as implausible. Equaliy or Prioriy? 99 is worh repeaing ha, o criicize Egaliarians by appealing o he Levelling Down Objecion, i is no enough o claim ha i would be wrong o produce equaliy by levelling down. As we have seen, since hey are pluraliss, Telic Egaliarians could accep ha claim. Our objecion mus be ha, if we achieve equaliy by levelling down, here is nohing good abou wha we have done. And we mus claim ha, if some naural disaser makes everyone equally badly off, ha is no in any way good news. These claims do conradic he Telic Egaliarian View, even in is pluralis form. shall reurn o he Levelling Down Objecion. The poin o noice now is ha, on a Deonic view, we can avoid all forms of his objecion. f we are Deonic Egaliarians, we do no believe ha inequaliy is bad, so we are no forced o admi ha, on our view, i would be in one way beer if inequaliy were removed by levelling down. We can believe ha we have a reason o remove inequaliy only when, and only because, our way of doing so benefis he people who are worse off. Or we migh believe ha, when some people are worse off han ohers, hrough no faul or choice of heirs, hey have a special claim o be raised up o he level of he ohers, bu hey have no claim ha ohers be brough down o heir level. V There are, hen, several differences beween he Telic and Deonic Views. Though hese views migh coincide, hey are likely o have differen scope, and differen implicaions. And, as we have jus seen, hey can be challenged in differen ways. f we are Egaliarians, i is hus imporan o decide which kind of view we hold. f we are impressed by he Levelling Down Objecion, we may be emped by he Deonic View. Bu, if we give up he Telic View, we may find i harder o jusify some of our beliefs. f inequaliy is no in iself bad, we may find i harder o explain, for example, why we should redisribue resources. Some of our beliefs would also have o go. Reconsider he Divided World, in which he wo possible saes are hese: (1) Half a 100 Half a 200 (2) Everyone a 145

11 100 Derek Parfi n oucome (1) here is inequaliy. Bu, since he wo groups are unaware of each oher's exisence, his inequaliy was no deliberaely produced, or mainained. Since his inequaliy does no involve wrong-doing, here is no injusice. On he Deonic View, here is nohing more o say. On his view, we canno claim ha (1) is worse han (2). f we believe ha (1) is worse, and because of he inequaliy, we mus accep he Telic form of he Egaliarian View. We mus claim ha he inequaliy in (1) is in iself bad. We migh, however, give a differen explanaion. Raher han believing in equaliy, we migh be especially concerned abou hose people who are worse off. Tha could be our reason for preferring (2). Le us now consider his alernaive. V n discussing his imagined case, Nagel wries: f one chose o move o he ciy, i would be an egaliarian decision. is more urgen o benefi he second child... This urgency is no necessarily decisive. may be ouweighed by oher consideraions, for equaliy is no he only value. Bu i is a facor, and i depends on he worse off posiion of he second child. An improvemen in his siuaion is more imporan han an equal or somewha greaer improvemen in he siuaion of he firs child. 28 This passage conains he idea ha equaliy has value. Bu i gives more prominence o anoher idea. Nagel believes i is more imporan o benefi he child who is worse off. Tha idea can lead us o a quie differen view. Consider firs hose people who are badly off: hose who are suffering, or desiue, or hose whose fundamenal needs have no been me. is widely claimed ha we should give prioriy o helping such people. This would be claimed even by Uiliarians, since, if people are badly off, hey are likely o be easier o help. am concerned wih a differen view. On his view, i is more urgen o help hese people even if hey are harder o help. While Uiliarians claim ha we should give hese people prioriy when, and because, we can help hem more, his view claims ha we should give hem prioriy, even when we can help hem less. Tha is wha makes his a disincive view. Equaliy or Prioriy? 101 Some apply his view only o he wo groups of he well off and he badly off.29 Bu shall consider a more general version of his view, which can be applied o everyone. On wha shall call The Prioriy View: Benefiing people maers more he worse off! hese people are. For Uiliarians, he moral imporance of each benefi depends only on how grea his benefi would be. For Prioriarians, i also def pends on how well off he person is o whom his benefi comes.! We should no give equal weigh o equal benefis, whoever receives hem. Benefis o he worse off should be given more weigh.30 Like he Egaliarian Pluralis View, his view is, in Rawls's sense, inuiionis. does no ell us how much prioriy we should give o hose who are worse off. On his view, benefis o he worse off could be morally ouweighed by sufficien benefis o he beer off. To decide wha would be sufficien, we mus simply use our judgemen. Like he belief in equaliy, he Prioriy View can ake eiher Telic or Deonic forms. can be a view abou which oucomes would be beer, or a view ha is only abou wha we ough o do. Bu, for mos of my discussion, his difference does no maer. V Le us now look more closely a his view. To whom should we give prioriy? Here are hree answers: (1) hose who are worse off in heir lives as a whole, (2) hose who are worse off a he ime, (3) hose who have needs ha are morally more urgen. (1) and (2) frequenly diverge. One of wo people may be worse off now, even hough she has earlier been, and will laer be, much beer off. (2) and (3), in conras, usually coincide. f one of wo people has more urgen needs, she is likely o be worse off a he ime. Bu, on some views abou he urgency of needs, ha is no always rue. Compare A, who is disabled, wih he less forunae bu ablebodied B. A's need for a wheel-chair may be claimed o be more urgen han any of B's needs, even hough A's oher advanages make her, on he whole, beer off.3! The choice beween (1) and (2) is he choice of wha Nagel calls unis for disribuive principles: he iems o which we apply hese

12 [ 102 Derek or Prioriy? 103 principles. 32 Nagel akes hese unis o be 'individual persons, individual human lives'. And he wries, 'wha makes a sysem egaliarian is he prioriy i gives o he claims of hose whose overall life prospecs pu hem a he boom.' Rawls and many ohers ake he same view. f lives are he relevan his increases he difference beween giving prioriy o hose who are worse off, and giving prioriy o meeing more urgen needs. Nagel someimes favours he second of hese. Thus he claims ha an egaliarian view 'esablishes an order of prioriy among needs and gives preference o he mos urgen'. And he wries: An arrangemen mus be accepable firs from he poin of view of everyone's mos basic claims, hen from he poin of view of everyone's nex mos basic claims, ec... [TJhe principles gran o each person he same claim o have his mos urgen needs saisfied prior o he less urgen needs of anyone else. 33 This implies ha we should give prioriy o needs raher han persons. The more urgen needs of someone who, on he whole, is beer off, ake prioriy over he less urgen needs of someone who is worse off. Nagel seems o have overlooked his implicaion. Thus he also wries, 'Prioriy is given o individuals who, aking heir lives as a whole, have more urgen needs'.34 This claim conflaes he disincion have drawn. X's needs may now be more urgen han Y's, even hough, in mos of her life, X has been, and will laer be, much beer off han Y. f we should give prioriy o more urgen needs, we should help X. f we should give prioriy o hose who are worse off in heir lives as a whole, we should help Y. Which answer should we give? Suppose ha we could suppor one of wo programs. The firs would provide reamen for a painful illness ha occasionally afflics he rich. The second would benefi an equal number of he poor, by subsidizing spors grounds, or seaside holidays. Which of hese should have prioriy? For his case o be relevan, i mus be rue ha, even wihou he reamen, he rich would on he whole be beer off. And i mus be rue ha our decision would make less difference o hem: ha i would give hem lesser benefis. We can hus suppose ha he reamen in quesion would no bring much relief o his illness. Since he benefis o boh groups would be hedonisic, hey can be roughly esimaed by an appeal o people's preferences. Le us suppose ha everyone involved would prefer a seaside holiday, or a new spors ground, o he relief of his amoun of suffering. Suppose we believe ha, even in such a case, he relief of suffering should ake prioriy. And suppose we ake a similar view abou oher urgen needs, such as hose produced by disabiliy. We hen have a view which is no, in any way, egaliarian. We hink i more imporan o give lesser benefis o people who, in he relevan sense, are beer off. Such a view is no, hink, absurd. Bu, because i is so differen, 1 shall ignore i here. 1 shall assume ha, on he Prioriy View, we should give prioriy, no o meeing special needs, bu o benefiing hose people who are worse off. And shall assume ha, in my examples, here is no difference beween hose who would be worse off a he ime, and hose who would be worse off in heir lives as a whole. X Wha is he relaion beween he Prioriy View and Egaliarianism? On he Prioriy View, i is morally more imporan o benefi he people who are worse off. Bu his claim, by iself, does no define a differen view, since i would be made by all Egaliarians. f we believe ha we should aim for equaliy, we shall hink i more imporan o benefi hose who are worse off. Such benefis reduce inequaliy. f ha is why we give such benefis prioriy, we do no hold he Prioriy View. On his view, as define i here, we do no believe in equaliy. We give prioriy o he worse off, no because his will reduce inequaliy, bu for oher reasons. Tha is wha makes his a disincive view. As before, we may hold a mixed view. We may give prioriy o he worse off, parly because his will reduce inequaliy, and parly for oher reasons. Bu such a view does no need a separae discussion. is enough o consider he pure version of he Prioriy View. How does his view differ from an Egaliarian view? One difference is purely srucural. As we have seen, equaliy canno plausibly be our only value. f we are Egaliarians, we mus hold some more complicaed view. Thus, on he Telic form of he Pluralis View, he belief ha inequaliy is bad is combined wih he belief ha benefis are good. The Prioriy View, in conras, can be held as a complee moral view. This view conains he idea ha benefis

13 104 Derek Parfi are good. merely adds ha benefis maer more he worse off he people are who receive hem. Unlike he Principle of Equaliy, which migh be combined wih he Principle of Uiliy, he Prioriy View can replace ha principle. can be regarded as he only principle we need. The chief difference can be inroduced like his. have said ha, on he Prioriy View, we do no believe in equaliy. We do no hink i in iself bad, or unjus, ha some people are worse off han ohers. This claim can be misundersood. We do of course hink i bad ha some people are worse off. Bu wha is bad is no ha hese people are worse off han ohers. is raher ha hey are worse off han hey migh have been. Consider nex he cenral claim of he Prioriy View: benefis o he worse off maer more. The same ambiguiy can lead one asray. On his view, if am worse off han you, benefis o me are more imporan. s his because am worse off han you? n one sense, yes. Bu his has nohing o do wih my relaion o you. may help o use his analogy. People a higher aliudes find i harder o breahe. s his because hey are higher up han oher people? n one sense, yes. Bu hey would find i jus as hard o breahe even if here were no oher people who were lower down. n he same way, on he Prioriy View, benefis o he worse off maer more, bu ha is only because hese people are a a lower absolue level. is irrelevan ha hese people are worse off han ohers. Benefis o hem would maer jus as much even if here were no ohers who were beer off. The chief difference is, hen, his. Egaliarians are concerned wih relaiviies: wih how each person's level compares wih he level of oher people. On he Prioriy View, we are concerned only wih people's absolue levels. 35 This is a fundamenal srucural difference. Because of his difference, here are several ways in which hese views have differen implicaions. One example concerns scope. Telic Egaliarians may, have said, give heir view wide scope. They may believe ha inequaliy is bad even when i holds beween people who have no connecions wih each oher. Bu his can seem a dubious view. Why is i bad if, in some far off land, and quie unknown o me, here are oher people who are beer off han me? On he Prioriy View, here is no ground for such doubs. This view naurally has universal scope. And ha is rue of boh is Equaliy or Prioriy? 105 elic and deonic forms. f i is more imporan o benefi one of wo people, because his person is worse off, i is irrelevan wheher hese people are in he same communiy, or are aware of each oher's exisence. The greaer urgency of benefiing his person does no depend on her relaion o he oher person. depends only on her lower absolue level. There are oher ways in which, given he srucural difference beween hese views, hey are likely o have differen implicaions. canno discuss hese here. Bu have described he kind of case in which hese views mos deeply disagree. These are he cases which raise he Levelling Down Objecion. Egaliarians face his objecion because hey believe ha inequaliy is in iself bad. f we accep he Prioriy View, we avoid his objecion. We are more concerned for people he worse off hese people are. Bu, as we have jus seen, i makes no difference o our concern wheher here are oher people who are beer off. On his view, when inequaliy is no bad for people, i simply does no maer. f he beer off suffer some misforune, so ha hey become as badly off as anyone else, we do no hink his in any way a change for he beer. x have explained he sense in which, on he Prioriy View, we do no believe in equaliy. Though we give prioriy o benefiing hose who are worse off, ha is no because such benefis reduce inequaliy. may be objeced ha, on he Prioriy View, we shall ofen aim for equaliy. Bu ha is no enough o make us Egaliarians. n he same way, Uiliarians ofen aim for equaliy, because inequaliy has bad effecs. Bu Uiliarians are no Egaliarians, since hey regard equaliy as a mere means. is worh pursuing his analogy. There is an imporan Uiliarian reason o aim for equaliy, no of well-being, bu of resources. This reason appeals o diminishing marginal uiliy, or he claim ha, if resources go o people who are beer off, hey will benefi hese people less. Uiliarians herefore argue ha, whenever we ransfer resources o hose who are worse off, we shall produce greaer benefis, and shall hereby make he oucome beer. On he elic version of he Prioriy View, we appeal o a similar claim. We believe ha, if benefis go o people who are beer off, hese benefis maer less. Jus as resources have diminishing marginal uiliy, so uiliy has diminishing marginal moral imporance.

14 106 Derek Parfi Given he similariy beween hese claims, here is a second similar argumen in favour of equaliy: his ime, no of resources, bu of well-being. On his argumen, whenever we ransfer resources o who are worse off, he resuling benefis will no merely in hemselves, greaer. They will also, on he moral scale, maer more. There are hus wo ways in which he oucome will be beer. The Uiliarian argumen in favour of equaliy of resources is, as Nagel says, a 'non-egaliarian insrumenal argumen'. reas such equaliy as good, no in iself, bu only because i increases he size of he resuling benefis. A similar claim applies o he View. Here oo, equaliy is good only because i increases he moral value of hese benefis. 36 There are, however, wo differences. diminishing marginal uiliy is no a universal law. n some cases, if resources wen o he people who were beer off, hey would give hese people greaer benefis.37 Uiliarians would hen believe ha we should ransfer resources o hese people. Tha would increase inequaliy. The law of diminishing moral goodness is, in conras, quie secure. As a moral claim, i always holds. On he Prioriy View, benefis o he worse off always maer more. This argumen for equaliy is hus more securely grounded. Bu his does no make i differen in kind. Like he Uiliarian argumen, i sill reas equaliy as a mere means. A second difference goes deeper. Since diminishing marginal uiliy is an empirical generalizaion, he Uiliarian argumen for equaliy is, in a way, coincidenal. merely happens o be rue ha, if are beer off, resources give hem smaller benefis. On he Prioriy View, here is no coincidence. does no merely happen o be rue ha, if people are worse off, benefis o hem maer more. On his view, hese benefis maer more because hese people are worse off. This is a fac, no abou he size of hese benefis, bu abou heir disribuion. And, in elling us o give o such benefis, his view has wha Nagel calls'a buil-in bias owards On he definiion wih which began, he Prioriy View is no Egaliarian. On his view, hough we ough o give prioriy o he worse ha is no because we shall be reducing inequaliy. We do no believe ha inequaliy is, in iself, eiher bad or unjus. Bu, since his view has a buil-in bias owards equaliy, i could be called Egaliarian in a second, looser sense. We migh say ha. if we ake his view, we are Non-Relaional Egaliarians. X Equaliy or 107 equaliy and prioriy are differen ideas, he disincion is ofen overlooked, wih unforunae resuls. is worh suggesing why his disincion has been overlooked. Firs, especially in earlier cenuries, Egaliarians were ofen fighing bales in which his disincion did no arise. They were demanding legal or poliical equaliy, or aacking arbirary privileges, or differences in saus. These are no he kinds of good o which our disincion applies. And i is here ha he demand for equaliy is mos plausible. Second, when Egaliarians considered oher kinds of good, hey ofen assumed ha, if equaliy were achieved, his would eiher increase he sum of hese goods, or would a leas no reduce his sum. f hey hough of benefis in uiliarian erms, hey may have assumed ha he redisribuion of resources would increase he resuling benefis. f insead hey were concerned only wih resources, hey may have regarded hese as a fixed sum, which would no be alered by redisribuion. n eiher of hese cases, equaliy and prioriy canno conflic. even when a move o equaliy migh reduce he oal sum of benefis, Egaliarians ofen assumed ha such a move would a leas bring some benefis o he people who were worse off. n such cases, equaliy and prioriy could no deeply conflic. Egaliarians overlooked he cases where equaliy could no be achieved excep levelling down. shall now menion cerain recen saemens of Egaliarian views. n he case of some views, hough hey are presened as being abou equaliy, ha fac is superficial. These views could be resaed as views abou prioriy, and hey would hen become more plausible. l3u oher views are essenially abou equaliy, and canno be resaed in his way. We can sar by asking which kind of view Nagel holds. n his review of Nozick's book, Nagel seemed o conflae equaliy and prioriy. He wroe: To defend equaliy as a good in one would have o argue ha improvemens in he lo of people lower on he scale of well-being ook prioriy over greaer improvemens o hose on he scale.38

15 108 Derek n his aricle 'Equaliy', Nagel does argue his. And, afer claiming ha i is more urgen o benefi he child who is worse off, he wries: This urgency is no necessarily decisive. may be ouweighed by oher consideraions, for equaliy is no he onlv value. 39 This suggess ha, o he quesion 'Why is i more urgen o benefi his child?', Nagel would answer, 'Because his would reduce he inequaliy beween hese wo children.' Bu doub ha his is really Nagel's view. Would i be jus as urgen o benefi he handicapped child, even if he had no sibling who was beer off? suspec ha, on Nagel's view, i would. Nagel is hus one wrier who someimes uses he language of equaliy, when he is really appealing o he Prioriy View. 4o Consider nex a remark of Dworkin's: is perhaps he final evil of a genuinely unequal disribuion of resources ha some people have reason for regre jus in he fac ha hey have been cheaed of he chances ohers have had o make somehing valuable of heir ives. 41 Why does Dworkin wrie 'he chances ohers have had'? Tha suggess ha here would be no evil if no one had such chances. Tha seems wrong. The real evil seems o be ha hese people were cheaed of he chances ha hey could have had. The argumen for an equal disribuion is no o give people equal chances o make somehing valuable of heir lives. Tha could be achieved by levelling down. The argumen is raher ha, while an unequal disribuion gives good chances only o some people, he same resources, if shared ou, would give hem o everyone. 42 We can now urn o he idea of disribuion according o need. Several wriers argue ha, when we are moved by his idea, our aim is o achieve equaliy. Thus Raphael wries: f he man wih greaer needs is given more han he man wih lesser needs, he inended resul is ha each of hem should have (or a leas approach) he same level of saisfacion; he inequaliy of naure is correced. 43 Ohers make similar claims. Thus, when discussing he gvllg of exra resources o mee he needs of he ill, or he handicapped, Norman wries, 'he underlying idea is one of equaliy. The aim is ha everybody should, as far as possible, have an equally worhwhile life.,44 As before, if his is he aim, i could be as well achieved by levelling down. This canno be wha Norman means. He could avoid his implicaion by omiing he word 'equally'. He could simply say, 'he aim is ha everybody should, as far as possible, have a worhwhile life.' Wih his revision, Norman could no longer claim ha equaliy is he underlying idea. Bu ha, believe, would srenghen his argumen. Disribuion according o need is more naurally inerpreed as a form of he Prioriy View.4s Some ideas, however, canno be reinerpreed in his way. For example, Cohen suggess ha 'he righ reading of egaliarianism' j f k f r or 109 is ha 'is purpose is o eliminae involunary disadvanage,.46 He means by his comparaive disadvanage: being worse off han ohers. Tha is an essenially relaional idea. Only equaliy could eliminae such disadvanage. Cohen's view could no be re-expressed in he language of prioriy. Remember nex he view ha i is in iself bad, or unfair, ha some people are born abler or healhier han ohers, or ha hrough he differences in he naural disribuion of resources, some people are worse off han ohers. Tha view is essenially abou inequaliy. There are many oher cases. For example, Ake wries: Jusice in a sociey as a whole ough o be undersood as a complee equaliy of he overall level of benefis and burdens of each member of ha SOCiey. The various maxims of disribuive jusice, Ake claims, can all be inerpreed as having as heir aim 'o resore a siuaion of complee equaliy o he greaes degree possible'.47 is someimes claimed ha, hough Egaliarians may seem commied o he inrinsic value of equaliy, ha is no really so, and ha no Egaliarian would believe ha here was any case for leveldown.48 Bu, while ha is rue of some Egaliarians, i is no rue of all. For example, Ake wries: Wha abou he case of someone who suddenly comes ino good forune, perhaps enirely by his or her own effors? Should addiional burdens... be imposed on ha person in order o resore equaliy and safeguard jusice?... Why wouldn' i be jus o impose any kind of addiional burden whasoever on him in

16 110 Derek X order o resore he i would be...49 The answer is ha, sricly speaking, Ake concedes ha, on his view, i would be jus o level down, imposing burdens on his person. He merely believes ha he claim of jusice would here be overridden, jus as he claims of efficiency, or happiness, can be overridden. Levelling down would be in one way good, or be somehing ha we would have a moral reason o do. Similarly, Temkin wries:, for one, believe ha inequaliy is bad. Bu do really hink i ha here is some respec in which a world where only some are blind is worse han one where all are? Yes. Does his mean hink i would be beer if we blinded everybody? No. is no all ha maers.so Several oher wriers make such caimsy Since some wriers are unmoved by he Levelling Down Objecion, le us now reconsider wha ha objecion claims. The objecion appeals o cases where, if some inequaliy were removed, ha would be worse for some people and beer for no one. As have said, hese are he cases which raise he deepes disagreemen beween our wo kinds of view. On he Prioriy View, we do no objec o inequaliy excep when i is bad for people. We shall see nohing good in he removal of inequaliy, when his would benefi no one. Telic Egaliarians disagree. On heir view, inequaliy is in iself" bad. This implies ha inequaliy is bad wheher or no i is bad My las claim assumes ha inequaliy is no in iself bad for s his assumpion jusified? f we are worse off han oher people, is ha in iself bad for us? nequaliy may, of course, have bad effecs. For example, if am worse off han oher people, his may pu me in heir power, or make me envious, or undermine my self-respec. Bu such effecs are irrelevan here. We are concerned wih he mere fac ha am worse off han oher people. To isolae his fac, we can suppose ha am no aware of hese people, and ha heir exisence has no oher effec on me. n such a case, hough he inequaliy has r,! f! i Equaliy or Prioriv? 111 no effecs, i remains rue ha am worse off han hese oher s ha bad for me? This quesion is easily misundersood. is, of course, in one sense bad for me ha am worse off han hese people. would be beer for me if was no worse-off han hem, because was as well-off as hey acually are. f ha were rue, would be beer off. Bu his is no he relevan comparison. Clearly, i is bad for me ha am no ha well off. Bu is i bad for me ha hey are? may help o rephrase our quesion. We should no ask, 's i bad for me ha am worse off han oher people?' This suggess ha he relevan alernaive is my being beer off. Raher we should ask, 's i bad for me ha, unknown o me, here are oher people who are beer off han me? Would i be beer for me if here were no such people? Would i be beer for me if hese people had never or were as badly off as me?' The answer depends on our view abou wha is in or agains people's ineress, and here are several heories here. Bu shall claim ha, on all he plausible versions of hese heories, he answer is No. The mere fac of inequaliy is no, in bad for he people who are worse off. Such inequaliies may be naurally unfair. And i would of course be beer for hese people if hey hemselves were beer off. Bu i would no be beer for hem wihou any effecs on hem, he oher people were jus as badly off. S2 We can now reurn o my earlier claim. For Telic Egaliarians, inequaliy is in iself bad. f ha is so, i mus be bad even when i is no bad for people. For hese Egaliarians, inequaliy is bad even when i is bad ar no one. Tha may seem enough reason o rejec his view. We may hink ha nohing can be bad if i is bad for no one. Bu, before we assess his objecion, we mus disinguish wo versions of his view. Consider hese alernaives: Everyone a some level (2) Some a his level Ohers beer off n oucome (1) everyone is equally well off. n oucome (2), some are beer off. n (2) here is inequaliy, bu his oucome is worse for no one. For Telic Egaliarians, he inequaliy in (2) is bad. Could his make (2), all hings considered, a worse oucome han

17 ! 112 Derek Pari or Prioriy? 113 Some Egaliarians answer Yes. These people do no believe ha inequaliy would always make oucomes, all hings considered, worse. On heir view, he loss of equaliy could be morally ouweighed a sufficien increase in he sum of benefis. Bu inequaliy is a grea evil. can make an oucome worse, even when his oucome would be beer for everyone. Those who hold his view shall call Srong Egaliarians. Ohers hold a differen view. Since hey believe ha inequaliy is bad, hey agree ha oucome (2) is in one way worse. Bu hey do no hink i worse on balance, or all hings considered. n a move from (1) o (2), some people would become beer off. For hese Egaliarians, he loss of equaliy would be morally ouweighed he benefis o hese people. On heir view, would be! on balance! beer han (1). Those who hold his view shall call Moderaes. This version of Egaliarianism is ofen overlooked, or dismissed. People ypically produce he sandard objecion o Srong Egaliarianism: he appeal o cases where a move o inequaliy would be bad for no one. They hen eiher ignore he Moderae view, or rea i as no worh considering. They assume ha, if we claim ha he badness of he inequaliy would always be ouweighed by he exra benefis! our view mus be rivial. 53 This, believe, is a misake. Our view would indeed be rivial if we held ha any loss of equaliy, however grea, could be ouweighed by any gain in uiliy, however small. Bu ha is no wha Moderaes claim. They claim only ha, in his kind of case, hose in which greaer inequaliy would be worse for no one, he badness of he inequaliy would in fac be ouweighed by he exra benefis. This claim can be subdivided ino a pair of claims. One is a view abou he relaive imporance of equaliy and uiliy. The oher, which has been overlooked, is a claim abou he srucure of hese cases. f here is greaer inequaliy, in a way ha is worse for no one, he inequaliy mus corne from benefis o cerain people. And here canno be a grea loss of equaliy unless hese benefis are also grea. These gains and losses would roughly march in sep. n he simples cases, his is obvious. Consider hese alernaives: (1) All a 100 (2) Half a 100 Half a 101 Half a 100 Half a 110 (4) Half a 100 Half a 200 As we move lower down he lis, boh gains and losses would seadily r, [ n a move from (1) o (2), here would be a small gain in bu only a small loss in equaliy. n a move from (1) o (3) he loss in equaliy would be greaer, bu so would be he gain in uiliy. grow. n more complicaed cases, he poin sill holds. f one of wo oucomes involves more inequaliy, bu is worse for no one, he beer-off mus gain. There can be much more inequaliy if he beer-off gain a grea deal. Bu here would hen be much more uiliy. 54 Since hese gains and losses roughly march in sep, here is room for Moderaes o hold a significan posiion. Moderaes claim ha, in all such cases, he gain in uiliy would ouweigh he loss in equaliy. Tha is consisen wih he claim ha, in oher kinds of case, ha may no be so. Moderaes can claim ha some gains in uiliy, even if grea, would no ouweigh some losses in equaliy. Consider, for example, hese alernaives: All a 100 Half a 100 Half a 200 (5) Half a 70 Half a 200. Moderaes believe ha, compared wih (1), (4) is beer. Bu hey migh claim ha (5) is worse. This would no be a rivial claim. n a move from (1) o (5), he worse-off would lose, bu he beer-off would gain more han hree imes as much. Compared wih (1), would involve a grea gain in uiliy. Bu, for hese Moderaes, his gain would be oo small o ouweigh he loss of equaliy. would here choose a smaller sum of benefis, for he sake of a more equal disribuion. Tha is why, hough Moderae, hey are rue Egaliarians. Reurn now o he Levelling Down Objecion. Srong Egaliarians believe ha, in some cases, a move owards inequaliy, even hough i would be worse for no one, would make he oucome worse. This may seem incredible. We may claim ha one of wo oucomes canno be worse if i would be worse for no one. To challenge Srong arians, i would be enough o defend his claim. To challenge Moderaes, his claim may no be enough. Moderaes believe ha, if he oucome wih greaer inequaliy would be worse for no one, i would no be a worse oucome. Bu heir claim is only ha i would no be worse on balance, or all-hings-considered.

18 114 Derek Parfi They mus agree ha, on heir view, his oucome would be in one way worse. On heir view, inequaliy is bad, even when i is bad for no one. To rejec heir view, we mus claim ha even his canno be rue. n he space remaining, can make only a few remarks abou his disagreemen. is widely assumed ha, if an oucome is worse for no one, i canno be in any way worse. This we can call he Person-affecing Claim. This claim migh be defended by an appeal o some view abou he naure of moraliy, or moral reasoning. Some, for example, argue as follows. is no hard o see how an oucome can be worse for paricular people. Bu i can seem puzzling how an oucome can be simply worse - worse, period. Wha is mean by his impersonal use of 'worse'? Some sugges ha his use of 'worse' can be explained, or consruced, ou of he concep 'worse for'. There are oher lines of hough which may lead o he Person-affecing Claim, such as a conracualis view abou moral reasoning. 55 Egaliarians migh respond by defending a differen mea-ehical view. Or hey migh argue ha his claim has unaccepable caions, since i conflics oo sharply wih some of our beliefs. Temkin responds in he second way. The Person-affecing Claim, he argues, is incompaible wih many of our ideals. 56 Temkin's bes example seems o me his appeal o wha he calls 'proporional jusice'. Would i no be bad, he asks, if 'he eviles mass murderers fare beer han he mos benign sains?' Bu his migh no be bad for any of hese people. may be bad ha he sains fare worse han he murderers. Bu his comparaive elemen is oo close o he quesion a issue: wheher inequaliy is bad. So we should forge he sains. s i bad ha he murderers fare as well as hey do? Would i be beer if hey fared worse? We migh hink his beer if i would give he murderers he punishmen ha hey deserve. Noe ha, in hinking his, we are no merely claiming ha hey ough o be punished. We may hink ha, if hey are no punished, perhaps because hey canno be caugh, his would be bad. The badness here may no involve any furher wrongdoing. And we may hink his bad even if heir punishmen would do no one any good perhaps because, as in Kan's example, our communiy is abou o dissolve. f we accep his reribuive view, we mus rejec he Person-affecing Claim. We believe ha, if people are no punished as hey deserve, Equaliy or Prioriy? 115 his would be bad, even if i would be bad for no one. And, if ha is rue, he same could be rue of he badness of inequaliy. Even if we rejec he reribuive View, as do, his analogy may sill be useful. Consider he claim ha i would have been beer if Hiler, unknown o ohers, had suffered for wha he did. f we rejec his claim, wha would our reason be? Would i be enough o say, 'How could his have been beer? would no have been beer for him.' This remark may seem o us inadequae. We may rejec reribuion, no because i is good for no one, bu because we do no believe in he kind of free will ha i seems o require. we believe ha, o deserve o suffer for wha we do, we would have o be responsible for our own characers, in a way ha seems o us o make no sense. f ha is why we rejec reribuion, his analogy may sill, in a somewha curious way, ell agains he Person-affecing Claim. We believe ha, in one sense, reribuion could have been good, even When i is good for no one. Or raher, wha makes his impossible is no he ruh of he Person-affecing Claim, bu he incoherence of he required kind of free will. We migh imagine corning o believe ha his kind of freedom is no incoheren. We may agree ha, in ha case, we could no rejec reribuion merely by claiming ha i is good for no one. f ha objecion would no be sufficien, why should i be sufficien as an objecion o Egaliarianism? Fully o assess he Person-affecing Claim, we would need o discuss mea-ehics, or he naure of moraliy and moral reasoning. Since canno do ha here, shall merely express an opiniony The Person-affecing Claim has, r hink, less force han, and canno be used o srenghen, he Levelling Down Objecion. X shall now summarize wha r have claimed. began by discussing he view ha i is in iself bad, or unfair, if some people are worse off han ohers hrough no faul or choice of heirs. This, he Telic Egaliarian view, can seem very plausible. Bu i faces he Levelling Down Objecion. This objecion seems o me o have grea force, bu is no, hink, decisive. Suppose we began by being Telic Egaliarians, bu are convinced by his objecion. Suppose ha we canno believe ha, if iy were removed in a way ha is bad for some people, and beer for no one, ha change would be in any way good. f we are o

19 116 Derek salvage somehing of our view, we hen have wo alernaives. We migh become Deonic Egaliarians. We migh believe ha, hough we should someimes aim for equaliy, ha is no because we would hereby make he oucome beer. We mus hen explain our view in some oher way. And he resuling view may have a narrower scope. For example, i may apply only o goods of cerain kinds, such as hose ha are co-operaively produced, and i may apply only o inequaliy beween cerain people, such as members of he same communiy. We may also have o abandon some of our beliefs. Reconsider he Divided World: Half a 100 Half a 200 (2) Everyone a 145 On he Deonic View, we canno clairh ha i would be beer if he siuaion changed from (1) o (2). Our view is only abou wha people ough o do, and makes no comparisons beween saes of affairs. Our alernaive is o move o he Prioriy View. We could hen keep our view abou he Divided World. is rue ha, in a change from (1) o (2), he beer off would lose more han he worse off would gain. Tha is why, in uiliarian erms, (2) is worse han (1). Bu, on he Prioriy View, hough he beer off would lose more, he gain o he worse off couns for more. Benefis o he worse off do more o make he oucome beer. We could claim ha his is (1) is worse han The Prioriy View ofen coincides wih he belief in equaliy. Bu, as have suggesed, hey are quie differen kinds of view. They can be aacked or defended in differen ways. The same is rue of Telic and Deonic views. So, in rying o decide wha we believe, he firs sep is o draw hese disincions. Taxonomy, hough unexciing, needs o be done. Unil we have a clearer view of he alernaives, we canno hope o decide which view is rue, or is he bes view. Appendix: Rawls's view How do he disincions have drawn apply o Rawls's heory? Rawls's Difference Principle seems o be an exreme version of he Prioriy View: one which gives absolue prioriy o benefiing Equaliy or 117 hose who are worse off. There are, however, hree qualificaions. We should apply he Difference Principle (1) only o he basic srucure of sociey, (2) only in conjuncion wih Rawls's oher principles, which require equal libery and equaliy of opporuniy, and we do no apply his principle o individuals, bu only o he represenaive member of he wors-off group. nsead of claiming ha he wors-off group should be as well off as possible, Rawls saes his view in a less direc way. He makes claims abou when inequaliy is unjus. On his view, wheher some paern of inequaliy is unjus depends on is effecs upon he worsoff group. Wha hese effecs are depends on wha alernaives were possible. Le us say ha inequaliy harms he wors-off group when i is rue ha, wihou his inequaliy, his group could have been beer off. nequaliy benefis his group when i is rue ha, in every possible alernaive wihou his inequaliy, hey would have been even worse off. " Rawls ofen claims nequaliy is no unjus if i benefis he wors-off group. Egaliarians migh accep his claim. They migh say, 'Even in such cases, inequaliy is bad. Bu i is no unjus. Such inequaliy is, all hings considered, jusified by he fac ha i benefis he wors off.' They migh add ha his inequaliy is, in a way, naurally unfair. would hen be a case of wha Barry calls jusified unfairness. Rawls's argumens do no sugges ha such inequaliy is, in iself, bad. He seems o accep claim (A) in he spiri of he Prioriy View. On his Difference Principle, since we should give absolue prioriy o he wors-off group, if inequaliy benefis his group, i is sraighforwardly morally required. There is no moral balancing o be done no inrinsic badness needing o be ouweighed. Rawls jus as ofen claims (B) nequaliy is unjus if i harms he wors-off group. Egaliarians migh make his claim. Bu, here again, i could be explained on he absolue version of he Prioriy View. On his view, if he wors-off group could have been made beer his is wha should have been done. Wha is unjus is ha he required prioriy has no been given o hese people. have suggesed ha Rawls's view could be regarded as one version

20 118 Derek Par/i of he Prioriy View. Wha would show ha i canno be so regarded? Tha migh be shown by Rawls's answer o a furher quesion. On his view, inequaliy is no unjus if i benefis he wors-off group, and i is unjus if i harms his group. Wha if inequaliy neiher benefis nor harms his group? Would i hen be unjus? Suppose ha, in some case, he only possible alernaives are hese: Everyone a some level (2) Some a his level Ohers beer off f we choose (2), here would be inequaliy, and his would no benefi hose who are wors-off. Bu here is no way in which he gains o he beer off could be shared by boh groups. The benefis o he beer off are, for some reason, no ransferable. Since ha is so, hough he inequaliy in (2) would no benefi he wors-off group, i would no be worse for hem. n such cases, on he Prioriy View, we mus favour (2). The benefis o he beer off are unequivocally good. The fac ha hey increase inequaliy is, for us, of no concern. Bu, if we are Egaliarians, we migh oppose (2). We migh claim ha he inequaliy in (2) is bad, or unjus. Would Rawls agree? f he would, his would show ha he does no hold a version of he Prioriy View. is clear ha, on Rawls's view, inequaliy is no unjus if i benefis he wors-off group. Does he mean 'if and only if'? s inequaliy unjus if i does no benefi his group? The answer may seem o be Yes. Rawls's Second Principle merely reads 'Social and economic inequaliies are o be arranged so ha hey are... o he greaes benefi of he leas advanaged'. This is compaible wih eiher answer. Bu his General Concepion reads, 'All social primary goods... are o be disribued equally unless an unequal disribuion... is o he advanage of he leas favored. Similarly, Rawls wries, 'njusice, hen, is simply inequaliies ha are no o he benefi of all.' And he ofen makes such claims.58 This suggess ha he acceps f! Equaliy or Prioriy? 119 he calls close-kni. This is rue when any change in he level of one group would change he levels of he oher groups.59 When levels are close-kni, if inequaliy does no benefi he wors-off group, i mus harm ha group. n such cases, (C) coincides wih (D) nequaliy is unjus only if i harms he wors-off group. n he passages o which have referred, his may be all ha Rawls means. n one secion of his book, Rawls direcly addresses my quesion. He considers a case in which he alernaives are hese: Two people are boh a some level (2) One is a his level The oher is beer off On Rawls's Difference Principle, which of hese oucomes should we choose? Rawls gives hree answers. The Difference Principle, he wries, 'is a srongly egaliarian concepion in he sense ha unless here is a disribuion ha makes boh persons beer off... an equal disribuion is o be preferred'. (76) On his firs answer, oucome (2) is worse han oucome (1). This remark does commi Rawls o a version of claim (C). ells us o avoid inequaliy unless i benefis hose who are wors-off. Rawls's second answer is implied by he indifference map wih which he illusraes his case (Figure 5. X 2 (C) nequaliy is unjus, unless i benefis he wors-off group. Bu Rawls may no inend (C). When he makes hese claims, he may be assuming ha he levels of he differen groups are wha Figure 5.1 o Xl

21 120 Derek Parfi This shows (2) o be as good as (1). On his map, (1) would be some poin on he 45-degree diagonal, and (2) would be on he horizonal line passing hrough his poin. Since his is an indifference map, all poins on his line arc equally good. As Rawls wries, 'Na maer how much eiher person's siuaion is improved, here is no gain from he sandpoin of he difference principle unless he oher gains also'. No gain from he sandpoin of his principle; bu also, as he indifference map implies, no loss. Laer in his secion, however, Rawls wries, 'he difference principle is compaible wih he principle of efficiency'. (79) This implies ha (2) is heer han (1). Compared wih (), (2) is beer for someone, and worse for no one. Given he furher assumpions ha Rawls makes, and he use o which he pus his principles, his inconsisency is no in pracice damaging. Bu, for he purposes of heory, i is worh asking which of hese hree answers is Rawls's rue view. f he acceps he firs or second answer, he canno hold a version of he Prioriy View. And his would affec he argumens ha could be given for or agains his view. believe ha he hird answer, hough less ofen suppored in his ex, is Rawls's rue view. He would accep, no (C), bu (D). On his view, inequaliy is unjus only if i worsens he posiion of hose who are worse off. Tha is wha is implied by he Lexical version of his Difference Principle. On ha principle, if we canno make oher groups beer off, we should, if we can, make he hesloff group even beer off. We should, ha is, increase inequaliy, in a way ha does no benefi any of he people who are worse off. More imporan, his is he view o which we are led by Rawls's main argumens. From he sandpoin of he Original Posiion, we would clearly favour giving benefis o he beer off, when his would no worsen he posiion of hose who are worse off. For all we know, we migh be he people who are beer off. On Rawls's assumpions, we would no limi he gains o ourselves if we were in his posiion for he sake of limiing oher people's gains if we were no. Describing he moivaion of his paries, Rawls wries: 'Nor do hey ry o gain relaive o one anoher... They srive for as high an absolue score as possible. They do no wish a high or a low score for heir opponens, nor do hey seek o maximize or minimize he difference beween heir successes and hose of ohers.' (144) As hese las remarks sugges, Rawls's view is no merely compaible or Prioriy? 121 wih he Prioriy View. Given his main argumen, i mus be, in is conen, a version of his view, since i mus concerned wih absolue no relaive levels. On he Difference Principle, we should make he wors-off group as well off as possible. is quie irrelevan wheher, in so doing, we reduce or increase inequaliy. This means ha, on my definiion, Rawls is a mos a Non-Relaional Egaliarian. Rawls's view is no, however, merely a version of he Prioriy View. f i were, i would be implausibly exreme. f we are no egaliarians, and are no concerned wih wheher some people are worse off han ohers, i is hard o see why we should give absolue prioriy o benefiing people who are worse off. And ha view seems oo exreme even when, as in Rawls's case, i applies only o he basic srucure of SOCiey, and only o he represenaive member of he wors-off group. f we are no concerned wih relaive levels, why should he smalles benefi o he represenaive wors-off person coun for infiniely more han much greaer benefis o oher represenaive people? To explain his feaure of Rawls's view, we should, believe, reinroduce he moral imporance of equaliy. An objecion o naural inequaliy is, [ have suggesed, one of he foundaions of Rawls's heory. And Rawls himself claims ha, in an accoun of jusice, equal division is he naural firs sep, and provides he benchmark by reference o which we can defend our final principles. As Barry noes, his suggess a differen way o defend Rawls's Difference Principle. 61 Firs we argue for equaliy, by appealing o he arbirariness of he naural loery. Then we allow deparures from equaliy provided ha hese are no worse for hose who are wors off. This explains why, in Rawls's phrase, he wors-off have he veo, so ha benefis o hem should have absolue prioriy. Noes This aricle owes much o he ideas of Brian Barry, David Brink, Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, James Griffin, Shelly Kagan, Dennis McKerlie, David Miller, Thomas Nagel, Richard Norman, Rober Nozick, ngmar Persson, Jane Radcliffe Richards, Joseph Raz, Thomas Scanlon, and Larry Temkin. 2 Thomas Nagel, Moral Quesions (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 1979), pp [pp in his volume]. See also Nagel's and Parialiy (New York: Oxford Universiy Press, 1991). 3 Rober Nozick, Anarchy, Sae, and Uopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp

22 122 Derek Parfi 4 Since acs may differ morally from omissions, we can also assume ha each of he possible oucomes would resul from he same kind of ac, And, since i may make a difference wheher any oucome would be a coninuaion of he saus quo, we should assume ha his would no be so, 5 For wo such broader accouns of weil-being, see Amarya Sen, 'Capabiliy and Weil-Being', and Thomas Scanlon, 'Value, Desire, and he Qualiy of Life', boh in The Qualiy of Life, edied by Marha Nussbaum and Amarya Sen (Oxford, Oxford Universiy Press, 1993), and Amarya Sen, nequaliy Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1992), ch.3, 6 See Sen, nequaliy Reexamined, ch On hese definiions, we are Egaliarians if, in any area, we believe we should aim for equaliy. f we had ha belief in only some small area, we would no naurally be called 'Egaliarians'. n ha respec my definiions are misleading. 8 We migh add, 'hrough no faul or choice of heirs'. 9 They are well discussed in Larry Temkin's nequaliy (New York: Oxford Universiy Press, 1993). 10 Moral Quesions, op. ci., p. 10, Cf. David Miller, 'Argumens for iy', Midwes Sudies in Philosophy, vol. V! (Minneapolis: Universiy of Minnesoa Press, 1982). 11 There are oher some oher possibiliies. As Kagan and Brink sugges, equaliy migh be inrinsically good, neiher by iself, nor because of is effecs, bu because i was an essenial par of some larger good. Cf. Miller, 'Argumens for Equaliy', op. ci. 12 Cf. Joel Feinberg, 'Noncomparaive Jusice', Philosophical Review, vol. 83 (July 1974). 13 Cf. Philip Monague, 'Comparaive and Non-comparaive Jusice', Pili/osophica/ Quarerly, vol. 30 (April 1980). 14 See Rober Goodin, 'Egaliarianism, Feishisic and Oherwise', Ehics, vol. 98 (Ocober 1987), and 'Epiphenomenal Egaliarianism', Social Researcil, vol. 52 (Spring 1985). 15 Cf. he disincions drawn in Lawrence Sager and Lewis Kornhauser, 'Jus Loeries', Social Science nformaion (Sage, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi, vol. 27, 1988), 16 John Rawls, A Theory of Jusice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universiy Press, 1971), p There is now a complicaion, Those who ake his second view do no merely hink ha such inequaliy is bad. They ofen speak of naural injusice, On heir view, i is unjus or unfair ha some people are born less able, or less healhy, han ohers, Similarly, i is unfair if naure besows on some richer resources. Talk of unfairness here is someimes claimed o make no sense. believe ha i does make sense. Bu, even on his view, our disincion sands, For Telic Egaliarians, i is he sae of affairs which is bad, or unjus; bu Deonic Egaliarians are concerned only wih wha we ough o do, 18 A Theory of Jusice, op, cil, p They include environmenal or circumsanial luck, Cf. Brian Barry, Theories of Jusice (London: Harveser, 1989), p Equaliy or 12::1 20 Some objec ha i canno be luck ha we have he genes we do, since we could no have had oher genes, Bu his use of 'luck' does no imply ha hings could have been oherwise. Somehing is 'luck', in his sense, if i is no somehing for which we ourselves are responsible, (Cf. Thomas Nagel, 'Moral Luck', Moral Quesions (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1979). 21 Cf. G. A. Cohen, 'On he Currency of Egaliarian Jusice', Ehics, vol. 99, 1989, and R. Arneson, 'Equaliy and Equaliy of Opporuniy for Welfare', Philosophical Sudies, vol. 56, Cf. Nozick, Anarchy, Sae, and Uopia, op. cil, p. 216, and Nagel, Moral Quesions, op, ci., p, 119 [po 71 in his volume], 23 See, for example, David Gauhier, Morals by Agreemen (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1980), pp. 18 and 268, 24 Gauhier, op, cil, p Cf. Nagel, Equaliy and Parialiy, op. ci., pp , and Thomas Pogge's discussion of Nozick, in his Realizing Rawls (haca: Cornell Universiy Press, 1989), ch, Cf. Nozick, Anarchy, Sae, and Uopia, op, cil, p, 206 (hough Nozick's arge here is no he Principle of Equaliy bu Rawls's Difference prinrinlo 27 Such an objecion is suggesed, for example, in Joseph Raz, The of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1986), ch, 9, and Larry Temkin, nequaliy, op, ci., pp , 28 Nagel, Moral Quesiolls, op. ci., p. 124 [pp in his volume], 29 Cf. H, Frankfur, The mporance of Wha We Care Abou (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 1988), ch, 11, and Joseph Raz, The Moraliy of Freedom, op. ci" ch Several oher wriers have suggesed such a view, See, for example, Thomas Scanlon, 'Nozick on Righs, Libery, and Propery', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1, Fall 1976, pp. 6-10, Joseph Raz, The Moraliy of Freedom, op. ci., Harry Frankfur, 'Equaliy as a Moral deal', in The imporance of Wha We Care Abou, op. ci., David Wiggins, 'Claims of Need', in his Needs, Values, Truh (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), Dennis McKerlie, 'Egaliarianism', Dialogue, vol. 23 (1984), and 'Equaliy and Prioriy', Uilias, vol. 6 (1994). 31 Cf. Frankfur, The mporance of Wha We Care Abou, op. ci., p Nagel, Moral Quesions, op. ci" p. 11] [po 64 in his volume). have claimed elsewhere ha, on wha ake o be he ruh abou personal ideniy, here is an argumen for aking hese unis o be people a paricular imes, and ha, on ha view, our disribuive principles move us owards Negaive Uiliarianism. (Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1984, Secion 117; and 'Commens', Ehics, July 1986, pp ) ::13 Moral Quesions, op, ci" pp. 117 and 121 [pp, 69 and 73 in his volume]. 34 bid., p, 121 [p. 73 in his volume]. 35 Raz pus he difference well. He wries: wha makes us care abou various inequaliies is no he bu he concern idenified by he underlying principle, is he hunger of he hungry, he need of he needy, he suffering of he ill, and so

23 124 Derek Parfi on. The fac ha hey are worse off in he relevan respec han heir neighours is relevan. Bu i is relevan no as an independen [ evil of inequaliy. s relevance is in showing ha heir hunger is greaer, heir need more pressing, heir suffering more hurful, and f herefore our concern for he hungry, he needy, he suffering, and no our concern for equaliy, makes us give hem prioriy. (The Moraliy 1 of Freedom, op. ci., p. 240.) When we are comparing benefis o differen people, i is easy o confuse concern wih relaive and absolue levels. On he Prioriy View, if one of wo people is worse off, benefis o his person maer more. They maer more, as have said, because his person is a a lower, absolue level. Bu in calling his a lower level, canno help describing he relaion beween hese levels. (This is why someimes say: benefis o people maer more he worse off hese people are.) 36 We migh go even furher. n some Uiliarian argumens, equaliy plays, an essenial causal role. really is a means, because i has various good effecs. Bu, in he argumen ha appeals o diminishing marginal uiliy, his may no be so. Suppose ha, as Uiliarians, we se ou o,, redisribue resources whenever his would increase he sum of benefis. We migh no even noice ha, if we carry his process o is limi, equaliy of resources will be he resul. And, even when we do noice his, we may regard equaliy, no as a means, bu as a by-produc. f we decide o aim for equaliy, his may be like aiming a a arge merely o ensure ha our arrow passes hrough some poin en roue. 37 See, for example, Amarya Sen, On Economic nequaliy (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1973), pp Sen has argued ha his may be rue of hose who are crippled. While his would seldom be rue of hose wih physical disabiliies, i seems plausible for hose who have cerain kinds of menal illness, or impairmen. f such people gain less from each uni of resources, uiliarians mus claim ha hey should ge fewer resources. On Sen's proposed Weak Equiy Axiom, hey should eiher ge more, or a leas no fewer. 38 Reading Nozick, edied by Jeffrey Paul (Blackwell, 1981), p Moral Quesions, op. ci., p. 124 [po 75 in his volume]. 40 Similar remarks apply o secion 117 of my Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1984). Nagel reurns o he choices beween hese views in his laer Equaliy and Parialiy, op. ci., chs 7 and 'Wha is Equaliy? Par 1: Equaliy of Welfare', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, Summer 1981, p Cf. Frankfur, op. ci., pp may of course be unfair if hese people were cheaed of such chances, while ohers had hem. am no claiming ha Dworkin's claim can be fully phrased in erms of prioriy. Bu equaliy is no he only issue, or, i seems, he mos imporan. 43 D. D. Raphael, Jusice and Libery (London: Ahlone Press, 1980), p. 10. Cf. p Richard Norman, Free and Eqllal (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press), p See, however, he excellen discussion in David Miller, 'Social Jusice and he Principle of Need', in The Froniers ofpoliical Theory, ed. Michael i ~, Equaliy or Prioriy? 125 Freeman and David Roberson (Brighon: Harveser Press, 1980). 46 Cohen, 'On he Currency of Egaliarian Jusice', op. ci., p Chrisopher Ake, 'Jusice as Equaliy', Philosophy & Public Affairs, Fall 1975, pp. 71 and See, for example, Rober Young, 'Envy and nequaliy', Joumal of Philosophy, November (Bu Young may only be claiming ha, in he erms inroduce below, here are no Srong Egaliarians.) 49 Ake, 'Jusice as Equaliy', op. ci., p neqllaliy, p See for example Amarya Sen, nequaliy Reexamilled, op. ci., pp For a conrary view, which would need a furher discussion, see John Broome, Weighing Goods (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), ch See, for example, Anony Flew, The Poliics of Procruses (Buffalo, NY: Promeheus, 1981), p. 26; McKerlie, 'Egaliarianism', op. ci., p. 232, See also Nozick, op. ci., p. 21l. 54 Shelly Kagan has suggesed a possible couner-example: one in which a very few people became much beer off han everyone else. The gain in uiliy would here be very small, and, on cerain views, he loss of equaliy would be grea. On Temkin's accoun, ha would be rue of views which ake he badness of inequaliy o depend on how much worse off people are han he bes-off person. On oher views, however, which find more plausible, he loss of equaliy would no be grea. Tha would be rue of views which appeal o how much worse off people are han he average person, or han everyone who is beer off han hem. 55 Such as he view advanced in Thomas Scanlon's 'Conracualism and Uiliarianism', in ed. Amarya Sen and Bernard Williams, Uiliarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 1982). 56 Temkin, nequaliy, op. ci., ch Anoher objecion o he Person-affecing View comes from wha have called he Non-deniy Problem (in my Reasolls and PersollS, op. ci.), ch Cf. 'The inequaliy in expecaion is permissible only if lowering i would make he working class even... worse off.' (78) 'No one is o benefi from hese coningencies excep in ways ha redound o he well-being of ohers.' (100) 'Those who have been favoured by naure... may gain from heir good forune only on erms ha improve he siuaion of hose who have los ou.' (101) 'he more forunae are o benefi only in ways ha help hose who have los ou.' (179) 'nequaliies are permissible when hey maximize, or a leas conribue o, he long-erm expecaions of he leas forunae group in sociey.' (151) 59 As Rawls wries: 'i is impossible o raise or lower he expecaion of any represenaive man wihou raising or lowering he expecaion of every oher represenaive man'. (80) Though he knows ha his is no always rue, and he claims ha his principles apply even when i is no rue, he wries, a one poin, 'close-kniness is assumed in order o simplify he saemen of he Difference Principle.' Perhaps i was assumed in all of he passages quoed above. 60 Rawls, A Theory of Jusice, Figure 5 on p See Barry, Theories of Jusice, op. ci., ch. V.

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