Abstract: Iran-Israel Relations : The Iranian Perspective

Transcription

1 1 Abstract: Iran-Israel Relations : The Iranian Perspective Presented by Doron Itzchakov The narrative concerning the relationship between Iran and Israel has been veiled by secrecy, and it is not surprising that the dialogue among scholars on this issue contains more questions than answers. This complex relationship has often been impacted by Iran's connections with the Arab world, its role in the East-West turbulence and the socio-political reality within Iran. The present study, focusing on the years , examines how the delicate relationship between the (Shiite) Muslim Iran and the State of Israel came to be, and sheds light on its fundamental elements. Also, the present study focuses on elements that have influenced the Iranian perspective and led the Iranian decision makers to tie the knot with Israel despite the inherent challenge. The study seeks to show that at the basis of the relationship was an activist Iranian policy that viewed the cooperation with Israel as a means to the advancement of Iran's regional security and status. The classified nature of the sources characterizing the scholarly dialogue led Israeli scholars to distance themselves from Iran-Israel relations. And in fact, during the past three decades, research by Israeli scholars concerning the bilateral relationship during that period is scarce. The discovery of a range of sources in Persian, upon which this study is based, in part, sheds light on obscure angles and exposes various layers of the relationship, including the security dimension. The years are the "forgotten years" in Iran-Israel relations and can even be described as pushed to the margins of historical research. The time frame covered by this study was, therefore, a formative period, which shaped the format of the relationship upon which Iranian foreign policy (vis-à-vis Israel) was based also during subsequent years. The present study explores the dynamics of the relationship between the two against the backdrop

2 2 of historical events in Iran and the region. In other words, the study explores the historical context and its impact on changes in the relationship, thus providing an appropriate link between the text and the context. The scope of the research can be divided into four separate time periods differentiated by the impact each period had on the relationship between the two countries. At the same time, the study creates a topical division exploring the different elements of the relationship and their respective impact on the general relationship. The first chapter discusses the development of contacts from the creation of the State of Israel until the accession of Mohammad Mosaddeq to the role of Prime Minister. This part explores the guidelines of Iran's policies in the context of the creation of the State of Israel in the Middle East region and discusses the reasons that led to Iran's de-facto recognition of Israel. Iran, whose political and economic state was clearly influenced by WW2, waited for the outcome of the 1948 War in order to formulate its position with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli military accomplishments, as well as its agricultural and settlement feats did not escape the scrutiny of Iranian decision makers and played a role in the Iranian decision making process. The decision to grant Israel de-facto recognition (March 1950) was slightly more intricate and involves personal as well as political considerations. The chapter discusses extensively the behind-thescenes events that led Prime Minister Mohammad Sa'ed to agree to a de-facto recognition and approve the opening of a legation in Israel. Likewise, the chapter discusses extensively the chain of reaction caused by this recognition and the important role played by the Jewish community of Iran, estimated at the time around 100,000. The second chapter focuses on the period during which Iran decided to nationalize its oil industry (May 1951-August 1953) and the repercussions of the nationalization on its relationship with Israel. This stormy period began with the effort

3 3 to gain the support of Arab countries in the struggle for nationalization, for which Iran declared the closing of its legation in Jerusalem and the recall of its representative under the excuse of economic considerations. However, during that time Iran did not revoke its de-facto recognition of Israel and left the status of the relationship under an obscure definition as a bargaining chip in the case of lack of support for its policies by the Arab States. The recall of the Iranian representative from Jerusalem did not disconnect the communication channel between the sides. In March 1952 Iran suggested Turkey as caretaker of its interests in Israel, a proposal rejected by Israel. A few months later (July 1952), Iran approached Israel with a request for support in its election for the seventh session of the UN Security Council. This study seeks to show that the Mosaddeq era was not uniform in its direction and should not be considered as a monolithic time unit during which relations were halted, as claimed by several Iranian-born scholars published after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. During the second part of the nationalization period (after July 1952), the pace of contacts between Iran and Israel accelerated due to Iran's disappointment with the refusal of Arab countries - especially Egypt - to purchase crude oil from its reserves. But the most prominent fact is that it was during the Mosaddeq era that Iran signed the first commercial agreement with Israel, known under the term "the Clearing Agreement." This agreement, signed in June 1953 between Bank Melli Iran and Bank Leumi le Israel, illustrates the manner Iran conducted its diplomacy, following two parallel channels: The declarative channel and the pragmatic channel. Another chapter discusses the time period between the August 1953 coup (deposing Mosaddeq) and the July 1958 revolution, which ended the monarchy in Iraq. During that period the relationship between the two countries indicates a gradual

4 4 warming reflecting a shift in the internal Iranian balance of power and Iran's decision to move towards the West and join the Baghdad Pact (October 1955). Nonetheless, the dominant element leading the bilateral relationship at that time was the oil trade. The first oil agreement between Israel and Iran's national oil company (NIOC) was signed in June 1955 and led to other transactions, eventually making Iran Israel's main oil provider. Studying the narrative of the oil relationship inevitably entails focusing on the analysis of the reasons that led Iran to risk its relations with the Arab countries and trade with Israel despites protests and threats. Such analysis leads to a number of conclusions, most prominent of which was Iran's striving towards an independent oil policy and reduction of its dependency on the oil consortium established in October Moreover, the price paid by Israel was higher than market prices at the time, to which one can add the fact that Israel agreed to purchase the oil under preferential conditions, which matched Iran's needs. 1 Later Israel began to function as a conduit for the exportation of Iranian oil to European markets, making the trade with Israel even more attractive, especially considering constraints imposed by Egypt on the passage through the Suez Canal and the cancellation of the building of the Qum Iskanderun Oil Pipeline. 2 The oil relationships were the central component in the relationship between the countries until late 1957, when defense relations began to be established. From that time onward, the defense axis became the principal contact channel under an explicit directive of the Shah. Not without reason, a considerable part of the last chapter (discussing ) is devoted to the defense layer, which assumed the overall 1 Israel agreed to purchase the oil at face value (Posted Price) which was higher than market price. In addition, the delivery terms were "FOB" (" (Free on Board which puts the responsibility on the buyer. 2. The Qum Iskanderun Oil Pipeline was supposed to serve Iran as a main channel of marketing the oil it produced to Europe.

5 5 responsibility for managing the relationship, including oil, culture, agriculture and trade. The reasons that led Iran to turn to Israel for the institutionalization of the defense-intelligence relationship are analyzed extensively, as well as other layers of cooperation that emerged in light of the struggle against common enemies in the Middle East and the Soviet menace alike. The creation of bases for operating agents along the Iraqi border was only one of many elements carried out jointly by the two countries. Iran's recognition of its intelligence vulnerabilities led it to turn to Israel after its disappointment in the CIA and MI6 who were focused on the East-West rivalry. Unlike the great powers, Israel was regarded as having the capability to help Iran in facing enemies at home and abroad without paying a price in terms of intervention in the conduct of internal Iranian matters. And, in fact, cooperation expanded significantly after the coup that brought Abd al-karim Qasim to power in Iraq. The change of public opinion in Iraq and the penetration of the Soviet Union into the region was a source of concern for Iran, which led to a further expansion of the intelligence cooperation and joint activity along the Iraqi border. The intelligence cooperation was extended also to the military channel and operated by that time through two channels: a. The SAVAK- Mossad channel (SAVAK Iran s Intelligence and National Security Organization); b. The Military Channel. As of that time, there was an increase in the number of Israeli experts and trainers who trained the Iranian security and military forces. The Middle Eastern reality presented common challenges, which were ancillary to the interests of both Israel and Iran. Egypt, which was promoting a Pan-Arab, Socialist and Revolutionary policy, and sought the status of a regional leader, became a common enemy of both countries. In this light one can analyze the joint intelligence operations and the aid extended by Iran and Israel to the Imam Muhammad al-badr,

6 6 which contributed to the entrenchment of Egypt in Yemen from September Similarly, one can view the common assistance extended to the Kurdish minority in Iraq from the sixth decade of the twentieth century. This assistance reflects correctly the joint interests of Iran and Israel based on the desire to weaken the power of a common enemy. Throughout the study a number of fundamental areas were tackled, which provided the foundation for the interface of the connections between the two countries. Prominent among those are: The defense dimension, the oil trade, agricultural assistance, trade and economic relations, information and communication, as well as cultural and scientific relations. The most important dimension of the contacts was undoubtedly the intelligence-defense-military area, which was the mainstay of the relationship from late 1957 onward. Examining the defense component leads to the conclusion that the two countries derived mutual benefits as a result of the institutionalization of the defense connection. Iran derived considerable benefit due to the fact that it had limited ability to collect intelligence in the Middle East. In many cases, Israel was a main source - and sometimes the only source - of information about countries considered by Iran as belligerent. Furthermore, Iran drew significant benefits from the training of its men by Israel in a range of intelligence and military areas, which contributed to its strengthening. On the other hand, Iran served for Israel as an outpost for its intelligence activities and a comfortable inroad to reach enemy countries with which it did not share a border. We can therefore state that the defense cooperation provided for both sides an effective way to strengthen its operative power on the one hand, and to weaken that of the enemy on the other. Exploring the scope of agricultural assistance indicates clearly that in such case Iran, rather than Israel, was the main beneficiary. Israel was a source of acquisition of

7 7 knowledge for many Iranians and opened its gates in a wide array of courses and training sessions that provided theoretical knowledge and practical skills alike. The relative benefit derived by Israel was the entry of Israeli companies into the Iranian market as a derivative of the assistance provided. Furthermore, the assistance provided by Israel after the Qazwin earthquake was an illustration of the Israeli readiness to help in crisis situations. In the absence of diplomatic relations, "cultural diplomacy" served as another channel to maintain the connection, and therefore it is included in the study. This channel allowed Iranian students and scholars to be trained in Israel in a variety of areas. No wonder, then, that the Iranian Ministry of Education recognized Israel as a country where Iranian students were entitled to study and receive a scholarship from the Pahlavi Foundation. The present study seeks to show the pattern of "informal" relationships developed according to the will of Iran in order to reap benefits without the risk involved in raising the bar of the relationship to the diplomatic level. Iran identified the Israeli drive to provide assistance in any area needed in the hope that the assistance would lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Consequently, Iran undertook steps that inspired the feeling that the level of relationship would be raised in the future, but made sure to highlight the timing issue time and again. Furthermore, the personal dimension was an important component - maybe too important - in the relationship between the two countries. It is true that thanks to the personal dimension many important doors to the Iranian realm were opened to Israel; however, their weight obstructed an orderly formal process from taking place between the two countries. The period under study produces a conclusion that Iran-Israel relations were the product of "mutuality of interest," thus dispelling the claim by several Iranian-born scholars that Israel was the main beneficiary of the formalization of the relations.