Iraq s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War

Transcription

1 Center fr Strategic and Internatinal Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. Suite 400 Washingtn, DC Phne: 1 (202) Fax: 1 (202) BurkeChair@csis.rg Iraq s Evlving Insurgency and the Risk f Civil War Anthny H. Crdesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy acrdesman@al.cm With the Assistance f Eric M. Brewer and Sara Bjerg Mller Wrking Draft, Revised: April 26, 2006 Cpyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further disseminatin and reprductin must be dne with the written permissin f the CSIS

2 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page ii Executive Summary The rising insurgency in Iraq has becme a war after the war that threatens t divide Iraq and thrust it int full-scale civil war. It dminates the struggle t reshape Iraq as a mdern state, has becme a grwing threat t the Gulf Regin, and has becme linked t the brader struggle between Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist extremism and mderatin and refrm thrughut the Islamic wrld. In military terms, the insurgency has evlved int a lng war, r war f attritin that has prduced ten times as many Calitin casualties as the fight t tpple the Regime and defeat Iraq s army. It is a cnflict with n clear end and which can either gradually fade if the Iraqi plitical prcess and develpment f Iraqi frces succeeds; r suddenly divide the cuntry in ways that n amunt f Calitin effrt may be able t avid. There is n clear r meaningful difference between insurgency and civil war, r between largely natinal terrrism and civil war fr that matter. They are all frms f civil cnflict. The insurgency in Iraq, hwever, has evlved ver time in ways that increase the risk f intense r full-scale civil war. It is increasingly driven by sectarian and ethnic struggles, rather than natinal mvements and causes. The frces in the insurgency include a number f different elements. Shi ite and Kurdish grups nw dminate the gvernment. Their militias and Shi'ite and Kurdish dminated elements f the Iraqi frces d, hwever, play a rle in what is already a lw-level civil cnflict. They wuld play a far greater rle if Iraq drifts int the kind f civil war that divides the cuntry. There are Sunni insurgency mvements, mst with Ba ath rigin, that are mre secular and natinalist in character, and cncerned with Sunni rights and preventing Shi ite dminance. These grups prbably have a large base f ppular Sunni supprt, but have been increasingly vershadwed by the Islamist extremists. The current vilence is dminated by Sunni Islamist extremists wh ppse any negtiatins r arrangement with the new Iraqi gvernment and cmprmise with Calitin frces. These extremists nw fcus mre n attacking Shi ites, Kurds, and thse Sunnis wh supprt the new gvernment r wh might participate in the plitical prcess than n Calitin frces. Nnetheless, they still attack Calitin, diplmatic, NGO, and ther nn-iraqi targets. They are seeking t frce the US and its allies t withdraw frm Iraq, and t defeat them thrugh a war f attritin, but their primary gal is t prevent Iraq frm emerging as unified natinal state dminated by a Shi ite majrity This reprt prvides an verview f bth hw the Iraqi insurgency has mved twards civil cnflict frm its inceptin in the spring f 2003 thrugh the first mnths f 2006, and f the ways in which insurgent tactics and methds have changed ver time. It is divided int five general sectins. The first sectin examines Iraq under the rule f Saddam, the immediate pst-war aftermath and the develpment f a vilent insurgency in the spring and summer f It chrnicles the insurgency s inceptin and hw it has evlved frm 2003 until 2006 and examines Calitin peratins t cunter it. The secnd evaluates insurgent patterns f attacks, and Calitin and Iraqi casualties. It als examines insurgent tactics, methds f attack, and the plitical, psychlgical and infrmatinal warfare lessns frm

3 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page iii The third sectin assesses the cmpsitin f the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs (bth Islamists and Natinalists ), freign jihadists, and the uncertain status f the Shi ites. It als addresses the degree t which these factins cperate r cnflict and the rle f Iraqi s neighbrs in the insurgency. The furth cnsiders Iraqi views f the threat. The fifth and final sectin ffers an assessment f prbable utcmes f the cnflict and lessns f the war. Trends in the Fighting and the Risk f Mre Intense Civil War The insurgency remains highly sectarian and highly reginal. It nt nly is driven by a relatively small number f Sunni insurgents, it is cncentrated in a limited prtin f Iraq. Sme 83% f the attacks frm August 29, 2005 thrugh January 20, 2006 ccurred in nly fur f Iraq s 18 prvinces, althugh these prvinces d include Baghdad and Msul and have sme 43% f the ppulatin. Twelve prvinces, with ver 50% f Iraq s ppulatin, have been the scene f nly 6% f the attacks. At the same time, the insurgents have shwn a cnsistent capability t attack at tw majr levels f peratins: First, thrugh a wide range f cnstant lw-level methds that have a serius cumulative effect. Secnd, thrugh large attacks designed t capture media attentin, intimidate and kill the gvernment s supprters, and prevent any frm f nrmalizatin by prvking Shi ite and Kurdish respnse and a mre intense civil war. The attacks n Shi'ite targets have increasingly led t Shi'ite reprisals and brader Sunni anger and fear in respnse. If ne lks at the cycles in the evlving struggle, there are n clear signs that the struggle is being lst r wn. Fr example, the number f attacks peaked t sme 700 per week in Octber 2005, befre the Octber 15 th referendum n the cnstitutin cmpared t 430 per week in mid- January. This was mre a functin f insurgent effrts t peak peratins in sensitive perids than any utcme f the fighting. Similarly, the number f US killed has averaged sme 65 per mnth since March The ttal f US killed was 96 in Octber 2005, 84 in Nvember, 68 in December, and 63 in January This reflected shifts in the cycles f attacks and in their targets. US experts estimated that sme 500 Iraqis were killed between the December 15, 2005 electins and mid-january 2006, an average perid in US casualties. 2 The key issue is nt s much the intensity f the fighting, but whether the mre extreme Sunni Islamists can paralyze r defeat the plitical prcess and intensify the level f civil cnflict n all sides. Trends in Late 2005 US and MNF-I fficials prvided the fllwing summary f trends at the time f the December 2005 electins. Despite predictins f majr vilence, there were relatively few attacks by insurgents n the actual day f the Octber 15, cnstitutinal referendum. Acrss the cuntry, mre than nine millin Iraqis vted in 6,000 plling statins. Early estimates put vter turnut at 61% and nly five f the capital s 1,200 plling statins were attacked. Hwever, incidents still ccurred in spite f a halt t nearly all mvement by nnmilitary and nn-gvernmental vehicles, and placing peak levels f Calitin and Iraqi security frces n duty. Vilence returned in late Octber, and shws n sign f leveling ff befre the December electins. Sunni participatin in the December 15, 2005 was higher than during the cnstitutinal referendum and Sunni turnut in the Octber referendum was higher than anticipated. Mst plitical parties did, hwever, divide alng sectarian and ethnic lines. The new Cuncil f Representatives had 275 seats and the final results fr the electin awarded the fllwing numbers t the main parties: United Iraq Alliance (Shi ites) 128 seats, Kurdish calitin 53, The Iraqi List (Secular Allawi list ) 25, Iraqi Accrdance Frnt (Sunnis)

4 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page iv 44; Iraqi frnt fr Natinal Dialgue (Sunni) 11. Amng the majr parties, the Shi ites wn 47% f the 275 seats; the Kurds wn 19%, the Sunnis wn 20%, and Allawi s secular natinalist wn 9%. Accrding t CENTCOM, 90 percent f the insurgency was Iraqi and Sunni, with a maximum f 10 percent freign cntributin t insurgent manpwer. 3 While relatively small, this freign element was recgnized as almst exclusively Sunni, a particularly vilent segment f the insurgency, and idelgically driven by Ne-Salafi extremism. Likewise, the freign element is seen as an imprtant surce f mney and materiel supprt t the insurgency. Insurgent attacks against Iraqi security frces began t increase dramatically during the final mnths f This trend cntinued int 2005, when, fllwing the January 30 electins, insurgents began t g after sfter, easier Iraqi targets rather than the well trained and well equipped US frces. An increase in attacks n Iraqi security frces cincided with an increase in attacks n infrastructure targets. Oil pipelines in the nrthern part f the cuntry have cme under repeated attacks in recent mnths. The pipelines, linking il fields in Kirkuk t Iraq s largest il refinery in Beiji and the Turkish prt f Cheyhan, were disrupted mre than half-a-dzen times during September and Octber Targeted plitical assassinatins als appeared t be increasing during the summer and fall f Ppular targets include lcal plitical and religius leaders, the heads f lcal plice frces and ministry fficials frm Baghdad. These attacks intensified in the weeks leading up t December 15 electins. In additin t assassinatins aimed at disrupting the judicial and plitical prcess, insurgents have carried ut assassinatins f religius leaders as part f their larger gal f using sectarian vilence t prvke a civil war. There appeared t be an up-turn in these assassinatins in late summer and early fall The number f insurgent attacks against msques and religius gatherings als increased during this perid. As has happened in the past befre electins, an upsurge in vilence in late Nvember 2005 marked a deliberate attempt by insurgents t disrupt the Iraqi plitical prcess, specifically the upcming December 15 parliamentary electins. But the escalatin f sectarian vilence was als in respnse t the Nvember 13 discvery f 173 mstly Sunni malnurished and abused detainees in an Interir Ministry building in Baghdad. The US discvery f a secret trture center administered by Shi ite-led gvernment security frces sparked renewed sectarian vilence and led t a number f tit-fr-tat murders in late Nvember. Attacks against freigners in Iraq were n the rise. Insurgents resumed their kidnappings f freigners in the fall f 2005, after almst a year f calm. During Octber and Nvember, insurgents kidnapped at least seven freigners (2 Mrccans; 2 Canadians; 1 Brit; 1 American; and 1 German). The tactic appears t have peaked in late 2004 hwever. Trends in Early 2006 The December 15, 2005 electin did n mre t stabilize the situatin and limited the insurgency than the transfer f pwer frm the CPA t the Iraqi interim gvernment in June 2004, r any f the ther electins that fllwed. MNF-I intelligence estimates that the number f insurgent attacks n calitin frces, Iraqi frces, Iraqi civilians and acts f sabtage rse by 29% in The ttal rse frm 26,496 in 2004 t 34,131 in These attacks have had a relatively cnsistent average success rate f 24% (attacks that cause damage r casualties.) 5 Put differently, the average number f attacks per mnth in the Calitin cunt (which tended t sharply undercunt attacks n Iraqi civilians) rse frm an average f arund 750 in late 2004 t a peak f nearly 3,000 in Octber 2005, and was 2,500 in December The average had been well ver 2,000 per mnth frm April 2004 nwards. 6 At the same time, MNF-I data d reflect a cntinuing shift twards attacks n Iraqis, rather than Calitin trps. A ttal f 673 US trps were killed in 2005, versus 714 in 2004, and the number f wunded drpped frm 7,990 t 5,639, a drp f 29%. 7 US frces saw fewer casualties largely because mre Iraqi frces were in the field and there were n majr urban battles like the battle f Fallujah. The number f U.S. casualties als drpped because the

5 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page v insurgents shifted t Iraqi targets that were mre vulnerable and had far mre plitical impact at a pint where it had becme clear that the US and its calitin partners wanted t withdraw many f their frces. The GAO summarized the status f the insurgency as fllws in testimny t Cngress n February 6, 2006, 8 The insurgency intensified thrugh Octber 2005 and has remained strng since then. As we reprted in March 2005, the insurgency in Iraq particularly the Sunni insurgency grew in cmplexity, intensity, and lethality frm June 2003 thrugh early Accrding t a February 2006 testimny by the Directr f Natinal Intelligence, insurgents are using increasingly lethal imprvised explsive devices and cntinue t adapt t calitin cuntermeasures enemy-initiated attacks against the calitin, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure increased in number ver time. The highest peak ccurred during Octber 2005, arund the time f Ramadan and the Octber referendum n Iraq s cnstitutin. This fllwed earlier peaks in August and Nvember 2004 and January Accrding t a senir U.S. military fficer, attack levels ebb and flw as the varius insurgent grups almst all f which are an intrinsic part f Iraq s ppulatin rearm and attack again. As the administratin has reprted, insurgents share the gal f expelling the calitin frm Iraq and destabilizing the Iraqi gvernment t pursue their individual and, at times, cnflicting gals. 7 Iraqi Sunnis make up the largest prtin f the insurgency and present the mst significant threat t stability in Iraq. In February 2006, the Directr f Natinal Intelligence reprted that the Iraqi Sunnis disaffectin is likely t remain high in 2006, even if a brad, inclusive natinal gvernment emerges. These insurgents cntinue t demnstrate the ability t recruit, supply, and attack calitin and Iraqi security frces. Their leaders cntinue t explit Islamic themes, natinalism, and persnal grievances t fuel ppsitin t the gvernment and recruit mre fighters. Accrding t the Directr, the mst extreme Sunni jihadists, such as al-qa ida in Iraq, will remain unrecnciled and cntinue t attack Iraqi and calitin frces. The remainder f the insurgency cnsists f radical Shi'ite grups, sme f whm are supprted by Iran, vilent extremists, criminals, and, t a lesser degree, freign fighters. Accrding t the Directr f Natinal Intelligence, Iran prvides guidance and training t select Iraqi Shi'ite plitical grups and weapns and training t Shi'ite militant grups t enable anti-calitin attacks. Iran als has cntributed t the increasing lethality f anti-calitin attacks by enabling Shi ite militants t build imprvised explsive devices with explsively frmed prjectiles, similar t thse develped by Iran and Lebanese Hezbllah. Changing Patterns in Attacks n Iraqi and Calitin Targets These trends scarcely mean the insurgency is winning, althugh it is hard t dismiss the risk that it may be able t paralyze plitical prgress and create a mre intense civil war. The previus data shw that insurgency has nt been able t increase its success rate, establish sanctuaries, win larger-scale military clashes, r dminate the field. It is active largely in nly fur f Iraq s 18 gvernrates. (Sme 59% f all US military deaths have ccurred in nly tw gvernrates: Al Anbar and Baghdad.) 9 Much f its activity cnsists f bmbings f sft civilian targets designed largely t prvke a mre intense civil war r halt the develpment f an effective Iraqi gvernment, rather than prgress twards cntrl at even the lcal level. S far, the insurgency has dne little t shw it can successfully attack cmbat-ready Iraqi units, as distinguished frm attacks n vulnerable casernes, recruiting areas, trainees r ther relatively easy targets. The insurgents have, hwever, learned and adapted thrugh experience. They have shwn the ability t increase the number f attacks ver time, and they have hit successfully at many imprtant plitical and ecnmic targets. Prvking civil war and undermining the Iraqi plitical prcess may nt bring the insurgents victry, but it can deny it t the Iraqi gvernment and the

6 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page vi US. The Sunni insurgents cntinue t strike successfully at plitically, religiusly, and ethnically imprtant Shi ite and Kurdish targets with suicide and ther large bmbings. The insurgents have cntinued t carry ut a large number f successful killings, assassinatins, kidnappings, extrtins, and expulsins. These have included a significant increase in the number f successful attacks n Iraqi fficials, Iraqi frces, and their families. Well ver 2,700 Iraqi fficials and Iraqi frces were killed in The Department f Defense estimated that 2,603 members f the Iraqi frces had been killed in actin by Octber 2005, far mre than the 1,506 members f US frces that had been killed in actin up t that date. 10 The insurgents cntinue t succeed in intimidating their fellw Sunnis. There is n way t cunt r fully assess the pattern f such lw level attacks, r separate them frm crime r Shi ite reprisals, but n ne dubts that they remain a majr prblem. Suicide attacks have increased, and killed and wunded Iraqis in large numbers. The number f car bmbs rse frm 420 in 2004 t 873 in 2005, the number f suicide car bmbs rse frm 133 t 411, and the number f suicide vest attacks rse frm 7 in 2004 t 67 in In case after case, Shi ite civilians and Sunnis cperating with the gvernment were successfully targeted in ways designed t create a serius civil war. The use f radside bmbs (imprvised explsive devices IEDs) remains a majr prblem fr US and ther Calitin frces. The ttal number f IED attacks nearly dubled frm 5,607 in 2004 t 10,953 in While the success rate f IED attacks drpped significantly, frm 25-30% in 2004 t 10% in 2005, they still had a majr impact. During 2005, there were 415 IED deaths ut f a ttal f 674 cmbat deaths, r 61.6 % f all cmbat deaths. IEDs accunted fr 4,256 wunded ut f a ttal f 5,941, sme 71.6% f the wunded. Frm July 2005 t January 2006, IEDs killed 234 US service members ut f a ttal f 369 ttal cmbat deaths, r 63.4%. They accunted fr 2,314 wunded ut f 2,980 ttal cmbat wunded, r 77.7 %. T put these numbers in perspective, IEDs caused 900 deaths ut f a ttal f 1,748 cmbat deaths, r 51.5 % during the entire pst-saddam fall frm March 2003 and January IEDs caused 9,327 wunded ut f a ttal f 16,606 r 56.2%. 12 Hwever, the numbers f persnnel killed and wunded by IEDs are scarcely the nly measure f insurgent success. Casualties may have drpped but the number f attacks has gne up. IED attacks tie dwn manpwer and equipment, disrupt peratins, disrupt ecnmic and aid activity, and interact with attacks n Iraqi civilians and frces t limit plitical prgress and help try t prvke civil war. One ther pint is wrth nting. There is n evidence as yet that Iraq is smehw a unique magnet fr glbal terrrist activity. It certainly has a pwerful plitical and idelgical impact, and is a key surce f Arab and Islamic anger. The number f freign vlunteers remains s limited, hwever, that Iraq must be regarded as just ne f several areas f Islamic extremist activity thers include Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Chechnya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Yemen. The Ecnmic Side f the Insurgency The insurgents have als cntinued t be successful in attacking the Iraqi ecnmy and the Calitin aid effrt, as well as human targets. They have ften paralyzed aid effrts, particularly in Sunni r mixed areas where such effrts might win ver current r ptential insurgents. They have frced a massive reprgramming f aid int shrt-term, security-riented activity, and well ver 20% f aid spending nw ges simply t prviding security fr aid activity. The attacks have dne much t discurage r reduce investment and develpment even in the mre secure

7 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page vii gvernrates, and have blcked r sharply limited effrts t renvate and imprve Iraq's infrastructure. They have largely prevented effrts t expand Iraq's il exprts -- its key surce f gvernment earnings. Insurgents had carried ut mre than 300 attacks n Iraqi il facilities between March 2003 and January An estimate by Rbert Mullen indicates that there were clse t 500 and perhaps as many as His breakdwn f the number f attacks was: pipelines, 398; refineries, 36; il wells, 18; tanker trucks, 30; il train, 1; strage tanks 4; and 1 tank farm. In additin, there were at least sixty-fur incidents in which the victims were related t Iraq s petrleum sectr, ranging frm high ranking persns in the Oil Ministry t il wrkers at refineries, pipelines, and elsewhere in the sectr, t cntract, military, plice, and tribal security peple. The number killed in these directed attacks reached at least The end result was that il prductin drpped by 8% in 2005, and pipeline shipments thrugh the Iraqi nrthern pipeline t Ceyan in Turkey drpped frm 800,000 barrels per day befre the war t an average f 40,000 barrels per day in In July 2005, Iraqi fficials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cst Iraq sme $11 billin. They had kept Iraqi il prductin frm appraching the 3 millin barrel a day gal in 2005 gal that the Calitin had set after the fall f Saddam Hussein, and prductin had drpped frm pre-war levels f arund 2.5 millin barrels a day t an average f 1.83 millin barrels a day in 2005, and a level f nly 1.57 millin barrels a day in December These successes have majr impact in a cuntry where 94% f the gvernment s direct incme nw cmes frm il exprts. The impact f such attacks has been cmpunded the ability f insurgents t steal il and fuel. The New Yrk Times has quted Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking sme 40 percent t 50 percent f all il-smuggling prfits in the cuntry, and had infiltrated senir management psitins at the majr nrthern refinery in Baji: "It's gne beynd Nigeria levels nw where it really threatens natinal security The insurgents are invlved at all levels." The Times als quted an unidentified US fficial as saying that, "It's clear that crruptin funds the insurgency, s there yu have a very real threat t the new state Crruptin really has the ptential f undercutting the grwth ptential here." The frmer il minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum, had said earlier in 2005 "il and fuel smuggling netwrks have grwn int a dangerus mafia threatening the lives f thse in charge f fighting crruptin." 15 The Changing Risk f Civil War What has changed since the transfer f pwer frm the CPA t interim gvernment in June 2004 is the slw and steady evlutin f the insurgency twards effrts by Sunni Islamist extremist grups t target Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis in ways that prvke civil cnflict. It is imprtant t recgnize that here has been plitical prgress in spite f the vilence. The final results fr the December 15, 2005 electins gave the Sunnis significant representatin, in spite f cmplaints abut fraud. The new Cuncil f Representatives had 275 seats and the final results fr the electin, which were certified n February 9, 2006, gave the main parties the fllwing number f seats: Iraq Alliance (Shi ites), 128 seats; Kurdish calitin, 53; The Iraqi List (Secular Allawi list ), 25; Iraqi Accrdance Frnt (Sunnis), 44; Iraqi frnt fr Natinal Dialgue (Sunni), 11. The Shi ite calitin wn 47% f the 275 seats, the Kurdish calitin wn 21%, the Sunni calitin wn 21%, and Allawi s secular natinalists (with significant Sunni supprt) wn 9%. 16 The final 1% f the seats went t ther parties. 17 As n party wn a gverning majrity f the seats in the parliament, a calitin gvernment will have t be frmed.

8 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page viii Mre than 12 millin Iraqi s vted in the December 2005 electin. Sunni turnut increased markedly frm the January electins. In Nanawa and Salah ad Din, it grew frm 17% and 19% respectively t 70% and 98%. In al-anbar Prvince it grew frm 2% in January t 86% in December. Natinally, vter turnut was 77%, an increase frm 58% in January. 18 Of the 1,985 electin cmplaints received by the Independent Electral Cmmissin f Iraq, nly 3% were cnsidered t have pssibly affected the results. These cmplaints amunted t n mre than 1% f the ttal vte, which was vided and excluded frm the final cunt. 19 If the December 2005 electin des eventually prduce an inclusive natinal plitical structure that gives Iraq s Sunnis incentives t jin the gvernment and plitical prcess, many current Iraqi Sunni insurgents are likely t end their participatin in the insurgency and the mre extreme elements will be defeated. N ne can deny, hwever, that there is a very serius risk that that the plitical prcess will fail. The insurgency has fund new targets and new pprtunities t drive the natin twards a mre intense civil war. The frmatin f a gvernment gives the insurgency a strng incentive t d everything it can t prevent any meaningful unity between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi ite, and t prvke cunter-vilence and attacks by Shi ites that will drive Iraqi Sunnis t supprt the insurgency. It can seek t explit divisins and fault lines within the dminant Shi ite calitin, and try t prvke the Kurds twards increased separatism. S far, the cnstitutinal referendum and the electin f a new Cuncil f Representatives in December 2005 have nt brught added security r stability. They have instead expsed the depth f the sectarian and ethnic divisins in Iraq, and raised serius questins as t whether any frm f unified r inclusive natinal gvernment can be effective. While sme frm f natinal r inclusive calitin gvernment is still likely t be frmed, frming a gvernment will at best be a prelude t new prblems and challenges. The new gvernment will then have t preside ver a plitical prcess that ffers the insurgency a hst f new issues t explit. Once the new Presidency Cuncil, Prime Minister, and full slate f ministers are finally in place, the new gvernment must pass legislatin t clarify and cdify the new cnstitutin. This will invlve a plitical struggle ver sme 55 enabling r implementing laws that are necessary t make the cnstitutin perative. Many are ptentially divisive and give the insurgency pprtunities t paralyze the Iraqi plitical prcess and prvke full-scale civil war. The key issues invlved include: Whether the natin shuld be divided int federal cmpnents by prvince. If this happens, it wuld almst inevitably be alng ethnic and sectarian lines althugh the Kurdish prvinces have many nn-kurdish minrity elements, the Shi ite prvinces ften have large Sunni minrities, and the Sunni prvinces lack il and any ecnmic viability. Sft ethnic cleansing has already begun in many parts f Iraq, including Baghdad. Federalism culd lead t sweeping, vilent struggles ver given areas and ppulatin mvements. Hw the natin s il resurces and revenues shuld be divided and hw new areas shuld be cntrlled and develped. The Kurds lack il reserves in their present areas and clearly want Kirkuk and the nrthern fields. Shi ites in the suth already talk abut cntrlling the bulk f the natin s prven reserves in central and suthern Iraq. The Sunnis have ptential reserves but n immediate assets, and the central gvernment gets virtually all f its revenue frm il exprts. Related issues ver hw t tax and increase Iraq s revenue base, and wh shuld cntrl its revenues. This includes majr debates ver the pwers f the central gvernment, any federal areas, the prvinces, and lcal gvernments.

9 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page ix The future security structure f the cuntry, wh will really cntrl the armed frces and security frces, and cntrl ver prvincial and lcal plice frces. This is cmplicated by a majr gap between the intent f the present cnstitutin and the reality f natinal and lcal militias. It is further cmplicated by the fact that the present frces are dminated by Shi ite and Kurdish elements, and culd divide alng ethnic and sectarian lines if the natin mved twards full-scale civil war. Debates ver the rle f Islamic law in the gvernment and every aspect f civil law. These issues nt nly have the ptential t divide religius and secular Iraqis but als culd lead t struggles ver whether Sunni r Shi ite interpretatins shuld dminate. Bth Sunni and Shi ite Islamist extremists culd resrt t vilence if their views were nt adpted. Basic issues ver gvernance including the resulting pwer f the central gvernment and ministries versus prvincial and lcal pwer. Reslving the future f Baghdad, a deeply divided city exempt frm being included in any federal area and where sft ethnic cleansing and the relcatin f Shi ites and Sunnis has already becme a lw-level civil cnflict. Deciding n hw the cming and future budgets shuld be spent, and hw ecnmic aid and develpment resurces shuld be allcated, in an era where the natinal budget already exceeds revenues, and massive utside freign aid and pls f il fr fd funds will have been expended. Scietal issues clsely linked t religius differences, and basic differences ver the respective rle f secular human rights and law and religius law and custm. Such issues are explsive at the best f times, but the new gvernment and Cuncil f Representatives must act almst immediately t frm a Cnstitutin Review Cmmittee that must try t reslve all f these issues in the middle f an nging insurgency and the risk f civil war lming within a fur-mnth perid f its frmatin. It must then win the supprt f whatever gvernment and mix f the Cuncil f Representatives that exists when it makes its recmmendatins, and if successful, hld a referendum 60 days later. Every element f this prcess ffers new pprtunities t the insurgency if Iraq s plitical prcess divides and falters. Every milestne ffers new incentives t attack, and every leader that mves twards prgress and cmprmise will be a target. A New Fcus n Attacks n Religius Shrines In fact, the insurgents have already intensified their attacks n Shi'ite shrines and prvked a new level f Shi'ite respnse. They scred a majr victry by attacking the Askariya shrine in Samarra, a Shi ite hly landmark, n February 22, They destryed its glden dme, althugh they caused n deaths. Lng befre this attack, there was increasingly dangerus trend twards Shi ite revenge killings, and vilence between Shi'ites and Sunnis had already becme a lw-level civil war. There is n easy way t quantify the scale f such Shi ite attacks and abuses with any precisin, but n ne dubts that they increased significantly after the spring f Even s, the destructin f the shrine, which hused the graves f tw revered Shi ite imams, caused an unprecedented wave f sectarian vilence in Iraq. In the five days that fllwed, sme estimated that ver 1,000 Iraqis were killed, that sme 300 Sunni and Shi'ite msques came under attack, and the cuntry seemed t be n the brink f a large-scale civil war. 20 The Iraqi gvernment and MNF-I have put these ttals at ne-third t ne-half these "wrst case" estimates, but the fact is that n precise numbers exist, and sectarian attacks have cntinued in the weeks that fllwed.

10 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page x Gvernment leaders did call fr calm, and peaceful demnstratins were held acrss the Shi ite dminated suth and in ethnically mixed cities such as Kirkuk. 21 At the same time, many statements by participants and average civilians indicate that Shi ite patience may well be wearing thin. A Shi ite emplyee f the Trade Ministry summed up such views as fllws: Yu have a TV, yu fllw the news wh is mst ften killed? Whse msques are explded? Whse sciety was destryed? Anther Iraqi put it differently: We didn t knw hw t behave. Chas was everywhere. Even the mre mderate Shi ite newspaper, Al Bayyna al Jadidah, urged Shi ites t assert themselves in the face f Sunni vilence. Its editrial stated that it was time t declare war against anyne wh tries t cnspire against us, wh slaughters us every day. It is time t g t the streets and fight thse utlaws. 22 Shi'ite religius leaders als cntinued t call fr calm, but their message was smetimes ambiguus bth in terms f wrds and actins. Fr example, Mqtada Al-Sadr rdered his Mahdi Militia t prtect Shi ite shrines acrss Iraq, and blamed the U.S. and Iraqi gvernment fr failing t prtect the Askariya shrine saying, If the gvernment had real svereignty, then nthing like this wuld have happened. In a speech frm Basra, al-sadr als called fr restraint and unity amngst Iraqi s: I call n Muslims, Sunnis and Shi ites, t be brthers Faith is the strngest weapns, nt arms. He als publicly rdered his listeners t nt attack msques in retaliatin saying, There is n Sunni msques and Shi ite msques, msques are fr all Muslims it is ne Islam and ne Iraq. 23 Despite Sadr s rhetric, hwever, it appeared that his militia was respnsible fr at least sme f the vilence. Amid demnstratins and cndemnatins frm bth Sunni and Shi ite plitical leaders, Shi ite militias such as al-sadr s Mahdi Army sught revenge against Sunni s and carried ut numerus killings and attacks n Sunni msques. Sunni grups reciprcated. Sunni pliticians have since made many charges that Sunni msques in Baghdad and sme suthern cities were attacked r actively ccupied by the Mahdi Army in the days fllwing the attacks. 24 The Assciatin f Muslim Schlars, a hard-line Sunni clerical rganizatin, alleged n Thursday that 168 Sunni msques were attacked, 10 imams killed and 15 abducted. 25 The assciatin als made direct appeals t al-sadr t intervene and stp the vilence, apparently suspecting he was a primary crdinatr f the Shi ite attacks. In early March hwever, U.S. gvernment estimates put the number f msque attacks at 33, nly nine f which were destryed r sustained significant damage. 26 In sme Sunni areas, residents, fearing attacks n their msques, erected barricades and std watch. In Al Malimin district, armed men patrlled the rf f the Sunni msque Malik bin Anas. 27 There is n dubt that the attack and its aftermath threatened prgress in frming an inclusive gvernment. Iraqi plitical figures called n the cuntry t recgnize that the attack was an attempt t create a civil war and urged Iraqi s t be calm. President Jalal Talabani said the day f the attacks, We are facing a majr cnspiracy that is targeting Iraq s unity we shuld all stand hand in hand t prevent the danger f a civil war. President Bush eched these sentiments saying, The terrrists in Iraq have again prven that they are enemies f all faiths and f all humanity the wrld must stand united against them, and steadfast behind the peple f Iraq. 28 The vilence resulted in the annuncement by the dminant Sunni party that it wuld suspend talks t frm a calitin gvernment and issued a list f demands. The immediate attentin given t these demands by the Iraqi gvernment, and a telephne call frm President Bush t the leaders f the seven majr plitical factins urging them t reinstitute talks, brught Sunnis back t a meeting with their Shi ite and Kurdish cunterparts. Later that evening, Prime Minister al-

11 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xi Jaafari, accmpanied by the leaders f the ther majr calitins, annunced at a press cnference that that cuntry wuld nt allw itself t engage in civil war and that this was a mment f terrific plitical symblism. 29 The reactin f Iraqi security, military and plice units t the sectarian vilence that fllwed the bmbing f the Askariya shrine was cnsidered by sme in the U.S. and Iraq t be a test in hw well these frces culd prvide security fr their wn cuntry in a crises. Opinins differ greatly, hwever, ver whether ISF frces passed this test. The MNF-I has claimed the armed frces played a majr rle in limiting and halting sectarian vilence. Others have claimed they ften allwed Shi'ite grups t attack Sunni msques, and that the security frces and plice did little t calm the vilence. The data that have emerge since the attack tend t supprt many f the MNF-I claims, but the risks f grwing divisins in the Iraqi frces, and a tilt twards the Shi'ite and Kurdish side remain all t real. Sme claim that Iraq has already reached the precipice f civil war, seen the dire cnsequences, and sberly held itself back. These individuals read events in late February as a turning pint fr Iraq. Fr thers, the recent sectarian vilence is a mre limited tipping pint tward a deepening civil cnflict. In balance, the risks have clearly increased, but it may well be t sn fr pessimistic predictins. Iraqis may have drifted tward mre intense civil cnflict, but the levels f vilence are still cmparatively limited. Mrever, fr all f the plitical risks, there are pprtunities as well and many Iraqis in every sectarian and ethnic factin understand the real pssibility f further escalatin and its ptential cnsequence f dividing the cuntry. Insurgent Tactics and Gals If ne turns t the tactical level, many f the trends are clearer. The Sunni part f insurgency has becme the equivalent f a distributed netwrk: a grup f affiliated and unaffiliated mves with well-rganized cells. It is extremely difficult t attack and defeat because it des nt have unitary r chesive structure r a rigid hierarchy within the larger mvements. The larger mvements seem t have leadership, planning, financing, and arming cadres kept carefully separate frm mst peratinal cells in the field. Accrdingly, defeating a given cell, reginal peratin, r even small rganizatin des nt defeat the insurgency althugh it can weaken it. The insurgency has effectively fund a frm f lw technlgy "swarm" tactics that is superir t what the high technlgy Calitin and Iraqi frces have been able t find as a cunter. It can mve slwly, in cycles, and episdically, cncentrating n highly vulnerable targets at the time f its chsing. Media cverage, wrd f muth, and penetratin int Calitin and Iraqi gvernment peratins prvides bth intelligence and a gd picture f what tactics wrk in military, plitical, and media terms. Mvements can "swarm" slwly arund targets f pprtunity, and rely n pen surce reprting fr much f their intelligence and knwledge f cmbat effectiveness. The Internet and infiltratin frm ther natins gives them knwledge f what tactics wrk frm ther areas. The ability t "swarm" against vulnerable civil and military targets at the time f the insurgent's chsing, and fcus n plitical and media effects sharply reduces the need t fight battles -- particularly if the dds are against the insurgents. The insurgency perates bth abve and belw the level f Calitin and Iraqi cnventinal superirity. It avids battles when it can, and prefers ambushes and IED attacks that strike at Calitin and Iraqi targets with either great superirity at the lcal level r thrugh remte attacks using IEDs. It attacks vulnerable Iraqi and freign civil targets using suicide bmbings, kidnappings, assassinatins, and ther tactics in ways that the Calitin and Iraqi frces cannt anticipate r fully defend against. It takes advantage f substantial ppular supprt in Sunni areas t disperse and hide amng the ppulatin, frcing the Calitin and Iraqi frces t use tactics and detainments that ften alienate the peple in the areas where they attack r attempt t detain insurgents, while still allwing the insurgents t disperse and escape. These tactics deprive the Calitin and Iraqi frces f much f their ability t explit superir weapns, IS&R assets, and cnventinal war fighting expertise, and use a cuntervailing strategy fcused n Calitin and Iraqi

12 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xii gvernment weaknesses. Calitin and Iraqi frces are adapting but are still ften frced t fight the insurgency n the insurgency's terms. The insurgency attacks abve the level f Calitin and Iraqi cnventinal superirity by expliting a diverse mix f past lyalty t the Ba'ath Party, Sunni sectarianism and fears f the lss f pwer and resurces, Iraqi natinalism against freign ccupiers and Iraq "puppets," and Islam against sectarianism. Its attacks are designed t wear dwn the Calitin frces thrugh attritin and destry their base f dmestic plitical supprt. They are als designed paralyze the Iraqi gvernment and frce develpment effrt, t prevent Iraqi Sunnis frm jining the Iraqi frces and supprting the gvernment, t prvke Shi'ite and Kurdish reactins that will further divide the cuntry alng ethnic and sectarian lines, and -- in sme cases -- prvke a civil war that will bth prevent Iraq emerging as a natin and divide in ways that will create a natinal and eventual reginal struggle between ne-salafi Islamic Puritanism and ther Sunnis, Shi'ites, and secular vices. This plitical battle is mre imprtant t the success r failure f the insurgency than any aspect f the military battle. The Shi ite and Kurdish side f the insurgency assumes a far mre indirect rle, and is mre an actr in the lw-level civil war than a player in the insurgency, but presents a serius prblem. Shi ite elements f the lcal plice and Ministry f the Interir are attacking Sunnis and cmmitting serius abuses. The Kurds are expliting their cntrl f the three prvinces that made up the Kurdish enclave under Saddam Hussein in ways that give them advantages ver ther ethnic grups in the regin, and present the threat f sft ethnic cleansing in the area f Kirkuk. The inclusiveness f the natinal gvernment is at risk, as is the effrt t create truly natin Iraqi frces. Prbable Outcmes The psitive side is that Shi'ite, Kurdish, and sme key Sunni leaders still actively wrk fr a united Iraq. Mre and mre Iraqi frces are cming n-line, playing an active rle, and taking ver their wn battlespace. The insurgency s far lacks majr freign supprt, althugh it des get limited amunts f mney, weapns, and freign fighters. It des nt have the supprt f mst Shi'ites and Kurds, wh make up sme 70-80% f the ppulatin. If Iraqi frces becme effective in large numbers, if the Iraqi gvernment demnstrates that its success means the phase ut f Calitin frces, and if the Iraqi gvernment remains inclusive in dealing with Sunnis willing t cme ver t its side, the insurgency shuld be defeated ver time -- althugh sme cadres culd then perate as diehards at the terrrist level fr a decade r mre. The negative side is that there is a serius risk f full-scale civil war. The effrts f the insurgents t divide Iraq alng sectarian and ethnic lines are having sme success and are leading t Shi'ite and Kurdish reprisals that are causing fear and anger amng Sunnis. Shi'ite and Kurdish federalism, mixed with the rise f Shi'ite religius factins and militias, can divide the cuntry. The Iraqi plitical prcess is unstable and uncertain, and parties and fficials are nw identified (and identifying themselves) largely by sect and ethnicity. Severe ethnic and sectarian divisins exist inside the gvernment at the natinal, reginal, and lcal levels. Ppular supprt fr the Calitin presence in Iraq is nw a distinct minrity in every Calitin cuntry. In shrt, the dds f insurgent success at best are even. Iraq culd degenerate int full-scale civil cnflict r remain divided and/r unstable fr sme years t cme. There already is limited ppular supprt in the US and Britain fr a cntinued military rle and majr new aid prgrams, and cntinued plitical turmil r serius civil war culd make a cntinued Calitin presence untenable and drive US and British frces ut f Iraq. It seems likely that the US will have t slw its plans t reduce its military presence, adjust t new threats, and intensify its effrts t shape effective security and plice frces if it is t deal with the grwing risk f civil cnflict

13 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xiii during the perid in which the new gvernment must cme t grips with all f the issues raised by the cnstitutin -- a perid which nw seems likely t last until at least September f Much depends n the success f the Iraqi plitical prcess fllwing the December 15th electin, hw Iraqis deal with the range f issues raised by the Cnstitutinal referendum and need fr actin n its utcme nce a new gvernment takes ffice. Much als depends n hw well Iraqi frces succeed in becming effective at bth the military and plitical level, and in replacing Calitin frces. Finally, much depends n the ability f the new Iraqi gvernment t take respnsibility fr what happens in Iraq, lead effectively, and establish effective plice and gvernment services in the field -- all areas where previus Iraqi gvernments have been weak. There is als a cntinuing pssibility that the insurgency will drive Iraq's plitical and religius leaders and varius elements f the Iraqi frces int warring Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish factins. Even the mst cmmitted leaders may be frced t abandn the search fr a natinal and inclusive plitical structure if sectarian and ethnic fighting escalates ut f cntrl. Thse that d nt, may be replaced by far mre extreme vices. The new Iraqi frces can divide alng ethnic and sectarian lines and much f the plice and security frces already are divided in this way. There is als a risk that Iraq culd bring in utside pwers supprting given factins. Iran supprting Iraqi Shi'ites, the Arab Sunni states supprting Iraq Sunnis, with the Kurds left largely islated and facing increasing prblems with the Turks. Any precipitus Calitin withdrawal wuld greatly encurage this pssibility. The Lessns f Cmplexity, Uncertainty, and Risk Whatever happens, the US and its allies need t cnsider the lessns f the "war after the war" in Iraq. One key lessn is the need fr ruthless bjectivity and t accept the plitical and military cmplexity f cunterinsurgency. Far t ften, plicymakers, analysts, and intelligence experts apprach the subject f cunterinsurgency by trying t versimplify the situatin, underestimate the risks, and exaggerate the level f cntrl they can achieve ver the curse and ultimate strategic utcme f the war. They try t deny bth cmplexity f mst cunterinsurgency campaigns, and the full range f issues that must be dealt with. In ding s, many try t brrw frm past wars r histrical examples, and they talk abut lessns, as if a few simple lessns frm ne cnflict culd be transferred easily t anther. The end result is that -- far t ften -- they end up rediscvering the same ld failed slgans and ver simplificatins and trt ut all the same ld case histries withut really examining hw valid they are. There is a great deal t be learned frm past wars if the lessns are carefully chsen and adapted as ptential insights int a new cnflict rather than transferable paradigms. The Iraq War, hwever, is nt the Afghan War, much less Ma, Malaysia, Vietnam, Nrthern Ireland, and the Israeli-Palestinian cnflict. There is nthing t be gained frm effrts t revive the same ld tactical and technical slutins, withut remembering past failures. Oil spts, hearts and minds, Special Frces, walls and barriers, and sensr nets are just a few examples f such effrts that have been applied t the Iraq War.

14 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xiv The Need Fr Accurate Planning and Risk Assessment Much has been made f the intelligence failures in assessing Iraqi weapns f mass destructin. These failures pale t insignificance, hwever, in cmparisn with the failure f US plicy and military planners t accurately assess the verall situatin in Iraq befre engaging in war, and fr the risk f insurgency if the US did nt carry ut an effective mix f natin building and stability peratins. This failure cannt be made the respnsibility f the intelligence cmmunity. It was the respnsibility f the President, the Vice President, the Natinal Security Advisr, the Secretary f State, the Sectary f Defense, and the Chairman f the Jint Chiefs. All had the respnsibility t bring tgether plicymakers, military planners, intelligence experts, and area experts t prvide as accurate a picture f Iraq and the cnsequences f an invasin as pssible. Each failed t exercise that respnsibility. The natin s leading plicymakers chse t act n a limited and highly idelgical view f Iraq that planned fr ne extremely ptimistic definitin f success, but nt fr risk r failure. There was n real planning fr stability peratins. Key plicymakers did nt want t engage in natin building and chse t believe that remving Saddam Hussein frm pwer wuld leave the Iraqi gvernment functining and intact. Plans were made n the basis that significant elements f the Iraqi armed frces wuld turn t the Calitins side, remain passive, r put up nly tken resistance. N real effrt was made t ensure cntinuity f gvernment r stability and security in Iraq s majr cities and thrughut the cuntryside. Decades f serius sectarian and ethnic tensin were dwnplayed r ignred. Actins by Saddam Hussein s regime that had crippled Iraq s ecnmic develpment since the early years f the Iran-Iraq War at time when Iraq had nly millin peple were ignred. Iraq was assumed t be an il wealthy cuntry whse ecnmy culd quickly recver if the il fields were nt burned, and transfrm itself int a mdern capitalist structure in the prcess. The natin s mst senir military cmmanders cmpunded these prblems by planning fr the cnventinal defeat f the enemy and an early exit frm Iraq, by making a deliberate effrt t avid Phase IV and stability peratins. The fact they did s t minimize the strain n the US frce psture, and the waste f US trps n lw pririty missins played a majr rle in creating the cnditins under which insurgency culd develp and flurish. The intelligence cmmunity and civilian and military area experts may nt have predicted the exact nature f the insurgency that fllwed. Analysis is nt prphecy. They did, hwever, prvide ample warning that this was a risk that Iraqi exiles were ften failing t prvide a balanced r accurate picture, and natin building wuld be bth necessary and extremely difficult. The natin s tp plicymakers chse t bth ignre and discurage such warnings as negative and exaggerated, and t plan fr success. They did s having seen the disintegratin f Yugslavia and the sectarian and ethnic prblems f Afghanistan. T succeed, the US must plan fr failure as well as success. It must see the develpment r escalatin f insurgency as a serius risk in any cntingency were it is pssible, and take preventive and nging steps t prevent r limit it. This is an essential aspect f war planning and n Chairman f the Jint Chiefs, service chief, r unified and specified cmmander can be excused fr failing t plan and act in this area. Respnsibility begins directly at the tp, and failures at any ther level pale t insignificance by cmparisn.

15 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xv This is even truer because tp-level plicymakers failed t recgnize r admit the scale f the prblem as it develped. Their failures were as much failures f reactin as predictin r cntingency planning, and failures t accurately assess and react t nging events are far less excusable. There were n mysteries invlving the scale f the cllapse f the Iraqi gvernment and security frces within days f the fall f Saddam Hussein. The reactin was slw, inadequate, and shaped by denial f the seriusness f the prblem. This situatin did nt imprve until mre than a year after the fall Saddam s regimes, and at least six mnths after it became apparent that a serius insurgency was develping. Majr resurces did nt flw int the creatin f effective Iraqi frces until the fall f The US aid effrt behaved fr nearly a year and a half as if insurgency was truly a small grup f diehards r terrrists. Even in late 2005, tp US civilian plicymakers split hairs ver semantics t try t even avid the wrd insurgency, failed t perceive that many Sunni Arab Iraqis see such an insurgency has legitimate causes, and chse t largely publicly ignre the risks f civil cnflict and the develping prblems in Shi ite frces and plitical structures. The US denied risks and realities f the Vietnam War. Eurpean pwers initially denied the realities that frced them t end their clnial rle. Israel denied the risks and realities f striking deep int Lebann and seeking t create a Christian-dminated allied state. Russia denied the risks and realities f Chechnya in spite f all the brutal lessns f having denied the risk and realities f Afghanistan. The failure t learn the need fr accurate characterizatin f the natin and regin where cunterinsurgency may -- r des -- exist seems t be a cnstant lessn f why natins g t and stay at war. The failure t plan fr risk and failure as well as success is equally significant. Ruthless bjectivity is the cheapest slutin t be preventing and limiting insurgency, and planning and deplying fr the full range f stability peratins and natin building is an essential precautin wherever the stakes are high and the risk is significant. The Limits f "Oil Spts" The "il spt" thery, fr example, is useful if it simply means securing key ppulated areas and allwing lcal gvernance t becme effective and peple t feel secure enugh t see the insurgents as defeatable. Winning hearts and minds des nt mean persuading peple t accept cnstant daily threats and vilence. The creatin f safe areas is critical. Success in Iraq, and many ther campaigns, will depend heavily n finding the right trade-ffs between creating safe areas and aggressively pursuing the enemy t prevent the insurgents frm creating safe areas f their wn and attacking the safe area f the Iraqi gvernment and Calitin. At a different level, hwever, il spts are simply ne mre slgan in a lng list f such appraches t cunterinsurgency. Iraq is nt atypical f many insurgencies in the fact that the key areas where insurgencies are active are als centers f ethnic and sectarian tensin, and that the insurgency within these areas is als a lw-level civil war. In cities like Baghdad and Msul, the mst imprtant ptential il spts, it simply is nt practical t try t separate the cnstant risk f mre intense civil cnflict frm defeating the insurgency. Sectarian and ethnic cnflict has intensified in spite f lcal security effrts, and a cncept that ultimately failed in Vietnam is in many ways simply nt applicable t Iraq. Neither ptin can really be chsen ver the ther. Wrse, in a highly urbanized cuntry where many majr urban areas and their surrundings have mixed ppulatins and the insurgency can explit serius ethic and sectarian tensins -- creating cherent safe areas in majr cities can be

16 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xvi difficult t impssible. Rapid actin tends t frce the US t chse ne sect r ethnic grup ver thers. It als presents majr tactical prblems in the many mixed areas including Iraq's majr cities. It is far frm clear whether it is even pssible t guard any area against wellplanned cvert IED and suicide bmbing attacks, r make it feel secure unless enugh plitical cmprmise has already taken place t d a far better jb f depriving insurgent f ppular supprt. Creating secure "il spts" in sectarian and ethnic based insurgencies like the Iraqi War als requires effective lcal gvernance and security frces. US and allied Calitin frces cannt create secure areas because they are seen as ccupiers and lack the area expertise, language skills, HUMINT, and stable persnal cntacts t knw if the insurgents are present r the area is really secure. Iraq is a gd example f a case where an ally may be able t eventually make areas secure, but where the plitical dimensin is critical, and Calitin frces cannt slve either the security r plitical prblem withut a lcal ally's aid. The Limits f Technlgy and Western "Swarm" Techniques An hnest assessment f the insurgent Iraq War, and particularly f its plitical and idelgical dimensins, als illustrates that technlgy is nt a panacea even fr the warfighting part f the cnflict. This is particularly true when the insurgency is far mre "human-centric" than netcentric and when insurgency is mixed with civil ethnic and sectarian cnflict Fr example, sensrs, UAV, and IS&R can have great value in Iraq, just as they did in Vietnam and Suth Lebann, but they are anything but magic bullets. The unattended grund sensr prgram in Vietnam was nce tuted as such a magic bullet but tk less than a year t defeat. Decades later, the Israelis tried using UAVs and unattended grund sensrs in Suthern Lebann, and develped a remarkable amunt f statistical evidence and technical data t indicate a mre mdern apprach wuld wrk. In practices, the IDF's effrts led Hezbllah t develp mre sphisticated tactics and IEDs at a fractin f the cst f the Israeli detectin and defense effrt, and Israel was eventually defeated. Bth experiences are warnings abut the limits f technlgy. At a different level, the infrmal distributed netwrks and "swarming" f the Iraqi insurgents is a serius warning abut the limits f technlgy-based effrts t rely n high technlgy frmal netwrks and "swarming" f the kind Australia chse in its Cmplex Warfighting dctrine, and effrts t use small, semi-autnmus cmbat elements that can suddenly cme tgether and "swarm" an enemy cncentratin with a mix f different jint frce elements integrated by mdern IS&R systems and battle management. This may wrk where the insurgency is small, and where the ppulatin is neutral, favrable t the utside frce, and/r hstile t the insurgents. The Iraq War shws that it has very acute limits in a mre mdern state where plitical and military cnditins are far less favrable. 30 The same is true f the British Future Land Operating Cncept (FLOC) and s-called C-DICT (Cuntering Disrder, Insurgency, Criminality and Terrrism) apprach. It is certainly wise t adpt a "system centric" apprach that cmbines the human element, all elements f jint frces, and tailred IS&R and battle management. But, this is n slutin t frce density prblems r the challenges raised by an insurgency that can still attack bth belw and abve the level f peratins that FLOC frces can use. It is a useful tl, but scarcely an answer t idelgical and plitical warfare where the insurgent perates against different targets at a different pace, and large elements f the ppulatin supprt the insurgency and/r are hstile t the

17 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xvii cunterinsurgents. Under these cnditins, a freign frce with a different culture and religin can use such an apprach t aid a lcal ally but cannt win n their wn. The US Army and Marine Crps apprach t "distributed peratins," and appraches t "cunterinsurgency," "small wars," "a mdular army," and "pacificatin" cme up against the same basic prblem in a case like Iraq. Like the Australian and British appraches, they can have value under the right cnditins. They becme dangerus and self-defeating, hwever, the mment tactics and technlgy becme ends in themselves, and the dminance f plitical and cultural factrs are ignred. Ma's descriptin f the peple as a sea that insurgents can swim in, indistinguishable frm all thse arund them, is n universal truth but it is a warning that in many cases, nly allied frces and allied gvernance can prevent the utside frce frm lsing t a vastly cheaper and smaller frce simply because it is perceived as a crusader r ccupier and the insurgency des nt face an effective lcal gvernment r mix f lcal frces. The Undrainable Swamp These plitical risks illustrate anther lessn that Iraq teaches abut bth cunterinsurgency and cunterterrrism. Many analysts have suggested that the key t victry is t remve the causes f terrrism r insurgency, t remve ppular supprt fr such mvements and give terrrists and/r insurgents incentives t jin civil sciety. In shrt, t drain the swamp. The fundamental wisdm f such an apprach is undeniable, but everything depends upn its feasibility. In Iraq s case, in Vietnam, and in many ther cases, the prblem is that the US cannt drain the swamp. It is dealing with a freign cuntry, different religins and idelgies, and different gals and values. It is perceived by a significant percentage f the peple as an invader, ccupier, ne-clnial pwer, crusader, r simply as selfishly serving its wn strategic interests. Language alne presents serius prblems, and American public diplmacy is t ethncentric t be effective. The US can encurage plitical, ecnmic, and scial refrm, but cannt implement it. Like Iraqis, peple must find their wn leaders, plitical structures, and methds f gvernance. The US lacks basic cmpetence in the ecnmics f natin building in scieties whse ecnmic structures, ability t execute refrms and prjects, and perceived values differ significantly frm its wn. Different cultures, human rights practices, legal methds, and religius practices can be influenced t evlve in ways the US sees as psitive, but there are n universal values, and the US cannt shape a different natin, culture, r religin. In many cases, the sheer scale f the prblem is als a majr factr. Demgraphic, ethnic, and sectarian prblems can take a generatin r mre t fully slve. Decades f ecnmic failure, neglect, and discriminatin can als take a decade r mre t fix. A lack f rule f law, wrking human rights, pragmatic and experienced leaders and plitical parties cannt be fixed by a few years f utside aid and educatin. It shuld be stressed that this in n way means that the US cannt exert tremendus influence during a majr cunterinsurgency r cunterterrrism campaign, r that the US shuld nt seek refrm and change. But, the swamp will almst always be undrainable unless a hst gvernment and pwer-set f lcal plitical mvements drives the prcess. Religius, cultural, and idelgical refrm must cme largely frm within. The lcal ppulace must see the reasn fr ecnmic refrm, and believe in it enugh t act. Gvernance and security must be largely lcal t be perceived as legitimate. Equally imprtant, if the swamp can be drained, the prcess will

18 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xviii generally take s lng that a US cunterinsurgency campaign will be lst r wn lng befre the prcess is cmpleted. The US failed t act n these realities in Vietnam. It began the Iraq War by rejecting them, and greatly strengthened the insurgency in the prcess while wasting critical mnths befre it made effective effrts t help the Iraqis help themselves. Mre than tw years after the end f the war, it still has nt shaped an aid prcess fcused arund the Iraqis, lcal methds, lcal needs, and lcal methds and executin. Part f an effective cunterinsurgency strategy is t hnestly assess all f the underlying causes that sustain an insurgency, knw what the US can credibly hpe t d t address them, understand that the US will nly be effective if lcal leaders can help themselves, and face the fact that s much time will be needed t fully deal with such prblems that the US can nrmally nly hpe t start the prcess f refrm and remving underlying causes during the duratin f mst cunterinsurgency campaigns. The Limits f Cheerleading and Self-Delusin There is n way t avid the fg f war, but there is n reasn t make it a self-inflicted wund. Cunterinsurgency cannt be fught n the basis f plitical slgans, fficial dctrine, idelgy, and effrts t spin the situatin in the mst favrable terms. Unless warfighters and plicymakers hnestly address the cmplexity, unique characteristics, and risks and csts f a given cnflict, they inevitably cme up with slutins that, as the ld jke states, are simple, quick and wrng. Histry shws all t clearly that this simple, quick and wrng apprach is hw Americans have created far t many past prblems in US freign plicy, and that it is a disastrus recipe fr war. In retrspect, fewer US failures ccurred because it lacked fresight, than because it culd nt resist praising itself fr prgress that did nt really exist and chsing simplicity at the expense f reality. T use anther ld jke, Iraq is anther case where Americans have tended t treat cunterinsurgency as if were a third marriage, a triumph f hpe ver experience. The prir histry f the insurgency shws that the US began by underestimating the scale f the prblems it really had t face and just hw many resurces, hw much time, and hw expensive in dllars and bld the cst wuld be. Cunterinsurgency campaigns cannt be based n hpe and best cases if the US wants t win. American plicy and military planners have t examine all f the variables, priritize, and be very careful abut the real-wrld imprtance f any risks and issues they dismiss. They must be ready fr the near certainty f majr prblems and grss failure in unanticipated areas. The reality is that cunterinsurgency warfare is almst always a wrst case r natins like the US wuld nt becme invlved in it in the first place. The US and ther Western states becme invlved in cunterinsurgency because an ally has failed, because a friendly natin has failed r because diplmacy and freign plicy have failed. Almst by definitin, cunterinsurgency means things have already gne seriusly wrng. The New Fg f War and the "Law f Unattended Cnsequences" Iraq is ne mre illustratin f the reality that the "fg f war" evlves at the same rate as technlgy and tactics. Regardless f success in battle, n cuntry can affrd t ignre the fact that the curse and utcme f cunterinsurgency wars is inevitably affected by the "law f unintended cnsequences." Risk analysis is remarkably difficult, because risk analysis is based n what we think we knw ging in, and that set f perceptins almst invariably prves t be seriusly wrng ver time. Bth allies and enemies evlve in unpredictable ways. Plitical,

19 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xix scial and ecnmic cnditins change inside the zne f cnflict in ways the US and its allies cannt anticipate. Wars braden in terms f the plitical impact n regins and ur glbal psture. Cnflict terminatin prves t be difficult t impssible, r the real-wrld utcme ver time becmes very different frm the utcme negtiatrs thught wuld happen at the time. The reality prves far mre dynamic and uncertain than is predicted ging in; the fight requires far mre time and resurces necessary t accmplish anything than peratrs plan fr. All planning fr cunterinsurgency warfare must be based n the understanding that there is n way t eliminate all such uncertainties, and mistakes will inevitably be made that g far beynd the nes that are the result f plitical bias r idelgy. There are sme wh wuld believe that if nly planners and analysts culd wrk withut plitical bias r interference, this wuld slve mst f cunterinsurgency prblems. In reality, even the best planners and analysts will face majr prblems regardless f their plitical and military leadership. The scale f ignrance and uncertainty will inevitably be t great when we enter mst cunterinsurgency cntingencies. The US and its allies must accept this as part f the price f ging t war. It is frightening t lk back at the almst endless reams f analyses, plans, and slutins that peple advanced in war clleges, think tanks and universities during the Vietnam War, El Salvadr and Lebann. Vietnam may have represented the nadir f American analysis, planning, and bjectivity. Hwever, Smalia, the Daytn accrds, and Iraq als represented a failure t analyze the situatin prperly. Even when the US analyzed well, it failed t translate this analysis int effective cunterinsurgency plans and peratinal capabilities within the interagency prcess. Mrever, time and again, the US drifted int trying t win in tactical terms rather than fcusing n hw it culd achieve the desired natinal, reginal, and grand strategy utcme. It frgt that it is nly the endgame that cunts, and nt the means. It als frgets that slgans and rhetric, idelgy, and a failure t fully survey and assess ultimately all becme a surce f self-inflicted wunds r friendly fire. The Lessn f Strategic Indifference; Of Knwing When t Play -- and When Nt t Play, the Cunterinsurgency Game The seriusness f the insurgency in Iraq, and the csts and risks impsed by such a cmparatively small insurgent frce with s many tactical limitatins, als raise a lessn the US seem t repeatedly learn at the end f cunterinsurgency campaigns and then perpetually frget in entering int the next cnflict. Nt every game is wrth playing, and smetimes the best way t win is nt t play at all even if this des mean years f instability and accepting the uncertainties f civil cnflict It is far easier t blunder int a war like the Iraq War than blunder ut. It is easy t dismiss the risks f becming bgged dwn in lcal plitical strife, ignre the risks f cunterinsurgency, and civil cnflict, dwnplay ecnmic and security risks, and mischaracterize the situatin by seeing the military side f interventin as t easy and the plitical need fr actin as t great. It is far t easy t exaggerate the threat. It is equally easy t bth exaggerate the ability f a cunterinsurgency campaign t achieve a desired strategic utcme and ignre the fact that histry is ften perfectly capable f slving a prblem if the US des nt intervene.

20 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xx Persnal anecdtes can lead t dangerus vergeneralizatins, but they can als have value. A few years ag, I tured Vietnam, and saw frm the Vietnamese side their visin f what had happened in the war. There were many tactical and plitical lessns I drew frm that experience, ne f which was hw thrughly we ignred what was happening t Buddhist perceptins and supprt at the plitical level while we cncentrated n the tactical situatin and the plitics f Saign. The lessn I fund mst striking, hwever, was seeing the grand strategic utcme f the war as measured by even the mst trivial metrics. I bught a bttle f mineral water in Hani airprt and discvering that n the frnt label it said USA Water, while its back label stated that it had been prcessed thrugh a 14-step prcess develped by NASA. When I lked at the ty cunter, I saw that the bulk f tys cnsisted f US fighters r fighters with US marking. When I walked ver t the news cunter, I saw the Investr s Jurnal in Vietnamese and English. This was after being tld repeatedly hw glad the Vietnamese were that we stayed in Asia as a deterrent t China. We were right in many ways abut the dmin thery, we just frgt that dmines culd fall in tw directins. Is Cunterinsurgency the Right Means t the End? This raises anther lessn the US needs t carefully evaluate in dealing with future security prblems and crises. Even if the game is wrth playing, cunterinsurgency may nt be the way t play it, particularly if the natin is divided alng sectarian, ethnic, r tribal lines in ways where there is n clear gd side r psitive frce fr change. Rbert Osgd made the pint a lng time ag that when a natin engages in limited war, it des it fr limited purpses. If a natin cannt keep the war and the purpses limited, it shuld nt engage. Histry shws that it is amazingly easy t frget this. There are times when a cunterinsurgency campaign is necessary r will be frced n the US frm the utside, but there are many times when the US has a chice f the means it can use t achieve a given end, and can chse ptins ther than cunterinsurgency. Cntainment is ne such ptin. Every reader will have t decide fr him r herself if they had knwn when the Calitin went int Iraq what they knw tday, whether they wuld still have rejected cntainment as the ptin? If ne cnsiders military invlvement in Iran r Syria, the same issues arise as t whether cntainment and diplmacy are quite that bad a chice versus expanding a limited war r regime change -- at least by frce? If cntainment is nt a substitute fr cunterinsurgency, the US must ask whether it shuld take advantage f military ptins where it retains advantages insurgents cannt cunter: the ability t carry ut selective strikes with limited cst. Placing US frces n the grund where they must cnduct a majr cunterinsurgency r cunterterrrism campaign is far mre cstly and riskriented than using limited amunts f frce in precisin strikes r ther carefully limited frms. Sanctins and sustained plitical pressure ften have severe limits, but they t can smetimes achieve the desired result in ways that are less cstly than cunterinsurgency. Even when a cunterinsurgency r cunterterrrism campaign is necessary, using US frces may ften be the wrng answer. It is true that the US will nrmally nly cnsider engaging in cunterinsurgency because the natin it is ging t fight is weak r divided. Far t ften, hwever, we seem t cmmit ur frces t cmbat. In many cases, it will still be better t rely n the lcal ally and build up their frces, even if this means a higher risk f lsing in what is, after all, a limited war.

21 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxi N natin is every likely t stay a failed natin. This des nt mean, hwever, that the US can fix any given cuntry in the face f massive plitical and scial divisins, ecnmic weakness r cllapse, and/r idelgical and religius turmil. The wrld s wrst prblems are its mst tragic prblems, but this des nt mean that the US can decisively change them with affrdable amunts f frce, aid, and effrts at plitical refrm. If anything, Iraq is a warning that the US des nt knw hw t measure and characterize the risks f interventin, is nt structured t cmbine natin building and cunterinsurgency n a massive scale, and cannt impse its system and values n anther peple unless they actually want them. In retrspect, the US culd almst certainly have dne far mre gd spreading the same resurces amng the natins and peples where they wuld have had real benefits, and by cncentrating n the wars it actually had t fight. At the same time, these are questins that events in Iraq may still answer in ways that give bth the Calitin and the Iraqi peple enugh f a victry t defeat the insurgency. The right answer in future crises may never be clear, easy t chse, r be the same fr different crises and prblems. It is als imprtant t emphasize, that that the lessns f Iraq are scarcely that the US shuld nt use and imprve its cunterinsurgency techniques. It is rather a warning that the US and ther pwers shuld nly engage directly in cunterinsurgency after it assesses the csts, risks, ability t achieve the desired end bjective, and alternative means hnestly and in depth. Cunterinsurgency Des Nt Always Mean Winning There is a grimmer lessn frm the evlutin f the insurgency in Iraq. It is a lessn that ges firmly against the American grain, but it is a natural crllary f limited war. If the curse f the plitical and military struggle shws the US that it cannt achieve the desired grand strategic utcme, it needs t accept the fact that the US must find ways t terminate a cunterinsurgency war. Defeat, withdrawal, and acceptance f an utcme less than victry are never desirable in limited war, but they are always acceptable. Fr all the arguments abut prestige, trust, and deterrence, there is n pint in pursuing a limited cnflict when it becmes mre cstly than the bjective is wrth r when the prbability f achieving that bjective becmes t lw. This is a lessn that ges against American culture. The whle idea that the US can be defeated is n mre desirable fr Americans than fr anyne else, in fact, almst certainly less s. But when the US lst in Vietnam it nt nly lived with the reality, it ultimately did nt suffer frm it. When the US failed in Lebann and Haiti, it failed at almst n perceptible cst. Exiting Smalia was nt withut cnsequences, but they were scarcely critical. This des nt mean that the US shuld nt stay in Iraq as lng as it has a gd chance f achieving acceptable bjectives at an acceptable cst. But, it des mean that the US can affrd t lse in Iraq, particularly fr reasns that are frankly beynd its cntrl and which the wrld will recgnize as such. There is n pint in staying the curse thrugh a majr Iraqi civil war, a catastrphic breakdwn f the plitical prcess, r a gvernment cming t pwer that simply asks us t leave. In all three cases, it isn t a matter f winning r lsing, but instead, facing a situatin where cnditins n lnger exist fr staying. Telling the Truth Abut Risks and the Value f Strategic Objectives In the future, the US will need t pay far mre attentin t the ptin f declaring that it is fighting a limited war fr limited bjectives if it really is a limited war. It may well need t fully explain what the limits t its gals and level f engagement are and develp a strategy fr implementing, cmmunicating and expliting these limits. One mistake is t tell the hst

22 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxii gvernment, r the peple yu are fighting with, that yur cmmitment is pen-ended and that yu can never leave; the incentive fr respnsibility vanishes with it. Similarly, if yu tell the American peple and the wrld that a marginal strategic interest is vital, the wrld will sner r later believe it, which is very dangerus if yu have t leave r lse. Yu are better ff saying yu may lse, setting limits, and then winning, than claiming that yu can t lse, having n limits, and then lsing. This shuld nt be a massive, innvative lessn, but it is ne we simply d nt seem prepared t learn. If the US Must Fight a Cunterinsurgency Campaign, It Must Fcus Firmly n the Strategic, Plitical, and Allied Dimensin f the Fighting The evlutin f the insurgency in Iraq is yet anther lessn in the fact that fcusing n the military dimensin f war is an almst certain path t grand strategic defeat in any serius cnflict, and particularly in cunterinsurgency in a weak and divided natin. If the US must engage in cunterinsurgency warfare, and smetimes it must, then it needs t plan fr bth the cmplexity and cst f successful cnflict terminatin and ensuring a favrable grand strategic utcme. It must prepare fr the risk f lng-term engagement and escalatin, civil war and ethnic and sectarian cnflict, and risks that will require mre frces and resurces. If such lng wars are t cstly relative t the value f the bjective, the US must set very clear limits t what it will d based n the limited grand strategic value f the utcme and act upn them -- regardless f shrt-term humanitarian csts. The US needs t prepare fr, and execute, a full spectrum f cnflict. That means ding much mre than seeking t win a war militarily. It needs t have the ability t make a valid and sustainable natinal cmmitment in idelgical and plitical terms. It must find ways f winning brad lcal and reginal supprt; stability peratins and natin building are the price f any meaningful cunterinsurgency campaign. The US Nrmally Cannt Win Serius Cunterinsurgency Wars Unless It Creates an Ally and Partner Wh Can Gvern and Secure the Place Where the US is Fighting. Iraq, like s many ther serius Pst-WWII insurgencies, shws that successful cunterinsurgency means having r creating a lcal partner that can take ver frm US frces and that can gvern. Bth Vietnam and Iraq shw the US cannt win an imprtant cunterinsurgency campaign alne. The US will always be dependent n the peple in the hst cuntry, and usually n lcal and reginal allies. T sme extent, it will be dependent n the quality f its peratins in the UN, in dealing with traditinal allies and in diplmacy. If the US can t figure ut a way t have r create such an ally, and fight under these cnditins, a cunterinsurgency cnflict may well nt be wrth fighting. This means the US must d far mre than creating effective allied frces. In mst cases, it will have t find a way t reshape the prcess f plitics and gvernments t create sme structure in the cuntry that can actually act in areas it "liberates." Pacificatin is the classic example. If the US r its allies can t deply allied plice frces and gvernment presence, the result is far ften t end up with a place n the map where n ne in his right mind wuld g at night. Ecnmics and Cunterinsurgency: Dllars Must Be Used as Effectively as Bullets The US must be prepared t use aid and civic actin dllars as well as bullets, and the US military has dne far better in this area in Iraq than it has in the past. Unfrtunately, the histry f the insurgency shws that the same cannt be said fr USAID in Washingtn, r fr any

23 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxiii aspect f the ecnmic planning effrt under the CPA. The US ignred the ecnmic and related plitical and cultural realities f natin building ging int Iraq and ignres the ecnmic realities nw. Every independent assessment f the US aid effrt warns just hw bad the US perfrmance has been in these areas -- even in critical areas like the il industry. The US has nw spent r cmmitted its way thrugh nearly $20 billin, and has virtually n self-sustained structural ecnmic change t shw fr it. Mst aid prjects spend mre mney n verhead, cntractrs, and security than gets t Iraqis in the field. It can t prtect mst f its aid prjects; fr t much f pst-march 2003 Iraqi ecnmic "grwth" has been illusry and cmes frm US waste and wartime prfiteering. Self-cngratulatry measures f achievement are mindless. Wh cares hw much mney the US spends r hw many buildings it creates, unless this effrt ges t the right place and has a lasting impact. The number f schl buildings cmpleted is irrelevant unless there are bks, teachers, furniture, students and security, and the buildings g t trubled areas as well as secure nes. Bad r empty buildings leave a legacy f hstility, nt success. Empty r lw capacity clinics dn t win hearts and minds. Increasing peak pwer capacity is meaningless unless the right peple actually get it. Lng Wars Mean Lng Plans and Lng Expenditures The US annunced n February 4th that its new Quadrennial Defense Review was based n a strategy f lng wars, and an enduring cnflict with terrrists and Islamist extremists. As the Iraq War and s many similar cnflicts have shwn, "lng wars" can als take the frm f lng natin buildings, lng stability peratins, and lng cunter insurgencies. This means they can nly be fught with patience, ver a perid f years, and with sustained investment in terms f US presence, military expenditures, and aid mney. In the case f Iraq, virtually every senir fficer and fficial came t realize by 2005 that a shrt campaign plan had failed t prepare the US and Calitin fr a meaningful effrt, helped create a serius insurgency, and led t a situatin that cst thusands f additinal killed and wunded and meant tens f billins f additin dllars were needed t have any chance f success. Talk f majr reductins in US frces mved t end-2006, and many experts talked abut Mst senir serving fficers privately talked abut a majr advisry and cmbat supprt effrt thrugh A "three mnth" departure had turned int what threatened t be a decade-lng presence if the US and its allies were t succeed. Estimates f ttal csts in the hundreds f billins f dllars that senir fficials in the Bush Administratin had dismissed in ging t war had already becme a reality, and the US was well n its way t a war that wuld cst at least 3,000 dead and 20,000 wunded. The message is clear. Any plan fr cunterinsurgency and stability peratins must include years f effrt, nt mnths. Spending plans fr military peratins and all frms f aid must be shaped accrdingly. The American tendency t begin peratins with the same plan fr immediate success -- "simple, quick, and wrng" -- needs t be replaced with an hnest assessment f the fact that histry takes time. The tendency t versell the ease f peratins, demand quick and decisive success, is a natural ne fr bth plicymakers and senir military fficers. It is als a path t failure and defeat. At best, it is likely t be paid fr in unnecessary bdy bags and billins f dllars. Hnestly Winning the Supprt f the American Peple

24 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxiv The sharp gap between the evlutin f the insurgency described in the preceding analysis, and the almst endless US effrts t use the media and plitics t "spin" a lng and uncertain cunterinsurgency campaign int turning pints and instant victry, has dne America, the Bush Administratin, and the American military great harm. Spin and shallw prpaganda lse wars rather than win them. They ultimately discredit a war, and the fficials and fficers wh fight it. Iraq shws that it is critical that an Administratin hnestly prepares the American peple, the Cngress and it allies fr the real nature f the war t be fught. T d s, it must prepare them t sustain the expense and sacrifice thrugh truth, nt spin. But there is nly s much shallw spin that the American peple r Cngress will take. It isn t a matter f a cynical media r a peple wh ppse the war; rubbish is rubbish. If the US spins each day with verptimistic statements and half-truths, it embarks n a prcess that will sner r later deprive itself f credibility -- bth dmestically and internatinally. Iraq is als yet anther warning that serius cunterinsurgency campaigns ften take five t fifteen years. They dn t end cnveniently with an assistant secretary r a President s term in ffice. Again and again we deny the sheer length f serius cunterinsurgencies. Planners, executers, and anyne wh explains and justifies such wars needs t be far mre hnest abut the timescales invlved, just hw lng we may have t stay, and that even when an insurgency is largely ver, there may be years f aid and advisry effrts. Lessns fr Warfighting Finally, this analysis f the insurgency raises lessn abut warfighting, that g beynd the details f military strategy and tactics, and prvide brader lessns that have been surprisingly cnsistent ver the mre than 40 years frm Vietnam t Iraq. First, warfighters must fcus relentlessly n the desired utcme f the war and nt simply the battle r verall military situatin. In strategic and grand strategic terms, it desn t matter hw well the war went last mnth; it desn t matter hw the US is ding tactically. The real questin warfighters must ask is whether the US is actually mving tward a strategic utcme that serves the ultimate interests f the US? If warfighters dn t knw, they shuld nt spend the lives f American men and wmen in the first place. The US, and any military frce engaging in cunterinsurgency warfare, shuld teach at every level that stability peratins and cnflict terminatin are the respnsibility f every field-grade fficer. (And, fr that matter, every civilian.) Warfighters need t act n the principle that every tactical peratin must have a plitical cntext and set f gals. The US needs t tie its verall campaign plan t a detailed plan fr the use f ecnmic aid at every level, frm simple bribery t actually seeking majr changes in the ecnmy f a given cuntry. Secnd, warfighters need t understand, as Gen. Rupert Smith has pinted ut, and as Iraq has shwn, that enemies will make every effrt t try t win cunterinsurgency cnflicts by finding ways t perate belw r abve the threshld f cnventinal military superirity. It is stupid, as sme in the US military have dne, t call Iraqi insurgents cwards r terrrists because they will nt fight n ur terms. The same remarkably stupid attitudes appeared in 19 th century clnial wars and ften cst thse flish enugh t have them the battle. The Mahdi's victries in the Sudan are a gd case example. The US has t be able t fight in ways that defeat insurgents and terrrists regardless f hw they fight. Insurgents are nt cwards fr fighting us in any way that des s at the highest cst t us and the least cst t them. If they can fight belw the US threshld f cnventinal superirity, then technlgy is at best a limited supplement t US human skills, military prfessinalism, and abve all, ur ability t find ways t strengthen lcal allies. It is far mre imprtant, fr example t have effective lcal frces than mre technlgy. Net-centric is nt a substitute fr human-centric, and fr that matter, human-centric isn t a substitute fr cmpetent peple dwn at the battalin level. Systems dn t win. Technlgy desn t win.

25 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxv Third, warfighters and their plitical leaders need t acknwledge that enemies can fight abve the threshld f US cnventinal ability, nt just beneath it. The character f America's plitical system, culture, and values are nt the answer t winning the plitical and idelgical dimensin f many cunterinsurgency campaigns. There is n reasn Americans shuld think they can win an idelgical struggle ver the future f Islam and/r the Arab wrld. Our Muslim and Arab allies, in cntrast, may well be able t win this struggle, particular if the US wrks with them and nt against them. US public diplmacy and plitical actins can have a majr impact in aiding cunterinsurgency and cunterterrrism. But, Iraq shws that the lcal, cultural, ethnic, religius, and plitical issues have t be fught ut in such wars largely by ur ally n the grund and ther Islamic states. The US can help, but cannt win, r dminate, the battle fr hearts and minds. Mrever, nly reginal allies with the right religin, culture, and legitimacy can cpe with the grwing ability f idelgically driven ppnents t find the fault lines that can divide us frm lcal allies by creating increased ethnic and sectarian tensins. Furth, althugh the US des need t imprve its cunterinsurgency technlgy, it cannt win with tys. Technlgy is a tl and nt a slutin. Israeli technlgy failed in Lebann as US technlgy did in Vietnam, and sme f the same IED systems that helped defeat Israel have nw emerged in Iraq: twin IR sensrs, shaped charges, radi-cntrlled devices, and fam painted t lk like rcks. Like Israel, the US can use technical means t defeat many IEDs, but nt enugh. Mrever, it is pssible that the ttal cst f every insurgent IED t date is still lwer than that cst f ne AH-1S that went dwn ver Iraq. Fifth, the frce must have the right balance f numbers and expertise. Many have argued since the beginning f the Iraq War that the Calitin needed far mre manpwer fr stability peratins. This is a slutin t sme prblems, where a simple security presence will deter terrrism and the grwth f an insurgency. It is, als, hwever, a dangerus illusin in ther cases. Large numbers f frces that will never have the right language and area skills with any serius prficiency, which lack the necessary specialist training, and have a different culture and religin will simply cmpund lcal resentments and the feeling the US r US-led frce is at best an ccupier and at wrst an enemy. "Stabilizers" can easily becme targets, and deplyed large numbers f frces means mre incidents with the lcal ppulatin, mre prblems in getting the hst cuntry t take respnsibility, the grwth f mre rear-area military bureaucracy, and dealing with large number f n r little-purpse trps that need t be prtected. At the same time, t few rdinary trps can be equally dangerus, particularly in establishing initial security and presence. Small elites cannt d large r rutine jbs. There must be enugh military and civilians in cuntry t establish basic security. There is n pint in wasting Special Frces, translatrs, military plice, cunterinsurgency and cunterterrrism experts, civil-military experts and ther scarce elite frces in "presence" and "supprt" missins. Finding the right balance will be difficult and case specific, and must deal with cntingency risks and nt simply the utcme plicymakers and military planners want. The key t success is t fit the frce t the case, and nt t the desire r the dctrine. Sixth, the best frce multiplier will be effective allies, and interperability with a true partner. If it is true that the US can win mst cunterinsurgency campaigns if it creates strng allies, the US must act decisively n this principle. US victries will ften nly be a means t this end. The real victries cme when the US has allied trps that can perate against insurgents in the field, and a friendly gvernment t carry ut natin building and civil actin activities at the same time. The US really begins t win when it can find ways t match the military, plitical, ecnmic, and gvernance dimensin. Creating a real partnership with allies als means respect; it desn t mean creating prxies r tls. It means recgnizing that creating the cnditins fr effective gvernance and plice are as imprtant as the military. S is the creatin f effective ministries. Iraq shws all t clearly that this kind f warfare, if yu fcus n the ministry f defense and ignre the ministry f the interir r the ministry f finance, just desn t wrk. In mst places, the actual cunterinsurgency battle is lcal and as dependent n plice and effective gvernance as effective military frces. In hyper-urbanized areas, which represent many f the places where we fight, the city is the key, at least as much as the natinal gvernment. Incidentally, Iraq has already shwn time after time that it is difficult t sustain any victry withut a lasting presence by lcal plice and gvernment ffices

26 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxvi Seventh, plitical legitimacy in cunterinsurgency is measured in lcal terms and nt in terms f American idelgy. Effective warfighting means the US must recgnize smething abut reginal allies that ges against its present emphasis n demcracy. In mst f the wrld, legitimacy has little t d with gvernments being elected, and a great deal t d with gvernments being ppular. By all means, hld electins when they d mre gd than harm. But bringing the peple security, the rule f law, human rights, and effective gvernance is far mre imprtant. In many cases, electins may be disruptive r bring peple t pwer that are mre f a prblem than a slutin. This is particularly true if electins cme withut the precnditins f mature plitical parties, ecnmic stability, a firm rule f law, and checks and balances. In mst cases, the US and its allies will still need t wrry abut the peple wh dn t win peple, ethnicities, and sects wh will nt have human rights prtectin. (If anyne thinks there is a crrelatin between demcracy and human rights, cngratulatins, they gt thrugh cllege withut ever reading Thucydides. The Melian dialgue is the histrical rule, nt the exceptin.) Eighth, the US needs t have a functinal interagency prcess and partner ur military with effective civilian cunterparts. Iraq has shwn that plitical leaders and senir military cannt affrd t bypass the system, r t lack supprt frm the civilian agencies that must d their part frm the utset. The US needs t begin by deciding n the team it needs t g t war, and then make that team wrk. It is ne f the ddities histrically that Rbert McNamara gt his largest increase in US trps deplyed t Vietnam by bypassing the interagency prcess. The Bush Administratin began by ging thrugh an interagency prcess befre the war, but largely chse t ignre it after January f This is the wrng apprach. Cunterinsurgency wars are as much plitical and ecnmic as military. They require plitical actin, aid in gvernance, ecnmic develpment and attentin t the idelgical and plitical dimensin. The US can nly succeed here if the interagency prcess can wrk. At anther level, the US needs civilian risk-takers. It needs a cunterpart t the military in the field. There is n pint in supprting the staffing f mre interagency crdinatin bdies in Washingtn unless their primary functin is t put serius resurces int the field. The US is nt ging t win anything by having better interagency crdinatin and mre meetings, unless the end result is t put the right mix f peple and resurces ut in the cuntryside where the fighting takes place. The US needs t put a firm end t the kind f mentality that verstaff the State Department and intelligence cmmunity in Washingtn, and desn t require career civilians t take risks in the field. Freign Service fficers shuld nt be prmted, in fact shuld be selected ut, unless they are willing t take risks. The US can get all f the risk takers we want. There already is a fld f applicatins frm qualified peple. It can als ensure cntinuity and expertise by drawing n the brave grup f peple already in Iraq and Afghanistan -- a remarkable number f whm are already cntract emplyees -- and giving them career status. In the prcess, the US als needs t civilianize sme aspects f its military. It needs t imprve bth their area and language skills, create the added specialized frces it needs fr stability and natin building peratins, and rethink tur length fr military wh wrk in critical psitins and with allied frces. Persnal relatinships are abslutely critical in the cuntries where the US is mst likely t fight cunterinsurgency wars. S is area expertise and cntinuity in intelligence. Cunterinsurgency needs a cre f military and civilians wh will accept 18 mnth t 24-mnth turs in key slts. The prblem tday is ften that the selectin system des nt fcus n the best persn but rather n external persnnel and career planning cnsideratins. Mrever, it fails t recgnize that thse wh take such additinal risks shuld be paid fr it in full, and be given different leave plicies and prmtin incentives. Tday, a slider that is nly a battalin cmmander is nly a battalin cmmander. The key fficers are thse with area and cunterinsurgency skills that g beynd the cmbat unit level. Thse fficers need t have mre diverse skills, and deal adequately with the brader dimensin f war, and stay lng enugh t be fully effective. Finally, human-centric warfare des nt mean "super-sldiers" r super-intelligence fficers. Military frces -- and the civilian supprt needed fr stability peratins, natin building, and cunterinsurgency -- d need better training in the nature f such peratins, lcal languages, and lcal cultures. But, military frces and civilians that are utstanding is a dangerus illusin. Effective peratins require bth adequate frce quality and adequate frce quantity, and the

27 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxvii understanding that mst peple are, by definitin, "average." Elites are an essential part f military peratins, but nly a part. This demand fr elites and super-intelligence fficers is a particular prblem fr warfighting intelligence, given the limits f tday's technical systems and means. It is als a prblem because Iraq shws that develping effective US-led and rganized HUMINT may ften be impssible. It is true that better intelligence analysis and HUMINT are critical. But, there will be many times in the future where we will als have t g int cunterinsurgency campaigns withut being able t put qualified Americans in the field quickly enugh t recruit effective agents and develp effective HUMINT n ur wn. Des that mean HUMINT isn t imprtant? Of curse it desn t; it is a useful tl. But t create effective HUMINT abilities t deal with security issues, the US will need an effective lcal partner in mst serius cases f bth cunterinsurgency and cunterterrrism. Having allied cuntries, allied frces, r allied elements, develp effective HUMINT will be a critical answer t US shrtcmings.

28 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxviii Table f Cntents I. INTRODUCTION...2 SADDAM HUSSEIN S POWDER KEG...3 AMERICA S STRATEGIC MISTAKES...5 Failure at the Grand Strategic Level...5 A Litany f Lesser Mistakes...6 II. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY...9 DENIAL AS A METHOD OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE...9 BASELINE/POST-CONFLICT: 1 MAY 2003 FALL THE INSURGENCY BECOMES SERIOUS: FALL TO END SERIOUS FIGHTING IN THE PRE-TRANSFER OF POWER PERIOD: WINTER-SPRING PRE-SOVEREIGNTY: 1 APRIL 28 JUNE EARLY SOVEREIGNTY: 29 JUNE 26 NOVEMBER Shifts in the Nature f the Insurgency...14 Mre Attacks n Iraqis...15 Estimating the Impact f the Insurgency thrugh Octber THE COURSE OF THE INSURGENCY IN EARLY The Uncertain Impact f the January 30, 2005 Electin...18 A New Resurgence f Sectarian Vilence...19 Warnings that Iraqi Frces Culd Feed the Insurgency...21 The Overall Trends in the Insurgency During A NEW RISE IN THE VIOLENCE -- POST-SOVEREIGNTY: APRIL 28, 2005-OCTOBER 14, A Shi'ite-Kurdish Gvernment Becmes a Natural Target...26 Warnings Abut Iraqi Frces and the Ministry f Interir...29 COALITION AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGNS IN THE SUMMER AND WINTER OF OPERATION IRON FIST, RIVER GATE AND STEEL CURTAIN (OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2005)...33 THE PERIOD BEFORE THE ELECTIONS: OCTOBER 15, 2005-DECEMBER 15, THE DECEMBER 15 ELECTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSURGENCY...36 POST-ELECTION: DECEMBER 16, 2005-ONWARD...41 The Attack n the Askariya Shrine and the Increase f Lw-Level Civil Cnflict...43 Sft Sectarian Cleansing and Internal Displacement...47 US-Iraqi Campaigns in Early Effrts t Create a Natinal Unity Gvernment...51 THE COURSE OF THE INSURGENCY TO DATE...56 III. PATTERN OF ATTACKS...62 SUMMARY ATTACK PATTERNS...62 TOTAL IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) BOMBINGS, VEHICLE BORNE BOMBINGS (VBIEDS), AND SUICIDE BOMBINGS...68 SABOTAGE AND INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS...75 Calitin Casualties...82 US Casualties...86 PATTERNS IN IRAQI FORCES AND GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES...89 MNF-I/US Estimates...89 Iraqi Gvernment Estimates...89 PATTERNS IN IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES...92 NGO Estimates: Iraqi Bdy Cunt...92 Iraqi Gvernment Estimates...92 IV. EVOLVING TACTICS...96

29 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxix POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND INFORMATION WARFARE...96 METHODS OF ATTACK AND COMBAT OVERALL PATTERNS V. CHARACTERIZING THE INSURGENCY THE REGIONAL, SECTARIAN, AND ETHNIC NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY ESTIMATES OF TOTAL INSURGENT FORCES THE IRAQI INSURGENCY VS. OTHER INSURGENCIES COMPARISONS OF INSURGENT AND IRAQI FORCES THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEM Insurgent Intelligence Capabilities Cunterintelligence and Iraqi Gvernment Effrts FINANCING THE INSURGENCY THE ROLE OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS The Impact f Crime n the Insurgency The Strength f Criminal Activity VI. THE DOMINANT ROLE OF IRAQI SUNNI ARAB INSURGENTS THE AREAS OF MAJOR SUNNI INSURGENT INFLUENCE SUNNI ISLAMIST EXTREMIST AND NEO-SALAFI VS. NATIONALIST INSURGENTS THE NATURE AND ROLE NEO-SALAFI AND ISLAMIST EXTREMIST GROUPS An Addictin t Vilence and Extremism Guessing at Their Strength KEY ISLAMIST EXTREMIST GROUPS The State Department Estimate Other Estimates The Crisis Grup Estimate AL QA IDA IN THE TWO RIVERS AND THE ZARQAWI FACTOR The Zarqawi Organizatin Structure and Its Strength The Zarqawi Hunt Zarqawi Ties t Bin Laden and Outside Sunni Islamist Grups Zarqawi and Attacks n Sunnis and Civilians The Zarqawi War Against Shi ites Overkill Against Fellw Muslims and the Iraqiazatin f Al Qa ida Zarqawi and Syria Expanding the Battle: Operatins Outside Iraq Zarqawi and Weapns f Mass Media OTHER SUNNI ARAB INSURGENT GROUPS: THE NATIONALISTS? Planning Befre, During, and Immediately After the War? The Mtives f the Mre Natinalist Insurgents Ba athists, Nn-Ba athists, r Semi-Ba athists? Other Natinalist Sunni Insurgents The Search fr Pwer and the Pssibility f Dialgue TENSIONS AND CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNI NATIONALISTS VERSUS SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS? Divisins Over Playing a Rle in the Plitical Prcess Iraqi Gvernment Negtiatins with Natinalist Insurgents THE ROLE OF SUNNI ARAB MILITIAS The Psitive Side f the Militia Stry The Negative Side ASSESSING THE FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THE SUNNI INSURGENCY The Natinalist Need fr Cmprmise The Islamist Need fr Civil War VII. THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS THE UNCERTAIN NUMBER, SOURCE, AND ROLE OF FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS...197

30 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxx NUMBER AND NATIONAL ORIGIN OF FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS Saudi Militants in Iraq: A Case Study SYRIA AND FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS IRAN AND FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS VIII. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE SHI'ITES SHI ITE FACTIONS AND THE VARIOUS MILITIAS Uncertain Links Between the Shi ite Militias and the Gvernment The Rle f the Badr Organizatin Death Squads and Mystery Killings Links t the Iraqi Plice and Special Security Frces THE ROLE OF MOQTADA AL-SADR The Rise and Temprary Fall f the Mahdi Militia Resurgence in Sadr, the December 2005 Electins, and the New Gvernment Sadr, Iran, and Iraq Sadr and the Attack n the Askariya Shrine Sadr, Civil War, the US, and the Caltin INTERNAL SHI ITE DIVISIONS INSURGENT PRESSURE ON THE SHI ITES TO MOVE TOWARD CIVIL WAR Accelerating Vilence in Vilence in IX. THE KURDS AND OTHER MINORITIES KURDISH PARTIES AND THE KURDISH MILITIAS TENSIONS BETWEEN THE KURDS AND OTHER IRAQIS UNCERTAIN KURDISH UNITY THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES AND OIL THE TURKISH QUESTION X. THE ROLE OF OUTSIDERS IN THE INSURGENCY CREATING A SHI ITE CRESCENT? THE VIEWS OF THE ARAB GULF STATES A CLASH WITHIN A CIVILIZATION? The Prblem f Syria The Prblem f Iran The Prblem f Turkey The Prblem f Jrdan XI. IRAQI VIEWS OF THE THREAT IRAQ'S VIEW OF THE THREAT IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION POLLS Iraqi Attitudes After the Invasin Iraqi Attitudes in Octber Iraqi Attitudes in Early Iraqi Attitudes Twards Iraqi Frces and US Withdrawal and Military Assistance THE IMPACT OF IRAQI OPINION ON THE INSURGENCY; 2006 AS A TIPPING YEAR IN THE LONG WAR? Hardline Insurgents Act Independently f Iraqi and Iraqi Sunni Ppular Opinin Fr Sme, Jining the Plitical Prcess Can Be a Tactic t Supprt the Insurgency WHAT THE ELECTIONS DID AND DID NOT SHOW ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENCY VERSUS IRAQI POLITICAL UNITY Indicatrs: Vting in the fur mst trubled prvinces where the insurgency has the mst supprt (Anbar, Salahuddin, Nineveh, and Diyala) Indicatrs: Natinalist versus Sectarian and Ethnic Parties Indicatrs: Vting in the Kurdish Areas...264

31 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxxi Nn-Indicatrs: Shi ite Intentins and Unity PUBLIC OPINION, THE INSURGENCY, AND THE FRAGILE STRUCTURE OF IRAQI POLITICS IN Other Factrs Shaping Attitudes Twards the Insurgency and Gvernment Insurgent Capability t Explit the Lack f Ppular Supprt fr the US and Calitin Frces Iraqi Attitudes Twards Security by Regin, Sect, and Ethnicity Supprt fr Insurgent Actins Outside Iraq Sunni versus Shi ite Differences Over Other Aspects f Iraqi Life Implicatins fr the Future XII. PROBABLE OUTCOMES AND THE LESSONS OF WAR THE LESSONS OF COMPLEXITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND RISK The Need Fr Accurate Planning and Risk Assessment The Limits f "Oil Spts" The Limits f Technlgy and Western "Swarm" Techniques The Undrainable Swamp The Limits f Cheerleading and Self-Delusin The New Fg f War and the "Law f Unattended Cnsequences" THE LESSON OF STRATEGIC INDIFFERENCE; OF KNOWING WHEN TO PLAY -- AND WHEN NOT TO PLAY, THE COUNTERINSURGENCY GAME Is Cunterinsurgency the Right Means t the End? Cunterinsurgency Des Nt always Mean Winning Telling the Truth Abut Risks and the Value f Strategic Objectives IF THE US MUST FIGHT A COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, IT MUST FOCUS FIRMLY ON THE STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, AND ALLIED DIMENSION OF THE FIGHTING The US Nrmally Cannt Win Serius Cunterinsurgency Wars Unless It Creates an Ally and Partner Wh Can Gvern and Secure the Place Where the US is Fighting Ecnmics and Cunterinsurgency: Dllars Must Be Used as Effectively as Bullets Lng Wars Mean Lng Plans and Lng Expenditures HONESTLY WINNING THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE LESSONS FOR WARFIGHTING ENDNOTES...292

32 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxxii Table f Figures FIGURE II. 1: ILLUSTRATIVE PATTERNS IN TARGETING AND CASUALTIES: SEPTEMBER 2003-OCTOBER FIGURE II.2: INSURGENT ATTACKS BY KEY TARGET: JANUARY 2004-JANUARY FIGURE II.3: THE KEY URBAN AREAS IN THE INSURGENCY...33 MAP II.1: GOVERNORATE BOUNDERIES...37 FIGURE III.4: DECEMBER 2005 ELECTION RESULTS: COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES...38 FIGURE III.5: PERCENTAGE OF VOTE WON BY FOUR MAJOR COALITION PARTIES IN EACH OF IRAQ S 18 PROVINCES FIGURE III.1: ATTACKS BY IRAQI GOVERNORATE OR PROVINCE: AUGUST 29, 2005 TO JANUARY 20, FIGURE III.2: APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MAJOR ATTACKS PER MONTH: JUNE 2003-FEBRUARY FIGURE III.3: AVERAGE WEEKLY ATTACKS BY TIME PERIOD: JANUARY 2004 JANUARY FIGURE III.4: TOTAL AVERAGE WEEKLY ATTACKS VERSUS EFFECTIVE ATTACKS BY TIME PERIOD: FEBRUARY 2004 NOVEMBER FIGURE III.5: PATTERNS OF IED ATTACKS: JANUARY 2004 TO OCTOBER FIGURE III.6: US IED DEATHS: JULY 2003 TO JANUARY FIGURE III.7: PATTERNS IN CAR BOMBINGS AND SUICIDE BOMBINGS: MAY-OCTOBER 2005 PART ONE...73 FIGURE III.8: PATTERNS IN CAR BOMBINGS AND SUICIDE BOMBINGS: MAY OCTOBER 2005 PART TWO...74 FIGURE III.9: PERCENT OF CAR BOMBS INTERCEPTED/DEFUSED: APRIL 2005 JANUARY MAP III.1: IRAQI OIL FIELDS AND PIPELINES...79 FIGURE III.10: AVERAGE MONTHLY ATTACKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE BY TIME PERIOD...80 FIGURE III.11: AVERAGE WEEKLY ATTACKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE BY TIME PERIOD: JANUARY 1, 2004 JANUARY 20, FIGURE III.12: CASUALTY PATTERNS IN IRAQI AND COALITION FORCES OVER TIME...83 FIGURE III.13: COALITION DEATHS BY COUNTRY AND MONTH: MARCH 2003 TO JANUARY FIGURE III.14: COALITION CASUALTIES BY IRAQI GOVERNORATE OR PROVINCE...85 FIGURE III.15: US CASUALTIES IN THE IRAQ WAR: TOTAL KILLED VS. WOUNDED, MARCH 2003-FEBRUARY 6, FIGURE III.16: US CASUALTIES IN THE IRAQ WAR: KILLED VS. WOUNDED, MARCH 2003-FEBRUARY 6, FIGURE III.17: AVERAGE DAILY IRAQI MILITARY AND OFFICIAL CASUALTIES BY MONTH: JANUARY 2004-SEPTEMBER FIGURE III.18: IRAQI FATALITIES BY CITY: MARCH 2003-FEBRUARY FIGURE III.19: TOTAL IRAQI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY MONTH: JANUARY 2005-JANUARY MAP V.1: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION AND POLITICAL BOUNDERIES FIGURE V.1: THE REGIONAL AND SECTARIAN NATURE OF THE FIGHTING, TOTAL ATTACKS BY PROVINCE: AUGUST 29-SEPTEMBER 16, FIGURE V.2: REGIONAL AND SECTARIAN NATURE OF THE FIGHTING, DAILY ATTACKS BY PROVINCE: AUGUST 29, 2005-JANUARY 20, FIGURE V.3: RATIOS OF INSURGENTS TO POPULATION AND GUERILLAS TO UNDERGROUND MEMBERS FIGURE VI.1: ZARQAWI S NETWORK IN MAP VI.1: TRIBES AND SUBTRIBES OF IRAQ FIGURE VI.2: FOREIGN MILITANTS IN IRAQ FIGURE VI.3: SAUDI MILITANTS IN IRAQ AS OF SEPTEMBER FIGURE XI.1: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF INSURGENTS FIGURE XI.2: IRAQI SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE IN THE IRAQI ARMY FIGURE XI.3: IRAQI ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ IN EARLY FIGURE XI.4: ARE LOCAL CONDITIONS GOOD? CHANGE IN RESULTS FROM 2004 TO FIGURE IX.5: IRAQI POLITICAL DIVISIONS BY IRAQI ETHNIC GROUP AND ARAB RELIGIOUS SECT FIGURE IX.6: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY BY AREA FIGURE IX.7: MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING ATTITUDE TOWARDS US IN FIGURE IX.8: IRAQI ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE US AID EFFORT IN IRAQ...274

33 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page xxxiii Maps Map II.1: Gvernrate Bunderies...37 Map III.1: Iraqi Oil Fields and Pipelines...79 Map V.1: Ethnic Distributin and Plitical Bunderies Map VI.1: Tribes and Subtribes f Iraq...191

34 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 2 I. Intrductin The rising insurgency in Iraq has becme a war after the war that threatens t divide Iraq and thrust it int full-scale civil war. It dminates the struggle t reshape Iraq as a mdern state, has becme a grwing threat t the Gulf Regin, and has becme linked t the brader struggle between Sunni and Shi'ite Islamist extremism and mderatin and refrm thrughut the Islamic wrld. In military terms, the insurgency has evlved int a lng war, r war f attritin that has prduced ten times as many Calitin casualties as the fight t tpple the Regime and defeat Iraq s army. It is a cnflict with n clear end and which can either gradually fade if the Iraqi plitical prcess and develpment f Iraqi frces succeeds; r suddenly divide the cuntry in ways that n amunt f Calitin effrt may be able t avid. There is n clear r meaningful difference between insurgency and civil war, r between largely natinal terrrism and civil war fr that matter. They are all frms f civil cnflict. The insurgency in Iraq, hwever, has evlved ver time in ways that increase the risk f intense r full-scale civil war. It is increasingly driven by sectarian and ethnic struggles, rather than natinal mvements and causes. The frces in insurgency include a number f different elements. Shi ite and Kurdish grups nw dminate the gvernment. Their militias and Shi'ite and Kurdish dminated elements f the Iraqi frces d, hwever, play a rle in what is already a lw-level civil cnflict. They wuld play a far greater rle if Iraq drifts int the kind f civil war that divides the cuntry. There are Sunni insurgency mvements, mst with Ba ath rigin, that are mre secular and natinalist in character, and cncerned with Sunni rights and preventing Shi ite dminance. These grups prbably have a large base f ppular Sunni supprt, but have been increasingly vershadwed by the Islamist extremists. The current vilence is dminated, hwever, by Sunni Islamist extremists wh ppse any negtiatins r arrangement with the new Iraqi gvernment and cmprmise with Calitin frces. These extremists nw fcus mre n attacking Shi ites, Kurds, and thse Sunnis wh supprt the new gvernment r wh might participate in the plitical prcess than n Calitin frces. Nnetheless, they still attack Calitin, diplmatic, NGO, and ther nn-iraqi targets. They are seeking t frce the US and its allies t withdraw frm Iraq, and t defeat them thrugh a war f attritin, but their primary gal is t prevent Iraq frm emerging as unified natinal state dminated by a Shi ite majrity This reprt prvides an verview f bth hw the Iraqi insurgency has mved twards civil cnflict frm its inceptin in the spring f 2003 thrugh the first mnths f 2006, and f the ways in which insurgent tactics and methds have changed ver time. It is divided int five general sectins. The first sectin examines Iraq under the rule f Saddam, the immediate pst-war aftermath and the develpment f a vilent insurgency in the spring and summer f It chrnicles the insurgency s inceptin and hw it has evlved frm 2003 until 2006 and examines Calitin peratins t cunter it. The secnd evaluates insurgent patterns f attack, and Calitin and Iraqi casualties. It als examines insurgent tactics, methds f attack, and the plitical, psychlgical and infrmatinal warfare lessns frm

35 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 3 The third sectin assesses the cmpsitin f the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs (bth Islamists and Natinalists ), freign jihadists, and the uncertain status f the Shi ites. It als addresses the degree t which these factins cperate r cnflict and the rle f utsiders in the insurgency. The furth cnsiders Iraqi views f the threat. The fifth and final sectin ffers an assessment f prbable utcmes f the cnflict and lessns f the war. Saddam Hussein s Pwder keg The Calitin must take much f the blame fr the way the insurgency has unflded, bit it seems almst certain but the fall f Saddam Hussein wuld have expsed deep fracture lines in Iraq, almst regardless f hw it ccurred. Arab Sunni rule ver an Arab Shi ite majrity is a key legacy f bth the Ottman Empire and the British divide and rule tactics that frmed the Iraqi state. The frced inclusin f the Kurds in Iraq, British suppressin f a largely Shi'ite rebellin, and the British chice f an expatriate Sunni mnarch helped reinfrce Sunni cntrl at the expense f the Shi'ites and Kurds. S did the vilent suppressin f repeated Kurdish uprisings Iraq s vilent plitics further cmpunded these prblems. Althugh Shi'ites and Kurds did play a rle in Iraq's pst mnarchy plitics, mst pwer struggles were between rival Sunni elites. The defeat f yet anther Kurdish rebellin in the mid-1970s helped cement suppressin f rival sectarian and ethnic factins by frce. S did Saddam's rise t pwer. He never tlerated plitical dissent in any frm, and began the bldy purging and suppressin f all rganized plitical resistance when he tk full pwer in Under Saddam, Iraq came t be ruled by a small, largely rural Sunni Arab elite that used the Ba ath Party and the state t maintain itself in pwer. Its ecnmy remained relatively undevelped; agriculture was never prperly mdernized r made prductive, inefficient stateindustries undercut develpment, as did a rigid state-cntrlled financial sectr and a mix f barriers t trade and utside investment. Wrse, the ecnmy effectively became a cmmand kleptcracy where Saddam Hussein used the natin s wealth t secure pwer and supprt his ambitins, and his ruling elite explited their psitins fr their wn persnal benefit. The natin was impverished and driven int massive debt in the early 1980s by Saddam Hussein s invasin f Iran and effrt t seize its il-rich territry in the suthwest f Iran. While mst f Iraq's Shi'ites and many f its Kurds remained lyal t the gvernment, sme did nt. Shi'ite dissidents were ruthlessly punished, and the Kurds whse lyalty was uncertain r tilted twards Iran were attacked, relcated, and ften killed. Many Kurdish and Shi'ite cnscripts were assigned t Iraq's lw grade infantry units, ften acting as little mre than a frward defensive shield fr Iraq's Republican Guards and main regular army units. The plitics f the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted frm , were essentially the plitics f ruthless repressin. Plitical dissent f any kind became even mre dangerus. Kurdish effrts t explit the war and achieve sme degree f autnmy r independence were met with murder, the use f pisn gas, and ethnic cleansing. Hundreds f thusands f Arab Shi ites were driven ut f the cuntry, and many frmed an armed ppsitin with Iranian supprt. While mst f the remaining Arab Shi ites remained lyal, their secular and religius leaders were kept under cnstant surveillance and smetimes imprisned and killed. The marsh areas alng the Iranian brder were a key center f the fighting between Iran and Iraq, but still became a sanctuary fr deserters and Shi ite ppsitin elements.

36 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 4 Eight years f war crippled the develpment f the natin s ecnmy, infrastructure, educatin, and effrts t prperly develp its il wealth. In the prcess, Shi'ite and Kurdish regins tk far mre serius cuts in civil spending than the majr cities and "lyal" Sunni areas. In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in effrts t slve his ecnmic prblems by seizing its il resurces. The result was the Gulf War, a massive military defeat, and a new burden f reparatins fr the war, and then t mre than a decade f UN and internatinal sanctins further crippling every aspect f the natin s develpment. Iraq s defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, fllwing its invasin f Kuwait in 1990, did mre than further impverish the cuntry. Uprisings in the Shi ite areas in the suth were suppressed with all f the regime s custmary vilence and then fllwed by a mix f repressin and lw-level civil war that lasted until Saddam was driven frm pwer. While this cnflict received nly limited attentin frm the utside wrld, it ften invlved significant lcal clashes between Iraqi gvernment frces and thse f Shi ite ppsitin mvements based in, and backed by, Iran. The pst-iraq War discvery f mass graves f Shi ite fighters and civilians are a grim testimny t hw serius this quiet fighting culd be. This further divided Shi ite and Sunni and als left a lasting legacy f anger against the US and Britain fr nt supprting the uprisings against Saddam and prtecting the Shi ites. A similar set f uprisings in the Kurdish nrth created a fld f refugees int Turkey fllwing the defeat f the Kurds. This frced the US t use airpwer t prtect the Kurds, and create an internatinal aid effrt t supprt them. This gave the Kurds a level f prtectin the Arab Shi ites lacked, but left them in a kind f limb where they had de fact autnmy, but lived with nearly ne-third f Iraq s military frces deplyed n the edge f their security zne. Divisins between the tw main Kurdish factins led t lw-level fighting and even t ne factin supprting an attack by Saddam n the ther. The end result, hwever, was t further increase the Kurdish desire fr independence, while keeping many dispssessed Kurds ut f their riginal hmes in areas like Kirkuk and Msul. 31 Frm 1991 until the Calitin invasin in 2003, Saddam Hussein created further prblems by encuraging tribal divisins and favring thse tribes and clans that supprted his rule and regime. He explited religin by increasingly publicly embracing Islam, and privately favring Sunni factins and religius leaders that supprted him while penalizing Shi ite religius leaders and centers he saw as a threat. At the same time, funds were pured int Sunni areas in the West, gvernment and security jbs were given t Sunnis, and scarce resurces went int military industries that heavily favred Sunni emplyment. The result was t distrt the ecnmy and urban structure f Iraq in ways that favred Sunni twns and cities in areas like Tikrit, Samarra, Fallujah, Ramadi and ther largely lyalist Sunni twns. Saddam Hussein s regime manipulated ratining, cntrl f imprts, and state funds. Saddam crrupted the UN il fr fd prgram fr his wn benefit, further undercutting ecnmic develpment, causing serius human hardship, and crippling part f the cuntry's infrastructure and medical services. The funding f educatin, medical services, and infrastructure was used as a plitical weapn in an effrt t explit the suffering f the Iraqi peple t break ut f UN sanctins. Revenues were used selectively t favr key pwer centers like Baghdad, and majr ptential centers f urban unrest, while leaving ther areas with limited r n essential services like water, pwer, and sewers.

37 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 5 Rather than seek t restre and develp the natin s il and gas wealth, existing fields were verprduced, funds were redirected fr the use f the regime, and exprts were manipulated t btain kickbacks and get plitical supprt frm natins like Syria. These effrts were claked by a prpaganda campaign blaming the US, UN, utside pwers, and UN sanctins fr all f the mistakes f the regime. Iraq's ethnic and sectarian fracture lines were rarely penly apparent, but tensins between the Sunni-dminated ruling elite and the Shi'ites and Kurds became steadily wrse. The gaps between the elite and rdinary Iraqi als wrsened, and much f the middle class was impverished. By cmparisn, Tit s regime in the frmer Yugslavia was bth prgressive and benign. At the time the US-led calitin invaded, Iraq was divided by far greater pressures, and had far less capability fr plitical leadership. It was a time bmb waiting t explde, fueled by bth its riginal heritage f ethnic and sectarian divisin and by ver twenty years f direct misrule by Saddam Hussein. America s Strategic Mistakes The United States made majr strategic mistakes in preparing t deal with this situatin. It did demnstrate that it culd fight the war it planned t fight: a cnventinal reginal war with remarkable efficiency, at lw cst, and very quickly. The prblem was that it fcused n cnventinal warfare, and driving Saddam frm pwer. The US failed t realistically plan fr, and then execute the ther phases f war: cnflict terminatin, stability peratins, and natin building. The US chse a strategy whse pstcnflict gals were unrealistic and impssible t achieve, and failed t plan fr the real nature f peace that was certain t fllw. The impact f these failures was cmpunded after Saddam's fall when it became apparent t Iraqis and the wrld that the basic ratinale fr ging t war was based n false intelligence estimates and Iraqi effrts t create weapns f mass destructin did nt exist. Failure at the Grand Strategic Level The wrst mistakes, hwever, were made at the grand strategic level The Bush Administratin and the senir leadership f the US military made the far mre serius mistake f wishing away virtually all f the real wrld prblems in stability peratins and natin building, and making massive plicy and military errrs that created much f the climate that allwed the insurgency in Iraq t emerge. The full chrnlgy f what happened is still far frm clear, and its nt yet pssible t understand exactly what happened r assign respnsibility with full credibility. It is clear, hwever, that many f the key decisins invlved were made in ways that bypassed the interagency prcess within the US gvernment, ignred the warnings f US area and intelligence experts, ignred prir military war and stability planning by the US Central Cmmand (USCENTCOM), and ignred the warnings f plicy makers and experts in ther key calitin states like the United Kingdm. T much credence was given t idelgues and true believers in the ease with which such a war culd be fught and in effective natin building. These included leading necnservatives in the Office f the Secretary f Defense, the Office f the Vice President, and sme fficials in the Natinal Security Cuncil, as well as in several highly pliticized think tanks. The same was true f varius Iraqi exile grups that grssly exaggerated the level f Iraqi ppular supprt fr a

38 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 6 liberating invasin, the ease with which Saddam Hussein s regime culd be replaced, and underestimated bth the scale f Iraqi s ethnic and sectarian divisins and ecnmic prblems. These prblems were cmpunded by leadership within the Office f the Secretary f Defense that put intense pressure n the US military t plan fr the lwest pssible level f US military deplyment, and then fr delays in that deplyment because f the plitical need t avid appearing precipitus t the UN. At the same time, the leadership f the US military actively resisted planning fr, and invlvement in, large-scale and enduring stability and natin building activity, and failed t plan and deply fr the risk f a significant insurgency. A Litany f Lesser Mistakes The fact the US failed t plan fr meaningful stability peratins and natin building was the mst serius strategic mistake that led t the insurgency and crime that are the fcus f this analysis. These mistakes, hwever, were cmpunded by many ther errrs: A failure t accurately assess the nature f Iraqi natinalism, the true level f culture differences, and the scale f Iraq s prblems. This failure f strategic assessment included the failure t see the scale f Iraq s ethnic and sectarian differences, its ecnmic weaknesses and prblems, the difficulty f mdernizing an infrastructure sized mre t millin than the current ppulatin f millin, unrealistic estimates f il wealth, the prbable hardcre supprt fr the frmer regime in Sunni areas, secular versus thecratic tensins, the impact f tribalism, the impact f demgraphics in a sciety s yung and with s many emplyment prblems, and a hst f ther real-wrld prblems that became US and Calitin difficulties the mment Calitin frces crssed the brder. The failure t plan and execute effective brader infrmatin peratins befre, during and after the invasin t win the hearts and minds f Iraqis, persuade them that the Calitin came as liberatrs that wuld leave rather than ccupiers wh wuld stay and explit Iraq, and that the Calitin wuld prvide aid and supprt t an truly independent gvernment and state. A secndary failure was nt t anticipate and defuse the fld f cnspiracy theries certain t fllw Calitin military actin. The failure t create and prvide anything appraching the kind and number f civilian elements in the US gvernment necessary fr natin building and stability peratins. These prblems were particular serius in the State Department and ther civilian agencies, and much f the civilian capability the US did have was nt recruited r willing t take risks in the field. The failure t plan and execute effrts t maintain the prcess f gvernance at the lcal, prvincial, and central level; t anticipate the risk f gvernment cllapse and the risk f lting, and t create a plan fr restructuring the military, plice, and security frces -- all f which needed t be prclaimed and publicized befre, during, and immediately after the initial invasin t win the supprt f Iraqi fficials and fficers wh were nt linked t active supprt f Saddam Hussein and past abuses, and t preserving the cre f gvernance that culd lead t the rapid creatin f bth a legitimate gvernment and security. Brad failures by what a leading fficer invlved in planning peratins in Iraq called quiescent US military and Intelligence cmmunity leaders wh bserved the distrtin/cherry picking f data that lead t errneus cnclusins and pr planning, but failed t press their case r frce the issue. Over-reliance n exile grups with limited credibility and influence in Iraq. Failure t anticipate and prepare fr Iraqi expectatins after the cllapse f Saddam s regime, and fr the fact that many Iraqis wuld ppse the invasin and see any sustained US and calitin presence as a hstile ccupatin. Miscalculatins abut UN supprt, NATO & calitins, and transit thrugh Turkey. Failing t prvide the persnnel and skills necessary t secure Iraqi rear areas and urban areas as the Calitin advanced, and t prevent the massive lting f gvernment ffices and facilities, military bases, and arms depts during and after the fighting: A prcess that effectively destryed the existing structure f

39 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 7 gvernance and security withut making any initial effrt t replace it. It was nt until May 2003, rughly tw mnths after the fall f Baghdad, that a 4,000 man US military plice effrt was authrized fr deplyment t Baghdad, and it then tk time t arrive. N serius effrt t rebuild Iraqi plice frces tk place until June 2004, in spite f mass desertins right after the fighting and the turmil caused by disbanding the Ba ath Party and military and security frces. 32 The creatin f a small cadre f civilians and military in the Office f Recnstructin and Assistance (ORHA), many initially recruited fr nly three-mnth turs. ORHA planned t perate in an Iraq where all ministries and functins f gvernment remained intact. It was charged with a largely perfunctry natin building task, given negligible human and financial resurces, nt allwed meaningful liaisn with reginal pwers, and nt integrated with the military cmmand. Effective civil military crdinatin never tk place between ORHA and the US cmmand during r after the war, and its missin was given s little initial pririty that it did nt even cme t Baghdad until April 21, twelve days after US frces n the grunds it did nt have suitable security. Failing nt nly t anticipate the threat f insurgency and utside extremist infiltratin, in spite f significant intelligence warning, but als t deply elements f US frces capable f dealing with cunterinsurgency, civil-military peratins, and natin building as US frces advanced and in the immediate aftermath f the cllapse f the regime. Creating reginal cmmands based n administrative cnvenience, rather than need, and leaving mst f the initial tasks f stability peratins and natin building up t imprvisatin by individual lcal cmmanders wh had minimal r n expert civilian supprt. Replacing ORHA after the fall f Saddam Hussein with the Calitin Prvisinal Authrity (CPA), and suddenly imprvising a vast natin building and stability effrt, recruiting and funding such an peratin with little time fr planning, and then attempting t carry ut the resulting missin alng heavily idelgical lines that attempt t impse American methds and values n Iraq. Placing the CPA and US cmmands in separate areas, creating large, secure znes that islated the US effrt frm Iraqis, and carrying ut nly limited crdinatin with ther Calitin allies. Staffing the CPA largely with peple recruited fr shrt turs and ften chsen n the basis f plitical and idelgical vetting, rather than experience and cmpetence. This failure was cmpunded by a lack f language and area skills and training n the part f mst US military frces, and intelligence capabilities designed t prvide the human intelligence (HUMINT), technical cllectin, analytic capabilities, and fusin centers necessary fr stability, cunterterrrist and cunterinsurgency peratins. A failure t hnestly assess the nature and size f the Iraqi insurgency as it grew and became steadily mre dangerus. Planning fr premature US military withdrawals frm Iraq befre the situatin was clear r secure, with majr reductins initially planned t begin sme three mnths after the fall f Saddam s regime, rather than planning, training, and equipping fr a sustained perid f stability peratins. A failure t react t the wartime cllapse f Iraqi military, security, and plice frces and fcus immediately n creating effective Iraqi frces a failure that placed a majr and avidable burden n US and ther calitin frces and cmpunded the Iraqi feeling that Iraq had been ccupied by hstile frces. Planning fr several years f ccupatin, nce the CPA was created, and fr a situatin where a US-led calitin culd imprves it wn values and judgments abut the Iraqi peple, plitics, ecnmy, and scial structure fr a perid f sme three years rather than expedite the transfer f svereignty back t Iraq as quickly as pssible. The recrd is mixed, but the CPA nly seems t have decided t expedite the transfer f svereignty in Octber 2003, after the insurgency had already becme serius, and its chice f June 2004 fr ding s was largely arbitrary. Even then, it failed t make its plans sufficiently cnvincing t mst f the Iraqi peple. Fresight is always far mre difficult than hindsight. Many, if nt mst, f these prblems hwever, were brught t the attentin f the President, Natinal Security Cuncil,

40 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 8 State Department, Department f Defense, intelligence cmmunity and in interagency frums in the summer and fall f N ne accurately prphesized all f the future, but many inside and utside gvernment warned what it might be. The prblem was nt that the system did nt wrk in prviding many key elements f an accurate assessment, it was that the mst senir plitical and military decisin makers ignred what they felt was negative advice ut f a cmbinatin f sincere belief, idelgical cnvictin, and plitical and bureaucratic cnvenience. Over time, these failures pushed the US t the limit f the grund frces it can easily deply. They have helped cause the death f thusands f Americans and ther Calitin frces after the fall f Saddam, and led t well ver 17,000 wunded. They als helped t kill and wund tens f thusands f Iraqis. They als help make the plitical prblems caused by Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divisins far wrse, made Iraq far mre vulnerable t utside ne-salafi Islamist extremist influences, and laid the grundwrk fr many f the prblems in creating effective Iraqi gvernance and military, security, and plice frces. N ne can claim that all f these US failures were avidable, r Iraq wuld nt have had serius prblems in any case. The fact remains, hwever, that mst such failures were the result f decisins made at the highest levels f US plicy and the direct respnsibility f the President, Vice President, Secretary f Defense, Natinal Security Advisr, Chairman f the Jint Chiefs, and service chiefs.

41 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 9 II. The Evlving Nature f the Insurgency The mistakes the Calitin made befre and during the effrt t drive Saddam Hussein frm pwer were cmpunded by the mistakes it made as the insurgency unflded. The US-led Calitin initially sught t impse its wn rule n Iraq and tried t restrict the develpment f Iraqi armed frces t a tken frce geared t defend Iraq s brders against external aggressin. The Calitin was slw t understand that nly an Iraqi gvernment, and Iraqi frces, wuld be seen as legitimate and avid grwing Iraqi hstility. It failed t understand the scale f the sectarian and ethnic divisins Iraq faced and that it favred Iraqi exiles and the Kurds in ways that push many Sunnis int active ppsitin. Denial as a Methd f Cunter-Insurgency Warfare US plicymakers and many in the US military initially lived in a state f near-denial abut the rise f terrrism and insurgency. The US assumed fr much f the first year after the fall f Saddam Hussein that it was dealing with a limited number f insurgents that Calitin frces wuld defeat well befre the electin. It did nt see the threat level that wuld emerge if it did nt prvide jbs r pensins fr Iraqi career fficers, r c-pt them int the natin building effrt. It was slw t see that sme frm f transitin payments were necessary fr the yung Iraqi sldiers that faced massive, natin-wide unemplyment. The US still failed t acknwledge the true scale f the insurgent threat and the extent t which ppular resentment f Calitin frces wuld rise if it did nt act immediately t rebuild a cnvincing mix f Iraqi military and security frces. The US failed t establish the prper plitical cnditins t reduce Iraqi ppular resentment f the Calitin frces and create a plitical climate that wuld ease the task f replacing them with effective Iraqi frces. It failed t make it clear t the Iraqi peple that the US and Britain had n ecnmic ambitins in Iraq and wuld nt establish permanent bases, r keep Iraqi frces weak t ensure their cntrl. In fact, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the first American Administratr in Iraq, suggested in early 2004 that US frces might remain in Iraq fr the next few decades, adding that securing basing rights fr the US shuld be a tp pririty. 33 During the summer and fall f 2003, hwever Iraqi insurgents emerged as a grwing threat with significant ppular supprt in Arab Sunni areas, and develped a steadily mre sphisticated mix f tactics. In the prcess, a native and freign Islamist extremist threat als develped which increasingly sught t divide Iraq s Sunni Arabs frm its Arab Shi ites, Kurds, and ther Iraqi minrities. The US was slw t react t the grwth f the insurgency in Iraq, t admit it was largely dmestic in character, and t admit it had significant ppular supprt. The US military and intelligence effrt in the field nly began t understand that the terrrist and insurgent threat was serius and grwing in the fall f Senir US fficials and fficers kept referring t the attackers as terrrists, kept issuing estimates that they culd nt number mre than 5,000, and claimed they were a mixture f utside elements and diehard frmer regime lyalists (FRLs) that had little ppular supprt. The US largely ignred the warnings Iraqi pinin plls prvided abut the unppularity f the war and Calitin, and claimed that Calitin plitical, ecnmic, and security effrts were either

42 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 10 successful r wuld sn becme s. In shrt, the US failed t hnestly assess the facts n the grund in a manner reminiscent f Vietnam. The cntinuing US fcus n "FRLs" als ignred the true nature f the insurgency. The US was dealing with a mixture f Iraqi natinalism, Sunni resentment and anger, ppular ppsitin t any frm f Western ccupatin, and a slwly grwing number f freign and Iraqi ne-salafi Sunni Islamist extremists. It als faced a lesser but still significant threat frm Iraqi Shi ite Islamist activists. The prblem was brad supprt, nt a small grup f bitter enders. The US was slw t understand the rle f the media. Iraqi and freign jurnalists prvided an inadvertent (and smetimes deliberate) prpaganda arm, and media cverage f insurgent activity and attacks prvided a de fact cmmand and cmmunicatins net t insurgents. This infrmal net prvided warning, shwed insurgents what tactics did and did nt wrk, and allwed them t crdinate their attacks t reinfrce thse f ther insurgent cells and grups withut frmal ties r crdinatin. The Calitin did nt try t create Iraqi frces with the capability t deal with serius insurgency and security challenges fr mre than a year, and then was slw t put these plans int practice. The US did nt attempt t seriusly train and equip Iraqi frces fr practive security and cunterinsurgency missins until April 2004 nearly a year after the fall f Saddam Hussein and tw-thirds f a year after a majr insurgency prblem began t emerge. 34 It then tk until the fall f 2004 t bring a critical mass f advisrs and military aid tgether fr the army. The risk f sectarian divisins within the Ministry f Interir was ignred fr far t lng and it was nt until the fall f 2005 that the Calitin began t understand just hw critical the plice were as a cmpnent f Iraqi frces. As late as July 2004, sme senir members f the Bush Administratin still grssly understated the seriusness f the insurgency in their public annuncements, and grwing Iraqi hstility t the use f Calitin frces. Administratin spkesmen still talked abut a cre insurgent frce f nly 5,000, when many Calitin experts n the grund in Iraq saw the cre as cmprised f at least 12,000-16,000. They als ignred signs f Sunni versus Shi ite tensin, and grwing ethnic tensin in the nrth. Baseline/Pst-Cnflict: 1 May 2003 Fall 2003 If ne lks at the initial pattern f attacks, the insurgency was slw t gather mmentum, and initially was dminated largely by frmer regime lyalists. Mst f the early militants seem t have been frmer Saddam Hussein lyalists (FRLs), r Iraqi Sunni natinalists, with little impact by Iraqi Islamist extremists r freign jihadists. It was tapes frm Saddam Hussein and Ba athists that urged militants t cntinue fighting, rather than tapes frm Abu Musab Zarqawi, were bradcast arund the cuntry. The bulk f the mney came frm Ba athist surces, and mst training cadres and leaders were still largely FRLs. Much f the initial vilence during May and June 2003 was centered n Fallujah and Baghdad, in the area knwn as the Sunni triangle. Attacks against msques and il facilities were targets frm the start. S was the targeting f lcal Iraqi fficials and recruits. In general, hwever, the insurgents cncentrated n Calitin targets, NGOs, and freign diplmats. A chrnlgy f sme f the early incidents illustrates bth hw the insurgency emerged and the types f attacks insurgents carried ut in the initial mnths fllwing the fall f Saddam's regime:

43 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 11 May 1, 2003: President Gerge W. Bush declares an end t majr cmbat peratins in Iraq. Seven U.S. sldiers were wunded in a grenade attack upn an American base in Fallujah, a strnghld fr Saddam Hussein lyalists. Earlier, U.S. trps killed 15 civilians at a prtest in the city. May 27, 2003: Tw U.S. sldiers die in an rganized attack n an army checkpint in Fallujah. June 15, 2003: Hundreds f American sldiers swept thrugh Fallujah in an peratin called Desert Scrpin. The peratin is intended t defeat rganized Iraqi resistance. June 30, 2003: Three blasts rck Fallujah. One, at the Al-Hassan msque, kills a Muslim cleric and six thelgy students, and injures 15 thers. U.S. Central Cmmand reprts that smething like an ammunitin dump explded near the msque. July 1, 2003: An explsin destrys a Sunni msque in Fallujah, killing at least 10 Iraqis, including the chief cleric, and injuring fur thers. Many Iraqis blame an American missile fr the destructin and chant, America is the enemy f Gd. July 5, 2003: An explsin at a plice-training center in Ramadi killed seven Iraqi plice recruits and wunded 40. July 16, 2003: Attacks in western Iraq claim the lives f a pr-u.s. mayr and his sn. August 7, 2003: A car bmb expldes utside the Jrdanian embassy in Baghdad, killing at least 15 peple and wunding dzens. August 15, 2003: Sabteurs blw up a crude il exprt pipeline in nrthern Iraq, igniting a fire and disrupting il exprts t Turkey. August 19, 2003: A truck bmb expldes utside U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24 peple, including the head f the U.N. missin, Sergi Vieira de Mell. Mre than 100 were injured. The dead als include the Iraqi crdinatr fr the U.N. children's fund, UNICEF, and several Wrld Bank staffers. August 29, 2003: An explsin at a Najaf msque kills 95, including ne f Iraq s mst prminent Shi ite leaders, Ayatllah Muhammad Baqr al-hakim. Anther 125 are wunded. As time passed, and the insurgents became mre rganized, the lethality and frequency f attacks increased. There were mre attacks n US and Calitin frces, sme by members f newly frmed militias raming the streets f Iraq s majr cities. Nevertheless, US and Calitin casualties were still limited. A ttal f 37 US sldiers were killed in May. The death tll fr US trps in June was 30. In July the death tll reached 47, but leveled ff in August and September t 35 and 30 respectively. The mnthly death tll was still nly 43 in Octber, althugh it suddenly rse t 82 in Nvember, almst dubling frm previus mnths. The US initially perceived many f the insurgent attacks as part f the nrmal breakdwn in law and rder fllwing any war and nt as the seeds f an insurgency. It als saw the slutin as finding new jbs fr the militias rather than dealing with actual insurgent ppsitin As a result, the US smetimes fcused n crime rather than the insurgents, and the sught t avid cnfrnting the militias and fcused n c-pting them. Sldiers were under direct rders t nly cnfiscate thse weapns they came acrss while n patrl. A May 5, 2003 article in The Miami Herald described the rle f the militias at this time as fllws: 35 Thusands f gunmen appear each Friday in the slum frmerly knwn as Saddam City, with the blessings f sme Shi ite clerics, stensibly t prtect wrshipers. Members, wh say they answer t the sheiks at the Hikma msque, claim they're 5,000 t 6,000 strng and n guard against attacks frm any leftver Fedayeen Saddam r ther Ba'ath Party lyalists.

44 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 12 "I am taking rders frm the msque. I am a sldier," said Samer Elias, 28, a frmer Iraqi Army infantryman cmmanding a checkpint a few blcks frm the msque. Kurdish plitical parties have psted a few armed fighters at their Baghdad ffices t inspect all visitrs and guard against attack. They're the vanguard f an estimated 30,000 Kurdish frces, rughly 15,000 each in the Kurdish Demcratic Party and Patritic Unin f Kurdistan, lyal t Massud Barzani and Jalal Talibani, at times rival warlrds fr leadership f Kurdish nrthern Iraq. But the best-rganized, mst evident Iraqi militia is the 1,800-strng Free Iraqi Frces wh answer t Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi Natinal Cngress, the Pentagn-backed ppsitin mvement that set up shp at the Iraqi Hunting Club in the desirable Mansur District. The Insurgency Becmes Serius: Fall t End 2003 Fcused killings f Iraqi fficials and recruits, and anti-us/calitin vilence, had clearly becme serius by Octber and Nvember US frces faced an average f attacks per day during this perid. The level f sphisticatin f attacks als increased steadily. The first crdinated suicide bmbing ccurred in Octber The fllwing mnth, militants sht dwn tw US helicpters. Tgether, these incidents signaled the start f a much mre serius insurgency. Insurgent attacks during this perid included: Octber 9, 2003: A suicide bmber drve his car int a plice statin in Baghdad, killing nine. Tw U.S. sldiers die and fur are injured in an ambush in Baghdad. Octber 12, 2003: A suicide car bmbing near the Baghdad Htel killed eight and wunded 32. Octber 14, 2003: A suicide car bmb explded utside the Turkish embassy in Baghdad, killing ne Iraqi and wunding at least 13. Octber 17, 2003: Three U.S. sldiers and at least seven Iraqis are killed in a gun battle utside the ffice f a Shia cleric in Karbala. Octber 19, 2003: Tw American sldiers died in an ambush utside Kirkuk. Octber 26, 2003: A rcket hit the Rashid htel in Baghdad, narrwly missing Paul Wlfwitz, the American deputy secretary f defense. A U.S. clnel died; 18 thers were wunded. Octber 27, 2003: Fur crdinated suicide attacks in Baghdad killed 43 and wunded mre than 200. The targets were the headquarters f the Red Crescent (Islamic Red Crss) and three plice statins. It was the bldiest day since the fall f Saddam Hussein s regime. Nvember 2, 2003: In the single deadliest strike n U.S. frces since the war began, guerrillas sht dwn an American Chink helicpter suth f Fallujah, killing 16 U.S. sldiers and injuring 21 thers. Nvember 7, 2003: Six U.S. sldiers died when their Black Hawk helicpter crashed after being struck by a rcket-prpelled grenade. Nvember 12, 2003: A car bmb utside an Italian military plice statin in Nasiriya killed 18 Italian fficers and at least eight Iraqis. The U.S. launched Operatin Irn Hammer against suspected Hussein lyalists. Nvember 21, 2003: A suicide bmbing utside the PUK ffice in Kirkuk killed fur. Nvember 29, 2003: Tw U.S. sldiers, seven Spanish intelligence fficers, tw Japanese diplmats, and a Clmbian il wrker died in separate guerrilla attacks. Nvember 30, 2003: U.S. frces repelled three ambushes n American cnvys in Samarra, killing 46 Iraqis and capturing eight. The capture f Saddam Hussein utside Tikrit in early December 2003 did nt reduce the level f insurgent vilence. The US death tll fr December was 40. By January 31, US fatalities frm

45 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 13 the pst-cmbat perid numbered 381, cmpared t 138 frm the cmbat phase f hstilities. Between December and January, insurgents sht dwn five US military helicpters. Serius Fighting in the Pre-Transfer f Pwer Perid: Winter-Spring 2004 The lethality and sphisticatin f insurgency attacks increased dramatically in February and March 2004, and fcused mre n ethnic and sectarian targets: February 1, 2004: 109 peple died and 247 are wunded in tw suicide attacks during celebratins at the headquarters f tw leading Kurdish parties in Irbil. One American sldier was killed and 12 were wunded in a rcket attack. 20 peple trying t lt an ammunitins dump in suthwestern Iraq were killed when the munitins unexpectedly explde. February 10, 2004: A car bmb explded utside a plice statin in Iskandariya, killing at least 55 and wunding up t 65. February 11, 2004: In yet anther attempt t disrupt the creatin f security frces, a suicide bmber rammed a car packed with explsives int a crwd f Iraqi Army recruits in central Baghdad, killing at least 47 and wunding 50 thers. February 14, 2004: Rughly 70 guerrillas firing rckets, mrtars and machineguns raided plice headquarters and the Iraqi Civil Defense Crps (ICDC) in Fallujah in an effrt t free freign prisners. 15 plicemen, fur insurgents and at least fur civilians died in the attack. The dead guerrillas appeared t be Lebanese and Iranian natinals. At least 70 prisners escaped, many 18 by ne accunt fled with the attackers. February 23, 2004: At least 10 peple were killed and ver 35 injured when a car bmb explded utside a Kirkuk plice statin. March 2, 2004: In the bldiest day in Iraq since the end f the war, at least five bmbs explded near Shi ite religius ceremnies in Baghdad and Karbala as hundreds f thusands f pilgrims packed the streets fr the Ashura ceremny. At least 270 peple died; 573 were wunded. March 9, 2004: Iraqi plicemen murdered tw CPA fficials and their Iraqi translatr utside Baghdad. The targeting killings were the first American civilian deaths in Iraq. March 23, 2004: 11 Iraqi plicemen were killed in separate attacks in Kirkuk and Hillah. March 24, 2004: Fallujah cntinued t be a htbed f insurgent activity, as attackers ambushed a U.S. military patrl, killing three civilians and wunding tw American sldiers. Lcal Iraqi security frces, including plice recruits, were signaled ut fr attack, and this initially reduced Calitin casualties. US fatalities fr the mnth f February fell t 21; the lwest since May But March prduced the secnd highest death tll fr US trps-52- since the end f the war. Pre-Svereignty: 1 April 28 June 2004 By early spring 2004, the insurgency had evlved int a tw-prnged ffensive. Calitin frces nw faced a war n tw frnts: against the Sunnis in central Iraq and against the Shi ites in the suth. At the same time, Sunni Islamist extremist grups began t play a mre active rle, bth in terms f attacks and in circulating prpaganda, tapes, and training aids. The Shi ite threat was largely frm the Mqtada al-sadr, a Shi ite cleric. In early April, his fllwers seized cntrl f several cities. Vilent clashes between US frces and Shi ite militias erupted in Kufa, Najaf and Qut.

46 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 14 US frces cntinued t battle Sunni insurgents in Fallujah and elsewhere in the Sunni Triangle. The perid between April and June 2004 was marked by frequent battles between US and insurgent frces and had clearly becme guerilla war rather than a terrrist campaign. The number f attacks against Iraqi civilians decreased nticeably, as insurgents cncentrated their effrts n US frces. Because f the grwing number f clashes between insurgents and Calitin frces, US fatalities fr the mnth f April increased t 137, mre than the previus three mnths cmbined. US fatalities fr the mnth f May were 80. Sme f the intensity f the fighting was defused, hwever, when Sadr endrsed the Iraqi Interim Gvernment and urged his fllwers t adhere t a previusly negtiated ceasefire. Early Svereignty: 29 June 26 Nvember 2004 The transfer f pwer frm the CPA t the interim Iraqi gvernment did mre t intensity the insurgency and braden the base f insurgent attacks than reduce tensin r legitimize the appinted Iraqi gvernment. At least 162 US sldiers were killed in the three mnths immediately fllwing the June 28 handver; mre than the entire number killed during the war itself. Insurgents cntinued their attacks against Calitin frces int the fall f 2004, killing 81 US sldiers in September and 65 in Octber. In August, mre than 1,100 US trps were injured; the highest mnthly ttal since the start f the US led invasin. Anther grim milestne was passed n September 7, 2004, when US military fatalities reached 1,000. Shifts in the Nature f the Insurgency This perid was marked by a dramatic increase in the rle f Ne-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents. A number f such grups, several pledging allegiance t Zarqawi, emerged during the fall f There were als signs that the insurgents had penetrated Iraqi security frces. On Octber 23, insurgents dressed in Iraqi plice unifrms killed 49 Iraqi Army recruits as they returned frm a training missin with US frces. The insurgents als increased the number f kidnappings f freigners in an attempt t get cuntries t withdraw frm the Calitin. In a seven-week perid in September and Octber, 2 Italian aid wrkers; a Japanese civilian; and the British-Iraqi directr f CARE internatinal, in additin t several American and British cntractrs were kidnapped. Sme are released; thers are beheaded. The first majr battle between US and insurgent frces, many f which were discvered t be Islamists, als tk place during this perid. In early Nvember, US and tken Iraqi frces entered Fallujah in a majr assault designed t rid the city f insurgents. The fighting was smetimes intense and led t the destructin f parts f the city. The insurgents tk heavy casualties and were frced t flee the city, but fund that Iraqi frces were nt yet ready fr serius fighting r capable f securing the city and the Iraqi gvernment was nt yet capable f establishing an effective presence r gvernance. The end result undercut much f the impact f Calitin victry and exacerbated tensins between Sunnis and the Shi ite dminated gvernment. Despite the Calitin ffensive in Fallujah, insurgent activity rse elsewhere in the cuntry. The nging insurgent attacks in Baghdad, Msul, Balad and the Sunni Triangle demnstrated the strength f the Zarqawi netwrk and the Iraqi insurgency. On Nvember 14, Fallujah fell t

47 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 15 Calitin frces. The US military suffered 38 fatalities and mre than 245 casualties. Between 1,200-1,600 insurgents were killed. Many mre insurgents fled the city prir t the peratin. Nvember was the deadliest mnth fr American trps since the invasin. Althugh 137 US sldiers were killed, fewer than half f them were killed in the Fallujah attack, signaling insurgents were resuming their ffensive n US frces everywhere. Sunni insurgents repeatedly shwed they culd strike in ethnically mixed and Shi ite dminated cities like Baghdad, Msul and Basra, in spite f US and Iraqi ffensives. Increasingly bld and deadly insurgent attacks killed mre than 80 Iraqis in a three-day perid in early December. In ne f the mre deadly incidents, insurgents attacked a bus f unarmed Iraqi civilian cntractrs, killing 17. In Baghdad, insurgents struck the Green Zne tw days in a rw, killing almst twenty and wunding several dzen. On December 15, insurgents attempted t verrun tw plice statins in Msul but were repelled by Iraqi plice and Natinal Guards. One week later, insurgents munted a secnd attack, this time n an Iraqi military utpst in Msul. The security presence in Msul remained fragile after 80% f the plice frce abandned their pst in Nvember due t munting security fears. The December 21 bmbing f a US military mess tent in Msul, which killed at least 22 peple, including 18 Americans, further demnstrated the reach f the insurgents during the winter The US death tll fr December was 72. The rad frm Baghdad t the internatinal airprt utside the city became a ppular target fr insurgents, and b a symbl f the Calitin and Iraqi gvernment s prblems in bringing security t Iraq in late Iraqis referred t the rute as Death Street and IED alley, while US frces called it Rute Irish. 36 The cntinued vilence in Sunni neighbrhds like Amariya, Hamra, Jihad, and Qaddisiya caused senir fficials t use armred buses called Rhins and helicpters when traveling in the area. 37 Mre Attacks n Iraqis The insurgents stepped up their attacks n Iraqis. In early fall, the Iraqi Health Ministry reprted that nearly 3,200 Iraqi civilians had been killed since April. September and Octber 2004 prved t be particularly bldy mnths, with mre than 34 car bmb attacks thrughut the cuntry-the highest mnthly ttal since the US invasin-ccurring in September alne. Other attacks during this perid included: September 6, 2004: In Fallujah, a car bmb killed seven US Marines and three Iraqi sldiers. September 7, 2004: One American sldier and 33 Iraqi insurgents were killed in clashes in Sadr City. September 12, 2004: 80 civilians were killed by insurgents in a 24 hur perid. Many f the attacks were synchrnized bmbings; a grup calling itself Unity and Jihad, which is reprtedly led by Zarqawi, claimed respnsibility fr many f the attacks. September 14, 2004: A car bmb utside Iraq s Army headquarters in Baghdad killed 47 recruits. 12 plicemen were gunned dwn in drive-by shting in Baquba. Zarqawi claimed respnsibility fr bth attacks. September 17, 2004: A suicide car bmb killed at least 13 peple near a plice checkpint in Baghdad. Elsewhere in Baghdad, US sldiers clashed with insurgents. September 30, 2004: Tw car bmbs ripped thrugh a crwd celebrating the pening f a new sewer plant, killing 41 Iraqis, including at least 34 children; 139 were wunded.

48 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 16 Octber 4, 2004: Three car bmbs tw in Baghdad and ne in Msul explded, killing 26 peple and injuring 100. Octber 7, 2004: Tw rckets struck the Sheratn Baghdad htel. Octber 10, 2004: At least 10 Iraqis died in explsins near the il ministry and plice academy. A suicide bmber fatally wunded a U.S. sldier utside the Ministry f Culture in Baghdad. Octber 12, 2004: Six American trps died frm hstile fire in Baghdad and in Al Anbar Prvince. Octber 13, 2004: Bmbs in Baghdad, Msul and the Al Anbar regin killed seven U.S. sldiers. Octber 14, 2004: Fr the first time since the end f the war, insurgents penetrated the heavily frtified Green Zne in Baghdad, killing fur Americans and six Iraqis. Octber 15, 2004: Car bmbs near the Syrian brder and in Msul killed five American trps. Octber 23, 2004: Insurgents dressed as plice fficers executed 49 newly trained Iraqi sldiers n a remte rad in eastern Iraq. Octber 25, 2004: An explsin near the Australian embassy in Baghdad killed three Iraqi and injured tw Australian sldiers. Octber 28, 2004: A militant grup called The Army f Ansar al-sunna executed 11 Iraqi security fficers taken hstage suth f Baghdad. The grup, which was blamed fr numerus beheadings, was an ffsht f Ansar al-islam. Octber 30, 2004: In the deadliest day fr American frces in six mnths, nine Marines were killed and nine mre were injured in insurgent attacks in the Al Anbar prvince. At least 25 Iraqi civilians died frm insurgent vilence and frm reckless fire by Iraqi security frces. Seven died when insurgents attacked the Al Arabiya news netwrk. A previusly unknwn grup calling itself The 1920 Revlutin Brigades tk respnsibility fr the attack. Octber 31, 2004: Insurgents fired a rcket at a Tikrit htel, killing 15 Iraqis and wunding eight. Estimating the Impact f the Insurgency thrugh Octber 2004 There are n reliable unclassified cunts f insurgent attacks and incidents, r f the casualties n bth sides during this perid. N recrd seems t have been kept f many cases f individual killings, disappearances, and kidnappings and there is n clear basis fr identifying wh was respnsible r whether insurgent actin was invlved, r the attack was simply a revenge killing r crime. Estimates f insurgent casualties are tenuus at best, and in all cases invlving Iraqis the data that are available tend t fcus n deaths and nt wunded -- particularly if the wunded did nt require hspitalizatin. The NGO Crdinating Cmmittee n Iraq did, hwever, make useful rugh estimates f the patterns f attack between September 2003 and Octber These patterns seem bradly crrect and bth illustrate key patterns in the fighting, and the need fr cmpetent and cmbatcapable Iraqi gvernment military, security, and plice frces: Frm September 2003 thrugh Octber 2004, there was a rugh balance between the three primary methds f attack, namely imprvised explsive devices (IEDs), direct fire, and indirect fire, with a cnsistent but much smaller number f vehicle-brne imprvised explsive devices (VBIED). Numbers f attacks varied significantly by mnth. There was a slw decline frm well ver 400 attacks each by imprvised explsive devices (IEDs), direct fire weapns, and indirect fire weapns t arund 300. There was, hwever, a slw increase in attacks using VBIEDs. Attack distributin varied, with a steadily rising number f attacks in the area f Msul in the nrth. Baghdad, hwever, was the scene f rughly twice as many attacks and incidents as the ther gvernrates,

49 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 17 with a mnth n average. Al Anbar, Salah-al-din, and Ninewah have had rughly ne-third t ne half as many. Babil and Diyala average arund 100 per mnth, lwer levels f attack have taken place in Tamin and Basra. Attacks fit a brad pattern during the day, althugh 60% f the attacks reprted are unspecified. Of thse that d have a specific time reprted, 10% are in the mrning, 11% are in the afternn, and 19% are at night. A rugh estimate f targets and casualties frm September 2003 t Octber 2004 is shwn in Figure II.1, and helps illustrate the cntinuing diversity f the attacks and their targets during the first perids f the insurgency: Figure II. 1: Illustrative Patterns in Targeting and Casualties: September 2003-Octber 2004 Target Number f Attacks/Incidents Killed Wunded Calitin Frces Calitin Air Cnvy CPA/US Officials/Green Zne Diplmatic Missin Lcal Authrity Cntractr Civilian Criminal & Suspect ICDC Kurds Army Plice UN IO NGO Jurnalist Interpreter Public Prperty Unspecified The Curse f the Insurgency in Early 2005 The insurgents made new effrts t attack bth Iraq plitical figures and Iraqi frces during the perid befre the January 30, 2005 electin There were many attacks n electin candidates and fficials, and several hundred attempted and successful attacks during the campaign. In typical attack n January 16, insurgents try t assassinate Salama al-khafaji, a candidate fr the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). Khafaji survived the attack, but many ther attacks were successful. The US lst 24 men and 60 were wunded in ne attack n a mess tent in Msul n December 21, Sme 68 Iraqis were killed in attacks in Karbala and Najaf a few days earlier, and sme 175 wunded. 39 Calitin frces, backed by elements f Iraqi frces, were able t secure the cuntry n electin day, but nly by puring frces int the field and largely shutting dwn mst mvements alng Iraqi rads and in Iraqi cities. During the first tw weeks f 2005, insurgent attacks included:

50 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 18 January 2, 2005: A suicide bmber killed 18 Natinal Guardsmen and a civilian in Balad. January 4, 2005: Insurgents assassinated the gvernr f Baghdad prvince. Zarqawi s grup, calling itself Al Qa ida in Iraq, claimed respnsibility. Attacks thrughut the cuntry left five U.S. and 13 Iraqi servicemen dead. January 10, 2005: Insurgents gunned dwn Baghdad s deputy plice chief and his sn. Tw U.S. sldiers died when a radside bmb explded in Baghdad. January 12, 2005: An ambush n a U.S.-Iraqi cnvy in Msul killed tw Iraqi sldiers. January 13, 2005: A senir aide t Ayatllah Ali Sistani was assassinated in Salman Pak, a city suth f Baghdad. Gunmen kill the directr f a Baghdad electin center. The Uncertain Impact f the January 30, 2005 Electin While Sunnis largely byctted the January 30, 2005 electin, it did have brad enugh Shi'ite and Kurdish supprt t cnvince sme bservers that the insurgency was weakening, and the Sunnis had n chice ther than t jin the Iraqi plitical prcess. Fr example, the Iraqi Interim Gvernment claimed in early 2005 that sme 16 f Iraq s 18 prvinces were secure. While these claims were smewhat exaggerated, there was a significant level f security in 10 t 12 prvinces. Hwever, the insurgency was clearly nt defeated, and was still capable f attacks in suppsedly safe Shi ite and Kurdish areas. US intelligence experts were far less sanguine. Vice Admiral Lwell E. Jacby, the Directr f the Defense Intelligence Agency, summarized the state f the insurgency as fllws in February 2005: 40 The insurgency in Iraq has grwn in size and cmplexity ver the past year. Attacks numbered apprximately 25 per day ne year ag. Tday, they average in the 60s. Insurgents have demnstrated their ability t increase attacks arund key events such as the Iraqi Interim Gvernment (IIG) transfer f pwer, Ramadan, and the recent electin. Attacks n Iraq s electin day reached apprximately 300, duble the previus ne-day s high f apprximately 150 reached during last year s Ramadan, The pattern f attacks remains the same as last year. Apprximately 80 percent f all attacks ccur in Sunni dminated central Iraq. The Kurdish nrth and Shi'a suth remain relatively calm. Calitin frces cntinue t be the primary targets. Iraqi Security Frces and Iraqi Interim Gvernment (IIG) fficials are attacked t intimidate the Iraqi peple and undermine cntrl and legitimacy. Attacks against freign natinals are intended t intimidate nn-gvernment rganizatins and cntractrs and inhibit recnstructin and recvery. Attacks against the cuntry s infrastructure, especially electricity and the il industry, are intended t stall ecnmic recvery, increase ppular discntent, and further undermine supprt fr the IIG and Calitin. Recent plls shw cnfidence in the Iraqi Interim Gvernment remains high in Kurdish cmmunities and lw in Sunni areas. Large majrities acrss all grups ppsed attacks n Iraqi Security Frces and Iraqi and freign civilians. Majrities f all grups placed great imprtance in the electin. Sunni cncern ver electin security likely explains the relatively pr shwing by the Sunni electrate in cmparisn with the Shi'a and Kurdish grups. Cnfidence in Calitin Frces is lw. Mst Iraqis see them as ccupiers and a majr cause f the insurgency. We believe Sunni Arabs, dminated by Ba athist and Frmer Regime Elements (FRE), cmprmise the cre f the insurgency. Ba athist/fre and Sunni Arab netwrks are likely cllabrating, prviding funds and guidance acrss family, tribal, religius and peer grup lines. Sme crdinatin between Sunni and Shi'a grups is als likely. Militant Shi'a elements, including thse assciated with Muqtada al Sadr, have peridically fught the Calitin. Fllwing the latest rund f fighting last August and September, we judge Sadr s frces are rearming, re-rganizing and training. Sadr is keeping his ptins pen t either participate in the plitical prcess r emply his frces. Shi'a militants will remain a significant threat t the plitical prcess and fractures within the Shi'a cmmunity are a cncern.

51 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 19 Jihadists, such as al-qa'ida perative Abu Musab al Zarqawi, are respnsible fr many high-prfile attacks. While Jihadist activity accunts fr nly a factin f the verall vilence, the strategic and symblic nature f their attacks, cmbined with effective Infrmatin Operatins, has a disprprtinate impact. Freign fighters are a small cmpnent f the insurgency and cmprise a very small percentage f all detainees. Syrian, Saudi, Egyptian, Jrdanian and Iranian natinals make up the majrity f freign fighters. Fighters, arms and ther supplies cntinue t enter Iraq frm virtually all f its neighbrs despite increased brder security. Insurgent grups will cntinue t use vilence t attempt t prtect Sunni Arab interests and regain dminance, prvke civil war, and/r serve the interests f Ne-Salafi Sunni extremism. Subversin and infiltratin f emerging gvernment institutins, security and intelligence services will be a majr prblem fr the new gvernment. Jihadists will cntinue t attack in Iraq in pursuit f their lng-term gals. Challenges t recnstructin, ecnmic develpment and emplyment will cntinue. The keys t success will remain imprving security with an Iraqi lead, rebuilding the civil infrastructure and ecnmy and creating a plitical prcess that all majr ethnic and sectarian grups see as legitimate. Nevertheless, Administratin spkespersns and several senir US fficers claimed that the insurgency was lsing grund. This, in part, was the result f the fact the US plicymakers still fcused mre n the number f ex-baathist leaders and insurgents it killed r captured at a time the insurgency was becming steadily mre Islamist extremist. In making such claims, US surces nted that prir t the Iraqi electin: 41 Sme twns and cities have been the scene f attacks each week since late August. Many are utside the "Sunni Triangle" and Al Anbar Prvince. The mst vilent city in terms f number f majr incidents has been Baghdad, with attacks a week. Msul is secnd with 4-13 majr attacks per week. The level f attacks in Basra has been relatively lw by cmparisn, but peaks f 7 attacks per week have ccurred in Basra and its envirns. In cntrast, they stated that after the Iraqi electin: Attacks against US sldiers per day have fallen t between 40 and 50. US fficials state that this is apprximately ½ the level ne year ag. Apprximately ½ f the attacks that due ccur cause n casualties r prperty damage. A New Resurgence f Sectarian Vilence By February 2005, it was clear that the vilence had nt abated. Mre than 130 Iraqis were killed in a 7-day perid in early February: February 3, 2005: Insurgents killed 12 Iraqi sldiers in an ambush suth f Kirkuk, executing the unarmed men ne by ne in the street. Five plicemen and a Natinal Guardsman were killed in Baghdad. February 6, 2005: Insurgents attacked a cnvy f trucks hauling cars destined fr Iraq s Ministry f the Interir. The truck drivers were kidnapped and the cars destryed. February 7, 2005: At least 27 Iraqis died in tw suicide bmbings, ne targeted plicemen cllecting paychecks near a Msul hspital, the ther a plice pst in Baquba. February 8, 2005: A suicide bmb struck Baghdad s Natinal Guard vlunteer center, killing at least 20 ptential recruits. February 9, 2005: Masked gunmen killed a televisin crrespndent wrking fr the American-funded netwrk Al Hurra and his 3-year-ld sn in Basra.

52 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 20 In Baghdad, insurgents assassinated a directr f the Ministry f Husing and three Kurdistan Demcratic Party fficials. Zarqawi s grup claimed respnsibility. 10 British sldiers died when a C-130 crashed. February 10, 2005: On the first day f the Muslim New Year, insurgent vilence claimed mre than 50 lives thrughut Iraq. February 11, 2005: Insurgents attacked three Shi ite targets a msque and tw bakeries in central Iraq, killing at least 21. What was equally clear was that the insurgents had established a pattern f attacks designed t divide Iraq alng sectarian and ethnic lines. The drive t push Iraqi twards an intense and fullscale civil war was already underway, and had actually begun in This pattern becmes all t clear frm a chrnlgy f the key suicide bmbings t date: Aug. 19, 2003: A truck bmb expldes utside the U.N. headquarters building in Baghdad, killing 22 peple. Aug. 29, 2003: A car bmb expldes utside msque in Najaf, killing mre than 85 peple, including Shi ite leader Ayatllah Mhammed Baqir al-hakim. Althugh fficials never gave a final death tll, there were suspicins it may have been higher. Oct. 27, 2003: Fur suicide bmbings target Internatinal Red Crss headquarters and fur Iraqi plice statins in Baghdad, killing 40 peple, mstly Iraqis. Feb. 1, 2004: Twin suicide bmbers kill 109 peple in tw Kurdish party ffices in Irbil. Feb. 10, 2004: Suicide bmber expldes a trucklad f explsives utside a plice statin in Iskandariyah, killing 53 peple. Feb. 11, 2004: Suicide attacker blws up a car packed with explsives in a crwd f Iraqis waiting utside an army recruiting center in Baghdad, killing 47 peple. March 2, 2004: Crdinated blasts frm suicide bmbers, mrtars and planted explsives strike Shi ite Muslim shrines in Karbala and in Baghdad, killing at least 181 and wunding 573. April 21, 2004: Five blasts near plice statins and plice academy in suthern city f Basra kill at least 55 peple. July 29, 2004: A suicide car bmb devastates a busy street in Baquba, killing 70 peple. Aug. 26, 2004: A mrtar barrage slams int a msque filled with Iraqis preparing t march n the embattled city f Najaf, killing 27 peple and wunding 63. Sept. 14, 2004: A car bmb rips thrugh a busy market near a Baghdad plice headquarters where Iraqis were waiting t apply fr jbs, and gunmen pen fire n a van carrying plice hme frm wrk in Baquba, killing at least 59 peple ttal and wunding at least 114. Sept. 30, 2004: A series f bmbs in Baghdad's al-amel neighbrhd kill 35 children and seven adults as U.S. trps hand ut candy at a gvernment ceremny t inaugurate a new sewage treatment plant. Dec. 19, 2004: Car bmbs tear thrugh a Najaf funeral prcessin and Karbala's main bus statin, killing at least 60 peple and wunding mre than 120 in the tw Shi ite hly cities. Feb. 8, 2005: A suicide bmber blws himself up in the middle f a crwd f army recruits, killing 21 peple. Feb. 18, 2005: Tw suicide bmbers attack tw msques, leaving 28 peple dead, while an explsin near a Shi ite ceremny kills tw ther peple. Feb. 28, 2005: A suicide car bmber targets mstly Shi ite plice and Natinal Guard recruits in Hillah, killing 125 and wunding mre than 140. Sme f the dead and injured are at a nearby market.

53 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 21 March 10, 2005: A suicide bmber blws himself up at a Shi ite msque during a funeral in the nrthern city f Msul, killing at least 47 peple and wunding mre than 100. April 24, 2005: Insurgents stage crdinated duble-bmbings in Tikrit and a Shi ite neighbrhd in Baghdad, killing a ttal f 29 Iraqis and injuring 74. May 1, 2005: A car bmb bliterates a tent crwded with murners fr the funeral f a Kurdish fficial in the nrthern city f Tal Afar, killing 25 peple and wunding mre than 50. May 4, 2005: Bmb expldes amng Iraqi civilians applying fr plice jbs in Kurdish city f Irbil, killing 60 peple and wunding sme 150. July 16, 2005: Suicide bmber detnates explsives strapped t his bdy at a gas statin near a Shi ite msque in central city f Musayyib, blwing up a fuel tanker and killing at least 54 peple and wunded it least 82. Even s, the US cntinued t make effrts t spin the curse f the insurgency in a favrable way. On February 17, 2005, Secretary f Defense Rumsfeld tld the Senate Armed Service Cmmittee that classified estimates n the size f the insurgency were nt static, but rather a mving target. In the same sessin, General Richard Myers, Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff, als avided hard numbers but described the insurgency as having limited capabilities; meaning that the insurgency culd nw "nly" munt arund 50 t 60 attacks n any given day. Lt. General Jhn F. Sattler, the head f the USMC Expeditinary Frce claimed in March that insurgent attacks were averaging nly 10 per day, with tw prducing significant casualties, versus 25 per day, with five prducing significant casualties, befre the battle f Fallujah in Nvember Warnings that Iraqi Frces Culd Feed the Insurgency There als were early warnings that the effrt t create Iraqi frces culd feed the insurgency unless truly natinal frces were created that did nt abuse Iraqi civilians r supprt sectarian and ethnic causes. The US State Department human rights reprt fr 2004 nted that Iraqi frces must perate in a climate f extrardinary vilence and extremism n the part f their ppnents, and make prtecting Iraqi civilians their primary missin. It als, hwever, sunded an imprtant warning abut the actins f Iraqi plice, security, and Natinal Guard actins thrugh December 31, 2004: 42 With the nging insurgency limiting access t infrmatin, a number f instances in the Reprt have been difficult t verify. Hwever, there were reprts f arbitrary deprivatin f life, trture, impunity, and pr prisn cnditins--particularly in pretrial detentin facilities--and arbitrary arrest and detentin. There remained unreslved prblems relating t the large number f Internally Displaced Persns (IDPs). Crruptin at all levels f the Gvernment remained a prblem. Sme aspects f the judicial system were dysfunctinal, and there were reprts that the judiciary was subject t external influence. The exercise f labr rights remained limited, largely due t vilence, unemplyment, and maladapted rganizatinal structures and laws; hwever, with internatinal assistance, sme prgress was underway at year's end. With the nging insurgency, there was a climate f extreme vilence in which persns were killed fr plitical and ther reasns. There were ccasinal reprts f killings particularly at the lcal level by the Gvernment r its agents, which may have been plitically mtivated. In early December, Basrah plice reprted that fficers in the Internal Affairs Unit were invlved in the killings f 10 members f the Ba'ath Party. Basrah plice als reprted that the same Internal Affairs Unit fficers were invlved in the killings f a mther and daughter accused f engaging in prstitutin. The Basrah Chief f Intelligence was remved frm his psitin as a result f the accusatins; hwever, he retained cmmand f the Internal Affairs Unit. An MOI investigatin int the Basrah allegatins was nging at year's end. Other instances reflected arbitrary actins by gvernment agents. Fr example, n Octber 16, Baghdad plice arrested, interrgated, and killed 12 kidnappers f 3 plice fficers.

54 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 22 The TAL expressly prhibits trture in all its frms under all circumstances, as well as cruel, inhuman, r degrading treatment. Accrding t Human Rights Watch (HRW), during this reprting perid, trture and ill treatment f detainees by plice was cmmnplace. In interviews with 90 prisners cnducted frm August t Octber, 72 claimed that they had been trtured r mistreated. The reprted abuses included sme instances f beatings with cables and hsepipes, electric shcks t their earlbes and genitals, fd and water deprivatin, and vercrwding in standing rm nly cells. Additinally, HRW reprted that specialized agencies, including the Majr Crimes Unit, Criminal Intelligence, Internal Affairs and pssibly the Intelligence Service, were respnsible fr pretrial irregularities, such as arrest withut warrant, lengthy perids f detentin befre referral t an investigative judge, and the denial f cntact with family and legal cunsel. Althugh detainees were primarily criminal suspects, they als included thers, such as members f the Mahdi Militia and juveniles, wh smetimes were caught in arrest sweeps. There were instances f illegal treatment f detainees. Fr example, n Nvember 1, Baghdad plice arrested tw Calitin Frce citizen interpreters n charges invlving the illegal use f small arms. After their arrest, plice bund the detainees' arms behind them, pulling them upward with a rpe and cutting ff their circulatin. This treatment was fllwed by beatings ver a 48-hur perid with a steel cable, in an effrt t make the detainees cnfess. Bth interpreters required medical treatment after their release t Calitin Frces. N further infrmatin n the incident was available at year's end. In anther case, the Cmmissin n Public Integrity (CPI) gathered enugh evidence t prsecute plice fficers in Baghdad wh were systematically raping and trturing female detainees. Tw f the fficers received prisn sentences; fur thers were demted and reassigned. There were als allegatins that lcal plice smetimes used excessive frce against bth citizens and freigners. On Nvember 28, a freign natinal reprted that plice beat him at a plice statin in Kufa. Accrding t the victim, he witnessed plice beating detainees at a plice statin while he was filing a claim n anther matter. When he questined the treatment f the detainees, he was beaten and detained fr 4 hurs. A number f cmplaints abut Iraqi Natinal Guard (ING) abuses surfaced during the year. Fr example, in Nvember, the ING raided a huse in suthern Baghdad and arrested fur alleged insurgents. The family was evicted and the ING burnt the huse. In anther incident, a dctr at the al-kindi hspital in Baghdad said that the ING had tried t frce him t treat ne f their clleagues befre ther mre serius cases. When he refused, they beat him. There als were many reprted instances f ING lting and burning huses in Fallujah in Nvember. Accrding t an ING fficial, disciplinary prcedures were in place t deal with the mistreatment f citizens and a number f members f the ING were fired during the year fr vilatins. There were numerus reprts and direct evidence that insurgents emplyed multiple frms f trture and inhumane treatment against their victims Althugh there was significant imprvement in Iraqi Crrectins Service (ICS) prisn cnditins fllwing the fall f the frmer regime, in many instances the facilities did nt meet internatinal penal standards. Accrding t the Gvernment, it generally permitted visits by independent human rights bservers. In August, the Internatinal Cmmittee f the Red Crss (ICRC) visited ICS facilities. The Ministry f Human Rights established a permanent ffice at the Abu Ghraib prisn. HRW visited sme ICS facilities. After the fall f the frmer regime, prisn functins were cnslidated int the Ministry f Justice, and the ICS was transferred frm the Ministry f Labr and Scial Affairs t the Ministry f Justice. Accrding t the Gvernment, ICS cnfined civilians under the rule f law, and a valid cnfinement rder frm a judge was required. Cnfinement was nt cnnected with military intelligence peratins nr was there any cntact with military cnfinement functins. Allegatins f inmate abuse by ICS Officers cntinued, althugh fewer than in the previus year. The ICS Internal Affairs Divisin claimed it cnducted investigatins f all detected r reprted cases and that apprpriate crrective actin was taken if an allegatin was verified. Althugh fewer than 10 cases were investigated between July and December, an individual with access t human rights cmplaints alleged that

55 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 23 hundreds f cases were pending accusing ICS fficers f abuse and trture f detainees and prisners, including wmen. N further infrmatin was available at year's end....at year's end, ICS was investigating eight cases in which inmates alleged plice pre-detentin abuse and trture. Overcrwding was a prblem. Inmate disturbances and rits reduced available prisn beds by apprximately ne-third, and pretrial detentin facilities were ften vercrwded. The insurrectins in Sadr City and later in Najaf created additinal vercrwding in detentin facilities. Detainees were generally retained in custdy pending the utcme f a criminal investigatin. Individuals were generally arrested penly and warrants were issued nly with sufficient evidence, althugh, there were numerus reprts f arbitrary arrest and detentin There were n publicized cases f criminal prceedings brught against members f the security frces in cnnectin with alleged vilatins f these rights, nr were there publicly knwn measures adpted t prevent recurrence. Due t the insurgency, high-crime rates, and limited plice training, inncent persns were smetimes arrested and detained errneusly The MOI's respnsibilities extended nly t internal security. MOI cmmands a number f unifrmed frces, including the Iraqi Plice Service (IPS) and Department f Brder Enfrcement. The MOI als has criminal and dmestic intelligence capabilities and regulates all dmestic and freign private security cmpanies perating in the cuntry. The MOI als has authrity ver the Civil Defense Directrate, the firefighters and emergency respnse rganizatin, and the Facilities Prtectin Service shielding strategic infrastructure, gvernment buildings, and cultural and educatinal assets. In the aftermath f the fall f the frmer regime, a plice presence temprarily vanished, except in the Kurdish Nrth. Plice equipment was stlen. After April 2003, a large recruitment and training prgram was established, including hiring frmer plice fficers. During the year, varius specialized units were created, including an Emergency Respnse Unit (with capabilities similar t a SWAT team) and Public Order Battalins that perfrm rit cntrl functins, as well as specialized cunterinsurgency units. Mre than any ther grup, the plice have been a target f terrrist attacks. Over 1,500 IPS persnnel have been killed between April 2003 and year's end. Additinally, pervasive lawlessness has led t an increase in vilent and rganized crime, particularly related t kidnappings. There was a widespread perceptin that plice made false arrests t extrt mney. Sme plice fficers did nt present defendants t magistrates and held them in detentin cells until their families paid bribes fr their release. In the Central Criminal Curt in Baghdad, the time between arrest and arraignment was ften in excess f 30 days, despite the 24-hur requirement. There were rganized plice abuses. Fr example, n September 4, apprximately 150 plice, nne f whm had unifrms r badges, surrunded the Iraqi Institute f Peace (IIP), which is assciated with the Internatinal Center fr Recnciliatin f the Cventry Cathedral, in respnse t an alert that a prminent frmer regime figure might be inside the Cathedral. Fur individuals identified themselves as MOI fficials, but did nt shw badges. Armed men, sme with heavy weapns, brke dwn the drs and ransacked the IIP building, stealing phnes and mney. The incident ended with n serius injuries but withut judicial fllw-up. On August 16, a ministry, reprtedly wishing t ccupy the real prperty used by a plitical party, caused party members t be arrested and detained fr almst 60 days withut charges. During their detentin, a habeas crpus writ frm the Chief Investigative Judge f the Central Criminal Curt was ignred. The minister invlved als refused t appear befre the judge t explain his ministry's actins. The plitical party members were eventually released; hwever, the prperty invlved remained under the cntrl f the ministry at year's end. Reprtedly, cerced cnfessins and interrgatin cntinued t be the favred methd f investigatin by plice. Accrding t ne gvernment fficial, hundreds f cases were pending at year's end alleging trture. There have been several arrests, and bth criminal and administrative punishments were handed ut t plice in cases where allegatins f trture were substantiated.

56 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 24 Additinally, crruptin cntinued t be a prblem with the plice. The CPI was investigating cases f plice abuse invlving unlawful arrests, beatings, and the theft f valuables frm the hmes f persns wh were detained; hwever, the plice ften cntinued t use the methds emplyed by the previus regime. In additin t the CPI, several ther mechanisms were put int place t address this prblem, including an internal affairs capability, mentring, and training prgrams that fcus n accuntability. Effrts t increase the capacity and effectiveness f the plice were nging; hwever, there was little indicatin that the IIG tk sufficient steps t address this prblem adequately r t reinfrce publicly the message that there will be n climate f impunity. Because f arbitrary arrest and detentin practices, sme prisners were held in incmmunicad detentin. Lengthy pretrial detentin cntinued t be a significant prblem due t backlgs in the judiciary and slw prcessing f criminal investigatins. Apprximately 3,000 inmates were in pretrial detentin, and 1,000 were held pst-trial. Crruptin remained a prblem in the criminal justice system. In the fall, the MOI referred allegatins f miscnduct invlving a judge t the COJ. The allegatins cncerned prfessinal miscnduct; including bribery. At year's end, this case was still pending The Overall Trends in the Insurgency During 2004 Figure II.2 shws hw the war intensified frm early 2004 t early As shwn, insurgent attacks against Iraqi security frces increased dramatically during the final mnths f The insurgents began t fcus n sfter, easier Iraqi targets rather than well-trained and wellequipped US frces after the January 30, 2004 electins. As the numbers f Iraqi frces grew, they invariably became a mre visible target fr insurgents. In additin, while the U.S. became mre adept at prtecting its wn frces frm radside attacks, many rutine and vulnerable missins have been turned ver t ISF. 43 Insurgents fund that Iraqi frces were easier targets and adjusted their tactics accrdingly, recgnizing that nce the U.S. and Calitin frces leave Iraq the primary enemy wuld be the Iraqi gvernment. One Iraqi fficial described the new insurgent tactic in the fllwing way: In the past, they were targeting the American frces because they were in charge f security After the new Iraqi army and plice were established they shifted their attacks. 44 This new fcus n Iraqi targets had the shrt-term effect f decreasing the number f insurgent attacks against US frces by mre than 25 per cent during the early mnths f The number f US fatalities als decreased during this perid, frm 107 in January 2005 t 58 in February 2005 and 36 in March Hwever, this shift away frm targeting US frces in favr f Iraqi frces was shrt-lived. US fatalities climbed t 52 in April and 80 in May The number f daily attacks climbed during frm 45 in March t mre than 60 in April. After that pint, the daily number f insurgent attacks increased steadily t the pint where it averaged arund 100 in Octber A ttal f 673 US trps were killed in 2005, versus 714 in 2004, and the number f wunded drpped frm 7,990 t 5,639, a drp f 29%. 47 US frces saw fewer casualties largely because mre Iraqi frces were in the field and there were n majr urban battles like the battle f Fallujah. U.S. casualties als fell because the insurgents shifted t Iraqi targets that were mre vulnerable and had far mre plitical impact at a pint where it have becme clear that the US and its calitin partners wanted t withdraw many f their frces. At the same time, the insurgents hit successfully at many imprtant plitical and ecnmic targets. Sunni insurgents cntinued t strike successfully at plitically, religiusly, and ethnically imprtant Shi ite and Kurdish targets with suicide and ther large bmbings. They carried ut a

57 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 25 large number f successful killings, assassinatins, kidnappings, extrtins, and expulsins. These included an increase in the number f successful attacks n Iraqi fficials, Iraqi frces, and their families. 48 The insurgents als cntinued t intimidate their fellw Sunnis. There is n way t cunt r fully assess the pattern f such lw level attacks, r separate them frm crime r Shi ite reprisals, but n ne dubts that they were a grwing prblem. Figure II.2: Insurgent Attacks by Key Target: January 2004-January ,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1, Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May- 04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nv-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May- 04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nv-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Other Targets Iraqi Frces Civilians US and Allied Frces ,550 1,625 1,400 1,425 2,450 1,650 1,900 2,250 1,500 1,900 Nte: Figures are rugh estimates based n graphical data presented in the New Yrk Times. Surce: A Reprt Card n Iraqi Security, New Yrk Times, April 11, A New Rise in the Vilence -- Pst-Svereignty: April 28, Octber 14, 2005 Much f the pst-electin ptimism vanished as the spring went n. US intelligence warned that the insurgency was actually grwing mre serius, and that the risk f ethnic and sectarian vilence was increasing. General Gerge W. Casey, cmmander f MNF-I, cnsistently warned that the insurgency wuld take years t fully defeat, but stated n March 9, 2005 that the level f attacks, the level f vilence has drpped ff significantly since the [Iraqi] electins. 49 General Casey stated that insurgents perating frm the Sunni areas had enugh manpwer, weapnry, ammunitin, and mney t launch between 50 and 60 attacks a day. 50 Casey did, hwever, pint t the arrest f several suspected terrrist leaders. Thugh the terrrists retained enugh ammunitin and arms t cntinue fighting fr years, Gen. Casey maintained that the

58 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 26 capture f certain leaders had degraded the insurgents abilities t fashin IEDs, the deadliest weapn cnfrnting US trps The US Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff, General Richard B. Myers did claim that same week that the number f attacks had fallen t per day, far fewer than befre the electins, but rughly the same as in March The Iraqi interim Minister f the Interir, Falah al- Naqib, made similar claims, as did Lt. General Sir Jhn Kiszeley, then the British Cmmander in Iraq. 52 Nevertheless, senir US fficers like General Abizaid gave mre cautius briefings in May than fficers had given in February, and talked abut years f cmbat. 53 When Gen. Richard Myers stated in late May that the levels f insurgent attacks had decreased, the US simultaneusly issued data shwing their lethality had increased. 54 The insurgency cntinued t inflict severe damage n Iraq s ppulatin in the spring f On April 13, insurgents blew up a fuel tanker in Baghdad and in a separate incident, attacked a US cnvy n the rad t the Baghdad Internatinal Airprt, killing five Iraqis wunding fur US cntractrs. In Kirkuk, insurgents killed 12 plicemen and nine Iraqi sldiers; the latter were guarding Kirkuk s il fields. Insurgents als detnated explsives targeting US frces and Iraqi plice in Msul. As these attacks demnstrate, insurgents had begun t step up their attacks n fuel cnvys and il infrastructure in the nrthern part f the cuntry in an effrt t disrupt life fr everyday Iraqis. Islamist mvements steadily increased their prfile in terms f claimed attacks, media expsure, prpaganda like tapes and CDs, and the use f the Internet and web sites. The nging insurgent attacks, and increasing sectarian and ethnic divisins delayed the gvernment s frmatin fr almst three mnths. It was nt until April 28 th that pressure frm Washingtn, Shi ite and Kurdish leaders decided t submit an incmplete list f cabinet prtflis, rather than delay the frmatin f a new gvernment any lnger. A Shi'ite-Kurdish Gvernment Becmes a Natural Target The sectarian and ethnic cmpsitin f the new gvernment als made it a natural target fr the insurgents. The cabinet, led by President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Jafaari, was clearly structured alng ethnic and sectarian lines. It included 16 Shi ites, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunni Arabs, 1 Christian and 1 Turcman. 55 Figure III.1 shws the breakdwn alng ethnic lines, and the plitical prcess prvided a warning that the insurgency wuld find mre ethnic and sectarian fault lines t explit. Figure III.1: Members f the Iraqi Cabinet as f May 8, 2005 Name Psitin Ethnic Affiliatin Jalal Talabani President Kurdish Ibrahim al-jaafari Prime Minister Shi ite Ruz Nuri Shawis Deputy Prime Minister (1) Kurdish Ahmed Chalabi Deputy Prime Minister (2) Shi ite Abid Mutlak al-juburi Deputy Prime Minister (3) Sunni

59 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 27 TBA* Deputy Prime Minister (4) TBA Saadun al-dulami Defense Minister Sunni Baqir Slagh (aka Bayan Jabr) Interir Minister Shi ite Muhsin Shlash Electricity Minister Shi ite Abdul Mttalib Ali Health Minister Shi ite Sami al-mudhaffar Higher Educatin Minister Shi ite Abdul Falah Hassan Educatin Minister Shi ite Ali Allawi Finance Minister Shi ite Jassim Jaafar Cnstructin & Husing Minister Shi ite Ali al-bahadil Agriculture Minister Shi ite Abdul Hussein Shandal Justice Minister Shi ite Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum Oil Minister Shi ite Salam al-maliki Transprt Minister Shi ite Suhaila Jaafar* Migratin and Displacement Minister Shi ite Abdul Karim al-inizy Alaa Kadhim Hashim al-hashimi Safa al-din al-safi Minister f State fr Natinal Security Affairs Minister f State fr Civil Cmmunity Affairs Minister f State fr Turism and Archaelgy Affairs Minister f State fr Natinal Assembly Affairs Shi ite Shi ite Shi ite Shi ite Osama al-nujafi Industry Minister Sunni Abdul Bassit Mawlud Trade Minister Sunni Nuri Farhan al-rawi Culture Minister Sunni Azhar al-sheikhli* Minister f State fr Wmen Affairs Sunni Saad al-hardan Minister f State fr Prvinces Sunni Narmin Othman* (Temprary) Human Rights Minister Sunni Saadun al-dulami Defense Minister Sunni Bassima Butrs* Science and Technlgy Minister Christian Talib Aziz Zayni Yuth and Sprts Minister Turcman Barham Salih Minister f Planning & Develpment Kurdish

60 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 28 Cperatin Nisrin Barwari* Minister f Municipalities and Public Wrks Kurdish Juwan Fuad Masum* Telecmmunicatins Minister Kurdish Abdul Latif Rashid Minister f Water Resurces Kurdish Narmin Othman* Minister f Envirnment Kurdish Idris Hadi Labr and Scial Affairs Minister Kurdish Hshyar Zebari Freign Minister Kurdish Nte: An asterisk (*) dentes female cabinet members. In is nt surprising, therefre, that sme f the deadliest attacks f the insurgency ccurred during this perid. Many directed were against sectarian and ethnic targets and fllwed by hardline Sunni Islamist statements justifying the attacks and trying t explit the attacks t further divide the cuntry: 56 May 1, 2005: A car bmb targeted a tent crwded with murners fr the funeral f a Kurdish fficial in the nrthern city f Tal Afar, killing 25 peple. May 4, 2005: A bmb explded amng Iraqi civilians applying fr plice jbs in the Kurdish city f Irbil, killing 60. May 6, 2005: Suicide bmbers killed at least 26 Iraqis and wunded several dzen mre in the Shi ite twn f Suwaira. Escalating vilence has killed mre than 200 peple since the cabinet was annunced eight days ag. July 16, 2005: A suicide bmb attack near a Shi ite msque in Musayyib killed at least 54 peple. July 24, 2005: A truck bmb utside a Baghdad plice statin killed 39 peple. August 17, 2005: Three car bmbs explded near a bus statin in Baghdad killing 43 peple. September 14, 2005: A suicide car bmb struck a wrk site in a Shi ite neighbrhd f Baghdad, killing 112 peple. September 17, 2005: A remte-cntrlled car bmb explded near a market utside Baghdad, killing 30 peple. September 29, 2005: Three suicide car bmbs struck the Shi ite twn f Balad, killing 102 peple. Octber 11, 2005: A suicide bmber struck an army recruiting center in Tal Afar, killing 30 peple. By April and May f 2005, it was all t clear that the electin, and Calitin cunterinsurgency activities, had nt reduced the seriusness f the insurgency and that the insurgents had taken hld in part f Western Iraq. The US Marine Crps launched its largest ffensive yet in the Syrian brder area and hstile areas alng the main rute frm Syria t Iraq in April Operatin Matadr, and a series f fllw-up attacks by Marine, US, and Iraqi frces in western Iraq, again shwed that the insurgents culd nt survive if they std and fught but ften culd if they dispersed. 57 Iraqi frces nly played a limited supprt rle in these battles, but did deply in greater strength in ther areas. These included a majr 40,000-man Iraqi security peratin called Operatin Lightning -- in the greater Baghdad area in June This peratin t had its successes, but again culd nt destry insurgent activity in any given area n a lasting basis.

61 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 29 There were sme psitive indicatrs. Twelve f the eighteen prvinces remained relatively secure. The airprt rad als became less dangerus. This fur-lane, six-mile stretch f highway leading frm Baghdad t the internatinal airprt had been ne f the mst dangerus rads in the cuntry: 37 peple were killed r injured in ambushes n the airprt rad in April 2005 alne. But that figure fell dramatically in the fall f In Octber, there was nly ne injury. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch attributed the imprved security t the presence f mre Iraqi security frces: 58 The difference is that the Iraqi plice mechanized brigade actively patrls Rute Irish [the name the US military gave the rad,] 24 hurs a day, seven days a week It transfrmed it frm the highway f death t ne f the mst safe and secure rutes in all f Iraq, again a tribute t the capabilities f these trained and ready plice frces. Warnings Abut Iraqi Frces and the Ministry f Interir There als were mre warnings abut the rle f Iraqi frces. A reprt by the Inspectr General f the State Department and the Inspectr General f the Department f Defense nted that as f late April 2005, 59 The Internatinal Plice Liaisn Officers (IPLOs) daily reprts chrnicle disturbing accunts f instances in which IPS persnnel are nt prfessinal in the perfrmance f their duties. There are frequent reprts f breakdwns in discipline, feuds amng plice units, and prisner abuse. In the absence f viable tracking systems, the IG Team is nt able t determine whether r t what degree Calitin-trained plice may be perpetratrs f such actins. The failure t impse prper discipline rests with IPS leaders (sme f whm have been directly, even vilently, invlved in the unseemly questinable incidents). The examples set by pr leaders fr Calitin-trained persnnel (mstly new recruits) bde ill. It was nt until the summer f 2005 that the special security frces f the Ministry f Interir were seen as a majr surce f attacks n Sunnis, and ptentially reacting t Sunni attacks n Shi ites by taking the kind f reprisals that might drive the cuntry twards civil war. Hwever, the appintment f Jabr t the pst f Ministry f the Interir that had drawn Sunni criticism after the January electins in 2005, then became steadily mre a cntrversial as Shi itedminated MOI security frces were increasingly implicated in retaliatin killings against Sunnis. Calitin and Iraqi Gvernment Campaigns in the Summer and Winter f 2005 Nevertheless, ethnic and sectarian vilence increased steadily during the rest f 2005, as many aspects f Sunni Islamist extremist activity became mre intense and mre fcused n preventing the emergence f a successful Iraqi plitical prcess and driving the cuntry twards civil war. Lw-level vilence and killings increased, and these began t prvke grwing Shi ite reprisals. Elements f the plice and Ministry f Interir special security frces, and the Badr Organizatin, increasing killed r intimidated Shi ites in reprisal fr the rise in Sunni Islamist extremist attacks n Iraq civilians, Shi ites and Kurds, and Iraqi pliticians Insurgent activity frced Calitin and Iraqi frces had t start a new series f ffensives in the Sunni areas in Western Iraq. In the summer 2005, US and a limited number f Iraqi frces launched a series f peratins in western Iraq designed t deny insurgents a strnghld and secure the regin in the run-up t the Octber 15th referendum n the new draft cnstitutin. Mst peratins were cnducted in Al Anbar prvince, alng the Syrian brder. Calitin peratin frces ranged in size frm several hundred t several thusand trps:

62 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 30 May 29, 2005, Operatin Mn River Dragn: Iraqi trps frm the 203 rd Army Battalin in cnjunctin with US sldiers frm Task Frce Liberty entered Al Julaam in Western Iraq lking fr a suspected insurgent leader. Speaking afterwards abut the peratin, US Army Capt. Rbert Crft said: The [Iraqi Army] presence cmpletely changes the dynamic f the peratin. Peple will cperate with us just the same. Hwever, when Iraqi sldiers are in the lead giving the instructins, things happen much mre quickly and with less cnfusin. The effect is that the peratin is safer fr bth U.S. sldiers and Iraqi civilians. 60 June 7, 2005: US trps frm 2nd Squadrn, 34th Armred Cavalry Regiment and Iraqi frces frm 1 st Brigade, 3 rd Iraqi Army Divisin carried ut peratins t disrupt anti-iraqi frces in the suthwest prvince f Ninewah. A jint peratin launched n May 26 in Tal Afar uncvered nine weapns caches and captured 73 militants. The peratins were part f 30 cmbined/independent peratins being cnducted thrughut Iraq. June 17-22, 2005, Operatin Rmhe (Spear): US-Iraqi frces cnducted searches in Karabilah. Calitin frces discvered three car bmb factries and several weapns caches, and killed 47 insurgents. June 28-July 6, 2005, Operatin Saif (Swrd): Calitin frces cnducted peratins designed t rt ut terrrists and freign fighters living alng the Euphrates River between the cities f Haditha and Hit. There were n American r Iraqi trp fatalities. July 4, 2005, Operatin Muthana Strike: Iraqi sldiers numbering 600 jined 250 US sldiers frm Task Frce Baghdad in cnducting searches f safe huses nearby the Baghdad Internatinal Airprt, leading t the capture f 100 suspected terrrists. 61 July 5, 2005, Operatin Bw Cuntry: Iraqi Security Frces jined Calitin Frces in an earlymrning raid in eastern Baghdad; a number f weapns and ammunitin caches were uncvered. 62 July 7-?, 2005, Operatin Qmtia (Scimitar): -Apprximately 100 Iraqi security frces and 500 US Marines cnducted raids in Zaidn, 30 km suth f Fallujah. The peratin was designed t disrupt terrrist activity in the regin. July 26-30, 2005, Operatin Thunder Cat: Iraqi and US sldiers cnducted a series f crdn-andattack missins resulting in the capture f 171 suspected terrrists. 63 July 2005-nging, Operatin Hunter (Sayaid): The peratin, intended t disrupt insurgent activities, deny freedm f mvement and reduce the insurgents ability t plan future attacks, was fcused arund the city f Qaim and alng the Syrian brder. The peratin was expected t last until the December 15 electins. August 3-10, 2005, Operatin Quick Strike: US-Iraqi frces cnducted peratins designed t rt ut insurgents in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and Barwanah (Parwana). The cmbined frce f 800 US Marines and 180 Iraqi sldiers captured 36 insurgents and defused nine car bmbs and mre than 28 IED s. August 4, 2005, Operatin Able Warrir: Calitin frces frm Taskfrce Baghdad cnducted a series f raids designed t defeat insurgent frces perating west f Baghdad airprt. September 10, 2005-?, Operatin Restring Rights: U.S.-Iraqi frces ttaling 8,500 entered Tal Afar in a new ffensive designed t rt ut insurgents. The peratin was expected t last several weeks. Tal Afar was hme t rughly 500 insurgents September 11, 2005, Operatin Zba a (Cyclne): US and Iraqi frces cnducted a series f raids designed t rt ut Al Qa'ida in Iraq insurgents perating in Rutbah. September 14, 2005, Operatin Flea Flicker: US and Iraqi frces searched huses in Zafaraniya, as part f an attempt t disrupt anti-iraqi activity in the area in preparatin fr the Octber 15 cnstitutinal referendum. Calitin frces detained several suspected insurgents and uncvered a number f weapns caches. 64 Octber 1-6, 2005, Operatin Kabda Bil Hadid (Irn Fist): US and Iraqi frces carried ut peratins in Anbar Prvince. Mre than 1,000 U.S. trps mved int the twn f Sa dah, in the al Qaim regin, near

63 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 31 the Syrian brder. Other cities targeted included Karabilah and Ubaydi. The gal f the peratin was t interdict freign fighters and prvide security fr the upcming referendum. Mre than 50 Al Qa'ida in Iraq terrrists are killed. Octber 4, 2005, Operatin River Gate: In the largest peratin f 2005 (and the secnd in western Iraq this week), U.S. frces numbering 2,500 and Iraqi security frces carred ut raids designed t deny insurgents the ability t perate in the Euphrates River twns f Haditha, Haqlaniyah and Barwanah (Parwana). Octber 28-29, 2005, Operatin Clean Sweep: -Task Frce Baghdad sldiers alng with Iraqi Security Frces targeted mre than 350 huses in suthern Baghdad, capturing 49 terrr suspects. 65 Nvember , Operatin Al Hajip Elfulathi (Steel Curtain): 2,500 US sldiers alng with 1,000 Iraqi Army sldiers launched attacks in western Al-Anbar prvince. The peratin was designed t restre security alng the Iraqi-Syrian brder and was the largest Calitin peratin in mnths. 66 Nvember 16, 2005, Operatin Numur (Panthers): The first f five peratins invlving Iraqi and US sldiers was launched. The peratins, centered n Ramadi, were intended t secure the area fr the upcming December electins. Nvember 19-21, 2005, Operatin Dhibbah (Bruins): Apprximately 150 Iraqi Army sldiers and 300 Marines cnducted peratins in nrthern Ramadi as part f effrts t blck ff knwn terrrist escape rutes. 67 Nvember 23-24, 2005, Operatin Asad (Lins): 200 Iraqi Army sldiers alng with 250 US sldiers cnducted peratins in the Tammim area f suthern Ramadi. It was the third such series f disruptin peratins aimed at capturing r killing terrrists in the Ramadi area. 68 Nvember 26-?, 2005, Operatin Nimur (Tigers): 550 Iraqi Army sldiers alng with sldiers frm the 2 nd Brigade Cmbat Team carried ut peratins in the Ma Laab District f eastern Ramadi aimed at securing the cnditins fr a successful December 15 electin. 69 December 2-? 2005, Operatin Harba (Shank): 200 Iraqi Army sldiers and 300 Marines carried ut peratins in Al Anbar s capital f Ramadi. Operatin Shank was the fifth in a series f peratins aimed at disrupting terrrist grups in the area. These peratins had sme psitive impacts. In early September 2005, fr example, US and Iraqi frces began Operatin Restring Rights n the insurgent strnghld f Tal Afar. It was the largest t-date urban assault since Fallujah. Trps faced little resistance, suspecting that mst insurgents fled the city during the pre-assault evacuatin f civilians. The develpments in the fight fr Tal Afar had the fllwing impact: 157 terrrists were killed, 291 thers were arrested. One Iraqi serviceman and six civilians were killed. In al-sarai district f Tal-Afar, explsives were planted in mst f the huses, which led t the destructin f huses in the area. Dzens f ther huses were destryed in the last three mnths during cmbat peratins thusand USD will be paid fr the families wh lst their hmes. 20 trucks f supplies arrived in Tal-Afar frm Baghdad. Ten ambulances were sent frm Msul t the nearby twn. Abut 1,000 tents have been prvided fr the refugees wh fled their twn f Tal-Afar and seven medical facilities have been set n the utskirts f the nrthern twn. The Iraqi gvernment said it wuld deply peacekeeping frces int the twn f Tal-Afar after the cmbat peratins in the regin are ver. In additin, it said that 1,000 residents f the twn wuld be trained t maintain security and that tribes based in area will als play a majr rle in maintaining security and stability. 70

64 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 32 The end result, hwever, was simply anther cycle in the vilence. The debate ver Iraq s new cnstitutin and the Octber 15, 2005 referendum n the cnstitutin made sme plitical prgress, but als divided Sunnis, Shi ites, and Kurds ver a hst f issues including federatin, the rle f religin in the state, cntrl f state revenues, and cntrl f il revenues. The end result was a new wave f attacks n bth Iraqi and US targets. The September death tll fr US sldiers was 49, dwn frm 85 in August. But thse numbers d nt tell the whle stry. US fatalities in Iraq fluctuated thrughut mst f the summer in 2005, with n clear pattern discernable. 78 US sldiers were killed in June. The death tll fr July was 54. The death tll fr Octber was 92, nearly a 50 percent increase frm the previus mnth. Octber was the secnddeadliest mnth fr US trps in 2005, secnd nly t January. It was the furth deadliest mnth since the war began. Nvember s death tll was 85. The insurgents als learned hw t cperate mre effectively in achieving these ends, particularly the mre rganized Islamist extremist elements. The majr Sunni Islamist extremist grups frmed a lse alliance and infrmal "majlis." They develped a mre sphisticated military literature and a wide range f training aids. They have begun t pst battle-by-battle summaries f the lessns t be learned frm each majr encunter with Calitin and Iraqi frces, analyses drawn frm ther cnflicts, and varius manuals. Videtapes and DVDs supplemented these effrts. While sme remained basic, thers became highly sphisticated reflecting the grwing military backgrund and expertise f sme f the insurgents invlved. 71

65 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 33 Figure II.3: The Key Urban Areas in the Insurgency Operatin Restring Rights Operatin Hunter; Irn Fist and Steel Curtain Operatin River Gate Operatin Cyclne Surce: CIA Wrld Factbk. Operatin Irn Fist, River Gate and Steel Curtain (Octber and Nvember 2005) Calitin and Iraqi effrts further intensified in the late fall f 2005, in respnse t bth new increases in insurgent vilence, and as part f an effrt t prepare fr the electin n December 15th. Operatin Irn Fist, River Gate and Steel Curtain were part f larger, nging peratins, knwn as Sayaid (Hunter), launched in mid-t-late summer The western part f Iraq s Al- Anbar prvince was a key target because it had becme a center f insurgent peratins that had increasingly been driven westward. Sme US fficials believed the insurgents had fund their last fthld in the area alng the brder with Syria. In late summer 2005, there were reprts that insurgents lyal t Zarqawi r at least key Sunni Islamist extremist grups claiming sme affiliatin t Al Qa ida -- had taken ver at least five Iraqi twns n the brder with Syria. The insurgents, estimated t number between 300 and 400, were reprted t be distributing death letters in which they rdered residents t leave their hmes r face death. Accrding t Lt. Cl. Julian Alfrd, cmmander f the 3 rd Battalin, 6th Marines Regiment statined near Qaim, It appears that al Qa'ida in Iraq is kicking ut lcal peple frm a lt f these twns ut there. US frces in the regin, numbering 1,000 at the time, estimated that as many as 100 families per day were fleeing their hmes. Fighters lyal t Zarqawi had been in cmplete cntrl f the area fr at least a mnth. N Iraqi sldiers r plice fficers were believed t be perating inside the twns f Dulaym al Husayba, Karabila, Sada and Al Ubaydi. 72 In late September, The Washingtn Pst reprted that a gradual buildup f US and Iraqi frces in the Euphrates River valley was underway. US fficials reprted that the mve was aimed at

66 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 34 securing the brder area arund Qaim and suppressing ther insurgency activity in the regin. 73 The mve appears t have been undertaken in preparatin fr Operatin Al Hajip Elfulathi (Steel Curtain), launched in the western part f Al-Anbar prvince n Nvember 5, Operatin Steel Curtain, like Operatins Irn Fist and River Gate befre it, is part f the larger Operatin Hunter. Steel Curtain invlved 2,500 US sldiers and 1,000 Iraqi Army sldiers and was designed t restre security alng the Iraqi-Syrian brder. Operatin Steel Curtain cncluded n Nvember 22. During the 17-day peratin, mre than 139 terrrists were killed and 256 detained. The ffensives cntinued until the December 15 electins. They invlved a wide range f effrts t secure hstile twns and cities and interdict insurgent mvements. In July, fr example, an Army squadrn f Stryker vehicles set up an utpst near the twn f Rawah, as part f the first phase f the peratin. Mre than 1,000 US trps alng with a battalin frm the Iraqi Interventin Frce crdned ff traffic in the area. In September, US warplanes blew up tw small bridges in the twns f Karabilah and New Ubaydi, frcing all traffic in the regin t use the US cntrlled Rawah river crssing. 74 Air Frce Brigadier General C.D. Alstn said in late December that these jint peratins were ne f several factrs cntributing t what he characterized as the diminishing capability f insurgents t sustain attacks. He stated this was a key measure f effectiveness studied by U.S. fficials when evaluating the strength f the insurgency. 75 Yet, nne f the data discussed earlier r later in this reprt shw any such pattern. The Calitin ffensives, and cnstant pressure frm ther attacks n the insurgents, certainly had a majr impact in limiting what the insurgency culd d. At the same time, mst majr insurgent grups and cells remained intact, and the ffensives taught the insurgents hw t disperse, be less vulnerable and use ther patterns f attack. They did nt reduce the drift twards sectarian and ethnic cnflict. The Perid Befre the Electins: Octber 15, 2005-December 15, 2005 The varius elements f the insurgency differed ver hw t deal with the December 15 th parliamentary electins. Several Sunni natinalist insurgent grups appeared t have struck a deal with US fficials that amunted t a shrt-term ceasefire t enable a relatively peaceful electin perid. One self-identified insurgent field cmmander tld Time Magazine he had been given rders nt t cnduct attacks in the fur days surrunding the electin date. 76 There are several lgical reasns t explain such a curse f actin: Bth Al Qa'ida in Iraq and Sunni natinalist insurgents claimed that they did nt want t injure Sunnis wh might g t the plls n Electin Day. Several Sunni grups appeared t be tacitly encuraging Sunni vters s as t secure a place in the Iraqi gvernment, unlike last January s electin. Other Sunni grups may have made the tactical decisin t wait ut electins and then declare them illegitimate n matter what the results and resume attacks. Other Sunni grups may have made the calculatin that the electin results culd never satisfy Sunni vters. By waiting until the vte is ver, such grups culd then claim t have given demcracy a chance, perhaps garnering renewed Sunni supprt. It is likely that insurgent grups were deterred frm attacks by the ban n mtr vehicles and the massive security presence n Electin Day. Strategic cnsideratins may have played a rle in insurgent decisins t implement a shrt-term ceasefire, but it is likely that tight security measures deterred them as well. U.S. frces increased

67 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 35 t abut 160,000 fr the December 15 electin, althugh they drpped t 138,000 (pre-electin levels) in the first quarter f Over 230,000 Iraqi sldiers and plice were set up in what was called the ring system f defense in which plice were statined inside the plling statins, special battalins utside t man check pints and cnduct searches, and beynd them Iraqi Army battalins and Calitin frces waited as a last resrt. In additin, all traffic was prhibited near plling places and between prvinces. 78 Nevertheless, sme f the deadliest attacks t date ccurred during the electin campaign: 79 Octber 31, 2005: A car bmb explded in Basra killing at least 20 peple. Nvember 2, 2005: A suicide bmber detnated a minibus near an utdr market suth f Baghdad, killing 20 peple. Nvember 10, 2005: A suicide bmber struck a Baghdad restaurant ppular with plice, killing 35 peple. Nvember 18, 2005: Near-simultaneus suicide bmbings killed 74 wrshippers at tw Shi ite msques near the Iranian brder. Nvember 19, 2005: A suicide bmber detnated his car in a crwd f Shi ite Muslim murners nrth f Baghdad, killing at least 36 peple. Nvember 24, 2005: A suicide bmber blew up his car utside a hspital suth f Baghdad, killing 30 peple. December 4, 2005: Supprters f Mqtada al-sadr threw shes and stnes at frmer Prime Minister Iyad Allawi as he enters the Grand Imam Ali shrine in Najaf t pray. Later that day, gunmen fire an RPG at his party ffices in Najaf. N ne is injured. December 6, 2005: Tw suicide bmbers detnated their explsives at Baghdad s plice academy, killing at least 43 peple. December 8, 2005: A suicide bmber detnated his explsives n a bus in Baghdad, killing 32 peple and wunding 44 thers. Accrding t statistics btained by the Agence-France Presse frm the Iraqi Ministry f Defense, 5,713 Iraqis were killed in 2005, nt including insurgents. This included 4,020 civilians, and 1,693 ISF. The MOD and MOI recrded 1,702 insurgents killed and 9264 detained. 80 Mre generally, MNF-I intelligence estimated that the number f insurgent attacks n calitin frces, Iraqi frces, and Iraqi civilians; and acts f sabtage; rse by 29% in The ttal had risen frm 26,496 in 2004 t 34,131 in (The Calitin reprted that these attacks have had a relatively cnsistent average success rate f 24%; attacks that cause damage r casualties.) 82 Put differently, the average number f attacks per mnth in the Calitin cunt (which tended t undercunt attacks n Iraqi civilians) had risen frm an average f arund 750 in late 2004 t a peak f nearly 3,000 in Octber 2005, and was 2,500 in December The average had been well ver 2,000 per mnth frm April 2004 nwards. 83 The cntinuing shift t attacks n Iraqis, rather than Calitin trps, als again shifted the balance f casualties. A ttal f 673 US trps were killed in 2005, versus 714 in 2004, and the number f wunded drpped frm 7,990 t 5,639, a drp f 29%. 84 US frces saw fewer casualties largely because mre Iraqi frces were in the field and there were n majr urban battles like the battle f Fallujah. Additinally, the insurgents shifted t Iraqi targets that were mre vulnerable and had far mre plitical impact at a pint where it had becme clear that the US and its calitin partners wanted t withdraw many f their frces.

68 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 36 The December 15 Electin and Implicatins fr the Insurgency Like the ther majr plitical events befre it, the December 15, 2005 electin did nt have a stabilizing effect r clearly undercut supprt fr the insurgency. While Many Sunnis did participate in the plitical prcess fr the first time, Iraqis vted alng sectarian and ethnic lines. The new Cuncil f Representatives had 275 seats. The United Iraqi Alliance, the Shi ite calitin party wn 5.2 millin vtes and 128 seats in the parliament. The Kurdish Alliance wn 2.6 millin vtes and 53 seats. The Sunni dminated Iraqi Accrdance Frnt wnt 1.8 millin vtes and 44 seats in parliament. The Sunni Iraqi Natinal Dialgue Frnt, a calitin f Sunni grups received nearly 500,000 vtes and 11 parliamentary seats and the secular Iraqi Natinal List wn 25 seats. 85 Althugh charges f fraud delayed the final certificatin f the electin results until February 9, 2006, such fraud was fund t be minr and did nt change the results. This result allcated seats t the main parties as fllws: Shi ites 47%; Kurds 21%, Sunnis 21%, Allawi s secular natinalists 9% and ther grups 1% 86 Map II.1 shws Iraqs prvinces. Figure III.4 breaks dwn the electin results by ethnic and sectarian grups and cmpares thse numbers t Iraqi ppulatin as a whle. 87 Figure III.5 shws the percentage f the vte wn by the fur majr calitin parties in each f Iraq s 18 prvinces. U.S. Ambassadr t Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad described the results as unsurprising, given that Saddam fr decades purpsely fstered a lack f trust amng cmmunities. He als nted, hwever, that cperatin had t be frged acrss ethnic and sectarian divisins fr a unified Iraq t remain pssible and if the gvernment was t address the issues at the rt f the plitical cnflict. 88

69 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 37 Map II.1: Gvernrate Bunderies

70 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 38 Figure III.4: December 2005 Electin Results: Cmpsitin f the Cuncil f Representatives 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Shi'ite Sunni Kurd Secular Other )Ppulatin (estimated% Cuncil% Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, February 2006 Reprt t Cngress, p. 9

71 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 39 Figure III.5: Percentage f Vte Wn by Fur Majr Calitin Parties in Each f Iraq s 18 Prvinces. United Calitin/United Alliance Iraqi Iraqi Kurdistan Gathering/Kurdistan Alliance Tawafq Frnt/Iraqi Fnt Iraqi Accrdance Natinal Iraqi List Basrah 77.5 N/A Missan N/A N/A 4.31 Theqar N/A N/A 5.04 Muthana N/A N/A 4.33 Qadissiya N/A N/A 7.78 Najaf N/A N/A 7.78 Salahaddin 7.44 N/A Wassit N/A N/A 8.06 Karbala N/A N/A Babil N/A Baghdad N/A Anbar N/A N/A Diyala Kirkuk N/A N/A Ninewa Sulaymaniya N/A N/A N/A Erbil N/A N/A N/A Dhuk N/A N/A N/A Surce: Independent Electral Cmmissin f Iraq: Unverified Electin Results N/A indicates that the party did nt win enugh percentage f the vte in that prvince t gain a seat in the Parliament. Once again, sme bservers were ptimistic. They claimed that the Sunni turn ut, and the lack f vilence n Electin Day was a turning pint in the Iraqi plitical prcess. Sme aspects f the results were psitive. The Sunni turnut in certain prvinces increased cmpared with the January electins earlier in the year. Fr example, in the Anbar prvince 86 percent f vters turned ut, an increase frm 2 percent in the January electins f that year. 89 The Sunni prvinces f Ninawa and Salahaddin saw vter turnut at levels f 70 and 98 percent respectively in

72 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 40 December. This was an increase frm 17 and 29 percent in January, respectively. Natinally, vter turnut increased frm 58 percent in the January electins, t 77 percent in December. 90 Yet, Sunnis did nt have t chse between plitical participatin and aiding the insurgency. Many Sunnis vted mre t assert Sunni pwer than because f any supprt fr the Iraqi plitical prcess. Sme Sunni insurgents hedged their bets by cntinuing t carry ut attacks while engaging in plitical talks with the Iraqi gvernment. In fact, ne cunterinsurgency expert at the Pentagn suggested that a number f Sunni s had adpted a mdel similar t the IRA s dualtrack strategy f cntinuing vilence while using the Sinn Fein t pursue plitical slutins. 91 US fficers als prvided a mre mixed assessment f the situatin. Departing cmmander f U.S. frces in Baghdad, Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr. assessed the situatin in the capital at the end f 2005 that mixed a list f successes with present and future challenges. The insurgency has weakened since the electin, and while verall attacks increased in 2005, successful attacks decreased 10 percent. Military peratins cut the number f car bmbs in Baghdad in half, and have uncvered duble the amunt f weapns caches. Insurgents were resrting t drive-by shtings, mrtar and rcket attacks that were less accurate and therefre less successful. A need t fcus Calitin effrts n training Iraqi frces t perate accrding t the rule f law and with respect t human rights, in additin t prmting a mre even ethnic and sectarian balance in the frces. The U.S. planned t increase the number f American advisrs, then 10, wrking with each Iraqi plice battalin in rder t plan, train, cach and cnduct peratins with them. The U.S. planned t replace the 3 rd Infantry Divisin in Baghdad with a smaller frce led by the 4 th Infantry Divisin. As areas f Baghdad are ceded t Iraqi security frces, the U.S. Divisin wuld reduce its presence in the city. 92 US Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff, General Peter Pace was asked whether electins wuld sap the insurgency shrtly in January He stated, The pprtunity in the future fr flks wh are against the gvernment t hide, t stre weapns and the like will g dwn. S I d believe that ver the curse f the cming year, that vilence will subside. 93 Pace stressed, hwever, that the general Iraqi ppulatin wuld have t play a significant rle. With regard t hw lng the insurgency culd maintain its past level f vilence, Pace stated: 94 I think that depends n the Iraqi peple. I think it depends n hw cmfrtable these terrrists feel mving abut the twns and cities in Iraq. I think if the Iraqi peple demnstrate t the terrrists that they re nt welcme in their cities, that they are nt welcme in their twns, that murderers which they are murderers f fellw Muslims, indiscriminate murderers that they are are nt welcme, that will reduce the number f [insurgents]. Pace als stated that the pssibility f U.S. trp withdrawals in early 2006 wuld depend n the decisins f U.S. cmmanders n the grund. The GAO summarized the status f the insurgency in 2005 as fllws, 95 The insurgency intensified thrugh Octber 2005 and has remained strng since then. As we reprted in March 2005, the insurgency in Iraq particularly the Sunni insurgency grew in cmplexity, intensity, and lethality frm June 2003 thrugh early Accrding t a February 2006 testimny by the Directr f Natinal Intelligence, insurgents are using increasingly lethal imprvised explsive devices and cntinue t adapt t calitin cuntermeasures enemy-initiated attacks against the calitin, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure increased in number ver time. The highest peak ccurred during Octber 2005, arund the time f

73 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 41 Ramadan and the Octber referendum n Iraq s cnstitutin. This fllwed earlier peaks in August and Nvember 2004 and January Accrding t a senir U.S. military fficer, attack levels ebb and flw as the varius insurgent grups almst all f which are an intrinsic part f Iraq s ppulatin rearm and attack again. As the administratin has reprted, insurgents share the gal f expelling the calitin frm Iraq and destabilizing the Iraqi gvernment t pursue their individual and, at times, cnflicting gals. 7 Iraqi Sunnis make up the largest prtin f the insurgency and present the mst significant threat t stability in Iraq. In February 2006, the Directr f Natinal Intelligence reprted that the Iraqi Sunnis disaffectin is likely t remain high in 2006, even if a brad, inclusive natinal gvernment emerges. These insurgents cntinue t demnstrate the ability t recruit, supply, and attack calitin and Iraqi security frces. Their leaders cntinue t explit Islamic themes, natinalism, and persnal grievances t fuel ppsitin t the gvernment and recruit mre fighters. Accrding t the Directr, the mst extreme Sunni jihadists, such as al-qa ida in Iraq, will remain unrecnciled and cntinue t attack Iraqi and calitin frces. The remainder f the insurgency cnsists f radical Shia grups, sme f whm are supprted by Iran, vilent extremists, criminals, and, t a lesser degree, freign fighters. Accrding t the Directr f Natinal Intelligence, Iran prvides guidance and training t select Iraqi Shia plitical grups and weapns and training t Shia militant grups t enable anticalitin attacks. Iran als has cntributed t the increasing lethality f anti-calitin attacks by enabling Shia militants t build imprvised explsive devices with explsively frmed prjectiles, similar t thse develped by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. Pst-Electin: December 16, 2005-Onward In practice, it sn became all t apparent that the electins had nt limited insurgent activity and vilence, and sectarian vilence cntinued t increase. Insurgent attacks cntinued in the frm f suicide bmbings against mainly Shi ite Arabs, plitical assassinatins and bdy dumps. Car bmbs and gunfire attacks als target Iraqi plice frces. Revelatins and accusatins f revenge killings perpetrated by the Shi ite dminated Interir Ministry frces against the Sunni ppulatin exacerbated sectarian and ethnic tensins thrughut talks t frm a new gvernment. Sme attacks during this time perid included: December 16, 2005: Gunmen killed tw relatives f a senir Kurdish fficial in Msul. The men, Dhiab Hamad al-hamdani and his sn-were relatives f PUK party fficial Khdr Hassan al-hamdani. December 18, 2005: Plice discvered the bdy f frmer Iraqi Army fficer Abbas Abdullah Fadhl and an unidentified man in Baghdad. In eastern Baghdad, a suicide bmber killed a plice fficer and injured tw thers. December 19, 2005: Ziyad Ali al-zawba i, the Deputy Gvernr f Baghdad, and three f his bdyguards escape an assassinatin attempt in the western Baghdad district f Al-Amil. A car bmb in the Al-Iskan district f Baghdad killed tw Iraqi civilians and wunded eight thers, including five plicemen. The brther f Sa d Nayif al-hardan, minister f state fr gvernrate affairs, was kidnapped in Al-Khalidiyah City in western Iraq. A car bmb explded utside a children s hspital in Baghdad, killing at least tw peple and wunding 11. December 22, 2005: Gunmen killed six Iraqi plicemen in Baghdad. In Samarra, gunmen killed three Iraqi plicemen and wunded fur thers. Gunmen assassinated Sheik Saffah Nayif al-fayyad, a tribal leader f the Al Bu-Amir tribe, nrth f Baghdad. In Balad Ruz, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives utside a msque, killing 10 Shi ites. December 23, 2005: In Balad, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives utside a msque, killing fur peple. December 26, 2005: In Diyala prvince, gunmen abducted Sunni plice clnel and killed a member f the lcal city cuncil. Als in Diyala, a car bmb, part f a failed assassinatin attempt against the gvernr, killed a bdyguard.

74 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 42 December 28, 2005: 14 peple frm a single Shi ite family were fund sht dead in their hme in Mamudiyah. In Baghdad, a frmer Ba'ath plice ffice was gunned dwn in a separate incident. December 29, 2005: Gunmen attacked a minibus carrying Shi ites in Latifiyah, suth f Baghdad, killing 14. December 31, 2005: Gunmen near Tikrit kidnapped three peple, including a pliceman. Iraqi security frces discver the remains f five bdies suth f the capital; fur were fund in a river and ne, halftrtured, was fund in an rchard. A bmb targeting the lcal headquarters f the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party in Khalis killed five peple. January 1, 2006: In Kirkuk and ther nrthern cities, a wave f bmbings killed at least 40 peple. In Baghdad, gunmen killed tw wrshippers and wunded five as they left the Sunni Hdhaifa msque. In Mahmudiyah, Sunni Arab insurgents sht and killed a Shi ite cleric, a member f Mqtada al-sadr s mvement. January 2, 2006: seven plice recruits were killed frm a radside bmb utside Baquba, 13 thers were wunded. In Rustimiyah, suth f Baghdad, Iraqi security frces discvered eight unidentified bdies in a water purificatin plant. January 3, 2006: Insurgents attempted t assassinate Ahmed al-bakka, the head f the Shi ite Dawa party in Muqdadiya. Instead, they killed his nephew and a bdyguard. In the Baghdad neighbrhd f Kadhimiya, militants attacked an Iraqi plice patrl with a car bmb, killing five and wunding 15 fficers and civilians. In the al-dra neighbrhd, a car bmb detnated near an Iraqi plice cmmand patrl, killing three, including a cmmand, and wunding 11. Insurgents blew up 20 fuel tankers traveling in a cnvy frm Baji t Baghdad. The attacks ccurred in Tikrit and Mashada. January 4, 2006: A suicide bmber attacked a funeral prcessin in Muqdadiya, killing 50 peple and wunding 40 mre. Militants kidnap the sister f Interir Minister Bayan Jabr, demanding that the ministry release all female prisners. In the Baghdad neighbrhd f Amariya, insurgents ambush and kill a prminent il ministry fficial. January 5, 2006: In Ramadi, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives near a plice recruitment center where apprximately 1,000 Iraqis were waiting t apply fr new plice jbs. 68 were killed and an unknwn number wunded. 45 Iraqis were killed in Karbala in a separate blast. In Baquba, fur plicemen died and fur were wunded in an insurgent ambush. January 9, 2006: Tw suicide bmbers detnated their explsives utside f the Ministry f the Interir, killing seven peple and wunding 35 mre. The 84 th anniversary f the frmatin f the Iraqi plice was being celebrated in the building next dr. Each bmber had the apprpriate security badge, thugh Iraqi guards were able t identify the first bmber as a threat. Their gunfire set ff his explsives. Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jafaari denunced this new vilence as an attempt t undermine effrts t cnstruct a gverning calitin. Other senir fficials, like President Talibani als called fr unity and an inclusive gvernment. Despite such calls fr cntinued cperatin, sme individual members f bth the Sunni and Shi ite calitin parties made public statements that threatened effrts at creating an inclusive gvernment. SCIRI issued a warning t Sunni elements f the insurgency that its patience is wearing thin and hinted that it may use militias such as the Badr Brigade t carry ut revenge attacks against suspected insurgents. In Sadr City, ver 5,000 Shi ite Muslims prtested in the streets n January 7 t cndemn the recent suicide attacks and mderate Sunni leaders, while vicing supprt fr the Ministry f the Interir. 96 Izzat al-shahbandar, an fficial with the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt, the main Sunni calitin party invlved in the negtiatin prcess, remarked that the current Shi ite-dminated gvernment was acting as an accmplice in the nging vilence by pursuing sectarian plicies and strengthening Shi ite cntrlled militias. 97

75 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 43 There were als cntinued reprts f Shi ite militia men and MOI frces carrying ut vilence against Sunnis. Fr example, in the Sunni neighbrhd f Tubji, armed men in Interir Ministry plice unifrms killed three Sunni s and abducted mre than 20 thers. 98 One f the few released, Yasser Khalil, tld his stry t an AP reprter: "They tk us away and put us int a rm in a building I didn't recgnize, where they beat us and asked us questins abut wh we were. They then tk a few f us in their cars and dumped us n the eastern utskirts f Baghdad, saying if we said anything r lked at them they wuld kill us." 99 Sunni religius and plitical leaders cndemned these, and similar attacks. Sunnis speculated ver whether the attackers were agents f the Interir Ministry, r gunmen wearing ministry plice unifrms, a tactic that had been used by insurgents in ther instances. Sunni cleric Ahmed Abdul Gharfur al-samarraei highlighted in a speech what he saw as a dilemma fr Sunnis in the face f bth a hstile Shi ite dminated Interir Ministry plice and U.S.-led calitin frces attempting t wage a cunterinsurgency campaign: Shuld an Iraqi man surrender? If he surrenders, he will be detained and trtured. If he resists, he will be cnsidered a terrrist. 100 The Attack n the Askariya Shrine and the Increase f Lw-Level Civil Cnflict On February 22, insurgents brught sectarian vilence t a new and dramatic height. They attacked the 1,200 year ld Askariya shrine in Samarra, a Shi ite hly landmark, destrying its glden dme but causing n deaths. The destructin f the shrine, which hused the graves f tw revered Shi ite imams, caused an unprecedented wave f sectarian vilence in Iraq. In its Human Rights Reprt, the UN Assistance Missin fr Iraq stated that since the bmbing, there has been a marked deteriratin in the security envirnment, resulting in hundreds f cases f killings, trture, illegal detentin and displacement. 101 It went n t characterize the vilence that ensued in subsequent days: 102 Numerus killings reprtedly tk lace, including public executins by militias, in Al-Baldiat, Saddr City and Al-Sha ab areas f Baghdad. Street clashes and assaults by armed grups cntinued fr days. Many individuals were reprtedly detained at imprvised checkpints, r were abducted frm hmes and msques. Several f thse illegally detained were later fund dead, ften bearing signs f severe trture In retaliatin fr the Samarra bmbing, a significant number f Sunni msques were reprtedly attacked, destryed r damaged and clerics were amng thse assassinated. Such attacks did nt seem t have been spntaneus but rather revealed a degree f rganizatin and the face that the perpetratrs had readily access t resurces and equipment members f all cmmunities were negatively affected by the unleashed vilence and tit-fr-tat attacks. Officials in Iraq reprted that security frces had arrested as many as 10 individuals suspected f being invlved in the bmbing in the days fllwing the attack. 103 Accrding t initial investigatins f the damage, it appeared that the mausleum s fur main pillars were packed with explsives. These explsive charges were then cnnected tgether and linked t a detnatr, triggered frm a distance. Jassem Mhammed Jaafar, Iraq s Cnstructin Minister, stated that this was a sphisticated peratin and rigging the explsives wuld have taken at least 12 hurs. 104 Later studies shwed that sme 20 men had ccupied the msque at night and spent hurs systematically planting sme 400 punds wrth f explsives. Almst inevitably, bservers differed sharply ver just hw serius a step the attack was in pushing the cuntry twards civil war. U.S. State Department Spkesman Adam Ereli asserted

76 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 44 that the vilence, and Iraqi s reactin t it, was an affirmatin f a successful U.S. plicy in Iraq. Yu ve gt plitical leadership acting tgether n behalf f the cmmn gd, and yu ve gt security frces demnstrating that capability and a respnsibility as a natinal entity that we ve been wrking t develp and that has nw been put t the test and, I think, is prving successful, Ereli said. 105 Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch eched these sentiments saying, We re nt seeing civil war ignited in Iraq We re seeing a cmpetent, capable Iraqi gvernment using their security frces t calm the strm. 106 On the Sunday mrning talk shw Face the Natin, Natinal Security Advisr Stephen Hadley said that Iraqi s had stared int the abyss a bit, and I think they ve all cncluded that further vilence is nt in their interest. 107 These views cntrasted sharply with the view f Tariq al-hashimi, the leader f the Sunni dminated Iraqi Accrdance Frnt wh called the reactin f the gvernments security frces miserable and ashamed and said that as usual [they were] either audience r participant. 108 Other reprts similarly nted that ISF were either unable, r unwilling t stp attacks by militias. 109 U.S. fficials indicated n Saturday that Calitin trps had mre than quadrupled its patrls frm 65 n Wednesday t Whether this was because Iraqi frces were unable t handle the increased vilence, r whether it was intended simply as a reassurance r frce multiplier t aid Iraqi trps was unclear. Other fficials in the U.S. were less ptimistic, r simply mre realistic. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt said that the vilence was a pthle rather than a bump in the rad and that the U.S. and Iraq will find ut if the shck absrbers in the Iraqi sciety will hld r whether this will crack the frame. 111 Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice tk a similar apprach and played dwn the ht buttn issue f civil war saying, I dn t think we d the Iraqi peple any gd, r really that we are fair t them, in cntinually raising the specter that they might fall int civil war. 112 Sme Iraqis prtrayed the vilence in a similar light. Hassan al-bazzaz, a plitical science prfessr at Baghdad University said, We are n the brink f either slving ur prblems r falling int a hle frm which it wuld be very difficult t climb ut. He added, This might be a turning pint fr all f us. If nt, everyne will pay a very high price there will be n exceptins. 113 Hwever, almst ne mnth after the attack, Iraq s frmer prime minister Iyad Allawi tld BBC news that, It is unfrtunate that we are in a civil war. 114 There were similar differences ver respnsibility fr the attack. U.S. fficials, and the majrity f their Iraqi cunterparts, indicated that the blame was prbably the result f actins by a Ne- Salafi extremist grup like al-qa ida. In an interview n CNN, Iraq s Natinal Security Advisr, Mwaffak al-rubaie stated that the attack was the blueprint f al-qa ida. Hwever, n grup immediately claimed the attack, and speculatin varied depending n wh was asked. One Iraqi man blamed the al-sadr s Mahdi Militia fr the attack. 115 In fact, many Shi ites cndemned that attack, while als assigning blame t their wn sect. 116 Mahmud al- Mashhadany, an fficial with the Sunni plitical party the Iraqi Cnsensus Frnt, als accused the Shi ites f planning the attack and the retaliatry vilence that fllwed saying, We think what happened yesterday was rganized. It had all been rganized the night befre. 117 The mujaheddin shura, a cuncil f Islamic extremist insurgent grups in Iraq, including al- Qa ida, issued a statement blaming the attack n the Iraqi gvernment s cperatin and clse relatinship with Iran. The grup als indicated that it was preparing a shcking respnse t the cnspiracy. 118

77 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 45 Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad blamed the attack n the U.S. and Israel saying during a TV bradcast, These heinus acts are cmmitted by a grup f Zinists and ccupiers that have failed. 119 Regardless f wh was respnsible, the respnse pushed the cuntry twards large-scale civil war. 120 Hundreds f Iraqis were killed in the vilence that fllwed the attack n the Msque, and Shi ites respnded with mre vilence against Sunnis. Frequent targets during this perid were msques, schls, headquarters f plitical parties and hspitals alng with Shi ite r Sunni dminated neighbrhds and large public places in general. While U.S. sldiers were killed and many attacks were aimed at Iraqi plice and military frces, the vilence was largely perpetrated against Iraqi civilians and appeared t be sectarian in nature. This cycle, which cntinued int March, included a mix f past methds f attack used t cause mass casualties against civilians and Iraqi security frces such as car bmbs and suicide bmbers, but als an increase in lw-level civil cnflict including mystery killings, bdy dumps, and assassinatins carried ut bth by Sunnis and Shi ites. But the lw-level nature f many f the attacks made it difficult t impssible t determine with certainty the perpetratrs f much f the vilence r why the victims were chsen. Althugh it is difficult t accurately assess the level f vilence triggered by the attack n the msque, the numerus cnfirmed attacks that did ccur during the first five days fllwing the attack shw just hw serius its impact was: February 22, 2006: In Al Amin, sutheast f Baghdad, gunmen set fire t a huse believed t be the residence f Sunni militants. February 22, 2006: Gunmen identified as Mahdi fighters drve int Al Shabab and attacked Ibad Al Rahman, a Sunni msque, kidnapped a man inside, and set the msque n fire. February 22, 2006: 7 U.S. sldiers were killed by radside bmbs. February 23, 2006: An attack n a Sunni msque in Barquba killed 8 Iraqi sldiers and wunded nearly a dzen peple. February 23, 2006: 47 peple, bth Sunnis and Shi ites were frced frm their vehicles by gunmen and sht, their bdies dumped in a ditch near Baqubah. Many were n their way t prtest the shrine bmbing. Included in these bdies were three Iraqi jurnalists. February 23, 2006: In Basra, militiamen brke int a prisn, hauled ut 12 inmates (including 2 Egyptians, 2 Tunisians, a Libyan, a Saudi and a Turk) and sht them. February 23, 2006: The Sunni clerical Assciatin f Muslim Schlars said 168 Sunni msques were attacked, 10 imams killed and 15 abducted. February 23, 2006: Gunmen pened fire n a Sunni msque in Baquba, where plice were guarding access t the msque. February 23, 2006: At a Shi ite demnstratin in Kirkuk, plice fund and defused a dzen explsive devices. February 24, 2006: Three Sunni msques in suthern Baghdad were attacked and mrtar runds landed near the Shi ite shrine f Salman al-farisi in the twn f Salman Pak, 20 miles suth f the capital. February 24, 2006: Gunmen strmed a huse suth f Baghdad and sht dead five Shi ite men. February 24, 2006: Tw mre rckets explded in the British Embassy cmpund in Baghdad's heavily frtified Green Zne, causing minr injuries t tw British wrkers. February 24, 2006: Plice fund at least 27 bdies in Baghdad and ther cities and twns. February 24, 2006: In Samarra, a radside bmb killed tw plicemen.

78 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 46 February 25, 2006: Three plice cmmands died when the funeral f a prminent Iraqi televisin jurnalist killed in the vilence was ambushed in western Baghdad. February 25, 2006: Gun battles erupted arund a Sunni msque in suthwestern Baghdad after Interir Ministry frces dispatched t prtect the msque came under fire frm gunmen inside. February 25, 2006: The bdies f 14 slain plice cmmands were fund near their three burned vehicles near a Sunni msque in suthwestern Baghdad, and 11 ther bdies were discvered in varius lcatins acrss Baghdad. February 25, 2006: A car bmb killed fur peple in the Shi ite hly city f Karbala February 25, 2006: 13 members f a Shi ite family were massacred in the twn f Baquba. February 25, 2006: Tw rckets slammed int Baghdad's Shi ite slum, Sadr City, killing three peple, including a child, and wunding seven. February 25, 2006: 21 ther peple died in small-scale shtings and bmbings in Baghdad and western areas f the city. February 26, 2006: At least seven mrtar runds hit in a Shi ite enclave f Dra a predminantly Sunni Arab district and ne f the mst dangerus parts f the city plice said. Fifteen peple were reprted killed at 45 injured. February 26, 2006: Tw mre mrtar runds crashed int hmes in the city's the eastern Shi ite-dminated neighbrhd f Hurriyah, killing three civilians and injuring six thers. February 26, 2006: A grup f sccer players stumbled upn three bdies in Mahmudiya, suth f Baghdad. The victims had been cuffed, blindflded and sht in the head and chest. February 26, 2006: In Madain, sutheast f the capital, a radside bmb explded near a plice patrl, killing ne fficer and injuring tw thers. February 26, 2006: in Ramadi, gunmen sht dead an ex-general in Saddam Hussein's army as he drve his car thrugh the Sunni-insurgent strnghld. February 26, 2006: In Hillah, a Shi ite-dminated city in Babil, a bmb explded at a crwded bus statin, injuring five peple. February 26, 2006: A bmb explded in a Shi ite msque in Basra, causing minr injuries. February 26, 2006: U.S. sldiers were killed when a radside bmb struck their vehicle in western Baghdad. February 28, 2006: A pair f bmb attacks in the pr, mstly Shi ite, Jadida district left 27 dead and 112 injured. In the first incident, a man wearing an explsives belt targeted a gas statin. Five minutes later, the first f at least five car bmbs in the capital explded near a grup f labrers. A car bmb struck near a small Shi ite msque in the Hurriya district f central Baghdad, killing 25 and injuring 43. Anther detnated by remte cntrl near a small market in the mstly Shi ite Karada district left six dead and 18 injured. In the upscale Sunni Arab district f Zayna, a car bmb targeting an army patrl killed five, while a car bmb targeting a cnvy fr an advisr t the Defense Ministry, Daham Radhi Assal, injured three. Elsewhere, a car bmb targeting a plice patrl n the rad between Kirkuk and the capital killed fur civilians. February 28, 2006: In the Hurriya district, gunmen blew up a Sunni msque withut causing casualties. February 28, 2006: Attackers damaged a msque in Tikrit that huses the remains f Hussein's father. February 28, 2006: A mrtar shell landed near the ffices f Baghdad TV, a satellite channel perated by the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni factin. Tw emplyees were injured. February 28, 2006: Authrities in Baqubah discvered nine bdies, each sht in the head. February 28, 2006: Tw British sldiers were killed and anther injured when their Land Rver was blwn up by a radside bmb while n patrl in the Iraqi twn f Amara. Similar types f attacks cntinued int March. On March 1, tw car bmbs killed 26 civilians and wunded 55. The fllwing day a bmb in a vegetable market in Baghdad killed eight and wunded 14. On March 3 ver 50 Sunni insurgents attacked a small twn near Baghdad killing

79 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page mstly Shi ite wrkers. The fllwing day, tw msques were attacked, ne Sunni and ne Shi ite. On March 5 tw car bmbings and varius shtings thrughut the day killed 25 Iraqis. 36 bdies were discvered n March 8: 18 in the back f a van and 18 that washed up at a water treatment plant. On March 12 a series f explsins killed ver 50 peple and wunded 200 thrughut a Shi ite slum near Baghdad. On the mrning f March 15 authrities and newspapers reprted that ver 87 bdies had been discvered in the past 24 hurs. 121 Baghdad, a mixed city, became particularly vilent. In the mnth after the Askariya attack, the murder rate in the city tripled frm 11 per day t 33 per day. During this same time perid, US military fficials indicated that 1,313 Iraqi civilians had been killed, and 173 f thse deaths were the result f car bmbs. 122 In the perid frm March 7 until March 21, ver 191 bdies were fund, many f them blindflded, mutilated and sht in the head. One affect the general deteriratin f security had in the wake f the bmbing was t make rdinary Iraqi rely even mre n small arms fr their wn prtectin. With this increase in demand came an increase in price. The price f a Russian-made AK-47 increased frm $112 befre the Askariya attack, t $290 afterward. The price f hand grenades has almst dubled t $ In April, the cntinuance f sectarian vilence brught tgether religius leaders frm bth Sunni and Shi ite sects t try and halt the bldshed and prevent Iraq frm descending int civil war. Held under the auspices f the Arab League, the cnference was t take place in Amman. Organizers f the cnference, strngly backed by King Abdullah, said that the meeting wuld generate a declaratin against sectarian vilence signed by bth Shi ite and Sunni leaders. 124 Msque bmbings by Sunni insurgents cntinued in April. On April 6, a car bmb explded near the sacred Imam Ali shrine in Najaf killing 10 and injuring 30. The very next day, three suicide bmbers targeted the Baratha msque in Baghdad, a primary headquarters fr SCIRI, killing ver 80 and wunding mre than 140. At least tw f the bmbers were dressed as wmen t hide the bmbs and slipped int the msque as the wrshippers left. The first bmb detnated at the main exit, and the secnd inside the msque as peple rushed back in fr safety. Ten secnds later, the third bmb explded. 125 Althugh Shi ite leaders called fr calm, the attacks underscred the cntinuity f vilence in Iraq, put greater pressure n plitical leaders t frm a calitin gvernment, and increased pressure n al-jaafari t step dwn in favr f a less divisive leader. Sft Sectarian Cleansing and Internal Displacement While the lng term impact f this spate f sectarian vilence n Iraq s future was nt yet knwn. In sme mixed Shi ite-sunni cmmunities it had a unifying effect. In these instances Shi ites and Sunnis rganized armed patrls t prtect their neighbrhds frm sectarian vilence. 126 At the same time hwever, it seemed that sectarian displacement was the mre dminant trend, as Sunni and Shi ite families left their mixed neighbrhds fr areas where their sect was the majrity. The U.N-affiliated Internatinal Organizatin fr Migratin estimated that by the end f March as many as 25,000 Iraqi s had been displaced since the Askariya bmbing. The Iraqi Ministry f Displacement and Migratin put the number even higher at 32, Althugh numbers differ, it is estimated that f these families, between 220 and 761 were Shi ites that had fled frm the Sunni dminated al-anbar prvince t Baghdad. In turn, 50 Sunni families had reprtedly relcated t frm Baghdad t Fallujah. It is als believed that 1,250 Shi ite families

80 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 48 fled Baghdad and central Iraq and settled in Najaf. 128 In Fallujah, anther city that is predminately Sunni, nly 37 Shi ite families remained accrding t the rganizatin. 129 By mid- April, the Ministry f Displacement Migratin put the number at 60,000 peple. 130 A spkesman fr the fr the ministry estimated that every day 1,000 Iraqi s are being frced t flee their hmes. 131 Much f the displacement ccurred in and arund the capital, traditinally a mixed city. In the Shi ite city f Najaf, an abandned htel was turned int a shelter fr incming families and in Nasiriyah, arriving families began setting up tents n the utskirts f the city. 132 Similarly, an amusement park in the predminately Shi ite twn f al-kut was cnverted int a makeshift refugee camp. 133 Iraqi fficials wrried that this massive relcatin wuld cause fd and water shrtages. 134 In April, there were reprts that with dysentery was spreading and cnditins were expected t wrsen with the cming summer. 135 This internal displacement, while ften the result f direct threats by either Sunni insurgents r Shi ite militias, was als due t the general deteriratin f security and increase in sectarian tensins fllwing the attack n the shrine. Families, wh ften felt secure amng their lng-time neighbrs f the ppsite sect, were nw facing abductins and killings perpetrated in brad daylight by masked gunmen. Fr example, when car lads f gunmen grabbed Mhannad al- Azawi, a Sunni, frm his pet stre in Baghdad and a Shi ite friend attempted t intervene, witnesses said the men pinted a pistl t his head and asked, Yu want us t blw yur brains ut t? 136 The UN Assistance Missin fr Iraq detailed these ccurrences in a reprt issued in April nting that a number f Sunni and Shi a families living in mixed neighbrhds were frcibly evicted frm their hmes r left vluntarily because f threats f vilence frm militias, insurgents and ther armed grups. 137 The stries tld by individual Iraqis were ften similar. One individual, Bassam Fariq Daash, a 34-year ld Shi ite fled frm his predminately Sunni village f Awad t nearby Shula after numerus death threats frm insurgents. Reprtedly, he was ne f 147 Shi ite families that had cme t that twn since the February 22 attack. 138 In a similar instance, a Sunni man wh lived in Samarra was beaten by black-clad militia men, his mther was sht and he was tld by the gunmen that they wuld kill him and everybdy [he knws] if he did nt leave the city immediately. 139 Hussein Alawan, a Shi ite, was driven ut f the mixed city f Latifiyah: They tld me that I shuld leave within 24 hurs r we will all get killed. S we left everything there and tk nly the bare things we need t live. 140 Mahadiyia Mushin, a Shi ite residing in the suburb f Abu Ghraib, fund her name n a death list tgether with the names f 31 ther Shi ite families that was distributed by Sunni Mujahideen. As she was preparing t leave, she watched gunmen drag her neighbr frm his huse, trture and sht him, and then light his huse n fire as a warning t thse wh refused t cmply. 141 In the mixed al-amel district, sme Sunni families received envelpes cntaining a single bullet and a letter telling them t leave the neighbrhd immediately. 142 A Sunni shp wner, Dhafir Sadun, left his lng time residence in Sadr City saying We did nt fear the Mahdi Army because we ve lived in Sadr City fr 20 years, and everyne knws us and knws hw we lve the Shi ites. But the Interir Ministry cmmands arrest any Sunni. They dn t just arrest them; they kill them. 143 The displacement caused by this sectarian vilence was als being explited fr financial gain in sme instances. There were reprts that an estate agent in Adamiyah, a Sunni

81 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 49 suburb in Baghdad, had paid teenagers t distribute fliers t Shi ite husehlds warning them t leave with the intentin f buying up the prperty at lw prices. 144 Similar tactics were ften emplyed. Leaflets were frequently distributed by gunmen r even by children. In sme instances, thse wh had fled did s after hearing their names n a list f enemies read ut at a Sunni msque. It was als reprted that religius vigilantes wuld paint black crsses, referred t as the mark f death, n the drs f thse it sught t drive ut. Yung children were smetimes abducted fr several hurs and then returned t their families with a warning that if they did nt leave, next time their children wuld be killed. 145 This displacement already began t affect lcal gvernance in the spring f In Musayyib, a traditinally mixed district, the city cuncil was run by 17 Shi ites, mst f whm were al-sadr supprters, and included tw nn-vting Sunni members. There were als reprts that members f the Mahdi Army had slwly began plicing the neighbrhds, implementing strict punishments fr the vilatin f Islamic law in the area. In ne instance a wmen was dused in acid fr having her ankles expsed. 146 US-Iraqi Campaigns in Early 2006 The Calitin launched several peratins in March 2006 aimed at insurgents attempting t fster sectarian vilence. Many f these were cnducted with Iraqi s taking the lead were pssible. In Operatin Scales f Justice, 26,000 Iraqi army and plice tgether with 10,000 Calitin frces cnducted 300 patrls n the streets f Baghdad per day in an effrt t increase general security. This peratin included mre than 100 checkpints established thrughut the city and was scheduled t cntinue until a new Iraqi gvernment was frmed. 147 Accrding t Maj. Gen. James Thurman, this peratin has resulted in increased lcal trust in Iraqi frces and ver 3,000 annymus tips regarding insurgent activity. He als indicated that these nging peratins had caused a 58% reductin in attacks in the city in the past 90 days. 148 Operatin Nrthern Lights was an Iraqi-led peratin that cnsisted f a series f ffensive raids t capture r kill insurgents, seize weapns and explsive material and halt sectarian attacks. In the initial stages f the peratin, 18 insurgents were captured and 8 weapns caches were discvered. 149 On March 17, the U.S. launched Operatin Swarmer near Samarra. This jint U.S.-Iraqi peratin, led by the 101 st airbrne divisin, was described as the largest air assault since the 2003 invasin. Accrding t U.S. military fficials, 1,500 Calitin and Iraqi trps participated and mre than 50 aircraft and 200 tactical vehicles were used. 150 Fur battalins were used frm the 101 st airbrne were used and abut 60 percent f the trps invlved were Iraqi accrding t Lt. Cl. Edward Lmis. 151 The peratin fcused n a 10 square mile area nrtheast f the city that had been a cncentratin f sectarian attacks in the weeks prir and als reprtedly harbred al-qaeda insurgents. 152 At least 40 suspected insurgents were apprehended n the first day and several weapns caches were discvered that cntained artillery shells, explsives, radside bmb making materials and military unifrms. 153 There were n reprts f casualties r resistance by insurgents. 154

82 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 50 The secnd day f the assault nly netted 10 mre detainees and 17 frm the day prir were released. In additin, n new weapns caches were fund. American cmmand even began t send sme trps back t their bases. 155 By the third day f the peratin, Lt. Cl. Lmis stated that abut 80 suspected insurgents had been detained since Thursday, the first day f the assault. Six f thse individuals were allegedly invlved in the killing f an Iraqi televisin statin directr and his driver several days earlier. 156 The peratin cncluded March 22 with n casualties and resulted in the detentin f 104 suspected insurgents and the discvery f 24 weapns caches. 157 On the evening f March 26, U.S. and Iraqi frces cnducted a jint peratin t disrupt a terrrist cell in nrtheast Baghdad. The events that fllwed hwever were sharply disputed by US and Iraqi fficials. 158 Accrding t military spkesman fr the U.S., the raid resulted in 16 insurgents killed, 15 captured, ne hstage freed and the discvery f weapns and bmb-making equipment. While sme reprts indicated that the peratin was aimed at Shi ite militiamen lyal t al-sadr wh were using the center fr interrgatin and trture, thers claimed that it was against a Sunni-led element. 159 Iraqi fficials hwever tld a very different accunt. Accrding t them, U.S. and Iraqi frces descended n the msque surrunding it with armed humvees and sealed ff all exits. When sldiers attempted t enter the msque, they tk fire resulting in an hur-lng gun battle. The Interir Ministry said that 17 peple were killed, including the msque s 80 year ld imam. Thse that were killed suppsedly wrked fr al-sadr and were engaged in evening prayer at the msque when the raid began. 160 Muhammad Ridha, wh wrked at the cmplex, said, There was n resistance at all frm the msque. There were n weapns during prayers The purpse f the raid was t kill Shi ites. 161 Aides t al-sadr alleged that 25 peple were killed and that U.S. trps sht the guards utside the msques befre strming the facility and killing all thse inside. 162 One witness, a pliceman, said that the msque appeared t have been hit by a rcket. 163 U.S. fficials cntinued t deny that they had entered a msque. 164 In fact, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli said that it was an Iraqi led peratin backed up by 25 US advisrs. He added that the Iraqi units tld us pint blank that this was nt a msque and that there s been huge misinfrmatin n the part f thse wh had suggested therwise. 165 Yet ftage aired n Iraqi news channels shwed at least a dzen unarmed crpses, including ne elderly man, in what appeared t be a prayer rm. 166 In a Pentagn briefing, Gen. Peter Pace stated that there was a minaret and prayer rm inside the cmpund but culd nt verify whether peple were killed in the prayer rm. 167 U.S. Army phts shwed dead men with weapns in a rm that lacked prayer rugs. 168 It was pssible that militia members staged the scene after U.S. and Iraqi frces departed. In the past, insurgents have demnstrated a capability t manipulate public pinin by frcing Calitin frces t attack hly sites, r make it appear that they did, as part f infrmatinal warfare. The issue may simply be ne f definitin. The msque was marked n the utside by a sign that read Al-Mustafa Husayniyah. Husayniyah is a Shi ite term fr a religius center r a cmmunity center that may als huse ffices fr plitical purpses. Thus, althugh the cmplex

83 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 51 did nt have many f the traditinal characteristics f a msque, it was cnsidered t be n by the Shi ites nnetheless. 169 Regardless f whether the facility was a msque, a prayer rm, r neither, the peratin had damaging plitical effects. The gvernr f Baghdad subsequently brke ff all cperatin with U.S. military frces. 170 Prime Minister al-jaafari secured a prmise frm Gen. Gerge Casey that he wuld cnduct an investigatin int the allegatins. 171 Shi ite plitical leaders cndemned the raid and al-sadr used the event as anther pprtunity t cndemn the American presence in Iraq and call fr Shi ite slidarity. One Mahdi member guarding a radblck t Sadr City said, We are ready t resist the Americans and strike their bases The Sunnis have nthing t d with this, and we shuldn t accuse them f everything that s ging n. 172 Operatin Cbra Strike was anther jint US-Iraqi peratin launched in April. Its gal was t lcate the suspected leader and financier f a terrrist cell wrking in the area. The cell was suspected f several murders, kidnappings and radside bmbings in Haswah and Iskandariyah. Althugh this same Iraqi-US team had been cnducting jint peratins since December 2005, this was the first missin rchestrated slely by Iraqi sldiers. 173 The results f these military peratins against insurgent strnghlds were mixed at best. Even thugh Iraqi frces came n line and increasingly began t take the lead in jint peratins, many f the same limits remained. While there were success stries, insurgents were still cnsistently able t disperse and re-emerge at anther lcatin. A lack f a permanent security presence in many areas permited the insurgents and criminals t return. Perhaps mst imprtantly, despite the fact that peratins and raids were ften peratinal successes they are able t net insurgent grups and weapns caches the number f attacks had nt abated and it was increasingly the case that Iraqis were the main target. In any case, it was nt clear in the early mnths f 2006 that the Sunni insurgency was the primary threat t Iraqi unity and security. US and Iraqi fficials bth cited the sectarian vilence and the risk f civil war as increasing areas f cncern. U.S. military fficials in particular nted the danger that Shi ite militias psed t Iraqi security. 174 Accrding t sme reprts, there were talks within the Department f Defense in April 2006 t rchestrate a secnd liberatin f Baghdad, nce a new Iraqi gvernment was frmed. Operatinally, it was designed t have Iraqi frces in the lead supprted by U.S. air pwer, special peratins, intelligence and back-up trps. As Iraqi and US frces went thrugh each neighbrhd, they wuld leave behind Sweat teams (Sewage, Water, Electricity and Trash) t imprve lcal cnditins and facilities. This new battle was t ffer the citizens f the capital prtectin frm sectarian vilence in exchange fr their assistance in identifying and capturing r killing insurgent and terrrist grups. 175 Symblically, the campaign was als said t be an effrt t shw that the Iraqi gvernment was capable f taking back the streets. 176 The gal was t cnduct the peratin during the summer, nce the gvernment had settled in and then begin withdrawing U.S. trps tward the end f the year. 177 Effrts t Create a Natinal Unity Gvernment Prgress als cntinued in frming a gvernment. In late January the tw dminant Shi ite and Sunni plitical blcs, United Iraqi Alliance and the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt had entered int talks

84 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 52 and publicly annunced a list f ptential nminees fr Prime Minister in the next gvernment. These included current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari; Adil Abdul-Mahdi f SCIRI; nuclear physicist Husseing al-shahrastani; and Fadhila party representative Nadim al-jabiri. 178 In February, Ibrahim al-jaafari was re-elected t the psitin by ne vte ver Adil Abdul-Mahdi. Al-Jaafari s victry was in part due t the supprt he received frm the legislatrs assciated with al-sadr. The pst-electin vilence did, hwever, cmplicate many aspects f the effrt t create an inclusive gvernment. Fr example, the cntrl f the Defense Ministry and Interir Ministry psts at the cabinet level became an even mre cntentius issue between the Shi ite dminated United Iraqi Alliance and the mstly Sunni Iraqi Accrdance Frnt. Adnan al-dulaimi, the leader f the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt, stated that he believed the appintment t the psitins shuld be kept away frm any sectarian and plitical cnsideratins and accused the MOI frces f engaging in sectarian cleansing in Baghdad. Hadi al-amri, the head f the Badr Brigade, the militia assciated with SCIRI, respnded that faced with daily slaughter the Shi ites will nt relinquish security prtflis." 179 In March hwever, the ministers f bth the Defense and Interir Ministries attempted t stem abuses by annuncing that they wuld nly carry ut jint raids in the future. 180 As fr the Sunni insurgency, the Iraqi gvernment cntinued t hld direct talks with willing Sunni militant grups. Althugh the gvernment had emphasized that n steadfast cmmitments have been made between parties, Talabani s advisr fr security affairs, Wafiq al Samarie, said that, many grups are cmmunicating with us. 181 This nging dialgue began in the mnths leading up t the December electin in an effrt t draw Sunni Arabs, the cre f the insurgency, int the plitical prcess and islate the Ne-Salafi elements The bmbing f the Askariya shrine and the sectarian vilence that fllwed threatened the prgress in frming an inclusive gvernment. Hwever, Iraqi plitical figures called n the cuntry t recgnize that the attack was an attempt t create a civil war and urged Iraqi s t be calm. President Jalal Talabani said the day f the attacks, We are facing a majr cnspiracy that is targeting Iraq s unity we shuld all stand hand in hand t prevent the danger f a civil war. President Bush eched these sentiments saying, The terrrists in Iraq have again prven that they are enemies f all faiths and f all humanity the wrld must stand united against them, and steadfast behind the peple f Iraq. The President als pledged U.S. assistance t rebuild the damaged shrine. Unlike the activist al-sadr, Grand Ayatllah Ali al-sistani tld his fllwers that attacks n Sunni msques were frbidden. 182 President Bush spke with the leaders f the seven majr plitical factins by phne and urged them t reinstitute talks. Afterwards, Sunni leaders agreed t meet with their Shi ite and Kurdish cunterparts. Later that evening, Prime Minister al-jaafari, accmpanied by the leaders f the ther majr calitins, annunced at a press cnference that that cuntry wuld nt allw itself t engage in civil war and that this was a mment f terrific plitical symblism. 183 U.S. Ambassadr t Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, warned that future U.S. supprt f the Iraqi gvernment and aid wuld be dependent upn the success f the gvernment s effrts at creating an inclusive arrangement. Al-Jaafari respnded that the new gvernment will nt be sectarian, Nt because the U.S. ambassadr says this and warns us, but because this is ur plicy. 184

85 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 53 A leading Sunni calitin party suspended talks t frm a calitin gvernment and issued a list f demands that had t be met in rder fr negtiatins t cntinue. These demands, which were met shrtly, included the impsitin f a curfew, a denunciatin f vilence by the Iraqi gvernment, and a return f the Sunni msques ccupied by Shi ite militias. 185 The first meeting f Iraq s 275-member Cuncil r Representatives tk place n March 16 amid nging sectarian vilence. The meeting itself was largely ceremnial, and lasted just ver 30 minutes. Accrding t Iraq s cnstitutin, the cuntry then had 60 days t frm a gvernment, yet many issues critical t the frmatin f a unity gvernment still had t be reslved. 186 In fact, the agnizing plitical struggles t take even the first steps t frm an effective gvernment dragged n until mid-april. One f the mst cntentius decisins by the dminant Shi ite blc was the nminatin f al-jaafari as Prime Minister. Sunnis, Kurds and sme secular members called fr a new nminatin by the United Iraqi Alliance. 187 Perhaps mre debilitating t the functinality f the bdy is that it culd nt elect its wn fficials r take up new business until it reached an agreement n the makeup f its new leadership. 188 Al-Jaafari stated after the meeting that he wuld step dwn as Prime Minister if the peple ask me [t]. It seemed likely hwever that the UIA wuld attempt stay united behind al-jaafari. 189 In fact, sme characterized the ceremny as mre f an interruptin t the nging negtiatins between the varius plitical grups t create a calitin gvernment that is satisfactry t Iraq s majrity Shi ites, yet gives prprtinal rles t the Sunnis and Kurds as well. One f the initiatives aimed t achieve this end, was the frmatin f a 19-member natinal security cuncil t set plicies pertaining t the army and plice frces, the cunter-insurgency campaign and the disarmament and disslutin f Shi ite militias. Tw f the psitins in the cuncil wuld g t the President and Prime Minister with the remaining seats being distributed t parties in prprtin t their representatin in parliament. 190 This cuncil s relatinship with the cabinet, chsen by the Prime Minister, was unclear because nwhere in the cnstitutin des it prvide fr the frmatin f such a cuncil. In fact, Kurdish leaders first suggested the cuncil in January as a check n Shi ite pwer. Althugh the UIA initially resisted it as uncnstitutinal, pressure frm the ther plitical parties and Ambassadr Khalilzad caused it t reluctantly acquiesce. Still, it did s nly n the grunds that decisins will require the apprval by 13 members, which fr the freseeable future gives the Shi ites vet pwer as lng as they remain unified within the cuncil. 191 U.S. frustratin with al-jaafari s reluctance t rein in Shi ite militias became increasingly vcal and in return, s did Shi ite accusatins f plitical bullying n the part f the U.S. This tensin was wrsened by allegatins that U.S. and Iraqi military frces raided a msque, killing wrshippers lyal t al-sadr. In late March, Ambassadr Khalilzad stated that President Bush desn t want, desn t supprt, desn t accept al-jaafari as the next prime minister. Althugh U.S. fficials in Baghdad did nt elabrate n the statement, they did nt dispute its authenticity. 192 Representatives frm al-jaafari s ffice immediately cndemned the remark. Hw can they d this? Hadier al-ubady, a spkesman fr al-jaafari asked. An ambassadr telling a svereign cuntry what t d is unacceptable. 193 The divisins within the United Iraqi Alliance ver al-jaafari, and increasing US pressure t frm a gvernment, did, hwever, lead sme members f the Shi ite calitin t withdraw their supprt frm the prime minister. In April, a senir Shi ite plitician, Kassim Daud, called fr

86 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 54 al-jaafari t step dwn. 194 One day later, Sheik Jalaladeen al-sagheir, a deputy t the SCIRI s leader Abul-Aziz al-hakim, declared that he was fficially suggesting anther candidate t replace al-jaafari. 195 Even Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi, cnsidered by sme t be his primary inter-party rival fr the psitin, publicly called fr al-jaafari t quit. 196 Grand Ayatllah Sistani hwever urged the Shi ite plitical parties t frm a gvernment quickly but als t supprt al-jaafari and maintain their unity. 197 During the same time, Kurdish leaders fficially infrmed the UIA that they had decided t reject al-jaafari as their nminatin fr prime minister. 198 A surprise visit by Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice and Freign Secretary Jack Straw further highlighted the urgency f frming an inclusive gvernment, but may have had the effect f hardening al-jaafari s insistence that he remain in ffice. Their visit came at a time when the US had becme increasingly vcal in its preference fr anther prime minister. This, and the fact that bth Rice and Straw seemed t have a mre amicable meeting with Adel Abdul Mehdi, likely caused al-jaafari t view their visit as an indirect attempt t influence Iraqi leaders and unseat him frm his psitin. In fact, al-jaafari s tp advisr, Haider al-abadi, reflected these exact sentiments saying, pressure frm utside is nt helping t speed up any slutin all its ding is hardening the psitin f peple wh are supprting Jaafari. Specifically addressing the US-British diplmatic envy he said, They shuldn t have cme t Baghdad. 199 Al-Jaafari himself said, There is a decisin that was reached by a demcratic mechanism, and I stand with it. 200 tthe increasing U.S. displeasure with al-jaafari s rle and inability t reign in Shi ite militias, led sme t pstulate that the U.S. might have a new ally in Iraq s Sunnis. During Rice s visit she dined with several Sunni plitical leaders in Baghdad, sme wh had byctted the January 2005 electins and frmerly supprted the insurgency. Tariq al-hashimi, the secretary general f the Sunni-dminated Iraqi Islamic Party recunted his time with Secretary Rice: I lked Cndi in the eye and tld her, Yur ambassadr shws tremendus curage and is ding a hell f a gd jb in Iraq. During her brief trip, Rice praised the maturatin f the Sunni plitical bdy and their participatin in Iraq s demcratic prcess. 201 It is unclear hw enduring these trends in U.S.-Sunni relatins will be. In additin, the U.S. likely still understands that as the majrity sect, it will have t deal with the Shi ites in any representative gvernment. 202 The UIA attempted t break the deadlck n April 10 by sending a three-member delegatin t persuade Sunni and Kurdish plitical grups t supprt al-jaafari s nminatin. These effrts failed and the grups cntinued t press fr anther candidate, saying they wuld nt jin a new gvernment under al-jaafari s leadership. 203 Tw days later, Adnan Pachachi, the acting parliament speaker, a Sunni, and a member f Allawi s party annunced that he wuld cnvene the legislature the fllwing week t cntinue with the demcratic prcess and frce the parties t decide n a prime minister. Pachachi added that he was tld by Shi ite pliticians that they hped t reslve the issue befre the parliament meets. 204 Fearing that this meeting culd create pen divisins within the Shi ite alliance, thereby disslving its pwer as the mst dminant blc, the UIA cuntered that the names f thse nminated fr the tp psts in gvernment must be agreed upn befrehand. Shi ite plitical

87 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 55 leaders justified this mve by asserting that cnvening a parliamentary sessin wuld be f little use if individuals were nt already selected t hld psitins within a gvernment. This tactic f insisting n apprval f the nminatins t imprtant gvernment psts befre a legislative meeting culd shift the burden f agreement back t Sunnis and Kurds. Shi ite pliticians requested that representatives frm each main plitical blc meet that Sunday, the day prir t the parliamentary meeting, t discuss pssible nminatins. 205 That weekend bth secular leaders frm Iyad Allawi s party as well as tp Shi ite clerics attempted t brker last minute agreements. Allawi annunced n Iraqi televisin that pliticians might have t create an emergency gvernment in rder t save Iraq frm its current deadly crises. 206 Adnan Pachachi,wh had previusly annunced his intentins t cnvene the bdy n Mnday regardless f whether disputes culd be settled befrehand, prpsed that this emergency gvernment include parties that didn t win seats in the electin and be based n a new arrangement rather than the cnstitutin. Pachachi called this a genuine, effective partnership between plitical grups rather than electin results which we d nt think reflected the vters will, anyway. 207, Tp Sh ite clerics did meet in Najaf t discuss ptential slutins that wuld allw the blc t hld nt pwer and debated mre frceful interventin by the clergy. The week prir, the sn f Grand Ayatllah Sistani, Mhammed Ridha Sistani, received a guarantee frm al-sadr that he wuld nt bject if the UIA replaced al-jaafari with anther candidate. 208 Nnetheless, when Mnday arrived the meeting f the parliament was pstpned as Sh ite pliticians still wrked t put tgether a list f nminatins t the tp psitins including prime minister. An advisr t al-jaafari indicated that ne f the leading candidates t replace the Prime Minister was Ali al-adeeb, wh was als frm the al-dawa party. The aide, Adnan Ali al- Kadhimi, als said that Talabani wuld likely remain as President and that Iyad Allawi, Adnan al-dulaimi and Saleh al-mutlak were being cnsidered fr the tw deputy president psitins. Talabani is a Kurd, Allawi a secular Shi ite and al-dulaimi and al-mutlak bth Sunnis. The Iraqi ambassadr t the U.S., Samir Sumaidaie, als mentined al-adeeb s as a ptential candidate n a CNN Sunday talk shw. 209 Sme leaders, seemingly disillusined with the prcess, predicted the negtiatins t frm a gvernment wuld g n fr weeks r mnths. Al-Mutlak, wh acknwledged he was running fr deputy president, said that he believed negtiatins wuld wear n fr weeks. He called al- Adeeb, the pssible candidate fr Prime Minister an Iranian, and said that regardless f what candidates the UIA puts frward, all f them are the same. 210 Similarly, Zafir al-ani, a spkesman fr the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt, predicted that a gvernment wuld nt be frmed fr anther mnth because f the differences between the parties. 211 Al-Jaafari cntinued t send mixed messages as t whether he wuld vluntarily step dwn r allw himself t be replaced by cnsensus. On April 19, he annunced in a natinally televised news cnference that stepping dwn wuld be ut f the questin. 212 In a cmplete reversal, the very next day he signaled that he wuld allw leaders f the UIA t withdraw his nminatin. Shi ite legislatrs planned t meet that Saturday t cnclude whether al-jaafari wuld remain, r a new candidate wuld be nminated in his place. Bassem Sharif, a UIA lawmaker indicated that the party was leaning tward the latter saying, The majrity pinin is in favr f this [changing the nminatin]. Althugh the legislature wuld still cnvene n Thursday, parliament

88 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 56 members indicated that it wuld be brief, and that a frmal sessin wuld be put ff until Sunday after Shi ite leaders had settled the future f al-jaafari. 213 It was nt until April 20 mre than fur mnths after the December 15 th electin -- that Jaafari frmally stepped dwn and Iraq culd agree n a new candidate fr Prime Minister, althugh the chice was nt that much different frm Jaafari. The Shi ite calitin chse anther Al Dawa plitician, Jawad al-maliki, wh had a reputatin fr taking a hardline twards rejecting any frmer Ba ath fficial, and being a strng pr-shi ite activist. He was finally apprved as Prime Minister n April 22 nd, as part f a plitical cmprmise that brught six ther pliticians t ffice, creating a new balance between Shi ite, Sunni, and Kurd. President Talibani retained his psitin, and Mahmud al-meshhani, a Sunni, became the speaker f the parliament. 214 Maliki did call fr an end t militia and sectarian vilence in taking ffice: Arms shuld be in the hands f the gvernment. The law calls fr the merging f militias within the armed frces. This call, hwever, was fr a merger and nt fr an end f the militias. It als came after a lng perid f grwing sectarian tensin. Mrever, Meshhani called fr all f Iraq s frces t created "n the basis f natinal lyalty" and attacked sectarian vilence, which fr Sunnis meant an end t the militias. While estimates differ, mre than 1,000 mre Iraqis seem t have died in ethnic and sectarian fighting between the February 22 nd at n the Msque f the Glden dme and the selectin f a prime minister. 215 The selectin f a new gvernment als did nt even guarantee shrt term success. The new prime minister designate still had 30 days in which t see if he culd frm a gvernment. The Curse f the Insurgency t Date The insurgents have suffered a series f significant and cntinuing tactical defeats since early 2004, ntably in cities like Najaf, Baghdad, Samarra, Fallujah, and Msul, but als increasingly in the triangle f death, Sunni triangle, and Iraqi-Syrian brder areas. Iraqi frces have cme t play a much mre imprtant rle, and many insurgent leaders have been killed r captured. Nevertheless, the histry f the fighting shws that Iraqi gvernment and US attempts t rt ut the insurgency have s far had limited impact. US and Iraqi effrts t thwart individual insurgent attacks have als smetimes been hllw victries. As ne US Marine specializing in cunterinsurgency in Iraq recently nted, Seizing the cmpnents f suicide bmbs (r IED making material) is like making drug seizures, cmfrting, but ultimately pintless. There will always be mre. Bth sides are still escalating t nwhere. The fact als remains that securing Calitin areas and frces ften simply drives insurgents and terrrists t attack Iraqis. Histry reveals n tipping pints and prvides n guarantees against the prspect f either a lng war at smething appraching the current level f vilence r a mre intense civil cnflict. While sme US fficers began t talk as early as the battle f Fallujah in Nvember 2004 as a tipping pint, many US experts were cautius even at the time. They felt the insurgents did lse a key sanctuary, suffered mre than 1,000 killed, and lst significant numbers f prisners and detainees. They als lst sme significant leaders and cadres. Many insurgents and insurgent leaders seem t have left Fallujah befre the fighting, hwever, and many thers escaped. N prvince is yet fully safe frm ccasinal attack, and the frequency and intensity f attacks have been nly part f the stry. Varius insurgent grups are still able t attack in ther areas like Msul, Ramadi, Samarra, Baquba, Balad, Bejii, Tal Afar, and Hawija during the fighting in Fallujah, and seem t have planned t disperse and t shift their peratins befre the fighting in Fallujah began. 216 The fighting in Msul was particularly severe after the battle f Fallujah, and

89 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 57 the US military reprted a ttal f attacks and incidents a day. 217 While the Calitin and Iraqi frces did capture large numbers f weapns and supplies, few experts if any felt that the insurgents faced any near term supply prblems given the numbers f weapns lted frm Iraq s vast arms depts during and after the fighting that brught dwn Saddam. The battles that have fllwed during the curse f 2005 have been less cncentrated and less intensive, but almst cntinuus mixed with raids, captures, and the sudden swarming f knwn and suspected insurgent headquarters and peratinal areas. Even cities that were suppsedly liberated befre the battle f Fallujah, like Samarra, have been the surce f enugh cntinuing attacks t frce the redeplyment f large numbers f Iraqi security and plice frces and elements f key US cunterinsurgency units like Task Frce There have been cntinuing kidnappings and assassinatins, and a cnstant campaign f intimidatin, disappearances, and mystery killings. These have been mixed exceptinally bldy suicide bmbings f Shi ites and Kurds designed t prvke a civil war. While neither MNSTC-I nr the Iraqi gvernment have prvided cunts f insurgent killed and wunded, the figures almst certainly exceed 10,000 between May 2003 and May 2005, and culd be substantially higher.. Sunni insurgents have repeatedly shwn since the battle f Fallujah that they can strike in ethnically mixed and Shi ite-dminated cities like Baghdad, Tal Afar, Msul and Basra, and ccasinally in Kurdish areas. 219 As a result, fur f Iraq s prvinces which include Baghdad and Msul and sme 43% f Iraq s ppulatin -- cntinue t have a majr insurgency threat and a majr insurgent presence While the previus chrnlgies have nt addressed the histry f attacks n infrastructure in any detail, there has been cntinuing sabtage f key targets like Iraq s il facilities. In early January 2006, fr example, the mere threat f insurgent attacks frced the shut dwn f the il refinery in Baiji. Insurgents attacked and destryed a cnvy f 20 il tanker trucks that were traveling between Baiji and Baghdad. The attackers launched tw separate ambushes, ne utside f Tikrit and the ther utside f Mashahda, utilizing RPGs t destry the cnvy. 220 These attacks, cupled with a temprary strike impsed by fearful tanker drivers and sabtage at a Baghdad refinery, led t a rise in the price f gasline. Prtests and harding were spradically reprted arund the cuntry. As is discussed later in this reprt, Iran and Syria cntinue t play a rle in the insurgency. There have als been indicatins that sme elements f the insurgency may be mving int ther areas. In August 2005, fr example, Saudi authrities annunced that they had seized 682 Iraqis wh tried t infiltrate Saudi territry in the first six mnths f the Interir ministry spkesman Brig. Gen. Mansur Turki stated that new security measures were being taken alng the brder with Iraq, including the erectin f sand barricades, the deplyment f heat sensrs and cameras, and rund-the-clck patrls. Still, accrding t Turki, the prblem remaining is a lack f security measures n the Iraqi side. 221 Aside frm an 800-kilmenter brder with Saudi Arabia, prus brders with Jrdan and Syria remain liabilities in cmbating freign assistance t Iraq s Sunni insurgency. In mid 2005 reprts began surfacing that al Qa'ida was preparing t send insurgents back t their wn cuntries in rder t carry ut attacks there. In Octber, Iraqi Interir Minister Bayan Jabr annunced that dcuments seized frm Abu Azzam (a lieutenant f Zarqawi s killed in September 2005) cntained details abut a plan t widen the insurgency beynd Iraq. Jabr tld Reuters that prir t his death, Abu Azzam had written Zarqawi and asked him t begin t mve

90 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 58 a number f Arab fighters t the cuntries they came frm t transfer their experience in car bmbings in Iraq and that hundreds f fighters had already left Iraq fr their hmes. 222 In July 2005, the private Israeli research service Debkafile reprted that al Qa'ida in Iraq was diluting its Iraq frce and mving mre than 1,000 f its peratives t Eurpe and cuntries in the Middle East in rder t launch terrr ffensives there. The targeted cuntries were: Britain, Italy, France, Denmark, and Russia in Eurpe; and, in the Middle East, Egypt Syria, Jrdan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. 223 Accrding t Debkafile the summer 2005 attacks in Lndn and Sharm al Sheikh were the first f many attacks part f the new Al Qa'ida ffensive. 224 Despite cntinued insurgent attacks, increased sectarian vilence and the real pssibility f civil war, administratin fficials emphasized that, Iraq was making prgress in fielding effective security frces, cntinuing ecnmic develpment, and furthering the demcratic prgress thrugh electins. They said US-Iraqi peratins were preventing the insurgents frm hlding territry, and the Iraqi peple had defied the insurgents by turning ut in large percentages acrss sectarian and ethnic divides t participate in the plitical prcess. Yet an MNF-I assessment in 2006 that brke dwn the prgress made by each prvince in areas f gvernance, security and ecnmics the three fcuses f the U.S. Natinal Strategy fr Victry in Iraq demnstrated that the future f Iraq was far frm certain and highlighted sme f the specific prblems faced by the US and Iraqi gvernments in creating an independent and secure Iraqi state. This assessment gave each prvince a status grade f Critical, Serius, Mderate, r Stable: 225 Critical: Dented a prvince that has a gvernment that is nt fully functining r nt frmed, r that is nly be[ing] represented by a single strng leader; an ecnmy that des nt have the infrastructure r gvernment leadership t develp and is a significant cntributr t instability; and, a security situatin marked by high levels f AIF activity, assassinatins and extremism. Serius: Dented a prvince that has a gvernment that is nt fully frmed r that is nt capable f serving that needs f its ppulace; ecnmic develpment is stagnant with high unemplyment; and a security situatin marked by rutine AIF activity, assassinatins and extremism. Mderate: Dented a prvince that has a gvernment that functins, but has areas f cncern in area such as the ability t deliver services, the influence f sectarian elements, etc; an ecnmy that is develping slwly, but in which unemplyment is still a serius cncern; and the security situatin is under cntrl, but where cnditins exist that culd quickly lead t instability. Stable: Dented a prvince that has a fully functining gvernment; a strng ecnmic develpment that supprts jb creatin; and a semi-permissive security envirnment where lcal security frces maintain the rule f law. The MNF-I analysis characterized each prvince as fllws: Muthanna Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Rule f law is weak due t inadequate prisn facilities. Understanding f rles within gvernment structures needs emphasis. A very dminant Gvernr, but Prvincial Cuncil is able t functin effectively. Security: ISF perate in a relatively permissive envirnment. Ecnmics: Prest prvince in Suthern Iraq. Maysan Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Gvernance capacity is imprving with DFID assistance; hwever, rule f law hindered due t a lack f adequate prisn facilities

91 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 59 Security: Large number f experienced lcal militia present. Camp Abu Naji experiences frequent IDF attacks and British patrls are frequently subject t harassing fire. Ecnmics: Little capacity t jump start its ecnmy. Kurdish Regin: Stable Gvernance: Stable gvernment with clse crdinatin between gvernment and security frces. Rule f law established and functining. Security: N significant AIF activity. Lcal security frces restraining crime and terrrism within the established legal system. Ecnmics: Freign investment increasing and verall level f ecnmic develpment is sund. Ninawa Prvince: Serius Gvernance: Gvernr is vershadwed by strng Kurdish Vice-Gvernr. Outdated laws hinder the perfrmance f Prvincial Cuncil and members are unsure f their respnsibility t their cnstituents. Security: Inter-ethnic vilence and AIF activity remain high. Ecnmics: High unemplyment and pr infrastructure cmbine t depress ecnmy. Tamim Prvince: Serius Gvernance: Gvernr unfficially accuntable t the Kurdish plitical parties. Prvincial Cuncil members have nt fully grasped their duties and respnsibilities. Deputy Gvernr psitin is unfilled due t deadlck between Arab and Turcman blcs n the Prvincial Cuncil. Security: Inter-ethnic vilence and suspicins f pst-electin tensins remain high. Ecnmics: High unemplyment. Requires private sectr develpment and grwth in agribusiness. Salah ad Din Prvince: Serius Gvernance: Prvincial gvernment functining, but is weak in prviding essential services. Security: Onging tribal cnflict adds t relatively high level f tensin within the prvince. AIF attacks against ISF remain a cncern. Ecnmics: Infrastructure unable t supprt ecnmic develpment; Prvincial Cuncil has yet t develp a plan t address. Diyala Prvince: Serius Gvernance: The tp prvincial ffices are divided up between Shi a, Sunnis and Kurds, leading t cnsistent infighting. Gvernr ften makes decisins withut cnsulting with the Cuncil, but he is accuntable t them fr the decisins he makes. Rule f law requires cntinued emphasis. Security: Attacks f intimidatin and assassinatins cntinue nearly unabated, targeting ISF, PC and civilians. Ecnmics: Ecnmy cntinues t grw, but unemplyment remains very high. Baghdad Prvince: Serius Gvernance: Strng and grwing influence f SCIRI party n the Prvincial Cuncil. Security: Assassinatins and intimidatin f public fficials, ISF and civilians ccur frequently. Criminal activity is a majr cntributr t the verall level f vilence. Ecnmics: High unemplyment and weak infrastructure have hindered ecnmic develpment. Natinal Assembly interference in Prvincial Cuncil impedes its ability t act t imprve ecnmic grwth. Anbar Prvince: Critical

92 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 60 Gvernance: The Gvernr is the dminant figure in all decisin making and gvernance functins. Prvincial Cuncil has minimal cntrl ver Gvernr s actins. IPS and curts system incapable f adequately supprting the rule f law. Significant intimidatin f PC members. Security: Insurgent activity against ISF increasing; security situatin is negatively impacting redevelpment effrts. Ecnmics: Infrastructure incapable f supprting small business develpment. Little pprtunity fr grwth. Babil Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Little transparency and accuntability f prvincial gvernment. Gvernr very dminate in dealings with ther members f Prvincial Cuncil. Strng Iranian influence apparent within Cuncil. Prvincial Cuncil attempting t place party lyalist in Plice Chief psitin. Security: Ethnic cnflict in Nrth Babil. The Prvincial Cuncil n lnger claims respnsibility frt his area, claiming t have ceded it t Baghdad prvince. Crime is a majr factr within the prvince. Ecnmics: Infrastructure prblems are affecting the grwth f the private sectr; unemplyment remains high. Najaf Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Iranian influence n prvincial gvernment f cncern. Hwever, gvernment is capable f maintaining stability within the prvince and prviding fr the needs f its ppulace. Security: AIF activity reduced t a level that ISF can cntrl withut CF assistance. There is grwing tensin between Madia Militia and Badr Crps that culd escalate. Recent targeting f CF resulted in 5 US deaths. Ecnmics: Grwth imprving, but unemplyment remains a cncern at abve 10%. Turism ffers a bright prspect fr future grwth. Karbala Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Gvernment is functining and imprving. Hwever, it appears t be increasing assciatin with the Iranian Gvernment. The lcal ppulatin is cgnizant f the large presence f Iranians in Karbala and are cncerned abut their grwing influence. Security: AIF activity reduced t a level that ISF can cntrl withut CF assistance. Suicide attacks are infrequent, but have ccurred within the last 30 days, killing ver 70 peple in ne event. Ecnmics: Grwth imprving, but unemplyment remains a cncern at 10%. Qadisiyah Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Prvincial Cuncil ineffective at prviding essential services; dminant Gvernr meddles in all areas f gvernment; rule f law crrupted and bureaucratic. Security: Security situatin is manageable by lcal ISF with sme supprt frm CF. Ecnmics: Slwly imprving ecnmic picture; unemplyment is biggest cncern. Wasit Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Gvernr is weak and appears mre interested in furthering his wn and the DAVA party s interest than in imprving lcal gvernment s respnsiveness t the peple. Security: Manageable, but high level f smuggling activity and tensins between Badr Crps and JAM culd lead t a wrsening situatin. Ecnmics: Unemplyment in the prvince remains high; ecnmic develpment has nt been addressed t the extent required. Basrah Prvince: Serius

93 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 61 Gvernance: Slwly getting started, the prvincial gvernment ften attempts t assert its influence beynd its authrity. Security: High level f militia activity including infiltratin f lcal security frces. Smuggling and criminal activity cntinues unabated. Intimidatin attacks and assassinatin are cmmn. Ecnmics: Unemplyment in the prvince remains high; ecnmic develpment hindered by weak gvernment. Dhi Qar Prvince: Mderate Gvernance: Sund gvernance prcesses and interactin between plitical parties. Require strengthening f lines f cmmunicatin between varius entities f Prvincial gvernment. Security: Strng JAM and OMS presence, but few significant attacks. CF experience ccasinal harassing attacks. Ecnmics: A number f new enterprises have started, but unemplyment remains a cntinuing prblem.

94 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 62 III. Pattern f Attacks Anther way t analyze the insurgency is t lk at the pattern f attacks and casualties. This is nt always easy. There has been a reasnable amunt f summary reprting, and a fld f reprting n daily incidents. Hwever, US and British fficial reprting n the insurgency has been erratic, and has left many gaps that make it difficult t analyze the insurgency's intensity and cycles, and characterize trends. Fr example, the cunts f attacks issued by senir US fficials have generally fcused n attacks directed at US and Iraqi gvernment targets rather than all attacks, and did nt include all attempts and minr incidents. They generally have nt included Iraqi criminal activity r sabtage, althugh sme is clearly insurgent driven. DIA figures and Calitin data als tend t be skewed in favr f cunts f attacks n Calitin frces and undercunt attacks n Iraqi civilians, and sme aspects f Iraqi fficials, military, and plice. One f the tragedies f Iraq is that as part f its effrt t spin reprting n the war in favrable directins, the Department f Defense has been slw t cunt Iraqi casualties f any kind, r treat Iraqi military and plice casualties as partners whse sacrifice deserves recgnitin. Calitin cunts als undercunt acts f sabtage. Like mst partial cunts, this disguises anther imprtant shift in the patterns in insurgency. These prblems have been cmpunded by the fact there are few meaningful Iraqi gvernment data. Iraqi Ministry f Defense and Ministry f Interir had stpped issuing meaningful reprting n the number and intensity f attacks in the summer f The US has, hwever, imprved sme f its reprting under pressure frm Cngress. Sme data have emerged frm Iraqi surces, and sme rganizatins like Iraq Bdy Cunt prvide useful additinal material. As a result, it is pssible t prvide at least sme insights based n the trends in the war. Summary Attack Patterns Figure III.1 shws the patterns in attack by prvince frm August 29, 2005 t January 20, It shws that nly fur prvinces accunted fr 83% f the attacks a cnsistent pattern since the early days f the insurgency, althugh sme 43% f the ttal ppulatin lived in these prvinces. It als shws that twelve prvinces, with sme 50% f the ppulatin received nly 6% f the attacks. Unclassified wrk by DIA and MNF-I shwing the apprximate number f ttal attacks per mnth frm June 2003 t February 2004 is summarized in Figure III.2 and average weekly attacks by time perid between January 2004 and January 2006 is shwn in Figure III.3. These data reflect patterns typical f the cyclical variatins in mdern insurgencies. 226 The same is true f the trend data n US, allied, and Iraqi casualties discussed later in this chapter, and it is clear frm a cmparisn f such data that there is nly an uncertain crrelatin between incident cunts and casualty cunts, and even accurate incident cunts wuld be nly the crudest pssible indicatin f the patterns in insurgency withut a much wider range f cmparative metrics. These attack cunts cnfirm the fact that insurgent activity surged befre the January 30, 2005 electins temprarily eased back, and then surged again -- rather than diminishing in any lasting way. An internal US Army analysis in April 2005 calculated that the apparent shift was mre a shift in fcus t mre vulnerable nn-us targets than an actual drp in incidents. 227 Similarly, a

95 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 63 study by the Natinal Intelligence Cuncil in the CIA, that was leaked t Newsweek, cncluded that US gvernment reprting had s many cnflicting surces and methds f analysis that the resulting metrics culd nt be trusted, and that there was inadequate evidence t supprt any cnclusins abut whether the insurgents were being defeated. 228 Figure III.4 shws the trend measured by a different standard: ttal attacks and effective attacks. It prvides a much clearer picture f the intensity f the war and hw sharp the cycles are in attempted attacks ver time. At the same time, there is ften surprisingly little crrelatin between attempted and effective attacks. The cycles in attempted attacks are much smaller and the trends are largely meaningless. The level f effective attacks is nearly cnstant frm April 2005 thrugh the end f The Department f Defense identified the fllwing trends in attack patterns in its February 2006 reprt t Cngress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Over the last quarter f 2005, the verall number f IED attacks trended dwnward. Three-quarters f insurgent attacks resulted in n casualties r serius damage. 80% f attacks were directed at Calitin frces, but Iraqi s suffered three-quarters f all casualties. Insurgent attacks range frm a single insurgent executing ne attack t a highly crdinated attack using different weapns systems. Hwever, there were nly fur f the mre sphisticated attacks in the six mnths prir. In the perid between September 17, 2005 and January 20, 2006, 23% f car bmbs were intercepted and defused. This was an increase frm 17% in the three mnths prir. In March, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch reiterated that 75% f all attacks take place in three prvinces. He added that the ther 15 prvinces averaged less than six attacks per day and that 12 f thse averaged less than tw per day. Natinwide hwever, attacks were averaging 75 per day, a level that had been cnsistent since August In April 2006, he stated that in al-anbar prvince attacks had decreased frm an average f 27 per day in Octber 2005, t abut 18 a day. 230 Despite an increase in trained Iraqi plice and military frces and a number f jint US-Iraqi military peratins, nt t mentin numerus plitical milestnes, the number f verall attacks had nt declined in the three years since the beginning f the war. 231

96 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 64 Figure III.1: Attacks by Iraqi Gvernrate r Prvince: August 29, 2005 t January 20, Al Anba r Bagh dad Sala Nina Diya h ad wa la Din Al Babi Tami l n Al Basr ah Ttal attacks Attacks Per Capita NA NA NA May san Thi Qar Qadi Karb Wasi Naja siyah ala t f Suyl Mut hana Arbil aym aniy Surce: Adapted frm Measuring Stability in Iraq, February 2006, Reprt t Cngress in Accrdance with the Defense Apprpriatins Act 2006 (Sectin 9010), February 2006, p. 26 Dah uk

97 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 65 Figure III.2: Apprximate Number f Majr Attacks per Mnth: June 2003-February June July August Sept Oct Nv Dec Jan 900 Feb March April May June July August Sept Oct Nv Dec Jan Feb Nte: Includes apprximate number f attacks n Calitin, Iraqi security frces, Iraqi gvernment fficials, civilians, and infrastructure. Surce: Adapted frm the DIA and MNF-I data presented in Jseph A, Christff, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observatins n Challenges in Transferring Security Respnsibilities t Iraqi Military and Plice, Gvernment Accuntability Office (GAO) GAO-05-43IT, March 14, 2005, p. 10.

98 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 66 Figure III.3: Average Weekly Attacks by Time Perid: January 2004 January Baseline Pre-Svereignty Svereignty Electin Pre-Cnstitutin Refered/Elect Time Frame Jan-31 Mar 04 1 Apr-28 Jun 04 1 Jun-26 Nv Nv Feb Feb-29 Aug Aug-20 Jan N f Attacks Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, DOD Reprt t Cngress, Octber 13, 2005 and the updated reprt issued in February, 2006, p. 27. Nte: Referendum perid nly has three weeks f data; average may be skewed by spikes in attacks. Actual numbers are estimates based n graphs prvided in the reprt.

99 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 67 Figure III.4: Ttal Average Weekly Attacks versus Effective Attacks by Time Perid: February 2004 Nvember 2005 Surce: Adapted frm material prvided by Brian Hartman, ABC News

100 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 68 Ttal Imprvised Explsive Device (IED) Bmbings, Vehicle Brne Bmbings (VBIEDs), and Suicide Bmbings The brad patterns in imprvised explsive device (IED) bmbings, vehicle brne bmbings (VBIEDs), and suicide bmbings have been discussed in the previus chapter, but the trend data again prvide useful insights. The trends in the use f imprvised explsive devices (IEDs) are shwn in Figure III.5, and the patterns in casualties are shwn in Figure III.6. As has been discussed earlier, these patterns fluctuate ver time, but shw a steady increase, and a significant rise in successful detnatins twards the end f Figure III.6 als shws an increase in US deaths frm such IEDs, althugh the number did drp in early By mid March, President Bush stated that nearly half f all IEDs were fund and disabled befre they culd detnate, and in the 18 mnths prir, the casualty rate f IEDs had been cut in half. 232 Even s, it was far frm clear that the military culd develp ways t detect and diffuse IED s quicker than the enemy can replace them. Accrding t Central Cmmand, IED attacks nearly dubled between 2004 and 2005 ging frm 5,607 t 10, Accrding t the Jint Imprvised Explsive Device Defeat Organizatin (JIEDDO) established by the DD, frm April 2004 t April 2006 there was a 45% decrease in the rate f IED casualties. 234 The patterns in suicide attacks, car bmbings, the resulting casualties, the numbers f bmb makers captured and killed, and the number f car bmbs defused and intercepted are mre cmplex and shwn in Figures III.7, III.8 and III.9. These figures nly cver 2005, but d shw interesting trends. The number f attacks drpped frm a high in early 2005, but the number f casualties did nt. As is ften the case with trends in an insurgency, there is n clear crrelatin between the tw trends. The trend fr bmbers captured r killed is f interest largely because, while the number is rising, the verall ttal has been and remains s lw. If ne lks at data frm ther surces, the number f car bmbings rse frm 65 in February 2005 t 170 in April, and the ttal number f majr attacks per day rse frm in February and March t 70 in April and May. The intensity f the attacks als increased as mre suicide bmbings tk place by Islamist extremists many cnducted by yung men frm cuntries like Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan wh infiltrated in frm acrss the Syria brder. The number f majr attacks invlving suicide bmbers rse frm 25% in February t a little ver 50% in April. There were 69 suicide bmbings in April 2005, mre than in the entire perid frm the fall f Saddam Hussein t the transfer f pwer in June In May, sme 90-suicide bmbings were the primary cause f sme 750 casualties that mnth. 235 The annual pattern was equally serius. If ne nly cunts car bmbings, there had been mre than 482 successful bmbings in the year since the handver f pwer n June 26, 2004, killing at least 2,176 peple and wunding at least 5, While the insurgents fcused mre n Iraqi targets, and increasingly n Shi ite and Kurdish targets that might help prvke a majr civil war, the attacks n MNF-I frces climbed frm 40 a day in March t 55 in April, far belw the peak f 130 a day befre the January 30, 2005 electins but scarcely reassuring. 237 The gd news fr the US was that nly 146 Americans died during the three-mnth perid frm February 1 t April 30, 2005, versus 315 in the pervius three-mnth perid. 238 The difficulty in analyzing the patterns in a cnstantly changing situatin is illustrated by anther surge in activity that tk place as the new gvernment was appinted. The Iraqi gvernment

101 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 69 annunced mst f its appintments n April 28, sme three mnths after the electin and mnths after the suppsed deadline fr ding s. In the week that fllwed (April 28-May 6), there were 10 majr suicide bmbings, and 35 majr attacks. Insurgents killed mre than 270 Iraqi civilians, and at least 14 bdies were fund in a Baghdad garbage dump that may have been frm previus attacks. Many f the attacks were against Iraqi frces and recruits, and the intensity f the attacks is indicated by the fact that a suicide bmber frm the "Army f Ansar al-sunna" killed mre that 60 peple in the Kurdish city f Irbil in Nrthern Iraq in a single attack. 239 Fr the first time, in April, mre than 50% f the car bmbings were suicide attacks. 240 These develpments led sme US fficers and fficials t claim that the insurgents were lashing ut because they had taken s many casualties that they were desperate, and/r t say that the successful car bmbings by Islamic extremists had little strategic meaning since they alienated the Iraqi peple and culd easily be carried ut by a small number f largely freign vlunteers that were nt representative f Iraqi Sunnis. Such arguments culd nt be disprved r prved, but they were made at a time the US Marines fund it necessary t cnduct a majr ffensive alng the Euphrates frm Haditha t the Syrian brder, the largest ffensive since the attack n Fallujah. US frces als had t launch anther majr peratin t secure the area suth and west f Baghdad, and fllw them up with a series f majr campaigns arund Msul and in western Iraq during the summer and fall. 241 These peratins had t be fllwed up again and again; largely because many f the insurgents culd disperse the mment they came under pressure. Als, the Calitin and Iraqi frces bth lacked the manpwer t ccupy high threat areas and the requisite Calitin r Iraqi gvernment teams t back up tactical victries with civic actin prgrams and effrts t establish effective gvernance. The insurgents and terrrists cntinued t try t strip the new gvernment f its perceived legitimacy. In spite f MNF-I estimates that sme 1,000-3,000 insurgents were being killed and captured each mnth, attacks n Iraqi security frces and gvernment fficials cntinued, and the number f suicide bmbings cntinued t munt. This is clear frm the summary data prvided in the previus chapter and frm the patterns in bmbings revealed similar cycles fr the rest f althugh cnsiderable uncertainty smetimes emerged ver such cunts because the Iraqi gvernment and Calitin did nt reprt cnsistently. There were 21 car bmbings in Baghdad alne during the first tw weeks f May, and 126 in the 80 days befre May 18 th. This cmpared with 25 during all f Daily attacks had averaged a day in February, but were at least 70 a day in June. 242 Althugh the number f car bmbings decreased frm April t July 2005, (frm April s high f 170 car bmbings, the number fell t 151 in May; 133 in June; and less than 100 in July) at the time, experts believed this was merely al Qa ida string up fr the late summer and fall ffensive. 243 The cycles were equally uncertain fr the rest f year. Calitin reprting in December 2005 shwed a drp in the number f suicide bmbings frm 70 in May t 40 in August, a rise t 50 in Octber, and then a drp t 23 in Nvember. The number f bmbs explded r cleared rse frm 1,170 in June t 1,869 in Octber, and then drpped t 1,330 radside bmbings and 68 car bmbings in Nvember. There had been 130 car bmbings in February. 244 The US death tll rse frm 49 in September t 96 in Octber, and then drpped t 85 in Nvember. By the end

102 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 70 Nvember, the US had lst 80 r mre dead in 10 f the 33 mnths f the war. Iraqi deaths went frm 69 in August t 356 in September and 290 in Nvember.

103 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page Figure III.5: Patterns f IED Attacks: January 2004 t Octber 2005 IEDs Rendered Safe 1800 IEDs Detnated Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nv Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Surce: Adapted frm material prvided by Brian Hartman, ABC News

104 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 72 Jan Nv Sept Jul May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul Figure III.6: US IED Deaths: July 2003 t January Surce: Adapted frm material prvided by Iraq Bdy Cunt as f February 6, Available at:

105 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 73 Figure III.7: Patterns in Car Bmbings and Suicide Bmbings: May-Octber 2005 Part One Casualties May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 5-May 5-Jun 5-Jul 5-Aug 5-Sep 5-Oct Clumn Vehicle Brne IEDs May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 5-May 5-Jun 5-Jul 5-Aug 5-Sep 5-Oct Clumn

106 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 74 Figure III.8: Patterns in Car Bmbings and Suicide Bmbings: May Octber 2005 Part Tw Suicide Attacks in May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 5-May 5-Jun 5-Jul 5-Aug 5-Sep 5-Oct Clumn Car Bmbings in May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 5-May 5-Jun 5-Jul 5-Aug 5-Sep 5-Oct Clumn Surce: Adapted frm material prvided by Brian Hartman, ABC News

107 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 75 Figure III.9: Percent f Car Bmbs Intercepted/Defused: April 2005 January % 23% 20% 17% 15% 13% 10% 5% % Car Bmbs Intercepted 0% 2 Apr - 1 Jul 05 2 Jul - 16 Sep Sep Jan 06 Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, February, 2006, Reprt t Cngress In accrdance with the Department f Defense Apprpriatins Act 2006 (Sectin 9010), p. 28. Sabtage and Infrastructure Attacks The impact f insurgent attacks n infrastructure has als been discussed in the previus chapter, but Figures III.10 and III.11 prvide trend lines that shw hw insurgents cntinued attacks designed t disrupt supplies f water, electricity, crude il, gasline and heating il, particularly in the greater Baghdad area. The shift in attack patterns d shw significant cycles, but cannt be related t the effectiveness f such attacks, and seems t reflect a massive undercunt f large numbers f minr sabtage attempts and success that are nt included in these figures. Map III.1 shws the lcatin f Iraqi ilfields and pipelines. In a reprt t Cngress in February 2006, the Department f Defense indicated that while attacks n Iraq s infrastructure accunt fr an extremely small prtin f verall attacks and cntinued t g dwn, the severity f the attacks has gne up and the enemy has becme mre prficient at targeting critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and at intimidating wrkers, such as truck drivers, wh are essential t distributin f il and essential services. 245 In March f 2006, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch indicated that attacks n infrastructure had declined 60% in the past three mnths. He attributed this t the increased presence f Iraqi security frces, then 250,000, arund the cuntry in general. 246 If ne lks at the histry f such attacks in mre detail, ne finds the fllwing patterns: Attacks n pwer and water facilities bth ffset the impact f US aid and cause Iraqi anger against the gvernment. Al Qa'ida and Ba'athist grups fund il facilities and pipelines t be particularly attractive targets because they deny the gvernment revenue (in the first quarter f FY 2005 Iraq lst an estimated $887 millin in exprt revenues due t insurgent attacks n infrastructure) 247, affect bth pwer and Iraqi ability t btain fuel, get extensive media and freign business attentin, and prevent investment in ne f Iraq's mst attractive assets. 248

108 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 76 The impact f this activity is regularly reflected in the histgrams in the Department f Defense, Iraq Weekly Status Reprt. Fr example, the April 27, 2005 editin shws that electric pwer generatin remained far belw the US gal, and usually belw the prewar level, frm January 1, 2004 t April 21, Crude il prductin averaged arund 2.1 MMBD frm February thrugh April 2005, versus a gal f 2.5 MMBD, and a prewar peak f 2.5 MMBD in March Fr September-Octber 2005, the crude il prductin average fell t 2.02 MMBD, still belw the target gal f 2.5MMBD. 249 Exprts averaged nly abut MMBD frm January t April 2005, largely because f pipeline and facility sabtage -- althugh recrd il prices raised Iraqi exprt revenues frm $5.1 billin in 2003 t $17.0 billin in 2004, and $6.2 billin in the first fur mnths f Frm May t September 2005, Iraqi il exprts averaged 1.42 MMBD. The increase was driven largely by strng exprts (ver 1.5 MMBD) fr the mnths f July- September. Early estimates fr Octber 2005, hwever, shwed il exprts falling t MMBD. 250 The cntinuing threat t electric facilities frced many Iraqis t rely n hme r neighbrhd generatrs even in the areas with pwer It was als a reasn that the US was nly able t spend $1.0 billin f $4.4 billin in prgrammed aid mney n the electricity sectr by the end f April 2005, and $261 millin ut f $1.7 billin n the petrleum sectr. 251 Sabtage and theft helped cripple many f the cuntry s 229 perating water plants by the spring f 2005, and sme 90% f the municipalities in the cuntry lacked wrking sewage prcessing plants, cntaminating the main surces f water as they drained int the Tigris and Euphrates. The Iraqi Municipalities and Public Wrks Ministry calculated in April 2005 that it prvided water t sme 17 millin Iraqis (70% f the ppulatin), and supplies were s bad that sme 30% f the 17 millin did nt have access t drinkable water. 252 In June, Baghdad s mayr, Alaa Mahmud al-timimi threatened t resign ver crumbling infrastructure in the city. On September 7, a Cngressinal mandated reprt stated that the nging insurgency had severely hampered effrts t rebuild Iraq s water and sanitatin systems. Of the mre than $24 billin the US Cngress has authrized fr recnstructin effrts since 2003, rughly $2.6 billin was alltted fr rebuilding water and sanitatin services. Cngress had initially planned n spending almst $4 billin n water and sanitatin prjects, but mre than $1 billin was eventually redirected twards ther pririties, including security needs. 253 Despite this, sme prgress appears t have been made in Baghdad. In Octber 2005, USAID annunced that mre than 15,650 huses had recently been cnnected t the Baghdad Water Distributin System. But the distributin system experiences 60 percent lss, a result f leaks, illegal cnnectins and sabtage. 254 And, as late as September 2005, several water and sewage statins in Fallujah were still perating belw 20% capacity. 255 The patterns f such attacks als cntinued t cme in cycles. Fr example, Figure III.10 shws that insurgent attacks n infrastructure targets increased dramatically in the run-up t the Octber 2005 referendum. Oil pipelines in the nrthern part f the cuntry have cme under repeated attack. Accrding t Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum, the upsurge in attacks began in mid-august 2005, fllwing the deadline fr writing Iraq s Cnstitutin. Between August 15 and September 7, there were mre than 10 attacks n pipelines. 256 The situatin cntinued t deterirate as the date f the referendum apprached. The pipelines, linking il fields in Kirkuk t Iraq s largest il refinery in Beiji and the Turkish prt f Cheyhan, were disrupted mre than half-a-dzen times during September and Octber 2005: 257 September 3, 2005: Insurgents bmbed the main pipeline running frm Kirkuk t Cheyhan, disrupting Iraqi il exprts fr mre than tw weeks and csting billins f dllars in lst revenue. September 13, 2005: A fire brke ut after a pipeline carrying crude il frm Kirkuk t a Beiji refinery sprang a leak. September 15, 2005: Anther fire brke ut an il pipeline in Kirkuk; the cause f the fire was unknwn. September 21, 2005: A bmb planted by insurgents damaged an il pipeline cnnecting the Bay Hassan il fields t Kirkuk. Repairs were expected t take up t a week.

109 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 77 Octber 6, 2005: Insurgents bmbed a pipeline near Kirkuk. Octber 12, 2005: An explsin shut dwn an il pipeline near the city f Beiji. Octber 20, 2005: Insurgents bmbed a pipeline linking Kirkuk t Beiji. Octber 25, 2005: Insurgents bmbed the Beiji petrleum refinery, killing at least five. On the eve f the Octber referendum, insurgents attacked Baghdad s electrical grid. In a tactic designed t disrupt the vte, insurgents sabtaged pwer lines and electricity twers nrth f the capital, leaving 70 percent f the city in the dark. 258 Even befre the attack, hwever, the amunt f electricity Baghdad received was a majr bne f cntentin, with daily electricity service in the capital averaging less than 8 hurs per day cmpared t the natinal average f 14 hurs. 259 The insurgents scarcely paralyzed the cuntry, but had ntable successes in many areas. These included significant attacks n il exprt facilities, water plants, and pwer. Fr example, the natinal average amunt f electricity generated reached a pst-war high in August 2004 with 4,707 megawatts, but steadily declined thrughut the rest f 2004 and mst f 2005 as a result f successful insurgent attacks n electricity and il infrastructure. 260 Because f the technlgical expertise invlved in these attacks, sme experts believed that frmer, Hussein-era fficials were still aiding the sabtage effrts althugh thers felt that by this time, there was a large pl f such expertise in the varius insurgent frces. 261 Insurgents carried ut mre than 300 attacks n Iraqi il facilities between March 2003 and January The end result was that il prductin drpped by 8% in 2005, and pipeline shipments thrugh the Iraqi nrthern pipeline t Ceyan in Turkey drpped frm 800,000 barrels per day befre the war t an average f 40,000 barrels per day in In July 2005, Iraqi fficials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cst Iraq sme $11 billin. They had kept Iraqi il prductin frm appraching the 3 millin barrel a day gal in 2005 that the Calitin had set after the fall f Saddam Hussein. Prductin had drpped frm pre-war levels f arund 2.5 millin barrels a day t an average f 1.83 millin barrels a day in 2005, and a level f nly 1.57 millin barrels a day in December In a reprt t Cngress, the Department f Defense stated that il prductin and exprts fell frm an average f 2.1 and 1.4 millin barrelsper-day in Octber 2005, t 1.9 and 1.2 millin barrels-per-day in January 2006, respectively. The same reprt cited sabtage as ne f several factrs cntributing t the cntinuing difficulty in delivering adequate electrical pwer t Iraqis. 263 The impact f such attacks was cmpunded the ability f insurgents t steal il and fuel. The New Yrk Times has quted Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking sme 40 percent t 50 percent f all il-smuggling prfits in the cuntry, and had infiltrated senir management psitins at the majr nrthern refinery in Baji: "It's gne beynd Nigeria levels nw where it really threatens natinal security The insurgents are invlved at all levels." The Times als quted an unidentified US fficial as saying that, "It's clear that crruptin funds the insurgency, s there yu have a very real threat t the new state Crruptin really has the ptential f undercutting the grwth ptential here." The frmer il minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum, had said earlier in 2005 that, "il and fuel smuggling netwrks have grwn int a dangerus mafia threatening the lives f thse in charge f fighting crruptin." 264 As a tangible example f such prblems, Radhi Hamza al-radhi, the chairman f Iraq's Cmmissin n Public Integrity, annunced in early February 2006 that Meshaan al-juburi, a member f the new Iraqi Natinal Assembly had been indicted earlier in December fr stealing

110 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 78 millins f dllars frm the funds that were suppsed t pay Sunni tribes t prtect a critical il pipeline against attacks and was suspected f giving sme f the funds t insurgents. 265 Juburi was a Sunni wh had brken with Saddam Hussein in 1989, and fled the cuntry. He had been active in the ppsitin t Saddam befre the invasin, and had tried t take cntrl f Msul after Saddam's fall. He was a member f the Juburi tribe, which had members in this insurgency, and had been asked t rganize 17 battalins f sldiers t prtect the pipeline in He was accused f bth taking much f the mney that was suppsed t g t these pipeline prtectin units, and allwing insurgents t play a rle in the il prtectin battalins. He may have created sme phantm members f each 1,000-man battalin t take the mney alltted fr the pay and fd fr nn-existent security persnnel. He als may have set up ambushes s the insurgents culd seize weapns being delivered t the units. Ali Ahmed al-wazir, the cmmander f the secnd battalin f the first brigade f the Special Infrastructure Brigades, based in the Wadi Zareitun district, was identified a the battalin cmmander hired by Mr. Juburi, and wh rganized insurgent attacks n the pipeline. It was reprted that bth Juburi and his sn had fled the cuntry just after they were indicted. At nearly the same time, the directr f a majr il strage plant near Kirkuk was arrested with ther emplyees and several lcal plice fficials, charged with helping t rchestrate a mrtar attack n the plant n February 2,

111 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 79 Map III.1: Iraqi Oil Fields and Pipelines

112 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 80 Figure III.10: Average Mnthly Attacks n Infrastructure by Time Perid Baseline Pre-Svereignty Svereignty Electin Pre-Cnstitutin Referendum N. f Infrastructure Attacks Time Frame Jan-March 04 April-June 04 July-Oct 04 Nv 04-Jan 05 Feb-Aug 05 Sept-Oct 05 Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Reprt t Cngress, July 21, Available at:

113 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 81 Figure III.11: Average Weekly Attacks n Infrastructure by Time Perid: January 1, 2004 January 20, Number f Attacks Baseline: 1 Jan Mar 04 Pre-Svereignty: 1 Apr Jun 04 Svereignty: 29 Jun Nv 04 Electin: 27 Nv Feb 05 Pre-Cnstitutin: 12 Feb Aug 05 Time Perid Referendum/Electin: 29 Aug Jan 06 Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, February 2006, Reprt t Cngress In accrdance with the Department f Defense Apprpriatins Act 2006 (Sectin 9010), p. 28 Nte: Average runded t the nearest whle number

114 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 82 Measuring the Evlutin f the Insurgency by Its Cst in Bld The human cst f the insurgency is nly ne measure f hw it has evlved, but it makes the seriusness f the cnflict all t clear. As f February 6, 2006, US casualties had risen t a ttal f nearly 2,300 US killed and well ver 16,000 wunded. Britain lst 101 killed and ther Calitin partners had lst 103, fr a ttal f 204. Iraqi casualties, hwever, had risen t 28,293-31, Iraqi casualties were rising much mre quickly than Calitin casualties. Unfrtunately, there are n meaningful estimates f Insurgent casualties. These numbers tended t rise as the insurgency became mre intense, but casualty rates did nt alter in predictable ways. In brad terms casualties tended t rise ver time, but shifted frm Calitin-dminated casualty lists t a steadily higher number f Iraqi casualties as Iraqi frces came n line and as the insurgents shifted their target base t ther Iraqis in an effrt t prevent the Iraqi gvernment frm becming effective and t cause a civil war. These trends are much clearer in the brad cycles in bth Calitin and Iraqi military casualties shwn in Figure III.12. In spite f minr variatins in the estimates by surce and date, Figure III.12 shws that a steady rise in ttal Calitin and Iraqi casualties tk place frm the start f the insurrectin thrugh the cnstitutinal referendum, with the rise in Iraqi casualties mre than cmpensating fr the drp in Calitin casualties. Calitin Casualties Calitin casualties are nly available in terms f deaths, and d nt distinguish ttal killed frm killed in actin, r shw allied wunded. Figure III.13 shws the pattern in all Calitin deaths by mnth frm the invasin t early There is a slw upward trend thrugh mid-2005, but the patterns vary sharply frm mnth t mnth. They als becme mre cnsistent after mid- 2005, in part because the US stpped fighting large urban battles. Figure III.14 shws casualties by Iraqi gvernrate. The data in this figure clearly shw that the insurgency has been cncentrated in the Sunni prvinces in the West Anbar, Salahideen, and Ninawah (Msul) -- and Baghdad. The Kurdish areas have been far mre secure, and s have mst prvinces in the suth. Basra has been a partial exceptin. Such data highlight the fact that the insurgency has been largely Sunni Arab, and cncentrated in nly fur f Iraq s 18 gvernrates, rather than natinal.

115 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 83 Figure III.12: Casualty Patterns in Iraqi and Calitin Frces Over Time MNSTC-I Estimate f Daily Killed and Wunded Baseline: 1 Jan Mar 04 Pre-Svereignty: 1 Apr Jun 04 Svereignty: 29 Jun Nv 04 Electin: 27 Nv Feb 05 Pre-Cnstitutin: 12 Feb Aug 05 Cnstitutin:29 Aug Sep 05 Iraqi Calitin Average Daily Casualties-Iraqi and Calitin: January 2004-January 2006 in MNF-I Reprt t Cngress Baseline: t Pre-Svereignty: t Pre-Cnstitutin: Svereignty: 29-6Electin: t t t Cnst Ref/Elec: t Caltiin Casualties Iraqi Casualties Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Reprt t Cngress, Octber 13, 2005, Page.24 and Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, February 2006 Reprt t Cngress In accrdance with the Department f Defense Apprpriatins Act 2006 (Sectin 9010), p. 27. Nte: Actual numbers are estimated frm data included in the abve reprt. The data are derived frm unverified initial reprts submitted by Calitin elements respnding an incident. These numbers shuld be used fr cmparative purpses nly.

116 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 84 Figure III.13: Calitin Deaths By Cuntry and Mnth: March 2003 t January 2006 Jan 2006 Nv Sept Jul 2005 May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul 2004 May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul May 2003 Mar M ar A M Ju Ju pr ay n l A Se O ug p ct N D v ec Ja n Fe b M ar A M Ju Ju pr ay n l A Se O ug p ct D Ja Fe M N ec n b ar v A M Ju Ju pr ay n l A Se O ug pt ct Other N D Ja Fe v ec n b British US Surce: Adapted frm material prvided by Iraq Calitin Casualty Cunt as f March 14, Available at:

117 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 85 Figure III.14: Calitin Casualties by Iraqi Gvernrate r Prvince Karbal a Najaf Qadisi Muth yah ana Wasit Mays an Dhi Qar Basra h Babil Diyala Bagh dad Anbar Western Sunni 783 "Kurdish" NE Mixed Baghdad 560 Central-Mixed Shi'ite and Suth Surce: Adapted frm Iraq Calitin Casualty Cunt, Salaha ddin At Tami m Ninaw Dahu a- k Msu Sulay Arbil maniy ah Anaba r

118 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 86 US Casualties The trends in US casualties are shwn in Figures III.15 t III.17 Figure III.15 shws just hw imprtant it is t include the number f wunded and t distinguish hw serius the wund is. These data make it clear that there are nearly seven times as many US wunded as killed, but that military medicine and prtectin gear has advanced t the pint where less than half f the wunded cannt be returned t cmbat. This is a majr advance ver previus wars. 268 Figure III.16 again shws that there are majr cycles in the trend. Fr example, there were 12 mnths frm March 2003 t Nvember 2005, where US fatalities per mnth were greater than 75. During that same perid, there were three mnths (April 2004; Nvember 2004; and, January 2005) where US fatalities were greater than There are many ther examples f such cyclical variatins that ccur when ne lks beynd mnthly patterns. Rather than experience a decline, the average number f casualties per day had grwn frm 1.7 in 2003 t 2.3 in 2004, and then remained relatively cnstant in January 26, 2005 just befre the electin -- was the wrst day f the war t date with 37 American dead. Seventeen American s died n a single day n August 3, 2005, and 29 n March 23, In mid-nvember 2005 the US military reprted that the survival rate fr wunded sldiers was 90 percent, the highest yet. The army credited the high survival rate t better bdy armr, frward deplyed surgical teams, swift medical evacuatins, and imprved trauma care. 271 Als in Nvember, the US military reprted that mre than 200 f the US trps killed t date in Iraq were fficers. The figure accunted fr 10.4% f deaths in Iraq, a number similar t the casualty rate f pervius wars. Of the 58,178 US sldiers killed in Vietnam, 7,878 r rughly 14%, were fficers. The casualty rate fr fficers in Iraq appeared t be increasing in late Between Octber 25 and Nvember 15, 58 US trps were killed, f which 13, rughly 22%, were fficers. But military fficials d nt believe the recent increase in fficer deaths marks a change in insurgent tactics: 272 We have n evidence pinting t the insurgents r terrrists targeting fficers as ppsed t ther members f the military. [Suicide bmbs and IEDs] are pretty indiscriminate in what they hit. The casualty cunt fr the U.S. steadily declined between between Octber 2005 and March During this perid, it drpped frm 96 in Octber t 31 in March. 273 This dwnward trend was likely the result f bth an insurgent switch t sft targets including Iraqi plice and civilians and als because parts f the cuntry were turned ver t Iraqi security frces. Indeed, by April f 2006, Iraqi plice, sliders and civilians were being killed at abut a rat f 75 per day. 274 In September 2005, Calitin frces absrbed 82% f all attacks and Iraqi s 18%. By February 2006, 65% were aimed at the Calitin and 35% at Iraqis. 275 Still, in the first fur days in April the U.S. suffered 14 casualties. 276 This indicated that the previus trend may have been temprary and that insurgents still had the capability t carry ut successful attacks against Cailtin frces. There is a mre imprtant message in Figure III.16, hwever, that if ften ignred in bth military analysis and the media. Figure III.16 shws that intense cmbat prduces much sharper swings in the number f wunded than in killed. As a result, the number f bth killed and wunded is bth a much better measure f cmbat activity and f the sacrifice that military frces make in cmbat. The failure t reprt n wunded is incmpetent analysis and incmpetent reprting.

119 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 87 Figure III.15: US Casualties in the Iraq War: Ttal Killed vs. Wunded, March February 6, Ttal Deaths Killed in Actin Nn-Hstile Ttal Wunded Wunded in Actin: RTD Invasin (19 Mar-30 Apr 03) Pst Saddam Fall (1 May , DD US Civilians Wunded in Actin Nn-RTD Ttals *2255 *1766 *489 *16,606 *8,923 *7,683 Surce: Department f Defense, defenselink, February 6, Nte: Des nt include casualties in enfrcing n fly znes befre March 19, Wunded-RTD = equals lighter wunded where persnnel were returned t duty within 72 hurs. Wunded-Nn-RTD= mre serius wunds where slider culd nt be returned t duty within 72 hurs.

120 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 88 Figure III.16: US Casualties in the Iraq War: Killed vs. Wunded, March 2003-February 6, 2006 Jan Nv Sept Jul May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul May Mar Jan Nv Sep Jul May Mar Surce: Defenselink and Iraq Calitin Casualty Cunt,

121 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 89 Patterns in Iraqi Frces and Gvernment Casualties MNF-I des keep track f Iraqi military and fficial casualties, but nly recently has begun t disclse such numbers in detail. One MNSTC-I expert stated, Data n Iraqi casualties are cllected by the Calitin, but public distributin f infrmatin abut this tpic shuld remain the purview f the Iraqi gvernment. They have mre visibility ver the issue, culd be mre accurate in reprting and are the apprpriate authrity t discuss the meaning. 277 MNF-I/US Estimates Figure III.17 summarizes recent Calitin effrts t shw the cycles in Iraqi military and fficial casualties, and the numbers shw a cyclical tendency twards steady escalatin. These figures wuld be far higher if wunded, and men attempting t jin the frces at recruiting statins were included. Nevertheless, these data d prvide sme useful insights. Accrding t the Pentagn's Octber 2005 "Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq" reprt t Cngress, "Apprximately 80 percent f all attacks are directed against Calitin Frces, but 80% f all casualties are suffered by Iraqis." The Pentagn data shwed the average number f daily attacks against Iraqis had mre than dubled since early 2004, frm arund 25 attacks per day t an average f 64 per day in the summer and fall f In early 2006, military fficials said that an average f 70 Iraqi fficers were killed each mnth. 278 A clear trend was visible in the data, with the number f daily attacks against Iraqis climbing frm 40 in the pre-electin perid (June-Nvember 2004) t mre than fifty during the electin (December 2004-February 2005), and then increasingly dramatically t mre than 60 in the run-up t the Octber 2005 referendum. 279 The Pentagn numbers did nt, hwever, distinguish between Iraqi security frces and civilian deaths. 280 Pentagn spkesman Lieutenant Cmmand Greg Hicks played dwn the significance f the reprt, telling reprters: "It's kind f a snapsht The Defense Department desn't maintain a cmprehensive r authritative cunt f Iraqi casualties." 281 A fllw-n analysis f the Pentagn data carried ut by several news rganizatins hwever shwed 26,000 Iraqis had been killed r injured since the end f the war. Further analysis f the Pentagn data shwed that fr every US sldier killed in Iraq, at least 13 Iraqi civilians were als killed. Iraq Bdy Cunt estimated that a ttal f 4,079 Iraqi sldiers and plice had been killed by early February 6, A ttal f 1,300 were estimated t have been killed befre The number f dead frm 2005 t February 2006 was estimated at 2,779. Iraqi Gvernment Estimates The Iraqi gvernment has been reluctant t release similar casualty data, perhaps because it fears this culd shw its weaknesses and discurage recruiting. The Ministry f Defense did reprt, hwever, that 85 Iraqi sldiers were killed in May 2005, cmpared with 40 in April, an increase f 75%. At least 79 sldiers were wunded in May, cmpared with 63 in April. The Ministry f Interir reprted that 151 Iraqi plice were killed in May 2005, cmpared with 86 in April, an increase f 75%. At least 325 plicemen were wunded in May, cmpared with 131 in April. The Ministry f Health reprted that 434 civilians were killed in May, cmpared with 299 in April, and that 775 civilians were wunded, versus 598 the previus mnth. 282

122 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 90 The Iraqi Ministry f the Interir released new figures n Iraqi civilian and security frce casualties in June The ministry fund that Iraqi civilians and plice fficers died at a rate f abut 800 a mnth frm August 2004 until May Reprtedly, insurgents killed 8,175 Iraqis during that time. 283 Iraqi Interir Minister Bayan Jabr stated that same mnth that insurgents had killed apprximately 12,000 Iraqis since the Calitin invasin, an average f 500 a mnth as reprted by the New Yrk Times. 284 An independent cunt f Iraqi military and plice casualties shwed that sme 1,300 had been killed between the fall f Saddam Hussein in April 2003 and the end f 2004, but that an increase in insurgent activity and a new fcus n Iraq frces killed 109 in January 2005, 103 in February, 200 in March, 200 in April and 110 in the first week f May. This was a ttal f rughly 1,200 killed in the first six mnths f 2005, raising the ttal t ver 2,400 killed scarcely a decline in insurgent activity. 285 In cntrast, the MNF-I reprted that "mre than 2,000" Iraqi security frces persnnel had been killed by the end f July

123 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 91 Figure III.17: Average Daily Iraqi Military and Official Casualties by Mnth: January 2004-September Baseline Pre-Svereignty Svereignty Electin Pre-Cnstitutin Referendum Clumn 1 Jan-Mar 04 Apr-Jun 04 Jul-Oct 04 Nv 04-Jan 05 Feb-Aug 05 Sept-Oct 05 N f Iraqi Casualties Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Reprt t Cngress, Octber 13, 2005, Page.24.

124 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 92 Patterns in Iraqi Civilian Casualties There are n reliable estimates f killed and wunded fr Iraqi civilians. The MNF-I has never made any estimates public, and the Iraqi gvernment has nt prvided any cnsistent data. NGO Estimates: Iraqi Bdy Cunt The best data, r "guesstimates," seems t be thse prvided by Iraq Bdy Cunt and Iraq Calitin Casualties ( this cunt is still extremely uncertain. 287 Iraq Bdy Cunt released a study f Iraqi casualties since the Calitin invasin in cnjunctin with the Oxfrd Research Grup in mid The study cncluded that apprximately 25,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in 2003 and 2004 with abut a third having been killed by Calitin trps. Althugh men ver 18 accunted fr the bulk f civilian deaths, the study fund that wmen and children accunted fr almst 20% f all deaths. Almst 80% f civilian deaths ccurred in 12 cities. Baghdad accunted fr almst half f the civilian deaths during this perid. Figure III.18 shws the breakdwn, althugh it may undercunt deaths in twns and cities in Western Iraq, and des nt cver the time perid fr several imprtant Calitin campaigns frm March 2005 nwards. The study relied n casualty reprts made available n 152 selected websites and did nt try t verify the sites surces. Sme f the sites are relatively unknwn and are f uncertain reliability. It als is nt clear hw strenuusly the IBC has tried t sift military casualties frm civilian casualties. Impinging the credibility f the IBC s figures further is the fact that it is an avwed antiwar grup. 288 In late 2005, Iraq Calitin Casualties estimated that the number f Iraqis killed was 26,982-30,380. This figure had risen t a range f 33,638-37,764 by March Iraq Calitin Casualties als began t prvide the mnthly breakuts f bth Iraqi military and Iraqi civilian casualties shwn in Figure III.19. Althugh such figures are uncertain, the much higher estimates made by sme ther rganizatins hwever, use methdlgies and databases that are s weak that they simply lack credibility. Iraqi Gvernment Estimates The Iraqi Ministry f Health has peridically reprted casualty figures since mid In late 2003, the ministry annunced that 1,764 Iraqis had been killed during the summer mnths. 290 Data fr the perid between April 2004 and Octber 2004 shw 3,853 civilians were killed and 15,517 were injured. 291 In January f 2005, the Ministry prvided the BBC with the fllwing statistics fr the six-mnth perid frm July 2004 t January 2005: 292 3,724 peple in Iraq were killed and 12,657 injured in cnflict related vilence 2,041 f these deaths were the result f military actin, in which 8,542 peple were injured 1,233 deaths were the result f "terrrist" incidents These figures, based n recrds frm Iraqi public hspitals, d nt distinguish between the deaths f civilians r Iraqi security frces, and may include insurgent casualties as well. UK Freign Secretary Jack Straw described the Iraqi methd f calculating casualties in Octber 2004: 293

125 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 93 Every hspital reprts daily the number f civilians (which may include insurgents) wh have been killed r injured in terrrist incidents r as a result f military actin. All casualties are likely t be taken t hspital in these circumstances except fr sme insurgents (wh may fear arrest) and thse with minr injuries. The Iraqi Health Ministry has prvided a breakdwn f Iraqi deaths frm early Nvember 2004 until early April 2005, althugh this cunt relies n uncertain data frm mrgues and hspitals. The Health Ministry nted that during this perid: % f the 3,853 deaths accunted fr by the ministry ccurred in Baghdad. Al Anbar witnessed the secnd highest number f deaths. Najaf had the third highest number f deaths. Children represented 211 ut f the 3,853 deaths. The highest death rates per capita were Al Anbar, fllwed by Najaf and Diyala. The ministry recrded 15,517 wunded, f which men made up 91%. Figures were nt available fr the mnths prir t August 2004 and n breakdwns f the data were made available. This gap in the data may be partly explained by the fact that until summer 2004, casualty infrmatin was gathered by the Ministry f Health and relied n infrmatin prvided by hspitals and mrgues. 295 Yet, reliance n hspitals and mrgues alne t cunt deaths prvides a lw figure fr apprximate deaths. Certainly, nt every dead bdy is taken t the hspital r mrgue and certain grups f Iraqis prbably avid the hspitals altgether. Iraqi gvernment figures released by the defense, interir and health ministries in late Octber 2005 reprted mre than 4,000 Iraqi deaths (f whm at least 3,000 were civilian) t date fr the year The breakdwn was as fllws: 3,314 civilian, 1,053 plice, and, 413 sldiers. Als killed were 1,389 suspected insurgents. 297 Iraqi fficials reprted 702 Iraqi deaths fr the mnth f September 2005 alne. The figure fell by 42 percent t 407 the fllwing mnth. Octber's figure included 83 plice and at least 25 sldiers. Althugh it was the furth deadliest mnth fr US frces, the death tll fr Iraqi civilians and security frces was relatively lw in Octber. 298

126 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 94 Figure III.18: Iraqi Fatalities by City: March 2003-February , % 10,000 8,000 6,000 4, % 2, % 3.7% 3.2% 3.0% 2.8% 2.5% 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0 Number Killed Baghdad 11,264 Fallujah 1,874 Nasiriya 984 Kerbala 929 Najaf 784 Msul 735 Basra 704 Kirkuk 613 Hilla 456 Tikrit 312 Baquba 304 Samarra 256 Surce: Iraq Bdy Cunt Data,

127 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 95 Figure III.19: Ttal Iraqi Military and Civilian Casualties by Mnth: January January Jan Feb Mar Apr Jun May Jul Aug Sep Oct Nv Dec Jan Plice/Military Civilian , Surce: Iraq Calitin Casualty Cunt, February 6, 2006,

128 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 96 IV. Evlving Tactics The insurgency als steadily evlved it tactics and appraches t warfare. These changes can be divided int tw brad grups. The first were changes in the way the insurgents pursued their gal f blcking the Iraqi plitical prcess and creating the kind f plitical cnditins that might drive the Calitin ut f Iraq. The secnd were changes in the way the insurgency dealt with the mre military aspects f asymmetric warfare. Plitical, Psychlgical, and Infrmatin Warfare The gals that shaped the strategy and tactics used by the varius insurgent grups evlved steadily after the summer and fall f The mst serius shift in gals was bradening the fcus f the attacks t include the new Iraqi gvernment, the Iraqi frces, and the supprters f the new gvernment. As has been discussed earlier, the insurgents came t make mre and mre use f plitical, psychlgical, and infrmatin warfare t try t drive the Calitin ut f Iraq, disrupt the new plitical prcess, and encurage sectarian and ethnic vilence. These trends accelerated as Islamist extremist grups came t play a larger rle in the insurgency and use mre extreme tactics. Almst frm the beginning, Iraqi insurgents, terrrists, and extremists als explited the fact that the media tends t fcus n dramatic incidents with high casualties, gives them high publicity, and spends little time analyzing the patterns in the insurgency. Beginning in early 2006, as the vilence shifted tward lw-level civil cnflict, the identities f the attackers were ften difficult t discern. While radside bmbings and suicide attacks still tk place, the increase in abductin and assassinatins f civilian Iraqis, many taken in brad daylight in frnt f their huse r business, seemed t be the dminant trends. It is likely that a mix f Sunni insurgents, Islamist extremists, Shi ite militias and rganized criminal gangs played rles in this cycle f sectarian cnflict characterized by attacks and repraisals. The changes in insurgent gals als had a majr impact n insurgent tactics. While varius insurgent elements did have different pririties and evlved different appraches t warfare, they came t explit the fllwing methds and tactics relating t plitical, psychlgical, and infrmatin warfare: Attack the structures f gvernance and security by idelgical, plitical, and vilent means: Use idelgical and plitical means t attack the legitimacy f the gvernment and natin building prcess. Intimidate and subvert the military and security frces. Intimidate and attack gvernment fficials and institutins at the natinal, reginal, and lcal levels. Strike at infrastructure, utilities, and services in ways that appear t shw the gvernment cannt prvide essential ecnmic services r persnal security. A July 2005 letter t Zarqawi frm Ayman al-zawahiri admnished the Al Qa'ida in Iraq leader fr fcusing t much n military attacks and nt enugh n plitical actins. In the letter, Zawahiri said freeing the cuntry frm Americans des nt depend n frce alne and urged Zarqawi t direct the plitical actin equally with the military actin. 299 Create alliances f cnvenience and infrmal netwrks with ther grups t attack the US, varius elements f the Iraqi Interim Gvernment and elected gvernment, and effrts at natin building: The infrmal cmmn frnts perate n the principal that the enemy f my enemy is my temprary friend. At the same time, mvements franchise t create individual cells and independent units, creating diverse mixes f enemies that are difficult t attack. Attack Iraqi elites and ethnic and sectarian fault lines; use them t prevent natin building and gvernance by prvking civil war: As the US and Calitin phased dwn its rle, and a svereign Iraqi gvernment increased its influence and pwer, insurgents increasingly shifted their fcus f their attacks t

129 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 97 Iraqi gvernment targets, as well as Iraqi military, plice, and security frces. At the same time, they stepped up attacks designed t prevent Sunnis frm participating in the new gvernment, and t cause grwing tensin and cnflict between Sunni and Shi ite, and Arab and Kurd. There are n clear lines f divisin between insurgents, but the Iraqi Sunni insurgents fcused heavily n attacking the emerging Iraqi prcess f gvernance, while Islamist extremist mvements used suicide bmbing attacks and ther bmbings t cause large casualties amng the Shi ite and Kurdish ppulatins smetimes linking them t religius festivals r hlidays and smetimes t attacks n Iraqi frces r their recruiting effrts. They als fcused their attacks t strike at leading Shi ite and Kurdish plitical fficials, cmmanders, and clergy. Targeting ther grups like Shi ites and Kurds, using car bmbings fr mass killings, and hitting shrines and festivals frces the dispersal f security frces, makes the areas invlved seem insecure, undermines effrts at gvernance, and ffers the pssibility f using civil war as a way t defeat the Calitin and Iraqi Interim Gvernment s effrts at natin building. Fr example, a step up in Sunni attacks n Shi ite targets after the January 30, 2005 electin led sme Shi ites t talk abut Sunni ethnic cleansing. This effect was cmpunded by bldy suicide bmbings, many f which had sme frm f gvernment target, but killed large numbers f Shi ite civilians. 300 These attacks included the discvery f 58 crpses dumped in the Tigris, and 19 largely Shi ite Natinal Guardsmen bdies in a sccer stadium in Haditha. They als included a bmbing in Hilla n March 1, 2005 that killed 136 mstly Shi ite plice and army recruits. 301 Similar attacks were carried against the Kurds. While the Kurds maintained ntably better security ver their areas in the nrth than existed in the rest f the cuntry, tw suicide bmbers still penetrated a plitical gathering in Irbil n February 1, 2004, killing at least 105. On March 10, 2005, a suicide bmber killed 53 Kurds in Kirkuk. On May 3, 2005, anther suicide bmber this time penly identified with the Sunni extremist grup Ansar al-sunna blew himself up utside a recruiting statin in Irbil, killing 60 and wunding mre than 150 thers. 302 At the same time, ther attacks systematically targeted Kurdish leaders and Kurdish elements in Iraqi frces. By May 2005, Shi ites had begun t retaliate, in spite f effrts t avid this by Shi ite leaders, cntributing further t the prblems in establishing a legitimate gvernment and natinal frces. Sunni and Shi ite bdies were discvered in unmarked graves and killings struck at bth Sunni and Shi ite clergy. 303 In additin t assassinatins aimed at disrupting the judicial and plitical prcess, insurgents have carried ut assassinatins f religius leaders as part f their larger gal f using sectarian vilence t prvke a civil war. There appeared t be an up-turn in these assassinatins in late summer and early fall 2005: July 19, 2005: Gunmen assassinate Sheikh Ahmad al-juburi, the imam at Al-Taqwa Msque in Al- Dawrah in suthern Baghdad. August 17, 2005: Gunmen assassinate Ali al-shimmari, a lcal imam and a member f the Assciatin f Muslim Schlars, in nrtheastern Baghdad. September 1, 2005: Gunmen kill Sheikh Salim Nusayyif Jasim al-tamimi, the imam f Al-Mustafa Msque in Baghdad and a member f the Assciatin f Muslim Schlars. September 15, 2005: A bmb explded at Rawdat al-wadi msque in Msul killing Sheikh Hikmat Husayn Ali, the imam f the msque. September 16, 2005: Insurgents kill Fadhil Amshani, a Shi ite cleric and fllwer f Mqtada al Sadr. Octber 2, 2005: Gunmen in sutheast Baghdad killed Salah Hassan Ayash, a Sunni imam. Nvember 14, 2005: Insurgents kill the administratr f Al-Hamid Msque in the Al-Saydiyah neighbrhd f Baghdad. Nvember 23, 2005: Gunmen wearing Iraqi army unifrms burst int the hme f Khadim Sarhid al- Hemaiyem, a Sunni and the head f Iraq s Batta clan, killing him alng with three f his sns and his sn-in-law. Nvember 26, 2005: In Basra, Iraqi plice discver the bdy f Sheikh Nadir Karim, the imam f a Sunni Msque. Karim had been abducted frm his hme the previus night.

130 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 98 Nvember 28, 2005: Gunmen kidnapped Shihab Abdul-Hussein, a member f the Badr Organizatin, in Baghdad. Nvember 29, 2005: In Fallujah, armed men kill Sheikh Hamza Abbas Issawi, a Sunni cleric wh had called fr Sunni participatin in the upcming parliamentary electins. December 4, 2005: In Baghdad, gunmen killed Sheik Abdul-Salam Abdul-Hussein, a Shi ite Muslim candidate running in the upcming general electins and a fllwer f Muqtada al-sadr. January 1, 2006: In Mahmudiyah, Sunni Arab insurgents sht and killed a Shi ite cleric, a member f Mqtada Sadr s mvement. January 25, 2006: A prminent Sunni Arab cleric, Karim Jassim Mhammed, 39, was sht dead Wednesday by plice at a checkpint heading int the nrthern city f Samarra. Accrding t sme reprts, mre than 60 Sunni imams have been killed since the start f the insurgency. 304 Insurgent attacks n msques and religius gatherings als intensified in the run up t the December 15 electins: Octber 29, 2005: A suicide bmber struck a small marketplace near a Shi ite msque in Huweder, six miles nrth f Baquba, killing at least 25 and wunding 45. Nvember 3, 2005: A suicide bmber driving a minibus detnated his explsives utside a Shi ite msque in Musayyib, suth f Baghdad, killing 20 and wunding 64. The msque was the site f a previus explsin in July, when a suicide bmber blew up a fuel tanker nearby, killing 54 peple. Nvember 9, 2005: Tw car bmbs explded near a Shi ite msque in Baghdad, killing six peple. Nvember 18, 2005: Suicide bmbers struck tw msques in the largely Kurdish twn f Khanaqin, near the Iranian brder. The attacks, against the Sheik Murad and Khanaqin Grand msques killed at least 80 Shi ite wrshippers and wunding mre than 100. A third wuld-be suicide bmber was arrested shrtly after the attacks. Nvember 19, 2005: A suicide bmber struck a crwd f Shi ite murners in the village f Abu Saida, near Baquba, killing at least 36 peple. Nvember 28, 2005: In Dra, a neighbrhd in suthwest Baghdad, insurgents ambushed a bus carrying British Muslims t Shi ite shrines, killing tw and wunding fur. Nvember 30, 2005: Gunmen kill nine Shi ite labrers near Baquba. Nvember 30, 2005: Gunmen fired n the hme f Salama Khafaji, a prminent Shi ite plitician. Althugh the upsurge in vilence in late Nvember was a deliberate attempt by insurgents t disrupt the upcming December 15 parliamentary electins, the largely sectarian nature f the vilence was als partly due t the US discvery n Nvember 13th f 173 mstly Sunni malnurished and abused detainees in an Interir Ministry prisn in Baghdad. The discvery f the secret trture center run by Shi ite-led gvernment security frces sparked renewed sectarian vilence and led t a number f tit-fr-tat murders in late Nvember. After the bmbing f the Glden Shrine n February 22, 2006, hundreds f Iraqi civilians were killed in nly a few days in what was the wrst sectarian vilence since the fall f Saddam. Attacks were mixed and cnsisted f large-scale bmbings and mrtar attacks as well as mystery killings, assassinatins and gunfights. Althugh a precise cunt f incidents in impssible, sme included: February 23: The bmbing f a Sunni msque in Baquba, killed eight Iraqi sldiers and wunded nearly a dzen. At least 47 bdies were fund scattered acrss Iraq late Wednesday and early Thursday, many f them sht executin-style and dumped in Shi ite-dminated parts f the capital. The individuals, bth Shi ites and Sunnis, were frced frm their vehicles n the way t a prtest and sht. February 24: Three Sunni msques in suthern Baghdad were attacked and mrtar runds landed near the Shi ite shrine f Salman al-farisi. Gunmen strmed a huse suth f Baghdad and sht dead five Shi ite men. Plice fund at least 27 bdies in Baghdad and ther cities and twns.

131 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 99 February 25: The bdies f 14 slain plice cmmands were fund near their three burned vehicles near a Sunni msque in suthwestern Baghdad, and 11 ther bdies were discvered in varius lcatins acrss Baghdad. A car bmb killed at least fur peple in the Shi ite hly city f Karbala and 13 members f a Shi ite family were massacred in the twn f Baquba. At least 21 ther peple died in small-scale shtings and bmbing acrss Baghdad. February 26, 2006: Mrtars slammed int crwded Baghdad neighbrhds killing 18 peple and injuring dzens. At least seven mrtar runds hit in a Shi ite enclave f Dra a predminantly Sunni Arab district and ne f the mst dangerus parts f the city plice said. Fifteen peple were reprted killed at 45 injured. February 28, 2006: A pair f bmb attacks in the pr, mstly Shi ite Jadida district left 27 dead and 112 injured. In the first incident, a man wearing an explsives belt targeted a gas statin. Five minutes later, the first f at least five car bmbs in the capital explded near a grup f labrers. A car bmb struck near a small Shi ite msque in the Hurriya district f central Baghdad, killing 25 and injuring 43. Anther detnated by remte cntrl near a small market in the mstly Shi ite Karada district left six dead and 18 injured. In the upscale Sunni Arab district f Zayna, a car bmb targeting an army patrl killed five, while a car bmb targeting a cnvy fr an advisr t the Defense Ministry, Daham Radhi Assal, injured three. Elsewhere, a car bmb targeting a plice patrl n the rad between Kirkuk and the capital killed fur civilians. Link asymmetric warfare t crime and lting; explit pverty and ecnmic desperatin: Use criminals t supprt attacks n infrastructure and natin building activity, raise funds, and undermine security. Explit unemplyment t strengthen dedicated insurgent and terrrist cells. Blur the lines between threat frces, criminal elements, and part-time frces. Attack petrleum and il facilities, electric pwer, water, and ther critical infrastructure: Attacks n petrleum, pwer and water facilities have been used t bth ffset the impact f US aid and direct Iraqi anger against the gvernment. Al Qa'ida and Ba'athist grups have fund il facilities and pipelines t be particularly attractive targets. Insurgents carried ut mre than 300 attacks n Iraqi il facilities between March 2003 and January An estimate by Rbert Mullen indicates that there were clse t 500 and perhaps as many as His breakdwn f the number f attacks was: pipelines, 398; refineries, 36; il wells, 18; tanker trucks, 30; il train, 1; strage tanks 4; and 1 tank farm. In additin, there were at least sixty-fur incidents in which the victims were related t Iraq s petrleum sectr, ranging frm high ranking persns in the Oil Ministry t il wrkers at refineries, pipelines, and elsewhere in the sectr, t cntract, military, plice, and tribal security peple. The number killed in these directed attacks reached at least The end result was that il prductin drpped by 8% in 2005, and pipeline shipments thrugh the Iraqi nrthern pipeline t Ceyan in Turkey drpped frm 800,000 barrels per day befre the war t an average f 40,000 barrels per day in In July 2005, Iraqi fficials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cst Iraq sme $11 billin. Attacks kept Iraqi il prductin frm appraching the 3 millin barrel a day gal in 2005 gal that the Calitin had set after the fall f Saddam Hussein, and prductin had drpped frm pre-war levels f arund 2.5 millin barrels a day t an average f 1.83 millin barrels a day in 2005, and nly 1.57 millin barrels a day in December These successes have majr impact in a cuntry where 94% f the gvernment s direct incme nw cmes frm il exprts. Attacks n pipelines als tk place, csting billins f dllars in lst exprts and slwing the rehabilitatin f Iraq s dilapidated il infrastructure. 307 Between the March 2003 invasin and the end f 2005, the cntinuing threat t electric facilities, rlling pwer cuts in mst areas, and majr shrtages frced many Iraqis t rely n hme r neighbrhd generatrs even in the areas with pwer. It was als a reasn that the US was nly able t spend $1.0 billin f $4.4 billin in prgrammed aid mney n the electricity sectr by the end f April 2005, and $261 millin ut f $1.7 billin n the petrleum sectr. 308 Sabtage and theft helped cripple many f the cuntry s 229 perating water plants by the spring f Sme 90% f the municipalities in the cuntry lacked wrking sewage prcessing plants, cntaminating the main surces f water as they drained int the Tigris and Euphrates.

132 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 100 Oil pipelines in the nrthern part f the cuntry came under repeated attacks in late Accrding t Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum, the upsurge in attacks began in mid-august, fllwing the deadline fr writing Iraq s Cnstitutin. Between August 15 and September 7, there were mre than 10 attacks n pipelines. 309 The situatin cntinued t deterirate as the date f the referendum apprached. The pipelines, linking il fields in Kirkuk t Iraq s largest il refinery in Beiji and the Turkish prt f Cheyhan, were disrupted mre than half-a-dzen times during September and Octber 2005: 310 September 3, 2005: Insurgents bmbed the main pipeline running frm Kirkuk t Cheyhan, disrupting Iraqi il exprts fr mre than tw weeks and csting billins f dllars in lst revenue. September 13, 2005: A fire brke ut after a pipeline carrying crude il frm Kirkuk t a Beiji refinery sprang a leak. September 15, 2005: Anther fire brke ut in an il pipeline in Kirkuk; the cause f the fire was unknwn. September 21, 2005: A bmb planted by insurgents damaged an il pipeline cnnecting the Bay Hassan il fields t Kirkuk. Repairs were expected t take up t a week. Octber 6, 2005: Insurgents bmbed a pipeline near Kirkuk. Octber 12, 2005: An explsin shut dwn an il pipeline near the city f Beiji. Octber 20, 2005: Insurgents bmbed a pipeline linking Kirkuk t Beiji. Octber 25, 2005: Insurgents bmb the Beiji petrleum refinery, killing at least five. On the eve f the Octber referendum, insurgents attacked Baghdad s electrical grid. In a tactic designed t disrupt the vte, insurgents sabtaged pwer lines and electricity twers nrth f the capital, leaving 70 percent f the city in the dark. 311 Even befre the attack, hwever, the amunt f electricity Baghdad received was a majr bne f cntentin, with daily electricity service in the capital averaging less than 8 hurs per day cmpared t the natinal average f 14 hurs. 312 Insurgents als prved adept at expliting the cuntry s fuel crisis in late December 2005 and early January Oil exprts fell frm their pst-war average f abut 1.6 millin bpd (barrels per day) t 1.2 millin bpd in Nvember 2005 and 1.1 millin bpd in December, the lwest since the cuntry resumed exprts after the US-led invasin. 313 A ttal f 508 millin barrels were exprted in 2005, dwn frm the 533 millin barrels sld the previus year. As a whle, Iraqi il prductin fell 8 percent in Exprts frm il fields in the suth, which prduce the majrity f Iraqi il, fell frm 514 millin barrels in 2004 t 496 millin in Nrthern prductin drpped frm 19 millin t 12 millin. The drp in prductin fr the suthern il fields was attributed t bad weather in the Gulf and a lack f electricity t run the refineries. Sabtage and persistent attacks by insurgents were blamed fr the decline in the nrth. 315 In late December, Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum annunced that Iraq hped t prduce at least 2.5 millin barrels f il per day by the end f Only weeks befre, hwever, he had said the cuntry hped t turn ut 3.0 millin barrels per day by the end f the next year, reaching 3.5 millin bpd by December On December 18, 2005, nly three days after parliamentary electins, the Iraqi gvernment raised the price f gasline, diesel, kersene and cking gas. The Iraqi gvernment had cntinued Saddam Hussein s plicy f subsidizing fuel prices, but faced grwing pressure frm the IMF and thers t increase the price f fuel. 317 The price f imprted gasline was raised fivefld, while the price f lcally prduced gasline rse sevenfld. Kersene prices increased fivefld and cking gas increased threefld. 318 The price hike sparked vilent demnstratins in several cities, including Tikrit and Amarah. Iraq s il minister spke ut against the price hikes and threatened t resign in prtest. The fuel crisis was cmpunded a few days later n December 21, when the il ministry was frced t clse the cuntry s largest il refinery after tanker-truck drivers went n strike. Althugh insurgents have repeatedly attacked il installatins in the nrth, they stepped up their threats t attack drivers in late December as part f an effrt t take advantage f the fuel price hike and the public s anger. 319 The clsure f the Beiji refinery, which nrmally prduces 8.5 millin liters f petrl per day alng with 7.5 millin liters f diesel, cst the Iraqi gvernment sme 18 millin dllars a day. 320 On December 30, the

133 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 101 gvernment relieved Bahr al-ulum f his duties fr 30 days as il minister, putting Ahmed Chalabi, the deputy premier, in charge. 321 As mentined abve, al-ulum had been critical f the gvernment s decisin t reduce fuel subsidies. Prtests, many f which turned vilent, cntinued thrughut the cuntry int early January. In Kirkuk, the gvernr was frced t impse an vernight curfew after fuel rits n January 1 killed at least ne persn and wunded fur thers. In Basra, 1,000 peple burned tires t prtest the price increases. 322 Insurgents respnded by stepping up the number f attacks against the il infrastructure, blwing up an il pipeline near a Baghdad refinery and setting tw petrl statins, alng with ffices belnging t the natinal il cmpany, n fire in Kirkuk in early January. Threats by insurgents led t the shutdwn f Iraq s mst prductive il facility in Baiji. 323 Althugh the truck drivers returned t wrk n January 3, the insurgents cntinued their attacks, ambushing three separate cnvys and killing at least tw tanker-drivers the fllwing day. 324 A sixty-tanker cnvy n its way t Baghdad hit an IED n January 4. Upn stpping anther tanker was hit by a rcket. Plice and il fficials reprted that 20 tankers were destryed, but an Oil Ministry spkesman, Asim Jihad, disputed that claim stating that cnvys usually are n bigger than ten tankers and suggested that nly ne tanker was hit. 325 The impact f such attacks has been further cmpunded the ability f insurgents t steal il and fuel. The New Yrk Times has quted Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking sme 40 percent t 50 percent f all il-smuggling prfits in the cuntry, and had infiltrated senir management psitins at the majr nrthern refinery in Baji: "It's gne beynd Nigeria levels nw where it really threatens natinal security The insurgents are invlved at all levels." The Times als quted an unidentified US fficial as saying that, "It's clear that crruptin funds the insurgency, s there yu have a very real threat t the new state Crruptin really has the ptential f undercutting the grwth ptential here." The frmer il minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-ulum, had said earlier in 2005 that "il and fuel smuggling netwrks have grwn int a dangerus mafia threatening the lives f thse in charge f fighting crruptin." 326 Strike at US and ther aid prjects t undermine Iraqi acceptance f the MNSTC-I and the perceived legitimacy f the Iraqi gvernment. It is unclear just hw systematic such attacks have been, but a reprt by the Special Inspectr General fr Iraq Recnstructin indicates that at least 276 civilians wrking n US aid prjects had been killed by March 31, 2005, and at least 2,582 had been wunded. The number f cntractrs killed als rse by 19% (t 44) in the first quarter f The cst impact is als high. The reprt indicates that the security csts f USAID funded aid prjects were nly 4.2% f the ttal cst frm March 2003 t February 2004, but rse t 22% during the final nine mnths f Other reprts indicated that cntractrs had filed 2,919 death and injury claims fr US and freign wrkers between the beginning f the war n March 19, 2003 and May 10, In April 2006, the Department f Defense agreed that U.S. military frces wuld be used t prvide security fr recnstructin teams being sent t Iraq t crdinate U.S. aid. The Department f Defense and Department f State had previusly disagreed n whether private security frces r U.S military service members wuld be used t prvide the security. 329 Fcus n Large US Installatins: As the insurgents became better rganized, they mved frm hit and run firings at US installatins t much larger and better rganized raids that culd capture majr media attentin even when these largely failed. The majr Zarqawi rganizatin assault n Abu Ghraib prisn in early April 2005 was an example f such a raid. 330 Other examples are the suicide bmbing and infiltratin attacks n the Green Zne in Baghdad and ther majr US military facilities in areas like Msul. In additin, the U.S. military reprted insurgent attacks n military bases in the western city f Ramadi with mrtars and small arms almst immediately after the results f the December electin were annunced. Despite a general shift in attacks away frm Calitin frces and tward Iraqi military, plice and civilians as the insurgency cntinued, a plt was uncvered in March 2006 in which 421 al-qa ida members were ne bureaucrat s signature away frm being admitted int the Iraqi Army battalins in charge f guarding entrances t the Green Zne. These fighters then planned n strming U.S. and British embassies, taking thse inside hstage. 331 Obtain and use unifrms and ID f Iraqi security frces t gain access t restricted areas and cnfuse the identity f the attacker: The use f Iraqi unifrms, security and army vehicles, false IDs, and intelligence gained frm infiltratrs became mre sphisticated. Fr example, in the mainly Sunni Arab

134 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 102 neighbrhd f Tubji, dzens f armed men dressed in Interir Ministry plice unifrms killed three Sunnis and abducted mre than 20 in January Als in January, tw suicide bmbers using plice identity cards and dressed in military unifrms attempted t enter an MOI building and detnate the explsives utside killing 29 Iraqis. Next dr, a ceremny hnring the 84 th anniversary f the Iraqi plice frce was being cnducted. Earlier the same year, insurgents wearing Iraqi army unifrms burst int the hme f Khadim Sarhid al- Hemaiyem, a Sunni candidate in the upcming electins and the head f Iraq s Batta clan, killing him alng with three f his sns and his sn-in-law. Insurgents and Islamists learned that a mix f silence, multiple claims t be the attacker, new names fr attacking rganizatins, and uncertain levels f affiliatin made it harder fr the US t respnd. They als prduced mre media cverage and speculatin. In Iraq and elsewhere, attacks have ften been accmpanied by what seem t be deliberate effrts t advance cnspiracy theries t cnfuse the identity f the attacker r t find ways t blame defenders f the US fr being attacked. In additin, cnspiracy theries charging the US with deliberately r carelessly failing t prvide an adequate defense have been particularly effective. As sectarian cnflict and lw-level civil war increased, many f the abductins and killings were cnducted by individuals wearing MOI cmmand unifrms. Althguh the MOI cntinued t deny its rle in any f the vilence, the strng militia presence in the security frces became a surce f tensin between the U.S. and the Shi ite dminated Iraqi gvernment. Use lw-level killings, kidnappings, threats, disappearances, and intimidatin t create added sectarian and ethnic cnflict and strife: While majr attacks and the use f weapns like mrtars and IEDs get the mst attentin, insurgent grups als seem t play a rle in a cnstant pattern f lw-level vilence against individuals designed t increase sectarian and ethnic tensin. It is unclear that Sunni grups have ever used Iraqi frces unifrms r deliberately acted as if they were Shi ites in attacking Sunnis, but they have been repeatedly accused f such tactics. It is clear that they have killed, intimidated, and blackmailed Shi ites, Kurds, and pr-gvernment individuals at a wide range f levels in an effrt t drive them ut f Sunni areas and create a cnstant climate f lw-level vilence designed t prvke a vilent Shi ite and Kurdish reactin. The use f these tactics increased after the February bmbing f the Askariya shrine. Masked gunmen r grups wearing MOI unifrms ften targeted individuals in their hmes r businesses. Sme times the individuals were kidnapped and a ransm demanded, but mre ften they were gunned dwn n the spt r turned up later trtured and execute in ne f the many bdy dumps. Althugh Shi ite militias bth within and utside the ISF were t blame, surely Sunni insurgents and criminal grups cnducted their wn retaliatry strikes. Sme f these events included: March 26, 2006: 10 bdies were fund blindflded, bund and sht in Baghdad, and 30 decapitated crpses were fund in Baquba. Masked gunmen kidnapped 16 emplyees f the Saaeed Imprt and Exprt Cmpany in Baghdad. March 29, 2006: Gunmen in Iraqi cmmand unifrms runded up 14 members f an electrical supply shp in Baghdad, and riddled them with machine-gun fire, killing 8 peple and wunding 6. March 30, 2006: In Ramadi, three wrkers frm the lcal hspital were fund blindflded and sht. March 31, 2006: 24 bdies f yung men handcuffed and shwing signs f trture were fund in Amiriyah. April 1, 2006: Gunmen attacked a minibus carrying Shiites nrtheast f Baghdad, killing six men and wunding ne wman. April 15, 2006: Gunmen wearing MOI cmmand unifrms and driving their standard issued trucks pened fire n guards utside f the Iraqna cellular phne cmpany, wunding ne guard whm they then abducted.

135 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 103 Accrding t U.S. military fficials in April, Shi ite militias psed the greatest threat t Iraqi security. Additinally, these lw-level assassinatins in the mnth f March accunted fr mre than fur times as many deaths as bmbings and ther mass-casualty attacks in the same mnth. 332 Use threats and terrr tactics t cause sectarian displacement: Bth Sunni insurgents and Shi ite militias began using threats and terrr tactics after the February 22 bmbing t drive either Sh ite r Sunni families ut f mixed neighbrhds in rder t make ne sect predminate. Similar tactics are ften emplyed. Leaflets were frequently distributed by gunmen r even by children. In sme instances, thse wh had fled did s after hearing their names n a list f enemies read ut at a Sunni msque. It was als reprted that religius vigilantes wuld paint black crsses, referred t as the mark f death, n the drs f thse it sught t drive ut. Yung children were smetimes abducted fr several hurs and then returned t their families with a warning that if they did nt leave, next time their children wuld be killed. 333 By mid-april, the Ministry f Displacement Migratin put the number at 60,000 peple. 334 A spkesman fr the fr the ministry estimated that every day 1,000 Iraqi s are being frced t flee their hmes. 335 Much f the displacement ccurred in and arund the capital, traditinally a mixed city. Explit Arab satellite televisin as well as traditinal media: Islamist mvements and ther insurgents learned hw t capture maximum expsure in reginal media, use the Internet, and abve all, explit the new Arab satellite news channels. Insurgents and terrrist als pay clse attentin t media reactins, and tailr their attacks t high prfile targets that make such attacks weapns f mass media. Al Qa'ida has repeatedly demnstrated a sphisticated understanding f the rle the media plays in advancing r weakening their rganizatin. Ayman al-zawahiri, Al Qa'ida's N.2, has described the cnflict as taking place in the battlefield f the media and has admitted that the rganizatin is engaged in a media battle in a race fr the hearts and minds f [Muslims] with the West. 336 Zarqawi s Al Qa ida in Iraq grup tk their attempted manipulatin f the news media t new heights in June In an Internet statement, the rganizatin severely criticized the Al Jazeera satellite televisin statin fr what it called impartial reprting. It claimed that Al Jazeera, lng criticized by US fficials, had sided with the US ver Iraq. There has been sme evidence t suggest that the jihadists might be lsing the media battle. Zarqawi has issued retractins r clarificatins after unppular attacks r statements. After his declaratin f ttal war n Shi ites in the summer f 2005 received a very cl respnse frm the larger jihadi cmmunity, Zarqawi issued a partial retractin. Zarqawi respnded in a similar way after the Nvember 9 bmbings in Amman. The backlash frm the Muslim wrld, especially within Jrdan itself, was enugh t prmpt Zarqawi t issue several statements denying Jrdanians had been the targets f the attacks. Such statements and retractins suggest Zarqawi may be n the defensive and that his grup is grwing increasingly vulnerable t Muslim public pinin. In what may prve t be a harbinger f future tactics, insurgents have begun t attack the media directly. On July 14, 2005, gunmen attacked a televisin crew in Baghdad, wunding three men. In Octber 2005, unknwn gunmen attacked a bradcasting and televisin cmpund in Msul in Octber. 337 Explit the internet as well as traditinal media; a tl fr prpaganda as well as cmmunicatin and exchange f tactical methds and techniques: Mre and mre web sites appear frm extremist mvements and terrrist grups that publicize the actins f such grups r make false r exaggerated claims. Disseminatin f vide, pictures, and accunts f insurgent attacks are part f an effrt by the varius grups t prmte the image f a chatic envirnment in Iraq in which the Iraqi gvernment cannt maintain rder and stability and Calitin frces are suffering tactical lses. Accrding t a reprt by the Army s Training and Dctrine Cmmand, the insurgent vides have grwn cmplex and sphisticated, with detailed graphics, English subtitles, English narratrs [and] Jihadist humr. 338 Iraqi terrrist and insurgent rganizatins have learned the media and analysts regularly mnitr such sites and they furnish a lw-cst surce f publicity. Accrding t ne reprt, the number f Iraqi insurgent websites increased frm 145 t 825 between January and December At the same time, the fld f web site activity makes it difficult t knw when sites are being used fr cmmunicatins. Terrrist and insurgent rganizatins frm all ver the wrld have established the equivalent f an infrmal tactical net in which they exchanges techniques fr carrying ut attacks, technical data n weapns, etc.

136 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 104 Insurgent vides f attacks can be useful fr the Calitin as well. The intelligence divisin f the Army s Training and Dctrine Cmmand has been incrprating them as an instructive tl and analyzing them fr a way t avid casualties. 340 Hwever, there was n indicatin f whether this additin t the training has had any measurable effect n reducing calitin vulnerability t attack, r making sldiers mre adept at aviding radside bmbs. Use the media t target and develp the equivalent f swarming techniques: Iraqi terrrist and insurgent rganizatins have learned that media reprting n the results f their attacks prvides a pwerful indicatr f their success and what kind f attack t strike at in the future. While many attacks are planned lng in advance r use targeting based n infiltratin and simple bservatin, thers are linked t media reprting n events, mvements, etc. The end result is that insurgents can swarm arund given types f targets, striking at vulnerable pints where the target and methd f attack is knwn t have success. Maintain a strategy f cnstant attritin, but strike hard accrding t a calendar f turning pints and/r at targets with high plitical, scial, and ecnmic impact: Insurgents and Islamists learned the imprtance f a cnstant lw-level bdy cunt and the creatin f a steady climate f vilence. This frces the US int a cnstant, large-scale security effrt; makes it difficult fr Iraqi frces t take hld; puts cnstant pressure n US and Iraqi frces t disperse; and ensures cnstant media cverage. At the same time, insurgents and Islamists shwed a steadily mre sphisticated capability t explit hlidays, electins and ther plitical events, and sensitive targets bth inside the cuntries that are the scene f their primary peratins and in the US and the West. Attacks n Kurdish and Shi ite religius festivals are cases in pint. S was an attack n Abu Ghraib prisn, the site f many media reprts n the abuse f Iraqi prisners n April 2, The prisn still held sme 3,446 detainees and the insurgent attack was cnducted by insurgents, lasted nearly 40 minutes, and was large and well rganized enugh t wund 20 US trps. 341 After the third anniversary since the beginning f the war in Iraq, President Bush made several speeches in which he referred t the city f Tal Afar as a success stry and a free city that gives reasn fr hpe fr a free Iraq. Several days later, 40 Iraqi s were killed and 30 wunded when a suicide bmber penetrated an Iraqi army recruiting ffice near a US-Iraqi military base. 342 Push ht buttns: Try t find frms f attack that prvke disprprtinate fear and terrr t frce the US Iraqi frces int cstly, drastic, and smetimes prvcative respnses: Terrrists and insurgents have fund that attacks planned fr maximum plitical and psychlgical effects ften have the additinal benefit f prvking ver-reactin. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad explited such tactics thrughut the peace prcess. One example f such attacks that put cnstant pressure n Americans, demnstrated insurgent strength, and gt high prfile media attentin was the lng series f attacks n the secure areas in the Green Zne in Baghdad and alng the rad frm that zne t the Baghdad airprt. Attacking the airprt rad was an almst perfect way f keeping up cnstant psychlgical and plitical pressure. It passed thrugh a hstile Sunni area, was almst impssible t secure frm IEDs, VBIEDs, rcket and mrtar attacks, and sniping withut pinning dwn large numbers f trps. This helps explain why there were well ver 100 attacks n targets mving alng the rad during January 30 thrugh May 4, Game Reginal, Western, and ther utside media: Use interview access, tapes, jurnalist hstage takings and killings, plitically-led and mtivated crwds, drivers and assistants t jurnalists, and timed and targeted attacks t attempt t manipulate Western and utside media. Manipulate US fficial briefings with planted questins. Use Americans and ther freigners as prxies: There is nthing new abut using Americans and ther freigners as prxies fr lcal regimes, r attacking them t win supprt fr idelgical psitins and causes. There has, hwever, been steadily grwing sphisticatin in the timing and nature f such attacks, and in expliting sfter targets such as American businessmen in the cuntry f peratins, in striking at US and allied targets in ther cuntries, r in striking at targets in the US. It is als clear that such attacks receive maximum plitical and media attentin in the US.

137 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 105 Attack UN, NGO, embassies, aid persnnel, and freign cntractr business peratins: Attacking such targets greatly reduces the ability t carry ut natin building and stability peratins t win hearts and minds. Attacking the inncent, and curtailing their peratins r driving rganizatins ut f the cuntry has becme an imprtant fcus f insurgents and Islamist extremist attacks. Iraqi insurgents have pursued this tactic since the first days f the insurgency. In Nvember f 2005, Al Qa'ida divulged new details abut the April 19, 2003 bmbing f the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, ne f the first majr attacks f the Iraqi insurgency and the first t intentinally target freigners. The 2003 bmbing killed 23 peple, including the head f the U.N. missin, Sergi Vieira de Mell, the Iraqi crdinatr fr the U.N. children s fund, UNICEF, and several Wrld Bank staffers, and injured mre than 150. In a statement psted n an Islamic radical website, Al Qa'ida said the attack had been planned by Thamir Mubarak Atruz, a Sunni Arab frm the twn f Khaldiyah in Anbar prvince. Atruz, a frmer fficer in Saddam Hussein s army had fled t Saudi Arabia but returned t Iraq befre the US-led invasin f Iraq began in March 2003 in rder t fight Americans. He was killed by US frces in Fallujah in April The 2003 bmbing f U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, althugh the mst famus attack n diplmatic ffices in Baghdad, is hardly the nly such incident since the insurgency began, hwever. Insurgents have als peridically fired mrtars against US facilities inside the Green Zne. Insurgents stepped up their attacks against freign diplmats in the summer and fall f In July, Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia killed tw Algerian diplmats and ne Egyptian. The grup als attempted t kidnap Bahraini and Pakistani embassy staff, thugh the frmer escaped with light wunds and the latter was unharmed. Insurgent attacks against diplmats in the fall and winter f 2005 included: Octber 10, 2005: Gunmen ambushed a cnvy f Arab League diplmats in Baghdad, wunding tw Iraqi plicemen. Octber 10, 2005: Mrtars strike a US embassy building in Hilla. Octber 20, 2005: Tw Mrccan embassy emplyees were kidnapped n the highway frm Amman t Baghdad. On Nvember 3, Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia psted a statement n a website saying Abdelkrim el-mhsfidi, a Mrccan diplmat, and Abderrahim Bualem, his driver, wuld be executed. The grup said the executins were meant as ''an example fr thers wh are still thinking t challenge the mujahedeen and dare t cme t the land f the tw rivers.'' Nvember 7, 2005: A Sudanese diplmat, Taha Mhammed Ahmed, is hit by a stray bullet while walking in the garden f the Sudanese Embassy in Baghdad. Nvember 9, 2005: Hammuda Ahmed Adam, a Sudanese Embassy emplyee was killed by unknwn gunmen while driving in the Mansur district f Baghdad. Nvember 12, 2005: Insurgents attacked the Omani Embassy in Baghdad, killing an Iraqi plice fficer and an embassy emplyee. Nvember 20, 2005: The US military annunced it had arrested five terrrists suspected f pltting t attack the Italian Embassy in Baghdad. December 23, 2005: Gunmen kidnapped a Sudanese diplmat and five ther men as they left a msque in Baghdad. As is evident frm the examples listed abve, insurgents have repeatedly singled ut envys frm Arab and Muslim cuntries in their attacks. Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia s strategy appears t be aimed at driving representatives f these cuntries frm Iraq in rder t weaken the new Iraqi gvernment and t divide US allies. In a statement released n Nvember 3, the rganizatin called n diplmats in Baghdad t pack their bags and leave r face certain death. 345 The statement, signed by the military wing f Al Qa'ida in the Land f the Tw Rivers, read: We are renewing ur threat t thse s-called diplmatic missins wh have insisted n staying in Baghdad and have nt yet realized the repercussins f such a challenge t the will f the mujahedeen. 346 Al Qa'ida's strategy has, hwever, had sme success. The Philippine Embassy in Baghdad relcated its staff t Jrdan after the July 2005 attacks n Algerian and Egyptian diplmats. The previus summer, the Philippine gvernment granted insurgent s demands and withdrew its peacekeeping cntingent frm Iraq in

138 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 106 rder t secure the safe release f a Filipin hstage. The kidnapping f Angel de la Cruz in July 2004 led Manila t issue a ban n its citizens wrking in Iraq. The gvernment re-issued the ban in Nvember 2005, after tw Filipin cntract wrkers were killed in Iraq. 347 On December 23, gunmen kidnapped six Sudanese natinals, including five embassy emplyees. The men were captured while leaving a msque in Baghdad. Abdel Mnem al-huri, the embassy s secnd secretary, was amng the hstages. Al Qa'ida in Iraq claimed respnsibility in an Internet statement n December 29 and demanded that Khartum break ff all diplmatic relatins with Iraq immediately. The Sudanese gvernment clsed its embassy in Baghdad and withdrew its diplmats the fllwing day. On December 31, insurgents released the five Sudanese diplmats. 348 These attacks limit the ability f the elected gvernment t establish internatinal legitimacy and credibility. Gvernments whse persnnel suffer an attack may nt have the will t cntinue t pursue relatins in the face f dmestic discntent ver any casualties and the Iraq war in general, as was the case with the Philippines. Such attacks can make the Iraqi gvernment lk pwerless. While there were as many as 40 diplmatic missins in Iraq as f late 2005, several cuntries have been hesitant t send ambassadrs t Baghdad. At least tw f Iraq s neighbrs, Jrdan and Saudi Arabia, have pstpned ding s until the security situatin in the cuntry imprves. 349 Kidnap, kill, and/r intimidate wmen and cadres f freign wrkers: Killing and kidnapping wmen, particularly thse wrking in NGOs and aid prjects gets great media attentin and leads sme rganizatins t leave the cuntry. Kidnapping r killing grups f freign wrkers puts plitical pressure n their gvernments, gets high lcal and reginal media attentin, and smetimes leads gvernments t stp their wrkers frm ging t Iraq. Cunts f kidnappings in Iraq, and analyses f respnsibility, are necessarily uncertain and sharply undercunt the number f kidnappings f Iraqis many f which are never reprted. An analysis f kidnappings frm April 1, 2004 t January 31, 2005 shwed, hwever, that there were 264 freign civilian kidnappings. Sme 47 were killed, 56 remained missing, 150 were released, five escaped, and a ttal f six were rescued. Given the fact there were sme 100,000 expatriates in Iraq at the time, this meant a rughly 1 in 380 chance f being kidnapped, and rughly 20% f the freigners kidnapped were killed r beheaded. 350 In Nvember f 2005, the New Yrk Times reprted that f the mre than 200 freigners wh had been abducted since the start f the war, several dzen had been killed and at least twenty were still missing. When US trps entered Fallujah in Nvember f 2004 they discvered bunkers where captives had been held and trtured. After Fallujah, hwever, the number f freign kidnappings drpped significantly. 351 Anther estimate f freigners kidnapped in Iraq placed the ttal at 268 at the end f January Of thse, 44 were killed, 135 were released, 3 escaped, 3 were rescued and the status f 81 were unknwn. 352 The kidnapping f freigners by insurgents returned in the fall f In late Octber, tw Mrccans were kidnapped by insurgents and held hstage. The fllwing mnth, fur aid wrkers, tw Canadians, a Britn and an American, were als kidnapped. A grup calling itself Swrds f Truth issued a claim f respnsibility, saying the fur were spies f the ccupying frces. 353 Als in Nvember, tw Filipin cntract wrkers were killed in a bmbing f their cnvy and a German archaelgist was kidnapped. On December 5, gunmen abducted a French engineer in Baghdad. Less than a week later, n December 9, insurgents kidnapped and killed an Egyptian engineer in Tikrit. 354 Camille Nassif Tannus, a Lebanese engineer was kidnapped n December 29 but was released three days later. 355 Accrding t the Lebanese gvernment, sme 50 Lebanese wrking fr private firms have been kidnapped since the 2003 US-led invasin f Iraq. While mst were released after the payment f ransms, at least five were killed by their captrs. 356 In January, Jill Carrll, a reprter fr the Christian Science Mnitr, was kidnapped n her way t an interview with a Sunni plitician. Several days later a tape by her captrs aired n al-jazeera demanding the release f Iraqi wmen prisners and threatened t kill Ms. Carrll if their demands were nt met in 72 hurs. Althugh the U.S. indicated that it was planning t release these prisners, it denied that the actin had any relatin t the insurgents' demands. Despite this, subsequent tapes were aired by Carrll s captrs, again, calling fr the release f all Iraqi wmen in custdy. Tw German engineers were als kidnapped frm their hmes during the same mnth.

139 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 107 Expand the fighting utside Iraq: In an interview with ABC News in mid-nvember, Iraq s Interir Minister Bayan Jabr said he believed Zarqawi might be planning ut-f-area peratins. Jabr said his ministry had uncvered infrmatin that Al Qa ida in Mesptamia was planning at least tw ther attacksne in Yemen and the ther in Egypt--against freigners and Americans. Jabr als claimed that freigners had been recruited t cme t Iraq in rder t receive training s that they culd return t their hme cuntries t carry ut attacks. A few days later, US Army Maj. Gen. William Webster, whse 3 rd Infantry Divisin is respnsible fr security in Baghdad, said he believed it a distinct pssibility that insurgents were training in Iraq fr attacks in ther cuntries. 357 It is nt clear exactly when Zarqawi and ther insurgents began t cnsider attacking targets utside Iraq, r when actual attempts began. Zarqawi, a Jrdanian, began t attack targets in Jrdan lng befre he went t Iraq. In late 1999, he rganized attacks n the Radissn SAS htel in Amman and Jewish and Christian religius targets. In Octber 2002, his fllwers killed Laurence Fley, as US diplmat assigned t the US Embassy in Amman. He seems t have played a rle in the bmbing f the Jrdanian Embassy in Baghdad in August There are sme indicatins that Zarqawi s grup began planning and attempting such attacks in late Jrdan reprted that a Zarqawi agent named Azmi al-jayusi led a cell that attempted t carry ut a massive explsive and chemical attack n the US Embassy, the headquarters f the Jrdanian General Intelligence Directrate, ffice f the prime minister and ther targets in Amman in mid-april Sme surces say Jrdan disrupted further attack attempts after that time, including a rcket attack n a US warship in Aqaba earlier in One senir Jrdanian surce claimed that Jrdan had filed tw attacks in 2003, eight in 2004, and 10 in Zarqawi was the first majr insurgent leader t penly threaten t expand the fighting t freign cuntries, althugh his pen statements nly began t get serius publicity in the summer f Jrdanian intelligence reprted that it had intercepted signals that Zarqawi had rdered sme f his fighters t leave Iraq t carry ut attacks in ther Arab and Islamic cuntries in Octber Sme experts believe the July 23, 2005 Sharm el-sheik bmbings signaled the expansin f Zarqawi s netwrk beynd Iraq. But the bmbings at the Red Sea resrt, which killed at least 88 and wunded mre than 150, appear t have been the wrk f Egyptian radical Islamists. Three grups--the Abdullah Azzam Brigades ; Tawhid and Jihad Grup in Egypt and the Hly Warrirs f Egypt -- claimed respnsibility fr the bmbings. Althugh all three are believed t have ties t Al Qa ida, there is n evidence t suggest Zarqawi was directly invlved in the attack. On Nvember 9, 2005, Zarqawi s peratin in Iraq carried ut three suicide bmbings f US wned htels in Amman. The attackers specifically targeted Jrdanians -- including a large wedding party and killed at least 60 peple frm sme six different cuntries and wunded mre than 100. Only a few Americans were killed r hurt in the attacks n the Radissn, Grand Hyatt and Days Inn. The casualties als included fur Palestinian fficials, ne f wh was Lt. General Bashir Nafe, the head f West Bank security. Kidnap, kill, and/r intimidate prfessinals, Iraqi media and intelligentsia, and cnduct mystery killings: Steady killing and intimidatin f individual prfessinals, media figures, and intelligentsia in threatened areas ffers a series f sft targets that cannt be defended, but where a cumulative pattern f killing and intimidatin makes gvernance difficult, creates majr prblems fr security and plice frces, weakens the ecnmy, and exacerbates the general feeling f insecurity t the pint where peple lse faith in the Iraqi gvernment, Calitin, and plitical prcess. Accrding t the head f Iraqi Jurnalists Syndicate, Shihab al-tamimi, kidnappings and assassinatins targeting Iraqi jurnalists surged in the weeks leading up t the January 30 electin. 359 The US State Department reprt n Human Rights fr 2004 states that the Ministry f Human Rights claimed that at least 80 prfessrs and 50 physicians were assassinated during Reprters Withut Brders nted that 31 jurnalists and media assistants were killed during the year. Universities als suffered frm a wave f kidnappings. Researchers, prfessrs, administratrs, and students were all victims, including sme wh disappeared withut a trace. 360 Accrding t the Iraqi newspaper Al-Mashriq, mre than 3000 Iraqi dctrs have left the cuntry in rder t save their lives since the start f the insurgency. 361

140 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 108 In September 2005, a lcal Iraqi newspaper reprted that after dctrs and university prfessrs, bakers had becme the mst ppular target amng insurgents in Iraq. In ne 48-hur perid, insurgents killed ten bakers in Baghdad alne. A number f bakeries were frced t clse after receiving threats frm insurgents. 362 Beginning in the fall f 2005, there were signs that insurgents had selected a new target: teachers. Up until that time, teachers had largely been spared the vilence inflicted upn ther ccupatins. In late September Sunni insurgents dressed as Iraqi plice fficers strmed the Jazeera primary schl in Muwelha, a Sunni suburb f Iskandariya, killing five teachers and their driver. 363 The attack raised fears amng many Iraqis that insurgents wuld nw begin t target Iraqi schls. A few days later, n September 29, gunmen pened fire n a mini-bus transprting teachers in the Al-Mansuriyah district f Baquba, killing ne and wunding several. 364 On Octber 9, gunmen entered a schl in Samarra and executed a teacher in frnt f students and ther teachers. 365 In all f the incidents, the teachers were Shi ites, leaving many t believe that the attacks were mtivated by sectarian vilence rather than insurgent hstility tward their prfessin. A number f schls, many in Shi ite neighbrhds, have respnded t the wave f attacks by erecting security barriers and hiring guards. 366 On Octber 20, a mrtar hit a public schl in the al-mansur neighbrhd f Baghdad, killing ne student and wunding fur thers. 367 Attacks n schls, hwever, are still relatively rare. University prfessrs have als becme ppular targets fr insurgents. In a five-day perid in late Nvember 2005 five university prfessrs were killed, three f them in greater Baghdad area. 368 In March 2005, the Ministry f Higher Educatin and Scientific Research said that 89 university prfessrs had been killed since teachers were allegedly murdered between December 2005 and March Academics themselves estimated that up t 105 f their clleagues have been assassinated. 369 Kidnap Iraqi prfessinals fr ransm and extrt lcal businesses: Insurgents, lcal gangs and militias ften turned t intimidatin and extrtin f dctrs and ther well paid prfessinals in rder t raise funds. In return they, ften wuld ffer prtectin. This risked creating a brain drain in which sme f the mst qualified and highly trained prfessinals began leaving Iraq fr neighbring cuntries. 370 By the end f March 2006, Iraqi plice said that as many as 30 peple are reprted kidnapped every day. 371 It is likely that many kidnappings g unrecrded hwever, as families prefer t pay the ransm rather than invlve the plice wh may be invlved in the abductin. Often these individuals are kidnapped fr ransms between $20,000 and $30, In ne instance, a British-trained surgen received a phne call at his practice frm the Mujahideen wh asked fr a dnatin t help ur cause. They made a suggestin f 10,000 dllars in exchange fr prtectin. The dctr, given tw days t cllect the mney, fled t Jrdan when he received a text message threatening his life. 373 In anther case, men claiming t be frm an anti-terrrist squad walked int a medical supply stre and remved 40,000 dllars frm the safe. They prceeded t kidnap the wner s sn and detained him until the family paid 40,000 dllars, nly a fractin f the 250,000 dllars they riginally demanded. 374 A Shi ite resident and wner f a mini-market in Msul said that while he had nt received any threats, tw f his friends were abducted and later killed because the family culd nt affrd t pay the ransm. 375 A string f these kidnappings and assaults happened in March: 376 March 8, 2006: 50 emplyees are abducted frm a Baghdad security cmpany. March 27, 2006: Gunmen in military unifrms kidnapped 16 peple frm an Iraqi exprt cmpany in central Baghdad. March 28, 2006: In three separate incidents, gunmen, many in military unifrms wearing masks, kidnapped 24 peple frm tw electrnics stres and a currency exchange stealing thusands f dllars in the prcess. March 29, 2006: Gunmen identifying themselves as MOI plice entered the ffices f a cnstructin firm and lined up the emplyees, killing 8. They abducted the manager and fled the scene.

141 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 109 In ne day in March, 21 peple were abducted in fur separate incidents. 15 men dressed as members f the Iraqi Army dragged six peple ut f a mney exchange shp and stle almst 60,000 dlllars. In tw ther similar events, men wearing MOI unifrms kidnapped individuals frm tw electrnics shps. 377 A jint U.S.-Iraqi raid in late March, allegedly n a Shi ite msque, resulted in the rescue f ne Iraqi hstage wh had been threatened with trture and death by militiamen if his family did nt pay 20, The identity f the attackers is almst impssible t distinguish. Sme claimed t be Mujahideen insurgents, thers Iraqi security frces. The MOI denied widespread claims that its sldiers had been invlved in these attacks and instead suggested that the perpetratrs were insurgents r freign terrrists wh had btained MOI and army unifrms. Kill and kidnap Iraqi gvernment fficials, plitical leaders, religius figures and heads f the plice, military and security frces: Targeted plitical assassinatins als appeared t be n the rise in the summer and fall f Ppular targets include lcal plitical and religius leaders, the heads f lcal plice frces and ministry fficials frm Baghdad. Fr the mnth f August, these attacks included: 379 August 1, 2005: In Baghdad, gunmen strm the huse f Haider Mhammed Ali al-dujaili, an aide t Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi, and kill him. August 3, 2005: Gunmen kill General Abdel Salam Rauf Saleh, the head f the Interir Ministry s cmmand unit. Als in Baghdad, gunmen kill a plice clnel and tw finance ministry emplyees. August 4, 2005: In Diyala, gunmen kill the directr f planning fr the regin. August 8, 2005: In Baghdad, gunmen assassinate tw fficials frm the Oil Ministry and wund tw thers. August 9, 2005: Gunmen assassinate Abbas Ibrahim Mhammed, an Iraqi Cabinet emplyee, in Baghdad. August 10, 2005: Gunmen kidnap Brig. General Khudayer Abbas, head f administrative affairs fr the Ministry f the Interir. August 14, 2005: In Baghdad, gunmen kidnap Husam Kazim Juwayid, general manager f the central bank. August 15, 2005: Gunmen assassinate Muhammad Husayn, a member f the municipal cuncil f Al- Khalis. A failed assassinatin attempt is carried ut n Iraqi Vice-President Adil Ab-al-Mahdi in Al- Azim. August 16, 2005: Gunmen attack and wund several bdyguards f frmer Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi August 17, 2005: Gunmen assassinate Ali al-shimmari, a lcal imam and a member f the Assciatin f Muslim Schlars, in nrtheastern Baghdad. August 18, 2005: Unknwn gunmen assassinate Jasim Waheeb, a Baghdad judge. August 19, 2005: Insurgents in Msul gun dwn three members f the Iraqi Islamic Party, the cuntry s largest Sunni party. Gunmen kill Aswad al-ali, an Arab member f a lcal cuncil near Kirkuk. August 25, 2005: Insurgents attack the cnvy f Iraqi president Jalal Talabani suth f Tuz Khrmat killing tw bdyguards and wunding three thers August 26, 2005: In Msul, gunmen kill Jiyam Hussein, the leader f the lcal Refrm Party. Gunmen assassinate an Iraqi plice fficer in nrtheast Baghdad August 27, 2005: Insurgents kill Lt. Cl. Mhammed Salih in Kirkuk. Als in Kirkuk, gunmen kill Lt. Cl. Muhammad Fakhri Abdullah. August 29, 2005: Gunmen kill Brig. Gen. Numan Salman Faris, directr f the rapid respnse team fr Baghdad s Azamiyah district.

142 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 110 Perids f relative calm culd be fllwed by sudden escalatins. Fr example, in ne twenty-fur hur perid in late September 2005, insurgents assassinated Clnel Fadil Mahmud Muhammad, the head f Diyala s Plice Cmmand; killed fur wrkers frm the Ministry f Displacement and Migratin in Baghdad; and carried ut ther assassinatins in Baquba, Ramadi, Latifiyah and Msul. 380 On Octber 30, gunmen assassinated Ghalib Abdul Mahdi, adviser t the cabinet f Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari and brther f Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi. Madhi was being driven t wrk in Baghdad by his driver when the tw were ambushed and killed. Gunmen struck again later in the day, wunding the deputy trade minister, Qais Dawd al-hassan. 381 Such attacks, attempts by the insurgents t weaken the new gvernment, are becming mre frequent. Attack thse invlved in the trial f Saddam Hussein and ther Ba ath leaders: In what appears t be a new twist in plitical assassinatins, gunmen have begun t target thse invlved in the trial f frmer regime fficials like Saddam Hussein. On Octber 20, ne day after the start f the trial in Baghdad, gunmen assassinated Saadn al-janabi. Al-Janabi had been defending Awad al-bandar, a frmer Ba'ath Party fficial. Tw weeks later, n Nvember 8, gunmen killed Adel al-zubeidi, the lawyer fr frmer Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan. Al-Zubeidi was riding in his car in the Sunni neighbrhd f Adil in western Baghdad when insurgents sprayed the car with bullets, injuring anther attrney, Thamir al-khuzaie in the prcess. In respnse t the attacks, mre than 1,100 Iraqi lawyers withdrew frm Saddam Hussein s defense team n Nvember 12. The attrneys had earlier said they wuld nt return t curt until security was stepped up and reaffirmed their intentin nt t return t curt n Nvember 28 when the trial was scheduled t resume. In the statement they released, the attrneys said they withdrew because there was n respnse frm the Iraqi gvernment, US frces and internatinal rganizatins t ur demands fr prviding prtectin t the lawyers and their families. 382 Many f the lawyers have rejected the Interir Ministry s ffer t supply them with bdyguards, claiming the Shi ite-led plice and security frces are behind many f the plitical assassinatins. 383 Iraqi plice arrested eight Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk n Nvember 26, tw days befre Saddam s trial was scheduled t resume in Baghdad. The men were accused f pltting t assassinate Raed Juhi, ne f the judges wh prepared the case against Saddam. When tld f the threat n his life, Juhi said: As an Iraqi citizen and a judge, I am vulnerable t assassinatin attempts If I thught abut this danger, then I wuld nt be able t perfrm my jb I will practice my prfessin in a way that serves my cuntry and satisfies my cnscience. 384 In a February 2006 reprt t Cngress, the Department f Defense highlighted the threats t judges in general and the security measures taken by the Calitin t attempt and prtect them: Intimidatin f judges by insurgents severely affects the rule f law in Iraq. Twenty-nine secure husing units inside the prtected Internatinal Zne have recently been made available t judges living in the Baghdad area. Eight CCCI (The Central Criminal Curt f Iraq) judges have access t up-armred vehicles, and 33 CCI judges have trained private security details at their cnstant dispsal. 385 Hrrr attacks, atrcities, and alienatin: Whether r nt the tactics were initially deliberate, insurgents in Iraq fund that atrcities like desecrating crpses and beheadings are effective plitical and psychlgical weapns fr thse Islamist extremists whse gal is t divide the West frm the Islamic wrld, and create an unbridgeable clash f civilizatins. Experts have lng pinted ut that ne f the key differences between Islamist extremist terrrism and previus frms f terrrism is that they are nt seeking t negtiate with thse they terrrize, but rather t create cnditins that can drive the West ut f the Middle East, undermine secular and mderate regimes in the Arab and Islamic wrlds, and establish the cnditins under which they can create Islamic states accrding t their wn ideas f Puritanism. This is why it serves the purpses f Islamist extremists, as well as sme f the mre fcused ppnents f the US and the West, t create mass casualties and carry ut majr strikes, r carry ut executins and beheadings, even if the result is t prvke hstility and anger. The gal f Bin Laden and thse like him is nt t persuade the US r the West, it is rather t s alienate them frm the Islamic and Arab wrld that the frces f secularism in the regin will be sharply undermined, and Western influence can be cntrlled r

143 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 111 eliminated. The gal f mst Iraqi insurgents is narrwer drive the US and its allies ut f Iraq but invlves many f the same methds. Seen in this cntext, the mre hrrifying the attack, the better. Simple casualties d nt receive the same media attentin. They are a reality f war. Killing (r smetimes releasing) inncent hstages des grab the attentin f the wrld media. Large bmbs in crwds d the same, as des picking targets whse inncence r media impact grabs headlines. Desecrating crpses, beheading peple, and similar acts f vilence get even mre media attentin at least fr a while. Such actins als breed anger and alienatin in the US and the West and prvke excessive plitical and media reactins, mre stringent security measures, vilent respnses, and all f the ther actins that help instigate a clash f civilizatins. The US and the West are ften prvked int playing int the hands f such attackers. At the same time, any attack r incident that garners massive media cverage and plitical reactins appears t be a victry t thse wh supprt Islamist extremism r thse wh are truly angry at the US even thugh the actual bdy cunt is ften lw, and victry des nt mean creating strnger frces r winning plitical cntrl. Each such incident can be used t damage the US and Western view f the Arab and Islamic wrlds. Tw incidents in particular, bth invlving the murder and mutilatin f US cntractrs, deserve special mentin. On March 31, 2004, insurgents in Fallujah attacked tw SUVs carrying fur civilian cntractrs charged with prviding security fr fd cnvys in the area. The insurgents attacked the vehicles with rcket-prpelled grenades and small arms fire befre pulling the bdies frm the burning vehicles and dragging them thrugh the street. Several f the bdies were mutilated and tw were strung up n a nearby bridge while lcal crwds chanted, Fallujah is the graveyard f Americans. Ftage f the burned and mutilated crpses was bradcast arund the wrld. 386 The brutality f the attack drew cmparisns t a similar incident in Mgadishu a decade earlier when American sldiers were dragged thrugh the streets by angry mbs. 387 Experts like Jhn Pike f GlbalSecurity.rg said the cmparisn t the 1993 attack was spt-n and suggested the Mgadishu attack prbably served as an inspiratin fr the Fallujah attack: They knew hw t stage that. They are trying t frighten Americans. They want t frighten us ut f Iraq It was premeditated, planned, skillfully staged terrrism. They knw the degree f dread it will inflict in American family members. 388 In July, after a three-week siege f Fallujah by US Marines, a militant grup calling itself the Islamic Army in Iraq claimed respnsibility fr the attack. 389 A similar incident ccurred n September 20, 2005, when insurgents attacked a cnvy f US cntractrs nrth f Baghdad. The cnvy, which included US military guards, came under attack after making a wrng turn in the largely Sunni city f Duluiyah, 45 miles nrth f Baghdad. Insurgents pened gunfire n the cnvy, killing fur and wunding tw. 390 The British newspaper The Daily Telegraph brke the stry mre than a mnth later, with a grisly accunt f the attack. The paper described hw the insurgents dragged tw cntractrs frm their truck and frced them t kneel, [k]illing ne f the men with a rifle rund fired int the back f his head, they dused the ther with petrl and set him alight. Bareft children, yelping in delight, piled straw n the screaming man s bdy t stke the flames. Afterwards, a crwd dragged the crpses thrugh the street, chanting anti-us slgans. 391 The military did nt cnfirm the attack (in fact, n mentin f it seems t have appeared befre the Telegraph accunt,) until Octber 22, and said nly it was investigating the incident. In 2005, insurgents began adpting a new hrrr tactic, targeting funeral prcessins. These attacks included: 392 March 10, 2005: A suicide bmber struck a Shi ite msque during a funeral in Msul. March 12, 2005: Gunmen killed three Iraqi plice fficers as they drive t a clleague s funeral in Msul. May 1, 2005: A car bmb detnated next t a tent crwded with murners fr the funeral f a Kurdish fficial in Tal Afar, killing 25 peple and wunding mre than 50.

144 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 112 July 2, 2005: A bmb went ff in a lcal market in Mahmudiya, suth f Baghdad. The attack, which killed tw and wunded 10, ccurred minutes after the funeral prcessin f Sheik Kamaleddin passed by. Octber 5, 2005: A bmb explded utside the Shi ite Husseiniyat Ibn al-nama msque in Hillah, killing 25 and wunding 87. Amng the victims were murners attending a funeral service fr a lcal restaurant wner killed by insurgents tw days earlier. Nvember 19, 2005: A suicide bmber killed at least 36 peple and wunded 50 mre in a Shi ite funeral prcessin nrth f Baghdad. January 4, 2006: A suicide bmber struck a Shi ite funeral east f Baquba, killing 37 peple and wunding 45 thers. These attacks, the majrity f which targeted Shi ites, received a lt f media attentin. After the January 2006 bmbing, UN Secretary-General Kfi Annan released a statement saying he was appalled by the suicide bmbing. Annan als cndemned the crime, saying it targeted inncent civilians in ttal disrespect fr human life and dignity. The Secretary-General urged all parties t cme tgether and refrain frm vilence that culd undermine the cuntry s recent demcratic prgress. 393 Bdy dumps: Bdy dumps became a variatin f hrrr attacks and atrcities. It has becme increasingly difficult t determine wh is respnsible fr bdy dumps, and there are clear indicatins that the number f Shi'ites killing Sunnis increased steadily in 2005, just as Sunni insurgents increased their killings f Shi'ites. It is clear, hwever, the bdies f Iraqi frces, pr-gvernment Iraqis, and ther Iraqis that have n links t Shi'ite attacks have been dumped in rivers, sccer stadiums, and ther public places where they were fund withut any clear picture as t wh had killed them r why. In mid March 2005, fr example, sme 80 bdies were fund in fur dumps in Iraq, many f wh were plice fficers and sldiers. 394 Other ntable discveries in late 2005 included: 395 April 20, 2005: 100 bdies were retrieved frm the Tigris River, near the twn f Madain. April 22, 2005: The bdies f 19 Iraqi sldiers were fund near Beiji. May 15, 2005: The bdies f 38 men sht executin-style were discvered at an abandned chicken farm, west f Baghdad. May 28, 2005: The mutilated bdies f 10 Iraqi Shi'ite Muslim pilgrims were funding the desert near the twn f Qaim. June 10, 2005: The bdies f 16 peple were discvered in western Iraq. June 12, 2005: Plice discver 28 bdies in and arund Baghdad. August 14, 2005: Captured insurgents lead Iraqi plice t a grave cntaining 30 bdies in suthern Baghdad. August 25, 2005: Iraqi plice discver 36 bdies in sutheastern Baghdad. September 3, 2005: Plice discver three bdies in the Tigris River, nrth f Baghdad. September 5, 2005: The bdies f three lcal pliticians were fund in Tal Afar. September 8, 2005: Plice discver 14 bdies near Mahmudiyah. September 9, 2005: The bdies f 10 decapitated Iraqis were fund. September 12, 2005: Plice in Baghdad discver the bdies f 10 Iraqi men. September 17, 2005: A ttal f 11 bdies, handcuffed and blindflded, were fund arund the cuntry. September 18, 2005: 20 bdies were pulled frm the Tigris River, nrth f Baghdad. September 22, 2005: The bdies f 10 Iraqis were discvered in Msul. September 28, 2005: The bdies f seven Sunni men frm Hurriya were fund in Shula. Octber 3, 2005: Three bdies were fund in Baghdad.

145 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 113 Octber 7, 2005: The bdies f 22 executed Sunnis are discvered in Badra, near the brder with Iran. Octber 11, 2005: A US Army patrl in Tikrit discvers three bdies with multiple gunsht wunds. Octber 26, 2005: The bdies f nine Iraqi brder guards are fund in Karbala. Octber 27, 2005: The bdies f 17 Sunnis are fund in Al-Nasiriyah Gvernrate. Octber 30, 2005: Iraqi plice discver 14 bdies near Tal Afar. The victims appeared t have been killed between ne and three mnths ag. Nvember 10, 2005: Iraqi sldiers discver the bdies f 27 executed civilians near the brder with Iran. Nvember 14, 2005: Fur bdies are discvered in nrthern Baghdad. Nvember 27, 2005: The bdies f three Iraqi sldiers were discvered in the Baghdad slum f Habibya. December 27, 2005: Iraqi authrities discvered the remains f 31 peple in a mass grave in Karbala. The remains were believed t be frm the 1991 Gulf War. December 31, 2005: The bdies f five Iraqis were fund in suthern Baghdad. Fur bdies had been dumped in a river, and the fifth, half-trtured, was fund in an rchard. As the list shws, mst f the bdy dumps have been fund in the greater Baghdad area. Sme 300 mass graves have been discvered since the fall f the Saddam Hussein regime in March Accrding t the Assciated Press, at least 204 f the 566 bdies that have been fund since the interim gvernment was frmed n April 28 were discvered in Baghdad. Althugh the identities f mst victims are unknwn, the Assciated Press has identified 116 Sunnis, 43 Shi ites and ne Kurd amng the victims. 397 The frequency f these discveries appeared t increase in the run-up t the Octber electin. Bdy dumps cntinued in Plitical leaders, frmer Ba'ath Party members and plice recruits were cmmn victims. On January 2, 2006, fficials discvered eight unidentified bdies inside a water purificatin plant in Rustimiyah, suth f Baghdad. 398 Fur days later, n January 6, Iraqi plice stumbled upn 10 bdies in Baghdad. 399 January 17, 2006: The bdies f Cl. Hussein Shi'ite, cmmander f the 2 nd Battalin f the Iraqi Army s 4 th Brigade and his brther were fund bund and sht in the head in western Baghdad's dangerus al-baiyaa district. They were abducted the previus Sunday in Mahmudiya. January 18, 2006: Seven Shi ites were fund murdered in this fashin in Wahdah. 25 bdies were discvered in Nibaei. 25 bdies were discvered in Nibaei. January 20, 2006: Plice said they had fund seven additinal bdies in Dujail. January 21, 2006: Iraqi authrities fund the bullet-riddled bdies f Iraqi cmmand fficer Ali Hussein in an pen field and frmer Ba'ath Party member Abdun Hamid in a playgrund near Karbala. January 22, 2006: The bdies f the 23 men were fund partially buried near Dujail, abut 50 miles nrth f Baghdad. They had been abducted Wednesday while traveling frm Baghdad t their hmes in Samarra after failing t be accepted at a plice recruit center. In the central city f Mashru, plice fund the bdies f tw blindflded men wh had been sht in the head and chest. The bdies f prminent Sunni Arab tribal leader, Sayid Ibrahim Ali, 75, and his 28-year-ld sn, Ayad, were fund in a field near Hawija, 150 miles nrth f Baghdad. January 23, 2006: The bdies f eight Sunni Arabs were fund in a field nrth f Baghdad five days after they were seized n their way hme by bus after being rejected fr admissin t the plice academy. January 26, 2006: Plice fund fur bund and blindflded bdies riddled with bullet hles in Mahmudiya, abut 20 miles suth f Baghdad. January 28, 2006: Plice fund the buried bdies f six labrers wh had been bund, gagged and sht in the head suth f the suthern city f Karbala.

146 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 114 January 31, 2006: In Baghdad, plice fund the bdies f 11 handcuffed, blindflded men inside a truck near the Ghazaliyah district f western Baghdad. Three ther bdies were fund in Baghdad's Rustamiyah area. February 4, 2006: The bullet-riddled bdies f 14 Sunni Arab men purprtedly seized by plice a week ag were fund dumped in Baghdad. February 16, 2006: The bdies f 12 men were fund dead, sht executin style in the head. After the February 22 attack n a sacred Shi ite shrine, the wave f sectarian killings that fllwed marked an increase in bth the frequency f bdy dumps, and the numbers f bdies discvered in each instance. These ften included Iraqi s wh were nt members f the plice, military r security frces, but rather civilian Shi ites r Sunnis. February 23, 2006: At least 47 bdies were fund scattered acrss Iraq late Wednesday and early Thursday, many f them sht executin-style and dumped in Shi ite-dminated parts f the capital. The individuals, bth Shi ites and Sunnis, were frced frm their vehicles n the way t a prtest and sht. February 24, 2006: Plice fund at least 27 bdies in Baghdad and ther cities and twns. February 25, 2006: 11 bdies were discvered in varius lcatins acrss Baghdad. February 28, 2006: Authrities in Baqubah this mrning discvered nine bdies, each sht in the head. The number f bdy dumps increased in March. By the end f the mnth, ver 385 peple were assassinated. The ttal, if including the last six days in February, was at least March 7, 2006: Plice said they fund the handcuffed bdies f 18 men in the back f a carg truck abandned n a radside in Baghdad's Amariya district, a Sunni Arab neighbrhd. Anther 18 bdies were washed up int a water treatment facility. March 8, 2006: Iraqi plice fund the bdies f fur handcuffed and hanged men in an pen field in east Baghdad. Anther bdy, sht in the head, was fund near a shp in an eastern suburb. March 11, 2006: Authrities discvered nine bdies arund the capital, each handcuffed and with bullet wunds t the head. March 14, 2006: Plice fund a 6-by-8-yard hle in an empty field. It cntained at least 27 dead men mst f them in their underwear in Kamaliyah, a mstly Shi ite east Baghdad suburb. An abandned minibus cntaining 15 bdies was fund n the main rad between tw mstly Sunni neighbrhds in west Baghdad. At least 40 mre bdies were discvered in varius parts f Baghdad, including bth Sunni and Shi ite neighbrhds. By the fllwing day it was reprted that 87 bdies were fund in the past 24 hurs. March 16, 2006: At least 25 bdies were fund sht executin style acrss the capital. March 17, 2006: Plice in a Shiite area f east Baghdad fund the bdies f fur Sunni men wh had been seized frm a taxi by masked gunmen the day befre in western Baghdad. March 18, 2006: In Baghdad a dzen bdies were fund. March 19, 2006: The bdies f 17 men trtured r sht t death were fund in Baghdad, 11 f them flushed by city sewers int the tanks f water-purificatin plants. March 20, 2006: Plice fund the bdies f at least 15 peple including a 13-year-ld girl dumped arund Baghdad. March 22, 2006: Plice discvered eight mre blindflded crpses in west Baghdad, sme f them shwing signs f trture. In Suwera, fur mre crpses were fund n the bank f the Tigris River. March 23, 2006: 3 bdies were fund in Baghdad and 8 in Fallujah. March 24, 2006: 13 executed bdies were discvered in Bink, Kasmiyah and Sadr City neighbrhds.

147 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 115 March 25, 2006: tw mre bdies were fund in the capital, sht in the head with their hands and feet bund. March 26, 2006: 10 bdies were fund blindflded, bund and sht in Baghadad, and 30 decapitated crpses were fund in Baquba. March 27, 2006: 12 bdies were fund in suthwestern Baghdad. 9 bdies were fund in west Baghdad handcuffed, blindflded and with rpes arund their necks. March 28, 2006: 17 bdies were discvered in Baghdad, all handcuffed and sht in the head. March 30, 2006: In Ramadi, three wrkers frm a lcal hspital were fund blindflded and sht. Al- Qaeda in Iraq claimed respnsibility fr the deaths and left a nt n the bdies claiming that the men were hmsexuals. March 31, 2006: plice fund five bdies scattered acrss the city. Three f thse were fund in Sadr City with signs f trture. 24 bdies f yung men handcuffed and shwing signs f trture were fund in Amiriyah. April 2, 2006: Nearly 40 bdies were fund in several neighbrhds surrunding Baghdad. April 4, 2006: 4 bdies were discvered, executed, in Baghdad. April 6, 2006: In Kirkuk, plice discvered a headless bdy they believe belnged t a Kurdish man kidnapped the previus night. 4 bdies were fund handcuffed and blindflded, in Baghdad's suthern Dra district. Deprive the central, reginal, and lcal gvernments effrts t expand legitimacy. Attack natinbuilding and stability targets: There is nthing new abut attacking key ecnmic targets, infrastructure, and aspects f gvernance critical t the functining f the state in an effrt t disrupt its ecnmy, undermine law enfrcement and security, and encurage instability. Iraqi insurgent and Islamist attacks n aid wrkers and prjects, and their rle in encuraging lting, sabtage and theft did, hwever, demnstrate a grwing sphisticatin in targeting stability effrts and tangible prgress in aid and gvernance. These tactics als interact synergistically with the abve tactics. Seek t create sanctuaries like Fallujah and the river areas in Al Anbar, Ninevah, and Msul Prvinces; and t take shelter in msques, shrines, and high value targets, and targets with high cultural impact: Again, expliting facilities f religius, cultural, and plitical sensitivity is nt a new tactic. Hwever, as peratins against Sadr and in Fallujah have shwn, the tactics raise the media prfile, create a defensive deterrent, and can be explited t make the US seem anti-islamic r t be attacking a culture and nt a mvement. Areas like msques are als used by insurgents t cnduct meetings and serve as sanctuaries by allwing them t give rders face t face withut having t wrry abut a U.S. presence. 401 Fr example in April 2006, Marines n patrl in Ramadi encuntered fire frm a msque minaret and were frced t use a tank t destry part f the structure where the insurgents were hled up. It marked the furth time in a threeweek perid that attacks had emanated frm the msque. 402 In anther instance a jint US-Iraqi raid n a suspected insurgent hideut, was prtrayed in the Iraqi media as an assault n a msque, which killed 16 wrshippers. The msque was marked n the utside by a sign that read Al-Mustafa Husayniyah. Husayniyah is a Shi ite term fr a religius center r a cmmunity center that may als huse ffices fr plitical purpses. Thus, althugh the cmplex did nt have many f the traditinal characteristics f a msque, it was cnsidered t be n by the Shi ites nnetheless. 403 Regardless f whether the facility was a msque, a prayer rm, r neither, the peratin had damaging plitical effects. In a different case, driving insurgent cells ut f Iraq s cities in 2004 led them t mve int Al Anbar Prvince in the West, and t seek shelter in twns alng the rute frm the Syrian brder alng the Euphrates, and thrugh Qaim, Rawa, Haithah, and Fallujah t Baghdad. Insurgents have als taken refuge in the largely Sunni twns and cities alng the Tigris frm Msul t Baghdad. The areas alng the rivers gave the insurgents a ppulatin t hide in and disperse amng. Unlike the flat desert areas, there were als

148 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 116 hills, tree cver, and numerus built up areas, with many ptential ambush sites and predictable lines f cmmunicatin where IEDs culd be implanted. While Calitin frces culd always enter such areas, they culd rarely stp the insurgents frm dispersing and later regruping at least in thse cases where n permanent garrisn and defense frce was deplyed and the Iraqi gvernment did nt prvide effective gvernance. 404 As late as the winter f 2005, insurgents cntinued t exert cntrl ver a number f Iraqi cities. In early December, sme 300 insurgents tk ver the streets f Ramadi fr several hurs. One eyewitness tld The Washingtn Times: 405 It was easy fr them t take Ramadi it was like a message t the American and Iraqi frces t shw their pwer, their ability t take a city. In many ther incidents, insurgents held cities fr several days r weeks at time. Faris and Ameriya, tw cities in Iraq s vilent Anbar prvince, were withut plice fficers fr seven mnths in 2005, frm February until September. 406 Explit, exaggerate, and falsify US attacks that cause civilian casualties, cllateral damage, friendly fire against lcal allies, and incidents where the US can be blamed fr being anti-arab and anti- Islam: Terrrists and insurgents have fund they can use the media, rumr, and cnspiracy theries t explit the fact that the US ften fights a military battle withut prper regard fr the fact it is als fighting a plitical, idelgical, and psychlgical war. Real incidents f US miscnduct such as the harsh treatment f detainees and prisners, and the excessive security measures are cases in pint. S t are careless plitical and media rhetric by US fficials and military fficers. Bin Laden, the Iraqi insurgents, etc., all benefit frm every Western actin that unnecessarily angers r frustrates the Arab and Islamic wrlds. They are nt fighting t influence Western r wrld pinin; they are fighting a plitical and psychlgical war t dminate Iraq and the Arab and Islamic wrlds. Kill members f the cnstitutinal cmmittee and the newly elected legislature: This tactic discurages plitical participatin, r in the case f the Sunni delegatin, deprives the cmmittee f the necessary numbers f Sunni participants t mve frward. Prceeding withut the requisite numbers f Shi ites, Sunnis, and Kurds wuld thus bring the cmmittee s legitimacy int questin. After weeks f prtesting their lack f representatin n the cnstitutinal cmmittee, Sunni Arab grups reached a cmprmise with senir members f the Shi ite dminated bdy n June 16, Under the deal, 15 Sunni Arabs representatives jined the cmmittee. As a result, the cmmittee grew in size frm 55 t 70. An additinal 10 Sunni Arabs were given special advisry rles, serving as cnsultants in the cnstitutinal prcess. US fficials strngly supprted the changes in the hpes that it wuld lead t greater Sunni participatin in the upcming cnstitutinal referendum. Insurgents did nt take lng t strike, hwever. On July 19, gunmen assassinated Mijbil Issa, ne f the newly appinted Sunni delegates wrking n the cnstitutin. His bdyguard and ne f the Sunni cnsultants, Dhamin Hussein al-obeidi, were als killed. The three men were leaving a Baghdad restaurant when three gunmen inside a minibus pened gunfire n the car carrying them. Fr many f Iraq s Sunnis, the vilence shwed the cnsequences f participating in Iraq s new plitical prcess. On July 20, the 12 remaining members f the Sunni Arab delegatin -tw had earlier resigned after being threatened by insurgents-suspended their membership in prtest ver the murder. Five days later, the delegatin ended its byctt and returned t the cmmittee. Kidnap, kill and attack candidates running in the December 15 parliamentary electins as well as lcal electin fficials in rder t disrupt the plitical prcess: Members f the Iraqi Natinal Assembly were frequent targets f attacks by insurgents in Althugh many believed Sunnis members f the Assembly were being singled ut fr attacks, a list f sme f thse killed shws that bth Shi ites and Kurds were amng the victims as well: April 27, 2005: Insurgents in Baghdad gun dwn Lamia Abed Khaduri Sakri. She was elected in January as part f Prime Minister Ayad Allawi s Iraqi List Party, which received 40 seats in the new cabinet. Sakri is the first member f the Iraqi Natinal Assembly t be assassinated.

149 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 117 June 28, 2005: A suicide attack takes the life f Sheik Dhari Fayad, the ldest member f the Iraqi Natinal Assembly. July 30, 2005: Sheik Khalaf Aliyan, a member f the Sunni Natinal Dialgue Cuncil, escaped an assassinatin attempt in suthern Baghdad. September 17, 2005: Gunmen kill Faris Nasir Hussein, a member f Iraq s Shabak ethnic minrity. Hussein was elected t parliament n the Kurdish ticket. The attack, which tk place n a rad frm Msul, als injured anther plitician, Haidar Qassem. After the success f the Octber referendum, insurgents stepped up their attacks against Iraqi pliticians in preparatin fr the December 15 parliamentary electins. As part f pre-electin vilence, insurgents unleashed a wave f assassinatins and kidnappings targeting candidates running in the electins as well as electin wrkers. Fr the mnth f Nvember, these included: Nvember 3, 2005: An internet statement psted n a website by Al Qa ida in Iraq says the grup had kidnapped Majida Yussef Sael, a candidate in the December electins and a member f Prime Minister Iyad Allawi s party. Nvember 8, 2005: In Kirkuk, insurgents kidnap Hatam Mahdi al-hassani, the brther f a leading Sunni Arab plitician. Nvember 12, 2005: Jamal Khaz'al, the chairman f the Iraqi Islamic Party in Basra, escaped an assassinatin attempt. Nvember 13, 2005: Insurgents assassinate Kiaweh, a member f the Al-Naafi Advisry Cuncil. Nvember 17, 2005: Tariq al-ma muri, the deputy chairman f the Al-Ummah al-iraqiyah Party and a candidate fr the upcming electins, escaped an assassinatin attempt in Al-Qut. Nvember 18, 2005: Fr the secnd day in a rw, Ma muri escaped an assassinatin attempt. This time in suthern Baghdad. Nvember 18, 2005: Insurgents kidnapped Tawfiq al-yasiri, secretary general f Iraqi Demcratic Calitin and Shams al-iraq candidate. Nvember 22, 2005: Unknwn gunmen brke int the headquarters f the Cmmunist Party s branch ffices in Sadr City, and killed tw activists. Nvember 23, 2005: Insurgents wearing Iraqi army unifrms burst int the hme f Khadim Sarhid al- Hemaiyem, a Sunni candidate in the upcming electins and the head f Iraq s Batta clan, killing him alng with three f his sns and his sn-in-law. Nvember 26, 2005: In a statement psted n an Islamist website, Al Qa ida in Iraq annunced it had killed Miqdad Ahmed Sit, a Kurdish electin activist, n Nvember 22 in Msul. Nvember 28, 2005: Gunmen in Baghdad kill Ayad Alizi and Ali Hussein. Bth were members f the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni party that had byctted the January electins but was running candidates in the December electins. Alizi had been selected t run as part f a Sunni ticket. Nvember 28, 2005: Gunmen in suthern Baghdad killed Ghalib al-sideri, a candidate fr the Iraqi Frnt fr Natinal Dialgue. Nvember 28, 2005: Insurgents attacked members f the Assyrian Party in Msul, killing tw and wunding tw thers. Nvember 30, 2005: Gunmen fired n the hme f Salama Khafaji, a prminent female Shi ite plitician, wunding tw guards. December 4, 2005: In Baghdad, gunmen killed Sheik Abdul-Salam Abdul-Hussein, a Shi ite Muslim candidate running in the upcming general electins and a fllwer f Muqtada al-sadr. December 5, 2005: An electin wrker was killed and his assistant wunded in Baquba. December 13, 2005: Gunmen in Ramadi killed Sunni Arab candidate Mizhar al-dulaimi.

150 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 118 December 13, 2005: A radside bmb in Latifiyah, suth f Baghdad, targeted the cnvy f Sheik Jalal Eddin al-sagheer, a Shi ite member f the Natinal Assembly. Assassinatins, attempted assassinatins and kidnappings f plitical figures, gvernment wrkers and their families cntinued even after the electins had ended. December 17, 2005: Gunmen killed tw relatives f a senir Kurdish fficial in Msul. The men, Dhiab Hamad al-hamdani and his sn-were relatives f PUK party fficial Khdr Hassan al-hamdani. December 19, 2005: Ziyad Ali al-zawba i, the Deputy Gvernr f Baghdad, and three f his bdyguards escaped an assassinatin attempt in the western Baghdad district f Al-Amil. The brther f Sa d Nayif al-hardan, minister f state fr gvernrate affairs, was kidnapped in Al-Khalidiyah City in western Iraq. December 22, 2005: Gunmen assassinated Sheik Saffah Nayif al-fayyad, a tribal leader f the Al Bu- Amir tribe, nrth f Baghdad. January 3, 2006: In Baghdad, gunmen kidnapped the sister f Bayan Jabr, the interir minister. January 4, 2006: Gunmen kill Rahim Ali Sudani, a directr-general at the il ministry, in Baghdad. January 18, 2006: The bdies f three men, including a relative f Iraq's defense minister, were fund with gunsht wunds t the head in a Baghdad apartment. Gunmen in the area f Al-Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad assassinated the bdyguard f Abd-al-Aziz al-hakim, head f the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq. January 21, 2006: A radside bmb blast als wunded five bdyguards f President Jalal Talabani in nrthern Iraq. January 26, 2006: Tw Iraqi gvernment emplyees were gunned dwn by drive-by militants in separate attacks in the nrthern city f Kirkuk. One was a senir fficial f Iraq's anti-crruptin cmmissin. February 8, 2006: Iraq's higher educatin minister escaped unharmed frm a car bmb attack n his cnvy that lightly wunded three f his bdyguards. February 12, 2006: A grup f armed men in a speeding car killed Educatin Ministry fficial Karim Selman al-zaidi in Baquba. February 13, 2006: Iraq's frmer electricity minister, Ayham al-samarie, escaped injury when a radside bmb explded near his three-vehicle cnvy in Baghdad, but tw bdyguards were wunded. February 28, 2006: a car bmb targeting a cnvy fr an advisr t the Defense Ministry, Daham Radhi Assal, injured three. March 2, 2006: Gunmen pened fire n the car f Iraqi Sunni plitical leader f the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt Adnan al-dulaimi killing a bdyguard and wunding three thers as the car was stpped t repair a punctured tire. Methds f Attack and Cmbat There is n clear divisin between the mix f insurgent and terrrist tactics fcused n the plitical and psychlgical nature f war and thse that fcus mre directly n attacking military targets like MNF-I and Iraqi gvernment frces, Iraqi and Calitin fficials, and the Iraqi ecnmy and natin building prcess. The insurgents again made majr adaptatins in their tactics and methds f attack that still further increased the prblems in creating effective Iraqi frces: Adapt targets t place maximum pressure n Iraqi scial and plitical apparatuses: Insurgents have adapted their tactics as well, fcusing greater attentin n Iraqi military frces and plice. In January 2005, 109 Iraq plice and military were killed thrugh insurgent activity. By May, this number had spiked t 259,

151 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 119 and by July As the Iraqi cnstitutinal prcess unflded which the Sunnis were largely absent frm due t their widespread byctt f the Parliamentary electin sectarian vilence became increasingly apparent. Sunni attacks n Iraqi security and plitical figures increased as radicals sught t derail the plitical prcess. On August 19, 2005, three Sunni electin wrkers were kidnapped in Msul, driven t Al Nr and executed befre a thrng f peple gathered befre the Al Nr Msque. Of the electin wrkers murdered, ne was identified as Faris Yunis Abdullah, a senir fficial in the mstly Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party. The three men were psting placards encuraging Iraqis t vte in the Octber 15 electin when they were abducted. 408 In the end f 2005 and beginning f 2006, the number f Iraqi military and plice killed per mnth hvered arund 200. In Nvember, December and January, deaths ttaled 176, 193 and 194, respectively. 409 Suicide bmbs, car bmbs, and mass bmbings: The use f such tactics increased steadily after late 2003, in part due t the high success rate relative t alternative methds f attack. By late 2004, explding vehicles accunted fr apprximately 60% f Iraqi plice and recruit fatalities. 410 Suicide attacks have increased, and killed and wunded Iraqis in large numbers. The number f car bmbs rse frm 420 in 2004 t 873 in 2005, the number f suicide car bmbs rse frm 133 t 411, and the number f suicide vest attacks rse frm 7 in 2004 t 67 in In case after case, Shi ite civilians and Sunnis cperating with the gvernment were successfully targeted in ways designed t create a serius civil war. Accrding t the Assciated Press, there were 190 suicide bmb attacks in the six-mnths between the creatin f the interim Iraqi gvernment n April 28 and Octber 28, Suicide attacks claimed sme 1,458 lives, rughly ne-third f all vilence-related deaths during this perid. Of the 3,902 Iraqis killed, 1,128 were security persnnel and the verwhelming majrity, 2,744, were civilians. Mre than 40 percent f the fatalities ccurred in the greater Baghdad area. After Baghdad, the cities with the largest number f fatalities frm suicide attacks were Msul, Tal Afar, Balad and Kirkuk with 196, 188, 124 and 118 deaths respectively. September prved t be the deadliest mnth fr these attacks, with at least 804 peple killed. That number fell by almst half in Octber. 412 The trend appeared t cntinue int the winter. In Nvember, there were nly 23 suicide attacks, the lwest number in seven mnths. Maj. Gen. Mark Lynch attributed the drp t successful US and Iraqi peratins alng the Syrian brder designed t prevent weapns and insurgents frm infiltrating Iraq. Lynch said at least 96 percent f suicide bmbers cme frm utside f Iraq. 413 It is nt always clear that suicide-bmbing techniques were tactically necessary. In many cases, timed devices might prduce the same damage. Events in Iraq shwed, hwever, that suicide bmbers had a majr psychlgical impact and gain exceptinal media attentin. They als came t serve as symbls f dedicatin and cmmitment, can be prtrayed as a frm f Islamic martyrdm, and attract mre plitical supprt and attentin amng thse sympathetic t the cause invlved. The cst f suicide bmbers was als lw. While n reliable figures are available, nly abut 10% seemed t have been Iraqis as f August 2005, and mst had been recruited frm utside Iraq by varius Islamist rganizatins. Key surces were Nrth Africa, the Sudan, Jrdan, Syria, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, and Central Asia. The limited evidence available indicates that many were chsen because they culd be persuaded t seek Islamic martyrdm, and d s cllectively and withut trying t call great public attentin t themselves. They ften culd be rapidly indctrinated and given minimal training and then be used as frce multipliers fr relatively small Islamic extremist grups. A single vlunteer culd use a strap-n bmb, r single vehicle filled with explsives, penetrate a crwded area r high prfile target area, and then set ff an explsin prducing high casualties. Many f these attacks were aimed at sft targets such as Iraqi civilians. The increase in the use f explsive vests wrn by individuals in sme cases enabled the attacker t infiltrate int areas ppulated with Iraqi frces, ften secured by a perimeter designed t defend against car bmbs and suicide car bmbers. Even when such attacks fail t reach their target the explsin ften gt intense public and media attentin. They als became plitical weapns by expliting the fact Arab Sunni Islamists were being used t kill and maim large numbers f Arab Shi ites and Kurds, as well as any Sunni vlunteers and military in the Iraqi frces. Sme f the larger weapns apprached the status f weapns f mass terrrism, and even much smaller levels f casualties gt enugh attentin t make them weapns f mass media and weapns f

152 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 120 mass plitics tls that culd be used t encurage ethnic and sectarian civil war. In the spring f 2005, sme 170 such attacks were cnducted in April, 151 in May, and 133 in June. These attacks generate even greater public and media attentin when wmen carry them ut. Zarqawi has asserted that many Iraqi females have cme t him asking t be dispatched n suicide missins. In the past, he has used this t try and shame Iraqi males int vlunteering fr suicide missins. 414 Althugh Saddam Hussein s security frces used female bmbers at least nce during the 2003 war, Al Qa ida in Iraq did nt begin using female suicide bmbers until the fall f (Prir t 2005, Calitin frces had reprted capturing a number f female suicide bmbers n ft, including ne trying t enter the Green Zne in Octber ) The first female suicide attack ccurred n September 28 in the city f Tal Afar. After having been denied entry t a civil military peratins building, the bmber detnated her explsives in a nearby square where Iraqi civilians and US sldiers ften interacted. The attack claimed the lives f five civilians and injured mre than 30. Zarqawi s rganizatin asserted respnsibility fr the attack in an Internet psting saying a sister f the Malik Suicidal Brigade had carried ut the successful missin. 416 The first female suicide attack f the insurgency was fllwed clsely by a female suicide car bmbing. On Octber 11, a female suicide bmber detnated her car near a grup f US sldiers n patrl in Msul. The nly ther knwn incident f a female suicide car bmber ccurred in Haditha in April f 2003 when tw wmen, acting n the rders f fficials in Saddam Hussein s regime, killed three US sldiers. 417 In respnse t the bmbing in Tal Afar, the reginal plice chief-general Ahmed Mhammed Khalafissued the fllwing statement: Tday s attack seems t represent a new tactic by the insurgents t use wmen, wh are rarely searched at the Tal Afar checkpints because f religius and scial traditins that grant wmen special treatment. Because f the bmbing, Gen. Khalaf said wmen and children wuld nw be searched in the same manner as men. 418 Cultural and religius barriers have made any interactin between US frces and Iraqi wmen difficult in the past. Fllwing the attacks, the Ministry f Defense annunced there wuld be n new security measures ther than being mre aware that females as well as men can be suicide bmbers. 419 The mst well-knwn Iraqi female suicide bmber was that f Sajida Mubarak al-rishawi, a 35-year-ld mther f fur frm Ramadi, wh was t have been the furth suicide bmber f the Nvember 9 htel attacks in Amman. Rishawi fled the Radissn htel after her husband detnated his explsives and her wn failed t g ff. She was picked up by Jrdanian plice three days later and made a televised statement that was subsequently aired arund the wrld. Hussein al-dulaimi, a cusin f Rishawi, believes she was mtivated by anger and humiliatin. Three f her brthers were killed by US frces in Iraq. Accrding t Dulaimi, the family was ften harassed by US trps: 420 In ne incident, Sajida s huse was raided, and an American sldier put his bt n the head f Sajida s husband that made her very angry, as this was a big insult against her and her husband. Rishawi s case is unusual in that it is believed t be the first case f husband and wife suicide bmbers. In late Nvember, reprts surfaced that a Eurpean wman had been invlved in a suicide attack in Iraq. Iraqi fficials believe a Belgian wman wh had cnverted t Islam after marrying a radical Muslim carried ut a Nvember 9 attack n a US military cnvy in Baghdad. The wman, identified as Muriel Degauque, was the nly fatality in the attack and had traveled t Iraq t carry ut jihad with her husband. 421 The case was the first instance f a Eurpean female suicide bmber. On December 6, 2005, tw female suicide bmbers blew themselves up at Baghdad s plice academy, killing at least 43 peple and wunding mre than 70. The attack was the deadliest against Iraqi security frces since February 28, Al-Qa'ida in Iraq claimed respnsibility fr the attack. 422 After the December electin and in early 2006, suicide bmbings cntinued t target predminately Shi ites civilians and Iraqi plice frces. Althugh cnsistent, the December bmbings were nt particularly deadly. On December 18 in eastern Baghdad, a suicide bmber killed a plice fficer and injured tw thers. On

153 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 121 December 22, a suicide car bmb in Iskandariyah wunded seven plicemen. The fllwing day, In Balad, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives utside a msque, killing fur peple. The next day, a suicide car bmber targeting tw Iraq army vehicles in Baghdad killed five sldiers and wunded seven thers, including several plice fficers. On December 29, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives near the interir ministry in Baghdad, killing fur plicemen and wunding five. In the span f eight days in early January, several suicide bmbings targeting plice recruits and Shi ites killed almst 180 peple. On January 3, 2006 a suicide car bmber attacked a bus carrying plice fficers in Baquba, killing three and wunding 14. The fllwing day, a suicide bmber detnated his explsives at a funeral in Miqdadiya, killing 37 Shi ite murners and wunding 45 thers. On January 5 in Karbala, a suicide bmber struck utside the Imam Hussein Shrine, killing mre than 49 Shi ites. The same day a suicide bmber targeting a plice recruitment center in Ramadi killed mre than 50 and wunded as many as 60 thers. On January 6, a suicide car bmb targeting a plice checkpint in the suthern Baghdad neighbrhd f Zafaraniya killed ne plice cmmand and injured three. Later, in Msul, a suicide car bmber struck a plice patrl, wunding 11 peple, including fur plicemen. On January 9, Tw suicide bmbers carrying plice identity cards and dressed in plice unifrms walked up t the Interir Ministry cmpund n Mnday mrning and blew themselves up hundreds f yards frm a ceremny attended by the American ambassadr, killing 29 Iraqis. On January 19, a suicide attacker detnated an explsive vest in a crwded dwntwn cffee shp, killing 16 and wunding 21. In early April, three suicide bmbers targeted the Baratha msque in Baghdad, a primary headquarters fr SCIRI, killing 79 and wunding mre than 140. At least tw f the bmbers were dressed as wmen t hide the bmbs and slipped int the msque as the wrshippers left. The first bmb detnated at the main exit, and the secnd inside the msque as peple rushed back in fr safety. Ten secnds later, the third bmb explded. 423 The day prir, a car bmb killed 10 at the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf. Use freign Islamist vlunteers as cannn fdder; put paid and lw value Iraqi insurgents in high risk psitins: Bth Islamist extremist cells and mre natinalist cells and grups learned t explit yung men recruited frm utside Iraq as Islamic martyrs in suicide bmbings and ther high risk missins. They develped freign recruiting netwrks, ften staging such vlunteers thrugh Syria and Jrdan, indctrinating them, and then using them ruthlessly. Alternatively, grups and cells learned t islate their leaders, financiers, and experts frm high risk and frnt line missins, sending in inexperienced and junir persnnel t take risks smetimes yung Iraqis paid tken fees fr risking the actual attack. In at least sme cases, Iraqis were sent ut t cnduct high-risk cnventinal attacks where the planner must have knwn they had little r n chance f survival. Stay behinds, diehards, and suicide squads: During and after Fallujah, insurgents increasingly had teams stay behind wh seem t have been prepared t die r t seek martyrdm. Many were Iraqis. Their willingness t defend a building r small area with suicidal determinatin and n regard fr retreat ften inflicted higher casualties n MNF-I and Iraqi frces. Mix crude and sphisticated IEDs: Hezbllah shuld be given credit fr perfecting the use f explsives in well structured ambushes, althugh there is nthing new abut such tactics the Afghans used them extensively against the Sviets. Iraq has, hwever, prvided a unique pprtunity fr insurgents and Islamist extremists t make extensive use f imprvised explsive devices (IEDs) and vehicle brne imprvised explsive devices (VBIEDs) by expliting its massive stcks f arms. The insurgents were able t draw n large stcks f explsives, as well as large bmbs and artillery shells. Nearly 400 tns f HMX and RDX plastic explsive disappeared frm the Qaqaa weapns facility alne after the fall f Saddam Hussein s regime. The Iraqi attackers als learned t cmbine their extensive use f lw grade IEDs, mre carefully targeted sphisticated IEDs, very large car bmbs and ther devices t create a mix f threats and methds that is much mre difficult t cunter than reliance n mre cnsistent types f bmbs and target sets. 424 The insurgents based many f their initial effrts n relatively simple weapns designs, sme f which seem t have been adapted frm the Arabic translatins f US field manuals n bby traps and similar imprvised devices. The insurgents sn learned, hwever, t use mre sphisticated detnatrs and triggering systems t cunter US electrnic cuntermeasures, and increase their distance away frm the bmb. Accrding t ne reprt, nly 10% f the IEDs used in Iraq as f May 2005 were mdeled n the pressure-detnatin devices shwn in US Army Field Manual 5-31 and in a direct Iraqi translatin

154 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 122 published in Insurgents had als learned hw t make crude shaped-charges t attack US armred and ther vehicles. Triggers fr IED devices grew mre sphisticated as well. One IED fund by sldiers was cnnected by a wire t a lng-range transmitter n tp f a telephne pll. Insurgents incrprated new technlgy with pressure-plated IEDs that are nly triggered by tracked vehicles. One sldier remarked abut the adaptatin f insurgent frces and the use f new technlgy saying, I didn t see that when I first came in. 426 Insurgents als incrprated the use f IEDs int the tactic f fllw-n attacks r ambushes. This allwed insurgents t target supprt vehicles that arrive n the scene f an attack, nce an initial IED has gne ff. Lt. Cl. Rss Brwn described ne such experience: I brught in vehicles t supprt them [the patrl] and they hit fur mre IEDs. These were 250-pund aircraft bmbs buried in the dirt. It was an IED ambush. 427 Once several vehicles are disabled insurgents then attacked the cnvy s using small arms and mrtar fire. By the summer f 2005, insurgents were attempting an average f 65 IED attacks a day. Many were detected and defeated, but their use f shaped charges had becme mre sphisticated, using technlgy first develped by the Lebanese Hezbllah. In additin, the insurgents had learned t cluster and stack antitank mines, and use brute frce IEDs like adapted 500-pund bmbs. 428 They als learned the vulnerabilities f US and Calitin armred vehicles and which held the mst trps and crew. They learned mre abut the prbable rutes Calitin and Iraq frces wuld have t take, and which kind f attacks wuld d mst t disrupt a given mvement. Insurgent rganizatins imprved in structure t the pint where key persnnel directing peratins, financing them, and prviding technical supprt were far less active in the field, and mre and mre use was made f freign vlunteers, quickly recruited Iraqis, and Iraqis paid small sums t d part f the wrk in implanting IEDs. Small, mstly independent cells came t carry ut many peratins a technique which ensured that peratins were hard t detect and penetrate, making it difficult t rll up an rganizatin by catching men in the field r interrgating members f any ne cell. In sme cases, hles and lcatins fr IEDs were prepared by ne small team -- smetimes using vehicles with hles cut in the bttm t defeat visual detectin. A different team might cruise thrugh an area and plant an IED n a target quickly n f the basis f pprtunity t defeat surveillance and patrls. Al Qa ida in Iraq and Ansaar al Islam became particularly skilled in such peratins. In shrt, the insurgents advanced bth their IED technlgy and tactics in tandem. 429 IED teams als frequently delegated three rles t its members: a lkut, a triggerman, and an emplacer. These cells ften als include a rifleman t distract the gunners in the American vehicle while the triggerman detnates the IED device. The emplacer is ne f the mst valuable members as it is nt nly a risky psitin, but necessitates experience t cause increased damage and casualties. 430 The insurgents als paid clse attentin t US intelligence cllectin methds, and cunter-ied peratins and change their behavir accrdingly. They used imprved methds f cncealment such as digging hles in a rad and then paving ver the hle. Other methds have included stealing plice, military, and gvernment vehicles, alng with unifrms and IDs t penetrate in t secure areas, and linking bmbings t ambushes with rifles and RPGs r additinal IEDs t attack the respnse frce. As Calitin trps became mre adept at uncvering IED factries and strage area, insurgents became mre systematic with their cnstructin and supply system. IEDs were ften built in factries in the small villages arund Baghdad then smuggled int the city t a few suppliers wh then sell them t insurgents. Insurgents als turned t car dealerships t stre munitins and IEDs instead f huses, making transprtatin easier. 431 In September 2004, General Richard Cdy, the US Army Vice Chief f Staff, stated that sme IEDs were ging ff each mnth, and rughly half either harmed US persnnel r damaged US vehicles. 432 While Calitin frces claimed t find sme 30-40% f IEDs, and render them safe, by May 2005, they als reprted that the number f IED incidents had steadily climbed t sme 30 per day. IEDs accunted fr 189 f 720 US cmbat deaths in abut 26 percent. Deaths caused by IEDs rse by mre than 41% during the first five mnths f 2005, cmpared with a similar perid in 2004, and accunted fr 51% f the 255 cmbat deaths as f June 9, There were 85 deaths attributed t IEDs in the first five mnths f 2004, and 120 in This was a primary reasn that the number f uparmred Humvees in US frces rse frm arund 200 in the summer f 2004 t 9,000 in June

155 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 123 Lt. General James T. Cnway, Directr f Operatins in the US Jint Staff, stated in May 2005, that a ttal f 70% f all Calitin casualties t date since the fall f Saddam Hussein had been caused by IEDs, an effrt that had been s successful that the US annunced that even uparmred Humvees were unsafe in high threat areas, and were being replaced with heavily armred 5-tn gun trucks. 434 The use f radside bmbs remains a majr prblem fr US and ther Calitin frces. The ttal number f IED attacks nearly dubled frm 5,607 in 2004 t 10,953 in While the success rate f IED attacks drpped significantly, frm 25-30% in 2004 t 10% in 2005, they still had a majr impact. During 2005, there were 415 IED deaths ut f a ttal f 674 cmbat deaths, r 61.6 % f all cmbat deaths. IEDs accunted fr 4,256 wunded ut f a ttal f 5,941, sme 71.6% f the wunded. Frm July 2005 t January 2006, IEDs killed 234 US service members ut f a ttal f 369 ttal cmbat deaths, r 63.4%. They accunted fr 2314 wunded ut f 2980 ttal cmbat wunded, r 77.7 %. T put these numbers in perspective, IEDs caused 900 deaths ut f a ttal f 1,748 cmbat deaths, r 51.5 % during the entire pst-saddam fall frm March 2003 and January IEDs caused 9,327 wunded ut f a ttal f 16,606 r 56.2%. 435 Hwever, the numbers f persnnel killed and wunded by IEDs are scarcely the nly measure f insurgent success. Casualties may have drpped but the number f attacks has gne up. IED attacks tie dwn manpwer and equipment, disrupt peratins, disrupt ecnmic and aid activity, and interact with attacks n Iraqi civilians and frces t limit plitical prgress and help try t prvke civil war. Similar data are nt available n Iraqi casualties, a larger percent f whm seem t have been hit by suicide bmbers and in ambushes, but the chrnlgy in the Appendix t this analysis shws there have been many effective attacks. Fr example, three Iraqi sldiers were killed and 44 were wunded in a single VBIED bmb attack n their bus n April 6, Iraqi military, security, and plice are particularly vulnerable because they have little r n armr, and ften must mve int insecure facilities r g n leave in unprtected vehicles simply t perfrm rutine tasks like bringing mney t their families in a cash-in-hand ecnmy. The number f radside bmbs cntinued t increase in the fall f 2005, part f the larger wave f vilence unleashed by insurgents in the run-up t the December 15 electins. The US military reprted that fr September and Octber 2005, there were mre than 2,000 radside bmbs. While IED attacks had numbered arund 700 a mnth in the spring f 2004, there were 1,029 attacks in August, 1,044 in September and 1,029 in Octber. Althugh bth the Iraqi and US security frces were becming mre adept at detecting the bmbs, the insurgents were planting explsives in greater numbers than ever befre. The lethality and effectiveness f the devices that were successful als increased. In the six mnth perid between May and Octber 2005, mre than 60 per cent f all US trp fatalities were caused by IEDs. Of the mre than 569 attacks acrss Iraq that ccurred during the last week f Octber, 40 percent invlved imprvised bmbs. IED attacks fr that perid accunted fr 64 percent f calitin casualties and 37 percent f Iraqi security frce casualties. 437 Similar trends cntinued in Nvember. The U.S. suffered 40 deaths frm IEDs, almst half f the ttal lsses fr the mnth. In December this number increased; 61 percent f all U.S. trp casualties were frm IEDs. Near the end f January, the verall deaths caused by IEDs as a percentage f attacks n US frces was dwn t just belw 40 percent. Yet the U.S. suffered fewer verall casualties that mnth, 63, nine f which came frm helicpter crashes due t hstile fire r mechanical malfunctins. 438 Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff, stated at a press briefing in Nvember: 439 Between the increase in armr and the changes in tactics, techniques and prcedures that we ve emplyed, the number f attacks-ied attacks-that have [killed r wunded trps] has gne dwn That said, there are mre verall IED attacks by the insurgents, and we are wrking n that prblem. But US effrts t cmbat the effectiveness f the IEDs and find them befre they detnate have nt always been successful. Jammers used by US trps in Iraq t prevent insurgents frm detnating IEDs with cell phnes r garage-dr peners ften interfere with US radi signals, causing trps t turn ff the jammers when they use their radis. 440 And newer infrared triggers cannt be blcked by electrnic cuntermeasures, such as devices that jam signals sent frm cell phnes and remte-cntrl devices used t detnate the bmbs. 441

156 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 124 Accrding t Pentagn spkesman Lawrence Di Rita, IEDs pse a tugh and evlving challenge because the prblem that existed last year is a different IED prblem than the IED prblem that exists tday. 442 In late fall, the Pentagn annunced that insurgents were using new triggers r sensrs n the devices but that it was unable t figure ut where the new technlgy was cming frm r hw best t defeat it. Althugh mst bmbs were still believed t be cming frm inside Iraq, the military said it had evidence that bmbs and technlgy were entering Iraq frm the utside. Iran, as discussed belw, is the candidate mst ften suspected as the surce f this new technlgy. US military fficials believe IEDs are likely t be a prblem fr US frces fr years t cme, and nt just in Iraq. Imprvised bmbs culd becme the weapn f chice fr future insurgencies and guerilla wars. A 140-persn Pentagn task frce began wrking n ways t cmbat the radside bmbings in mid Brig. Gen. Jseph Vtel, wh currently leads the Pentagn s anti-ied effrt, said in early Nvember 2005 that IEDs remain the nly thing that we haven t slved, I think, in terms f the enemy capability t perate against us. Lt. Gen. James Cnway, the peratins directr f the Jint Staff, agreed, saying the US military was placing a greater emphasis n IEDs because it s the nly tl the enemy really has left in rder t be able t take us n and be able t really cause casualties. Similarly, Di Rita has said that nce the US finds a way t eliminate the imprvised devices, it s ver. 443 The prblem f IEDs, and the apparent increase in lethality and sphisticatin f technlgy must nt be exaggerated hwever. Pentagn fficials asserted in early January 2006 that insurgents had develped jumping IEDs and were using them t attack lw-flying Calitin helicpters. These claims were retracted later in the mnth when the Department f Defense released a statement indicating that it did nt knw f any incidences f this nature. 444 The Pentagn has been lking at hw the British and Israelis dealt with similar prblems in Nrthern Ireland and Lebann in rder t learn frm thse experiences. S far, hwever, the taskfrce, which has received mre than $1.5 billin in funding t date, has been unable t prduce a silver bullet against IEDs. 445 In December 2005 the Department f Defense annunced that tw training centers wuld be pened in the US t help teach sldiers hw t detect and disarm IEDs. Previusly, sldiers had nly received IED training upn their arrival in Iraq. The headquarters f the Jint Imprvised Explsive Device Defeat Task Frce will be lcated at Frt Irwin, Califrnia. A secnd training facility will pen in January 2005 at Elgin Air Frce Base in Flrida. Tgether, the centers will teach sldiers hw t use rbtics and UAVs as well as ther technlgy t cmbat the IEDs. Speaking abut the centers, Lt. Cl. Thmas Magness said: We ve gt t help these guys befre they deply the threat evlves every day. This is an enemy that has demnstrated that they re ging t change. 446 Adapt technlgy and tactics t match updates in Calitin defense capabilities: Despite technlgical advances and changes in tactics by the US military, insurgents cntinue t remain ne step ahead. The summer f 2005 brught an increase in shaped-charge explsives, the use f sphisticated infra-red mtin detectrs t fire them as targets passed by, and new radi-cntrlled triggers with enugh range and pwer t wrk frm utside the range f the Calitin s ECM bubble. The number f American trps killed by IEDs spiked during the summer, with 35 deaths in May; 36 in June; and 39 in July. 447 Anther adaptatin that has increased the lethality f insurgent IED attacks was the increased size f the weapns, a respnse t the up-armring f U.S. vehicles. Initially, IEDs in Iraq were small charges cmpsed f single 60mm and 81mm mrtars. Insurgents have since increased the size t 122mm and 152mm, and begun t use buried 500 and 1,000-lb airplane bmbs t effect an explsive upward frce that can render current up-armring useless. 448 The 39 deaths by bmbing in July 2005 was the largest t-date mnthly tll since the war began. In early Octber 2005, the British gvernment annunced that the recent increase in sphisticated radside bmbs in Iraq culd be traced t Iran. During the summer f 2005 insurgents began using infrared trip wires rather than the less sphisticated remte cntrl devices t detnate IEDs. The technlgy is similar t that used by Hezbllah in Lebann. While cautining that they culd nt be sure abut the level f fficial r unfficial Iranian invlvement, Prime Minister Tny Blair tld reprters that new explsive devices being used against Calitin trps in Iraq culd nevertheless be traced either t Iranian elements r t Hezbllah. 449 In January f 2006, the British gvernment issued a frmal prtest t Iran after similar

157 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 125 electrnically triggered devices were fund in eastern Iraq. 450 A breakaway grup frm Mqtada al-sadr s militia is believed t be using the trip-wires, as are Sunni insurgents. Frm 2004 t 2006, the US spent abut $6.1 billin in an effrt t defeat IEDs. In 2006, the Pentagn s Jint IED Defeat Organizatin received an increase f 3.3 billin. Despite this investment, Maj. Randall Simmns, a Gergia Natinal Guardsmen deplyed in Iraq, said, As we ve imprved ur armr, the enemy s imprved his IEDs. They re bigger, and with better detnating mechanisms. Lt. Cl. Bill Adamsn, peratins chief fr the anti-ied campaign, agreed saying, They adapt mre quickly than we prcure technlgy. 451 Althugh these advances in technlgy and changes in tactics lwered the casualty rate per IED attack in 2005, the attacks nearly dubled frm 5,607 in 2004 t 10,953 in Therefre, the number f US deaths as a result f IEDs still increased. By mid-2005, 40 US sldiers per mnth n average, twice the rate f 12 mths prir, were killed by IEDs. 453 The sheer number f IED incidents during this time perid is illustrated by ne 21-man IED respnse unit wh encuntered 2,178 incidents in 7 mnths frm the summer f 2005 t the winter f In March 2006 hwever, Pentagn spkesman Brian Whitman pinted t the fact that the casualty rate f IEDs is half f what it was the 18 mnths prir. 454 Increase the size and pwer f IEDs t nullify the advantages f US and Calitin armr and find cuntermeasures t US jamming and ther cuntermeasures: In tw separate instances in early January 2005, IEDs destryed a Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an Abrams tank. The tw vehicles are amng the mre heavily armred vehicles in the US arsenal. Prir t the tw bmbings, bth the Abrams and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle had prven relatively effective in prtecting trps inside. Mre generally, insurgents have learned t use vehicles with hles drilled in their flrs t rapidly dig hles, and nly emplace IEDs when they knw cnvys are n the way. They have learned simple radi cntrl devices like garage dr peners and cell phnes are detectable and jammable. They have imprted mre sphisticated trigger devices, arm IEDS befre cnvys r vehicles are in line f sight, and use IR mtin detectrs and trip wires t detnate the IED when they are nt present t be cunterattacked. Alternatively, they have learned t use mre than ne IED, fire additinal weapns after vehicles have halted t deal with the first attack, and smetimes swarm the vehicles under attack with rapid strikes with RPGs and autmatic weapns. These attacks have becme mre lethal as insurgent fire has becme mre accurate, and they have learned t strike at vulnerable pints in armred and uparmred vehicles (like the windws f uparmred Humvees.) Simple camuflage methds are effective as well. Insurgents have used animal carcasses t hide IEDs, disguised them as rcks, r painted them with plaster t resemble a piece f cncrete. They were als hidden in bjects such as dnkey carts, paint cans, trash bags, and plastic bttles. 455 There were als reprts f an IED fund hidden inside the sleeve t an MRE package and a human leg armed with a pressureswitch bmb set t g ff when it was picked up. 456 In Ramadi, insurgents set up mannequins armed with explsive devices either hping that sldiers wuld think they were crpses and stp t check them, r just simply distract sldiers making them mre vulnerable t attack. 457 US Sldiers als reprted IEDs being laid in stages. One day a seemingly harmless piece f trash wuld be drpped n the grund, the next day explsives wuld be planted in it and the fllwing day it wuld be armed. There were als reprts f children as yung as 12 r 13 years ld emplacing IEDs. 458 Attack cnvys t frce the US and Calitin t defend lgistics and supply peratins, hit a mre vulnerable target, and disrupt US peratins. The GAO reprted in February 2006, that, the security envirnment in Iraq has led t severe restrictins n the mvement f civilian staff arund the cuntry and reductins f a U.S. presence at recnstructin sites, accrding t U.S. agency fficials and cntractrs. Fr example, the Prject Cntracting Office reprted in February 2006, the number f attacks n cnvys and casualties had increased frm 20 cnvys attacked and 11 casualties in Octber 2005 t 33 cnvys attacked and 34 casualties in January In anther example, wrk at a wastewater plant in central Iraq was halted fr apprximately 2 mnths in early 2005 because insurgent threats drve away subcntractrs and made the wrk t hazardus t perfrm. In the assistance prvided t supprt the electral prcess, U.S.-funded grantees and cntractrs als faced security restrictins that hampered their mvements and limited the scpe f their wrk. Fr example, IFES 14 was nt able t send its advisrs t mst f the gvernrate-level electins administratin ffices, which hampered training and peratins at thse

158 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 126 facilities leading up t Iraq s Electin Day n January 30, Specialize and cmpartment peratins, use islatin, affiliatin, and swarming: Insurgent grups have learned t create structures where leadership cadres are almst ttally islated frm peratins and cmmunicatin, allwing them t fcus n prviding brad guidance and the prpaganda and media struggle. Finance, planning, armrer, and pert peratinal grups are similarly islated and physically separated frm the leadership and each ther. Specialized grups are created in larger rganizatins fr IED peratins, assassinatins, even strikes fcused n specialized grups like Shi ite clergy. Other cells fcus slely n surveillance, recnnaissance, transprtatin and safe huses. 460 Suicide bmber grups are kept separate frm thse planning and arming the attacks and treated as expendable. Lw level and lw value cadres are expended in defensive peratins r attacks, while higher value cadres disperse and seek t survive. Paid elements are used t avid lss f cadre persnnel. Cell structures are deliberately kept lse, and direct cmmand and cmmunicatin minimized. Missin tasking replaces the kind f direct tasking and cmmunicatin that the Calitin and Iraqi frces might detect. Affiliated grups and different mixes f cells may be brught in t swarm a given target r supprt a given peratin, but the prliferatin f different grups and elements helps ensure the survival f all insurgent grups by making it impssible t target a given set f cells and leaders. What the military calls lw-level insurgent cells, perate and attack in a specific regin. But ther mre larger and hierarchical grups, many made up f frmer Iraqi military and intelligence fficers, cver wider areas and can rganize larger attacks. There is evidence that the insurgency is increasingly able t cnduct cmplex attacks. Fr example n January 24, 2006 in Ramadi, it tk the cmbined frces f U.S. marines wrking with Iraqi trps and supprted by attack aircraft t defeat a series f crdinated insurgent attacks in brad daylight. The insurgents used weapns including mrtars, small arms and RPGs. 461 One such insurgent netwrk, the Islamic Patritism Mvement numbered abut 55 fighters and was assciated with the larger Secret Islamic Army. Led by a frmer Iraqi intelligence fficer named Abu Omar, knwn as the grups emir, he assigns peratins and planning t his lieutenants, many wh are frmer Republican Guard members. Each cell leader then has three t fur cells cnsisting f three t fur men apiece. Each man has a specific functin: kidnapping; IEDs; supprt; intelligence, surveillance and recnnaissance. 462 The insurgents als use their wn versin f swarming. They use media cverage, key calendar events, and ther frms f pen surce targeting and reprting n the effectiveness and impact f given attacks t knw which strike have high prfile, what methds f attack wrk, and the media and military impact f their actins. The prliferatin f grups and cells, attack smewhat at randm, but against high value targets in given place r time, f a given type, r simply in a cnstant stream f diverse attacks remves the need fr crdinatin and cmplex C4I/BM peratins, and allws a slw and uncrdinated temp f peratins t be effective. Use Swarming techniques fr attacks n vehicles: The quality f urban and rad ambushes imprved strikingly in Iraq, as did the ability t set up rapid attacks, and explit the vulnerability f sft skinned vehicles. Insurgents als learned t swarm calitin frces by rushing in frm different pints r firing simultaneusly frm multiple lcatins. In sme cases, a single vehicle culd take eight RPG runds in a shrt encunter. Particularly in built-up areas, these tactics culd kill r disable even heavy armr like the Abrams tank, and psed a majr threat t lighter armred vehicles, as well as expsed infantry. Use mixed attacks and sequential ambushes t attack military and emergency frces in fllw-n attacks: Iraqi insurgents steadily imprved their ability t carry ut cmplex attacks where an IED might be set ff and then either mre IEDs r ther methds f attack wuld be used against rescuers and fllwn frces. Alternatively, an ambush might be used t lead US and Iraqi frces int an area with IEDs. By the spring f 2005, insurgents increasingly used such mixed attacks t strike at US facilities. Fr example, they used a mix f gunmen, suicide car bmbs, and a large fire truck filled with explsives t attack a US marine base at Camp Gannn at Husaybah near the Syrian brder n April 11, On May 9, 2005, they used a hspital at Haditha as an ambush pint, and then attacked the US frces that respnded with suicide bmbs nce they are entered. This mix f unpredictable attacks, many slwly built up in ways difficult fr US intelligence methds t detect, has greatly cmplicated the peratins f US and Iraq frces, althugh scarcely defeated them.

159 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 127 In 2005 IEDs were used t initiate an attack at a pre-selected lcatin and were ften fllwed n by small arms fire, mrtar attacks, r mre IEDs explsins as reinfrcements attempted t arrive. 464 On April 2, an attack n Abu Ghraib was initiated with multiple car bmbs against the entrance gates and then fllwed by mrtar fire, rcket prpelled grenades and small arms fire, which frced the Marines t abandn their psitins. Reinfrcements were struck by multiple IEDs n their way t the scene and encuntered small arms fire. Accrding t intelligence analysts, 12 crdinated attacks tk place in under 30 minutes. 465 On June 20, an Army patrl interrupted a grup f insurgents assembling mrtars and machine guns fr what appeared t be a large-scale attack against a cmmand cmpund with mre than 100 fighters. In the large-scale chase that ensued, insurgents managed t detnate ne suicide car bmb and a secnd went ff as a result f the gunfire. IEDs and car bmbs struck arriving reinfrcements wh then came under fire frm nearby rftps. 466 One intelligence fficer with the 3 rd Infantry Divisin characterized these attacks as cmplex, prfessinalstyle attacks, militarily thught ut, planned and resurced peratins. 467 A large-scale assault n an Iraqi prisn in March f 2006 using cmbined arms, was an example f simple but effective planning and crdinatin amngst insurgents. Nearly 100 insurgents armed with autmatic rifles an RPGs strmed a jail in nrth Baghdad, killing 20 plice and a curthuse guard in a prisn break that freed 33 prisners; 18 f whm had been captured in plice raids just tw days earlier. The assault left 10 attackers dead. They cut the telephne wires befre they entered t prevent the plice frm calling fr backup and detnated a series f radside bmbs as they fled t prevent a chase. 468 Explit the weaknesses in US, Calitin, and Iraqi cmbat and lgistic vehicles: The insurgents sn learned t target unarmred and lightly armred vehicles, and t hit at their weakness pint. Deliberately r nt, they learned this frced the US t use steadily heavier armr, disperse frce t prtect mst mvements, and pay the cst f trying t uparmr and uparm everything frm truck and Humvees t armred fighting vehicles like the Stryker. At the same time, insurgents learned hw t place IEDs where they culd kill many armred vehicles frm belw where their armr was lighter r less effective, and t use detnating devices that allwed remte triggering as armred vehicles passed abve an IED r grup f anti-tank mines. Develp cmplex mixes and ambushes using small arms and light weapns like autmatic weapns, RPGs and mrtars: At least thrugh the spring f 2005, insurgents did nt make effective use f lted guided anti-tank weapns, and had nly been able t dwn ne aircraft with man-prtable surface t air missiles (MANPADS). 469 They did, hwever, steadily imprve their tactics frm single fire ambushes t multiple firings f RPGs against the same target, mixes f firing psitins, and sequential fire pints, ambushes, and defenses -- mixing small arms, RPGs, and light autmatic weapns. While much will depend n the level f insurgent and Islamist extremist access t arms, Iraq and Afghanistan have seen a steady imprvement in the use f systems like mrtars, anti-tank weapns, rckets, and timed explsives. It has als seen imprvements in light weapns and the increasing use f armr piercing ammunitin as a cheap way f attacking bdy armr, vehicles, and penetrating walls. Insurgents have als used surface-t-air missiles such as the Russian-made SA-7 Grail t bring dwn at least ne U.S. Apache helicpter. One insurgent grup with ties t Syrian intelligence was believed t have mre than a dzen f these missiles. It was unclear where the SAMs riginated 470 Imprt small frce multipliers : Rather than smuggle large numbers f arms, and create highly visible lines f supply, the insurgents imprted devices like night visin systems, cmmercial cmmunicatins, sniper rifles, and new frms f mre sphisticated detnatrs. Make effective use f snipers: Iraqi insurgents initially had pr marksmanship and tended t fire ff their weapns in sustained and prly armed bursts. With time, hwever, sme grups and cells nt nly develped effective snipers, but trained sptters, learned hw t psitin and mix their snipers with ther elements f Iraqi frces, and develped signals and ther cmmunicatins systems like them in tactical peratins. Overall fire discipline and marksmanship remained pr thrugh the late spring f 2005, but sniper elements became steadily mre effective, and the verall quality f insurgent fire discipline and marksmanship was generally n wrse than that f Iraqi sldiers, security persnnel, and plice. Snipers

160 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 128 acquired new types f rifles, ant-armr ammunitin, and bdy armr frm utside Iraq, indicating they might have bth supprt and training frm Islamist extremists. Islamist web sites als began t include interactive sniper training data as a recruiting tl and crude training aid. 471 Attack lines f cmmunicatin (LOCs), rear area, and supprt activity: Iraqi insurgents sn fund that dispersed attacks n lgistics and supprt frces ften ffer a higher chance f success than attacks n cmbat frces and defended sites, and make the Calitin fight wars based n deep supprt rather than deep strikes beynd the Frward Edge f Battle Areas (FEBA). In sme cases, like the rad frm the Green Zne and central Baghdad t the airprt, insurgents als chse rutes that the Calitin and gvernment frces culd nt avid, where cnstant attacks bth harassed peratins and became a plitical statement and symbl f Iraq s lack f security. These ambush alleys allwed the insurgents t frce a majr Iraqi r MNF defensive effrt at relatively little cst. Strike at highly visible targets with critical ecnmic and infrastructure visibility: Water and pwer facilities have a brad plitical, media, ecnmic, and scial impact. Striking at critical exprt-earning facilities like Iraq s nrthern exprt pipeline frm the Kirkuk il fields t the IT-1A strage tanks near Beiji, where il accumulates befre it is pumped further nrth t Cheyhan, has sharply affected the gvernment s revenues, frced it t create special prtectin frces, and gained wrld attentin. Kill Iraqi elites and sft targets : The insurgents sn fund it was far easier t kill Iraqi fficials and security persnnel, and their family members, than Americans. They als fund it was easier t kill midlevel fficials than better-prtected senir fficials. In sme areas, simply killing educated elites and/r their family members dctrs, prfessinals, etc. culd paralyze much f the natin building prcess, create a brad climate f insecurity, and frce the US and Iraqi frces t disperse resurces in defensive missins r simply have t stand aside and tlerate cntinued attacks. Target electins, the plitical prcess and gvernance: Electins and the lcal presence f gvernment are sft, dispersed targets whse peratin is critical t plitical legitimacy. Hitting these targets helps derail the plitical prcess, gets media visibility, ffers vulnerable lw hanging fruit, and intimidates the gvernment and ppulatin in much wider areas than thse subjected t direct attack. In the run up t the Octber referendum, insurgents intensified their attacks upn plitical and infrastructure targets. Insurgents bmbed a number f party ffices, including thse f the Kurdish Demcratic Party and the Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party. The latter was attacked after it urged its fllwers t vte in favr f the cnstitutin. Despite predictins f majr vilence, there are relatively few attacks by insurgents n the actual day f the referendum. Acrss the cuntry, mre than nine millin Iraqis vted in 6,000 plling statins. Early estimates put vter turnut at 61% and nly five f the capital s 1,200 plling statins are attacked. Hwever, incidents still ccurred in spite f a halt t nearly all mvement by nn-military and nngvernmental vehicles, and placing peak levels f Calitin and Iraqi security frces n duty. In Ramadi, US patrls clashed with insurgents in the early mrning hurs. Als in Ramadi, a radside bmb kills five US sldiers and tw Iraqi sldiers. Insurgents fired six mrtar runds at a sprts hall being used as a plling center. A radside bmb in Saqlawiyah killed a US Marine. Suth f Basra, gunmen attacked an empty plling statin at 3 a.m., but were apprehended. In Baquba, a radside bmb struck an Iraqi army and plice cnvy n patrl, killing three sldiers and wunding anther three. In Baghdad, insurgents targeted five plling statins: A radside bmb explded early Saturday near a schl plling statin in the Amiriyah neighbrhd f western Baghdad, wunding tw plicemen. At 8:30 a.m., a rcket landed nearby a vting statin in Azamiyah, nrthern Baghdad, injuring ne civilian. Half an hur later, a mrtar landed near a plling statin in the Kazemiyah area. The mrtar did nt explde. Insurgents pened fire n a plling statin in the Amil district f western Baghdad. Iraqi plicemen returned fire, accidentally wunding three civilians n their way t vte. At midday, insurgents sht and killed a vter walking hme frm a plling statin in western Baghdad.

161 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 129 As already discussed, insurgents stepped up their attacks against Iraqi pliticians in preparatin fr the December 15 parliamentary electins. As part f pre-electin vilence, insurgents unleashed a wave f assassinatins and kidnappings targeting candidates running in the electins as well as electin wrkers. Attacks against party ffices have als becme cmmn. But as with the Octber referendum, vilence n the day f the electin was relatively light. Sme f day s vilence included: Three separate attacks n plling statins in Msul: at the first, a bmb killed ne persn; at anther statin, a grenade killed a schl guard; a mrtar attack n a third plling statin did nt cause any casualties hwever. In Tal Afar, a mrtar shell killed ne civilian utside a plling statin. A bmb explded in Ramadi. In Tikrit, a mrtar rund struck a plling statin. A mrtar attack injured ne child in Baghdad. A secnd mrtar attack (n a different plling statin) caused n injuries. In Muqdadiyah, nrth f Baghdad, a bmb injured tw electin wrkers after security frces accidentally set it ff while trying t defuse it. In Fallujah, a bmb was defused. US frces als reprted defusing several bmbs in ther predminantly Sunni neighbrhds in the cuntry. Strike at majr aid and gvernment prjects after cmpletin; break up prject effrts when they acquire visibility r have high levels f emplyment: Insurgents and terrrists ften simply struck at the mst vulnerable prjects, but they seem t have learned that timing their attacks, lting, sabtage, and intimidatin t strike when prjects are cmpleted means the Calitin and gvernment aid effrts have maximum cst with minimum effect. They struck at prjects when the security frces prtecting wrkers and aid teams were n lnger there. This ften led the lcal ppulatin t blame the Calitin r gvernment fr nt keeping prmises r prviding the prper prtectin. Alternatively, breaking up prject effrts when they began t have maximum lcal visibility and emplyment impact had many f the same effects. Hit the sftest element f Iraqi military, security, and plice frces: The insurgents fund they culd strike at men n leave, their families, recruits r thse seeking t enlist, green trps and trainees, and lw quality units with limited fear f effective retaliatin. High prfile mass killings gt majr media attentin. Mrever, islated frward elements in hstile r threatened areas nt nly were vulnerable, but successful attacks brke up gvernance, aid effrts, and intimidated lcal ppulatins. This strategy has been mst damaging t Iraqi plice, which remain the weakest element in the security apparatus. Create infrmal distributed netwrks fr C 4 I deliberately r accidentally: Like drug dealers befre them, Iraqi insurgent and Islamist extremists have learned enugh abut COMINT and SIGINT t stp using mst vulnerable cmmunicatins assets, and t bypass many if nt mst f the effrts t cntrl cash flw and mney transfers. The use f messengers, direct human cntact, cded messages thrugh the Internet, prpaganda web pages, and mre randm methds f electrnic cmmunicatin are all cases in pint. At the brader level, hwever, insurgents in Iraq seem t have adapted t having cells and elements perate with cnsiderable autnmy, and by lsely linking their peratins by using the media and reprting n the verall pattern f attacks t help determine the best methds and targets. Smuggling, drug sales, theft and lting, and direct fund transfers als largely bypass effrts t limit peratins thrugh cntrls n banking systems, charities, etc. Under these cnditins, a lack f central cntrl and chesive structure may actually be an asset, allwing highly flexible peratins with minimal vulnerability t rll-up and attack. The existence f parallel, nn-cmpeting grups f hstile nn-state actrs prvide similar advantages and has the same impact. The fact that insurgent and Islamist extremist grups perate largely independently

162 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 130 and use different tactics and target sets greatly cmplicates US peratins and prbably actually increases verall effectiveness. Denying the Calitin and Iraqi gvernment lcal victry: The ther side f the cin was that the insurgents fund they culd disperse and reinfiltrate int many twns and parts f cities the mment Calitin and cmbat-ready Iraqi elements left and deny the Iraqi gvernment the ability t either deply plice r gvern. Alternatively, bmbings and sabtage culd prevent r restrict the recvery f a twn r area, and create a level f risk that meant many wuld nt return r attempt t live a nrmal life. Even as late as Nvember 2005, insurgents were able t capture large parts f Ramadi and exert cntrl. Street scuts and sptters: Like many previus insurgent grups, Iraqi hstiles learned t have children, yung men, and thers use cell phnes, signals, and runners t prvide tactical scuting, intelligence, and warning in ways that prved very difficult t detect and halt. Make cities and twns urban sanctuaries and defensive mrasses: Iraqi insurgents fund that cities with supprtive and/r accepting ppulatins can be made int partial sanctuaries and centers fr defensive fighting and ambushes, and that tactical defeat can nrmally be dealt with by dispersal and hiding amng the civilian ppulatin. Such tactics wrk well in attacks n lcal authrities and security frces friendly t the US, effrts t blck natin building at the lcal level, and effrts t explit religin, ethnicity, tribalism, etc. Several cities in Al Anbar prvince have served as sanctuaries fr militants. Insurgents typically leave the cities befre a majr US peratin begins and return nce the peratin has ended. Use neighbring states and brder areas as partial sanctuaries: While scarcely a new tactic, Iraqi insurgents have made increased use f crss brder peratins and taken advantage f the difficulties in securing the Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi brders. By March 2005, fr example, these tactics had created a near sanctuary in the area alng the Euphrates frm Hit and Haditha tward Syria and thrugh Ubaydi, Qaim, Karabilah, and Qusaybah t the Syrian brder alng the rad t Abu Kamal. 472 The Vietnamese used the same tactic in Cambdia and Las, as have many ther insurgent frces. The idea f securing a natin by securing the territry within its bundaries is ften a tactical myth. Create dispersed and rapidly mbile peratins and centers, mixed with fixed diehard and sleeper installatins. The insurgents rapidly learned nt t cncentrate peratives and t keep them rapidly mbile. They mixed these with die hard facilities designed t fight and defend themselves and inflict casualties if attacked, and with sleeper cells and stay behind peratins t recver after an area was attacked, captured, and secured by Calitin and Iraqi frces. Explit weaknesses in US human intelligence (HUMINT), battle damage assessment (BDA), and damage characterizatin capabilities: Iraqi insurgents and ther Islamist extremists learned that US intelligence is ptimized arund characterizing, cunting, and targeting things, rather than peple, and that the US has a pr capability t measure and characterize infantry and insurgent numbers, wunded, and casualties. They explit these weaknesses in dispersal, cnducting attacks, cncealing the extent f lsses, and manipulating the media by claiming civilian casualties and cllateral damage. Cunter US advantages in intercepting satellite and cellular cmmunicatins: Insurgents utilize the text messaging functin f cell phnes t cmmunicate in an effrt t avid electrnic eavesdrpping by the US. Insurgents will ften use mre than ne phne t cmmunicate a message, s that thse listening in nly hear part f the message. Explit slw Iraqi and US reactin times at the lcal tactical level, particularly in built up areas: Learn t explit the delays in US respnse effrts, and rigidities in US tactical C 4 I behavir, t attack quickly and disperse. Explit fixed Iraqi and US patterns f behavir: Take advantage f any tendency t repeat tactics, security, mvement patterns, and ther behavir; find vulnerabilities and attack. Hit at US HUMINT links and translatrs: US dependence n Iraqi translatrs and intelligence surces is a key area f US vulnerability and ne the insurgents have learned t fcus n.

163 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 131 Use resurgence and re-infiltratin dig in, hide, and reemerge: Disperse under pressure r when defeat seems likely. Let the US take an empty city r bjective. Resurge when the US tactical presence declines. Use incident frequencies, distributin f attacks and tactics that strain r defeat US intelligence, surveillance and recnnaissance (IS&R) assets and ability t supprt Iraqi frces: Assets like RPVs, aircraft, SIGINT systems, etc. can prvide significant capability when they are available. It is unclear whether it is deliberate r nt, but the gegraphic spread and daily incident cunt in Iraq indicates that insurgent mvements and actins ften reach numbers t large t cver. In fact, the US averaged sme 1,700-2,000 patrls per day during May While it is nice t talk abut net-centric warfare, it is a lt harder t get a big enugh net. Insurgents learned that the US has less ability t track and characterize irregular frces, insurgent/terrrist teams, and urban and dispersed infantry than frces using mechanized weapns r significant numbers f vehicles. Blending int the civilian ppulatin has wrked well fr lcal insurgents and Islamists in bth Afghanistan and Iraq, and Iraqi insurgents learned that they can explit rules f engagement where the US and Iraqi gvernment frces d nt have sldiers r agents n the grund t perfrm targeting and IFF functins. As valuable as IS&R assets are, they d nt prvide sme critical kinds f situatinal awareness with any reliability. Chse a vulnerable Iraqi and US frce: Deny the US and Iraqi frces a large, chesive enemy while attacking small r dispersed elements f US and Iraqi frces, facilities, r targets. Cunter US IS&R capabilities by adapting new techniques f cmmunicatin and interactin: The steady leakage f details n US and allied intelligence cllectin methds has led Islamist extremist and terrrist mvements t make mre use f curiers and direct financial transfer; use electrnic cmmunicatins mre safely, find ways t cmmunicate thrugh the Internet that the US cannt target, disperse better, and imprve their hierarchy and cell structure. This als meant develping lw-tech methds f cmmunicatin and signaling. In Ramadi, insurgents flew kites ver areas patrlled by U.S. trps t direct mrtar fire and released pigens t give away the lcatin f Calitin frces. They als used cdes annunced thrugh msque lud speakers t signal an attack. Often calls fr bld drives r annuncements f funeral prcessins were actually cded signals t insurgents f trp lcatins. In mre than ne instance, elabrate funeral prcessins have been used t mask insurgent mvement. The cffins, which carry guns and RPGs, are set dwn behind a wall where insurgents can arm themselves, then turn and fire n Calitin patrls. 473 Cunter US and Iraqi gvernment IS&R assets with superir HUMINT: Develpments in Iraq indicate that the US faces a repetitin f its experience in Vietnam in the sense that as varius insurgent factins rganize, they steadily imprve their intelligence and penetratin f rganizatins like the CPA, CJTF-7, the Iraqi gvernment and security frces, and the Iraqi factins backing natin building. Like Vietnam, Iraq is a warning that hstile HUMINT surces are ften pushed int prviding data because f family ties, a fear f being n the lsing side, direct and indirect threats, etc. In Iraq, it seems likely that family, clan, and ethnic lyalties have made many suppsedly lyal Iraqis becme at least part time surces, and that US vetting will ften be little mre than either a review f past ties r checks n the validity f data being prvided. The end result may be an extremely high degree f transparency cncerning US and Iraqi gvernment peratins. This will ften prvide excellent targeting data n key US and allied fficials, events, etc. It can include leverage and blackmail, and vulnerability data, as well as warning f US and ther military peratins. Dual lyalty and HUMINT penetratin f Iraqi security and military frces may be the rule, rather than the exceptin..accrding t U.S. military surces, insurgents had recruited Iraqi prstitutes and children t gather intelligence arund the Green Zne in an effrt t pinpint vulnerabilities. Because wmen are nt stpped and searched at checkpints as frequently as men, insurgents increasingly used them t transprt munitins Prstitutes have been used t gain infrmatin frm their custmers abut calitin peratins and children, wh mstly g abut unnticed, have been used t cunt vehicles and identify patterns in calitin patrls and schedules. It was suspected that this infrmatin is then passed t insurgent sympathizers within the Iraqi plice frces wh can enter and exit the zne withut being searched. 474

164 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 132 Use the media, infiltratrs/sympathizers, and ex-detainees fr cunterintelligence: Cnstantly mnitr the media and Internet fr data n US and Iraqi intelligence, targeting, and peratinal data. Use infiltratrs and sympathizers. Debrief released prisners and detainees t learn what their capture and interrgatin reveals abut US and Iraqi intelligence effrts. Iraqs Interir Ministry alleged in March 2006 that 3,000 insurgents had infiltrated the security frces. 475 Overall Patterns In summary, the insurgency has evlved tactics that pse a majr challenge t bth the cnventinal warfighting superirity f US-dminated Calitin frces and the cncepts such frces have had f swarming and adapting high technlgy systems t cunterinsurgency and cunterterrrism. The insurgents have shwn that lw technlgy insurgent frces can, in sme ways, be far mre effective at "swarming" than high mbility, high technlgy, advanced IS&R frces. This is nt a new lessn. Many insurgent tactics are similar in many ways t the tactics used by ther insurgent frces in dealing with cnventinal frces virtually since the beginning f war. Rather than sme furth generatin cncept, they stem back at least t the days f Sun Tzu, and many f the prblems the Iraqi gvernment and Calitin frces face as similar t thse raised in mdern, successful insurgencies like the Cmmunist Chinese and Vietnamese: The Sunni part f insurgency has becme the equivalent f a distributed netwrk: a grup f affiliated and unaffiliated mvements with well-rganized cells. There are at least three majr grups f Islamist extremist insurgents, and while they are lsely affiliated in an infrmal Majlis created in 2005, they are virtually independent. They are difficult t attack and defeat n an individual basis because they d nt have unitary r chesive structure r a rigid hierarchy. The larger mvements have leadership, planning, financing, and arming cadres kept carefully separate frm mst peratinal cells in the field. These cells have becme increasingly specialized and cmpartmented t simplify training and retain expertise, as well as imprve security. Accrdingly, defeating a given cell, reginal peratin, r small rganizatin des nt defeat the insurgency althugh it can weaken it. The insurgency has develped a frm f lw technlgy "swarm" tactics that is superir t what the high technlgy Calitin and Iraqi frces have been able t find as a cuntermeasure. The insurgents have a natural advantage in terms f time and their temp f peratins because they are fighting a lng war r war f attritin. They d need t respnd t the pace f plitical and military events in Iraq, but they can still mve much mre slwly, swarm in cycles and episdically, and cncentrate n highly vulnerable targets at the time f their chsing. The heavy use f IEDs, suicide bmbings, shrt-term ambushes, and lw-level killings and assassinatins ensures that the expsure f insurgent frces is limited and nly a minimal insurgent presence is needed. Cncentrating n sft targets, remtely triggered IEDs and bmbs, and carefully cntrlled ambushes reduces the prfile that the Calitin can use fr intelligence cllectin, and any expsure t Calitin and the mre effective Iraqi frces units. Swarming in the frm f steadily increasing numbers f IED and lw-level attacks partially cmpensates fr the relatively lw success rate f many attacks. Media cverage, wrd f muth, and penetratin int Calitin and Iraqi gvernment peratins prvides bth intelligence and a gd picture f what tactics wrk in military, plitical, and media terms. Mvements can "swarm" slwly arund targets f pprtunity, and rely n pen surce reprting fr much f their intelligence and knwledge f cmbat effectiveness. The Internet and infiltratin frm ther natins gives them knwledge f what tactics wrk frm ther areas. The ability t "swarm" against vulnerable civil and military targets at the time f the insurgent's chsing, and fcus n plitical and media effects sharply reduces the need t fight battles -- particularly if the dds are against the insurgents. The insurgency perates bth abve and belw the level f Calitin and Iraqi cnventinal superirity. It avids battles when it can, and prefers ambushes and IED attacks that strike at Calitin and Iraqi targets with either great superirity at the lcal level r thrugh remte attacks using IEDs. It attacks vulnerable

165 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 133 Iraqi and freign civil targets using suicide bmbings, kidnappings, assassinatins, and ther tactics in ways that the Calitin and Iraqi frces cannt anticipate r fully defend against. Insurgent grups take advantage f substantial ppular supprt in sme Sunni areas t disperse and hide amng the ppulatin, frcing the Calitin and Iraqi frces t use tactics and detainments that ften alienate the peple in the areas where they attack r attempt t detain insurgents, while still allwing the insurgents t disperse and escape. These tactics deprive the Calitin and Iraqi frces f much f their ability t explit superir weapns, IS&R assets, and cnventinal war fighting expertise, and use a cuntervailing strategy fcused n Calitin and Iraqi gvernment weaknesses. Calitin and Iraqi frces are adapting but are still ften frced t fight the insurgency n the insurgency's terms. The insurgents have carefully studied the lessns f the battle f Fallujah in They realize that they d nt benefit frm majr battles against Calitin frces and are t weak t take n Calitin-supprted Iraqi frces in direct cmbat. Dispersal and cncealment are essential parts f bth survival tactics and swarming, as are effrts t wait ut the presence f Calitin frces in areas where the insurgents have been pushed ut r dispersed. The insurgents are ften able t either frce the Calitin t hld a liberated area indefinitely, r return when the Iraqi gvernment and Iraqi frces prve unable t functin effectively nce Calitin frces withdraw. They can als explit high unemplyment and ethnic and sectarian tensin when the gvernment cannt put a Sunni face n its presence and the fact that the Iraqi plice are generally unable t prvide security unless Calitin r Iraqi army/special security frces are present. The insurgents attack abve the level f Calitin and Iraqi cnventinal superirity by expliting a diverse mix f past lyalty t the Ba'ath Party, Sunni sectarianism and fears f the lss f pwer and resurces, Iraqi natinalism against freign ccupiers and Iraq "puppets," and Islam against sectarianism. Its attacks are designed t wear dwn the Calitin frces thrugh attritin and destry their base f dmestic plitical supprt. They are designed paralyze t the Iraqi gvernment and frce develpment effrt, t prevent Iraqi Sunnis frm jining the Iraqi frces and supprting the gvernment, t prvke Shi'ite and Kurdish reactins that will further divide the cuntry alng ethnic and sectarian lines, and -- in sme cases -- prvke a civil war that will bth prevent Iraq emerging as a natin and divide in ways that will create a natinal and eventual reginal struggle between ne-salafi Islamic Puritanism and ther Sunnis, Shi'ites, and secular vices. This plitical battle is mre imprtant t the success r failure f the insurgency than any aspect f the military battle. While sme Sunni Islamist extremist grups have been s extreme that they have alienated the lcal Sunni ppulatin, r even prvked attacks by Iraq Sunnis, mst have realized they need t mderate their wrds and actins t sme degree and dwnplay freign leadership and the rle f freigners. Zarqawi has either dwnplayed his rle r been pushed smewhat t the sidelines. The leading Emirs are nw said t be Iraqi, ther leaders take n pseudnyms designed t at least make them seem Iraqi and prpaganda is mre fcused n Iraq. Mst Ne-Salafi grups nw dwnplay their religius and idelgical ppsitin t Shi ites and ther branches and vices within Islam, r avid such charges entirely. At the same time, the varius Sunni insurgent grups that are tied t the Ba ath r mre natinalist bjectives have als becme mre religius, at least in terms f their public rhetric. As in ther insurgencies, finding the right public vice, and the mix f idelgy and prpaganda that prvides public supprt, is an essential tl fr bth sustained peratins and prviding the ppular base fr swarming. The prblems such changes in insurgent tactics have created fr Calitin frces is that they have ften allwed insurgents t cntinue t fight belw the threshld where US, British, and ther Calitin frces culd explit their superir cnventinal weapns and technlgy. They have kept casualties high enugh t create a serius war f attritin and have frced Calitin frces t spend at least several rders f magnitude mre n cuntermeasures than the insurgents had t spend n new weapns and tactics. The insurgents have als explited the much greater vulnerability f Iraqi frces as a means f defeating the Calitin as well as the new Iraqi gvernment. The effectiveness f these tactics has been greatly enhanced by Calitin mistakes. The US initially failed t prvide minimal facilities and equipment such as bdy armr, cmmunicatins and vehicles. While the US

166 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 134 training teams and US cmmanders in the field made steadily better effrts t rganize and train Iraqi frces t prtect themselves, the US as a whle cncentrated n manpwer numbers and then left Iraqis ut in the field t die. The seriusness f this prblem is all t clear when ne cnsiders the impact f less serius shrtfalls in equipment fr US frces. It is clear frm the Cngressinal and media reactin t the discvery that the US was slw t uparmr Humvees and trucks fr its grund frces. At the same time, it is striking that the resulting debate ver the equipment issued t US and Calitin frces failed t ask what equipment was being prvided t Iraqi frces althugh they had been a prime target f the insurgents and terrrists since late summer f 2003.

167 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 135 V. Characterizing the Insurgency Calitin and Iraqi frces must nw deal with a cmplex mix f threats which may braden sharply if the cuntry mves twards a mre intense frm f civil cnflict. The key issues deciding whether the cuntry des mve twards civil war are whether the Sunni side is dividing, the nature and effectiveness f the varius Sunni insurgent mvements, the risk that the cuntry will divide versus the prspects fr unity, and the rle that Shi ite, Kurdish and freign factins might play if the natin is plunged int a far mre serius frm f civil war. The Bush Administratin has gradually accepted the fact that it faces a very real insurgency with diverse elements that will take years t defeat. It still, hwever, tends t understate the level f the insurgent threat, and the brader risks it pses. The Administratin characterized the insurgency as fllws in the Department f Defense s Octber 2005 quarterly reprt t Cngress n the stability and security f Iraq: 476 The insurgency is primarily a Sunni Arab phenmenn and is nt a natinal mvement; it has a very narrw base in the cuntry. It cntinues t be cmprised f semi-autnmus and fully autnmus grups with a variety f mtivatins. Measuring the strength f the insurgency in terms f numbers alne des nt prvide an adequate assessment f insurgent capabilities. Insurgent numbers are a very small fractin f Iraq s ppulatin. The vast majrity f these grups are cnnected in sme way thrugh members belnging t scial netwrks (e.g., familial, tribal, and frmer prfessinal) that stretch acrss Iraq and beynd. Insurgents can als be gruped int several strands: terrrists and freign fighters, rejectinists (mstly Sunni), Saddam lyalists, and criminals. The main threat t achieving Iraqi cntrl f and respnsibility fr security in prvinces is, in the near and medium term, terrrists and freign fighters because f the psychlgical impact n the ppulatin f their terrr campaign, which appears t target Iraqi civilians indiscriminately. One ntewrthy strategic indicatr f prgress in the security envirnment is the cntinued inability f insurgents t derail the plitical prcess and timelines. This is a key bjective they are failing t achieve. As expected, there has been an increase in the average number f insurgent attacks during the perid leading t the cnstitutinal referendum. Insurgent attacks remain cncentrated in fur f Iraq s eighteen prvinces; half f the Iraqi ppulatin lives in areas that experience nly six percent f all attacks. Six prvinces reprted a statistically insignificant number f attacks based n ppulatin size. Althugh abut 80% f all attacks are directed against Calitin Frces, the Iraqi ppulatin suffers abut 80% f all casualties. Iraqi rejectinists maintain a steady level f vilence that cmplicates effrts t stabilize Iraq. Criminal elements and crruptin ften enable the insurgency. As nted, these several strands f the insurgency have failed t derail the plitical prcess, and their effrts t fment ethn-sectarian cnflict have nt been successful due in large part t key Iraqi figures calling fr restraint amng their cmmunities. Successful electins will nt likely change the freign fighters' strategy. The Iraqi rejectinists particularly thse wh are Sunni may, nnetheless, lse sme f their supprt base as the plitical prcess advances. Saddam lyalists may present a lnger-term threat t building a demcratic, prsperus Iraq because they remain fcused n creating cnditins in which they can disrupt and subvert the gvernment. Multi-Natinal Frce-Iraq peratins in several f the areas mst affected by the insurgency have cmbined with lcal cmmanders' engagement f lcal fficials, tribes, and clerics. These peratins have disrupted a number f key insurgent cells, limited their freedm f actin, and maintained cperatin with influential lcal leaders in rder t keep recnstructin and demcracy building mving frward. A significant factr enabling prgress against the insurgency is the dramatic increase in intelligence tips received frm the ppulatin in the past several mnths, indicative f increasing ppular rejectin f the insurgents. Insurgent grups cntinue t demnstrate an ability t adapt, relcate, regenerate, and sustain a campaign f intimidatin against Iraqi fficials, prfessinals, cllabratrs with the calitin, and

168 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 136 religius figures. The insurgency remains cncentrated in Baghdad, Nineveh, al-anbar, and Salah ad Din prvinces. In these areas, the insurgency sustains a level f vilence and casualties that can prduce effects that include: maintaining a nn-permissive envirnment that undermines lcal gvernance, emerging institutins, recnstructin effrts, and ecnmic grwth; inhibiting freign investment and diplmatic representatin; limiting the rles f nn-gvernmental rganizatins and cntractrs; and increasing the csts f recnstructin. Many aspects f this summary was crrect at the time, but it did underplay the cmplexity f the Sunni insurgency, ignre the rle f ther factins in Iraq s lw-level civil war, and abve all dwnplay the risk f a far mre intense civil cnflict. The Department f Defense prvided a similar characterizatin f the insurgency in its February 2006 quarterly reprt. It again claimed that the insurgency was grwing weaker and Iraq was mving twards unity: 477 A ntewrthy indicatr f prgress in the security envirnment has been the enemy s inability t derail the plitical prcess and t fment large-scale ethn-sectarian vilence. Rejectinists, Saddamists, and Terrrists have failed t achieve their cmmn peratinal bjectives t: Derail the plitical prcess. Fment large-scale ethn-sectarian vilence Deter develpment f the Iraq Security Frces Damage Iraqi public trust in the Iraq Security Frces Expand the cnflict reginally Widen their plitical supprt amng the Iraqi peple Frce the premature disengagement f the Calitin Since the last reprt, sme Sunni rejectinist grups recgnized that nt participating in the January 2005 electins was a strategic mistake. Even as they cntinued t use f cndne vilence, they attempted t advance their agendas thrugh plitical means; they succeeded in cnvincing great numbers f their Sunni supprters t vte in the Octber referendum and in the December 2005 electins It has als paved the way fr separating thse Sunnis willing t accept and wrk with the new Iraqi regime frm thse irrevcably cmmitted t vilent verthrw f the new Iraq and rule by the privileged and unelected few. The reprt elabrated n the grwing divide between al-qa ida and the mre natinalist Sunni insurgents due in part t Zarqawi and affiliated rganizatins verkill attacks n Iraqi civilians: These develpments put Sunni rejectinist grups at dds with Al-Qa ida and its affiliates, which remain intractable and ppsed t demcracy. The September 14, 2005, Al-Qa ida in Iraq declaratin f War n Shi a was the final wedge that split the bnd between Al-Qa ida, its affiliates, and the Sunni rejectinists. The Nvember 2005 Amman, Jrdan, bmbing further alienated Iraqi Sunnis and reginal Arabs wh had given either vert r tacit supprt t the insurgency. The resulting fracture alters the dynamics f the insurgency in Iraq. Previusly, the strategies f Sunni rejectinists, Al-Qa ida, and its affiliates were largely cmplementary. Nw, the tw grups lines f peratin are divergent and increasingly ppsed. These develpments cupled with successful Calitin peratins t disrupt terrrist netwrks in Ninawa and Anbar prvinces have cmbined t change the nature f the cllective enemy frces, and, as a result, the verarching term insurgency is less f a useful cnstruct tday. Previus synergy amng enemy grups is breaking apart. Saddamists remain a ptential lng-term threat due t histrical success in seizing pwer thrugh infiltratin and subversin althugh it is difficult t determine their current capabilities. Al-Qa ida and its affiliates are mving int an increasingly islated vilent psitin, while Sunni Arabs appear t be mving tward increased plitical participatin.

169 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 137 It again dwnplayed the risk f civil war and stated that while this was a cncern, sectarian cnflict remained minimal and that the risk was ften exaggerated: Terrrist grups have s far failed t create widespread sectarian cnflict, despite this being a clear gal f sme. Terrrist leader Abu Musab al-zarqawi has publicly advcated attacks that intensify sectarian tensin and has declared war n the Shi a. Al-Qa ida in Iraq has killed thusands f Shi a men, wmen, and children thrughut the year in a series f bldy suicide attacks against msques, markets, and ther lcatins where Shi a gather in large numbers. Ministry f Interir security units, which are majrity Shi a and Arab and which are suspected f being penetrated t sme degree by Shi a militias, have carried ut attacks against and detentin f Sunni Arabs that are suspected Ba athists. Ethnic tensins als exist in nrthern Iraq between Kurds and ethnic minrities, including Turkmans, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. The number f estimated sectarian incidents is lw when cmpared t ttal attacks, but the brutal methds used and the media cverage f these incidents increase cncerns that sectarian vilence culd escalate. Gvernment pwer sharing, integratin f ISF, and events such as the recent recnciliatin cnference in Cair are just sme f the initiatives underway t defuse sectarian tensins. Classifying vilence as sectarian is frequently a matter f perceptin; it is ften difficult t differentiate between attacks n citizens in general (including tribal and lcal vendettas, and pure criminal activity) and thse specifically targeting members f a particular sect. T date, the level f sectarian vilence has been spradic, but ethn-sectarian attacks may increase in an effrt t prvke reprisals. Iraqis may cunter vilence with lcalized prtectin militias, discussed earlier. Psitive statements frm religius and plitical leaders will cntinue t help damped vilent reactins t such prvcatins. In reality, the insurgency has remained a serius threat, and the risk f civil war did nt diminish after the February 22 Askariya shrine attack. US military cmmanders and U.S. fficials in Baghdad made it clear in March 2005 that cntaining the civil cnflict was nw their primary cncern. They acknwledged that the increase in sectarian vilence in the weeks fllwing the attacks was an even greater threat t U.S. effrts in the cuntry and the unity f the Iraqi state than the insurgency. Ambassadr Khalilzad warned that a majr civil war remained a serius pssibility. Secretary f Defense Dnald Rumsfeld stated that Iraq is nt in civil war at the present time. He did, hwever, admit the risk and summarize U.S. plicy plans fr respnding if civil war shuld break ut: The plan is t prevent a civil war, and t the extend ne were t ccur, t have the Iraqi security frces deal with it t the extent they re able t. 478 Chairman f the Jint Chiefs, General Peter Pace, characterized Iraq as a place that is having sme real difficulties right nw. He als gave a mre balanced assessment that seemed t indicate that whether civil war ccurred r nt was a functin f a cllective Iraqi decisin: Everything is in place if they [Iraqis] want t have a civil war everything is als in place if they want t have a united, unified future. 479 General Jhn Abizaid tld a Senate cmmittee, There s n dubt that the sectarian tensins are higher than we ve seen, and it s a great cncern t all f us. He added that the nature f the security situatin in Iraq was changing frm insurgency tward sectarian vilence. He later clarified this in the cntext f the U.S. missin in Iraq saying, sectarian vilence is a greater cncern fr us security-wise right nw than the insurgency. 480 Iraqi fficials were even mre frank. On March 19th, frmer Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi stated in a BBC interview that, "It is unfrtunate that we are in civil war. We are lsing each day as an average 50 t 60 peple thrughut the cuntry, if nt mre If this is nt civil war, then Gd knws what civil war is." Allawi said the vilence in the cuntry was mving twards "the pint f n return" and that Iraq was "in a terrible civil cnflict."

170 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 138 That same day, President Talibani stated in anther BBC interview that, "I cannt deny the danger f it, but I dn t think that nw it s that serius. It was very clse after the evidence f what happened in Samarra against these tw hly shrines, but nwadays I think that it is far frm (certain) I am afraid f anther Samarra, it wuld lead t sme kind f clashes. What is very gd and we can say it will be a big bstacle t civil war is the leaders f all parties and grups are against civil war, they are wrking twards calming dwn the streets and t bring the peple tgether Peple are feeling nw that there are mre sectarian prblems, the life cnditins are nt s gd, the levels f danger, many peple are trying t leave the cuntry...i am ptimistic because Iraqis have gt n chice. There is n pssibility f dividing Iraq. Take Kurdistan. Kurdistan cannt be independent while all the neighbring cuntries are against. Arabs f Iraq, Sunnis dn t want t separate Iraq they are dreaming t cme back and rule the cuntry. Shi ites think that they are the majrity, they think they have the right t rule the cuntry fr that there is n pssibility fr internally and als the internatinal cmmunity and the reginal gvernments are nt permitting any kind f divisin f Iraq. Fr that I am very ptimistic that Iraq will remain, and if we can achieve as much as pssible peace and security with demcracy and federatin we will have a strng and united Iraq. The Reginal, Sectarian, and Ethnic Nature f the Insurgency S far, the insurgency is largely sectarian and driven by a minrity f Sunni Arabs. As the previus chapters have shwn, is nt a natinal insurgency. Iraqi Kurds have never supprted it, and nly small numbers f Shi'ites have taken an active rle. It has been driven by a relatively small part f Iraq s Sunni ppulatin cncentrated in part f the cuntry, and many f its mst vilent actins have been led by a cadre f freign vlunteers and extremists which did nt seem likely t exceed 3,000 full time insurgents as f September Althugh there are n accurate census data, the Arab Sunni ppulatin may nly be arund 15-20% f Iraq's ttal ppulatin. Such estimates are, hwever, uncertain. The CIA placed Iraq s ppulatin at 26,074,906 as f July The CIA estimated in January 2006 that Iraq s ppulatin was 75-80% Arab, 15%-20% Kurdish, and 5% Turkman, Assyrian r ther 5%. It estimated that the sectarian split in the entire ppulatin was 97% Muslim (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), and 3% Christian. This estimate by Muslim sect, hwever, included the 20%- 25% f the ppulatin that was nt Arab, and nt just Arab Sunnis. 481 It is unclear if any accurate figure exists fr the number and percentage f Sunni Arabs, althugh electin registratins t date wuld put in clse t the 20% figure. Map V.1 shws the distributin f the ethnicities acrss Iraq s gvernates.

171 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 139 Map V.1: Ethnic Distributin and Plitical Bunderies As Figures V.1 and V.2 shw, mre than 80% f all attacks have cnsistently ccurred in nly fur prvinces, althugh they are hme t sme 42% f the ppulatin. Its main base has been Al Anbar prvince and a relatively limited number f twns and small cities in the West. If ne nly cnsiders the hard-cre Sunni insurgent areas in Western Iraq, they prbably nly have abut 6-8% f Iraq's ttal ppulatin. 482

172 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 140 Figure V.1: The Reginal and Sectarian Nature f the Fighting, Ttal Attacks by Prvince: August 29-September 16, These fur prvinces have less than 42% f the ppulatin but accunt fr 85% f all attacks These twelve prvinces accunt fr 50% f the ppulatin but nly 6% f t attacks. 0 Bag hda d Al Anb ar Sala Nin Diy h ad awa ala Din Al Tam im Babi l Al May Basr san ah Al Was Kar Qad it bala isiya Thi Arbi Qar l N f Attacks Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Reprt t Cngress, Octber 13, 2005, p Al Mut han An Naj af As Dah Sula uk yma

173 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 141 Figure V.2: Reginal and Sectarian Nature f the Fighting, Daily Attacks by Prvince: August 29, 2005-January 20, Numberf Attacksper Day 5 0 AlAnba Baghda SalahadDNinaw Diyal AlTamiBabil AlBasrah Maysa ThiQa AlQadisiyKarbal Wasit AnNaj AlMuthan Arbil AsSulaymani Dahuk Surce: Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq, DD Quarterly Reprt t Cngress, February 2006, p.26. Nte: Actual numbers are estimates based n data prvided in the reprt.

174 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 142 Estimates f Ttal Insurgent Frces Estimates f the size f the insurgency have varied widely since the struggle first became serius in August Much depends n the definitin f insurgent and the level f activity and dedicatin invlved, and virtually every intelligence surce that has such estimates has made it clear that any figures fr the ttal manning f insurgent frces are little mre than "guesstimates. The Calitin was, hwever, slw t make such guesstimates even marginally realistic. US fficials kept repeating estimates f ttal insurgent strengths f 5,000 frm rughly the fall f 2003 thrugh the summer f In Octber, they raised their estimates t a range f 12,000 t 16,000 but have never defined hw many are hard-cre and full time, and hw many are part time. As has been discussed earlier, estimates as divergent as 3,500 and 400,000 were being cited in the spring and early summer f US and Iraqi fficials have, hwever, that been cnsistently careful t nte that they are uncertain as t whether the numbers are increasing r decreasing with time as a result f US and Iraqi peratins versus increases in plitical and ther tensins that lead Iraqi Arab Sunnis t jin the insurgents. There is n evidence that the number f insurgents is declining as a result f Calitin and Iraqi attacks t date. US experts stated in the spring f 2005 that they had n evidence f a decline in insurgent numbers in spite f large numbers f kills and captures since the summer f In fact, accrding t the Ministry f Human Rights, there were a ttal f 29,565 detainees at the end f February 2006, 14, 229 f which were in MNF-I custdy. The Ministry f Justice held 8,391 f these, 5,997 were held by the Ministry f Interir, 460 by the Ministry f Defense and 488 juveniles were held by the Ministry f Labr and Scial Affairs. Nnetheless, attacks still persisted. 484 US experts als cautin that much depends n hw insurgents are defined and cunted: cre, full time, part time, sympathizers, etc. They als nte that almst all cunts nly include men althugh wmen d play an active rle in supprt functins, and a number f insurgent grups perate in a family envirnment, rather than as islated grups f men. Mixing active insurgents with families bth prvides supprt in ways that free male insurgents t act, and prvides prtective cver which can be used t charge that Calitin and Iraqi frces abusing civilians when insurgent cells and facilities are attacked. This explains why a few utlying estimates were still as lw as 3,500 full-time actives making up the cre frces in Mst US military estimates range between 8,000 and 18,000, perhaps reaching ver 20,000 when the ranks swell fr majr peratins. Iraqi intelligence fficials, n the ther hand, have smetimes issued figures fr the ttal number f Iraqi sympathizers and insurgents as high as 200,000, with a cre f anywhere between 15,000 and 40,000 fighters and anther 160,000 supprters. Newsweek quted US surces as putting the ttal f insurgents at 12,000-20,000 in late June Anther US expert was quted as saying it had sme 1,000 freign jihadists, 500 Iraqi jihadists, 15,000-30,000 frmer regime elements, and sme 400,000 auxiliaries and supprt persnnel. 485 Thrughut 2005, the numbers put frth publicly fluctuated between 15,000-20,000 fr the ttal number f insurgents. Near the fall f 2005, estimates f freign insurgents were between 700 and 2,000. That estimate stayed cnsistent int

175 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 143 The true figure may well fall smewhere with this range f different figures, but the exact number is largely irrelevant. There is n single meaningful definitin f the term. There are many different kinds f insurgents : cadres, full time, part time, sympathizers, cllabratrs and thse wh passively tlerate their actins. Insurgent leaders, cell grup leaders, cell leaders, and experts determine success r failure. In spite f many killings and arrests, these cadres have becme steadily mre experienced, adapting tactics and methds f attack as fast as the Calitin can cunter them. They have als develped netwrks with sme frm f central cmmand, planning, and financing. These are the numbers that are truly imprtant, but n ne has made a meaningful unclassified estimate f this aspect f insurgent strength. Furthermre, the ability f insurgents t find replacements is as critical as their current numbers at any given time. US fficers have repeatedly cmmented n the resiliency f the insurgency. Cl. Ed Cardn said, One thing that has really surprised us is the enemy s ability t regenerate, we take a lt f peple ff the streets, but they can regenerate very rapidly. The insurgent netwrks are cmplex, [and] diffuse. We can take ut the leadership, but it desn t take lng fr them t grw new legs. 487 Much depends n whether the insurgency cntinues t enjy enugh ppular sympathy amng Sunnis and thers t cntinue t fight, and whether the vilence f Sunni Islamist extremist grups can paralyze effrts at inclusiveness and natinal unity, r even trigger civil war. In practice, suicide bmbings by small grups f such extremists may be far mre dangerus than the lwer levels f vilence by larger mainstream Ba athist r Sunni grups. The Iraqi Insurgency vs. Other Insurgencies One can nly speculate n hw the strength Iraqi insurgency cmpares with that f ther mdern insurgencies. In August 2005, U.S. Gen. Jhn Abizaid, head f Central Cmmand, estimated that the insurgency was nly 20,000 strng, and that it culd be even less than that. This number amunted t less than ne-tenth f 1 percent f the Iraqi ppulatin. Figure V.3 displays data n seven twentieth century insurgencies analyzed in a 1963 gvernment-spnsred reprt by Andrew Mlnar. The figure shws the percentage f the ttal ppulatin represented by each respective insurgency. The average number is abut 2.4 percent, well abve the 0.1 percent that Gen. Abizaid cited fr Iraq s insurgency.

176 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 144 Figure V.3: Ratis f Insurgents t Ppulatin and Guerillas t Undergrund Members (Fr Seven Irregular Cnflicts) France ( ) Yugslavia ( ) Algeria ( ) Malaya ( ) Greece ( ) Philippines ( ) Cuntry Insurgents as % f Ppulatin Rati f Armed Guerillas t Unarmed Members f the Undergrund 0.97 % 1: % 1: % 1:3 1.9 % 1: % 1: % 1:8 Palestine 2.25 % 1:2 ( ) Surce: Adapted frm Andrew R. Mlnar, Undergrunds in Insurgent, Revlutinary, and Resistance Warfare (Washingtn, DC: Special Operatins Research Office, 1963), Page

177 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 145 Cmparisns f Insurgent and Iraqi Frces There is n way t quantify hw the trends in insurgent strength have kept pace with develpment f Iraqi military, security, and plice frces. There are als n meaningful cmparative casualty estimates, althugh MNSCT-I has issued reprts f ver 1,000 dead in the varius elements f Iraqi frces, and ne US cmmander has talked abut 15,000 insurgent and terrrist casualties. 488 In any case, the value f any numerical cmparisns f insurgent t Iraqi frces is uncertain. In sme histrical cases, the rati f security frces t insurgents has smetimes had t reach levels f 12:1 thrugh 30:1 in rder t prvide security in a given area. These, hwever, have generally been wrst cases where tiny cadres culd hide in large areas r amng large ppulatins, and where there was n plitical slutin t the prblems that created the insurgency and little r n active presence by the gvernment. In ther cases, a small number f security frces have decapitated a mvement r cell and ended the insurgency. Intangibles like the battle fr plitical perceptins and hearts and minds have ften been mre critical than the cmparative numbers f insurgents and defenders. The effectiveness f the insurgents relative t the effectiveness f their ppsitin has als generally been mre imprtant than such ratis. As the previus Chapters have shwn, threat frces have never been strng enugh t win mre than small ambushes r clashes, but their tactics and capabilities have evlved steadily thrugh the curse f the cnflict in respnse t attacks by Calitin and Iraqi frces, their wn inventiveness, and lessns learned frm ther cnflicts. It des seem clear frm the previus chapters that the he insurgents and terrrists have grwn in capability, althugh serius fighting in Fallujah, Msul, Samarra, and Western Iraqi may have reduced their size. The insurgents have learned a great deal abut hw t use their weapns, build mre sphisticated IEDs, plan attacks and ambushes, imprve their security, and lcate and attack targets that are bth sft and that prduce plitical and media impact. 489 The Intelligence and Security Prblem There are several additinal aspects f the insurgency that are an imprtant backgrund t any discussin f its individual elements. Insurgent Intelligence Capabilities Ba athists, Sunni natinalists, and Sunni Islamist extremists, all pse acute security and cunterintelligence prblems fr MNF-I and Iraqi frces. As has been tuched upn in previus chapters, the insurgents have gd surces within the Iraqi Interim Gvernment and frces, Iraqi sciety and smetimes in lcal US and Calitin cmmands. This is inevitable, and little can be dne t stp it. Iraq simply lacks the resurces and data t prperly vet all f the peple it recruits. US fficials believe the insurgent leadership is ften s well infrmed by its intelligence netwrk that it can stay ahead f US and Iraqi frces, fleeing twns befre Calitin frces arrive and slipping in and ut f the cuntry. 490 There are gd reasns fr these intelligence and security prblems. Many Iraqis nly wrk fr the gvernment r in the Iraqi frces because they cannt find ther emplyment. They may, in fact, quietly sympathize with the insurgents. Wrkers in US and gvernment facilities, and in varius aid and cnstructin prjects, are even harder t vet. Men wh d supprt the

178 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 146 gvernment are vulnerable t threats against the families, kidnappings, and actual murders f friends and relatives. The end result is that the insurgents ften have excellent intelligence frm surces within the Iraqi gvernment, Iraqi frces, the Iraqis supprting Calitin frces and gvernment activities, and Iraqi industry. This enables them t lcate sft targets, hit at key pints in terms f Iraq s ecnmy and aid prjects, and time their attacks t pints f exceptinal vulnerability. In practice, it als allws them t pick weak and vulnerable elements f the Iraqi military, security, and plice frces and ften prduce significant casualties. At the same time, in many areas they can use intimidatin, threats, kidnappings, and selective murders and assassinatins t paralyze r undercut Iraqi units. This means a cmparatively small number f cre insurgents can bypass r attack the develping Iraqi frces with cnsiderable success. The insurgents als can take advantage f new reprting n the Internet, the steady grwth f Iraqi media and near-real time news reprting, and ther media cverage f the fighting, particularly Arab satellite televisin. This cverage has ften prvided almst immediate feedback and a picture f what tactics and weapns wrk, what strikes have mst media and plitical impact, and what targets are vulnerable. This Al Jazeera Effect substitutes fr many elements f a CI system. At the same time, cnfrnting this cnfusing array f threats is made mre difficult withut general Iraqi lyalty and stand-alne Iraqi frces. Cunterintelligence and Iraqi Gvernment Effrts Sme US fficials have expressed frustratin with the Iraqi gvernment fr failing t mve quickly enugh in develping its wn intelligence agency. US and Iraqi authrities wrked tgether in a jint intelligence effrt t capture frmer Ba ath Party members, including Saddam Hussein, and Washingtn wuld like t see the same happen with Zarqawi. But accrding t US fficials, Baghdad has been unable t establish a netwrk f lcal infrmants. 491 US, allied, and Iraqi human intelligence is imprving but Calitin effrts are badly hurt by high turnver and rtatins, pr allcatin f human resurces that sharply verstaff sme areas and under staff sme key links, ver-cmpartmentalizatin, ver reliance n cntractrs, and prly designed and executed IT and secure cmmunicatins systems. Mst Iraqi netwrks serving the US in hstile areas have quality and lyalty prblems, while thers either use their psitins t settle scres r misinfrm Calitin trps. Iraqi intelligence is just beginning t take shape, and has nly limited cverage f Sunni areas. Training and equipment have imprved significantly ver time. The Octber 2005 reprt t Cngress shwed the number f tips frm Iraqi citizens had increased by mre than six fld frm 483 March, t 1,581 in April, 1,740 in May, 2,519 in June, 3,303 in July, 3,341 in August 2005 and 4,749 in September. 492 Mre recent reprting shws they ttaled 3,162 in Octber, 4,212 in Nvember, and 3,840 in December. 493 The rganizatin f effective Iraqi gvernment intelligence and cunter intelligence effrts will take at least until the end f 2005 and prbably well int Mrever, Calitin and Iraqi gvernment vulnerability is unavidable t sme extent. Aid prjects are easy t infiltrate and t target when nearing cmpletin. NGO r cntractr headquarters are easily bservable targets. Infrastructure and energy facilities are typical targets that have lng lines f pipes r wires and many vulnerable links. The media has t be careful and defensive, as d emergency wrkers and medical teams. Any natin is invariably filled with sft r vulnerable targets that experienced insurgents can, and d, target at will.

179 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 147 Financing the Insurgency The exact surces f insurgent finances are anther majr area f debate. Analysts believe that elements f Saddam Hussein s regime sught refuge in the UAE, Jrdan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria at varius pints befre, during, and after majr cmbat peratins in Iraq. Thse elements were then able t establish a financial base frm which t send funds t the insurgents n the grund. In July 2005 a senir intelligence fficer in the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Caleb Temple, testified befre the Huse Armed Services Subcmmittee n Terrrism, Uncnventinal Threats and Capabilities and the Huse Financial Services Subcmmittee n Oversight and Investigatins. Temple stated that the insurgents financiers had the cnnectins and enugh mney t fund their activities, perhaps even increase the vilence, fr sme time. He stated: 494 We believe terrrist and insurgent expenses are mderate and pse little significant restraints t armed grups in Iraq. In particular, arms and munitins csts are minimal leaving us t judge that the bulk f the mney likely ges twards internatinal and lcal travel, fd and ldging f fighters and families f dead fighters; bribery and payffs f gvernment fficials, families and clans; and pssibly int the persnal cffers f critical middlemen and prminent terrrist leaders. Temple and Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser asserted that varius criminal activities as well as certain Islamic charities als cntributed t the flw f funds t insurgents in Iraq. Vital t strangling the insurgency, Temple stated, was the ability t staunch the flw f mney. He asserted, Drying up mney and stpping its mvement degrades terrrist and insurgent peratins. It hinders recruitment and impedes curiers, disrupts prcurement f bmb cmpnents, and creates uncertainty in the minds f suicide bmbers regarding whether their families will receive prmised cmpensatin. 495 In July 28, 2005 testimny befre the Huse Armed Services Cmmittee, Glaser listed sme f the mst cmmn methds f funding the insurgency: 496 Funds prvided by charities, Iraqi expatriates, and ther deep pcket dnrs, primarily in the Gulf, but als in Syria, Lebann, Jrdan, Iran, and Eurpe; Criminal activities, such as kidnapping fr ransm, pssible narctics trafficking, rbbery, theft, extrtin, smuggling, and cunterfeiting (gds and currency). Glaser als reviewed sme f the effrts underway t help stanch these cash flws: Since March 2003, the U.S. Gvernment has fcused n the need t lcate, freeze, and repatriate Iraqi assets frm arund the wrld, as well as t find cash and ther assets within Iraq that were stlen and hidden by Frmer Regime Elements. In May 2003 the United Natins Security Cuncil adpted UNSCR 1483, which calls n U.N. Member States t identify, freeze and transfer t the Develpment Fund fr Iraq (DFI) assets f senir fficials f the frmer Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities wned r cntrlled by them r by persns acting n their behalf. The President subsequently issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13315, which authrizes the Secretary f the Treasury t freeze the assets f frmer regime elements. T date, under E.O , the Department f the Treasury has designated scres f Iraq-related entities and individuals (including 55 senir Iraqi fficials wh were named by the President in issuing E.O 13315, and 47 administrative r "derivative" designatins.) The U.S. Gvernment, in turn, submits these names t the United Natins fr listing by the UN 1518 Cmmittee under UNSCR Only a week ag, the Department f the Treasury designated six f Saddam Hussein's nephews (sns f Saddam's half brther and frmer presidential advisr, Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti), and we understand that their names have nw been accepted at the UN. Fur f the designated individuals prvided financial supprt (and in sme cases, weapns and explsives) t Iraqi insurgents. Similarly, n June 17,

180 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page , we designated, Muhammad Yunis Ahmad fr prviding funding, leadership and supprt frm his base in Syria t several insurgent grups that are cnducting attacks in Iraq. On June 9, 2005, we als designated tw assciated Syrian individuals, General Zuhayr Shalish and Asif Shalish and a related asset, the Syria-based SES Internatinal Crpratin fr their supprt t senir fficials f the frmer Iraqi regime. SES als acted as false end-user fr the frmer Iraqi regime and facilitated Iraq's prcurement f illicit military gds in cntraventin f UN sanctins. Just as there is a U.N. Security Cuncil Reslutin requiring cuntries t freeze the assets f frmer Iraqi regime elements, s t are there U.N. Security Cuncil Reslutins requiring cuntries t freeze the assets f individuals and entities related t al Qa'ida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban (UNSCR 1267) and ther glbal terrrist grups (UNSCR 1373). The U.S. implements its bligatins under these reslutins thrugh E.O T date, the Treasury Department has designated ver 400 individuals and entities under E.O These actins include individuals and entities tied t jihadist insurgency grups: -- Sulayman Khalid Darwish (January 25, 2005) (Syria-based Zarqawi supprter/financier), als designated by the UN, pursuant t UNSCR 1267; Syria jined the U.S. in c-designating Darwish at the UN. U.S. utreach effrts t cuntries in the Gulf regin are manifld, bth bilaterally and multilaterally. Fr example, just this calendar year I have persnally traveled t Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and have led the U.S. delegatin t the Middle East/Nrth Africa Financial Actin Task Frce (MENA FATF) - a new multilateral bdy that wrks t ensure the implementatin f cmprehensive anti-mney laundering and cunter-terrrist financing systems thrughut the regin. Launched in Nvember 2004, this 14- member bdy held its first plenary sessin in Bahrain in April 2005 and is preparing fr its secnd plenary sessin in September f this year, currently scheduled t take place in Beirut. This bdy has the ptential t be effective in persuading its members t implement systems t freeze assets in a timely and effective manner. We als have extensive utreach effrts t Eurpe - mst prminently the US-EU Cunter-Terrrist Financing Wrking Grup, chaired by Assistant Secretary f State Anthny Wayne. Thrugh this and ther mechanisms, we are wrking t ensure the effective and aggressive implementatin f targeted financial sanctins thrughut Eurpe. The full range f U.S. effrts against terrrist financing are crdinated by the Terrrist Financing Plicy Crdinatin Cmmittee (PCC), which is chaired by Deputy Natinal Security Advisr Juan Zarate, and includes representatives frm the Departments f the Treasury, State, Justice, and Defense, as well as representatives frm the law enfrcement and intelligence cmmunities. The Rle f Crime and Criminals There is n reliable way t distinguish insurgency frm crime. The vast majrity f Iraqi criminals prbably have limited r n ties t the insurgents. Yet sme are clearly fr hire in terms f what they target r in being willing t take pay fr sabtage r acts f vilence that help create a climate f vilence in given areas. At least sme elements in the Sunni insurgency d, hwever, wrk with criminal elements lting and sabtage campaigns. These clearly invlve sme native and freign Sunni Islamist extremists particularly in areas like kidnappings but the alliances Ba athists and Sunni natinalists have with criminal grups seem t be much strnger. They als seem t dminate the cases where tribal grups mix insurgents and criminals. Many US and Iraqi intelligence fficers believe that sme criminal netwrks are heavily under the influence f varius frmer regime elements r are dminated by them, and that sme elements f rganized crime d help the insurgency. The US Defense Intelligence Agency stated in July 2005 that sme aspect f insurgent financing was derived frm kidnapping fr ransm, drug trafficking, rbbery, theft, extrtin, smuggling and the cunterfeiting f gds and

181 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 149 currency. 497 Furthermre, at least sme Shi'ite criminal grups and vendettas use the insurgency r Sunnis as a cver fr their activities. The Impact f Crime n the Insurgency Crime affects intelligence as well as security. Independent criminals, insurgents and their criminal allies understand the limits f Calitin ability t cver the given areas and the Calitin s vulnerabilities. Many patterns f Calitin, Iraqi gvernment, and Iraqi frces activity are easily bserved and have becme predictable. Bases can ften be bserved and are vulnerable at their entrances t rcket and mrtar attacks, and alng their supply lines. There are many sft and relatively small islated facilities. The crime prblem als affects Iraqi cnfidence in the gvernment and its ppular legitimacy. Far mre Iraqis face day-t-day threats frm criminals than frm terrrists and insurgents, althugh there is n area ttally free frm the risk f attack. If Iraqis are t trust their new gvernment, if insurgents are t be deprived f recruits and prxies, and if Iraq is t mve twards ecnmic develpment and recvery, the crime prblem must be slved at the same time the insurgents and terrrists are being defeated. This is a key pririty in terms f Iraqi frce develpment because it means effective regular plicy is critical, and must have the same emphasis as develping military and security frces. The Bush Administratin summarized the impact f crime in Iraq as fllws in its Octber 13, 2005 reprt t the Cngress n Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. The reprt made it clear that crruptin was in many ways as imprtant a criminal activity as the threat utside gvernment, and that the develpment f an effective judicial and plice structure fr dealing with crime was still in the initial stages f prgress: The mst bvius indicatr f success in establishing rule f law in Iraq is prbably the crime rate. Unfrtunately, data n criminal activity in Iraq are unreliable. If such statistics becme available, they will be included in future reprts. All 869 judges in Iraq have been reviewed and 135 remved because f substantial evidence f crruptin r Ba ath Party affiliatin. All Iraqi prvincial criminal curts are als nw peratinal, althugh the number f trials prceeding in these curts varies. In sme areas, relatively few cases are tried. In general, the primary impediment t prsecuting mre cases is the ability f plice and prsecutrs t cllect evidence and prepare cases fr trial. The Calitin has therefre trained 99 judicial investigatrs, wh in Iraq assume sme f the investigative duties perfrmed by detectives in American plice departments. Training f Iraqi judges is nging, with 351 Iraqi judges having received at least sme training. The Calitin has als established a witness prtectin prgram and a judicial security prgram t prtect judges and curthuses. In additin, the Calitin is engaged in nging effrts t build Iraqi prisns and train crrectins fficers and t encurage the Iraqi gvernment t assume full respnsibility fr security internees. The Central Criminal Curt f Iraq is the curt that tries defendants accused f terrrism and crimes against the Calitin, amng ther crimes. Since its inceptin, it has cnducted 544 trials and handed dwn 522 cnvictins. (Sme f the trials invlved multiple defendants.) The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) has begun the prcess f prsecuting Saddam Hussein and ther tp fficials f his regime. Under the Iraqi system, a defendant is given a separate trial fr each event that cnstitutes a crime. Saddam is therefre likely t face multiple, different trials. The first f these trials is currently scheduled t begin n Octber 19. The U.S. Department f Justice-supprted Regime Crimes Liaisn Office cntinues t assist with preparing the IST, prviding training and ther supprt fr IST attrneys and judges.

182 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 150 The Strength f Criminal Activity Like mst aspects f the insurgency, it is difficult t knw the strength f criminal elements and the extent t which they are and are nt tied t insurgent grups. The cllapse f Saddam s regime, massive unemplyment, the disbanding f a wide range f military and security elements, the destructin f Iraq s military industries, de-ba athificatin, and sheer pprtunism have all cmbined t make rganized and vilent crime an endemic part f Iraqi sciety even in many areas where the insurgents have little real strength. Criminals are als are a pwerful frce behind lcal vigilante and militia effrts that at least indirectly challenge the legitimacy f the central gvernment. Crime has virtually the same impact as sabtage even when there is n deliberate intent t supprt the insurgency. Acts like wire and equipment theft limit the gvernment s ability t distribute electrical pwer add t the image f ineffective gvernance. Similarly, il and gas thefts add t Iraqi fuel prblems and deprive the gvernment f revenues. While mst kidnappings are almst certainly decupled frm any plitical mtive, sme may have been dne fr hire at the bidding f varius insurgent grups. At best, the end result is a climate f cumulative vilence, with sme elements f Sunni versus Shi ite tensin. At wrst, crime vastly cmpunds the gvernment and Calitins security prblems, ffers insurgent grups yet anther kind f infrmal netwrk, helps blck investment and develpment, cmpunds the prblem f hiring security frces, and undermines legitimacy. The fact that the Ministry f Interir stpped reprting meaningful crime statistics in mid-2004 makes trend analysis almst impssible. The same is true f the casualties invlved. The Ministry f Health reprted in the spring f 2005 that sme 5,158 Iraqis had died frm all frms f criminal and insurgent activities during the last six mnths f 2004, but mst experts felt such reprting might nly include abut half the real ttal. The Baghdad Central Mrgue cunted 8,035 deaths frm unnatural causes in Baghdad alne in 2004, a majr increase frm 6,012 in 2003 and a figure that cmpared with 1,800 in the last year f Saddam Hussein. The mrgue reprted that 60% f thse killed were killed by gunsht wunds and were unrelated t the insurgency. These deaths were largely a cmbinatin f crime, tribal vendettas, vengeance killings, and mercenary kidnappings. 498 It is als all t clear that the fcus n defeating active insurgents has nt been matched by similar effrts t develp effective plice frces and prisn system, eliminate crruptin, create a wrking and efficient judicial system, r create an effective system fr prsecutin. The end result is that day-t-day security, even in areas withut active insurgent activity, is ften pr t nn-existent, dependent n lcal frces r militias, and/r dependent n bribes and prtectin mney. This makes it easier fr insurgents t infiltrate, allws them t becme the de fact security frce r intimidate the ppulatin in sme Sunni areas, alienates sme f the gvernment s ptential supprters, and leads t widespread distrust f the plice and criminal justice system. The situatin has nt been helped by the relatively limited staffing f the Ministry f the Interir, the Sunni perceptin that it is Shi ite dminated, and the fact that the Calitin advisry effrt remained limited and understaffed thrugh Octber 1, when it was rerganized and put under the MNSTC-I. In the early mnths f 2006, there appeared t be an increase in the number f abductins fr ransm, and attacks and fllw n rbberies f lcal businesses. Many f these acts, hwever, are difficult t dinstinguish frm nging sectarian vilence and the perpetratrs are nt easily

183 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 151 identified. It is likely a mix between insurgent grups, militias, rganized crime and simple criminals. By the end f March 2006, Iraqi plice said that as many as 30 peple are reprted kidnapped every day. 499 It is likely that many kidnappings g unrecrded hwever, as families prefer t pay the ransm rather than invlve the plice wh may be invlved in the abductin. In ne instance, a British-trained surgen received a phne call at his practice frm the Mujahideen wh asked fr a dnatin t help ur cause. They made a suggestin f 10,000 dllars in exchange fr prtectin. The dctr, given tw days t cllect the mney, fled t Jrdan when he received a text message threatening his life. 500 In anther case, men claiming t be frm an anti-terrrist squad walked int a medical supply stre and remved 40,000 dllars frm the safe. They prceeded t kidnap the wner s sn and detained him until the family paid 40,000 dllars, nly a fractin f the 250,000 dllars they riginally demanded. 501 A string f these kidnappings and assaults happened in March: 502 March 8, 2006: 50 emplyees are abducted frm a Baghdad security cmpany. March 24, 2006: In the Saydiyah district, suth f Baghdad, gunmen killed fur pastry shp emplyees March 26, 2006: Gunmen in military unifrms kidnapped 16 peple frm an Iraqi exprt cmpany in central Baghdad. March 28, 2006: In three separate incidents, gunmen, many in military unifrms wearing masks, kidnapped 24 peple frm tw electrnics stres and a currency exchange stealing thusands f dllars in the prcess. March 29, 2006: Gunmen identifying themselves as MOI plice entered the ffices f a cnstructin firm and lined up the emplyees, killing 8. They abducted the manager and fled the scene. In ne day in March, 21 peple were abducted in fur separate incidents. 15 men dressed as members f the Iraqi Army dragged six peple ut f a mney exchange shp and stle almst 60,000 dlllars. In tw ther similar events, men wearing MOI unifrms kidnapped individuals frm tw electrnics shps. 503 A jint U.S.-Iraqi raid in late March, allegedly n a Shi ite msque, resulted in the resuce f ne Iraqi hstage wh had been threatened with trture and death by militia men if his family did nt pay 20, Abu Sufiyan, a well knwn Baghdad businessman, was fund dead with signs f trture even after his family had paid $120,000 t secure is release. 505 The fcus n wealthy Iraqi s caused sme well-ff individuals t mve t pr neighbrhds, sell their prperty r businesses and live mre mdestly in general t avid attracting the attentin f criminals, kidnappers r assassins. In many cases, individuals wh had survived their abductins said that the gangs had btained extensive, ften cnfidential infrmatin, n their assets and wrth. 506 While small-scale crime and crruptin were rampant, there were als larger criminal enterprises taking advantage f the general lack f security and authrity. In April 2006, Iraqi plice busted an il smuggling ring attempting t exprt mre than 50,000 metric tns f il t Syria. This was t be sent ver in 1,200 trucks and was the equivalent f 400,000 barrels rughly a fifth f

184 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 152 Iraq s daily prductin valued at 28 millin dllars. The seizure f the il and the arrest f thse invlved was the largest anti-smuggling effrt ever by Iraqi authrities and was the culminatin f mre than a mnth f investigatin and surveillance. 507 VI. The Dminant Rle f Iraqi Sunni Arab Insurgents There is n debate amng experts ver the fact that Sunni Arabs dminate the insurgency. There are serius debates ver the extent t which the insurgency is nw dminated by Ne-Salafi Islamist extremists r whether there are still large numbers f insurgents that are mre natinalist, secular, and pr-ba ath in character. Similar debates have emerged ver hw unified and crdinated the varius insurgent grups are, ver the extent t which they have nn-iraqi leaders and members, and ver pssible cnflicts between the Ne-Salafi Islamist extremist grups and ther mre natinalist Iraq insurgent grups and Iraqi Arab Sunnis wh wish t jin the plitical prcess r simply be left t get n with their lives. As is the case with effrts t estimate the ttal manning f the insurgents, there are n reliable estimates f the numbers f the varius types f Sunni insurgents, r breakdwns f their strength by mtivatin and grup. Sme 35 Sunni Arab "grups" have made sme kind f public annuncement f their existence, r claimed respnsibility fr terrrist r insurgent attacks althugh many may be little mre than cells and sme may be effrts t shift the blame fr attacks r make the insurgent mvement seem larger than it is. 508 There seem t be at least three main grups f insurgents but ther grups may simply be cver names, cells r elements f ther larger grups, r little mre than tribal r clan grupings, since sme lcal elements f the Sunni insurgency have strng tribal affiliatins r cells. The Sunni elements f the insurgency clearly invlve a wide range f disparate Iraqi and freign grups, and mixes f secular and Islamic extremist factins. There are elements tied t frmer Ba athist fficials, and t Iraqi and Sunni natinalists. There are elements cmpsed f native Iraqi Sunni Islamists, grups with utside leadership and links t Al Qa ida, and freign vlunteers with little real structure -- sme f which seem t be seeking Islamic martyrdm rather than clearly defined plitical gals. An verwhelming majrity f thse captured, killed, and detained t date, hwever, have been Iraqi Sunnis. The leading insurgent grups cmplicate analysis because they may use several different names, rganize themselves int cmpartmented subgrups, and are increasing rganized s that their cadres are in relatively small and specialized cells. Sme cells seem t be as small as 2 r 3 men. Others seem t perate as much larger, but nrmally dispersed grups, capable f cming tgether fr peratins f as many as men. These subgrups and cells can recruit r call in larger teams, and the lss f even a significant number f such cells may nt cripple a given grup. Even if it did, several Sunni grups perate in mst high threat areas. Tribal and clan elements play a rle at the lcal level, creating additinal patterns f lyalty that cut acrss idelgy and plitical gals. In ne dcumented incident, a Sunni tribe in Samarra tried and publicly executed al-qa'ida members fr the murder f a lcal sheik after an interrgatin. 509 The stated bjectives f varius grups range frm a return f sme frm f Ba athist like regime t the creatin f an extremist Sunni Islamic state, with many Iraqi Sunnis acting as much ut f anger and fear as any clearly articulated gals. The varius insurgent and terrrist grups ften cperated, althugh there are indicatins f divisins between the mre-ba ath riented Iraqi Sunni grups and sme f the Sunni Islamic

185 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 153 extremist grups with utside ties r directin. At least sme Sunni grups were willing t cnsider negtiating with the new gvernment, while Islamist extremist grups were nt. This led t threats and sme vilence between varius Sunni factins. 510 At the same time, the threat cntinues that Sunni Arab extremists will prvke smething appraching a full-scale civil war. They have stepped up suicide and ther attacks n Shi ites and Kurds. Many f these attacks have clearly been designed t blck effrts at including Sunnis in the gvernment and t try t prvke Shi ites and Kurds int reprisals that will make a stable natinal gvernment impssible t achieve. The cnstant Sunni insurgent effrts t divide the cuntry alng sectarian and ethnic lines culd radically alter the balance f pwer if Iraq des drift int full-scale civil war. There is als the risk that new insurgent grups culd emerge. A vilent split between the Arab Shi'ites and Kurds remains pssible, as d such splits within the majr Shi'ite factins inside and utside the gvernment. Barring such divisins, hwever, the insurgency will remain largely Iraqi and Sunni dminated. CENTCOM estimated in the summer f 2005 that 90 percent f the insurgency was Iraqi and Sunni, with a maximum f 10 percent freign cntributin t insurgent manpwer. 511 While relatively small, this freign element is recgnized as almst exclusively Sunni, a particularly vilent segment f the insurgency, and idelgically driven by Ne-Salafi extremism. Likewise, the freign element is seen as an imprtant surce f mney and materiel supprt t the insurgency. The Areas f Majr Sunni Insurgent Influence The main Sunni insurgent grups are cncentrated in cities ranging frm areas like Msul and Baghdad; in Sunni-ppulated areas like the Sunni Triangle, the Al Anbar Prvince t the west f Baghdad, and the s-called Triangle f Death t the sutheast f Baghdad; and in Sunni areas near the Iraqi and Turkish brders. As a result, fur f Iraq s prvinces have bth a majr insurgency threat and a majr insurgent presence. At the same time, they have cntinued t lack the idelgical chesin and peratinal crdinatin necessary t mbilize Iraqi Sunni Arabs with ptimal effect. Sunni insurgents have exerted cnsiderable sway--at varius pints--in Fallujah, Rawa, Anna, Haditha, Ramadi, Rutbah, Qaim, Ubaydi, Karabilah, Haqliniyah, Barwanah, Tal Afar, and thers. They have nt, hwever, established lng-term cntrl ver safe havens frm which t perate, and Calitin assaults have disrupted cntinuus insurgent cntrl in such areas and the creatin f insurgent sanctuaries. General Jhn Abizaid, cmmander f the US Central Cmmand, has said that the fur prvinces with particularly difficult security situatins are western Baghdad, Al Anbar, Nineveh and Salahuddin. 512 Yet, even in these areas -- where insurgents have significant lcal influence -- much f the ppulatin is divided and nly limited areas have nrmally been under active insurgent cntrl. In Octber f 2005, a Cngressinal reprt nted that the insurgency remained cncentrated in fur f Iraq s eighteen prvinces: Baghdad, Al Anbar, Ninewah, and Salah ad Din. As has already been shwn in Figure V.1, these fur prvinces have less than 42% f the cuntry s ppulatin but accunt fr 85% f the vilence. 513

186 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 154 Al Anbar is bth Iraq s largest prvince (rughly the size f Belgium), and ne f its least ppulated rughly ne millin peple ut f Iraq s 27 millin. It is at least 90% Sunni Arab, and ffers a rute t a ptential sanctuary in Syria, and has brders with Jrdan and Saudi Arabia as well. Aside frm Fallujah, the area immediately surrunding the Euphrates, and its agricultural areas have becme a key perating area fr insurgents. S have the twns alng the Iraqi-Syrian where insurgents have take advantage f the desert and rugh terrain fr smuggling and dispersal. While it has sme majr cities, it has lng been a tribal area where the gvernment has exercised limited cntrl. Given these factrs, it is scarcely surprising that it has been a center f the Sunni insurgency, and sme estimates indicate that 500 f the 1,630 US servicemen killed in Iraq during the war up t June 2, 2005, died in Al Anbar. It is ne f the few areas where insurgents have penly ccupied twns and set up check pints, and large numbers f Jrdanian truck drivers have been killed n the rad frm Amman in an effrt t break up lines f supply. 514 Sunni Islamist Extremist and Ne-Salafi vs. Natinalist Insurgents Experts differ n hw much insurgent grups cmpete r crdinate, and hw different their gals are. The grups that make the mst use f public statements and the Internet d tend t advance cmmn themes. They at least claim t be Sunni Islamist in character, and insurgent web sites d reflect a shift twards the use f mre religius rhetric and themes ver time. Like many ppsitinist and radical mvements, hwever, it is nt always clear what such Islamist claims really mean. Leaders may be true believers and strngly supprt Ne- Salafi beliefs, but such Puritanism des nt really set clear gals fr the future. It seems likely that mst leaders and the vast majrity f Sunni insurgents knw far mre abut what they are against than what they are fr. This des give them a cmmn set f targets and t sme extent means they pursue a cmmn strategy. At the same time, a number f intelligence, Calitin, and Iraqi gvernment experts feel the insurgents d divide int tw majr grups. The first are largely native Iraqi Sunni insurgents. They still seem t be primarily natinalist in character. They are nt seeking reginal r glbal Jihad, but rather the ability t influence r cntrl events in Iraq. In general, native Iraqi Sunni natinalists want t return t a gvernment clser t the Ba'athist regime. They may be religius, but a secular regime under Sunni cntrl is acceptable. Their primary gal is t regain the pwer they nce had, r at the minimum btain their fair share f pwer and nt be subject t Shi ite rule.. Anger, revenge, ecnmic need, ppsitin t the US invasin and any gvernment that grws ut f it r sheer lack f hpe in the current system are all mtives as well. The secnd cnsists f Sunni ne-salafi insurgents particularly thse led by harder-line ne-salafi figures like Zarqawi. These grups have different gals. They believe they are fighting a regin-wide war in Iraq fr a frm f Sunni extremism that nt nly will eliminate any presence by Christians and Jews, but als create a Sunni puritan state in which ther sects f Islam are frced t cnvert t their interpretatin r are destryed. Mst f these grups avid attacking ther sects f Islam, at least publicly and have made a grwing effrt t identify themselves as Iraqi rather than as grups dminated by freign leaders are influence. Others, like the grup led by Zarqawi, are mre extreme. These ne-salafis have little f mainstream Islam's tlerance fr peples f the bk, but they have n tlerance f ther interpretatins f Islam. Such insurgents are knwn in the Muslim wrld as Takferies a term that refers t grups that base their idelgy n determining wh is a believer in their view. They see thse wh d nt fit their definitin f piety as apstates. T sme, particularly the grup led by Zarqawi, all ther Islamic sects like Shi'ites and even ther Sunnis, are effectively nnbelievers r Kafirs

187 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 155 Such generalizatins have severe limits and uncertainties. There is n way t knw hw many Iraqis supprt the ne-salafi and ther Sunni extremist elements f the insurgency, any mre than there are any precise cunts f the freign vlunteers wh supprt them. It is unclear hw many members f Sunni extremist grups actually supprt the grup s idelgical gals rather than act ut f anger, misinfrmatin, and/r a naïve search fr martyrdm. It is als imprtant t pint ut that Sunni Puritanism des nt, in itself, mean advcating vilence against ther Islamic sects r thse utside Islam. Other Sunni puritan mvements call Shi ites and ther sects heretics (bid a), attacker f Gd s unity (tawhid), and even as advcates f plytheism (shirk). Sme extremist puritan Salafis preachers have called Shi ites apstates, and advcate shunning them, hating them, and scrning them as rawafidh (which means rejectinists; a reference t the Shi ites rejectin f electing Abu Bakr as the first Caliph after the death f the Prphet ver Ali, Islam furth Caliph and Shi ites first Imam). Yet, such religius rhetric has rarely taken the frm f vilence. Like Christian and Jewish extremists, wrds d nt necessarily mean a cmmitment t actin. 515 Sme traditinal Salafist grups and traditinal Shi ite grups have cexisted and wrked clsely tgether. Ntable examples include Hezbllah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine. In additin, the Muslim Brtherhd cperated with Iran after the revlutin in 1979, despite sme f the cuntry s actins against Iranian Sunnis. The Nature and Rle Ne-Salafi and Islamist Extremist Grups The idelgical belief structure f the varius Ne-Salafi and ther Islamist extremist grups is hard t characterize. They are far mre plitical and military activists than thelgians. As such, they are nt puritans in the sense f Wahhabi, nr are they Salafis in the traditinal sense f the wrd. While they are Islamist, they are nt s much religius as cmmitted t a vilent struggle fr their beliefs. Their freign leaders and cadres have been created in past wars, and their Iraqi members have been created since the Calitin invasin f Iraq. Religin has prven t be an imprtant factr in the cmpsitin f these grups and extending their reach int the Iraqi ppulatin. There have been reprts that sme natinalists have jined ranks with these ne-salafi grups in Iraq. Mwaffak Rubaie, Iraq s Natinal Security Advisr, was quted as saying, Religin is a strng mtive. Yu are nt ging t find smene wh is ging t die fr Ba athists. But Salafists have a very strng message. If yu use the Kran selectively, it culd be a weapn f mass destructin. 516 An Addictin t Vilence and Extremism The vilent Sunni ne-salafi and ther Sunni Islamist extremist grups d, hwever, clearly differ frm ther Sunni insurgents in their willingness t use vilence against nn-cmbatants and the inncent and in their willingness t use vilence against ther Muslims. They are far mre willing t use extreme methds f vilence, like suicide bmbs, against Shi'ite and Kurdish targets. They are equally willing t use these methds f attack against Iraqi fficials and Iraqis in the military, security, and plice services, and Iraqis f all religius and ethnic backgrund that d nt supprt them in their interpretatin f jihad. Mrever, sme have been willing t act n the principle that rdinary Iraqi citizens can be sacrificed in a war fught in Gd s cause. These Sunni Islamic extremists are fighting a war that extends thrughut the wrld, nt simply in Iraq, and their gals affect all Arab states and all f Islam.

188 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 156 It als seems clear that many such insurgents d nt believe they have t win in Iraq, at least in any cnventinal sense f the term. They d nt need t restre Sunni pwer r cntrl, at least in the near term. Simply driving the US and its Calitin allies ut f Iraq in a war f attritin is seen as a key gal and wuld be seen as a majr strategic victry. An utcme that left Iraq in a state f prlnged civil war, and frces a spreading cnflict in Islam between Sunnis and ther sects, and ne-salafists and ther Sunnis, is seen a prelude t a brader eschatlgical cnflict they believe is inevitable and that Gd will ensure they win. They are nt fighting a limited war -- at least in terms f their ultimate ends and means. Cmprmise is at best a temprary actin frced upn them fr the purpses f expediency. True Ne-Salafis als seen the insurgency are part f a general war fr the cntrl and sul f Islam, rather than Iraq. If anything, they ultimately gain the mst if the Sunni and Shi ite wrlds divide, if Iraq becmes the cntinuing scene f vilence between the US and Arabs, if US frces remain tied dwn, and if their actins create as much reginal instability as pssible. This means there are n clear limits t the willingness f sme f the mre extreme Sunni Arab insurgent elements t escalate, even if this means trying t drive the natin int a civil war they cannt win. They are als likely t escalate even further as their situatin becmes mre threatened. Ne-Salafi extremist grups, such as that f Abu Musab Zarqawi are the main causes f suicide bmbings and mass attacks n civilians, especially the nes directed against the Shi ites. Zarqawi has been ambiguus in his permissibility f attacking ther Muslims and has issued varius statements, sme f which sanctin attacks n Iraqi Shi ites, and thers emphasizing that such casualties shuld be avided. Such ne-salafi extremists have used religius rhetric effectively in Iraq, and have tried t link the cnflict in Iraq t ther Muslim struggles in Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Their statements and recruitment tapes start with references t these cnflicts and tie their struggle in Iraq as part f this wrldwide Islam vs. the West cnflict. Such grups extend their cmmitment t vilence t ther Sunnis and Iraqis, althugh they differ ver hw willing they are t state this publicly. Until September f 2005, mst Sunni Islamist extremist grups were generally careful t avid any pen claims f a split with Iraqis Shi ites, and sme cperated with Sadr and his militia. Since, they have carried ut mass attacks and bmbings n Shi ites, and they have repeatedly shwn that they place few -- if any -- limits n the means f vilence against thse they regard as enemies f Islam. Frm the viewpint f negtiatin and deterrence, this belief structure means that many cadres and leaders f such grups and cells cannt be persuaded, nly defeated. Furthermre, they nt nly will remain alienated and vilent --almst regardless f what the gvernment and ther Sunnis and Sunni insurgents d -- they will remain active diehards until they are rted ut, mve n t new cuntries r areas if frced t disperse, and jin ther extreme Sunni Islamist mvements if the nes they currently supprt are defeated. Guessing at Their Strength N ne can reliably estimate hw many such ne-salafi extremists there are in the field. N ne fully understands hw many mvements and cells are invlved. It seems fairly clear, hwever, that such ne-salafi grups are a driving frce in the insurgency. It is als fairly clear that they are tactical and lethal in their vilence in Iraq.

189 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 157 The mst visible grups r names fr a mix f affiliates including Sunni Islamist grups like Al Qa'ida and Ansar al Sunna, and mre natinalist r "Ba'athist grups like the Victrius Army Grup. Mre than 35 grups have claimed t exist at varius times. Their numbers include grups like the Supprters f the Sunni Peple. Sme surces put the number at ver 100, but these ttals seem t include mere frnts and Sunni grups that are mre secular r affiliated with the Ba'ath. The names include grups like the Men's Faith Brigade; the Islamic Anger, Al Baraa bin Malik Suicide Brigade; and the Tawid Lins f Abdullah ibn al Zbeir. A study f Internet websites and pstings by SITE fund mre than 100 grups claimed t exist in varius prclamatins and Sunni Islamist websites. Of these, SITE fund that 59 were claimed by Al Qa'ida and 36 by Ansar al Sunna. Anther eight grups claimed t be perating under the directin f the Victrius Army Grup, and anther five grups claimed t be perating under the 20th f July Revlutin Brigade. 517 Wrk by the Crisis Grup fund at least 14 largely ne-salafi grups had web pages, and that large numbers f brigades and frmatins existed that had sme degree f autnmy r independence. 518 It als fund that the majr grups were lsely linked in an infrmal Majlis, althugh it is unclear hw real such a bdy is, hw ften it meets, r what it des. The majr grups d seem t have cadres f leaders, planners, financers, and "armrers." These may r may nt cntrl a given peratin; have jurisdictin ver a given grup f cells, r simply supply affiliates. It is clear that Al Qa'ida smetimes claims attacks are crdinated by different elements. Fr example, an Octber 24, 2005 attack n the Palestine and Sheratn Htels in central Baghdad was claimed by the "Attack Brigade," the "Rckets Brigade," and "Al Baraa bin Malik Suicide Brigade" It was far frm clear wh was really invlved. As these names indicate, sme grups als seem t specialize in given type f attacks, and ther n given types f targets. Sme, fr example, nly seem t attack Calitin targets while thers (the "Omar Brigade"?) attacks Iraqi elements such as the Badr Organizatin n the grunds they attack Sunnis. Insurgent grups ften act alne, r claim affiliatin with ther rganizatins. Sme, such as the Ansar, r "Suicide" Brigade, create cnfusin because their name implies they are members f ne grup but claim affiliatin with anther. The Ansar Brigade claims claim an affiliatin with Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia. Al Qa'ida, hwever, penly assciates itself with nly sme f the grups that claim affiliatin with it. The high degree f cmpartmentalizatin, islatin, and independence f such mvements nt nly helps prtect them and enables them t perate as infrmal distributed netwrks; it makes their strength fluid and extremely hard t estimate. As Bruce Hffman f the Rand Crpratin pinted ut, "There is n center f gravity, n leadership, n hierarchy; they are mre a cnstellatin than an rganizatin. They have adpted a structure that assures their lngevity." Abdul Kareem al-eniezi, the minister fr natinal security, has said that, "The leaders usually dn't have anything t d with details Smetimes they will give the smaller grups a target, r a type f target. The grups aren't cnnected t each ther. They are nt that rganized." 519 When it cmes t estimating the number f Ne-Salafi and ther Sunni Islamist extremist grups relative t ther insurgents, sme experts guesstimate the number f Islamist extremist insurgents at as little 5-10 percent f the ttal insurgents withut being able t say what base number they are a percent f, r distinguishing cre insurgents frm part timers r sympathizers.

190 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 158 As has been nted earlier, US experts and fficers smetimes make reference t a ttal f 20,000 insurgents f all kinds, but such experts are amng the first t state that these numbers are mre nminal mid-pints in a range f guesses than real estimates. Other experts estimate the ttal number f Sunni insurgents and active sympathizers insurgents f all kinds at ttals frm 15,000 t 60,000, with far larger numbers f additinal passive sympathizers. These guesstimates wuld put the Sunni Islamist extremists at anywhere frm 1,500 t 6,000. Sme estimates d put the ttal number f ne-salafi Sunni extremists much higher. 520 Anthny Llyd f the Lndn Times has stated that, "An intelligence summary, citing the cnglmeratin f insurgent grups under the al-qa ida banner t be the result f rebel turf wars, mney, weapnry and fear, cncluded that f the estimated 16,000 Sunni Muslim insurgents, 6,700 were hardcre Islamic fundamentalists wh were nw supplemented by a pssible further 4,000 members after an amalgamatin with Jaysh Muhammad, previusly an insurgent grup lyal t the frmer Ba athist regime." Given the difficulty in distinguishing cre activists frm part time r fringe activists, n ne can discunt such estimates. The fact is, hwever, that such estimates again highlight the level f uncertainty surrunding a number f key aspects f the insurgency Key Islamist Extremist Grups There is a brad cnsensus ver which Islamist extremist grups are mst imprtant, but little cnsensus ver their relative strength and pwer, and the nature f the smaller grups. The State Department Estimate While the varius Sunni Islamist extremist grups are in a cnstant state f flux, the unclassified assessments in the US State Department Cuntry Reprts n Terrrism, prvided the fllwing descriptin f the key Islamist grups as f April 2005: 521 Iraq remains the central battlegrund in the glbal war n terrrism. Frmer regime elements as well as freign fighters and Islamic extremists cntinued t cnduct terrrist attacks against civilians and nncmbatants. These elements als cnducted numerus insurgent attacks against Calitin and Iraqi Security Frces, which ften had devastating effects n Iraqi civilians and significantly damaged the cuntry s ecnmic infrastructure. Jrdanian-brn Abu Mus ab al-zarqawi and his rganizatin emerged in 2004 t play a leading rle in terrrist activities in Iraq. In Octber, the US Gvernment designated Zarqawi s grup, Jama at al Tawhid wa al-jihad, as a Freign Terrrist Organizatin (FTO). In December, the designatin was amended t include the grup s new name Tanzim Qa idat al-jihad fi Bilad al-rafidayn (r The al-qa ida Jihad Organizatin in the Land f the Tw Rivers ) and ther aliases fllwing the merger between Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden s al-qa ida rganizatin. Zarqawi annunced the merger in Octber, and in December, bin Laden endrsed Zarqawi as his fficial emissary in Iraq. Zarqawi s grup claimed credit fr a number f attacks targeting Calitin and Iraqi frces, as well as civilians, including the Octber massacre f 49 unarmed, ut-f-unifrm Iraqi Natinal Guard recruits. Attacks that killed civilians include the March 2004 bmbing f the Munt Lebann Htel, killing seven and injuring ver 30, and a December 24 suicide bmbing using a fuel tanker that killed nine and wunded 19 in the al-mansur district f Baghdad. In February 2004, Zarqawi called fr a sectarian war in Iraq. He and his rganizatin sught t create a rift between Shi a and Sunnis thrugh several large terrr attacks against Iraqi Shi a. In March 2004, Zarqawi claimed credit fr simultaneus bmb attacks in Baghdad and Karbala that killed ver 180 pilgrims as they celebrated the Shi a festival f Ashura. In December, Zarqawi als claimed credit fr a suicide attack at the ffices f Abdel Aziz al-hakim, leader f the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq (SCIRI), ne f Iraq s largest Shi a parties, which killed 15 and wunded ver 50.

191 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 159 Zarqawi has denied respnsibility fr anther significant attack that same mnth in Karbala and Najaf, tw f Shi a Islam s mst hly cities, which killed Iraqi civilians and wunded mre than 120. Terrrists perating in Iraq used kidnapping and targeted assassinatins t intimidate Iraqis and third-cuntry natinals wrking in Iraq as civilian cntractrs. Nearly 60 nncmbatant Americans died in terrrist incidents in Iraq in Other American nncmbatants were killed in attacks n calitin military facilities r cnvys. In June, Zarqawi claimed credit fr the car bmb that killed the chairman f the Calitin-appinted Iraqi Gverning Cuncil. In April, an American civilian was kidnapped and later beheaded. One mnth later, a vide f his beheading was psted n an al-qa ida-assciated website. Analysts believe that Zarqawi himself killed the American as well as a Krean hstage, kidnapped in June. Zarqawi tk direct credit fr the September kidnapping and murder f tw American civilians and later their British engineer c-wrker, and the Octber murder f a Japanese citizen. In August, the Kurdish terrrist grup Ansar al-sunna claimed respnsibility fr the kidnapping and killing f 12 Nepalese cnstructin wrkers, fllwed by the murder f tw Turkish citizens in September. Many ther freign civilians have been kidnapped. Sme have been killed, thers released, sme remain in their kidnappers hands, and the fate f thers, such as the directr f CARE, is unknwn. Other terrrist grups were active in Iraq. Ansar al-sunna, believed t be an ffsht f the Ansar al-islam grup funded in Iraq in September 2001, first came t be knwn in April 2003 after issuing a statement n the Internet. In February 2004, Ansar al-sunna claimed respnsibility fr bmb attacks n the ffices f tw Kurdish plitical parties in Irbil, which killed 109 Iraqi civilians. The Islamic Army in Iraq has als claimed respnsibility fr terrrist actins. Apprximately 3,800 disarmed persns remained resident at the frmer Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK) military base at Camp Ashraf; the MeK is a designated US Freign Terrrist Organizatin (FTO). Mre than 400 members renunced membership in the rganizatin in Frty-ne additinal defectrs elected t return t Iran, and anther tw hundred were awaiting ICRC assistance fr vluntary repatriatin t Iran at the end f the year. PKK/ KADEK/Kngra Gel, a designated freign terrrist grup, maintains an estimated 3,000 t 3,500 armed militants in nrthern Iraq, accrding t Turkish Gvernment surces and NGOs. In the summer f 2004, PKK/KADEK/Kngra Gel renunced its selfprclaimed cease-fire and threatened t renew its separatist struggle in bth Turkey s Sutheast and urban centers. Turkish press subsequently reprted multiple incidents in the Sutheast f PKK/KADEK/Kngra Gel terrrist actins r clashes between Turkish security frces and PKK/KADEK/Kngra Gel militants. The State Department reprt als prvided a mre detailed descriptin f the rle f Ansar al- Islam (AI) (a.k.a. Ansar al-sunnah Partisans f Islam, Helpers f Islam, Kurdish Taliban): 522 Ansar al-islam (AI) is a radical Islamist grup f Iraqi Kurds and Arabs wh have vwed t establish an independent Islamic state in Iraq. The grup was frmed in December In the fall f 2003, a statement was issued calling all jihadists in Iraq t unite under the name Ansar al-sunnah (AS). Since that time, it is likely that AI has psted all claims f attack under the name AS. AI is clsely allied with al-qa ida and Abu Mus ab al-zarqawi s grup, Tanzim Qa idat al-jihad fi Bilad al-rafidayn (QJBR) in Iraq. Sme members f AI trained in al-qa ida camps in Afghanistan, and the grup prvided safe haven t al-qa ida fighters befre Operatin Iraqi Freedm (OIF). Since OIF, AI has becme ne f the leading grups engaged in anti-calitin attacks in Iraq and has develped a rbust prpaganda campaign. AI cntinues t cnduct attacks against Calitin frces, Iraqi Gvernment fficials and security frces, and ethnic Iraqi grups and plitical parties. AI members have been implicated in assassinatins and assassinatin attempts against Patritic Unin f Kurdistan (PUK) fficials and Calitin frces, and als wrk clsely with bth al-qa ida peratives and assciates in QJBR. AI has als claimed respnsibility fr many high prfile attacks, including the simultaneus suicide bmbings f the PUK and Kurdistan Demcratic Party (KDP) party ffices in Ibril n February 1, 2004, and the bmbing f the US military dining facility in Msul n December 21, Its strength is apprximately 500 t 1,000 members, its lcatin and area f peratin is primarily central and nrthern Iraq The grup receives funding, training, equipment, and cmbat supprt frm al-qa ida, QJBR, and ther internatinal jihadist backers thrughut the wrld. AI als has peratinal and lgistic supprt cells in Eurpe.

192 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 160 Other Estimates Virtually all surces agree that tw key Iraqi Islamist extremist grups include the ne led by Abu Musab al-zarqawi, first knwn as al-tawhid wal-jihad, r Unity and Hly War, and nw knwn as Tandhim Qa idat al-jihan fi Bilad al-rafidayn r as the al-qa ida f Jihad Organizatin in the Land f Tw Rivers. The secnd easily identifiable grup with significant numbers f freign vlunteers is the ffsht f Ansar al-islam, r Prtectrs f Islam, an Islamist grup created in the Kurdish regins in September 2001, called Ansar al-sunna, r Prtectrs f the Sunna Faith. Ansar suffered a jint attack frm Kurdish and US frces in March 2003, frcing many f its fighters t scatter, pssibly t Iran, befre several allegedly settled in Msul. Tw ther grups, and their area f peratin, include: 523 Al-Muqawama al- Iraqiya al-wataniya al-islamiya Fayaliq Thawrat 1920 r the Iraqi Natinal Islamic Resistance the 1920 Brigades: West Baghdad, Ninewah, Diyala, and Anbar. Al-Jibha al-wataniya litahrial- Iraq r the Natinal Frnt fr the Liberatin f Iraq and which seems t be an umbrella fr grups f Islamists and natinalist, namely the Islamic Army f Iraq, the Army f Mhammad, the Iraqi Resistance Frnt, the Iraqi Liberatin Army, and the Awakening and Hly War: Fallujah, Samarra, and Basra The Crisis Grup Estimate The Crisis Grup believes that Sunni Islamist grups have cme t dminate the insurgency and develped a list in early 2006, which it summarized as fllws: 524 Tandhim al-qa ida fi Bilad al-rafidayn (al-qa ida s Organisatin in Mesptamia). Frmerly al-tawhid wal-jihad (Mntheism and Jihad), the grup has been shaped by the persnality f its purprted funder, Abu Mus ab al-zarqawi. The grup claims t have 15 brigades r battalins (Katiba, plural Kata ib) perating under its banner, including tw martyrs brigades, f which ne allegedly cmprises exclusively Iraqi vlunteers. Jaysh Ansar al-sunna (Partisans f the Sunna Army). 525 The grup reprtedly is an ffsht f Jaysh Ansar al-islam (the Partisans f Islam Army); a jihadi rganisatin previusly based in Kurdistan and which by mst accunts has ceased t perate in Iraq. (Tellingly, a grup claiming affiliatin with Jaysh Ansar al- Sunna, Jaysh al-sunna wal-jama a publishes a magazine in Kurdish). The grup claims t have sme 16 brigades. It has cmmitted sme particularly vilent attacks. Al-Jaysh al-islami fil- Iraq (the Islamic Army in Iraq). Thirteen brigades have claimed allegiance t this grup. Again, the grup s highly Salafi discurse blends with a vigrusly patritic tne. It is widely seen bth in Iraq and in the West as ne f the armed grups that is mre natinalist in character and mre likely t turn away frm armed struggle if a suitably inclusive plitical cmprmise is pssible. The authrs f the Crisis Grup study disagree and argue that, The perceptin that al-jaysh al-islami fil- Iraq cmprises chiefly frmer regime fficers while Tandhim al-qa ida is a gathering f freign militants is misleading. Undubtedly, Tandhim has tapped int freign vlunteers wh are ready t die, but the lgistics f suicide attacks (smuggling, hsting, training, and equipping vlunteers, gathering intelligence n targets, etc.) require slid rting in Iraqi sciety and capabilities Iraqis alne can prvide. The make-up f al-jaysh al-islami fil- Iraq may well invlve a cre f experienced Iraqi fficers and ther members f the frmer regime, but unseasned and devut cmbatants, as well as Iraqi salafi preachers with cnnectins thrughut the Muslim wrld ught nt be excluded. Indeed, such mixed cmpsitin, as well as crss dependencies (jihadis rely n lcal netwrks, and n internatinal surces f finance and legitimacy), help explain in part the relative hmgeneity in discurse. Al-Jabha al-islamiya lil-muqawama al- Iraqiya (the Islamic Frnt f the Iraqi Resistance), knwn by its initials as Jami (msque r gathering). This grup culd be mre akin t a public relatins rgan shared between different armed grups, rather than an armed grup in itself. Issuing regular, weekly updates f

193 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 161 claimed attacks, it als has a cmprehensive website and publishes a lengthy, mnthly magazine als called Jami. Deeply natinalistic, but with a slight Salafi taint, its discurse cunts amng the mre sphisticated f the grups. Jaysh al-rashidin (the First Fur Caliphates Army). As many as six brigades reprtedly perate under its banner. The grup issues regular updates n its activities and f late has recently set up a website. Jaysh al-ta ifa al-mansura (the Victrius Grup s Army). At least three brigades are knwn t have pledged alliance t this grup, which als issues weekly updates. Jaysh al-mujahidin (the Mujahidin s Army). This grup t puts ut weekly updates and perates a website, which was briefly shut dwn and suspended in December Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiya fil- Iraq (the Islamic Resistance s Mvement in Iraq), which at sme stage Kata ib Thawrat Ashrin (the 1920 Revlutin Brigades) appears t have jined. Jaysh Muhammad (Muhammad s Army), which issues peridic cmmuniqués and vides fcusing n IED attacks in the Anbar gvernrate. Asa ib Ahl al- Iraq (the Clans f the Peple f Iraq). Saraya Al-Ghadhab Al-Islami (the Islamic Anger Brigades) Saraya Usud Al-Tawhid (the Lins f Unificatin Brigades) Saraya Suyuf al-haqq (the Swrds f Justice Brigades). This grup tk respnsibility fr the Nvember 2005 kidnapping f fur peace activists frm the Christian Peacemaking Team. Its rigins and affiliatin remain murky, althugh it claims t perate under the banner f Jaysh al-sunna wal-jama a, a recent ffsht f Jaysh Ansar al-sunna. It is imprtant t nte that the Crisis Grup created this list largely n the basis f the public statements by varius insurgent grups, and that the grups differed significantly in histry and credibility. The first five grups were seen as having significant peratinal status. The secnd fur cnsisted f grups that tk credit fr military actins but which tended t use far less elabrate and stable channels f cmmunicatin than the abve fur, althugh their public statements shwed beliefs similar t thse f al-jaysh al-islami and Jami. The last fur grups lack regular means f cmmunicatin and rely instead n peridic claims f respnsibility thrugh statements r vides. The Crisis Grup als had cunted sme 50 different brigades by December 2005, that had claimed t carry ut military actin r terrrist attacks under the name f ne majr grup r the ther. It reprted that, In traditinal Arab military parlance, a brigade cmprises frm 100 t 300 men, which wuld add up t a ttal f rughly 5,000 t 15,000 insurgents. By the time the Crisis Grup issued the reprt in February 2006, nne f these grups made frmal attacks n Shi ite sectarianism, but virtually all f the active grups did repeatedly attack Shi ite targets. All made repeated effrts t establish their credibility by prviding detailed n military and terrrist peratins. They claimed t act ut f Islamic hnr and tended t dwnplay r ignre their wrst actins, they attacked US and Iraqi gvernment actins fr crimes and atrcities, and accused the Shi ites and Kurds f sectarian and ethnic separatism ignring their wn fcus n Shi ite and Kurdish targets. It was the Shi ites and nt the Kurds, hwever, which they generally accused f using death squads, cmmitting crimes, and fighting dirty wars. In practical terms, hwever, there seemed t be n clear limits t the willingness f the mre extreme Sunni Arab insurgent elements t escalate, even if this meant trying t drive the natin

194 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 162 int a civil war they culd nt win. As a result, sme are likely t escalate even further as their situatin becmes mre threatened. It seems almst certain that many cadres and leaders f such grups and cells cannt be persuaded, nly defeated. Sme nn-islamist extremist grups will remain alienated almst regardless f what the gvernment and ther Sunnis d, and will mve n t jin the mst extreme Islamist mvements. Al Qa ida in the Tw Rivers and the Zarqawi Factr Zarqawi s Tandhim Qa idat al-jihan fi Bilad al-rafidayn, r al-qa ida f Jihad Organizatin in the Land f Tw Rivers, is nly ne Sunni Islamist extremist insurgent grup. Views differ regarding the size f al-qa ida f Jihad Organizatin in the Land f Tw Rivers, hw much cntrl is exercised by Zarqawi, the depth f its ties t Bin Laden and Al Qa ida, hw many f its current fighters are Iraqi versus nn-iraqi, and hw many ther Islamist extremist grups exist and hw independent they are f Zarqawi and Al Qa'ida. This debate heightened in 2006, when it seemed that Zarqawi had either given up frmal leadership fr plitical and prpaganda reasns, r had been pushed int a sideline psitin. A number f grups have claimed affiliatin with Zarqawi and Al Qa ida in the Tw Rivers since early 2004, but it is unknwn hw clsely tied many f these grups are t Zarqawi. It is likely that sme f them either nly claim him as an inspiratin, r perate as almst ttally independent grups and cells. This seems t include a number f elements rganized alng tribal lines. Sme experts believe that the Calitin, mst analysts and the media have demnized Zarqawi, have verestimated the imprtance f al-qa ida in Iraq, and have made ne element f the insurgency the symbl f a much mre cmplex mix f mvements. This may be true t sme extent, but there is n questin that Zarqawi and al-qa ida have has becme the names that dminate much f the reprting n the Islamist extremist aspects f the insurgency. The Zarqawi Organizatin Structure and Its Strength There is n cnsensus ver hw al Qa ida has rganized its peratins in Iraq, r ver hw its structure has changed ver time. On Nvember 10, 2005 the Calitin released a diagram (Figure VI.1) shwing the makeup f the Zarqawi netwrk. At a news cnference describing the US military s prgress in capturing Zarqawi peratives, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch tld reprters: 526 The insurgency is brken int three grups: terrrists and freign fighters, Iraqi rejectinists and Saddamists. We believe that the terrrists and freign fighters are the mst lethal grup f the insurgency. And it is indeed an rganized grup, and the face f that grup is Zarqawi -- al Qa ida in Iraq Over the last several mnths, we've been able t kill r capture ver 100 members f al Qa ida in Iraq. Since I've talked t yu abut this graphic last, we have indeed taken ut ne additinal tier-ne member. Reminder: tier ne are thse peple wh have direct access t Zarqawi. They are Zarqawi's lieutenants. They are his trusted advisers. They have visibility in al Qa ida peratins nt just in Iraq but als acrss the entire Middle East. And when Zarqawi lses a tier-ne member, he's lsing ne f his mst trusted advisers. The Ramadi military leader was killed in an peratin in Ramadi a week ag, Abu Abdullah, alng with 12 additinal terrrists. S ne mre tier-ne individual killed. Tier tw: tier-tw leadership plan and facilitate peratins in a regin f Iraq. They are respnsible fr flw f mney, fr flw f infrmatin, fr flw f munitins, and flw f freign fighters. Since we talked last, tw additinal tier- tw members have been killed r captured, bth in Msul -- the emir f Msul and the chief f Msul security. Since we talked last, 15 additinal tier-three members have been killed r captured. These are the individuals wh cntrl cells, lcal cells -- bth Iraqis and freign fighters -- serving as cell leaders.

195 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 163 Figure VI.1 lists 38 Tier 2 and 71 Tier 3 peratives killed r captured. Accrding t the US military, the influence f freign fighters was mst predminant in the tier-three. Speaking abut the new develpments, Lynch said: we have great success at killing r capturing his leaders, his cell leaders, his crdinatrs and his lieutenants, and this chart just cntinues t expand, and eventually, he s ging t be n this chart. 527 Manpwer des nt seem t have been a critical prblem in spite f Calitin successes. Zarqawi seems t have been able t recruit mre vlunteers after the fighting in Fallujah, and substantially mre vlunteers fr suicide bmbings after the January 30, 2005 electins brught a Shi ite and Kurdish dminated gvernment t pwer. The same has been true since the ffensives in western Iraq later in It is nt clear whether such recruiting has strengthened his mvement, r simply helped t cpe with the cnstant attritin caused by MNF-I and Iraqi attacks. A number f experts feel al-qa ida prbably ttals less than 2,000 full and part time men -- including bth Iraqis and freigners -- and prbably with a cre strength f n mre than several hundred The verall rle f freign fighters is described in mre detail later in this analysis, but they have clearly played an imprtant rle in al-qa ida. In the spring f 2004, US fficials estimated that there might be a cre strength f fewer than 1,000 freign fighters in Iraq r as many as 2,000. A few press estimates went as high as 10,000 befre the fighting in Fallujah, but seemed t be sharply exaggerated. It seems likely that the cadres f freign vlunteers in al-qa ida have been well under 500 men. The number f freign vlunteers with ties t al-qa ida detained by the Calitin and Iraqi gvernment has remained relatively lw. Hwever, sme MNSTC-I and Iraqi experts felt in early that s many vlunteers were cming in acrss the Syrian and ther brders that the ttal was rapidly increasing. 528 This helped make imprving brder security a tp Calitin and Iraqi gvernment pririty in January and February 2005, and a factr in a majr Marine ffensive in the Syrian brder area in May

196 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 164 Figure VI.1: Zarqawi s Netwrk in Tier I Have direct ties t AMZ Dr. Muhsin Assistant t Abu Aqil Baghdad AQIZ OPERATIVES KILLED OR CAPTURED THROUGH 7 NOVEMBER 2005 TIER I Abd al Satar Abu Sayf Emir f Chief, Msul Msul Security Abu al-abbas Baghdad SVIED /FF Cell Leader Abu Abdallah Ramadi Military Leader Abu Hassan AMZ Frger / Gatekeeper Abu Azzam Emir f Iraq Abu Talha Emir f Msul Dr. Hassan Media Chief Abu Abd al-aziz AMZ Senir Leader Baghdad Abu Zaynab Abu Abd al-rahman Hisham Abu Omar a.k.a. Abu Majid Emir f Hit Gatekeeper/Safehuse AQIZ Curier Abu Bakr, Emir f Facilitatr/RamadiEmir Baghdad/Rawah Emir f Hit Kurdish Regin Khallad Abu Rim a.k.a. Adel Freign Fighter Media Chief/ Facilitatr, MsulCmputer Expert TIER II Abu Qutaybah Abu Zayd AMZ Curier Emir f Gatekeeper West Msul Abu Aisha Emir f Haditha Abu Ibrahim Replaced Abu Islam In Hussayabh Abu Umar a--kurdi Master VBIED Builder, Baghdad Abu Fatima Emir f Msul Ghassan Amin Abu Uthman Emir f AMZ Driver/ Rawah Safehuse Prvider Abu Ali Emir f West Al Anbar Abu Aqil AQ Deputy f Iraq/ Emir f Baghdad Abu Ali Emir f Msul Abu Umar FF Leader frm Msul Abu Ahmed Emir f Baghdad Abu al-fath Facilitatr in Msul 38 Tier II Leaders in lcal and reginal areas Mullah Birwa Abu Ahmad Mahmud Saynt Abu Barra Abu Islam Abu Zubayr Abu Sayf al-urdani Abu Mahmud Emir f Operatinal Emir Senir AssistantLeader f Abu Islam Emir f Msul AMZ Chief f Baghdad Military German y Cmmander, Hit f Hit t Abu Talha Grup, Al Qaim Security / Bdyguard Cmmander TIER III Abu Hassan Abu Anas Muhammad DahamKhamis a.k.a. Abu Abu Sirhan AQIZ Cell Leader Ramadi Insurgent Seba, Frmer Assistant t Cell Leader Ar Ramadi Leader Intel Officer Abu Talha Wald Muhammed Abu Dijana Nashwan Mijhim Abu Dua Farhan al Zubaydi Al Qaim Muslet BeheaddingFreign Fighter AQIZ Barber Prpagandist Leader Facililtatr Abu Mahmud Terrr Cell Leader Abu Saud Freign Fighter Facilitatr Abu Asil Abu Raghad Freign Fighter Freign Fighter Facilitatr Cell Leader Abu Talha Ubaydi Cell Leader Abu Usama Husaybah Cell Leader Abu Salman Husaybah Cell Leader Abu Umar Husaybah Cell Leader Abu Hamza Husaybah Cell Leader Abu Maria Fahad Prpaganda FRE/Cell Chief, Msul Leader, TWJ Walid Dr. Muhammad Abu al-izz Abu Shahed Abu Zayd Media Operative Assciate f Cell Leader Assciate Ramadi VBIED Cell Abu Rim Msul Abu Abd al-qadir Leader in Saqlawiyah Abu Junaid Jamal Abu Muhannad Abu Ra d Ahned Mashandani Abu Yunis Abu Asim Abu Umar sl-kurdi Baghdad Cell Leader, FRE Cell Leader Baghdad VBIED Husaybah Freign Assciate Cell Leader Msul fr JTWJ Cell Leader Fighter Facilitatr Fadhil Mashadani Abu Hamza Abu Saddam Abu Mahmud Abu Khattab Baghdad Ba ath Abductin f Baghdad SVIED/ Msul SVBIED AMZ Military Leader Jeffrey Ake FF Cell Leader Cell Leader Facilitatr Abu Fatima Baghdad Cell Leader Abu Zubar Abu Hassan Abu Ali Cell Leader, Assciate f Abu AMZ Safe Msul Umar al-kurdi Huse Abu Uthman Abu Qutayba Cell Leader, Cell Leader Msul Dawrah/Baghdad Abu Faris Msul Cell Leader Abu Yahya AQIZ Media Cell Member New Additin Abu Rayyan Abu Da ud Abu Usama Khattab Chief f OpnsRamadi SVBIED AMZ Driver AQIZ/FF SVIED, Baghdad Cell Leader Facilitatr Fuad Khalid Affar Hamza Cell Leader, Msul Abu Muhajir Abu Uthamn Abu al-bara, Abu Freign Fighter Msel Net, Assc. Khalid Facilitatrs, Facilitatr, Msul f AbuBara Assc f Abu Abd al-aziz Abu Ali Kidnapping Hstage Negtiatr Abu Samra Baghdad Intelligence Abu Walid FRE Leader/ Financier Abu Haydar IED\Hstage Cell Ramadi Imad, AAA Lieutenant Financial Supprt Abu Khayrullah Cell Leader, Msul Rakan Cell Leader, Baghdad Abu Raid Emir f Abu Ghraib Hudayfah Satter Assciate f Abu Rim /Dr Hassan Abu Ma adh AAA Driver Abu Ali Cell Leader Msul Abu Ja far Baghdad VBIED Builder Hajji Ibrahim Assciate f Abu Talha Qutaybah AQIZ Baghdad Attack Planner Abu Umar Abu Khayrullah Cell Leader, Msul Baqubah Cell Leader Kawa Majid Abdullah Azzam Assciate Tameen Cell Leader Msul Layth al-alwani Ramadi Cell Leader Abu Hamza Key Planner Chemical Attack Msul Airfield Abu Hassan Abu A zam Media Cell Assciate f Abu Member Umar al-kurdi Abu Sayf Baghdad SVIED /Cell Leader 71 Tier III Iraqi & Freign Fighters, many serving as cell leaders Surce: MNF-I Briefing with Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, Nvember 10, Available at

197 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 165 The Zarqawi Hunt While US claims abut the imprtance f the killings and captures f Zarqawi s senir lieutenants have smetimes seemed exaggerated as have claims t have nearly killed r captured Zarqawi there have been many real successes. On January 10, 2005, then Prime Minister Allawi annunced that Izz al-din Al- Majid, a chief Zarqawi financier, was arrested in Fallujah in early December Al Majid had mre than $35 millin in his bank accunts and cntrlled $2 t $7 billin f frmer regime assets stlen frm Iraqi gvernment accunts. His bjective, accrding t interrgatrs, was t unite the insurgent grups Ansar al-sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, and the Islamic Resistance Army. Since that time, the appendix t this reprt shws that MNF frces have killed r captured many ther such senir cadres. In July 2005, US Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff General Richard Myers annunced that the Calitin had captured a lng sught after battlefield cmmander, Abu Abd-al-Aziz. Accrding t the US military, al-aziz had led a freign fighter cell in Fallujah up until the US tk cntrl f the city. Fleeing the city, al-aziz apparently came t Baghdad and earned the mniker the Amir f Baghdad amng fellw insurgents. 530 Later that mnth, the US military annunced the capture f what was described as an Al Qa ida cmmander and clse cnfidant t Zarqawi. Khamis Farhan Khalaf Abd al-fahdawi, r Abu Seba, was captured with apprximately 30 ther terrrist suspects. It is believed that Seba played a rle in the murder f Egypt s ambassadr and in the attacks n the Pakistani and Bahraini envys. An Internet psting purprtedly written by Zarqawi s grup claimed that Seba was a lw-level leader f a cell in Baghdad and that the US frces were inventing ranks t prtray an image f success in taking dwn the terrrist netwrks. 531 Nt lng after, an Egyptian insurgent named Hamdi Tantawi was captured by Iraqi plice in the twn f Yusufiya, alng with weapnry, cmputers, and mney. It is believed that Tantawi financed insurgent peratins and allegedly was a lieutenant t Ayman al-zawahiri, the secnd mst recgnized internatinal Al Qa ida figure behind Osama bin Laden. Further details were unavailable, and it is unclear whether Tantawi was perating independently r crdinating with Zawahiri and/r Zarqawi. If he were as clse t Zawahiri as suggested by the press reprts, it wuld suggest that the crdinatin between the ld guard Al Qa ida leadership and the Al Qa ida in Iraq grup is far clser than previusly thught. It wuld als suggest that Bin Laden and Zawahiri are perhaps nt as hard pressed and n the run alng the Afghan brder with Pakistan as has largely been assumed. US military spkesman General Kevin Bergner tld reprters n September 16 that jint peratins between Iraqi and US frces in nrthern Iraq had captured r killed 80 senir leaders since January In late September 2005, the US military annunced it had killed tw senir members f Zarqawi s grup. Abu Nasir, believed t be Al Qa ida in Iraq s leader in Karabilah, was killed near the brder with Syria n September 27. Tw days earlier, US frces in Baghdad sht and killed Abdullah Najim Abdullah Mhamed al-jawari, als knwn as Abu Azzam. Thught t be Al Qa ida in Iraq s N. 2 man, Abu Azzam was the leader f the insurgency in Iraq s Anbar Prvince. Recent imprvements in US human intelligence, imprved technical intelligence,

198 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 166 targeting f insurgents, and mre develped infrmants, are believed t have cntributed t the success f the tw peratins. 533 Arund the same time, sldiers f the 2 nd Battalin, 1 st Infantry frm the 172 nd Stryker Brigade, knwn as 2-1, captured mre than 180 suspected terrrists. In late Octber, the 2-1 killed a terrrist cell leader and his assistant, crippling an al Qa'ida terrrist cell in Msul. The terrrists, identified as Nashwan Mijhim Muslet and Nahi Achmed Obeid Sultan, were killed during a raid n their safe huse n Octber 22. Muslet and Sultan were behind at least three videtaped beheadings and had terrrized Msul residents thrugh radblcks, extrtin and kidnappings. 534 In early Nvember, the US military annunced it had killed tw reginal terrrists in an peratin in the twn f Husaybah, n the Syrian brder. Accrding t a US military press release, the tw men, identified as Asadallah and Abu Zahra, were key al Qa ida in Iraq terrrist leaders. The statement described the tw men in the fllwing way: 535 Asadallah was a senir al Qa ida in Iraq terrrist leader and freign fighter facilitatr in the Husaybah area. Asadallah cmmanded several terrrist and freign fighter cells in the Husaybah, and al Waim regin. Asadallah als crdinated the funneling and distributin f freign fighters frm Syria int the Husaybah area as well as their emplyment as suicide bmbers. His freign fighters were respnsible fr numerus suicide bmbings in the regin. He als directed, planned and executed many f the terrrist attacks n Iraqi security and calitin frces. Abu Zahra, a clse assciated f the current al Qa ida in Iraq Emir f Husaybah. As a clse persnal friend and cnfident t the Emir f Husaybah he acted as an assistant, helping run the day t day activities f the terrrist rganizatin. Zahra tk an active rle in planning and crdinating attacks against Iraqi security and Calitin frces. He additinally was reprted t prvide lgistical supprt fr varius terrrist cells in the area. This supprt included prviding weapns and ammunitin, arranging husing, and mney fr freign fighters and terrrists perating in the area. Als in Nvember, US fficials reprted that they had cme clse t capturing Zarqawi n at least three ccasins. The military said it was using eavesdrpping satellites, unmanned drnes and U-2 spy planes t gather intelligence n the insurgency and t track Zarqawi s mvements. US frces were als helping Iraqis in the intelligence prcess. 536 US fficials d believe they have been clse t catching Zarqawi n several ccasins. In the past, US frces have strmed restaurants and hspitals after receiving reprts abut Zarqawi sightings. The US military believes it came clsest t capturing Zarqawi in February 2005, when the insurgent leader jumped ut f a truck as it apprached a US checkpint utside Ramadi. Zarqawi s driver and bdyguard were captured, and a large amunt f cash alng with Zarqawi s laptp cmputer was seized. There may have been ther near misses. Accrding t a senir US intelligence fficial: Several times we have shwed up at places where we knw he was hurs r days earlier. But the intelligence we get is never fresh enugh. US fficials believe Zarqawi has slipped in and ut f Iraq during the past few years, traveling t Jrdan, Syria and Iran t raise funds and recruits fr the insurgency. 537 US assertins that they were getting clser t Zarqawi intensified in the fall f In late Nvember, US Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad tld CNN, His [Zarqawi s] days are numbered, he is ging t be ultimately fund Either he will be brught t justice r he will die in the battle t capture him, but we are getting clser t that gal every day. A lt f calitin frces and experts are wrking hard n this it's nt a questin f whether but when. 538

199 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 167 On Nvember 19, US and Iraqi frces surrunded a tw-stry huse in the mstly Kurdish area f eastern Msul, after receiving intelligence that Zarqawi might be hiding there. Calitin trps encuntered fierce resistance by the insurgents, heightening suspicin that a high-value target like Zarqawi was inside the huse. Three f the eight insurgents killed during the threehur raid blew themselves up rather than be captured alive. Immediately fllwing the raid, US frces sealed the huse. Speculatin that Zarqawi might have been killed in the raid grew after Iraqi Freign Minister Hhshyar Zebari tld the Jrdanian Petra news agency that DNA tests were being carried ut n the bdies. But the gvernr f Nineveh prvince, Duraid Kashmula, tld the Washingtn Pst n Nvember 21 that there was nly a 30 percent chance that ne f the bdies was that f Zarqawi adding, We ve had dry hles befre. 539 US fficials, hwever, remained cautius. On Nvember 22, a tp US cmmander in Iraq said there was abslutely n reasn t believe Zarqawi had died in the raid and Ambassadr Khalilzad eched that assessment, saying, I d nt believe that we gt him. But his days are numbered we re clser t the gal, but unfrtunately we didn t get him in Msul. 540 The fllwing day, Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia issued a statement n an Islamic web site denying their leader had been killed. The statement said the grup had waited t respnd t the rumrs f Zarqawi s death until this lie tk its full length t let Muslims knw the extent f [the media s] stupidity and shallw thinking. 541 In late Nvember 2005, US fficials believed the best intelligence shwed Zarqawi was perating in western Baghdad. But Iraq s Interir Minister Bayan Jabr tld ABC News in mid- Nvember that the Iraqi gvernment had evidence that Zarqawi had been injured in Ramadi smetime in Octber r early Nvember. These cnflicting reprts suggested Zarqawi remained as elusive. 542 US fficials als claimed that mre and mre Iraqis were cming frward with tips n his whereabuts fllwing the Nvember 9 bmbings in Amman. 543 But while the military s elite Task Frce 145 cntinued the mre than tw year ld hunt f the elusive leader f the insurgency, the public diswning f Zarqawi by his wn tribe after the Nvember 9 bmbings may ultimately d mre t hasten his capture. What is clear is that al-qai da remains a majr frce in the insurgency. Its frces have been capable f what are relatively large ffensive peratins by insurgent standards, such as the spring 2005 attack n Abu Ghraib prisn. Many f the insurgent frces the US Marine Crps fught in its ffensive alng the Euphrates and near the Syrian brder in May 2005 either had ties t Zarqawi r were part f mixes f Zarqawi lyalists and ther Iraqi Sunni insurgents. Al-Qa ida and ther extremist rganizatins still have the capability t target Shi ite Iraqi s in an effrt t heighten civil cnflict in early in early Accrdingly t sme uncertain reprts, al- Qaida was als still capable f capable f rganizing large-scale assaults against strngly defended calitin psitins. In March 2006, the Ministry f Interir claimed plt was uncvered that invlved an attempt by 421 al-qa ida members t stage an attack n the Green Zne. These recruits were, accrding t Interir Minister Bayan Jabr, a bureaucrat s signature away frm acceptance int the Army battalins charged with guarding the gates t the Green Zne. After gaining access t the area, the fighters planned n strming U.S. and British embassies taking thse inside hstage. Several Defense Ministry fficials were implicated as insiders in the plt and subsequently jailed. 544 It

200 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 168 is imprtant t nte, hwever, that Calitin surces never cnfirmed the existence f such a plt. In March f 2006, wanted terrrist Rafid Ibrahim Fattah (aka Abu Umar al Kurdi) was killed in an early mrning raid. Abu Umar had ties t Jaysh al Islami, Ansar al Sunnah, Taliban-members in Afghanistan, extremists in Pakistani, as well as senir al-qaeda leaders including bin Laden and al-zawahiri. 545 Zarqawi Ties t Bin Laden and Outside Sunni Islamist Grups Al Qa ida in Iraq has strengthened its ties t utside terrrist grups. In Octber 2004, Zarqawi publicly pledged allegiance t Bin Laden and changed the name f his rganizatin frm Al Tawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Hly War) t Al Qa ida in the Land f the Tw Rivers. 546 While there is n evidence that the tw men have ever met r even directly cmmunicated, Bin Laden issued a statement in December 2004 cnfirming Zarqawi as the Emir f Al Qa ida in Iraq. This linkage is part f a brader prcess. Mvements like the Army f Ansar al-sunna, which claimed respnsibility fr the attack n the US mess tent in Msul in December 2004 and fr many ther suicide attacks, seem t have a mix f links t Zarqawi and pssibly Al Qa ida. They seem t be largely Iraqi, but their mix f Sunnis and Kurds is uncertain, as is the extent t which the grup and its cells are at least partly a legacy f Ansar al-islam an active Islamist grup that reprtedly prvided sanctuary fr Zarqawi befre the war. In Nvember 2004, Ansar al- Sunna claimed that it had twice cllabrated with Zarqawi s grup and anther grup knwn as the Islamic Army in Iraq. In February 2005, a leaked US intelligence mem indicated that an intercepted cmmunicatin, reprtedly frm bin Laden t Zarqawi, encuraged Iraqi insurgents t attack the American hmeland. 547 Even s, US intelligence analysts view bin Laden and Zarqawi as separate peratrs, and it remains unclear as t what if any rganizatinal r financial supprt Bin Laden prvides Zarqawi s rganizatin. 548 Accrding t US intelligence fficials, Zarqawi has surpassed Bin Laden in raising funds: Right nw, Zarqawi is fighting the war, and [Bin Laden] is nt wh wuld yu give mney t? But a Justice Department fficial dwnplayed the mney issue, saying: 549 It s nt like Jhn Gtti running arund Manhattan in fancy suits and limusines We are talking abut a man wh is perating in an area that is extremely primitive, in a very clandestine manner and with a huge netwrk f peple that d his cmmunicatins fr him and surrund him and prtect him. Zarqawi s financial independence frm Bin Laden was seemingly cnfirmed in a 2005 letter t Zarqawi purprted t be frm Al Qa'ida's N. 2, Ayman Al Zawahiri. In the letter, discussed in detail belw, Zawahiri asks Zarqawi t send funds t the Al Qa'ida leadership. Anther Zarqawi letter, written n April 27, 2005 by ne f his assciates (Abu Asim al Qusayami al Yemeni), seemed t reflect Zarqawi s cmplaints abut the failure f sme f his vlunteers t martyr themselves. This was typical f the kind f cmplaints he has used bth t try t lever mre supprt frm Bin Laden and gain mre supprt frm Arabs utside Iraq. 550 Sme analysts believe that Bin Laden made a strategic errr by declaring Zarqawi the emir fr peratins in Iraq. Iraqis are deeply distrusting f utsiders and, in particular, neighbrs in the regin. Bin Laden s declaratin culd be seen by Iraqis in highly natinalistic terms as a Saudi rdering a Jrdanian t kill Iraqis. These analysts believe that this will mtivate thse Iraqis wh were previusly weary f the plitical prcess, t ffer their supprt t the elected gvernment.

201 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 169 Zarqawi and Attacks n Sunnis and Civilians Zarqawi appears t have made sme effrts t remake his rganizatin s reputatin t reduce tensins with Iraqi Sunnis, and pssibly Iraqi Shi ites as well. Al Qa ida website prnuncements claimed that the grup had tried t avid Muslim casualties with the ntable exceptin being the Iraq military and security frces. They quickly denunced attacks n civilians like the massive suicide car bmbing in Hilla in March Zarqawi has, hwever, advcated attacks n Shi ites and said he views them as apstates. It was clear that many bldy suicide bmbings and ther attacks had supprt frm elements lyal t Zarqawi, and that many were sectarian attacks n Shi ites r ethnic attacks n Kurds. U.S. military analysts believed that by the spring f 2006, Zarqawi s rganizatin carried ut 90% f all suicide attacks in Iraq. 552 It is nw unclear if any Shi ite element, including many f Sadr s supprters, is willing t cperate with such Sunni extremist grups. A tape attributed t Zarqawi in May 2005, was anything but reticent. 553 In the ne hur and 14 minute tape, he explained why Muslim civilians were being killed in his attacks and justified the killing n the basis f research by Abu Abdullah al Muhajer. He claimed that many peratins were cancelled because they were ging t kill large numbers f Muslims, but mistakes were made and we have n chice it s impssible t fight the infidels withut killing sme Muslims. He stated that Muslims were killed in 9/11, and attacks in Riyadh, Nairbi, and Tanzania. He added that if these were cnsidered illegitimate then it wuld mean stpping jihad in every place. He said that Iraq s gegraphy made direct cmbat with the enemy difficult, and the nly way arund this was t intensify cmbat thrugh suicide peratins. He cntrasted Iraqi terrain t Afghanistan s muntains and t Chechnya s wds, where it was easier fr the mujaheddeen t have a safe place t hide and plan after fighting with the enemy. He stated that it was difficult fr the mujaheddeen t mve in Iraq because f the checkpints and the US bases. Suicide peratins were easier t carry ut, mre efficient, and culd effectively frce the enemy t leave the cities fr places where it wuld be easier t sht them. These peratins are ur weapn...if we stp them jihad will be weaker If the enemy gets full cntrl f Baghdad it will implement its plan and cntrl the whle natin. The whle wrld saw what they did in Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca and prisns in Qut, Najaf and Karbala that s when they did nt have full cntrl, s what wuld happen if they d? Zarqawi claimed his grup never attacked ther sects in Iraq wh are nt cnsidered Muslims, but fught the Shi ites because they assist the enemy and are traitrs. Accrding t Zarqawi, the Shi ites nly pretend they care abut civilian casualties He als claimed there was a plan t eliminate the Sunnis in Iraq, and that Sunni msques were being handed ver t Shi ites and that Sunni clerics, teachers, dctrs and experts were being killed. He claimed that Sunni wmen were being kidnapped and that Shi ite plice participated in raping wmen at Abu Ghraib. He claimed there were widespread abuses at Iraqi gvernment-run prisns. These accusatins included prisn in Qut which he said was being run by Iranian intelligence and a prisn in Hilla run by a Shi ite majr general called Qays (evidently Majr General Qays Hamza, chief f al Hillah plice), wh cuts Muslims bdies and rapes wmen. He mentined a specific stry where Qays threatened t rape the wife f ne f the fighters. He said his fighters unsuccessfully tried t kill Qays. In fact, there was a web statement dated March 30 th abut a suicide bmbing in Hilla that targeted Majr General Qays. 554

202 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 170 Anther tape -- attributed t Zarqawi -- aired n July 6, In the tape, Zarqawi reaffirmed that targeting Iraqis is legitimate and he dubbed the Iraqi security frces apstates. He called n Iraqi clerics wh disapprve f targeting Iraqis t recnsider their views. The Jrdanian asserted in the message that the US went t war with Iraq in rder t advance Israel s interests and refers t the cnflict in Iraq as a quagmire. He declared that the US will sn invade the lands f Sham (Greater Syria) n the pretext f stpping insurgent infiltratin, and that this had nt yet happen nly due t the fercity f the militant attacks. He als annunced the creatin f a new brigade charged with killing the members f the Failaq Brigade, a Shi ite militia. On September 14, 2005, Al Qa'ida in Iraq released anther auditape by Zarqawi. On the tape, which surfaced n a day when insurgent attacks killed mre than 150 peple and wunded mre than 500, Zarqawi declared all ut war against Shi ite Muslims in Iraq. In a letter released earlier in the day, the rganizatin said the upsurge in vilence was in respnse t the nging US peratin against insurgents in Tal Afar. Zarqawi accused the US military and Shi ites f using pisnus gas and rapping wmen in Tal Afar and appealed t Iraqi sects t renunce the Al-Jaafari gvernment and its crimes. Zarqawi als threatened vilence against Calitin trps and Iraqi gvernment fficials, calling n them t cme ut f their lairs in the Green Zne. Zarqawi s declaratin began: 555 Days g by, and events fllw ne after the ther. The battles are many, and the names used are varied. But the gal is ne: a Crusader-Rafidite [a dergatry term fr Shia] war against the Sunnis. The interests f the Crusaders have cnverged with the desires f their brthers, the hate-filled Rafidites, and the utcme was these crimes and massacres against the Sunnis-frm Al-Falluja t al-madain, Al- Diyala, Al-Samarra, and Al-Msul, thrugh Al-Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Al-Rawa, Al-Qaim and ther places, and recently-but nt last-at Tel afar This is an rganized sectarian war, whse details were carefully planned against the will f thse whse visin has been blinded and whse hearts have been hardened by Allah. Beware, h Sunni schlars-has yur sns bld becme s cheap in yur eyes that yu have sld it fr a lw price? Has the hnr f yur wmen becme s trivial in yur eyes? Beware. Have yu nt heard that many f yur chaste and pure sisters frm amng the Sunnis f Tel afar had their hnr desecrated, their chastity slaughtered, and their wmbs filled with the sperm f the Crusaders and f their brthers, the hate-filled Rafidites? Where is yur religin? Mrever, where is yur sense f hnr, yur zeal, and yur manliness? Accrding t Zarqawi, the timing f the peratin in Tal Afar had been planned t cver up the scandal f Allah s enemy, Bush, in his dealing with what was left behind by ne f Allah s sldiers-the devastating Hurricane Katrina. 556 Zarqawi als claimed that US frces numbering 4,000 and Iraqi frces numbering 6,000 cnverged n Tal Afar in rder t d battle with a small grup f believers, which number[ed] n mre than a few hundred. In the speech, Zarqawi singled ut Iraqi gvernment fficials and members f the Iraqi security frces, as well as ther cllabratrs fr denunciatin: 557 Behld the Rafidites lackey, [Iraqi Defense Minister] Sa dn Al-Dulaimi, may Allah keep him miserable, bragging abut their victries at Tel afar. If nly I knew what victry they are talking abut-these cwards, nne f whm dares t leave his lair unless he is shielded by the wmen f the Marines. Des this traitr believe that bmbing huses, with wmen and children inside, cnstitutes a victry? By Allah, what a miserable victry This lackey [Al-Dulaimi], wh betrayed his religin and his natin, and agreed t serve as a tl f the Crusaders and Safavids threatens that he and his angels f destructin are advancing twards Al-Anbar, Al-

203 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 171 Qaim, Rawatha and Samarra. T him we say that the mujahedeen have prepared fr yu and fr yur sldiers, by Allah s virtues, a slashing swrd and lethal pisn. Allah willing, yu will be given t drink frm the varius gblets f death, and the lands f the Sunnis will cntain yur rtting crpses. Cme, if yu want, nw r later. whever is prven t belng t the Pagan [Natinal] Guard, t the plice, r t the army, r whever is prven t be a Crusader cllabratr r spy-he shall be killed. Furthermre, his huse shall either be destryed r burned dwn, after the wmen and children are taken ut f it. This is his reward fr betraying his religin and his natin, s that he shall serve as a clear lessn and a preventive warning t thers. any tribe, party, r assciatin that has been prven t cllabrate with the Crusaders and their apstate lackeys-by Gd, we will target them just like we target the Crusaders, we will eradicate them and disperse them t the winds. The Zarqawi War Against Shi ites Zarqawi is scarcely the nly Sunni Islamist extremist t denunce Shi ites fr betraying Iraq and fighting dirty wars, and the previus chapters have traced a brad pattern f attacks designed t divide Iraq alng sectarian and ethnic lines and prvke a mre intense civil war. Mst Sunni Islamist grups have, hwever, generally avided pen attacks n Shi ites and ther sects. Zarqawi has gne further in ways that may have alienated as many Iraqis as it intimidated and prduced a serius backlash amng sme f his supprters. His September 2005 statement ended with a declaratin f ttal war against Iraq s Shi ites: 558 This is a call t all the Sunnis in Iraq: Awaken frm yur slumber, and arise frm yur apathy. Yu have slept fr a lng time. The wheels f the war t annihilate the Sunnis have nt and will nt halt. It will reach the hmes f each and every ne f yu, unless Allah decides therwise. If yu d nt jin the mujahedeen t defend yur religin and hnr, by Allah, srrw and regret will be yur lt, but nly after all is lst. Based n all that I have mentined, and after the wrld has cme t knw the truth abut this battle and the identity f its true target, the Al-Qa ida rganizatin in the Land f the Tw Rivers has decided: First, since the gvernment f the descendant f Ibn Al- Alqami and the servant f the Crss, Ibrahim Al-Ja fari, has declared a ttal war against the Sunnis in Tel afar, Ramadi, Al-Qaim, Samarra, and Al-Rawa, under the pretext f restring rights and eliminating the terrrists, the rganizatin has decided t declare a ttal war against the Rafidite Shi ites thrughut Iraq, wherever they may be. This prvked a majr reactin. Immediately fllwing the release f the statement, Shi ite leaders and jurnalists called upn Iraqi Sunnis t cndemn Zarqawi s declaratin. One f them, Abdulhadi al-darraji, a representative f Muqtada al-sadr, insisted that the Sunni Muslim Clerics Assciatin issue a fatwa (religius edict) frbidding Muslims frm jining these grups that deem thers infidels. 559 Sunni respnses t Zarqawi s declaratin f war against the Shia were mixed, but largely negative. Sme leaders did accept Darraji s call fr a Sunni rejectin f Zarqawi. The Assciatin f Muslim Schlars [AMS] in Iraq called n Zarqawi t renunce vilence against Shi ites and Sunnis in Iraq wh were invlved in the plitical prcess, saying: Al-Zarqawi must retract his threats because they hurt jihad and wuld cause the shedding f the bld f mre inncent Iraqis. 560 The Muslim Clerics Assciatin als urged Zarqawi t retract his statement. The mst surprising respnse came frm a gathering f members f the Salafi Higher Cmmittee fr Da wah, Guidance, and Fatwa, wh rejected Zarqawi s declaratin as unacceptable and said the spilling f Muslim bld was religiusly frbidden. 561 Zarqawi reacted t these calls by retracting part f his earlier statement. On September 19, 2005, he issued anther statement as a fllw-up t his declaratin f war, saying: It has becme knwn t ur grup that sme sects, such as the Sadr grup and thers, have nt taken part in

204 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 172 the massacres and nt helped the ccupier. S we have decided nt t hurt these grups in any way, as lng as they d nt strike us. 562 But Zarqawi accused six Shi ite and Kurdish grups (Al- Dawa Party, The Higher Revlutinary Party, Natinal Cnference Party, Al-Wifaq Party, Kurdistan Demcratic Party, and Kurdistan United Natinal Party) f helping the US ccupatin frces and said attacks against them wuld cntinue. 563 Overkill Against Fellw Muslims and the Iraqiazatin f Al Qa ida Zarqawi s retractin was seen by sme as a sign f a rupture between his grup and ther insurgents. In the summer f 2005, a statement allegedly written by Zarqawi revealed a strained relatinship with the militant Islamist preacher (and frmer cellmate f Zarqawi s) Islam Mhammed al-barqawi. Zarqawi had lng been identified with Al-Barqawi, als knwn as Abu Mhammed al-maqdisi, and ften referred t him as his sheik and spiritual guide. 564 In an interview with Al Jazeera televisin in July, Al-Barqawi admnished Zarqawi, saying suicide bmbings in Iraq had resulted in the deaths f t many Iraqis and that the militants shuld nt target Shi ite Muslims. 565 Zarqawi s statement was a direct respnse t al-barqawi s interview. In it, he questined al-barqawi s statements and implred the preacher t nt turn against the Mujahedeen. 566 If authentic, the psting seems likely t cnfirm what Zarqawi s letter t Bin Laden suggested: that the fnt f supprt Zarqawi expected t cme frth in Iraq and the Middle East has yet t materialize n the scale he envisined. Mrever, the psting against Barqawi and the partial retractin f the declaratin f war against Shi ites suggests that Al Qa'ida in Iraq s leadership is sensitive t Muslim public pinin. New Yrk University prfessr f Islamic Studies Bernard Haykel believes Zarqawi s war n Shi ites is deeply unppular in sme quarters f his wn mvement and is cntributing t a schism within the jihadi mvement. 567 Further evidence appeared in Octber 2005 when the US gvernment published a letter purprted t be frm Ayman Al Zawahiri t Zarqawi. In the letter, dated July 9, 2005, Zawahiri asks fr news frm Iraq and urges Zarqawi s rganizatin t think abut their lng-term strategic bjectives. Calling the struggle in Iraq the place fr the greatest battle f Islam in this era, Zawahiri writes: 568 we must think fr a lng time abut ur next steps and hw we want t attain it, and it is my humble pinin that the Jihad in Iraq requires several incremental gals: The first stage: Expel the Americans frm Iraq. The secnd stage: Establish an Islamic authrity r amirate, then develp it and supprt it until it achieves the level f a caliphate-ver as much territry as yu can t spread its pwer in Iraq, i.e. in Sunni areas, is in rder t fill the vid stemming frm the departure f the Americans, immediately upn their exist and befre un-islamic frces attempt t fill this vid, whether thse whm the Americans will leave behind them, r thse amng the un-islamic frces wh will try t jump at taking pwer The third stage: Extend the jihad wave t the secular cuntries neighbring Iraq. The furth stage: It may cincide with what came befre: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established nly t challenge any new Islamic entity. After having utlined the fur stages f the cnflict, Zawahiri addressed the grup s level f ppular supprt. Zawahiri said the rganizatin s gals will nt be accmplished by the mujahed mvement while it is cut ff frm public supprt. Mrever, maintaining and increasing public supprt was a decisive factr between victry and defeat, in the absence f which the Islamic mujahed mvement wuld be crushed in the shadws and the struggle

205 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 173 between the Jihadist elite and the authrities cnfined t prisn dungens far frm the public and the light f day. Zawahiri urged Zarqawi t avid any actin that Iraqis did nt understand r apprve and t invlve them in his planning by bring[ing] the mujahed mvement t the masses and nt cnduct[ing] the struggle far frm them. 569 Zawahiri als warned that the scenes f slaughter emerging frm Iraq were having a damaging effect n the wider jihadi mvement. He warned Zarqawi, mre than half f this battle is taking place in the battlefield f the media [W]e are in a media battle in a race fr the hearts and minds f ur Umma. 570 He als said the fllwing abut targeting Shi ites: many f yur Muslim admirers amngst the cmmn flk are wndering abut yur attacks n the Shia. The sharpness f this questining increases when the attacks are n ne f their msques My pinin is that this matter wn t be acceptable t the Muslim ppulace hwever much yu have tried t explain it, and aversin t this will cntinue. Indeed, questins will circulate amng mujahedeen circles and their pinin makers abut the crrectness f this cnflict with the Shia at this time. Is it smething that is unavidable? Or, is it smething can be put ff until the frce f the mujahed mvement in Iraq gets strnger? And if sme f the peratins were necessary fr self-defense, were all f the peratins necessary? Or, were there sme peratins that weren t called fr? And is the pening f anther frnt nw in additin t the frnt against Americans and the gvernment a wise decisin? Or, des this cnflict with the Shia lift the burden frm the Americans by diverting the mujahedeen t the Shia, while the Americans cntinue t cntrl matters frm afar? And if the attacks n Shia leaders were necessary t put a stp t their plans, then why were there attacks n rdinary Shia? Wn t this lead t reinfrcing false ideas in their minds, even as it is incumbent n us t preach the call f Islam t them and explain and cmmunicate t guide them t the truth? And can the mujahedeen kill all f the Shia in Iraq? Has any Islamic state in histry ever tried that? And why kill rdinary Shia cnsidering that they are frgiven because f their ignrance?.and d the brthers frget that bth we and the Iranians need t refrain frm harming each ther at this time in which the Americans are targeting us? Zawahiri s final theme in his thirteen-page letter was the issue f plitical versus military actin. Zawahiri stressed the need fr Zarqawi t direct the plitical actin equally with the military actin and suggests that in additin t frce, there be an appeasement f Muslims and a sharing with them in gvernance. Once mre, Zawahiri cautined the Al Qa'ida in Iraq leader abut the use f excessively vilent acts saying they risked alienating the Muslim masses, whse enthusiasm is critical t the verall success f the enterprise. The letter, which seems t reflect the strategic perspective f the brader Al Qa ida leadership, was the clearest blueprint f Al Qa'ida s plans fr Iraq yet. Less than a week after the US released the letter, hwever, Al Qa'ida in Iraq issued a statement n an Islamist website rejecting the letter s authenticity. Their statement read: We in Al Qa ida Organizatin annunce that there is n truth t these claims, which are nly based n the imaginatin f the pliticians f the Black [i.e. White] Huse and their slaves. 571 As with mst ther Al Qa ida statements thugh, US experts were divided ver the authenticity f the letter. The Cngressinal Research Service s Kenneth Katzman said the letter cntained elements that raised dubts abut its authenticity: The purprted letter has Zawahiri admitting t certain things that it s nt realistic fr him t admit, because he wuld knw there s a ptential this letter might be intercepted. Others, like Mike Scheuer, a retired CIA analyst, disagreed and said the letter was mst likely authentic. 572 Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia s media respnse fllwing the Nvember 9 bmbings in Amman (discussed belw) was unusual in that the grup issued three statements relatively quickly. One

206 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 174 frequent cmmentatr t a jihadi website cmplained Al Qa'ida had been t hasty in issuing the statements, including the claim f respnsibility, alerting Jrdanian fficials t the fact that there might have been a furth bmber, as well as a husband and wife team, invlved in the attack. Criticism f Zarqawi s attack was als apparent n ther Internet jihadi websites. Pstings n websites shwed that the killing f inncent Muslims upset Zarqawi s traditinal base f supprters and sympathizers. Many criticized the selectin f the target, the timing f the attack as well as the means f the attack. Sme even urged the Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia leader t abandn any future military peratins that might harm Muslims. One such psting by a writer calling himself Al-Murshid r the guide read: 573 This is bth a (religius) task and a pragmatic tactic Acts where many inncent Muslims lse their lives make us lse a lt f ppular supprt The death f the inncent Muslims in this attack was a fact that lived with each Jrdanian. Nw peple say al-qa'ida kills inncent Muslims. The backlash against Zarqawi s grup in the aftermath f the Amman bmbings and the declaratin f war against Shi ites pint t an n-ging and nt yet reslved internal dispute amng the jihadists as t their tactics, specifically whether r nt the grup shuld target civilians and/r fellw Muslims. The end result s far seems t be that al-qa ida in Iraq has had t dwnplay Zarqawi s rle, put an Iraqi Emir in his place as at least the fficial leader, and seek t make al-qa ida seem t be a mre Iraqi and less Shi ite rganizatin. Hw real such effrts are is a different issue. The Mujahedeen Shura, created in January 2006, which cmbined al-qaeda in Iraq with five ther insurgent grups, appinted an Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid al-baghdadi as its head. In the mnths that fllwed, it curtailed its claims f attacks against Iraqi civilians and cled its rhetric against Shi ites. 574 Again, experts and analysts differed ver whether t interpret this as a shift in tactics r a change in strategy. Sme U.S. fficials acknwledged that there was n way t tell whether this cuncil, r its leaders such as al-baghdadi, even exist. One intelligene analyst indicated that it was simply the latest piece f prpaganda by al-qaeda: It s a shift in tactics, nt a real change. 575 Others, such as Bruce Hffman, a terrrism expert at RAND, suggested that the the rganizatin and its affiliates were real, but cast dubt n the assertin by Zarqawi that he had abdicated cntrl f al-qaeda in Iraq. 576 Determing the true rle f Zarqawi in Iraq has been further cmplicated by a U.S. gvernment effrt t magnify his influence and stature as a terrrist perating in Iraq. This psychlgical campaign, aimed primarily at the Iraqi peple, sught t drive a wedge between Zarqawi s netwrk and ther Iraqis and insurgent grups by prtraying him as a freign terrrist whse tactics included killing Iraqi civilians and destrying the cuntry s infrastructure. Playing ff Iraqi natinalism and xenphbia, this effrt was characterized by sme within U.S. military headquarters in Iraq as the mst successful infrmatin campaign t date. 577 Als cmplicating assessments f Zarqawi s rle, and Zarqawi s relatinship with al-qaeda, was a tape f al-zawahiri psted t the Internet in April 2006 which praised Zarqawi and urged Iraqi insurgents t remain united behind him: The Natin f Islam, I ask yu t supprt yur brthers, the mujahaedeen in Iraq, and ur brther, Abu Musab al-zarqawi, abut whm I didn t see anything but gd things the whle perid I knew him Yur enemy is nw dizzy, and d nt stp fighting until he is defeated by the grace f Gd. 578

207 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 175 The tape hwever, appears t be made in Nvember This is mnths after Zawahiri was alleged t have written a letter advising Zarqawi t curb his attacks against Shi ites and reminding him that the battle is ne fr the hearts and minds f Muslims. It als was psted at a time when it appeared Zarqawi was keeping a lwer prfile and has placed al-qaeda in Iraq under an umbrella rganizatin referred t as the Mujahedeen Shura. 579 Zarqawi and Syria Experts differ in pinin as t hw much f Zarqawi s peratins have taken place in Syria and with Syrian backing. There are reprts that Zarqawi and tp lieutenants met in Syria in the spring f 2005, but these have yet t be cnfirmed by US fficials. In fact, US intelligence assessments expressed dubt in June 2005 that Zarqawi had crssed int Syria earlier in the year, stating that such an event was incnsistent with Syria s, and Zarqawi s, pattern f behavir. US, British, and Iraqi experts d believe, hwever, that a substantial number f recruits pass thrugh Syria, and with Syrian tlerance r deliberate indifference if nt active supprt. 580 Expanding the Battle: Operatins Outside Iraq It is t early t generalize abut Zarqawi s influence utside Iraq, but he has rchestrated a number f attacks in Jrdan, and has discussed bradening his peratins t include ther Arab and Islamic cuntries. In sme ways, this may be mre a matter f persnal ambitin and a pre-iraq war agenda than a real effrt t braden the war. Zarqawi is a Jrdanian wh served a seven-year sentence fr effrts t verthrw the Jrdanian gvernment, and began t attack targets in Jrdan lng befre he went t Iraq. Attacks against Jrdanian targets in recent years have included: 581 January 17, 1998: Masked men raid a dinner party at the hillside mansin f wealthy Iraqi businessmen in Amman, slitting the thrats f a tp Baghdad diplmat and seven ther peple. March 28, 1998: A crude bmb expldes in an elite English-language schl in Amman in what ne senir gvernment fficial calls an apparent attempt t instigate attacks against Americans. The explsin shatters windws but causes n injuries. Octber 28, 2002: An American diplmat, Laurence Fley, is assassinated in frnt f his huse in Amman, gunned dwn in the first such attack n a US diplmat in decades. August 7, 2003: A car bmb expldes utside the Jrdanian Embassy in Baghdad, killing at least 17 peple, including tw children. Mre than 50 peple are wunded. August 19, 2005: Attackers fire at least three rckets frm the hills abve the Jrdanian prt city f Aqaba, with ne narrwly missing a US Navy ship dcked in the prt and anther hitting a taxis utside an airprt in nearby Israel. A Jrdanian sldier is killed. It is nt clear exactly when Zarqawi and ther insurgents began t cnsider attacking targets utside Iraq. There are indicatins that Zarqawi s grup began planning and attempting attacks utside Iraq in late It is clear that ne majr attempt did ccur in the spring f Jrdan reprted that a Zarqawi agent named Azmi al-jayusi led a cell that attempted t carry ut a massive explsive and chemical attack n the US Embassy, the headquarters f the Jrdanian General Intelligence Directrate, ffice f the prime minister and ther targets in Amman in mid- April Jrdanian fficials said they had halted an attack using three trucks laded with 20 tns f explsives and chemicals. The three trucks were halted in Irbid, and Jrdanian surces claimed they culd have killed 80,000 peple and wunded 160,000 thers within a tw square

208 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 176 kilmeter area. The cell was ne f tw cells in place, and its members had a variety f frged Jrdanian, Syrian and ther Arab passprts Zarqawi acknwledged the attempt in an auditape circulated n April 30, 2004, but denied any effrt t use chemical weapns. The tape made available n an Islamist website said his gal was t "ttally destry the building f the Jrdanian intelligence services" with "raw materials which are sld n the market The Jrdanian security services have lied in claiming t have filed a plan t kill inncent Muslims. 582 He accused Jrdan f "creating an utcry and presenting the Jrdanian peple as a victim targeted at the hands f terrrism... in rder t hide the srdid face f the Jrdanian intelligence services " and f the "evil Jrdanian services" f "fabricating (the affair) f the chemical bmb." Zarqawi went n t say "If we had such a bmb -- and we ask Gd that we have such a bmb sn -- we wuld nt hesitate fr a mment t strike Israeli twns, such as Eilat, Tel Aviv and thers We have scres t settle with this (Jrdanian) gvernment which will turn children's hair white." Sme surces say Zarqawi halted further attack attempts after that time. One senir Jrdanian surce claimed that Jrdan had filed tw attacks in 2003, eight in 2004, and 10 in Zarqawi was the first majr insurgent leader t penly threaten t expand the fighting t freign cuntries, hwever, althugh his pen statements nly began t get serius publicity in the summer f Jrdanian intelligence reprted that it had intercepted signals that Zarqawi had rdered sme f his fighters t leave Iraq t carry ut attacks in ther Arab and Islamic cuntries in Octber Jrdan has fr years been cnsidered a safe place, nestled between the nging vilence f the intifida in the Palestinian territries and, mre recently, the insurgency in Iraq. In recent years, hwever, this has begun t change. Accrding t experts like Jst Hiltermann f the Internatinal Crisis Grup, "[Jrdan] was always a fragile asis It was nly a matter f time befre smebdy gt thrugh." On Nvember 9, 2005, Zarqawi s rganizatin struck three US wned htels in Amman. Neither the attack nr the targets shuld have cme as a surprise t Jrdanian fficials hwever. Zarqawi had previusly attempted t blw up western htels in Amman-including the Radissn SAS-as part f millennium celebratins in late That attack, hwever, was thwarted by Jrdanian intelligence and Zarqawi later fled t Afghanistan. 584 The Nvember 9 bmbings at the Radissn SAS, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn htels killed at least 60 peple and wunded mre than a hundred thers. The bmbers-all Iraqis-deliberately targeted Jrdanians-including a Jrdanian-Palestinian wedding party. Fur Palestinian fficials, including Lt. General Bashir Nafe, the head f West Bank security, as well as ther freigners, were als amng the casualties. The first bmbing ccurred shrtly befre 9 p.m. inside the Philadelphia ballrm f the Radissn htel. Right befre detnating his 22-pund explsive packed belt, the bmber and the apparent leader f the cell, Ali Hussein Ali al-shamari, jumped nt a table. The explsin brught parts f the ceiling dwn nt the mre than 300 wedding guests assembled in the ballrm and sprayed ball bearings cntained inside the vest acrss the rm. Mments after the first bmbing, 23 year-ld Rawad Jassem Mhammed detnated his bmb in the cffee shp f the Grand Hyatt. Secnds later, the third bmber, Safaa Mhammed Ali, als

209 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page , detnated his explsives utside the Days Inn htel. Jrdanian fficials believe that, like Mhammed, Ali planned t detnate the bmb inside the cffee shp. But after a suspicius waiter called security, Ali fled. Once utside the htel, he knelt n the grund and detnated his explsives, killing three members f a nearby Chinese military delegatin. 585 Immediately fllwing the attack, rumrs began circulating that there had been a furth bmber and that a husband and wife had carried ut ne f the attacks. On Nvember 13, the alleged furth bmber and wife f the ringleader-sajida Mubarak al-rishawi appeared in a vide cnfessin n Jrdanian televisin. Rishawi said her husband had pushed her ut f the Radissn ballrm after her wn bmb failed t detnate and that she had then fled the scene in a taxi. Her whereabuts fr the three days between the attacks and her capture by Jrdanian plice have nt yet been cnfirmed. Jrdanian fficials say she went t her sister s husband s family in the nearby city f Salt, but witnesses claim t have seen her in the Tlaa Ali neighbrhd f Amman where ne f the cell s safe huses was lcated. 586 Frm Rishawi s televised statement, we knw that much f the attack was assembled utside f Jrdan. Shamari and his wife, bth natives f Anbar prvince, left Iraq n Nvember 5. The cuple were picked up by tw men in a white car and driven acrss the brder, apparently using fake passprts under the name f Ali Hussein Ali and Sajida Abdel Kader Latef t enter Jrdan. The explsive belts used in the bmbings appear t have entered the cuntry with them. Tw days later, n Nvember 7, the grup rented an apartment in the Tlaa Ali neighbrhd f Amman. The apartment, lcated in an area with a large Iraqi cmmunity, was ne f at least tw safe huses the cell used befre the attack. On the evening f the 9 the bmbers tk taxis t their targets, which accrding t Rishawi, had been selected in advance. There are clear links between Zarqawi s grup and the attack in Jrdan. At least tw f the bmbers - Ali Hussein Ali Shamari and his wife - seem t have been part f Zarqawi s peratin in Fallujah. Three f Rishawi s brthers were killed by US frces in Iraq. 587 One, Samir Mubarak Atrus al-rishawi was Zarqawi s tp lieutenant in Anbar prvince and was killed by a US strike n his pickup truck during peratins in Fallujah in Accrding t the US military, anther bmber, Safaa Mhammed Ali, may have been in their custdy briefly in The US military said it detained an Iraqi with the same name as Ali in Nvember 2004 but released him after tw weeks because they lacked grunds t hld him. As f this writing, US fficials are unsure if the Ali they had in their custdy was the same ne wh struck the Days Inn htel n Nvember 9. Althugh all fur bmbers were Iraqi natinals, it is pssible that Zarqawi drew n his wn cnnectins in Jrdan t carry ut the Nvember 9 attacks. There are sme 400,000 Iraqis living in Jrdan, sme f whm have ties t Salafi jihadists in Iraq and might be willing t help carry ut peratins in Jrdan. Jrdanian fficials, including King Abdullah II, have refused t rule ut the pssibility that Jrdanians may have been invlved in the attacks. In the days fllwing the bmbings, Jrdanian security fficials arrested 12 suspects, mstly Jrdanians and Iraqis. Perhaps the strngest evidence f a Jrdanian cnnectin cmes frm the city f Salt, 17 miles nrtheast f Amman. As already mentined, many reprts say Rishawi fled t the hme f her brther-in-law s family there after the bmbings. Smetime in 2002 r 2003, Rishawi s sister Fatima married Nidal Arabiyat, a 30-year-ld unemplyed Jrdanian frm Salt wh had jined the Salafi jihadi netwrk several years earlier. Arabiyat had jined Raed Khreisat, a religius leader, in the late 1990s and gne t train with the

210 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 178 Kurdish Islamic grup, Ansar al-islam in nrthern Iraq. After American frces invaded Iraq in 2003, Arabiyat jined frces with Zarqawi. When Arabiyat was killed fighting US frces in Iraq, it was Rishawi s husband, Shamari, wh called Arabiyat s family in Salt t tell them he had becme a martyr. 588 The Rishawi-Arabiyat link, althugh fascinating is hardly unusual. Strng tribal and family ties exist between Jrdanians and Iraqis. Lcals say at least 30 men frm Salt have died in Iraq fighting the Americans. 589 Many are cnnected by mre than family ties r lyalty t their clan; they are mtivated by a shared belief in Salafi Jihadism. The Jrdanian reactin t the Nvember 9 bmbings was ntably different frm past reactins t Zarqawi attacks. In the days fllwing the triple bmbing, tens f thusands f Jrdanians marched against Zarqawi and pledged their allegiance t King Abdullah. Jrdanians seem t have been shcked by the knwledge that Zarqawi, a fellw Jrdanian, deliberately sught ut Jrdanian targets and Jrdanian victims. Even Zarqawi s wn Khalayleh clan jined the public backlash, taking ut ads in the cuntry s leading newspapers denuncing their infamus relative and pledging t remve any tribal prtectin he may have been benefiting frm. 590 Fr his part, Zarqawi respnded t the public backlash by releasing an auditape n Nvember 18. Earlier statements frm Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia had alerted Jrdanian fficials t the fact that there might have been a furth bmber, as well as a husband and wife team, invlved in the attack. Zarqawi s 26-minute Nvember 18 statement began: 591 All the wrld has heard the nise made by the Jrdanian Gvernment that the Jrdanians are the victims f terrrism and that thse terrrists like t shed bld, all this came after three lins have left their lair in Baghdad making their way t the center f Amman t target three hideuts f the crusaders and the Jews. The Qa ida has made the blessed step fr the cming reasns: 1. The Jrdanian gvernment has annunced its infidelity and clearly battled against Gd. 2. The Jrdanian army has becme the guard f the brders f the Israeli brders, they have banned the Mujahedeen frm breaking int the depth f the blessed lands t fight the (brthers f the mnkeys and the pigs). Hw many f the Mujahedeen [have been] killed by a bullet in the back frm the Jrdanian sldiers securing the brders? 3. The Jrdanian gvernment has spread vice and crruptin. The state has becme like a swamp f prngraphy-the htels and the refreshment resrts are widely spread n Aqaba and the Dead Sea-we feel pity [fr] the harm caused by this crrupted family f bth its men and wmen. 4. This state has permitted the Zinist enemy t infiltrate in the Jrdanian sciety scially, ecnmically, and plitically. The best ever example given is the Hassan industrial city, where all the capitals are in the hands f the Jews. 5. The American s secret prisns in Jrdan, wrking under the supervisin f the American intelligence itself, said that there are tens f Mujahedeen in them, ging under all different clrs f trture dne [at] the hands f the Jrdanian intelligence members. The Ls Angeles Times newspaper has mentined earlier that the best ally fr the CIA in the regin nw is the Jrdanian intelligence, and that part f the CIA budget ges t train the members f the Jrdanian intelligence members in Amman. 6. Cncerning Iraq, Jrdan has becme the rear base fr the Americans in their war against the Islamic natin, the American airplanes flies frm the Jrdanian lands t attack the Mujahedeen, and lest we frget the army f translatrs (the Infidels). The fleet f vehicles that supplies the American army with fd supplies were all driven by the Jrdanians.

211 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 179 A message t the Mslem peple in Jrdan, we assure yu that we are the earnest nes abut yur safety, we knw that yu were the prey f the criminal regime, they have lied when they say that yu becme the victims f the Mujahedeen, it is a lie. Zarqawi cntinued: We have targeted these htels after tw mnths f surveillance and basing n infrmatin cllected frm inside and utside the htels frm ur trusty surces. The Radissn Htel was the gathering pint f the Israeli turists and intelligence members, als the Day s Inn htel. It is als the residence f all the Israeli embassy emplyees. The Hayat Amman [sic. Grand Hyatt] is the centre f the American, Israeli and the Iraqi intelligence. The Israeli spy Azzam Azzam was meeting the Msad members in the Hayat Amman htel it is a lie that the martyr has blwn up himself in the middle f the wedding crwds The gvernment that was able all these years t duble crss peple that they are enemies f the Zinists can cnvert the truth easily, we ask Gd s mercy fr all Mslems killed in this peratin, as they were nt the target, the martyrs have targeted the hall that had the meeting f the intelligence fficers, the killing was due t cllapsing f the secndary ceiling, it was nt dne with intentin. the brther f the grm has said accrding t the Quds press, it was unlikely that the blast was due t a suicide attack, as there were n signs f smething wrng ging [n]. He als added that the ceiling has fallen with all cmpnents, cement, irn bars and the decratin, n the heads f the wedding attendees, the dust has cvered all ver the place he think[s] the cause was a bmb planted in the ceiling as there was n fire. The tw ther htels were embracing [a] number f American and Jewish figures. The brthers have succeeded in knwing the place and time f their meeting, after frequent surveillance fr the place, s the brthers knew fr sure their targets. Zarqawi justified the attack by claiming that Israeli and American secret agents had been meeting at the three htels. Zarqawi als repeatedly asserted that Jrdanians had nt been the targets. Near the end f his statement, he threatened King Abdullah, stating: Yur star is fading. Yu will nt escape yur fate, yu descendant f traitrs. We will be able t reach yur head and chp it ff 592 Sme experts believe the Nvember 9 triple bmbings in Amman may have been the first example f Zarqawi cming thrugh n his pledge t spread jihad utside Iraq. In an interview with ABC News in mid-nvember, Iraq s Interir Minister Bayan Jabr said he believed Zarqawi might be planning mre ut-f-area peratins. Jabr said his ministry had uncvered infrmatin that Al Qa'ida in Mesptamia was planning at least tw ther attacks-ne in Yemen and the ther in Egypt-against freigners and Americans. Jabr als claimed that freigners had been recruited t cme t Iraq in rder t receive training s that they culd return t their hme cuntries t carry ut attacks. As prf, he ffered several passprts the ministry had seized in recent mnths. Amng the natinalities represented were the cuntries mst ften assciated with freign fighters in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Algeria. But als seized were passprts frm France, Suth Africa, Azerbaijan, India and Pakistan. 593 It is t early t say whether the Amman bmbings signal Zarqawi is widening the jihad and taking the Iraqi insurgency abrad. Rather than see Iraq as spilling ver int ther cuntries, r as sme kind f magnet fr terrrism, it is wise t cnsider Zarqawi s histry, and the fact his attacks n Jrdan may be mre a lgical extensin f his persnal histry and cnnectin t that cuntry.

212 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 180 Zarqawi and Weapns f Mass Media The varius Islamist extremist grups have been highly effective at striking at targets in ways that achieve high media and plitical impact, particularly in the frm f suicide bmbings and beheadings. 594 These attacks have been weapns f mass media when they have struck against Calitin targets, and this has led sme t see such militant grups as successful manipulatrs f Arab and Western media utlets, able t tailr their attacks fr maximum media cverage and psychlgical effect. As wrk by the Crisis Grup has shwn, they have als made effective use f the Internet, shwing a steadily increasing sphisticatin in using it as a methd f cmmunicating and seeking Iraqi and utside supprt. 595 At the same time, Zarqawi s extremism has smetimes backfired when directed against fellw Muslims, just as it did in declaring war n Shi ites. In the summer f 2005, fr example, Zarqawi s grup attacked several Muslim diplmats in an effrt t stymie relatins between the new Iraqi gvernment and freign gvernments. Egypt s Ihab Sherif, tapped t becme the first Arab ambassadr t Iraq, was kidnapped and then killed by the Jrdanian terrrist s Al Qa ida mvement. An Internet statement released by the grup suggested that he might have been beheaded and stated that he had been killed fr Egypt s recgnitin f the Iraqi gvernment, fr the cuntry s fstering f disbelief in Islam, fr waging war against Muslims by cracking dwn n Islamist grups like the Muslim Brtherhd, and by sending an ambassadr t Iraq at US Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice s bidding. 596 Sn afterwards, Zarqawi s grup targeted Pakistani Ambassadr Mhammed Yunis Khan and Bahraini charges d affaires Hassan Malallah Ansari. In separate attacks, bth Khan s and Ansari s cnvys were hit with gunfire in what were described as attempted kidnappings. Ansari suffered a minr gunsht wund and Pakistan quickly relcated Khan t Jrdan. Nt lng after, tw f Algeria s diplmats t the new Iraqi gvernment was kidnapped in Baghdad and later killed. The resulting cverage in Iraqi and Arab media was anything but favrable, and may help explain why jihadist websites ften list cmplaints detailing a lack f press cverage fr sme f their attacks, and abut media criticism Zarqawi s Al Qa ida in Iraq grup severely criticized the Al Jazeera satellite televisin statin in June 2005 fr what it called impartial reprting. It claimed that Al Jazeera, lng criticized by US fficials, had sided with the US ver Iraq. Similarly, in January f 2006, Zarqawi psted an audi clip n an Islamist website denuncing thse cuntries that had met at an Arab League summit in Nvember t address Iraqi plitical recnciliatin as agents f the U.S. and guilty f destrying Iraq. 598 Zarqawi has als had t issue retractins r clarificatins after unppular attacks r statements. After his declaratin f ttal war n Shi ites (discussed abve) received a very cl respnse frm the larger jihadi cmmunity, Zarqawi issued a partial retractin. Many Sunnis rejected Zarqawi s declaratin and Al Qa'ida's Zawahiri warned attacks n Shi ites wuld hurt the grup s level f ppular supprt. Zarqawi respnded in a similar way after the Nvember 9 bmbings in Amman (als discussed abve). The backlash t this declaratin frm the Muslim wrld, especially within Jrdan itself, was enugh t prmpt Zarqawi t issue several statements denying Jrdanians had been the targets f the attacks. Instead, Zarqawi claimed Israeli and American intelligence fficials meeting in the

213 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 181 htels were the real targets. Such statements and retractins suggest Zarqawi may be n the defensive and that his grup is grwing increasingly vulnerable t Muslim public pinin. Such develpments may have helped lead Zarqawi s Al Qa ida in Mesptamia grup t start an nline Internet magazine entitled Zurwat al Sanam, in an effrt t wage a mre effective prpaganda and recruiting campaign. Other insurgent grups n the Web have mirrred this effrt, and sme analysts believe that it is a defensive tactic t cunter the perceived inrads made by the January 30 th electins and the capture f imprtant terrrist lieutenants in the mnths that fllwed. 599 Other Sunni Arab Insurgent Grups: The Natinalists? At the beginning f the insurgency, Calitin frces tended t refer t Iraq s mre mainstream insurgents as frmer regime lyalists (FRLs), r frmer regime elements (FREs). As the insurgency has evlved, s did the terminlgy used t describe it, and these terms fell ut f favr with analysts as time prgressed. At the same time, Iraq s Arab Sunnis are nly beginning t frge new plitical identities ut f the pwer vacuum left by Saddam Hussein s dictatrship, and a number f analysts feel that they have either tended t becme mre Islamist r t mve twards pssible accmmdatin with the new gvernment. While mst f Iraq s ruling elite during Saddam Hussein s decades f dictatrship was Sunni, the tp elite came frm a small prtin f Sunnis, many with family backgrunds in what were riginally rural military families. The tp elite had strng ties nt nly t Saddam s extended family, but t Tikritis in general, and the al-bu Nasir tribe and its Bejat clan and Majid family. 600 The vast majrity f Sunnis gt little special benefit frm Saddam s rule, and many Sunnis suffered frm his ppressin in the same way as ther Iraqis. Planning Befre, During, and Immediately After the War? It is uncertain if Saddam s regime tk effective actin t create such grups befre, during, r immediately after the war. There has been little unclassified intelligence n what the Calitin and Iraqi gvernment has learned abut such grups since the insurgency gathered mmentum in Hwever, the bulk f the evidence seems t indicate that any such planning was largely ineffective, except fr the creatin f large weapns caches designed t supprt the largely nnexistent Ppular Army and service peratins by the Fedayeen. These effrts may have eased the rise f the insurgency after the war, but the remnants f Saddam s regime were slw t rganize, many leaders were quickly captured, and many f thse wh jined the insurgency were mre pr-sunni and/r pr-ba ath than pr-saddam. An analyst with the Crisis Grup cnducted interviews with Ba athists and fficers f the frmer security apparatus (including Special security) in Baghdad, Tikrit, Bayji and Msul and fund that, 601 There is n evidence that Saddam designed a guerrilla strategy in anticipatin f military defeat. Indeed, the perid immediately fllwing the verthrw f the Baathist regime was remarkably calm; U.S. frces, in effect, suddenly fund themselves withut an enemy The fallen regime s pwer structures cllapsed almst instantaneusly, laying bare the extent t which Saddam Hussein s authrity including ver his wn security apparatus relied n cercin rather than lyalty. Senir Baath party members as well as army and intelligence fficers initially were at a lss, facing bth an uncertain future and a ppulatin that, in its vast majrity, appeared willing t give the United States a chance. Far frm preparing a cllective cmeback, these s-called Saddamists abve all were preccupied with persnal survival. Elements f the frmer regime, sme Shi ites included...sn helped set up small cells f fighters. But this was nt planned ahead f time and reflected neither a desire t restre the past nr idelgical

214 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 182 attachment t Baathism; rather, these cells develped gradually, initially drawing individuals angered by dim prspects, resentful f the ccupatin and its indignities, and building n pre-existing party, prfessinal, tribal, familial r gegraphic--including neighburhd netwrks. Frmer regime fficials were, f curse, ideal candidates and sn became the vanguard f the armed ppsitin, cmbining as they did idleness, relevant military and intelligence skills as well as knwledge f the whereabuts f vast weapns stckpiles and relatively scarcer cash reserves cncealed by the regime in anticipatin f the prjected defence f Baghdad Frmer hierarchical structures in the Baath party r the army helped structure what initially were amrphus cells But fr the mst part this had little t d with Baathist lyalty; frm the utset, the armed ppsitin s discurse build n patritic and religius themes at the expense f a largely discredited idelgy. Even at an early stage, when freign fighters in all likelihd played a negligible part in day-t-day peratins, the upsurge in attacks during the mnth f Ramadan in 2003 (27 Octber-25 Nvember) illustrates the extent t which the struggle was framed as a religius duty A handful f grups claimed t be acting n behalf f the Baath, but they quickly were put n the defensive, having t accunt fr the frmer regime s perversin f Baathism its crimes and the 2003 debacle While sme fighters prbably still lked upn Saddam Hussein as a symbl f anti-imperialist resistance virtually all armed grups dissciated themselves frm the frmer president and sme penly denunced him. Nr is there persuasive backing fr the view that the current battle is but the extensin f a glbal jihadi war. Mst analysts nw cncur that the Baathist regime did nt entertain relatins with al-qa ida and freign vlunteers invited by Saddam t die in his defence had nthing t d with Osama bin Laden s rganizatin. The impact f freign jihadis grew ver time, but during the early stages f the insurgency it appears t have been negligible and al-qa ida in particular remained absent, claiming nne f the spectacular attacks rchestrated in 2003 Suicide missins nly appeared well int the ccupatin. In shrt, resrt t static explanatins f the insurgency tends bth t misjudge what in fact has been a dynamic, evlving phenmenn and, imprtantly, t dwnplay the rle played in its emergence and subsequent develpment by specific U.S. plicies and practices. Such reprts may, hwever, understate the level f rganizatin invlved. Sme US intelligence experts did say n backgrund befre the invasin that Saddam s regime and intelligence and security services were rganizing fr a pst invasin resistance. The brad dispersal f weapns and arms in much f Iraq may have been designed t supprt such activities, and a relatively sphisticated peratin did develp by mid t late-2003 that included individuals with ties t senir Ba athists wh were perating in Syria as well as Iraq. The Mtives f the Mre Natinalist Insurgents What is clear is that the insurgent elements with ties t the frmer regime, and/r which are mre secular r natinalist in character, have becme less active than the mre religius and extremist insurgents, and have dne much less t seek publicity thrugh tls like the Internet. Yet, such insurgents may have cnsiderably mre supprt and sympathy frm Iraqi Sunnis as a whle than the Islamists. Public pinin plls and ther surces abut Iraqi Sunni attitudes, give several indicatins abut thse Sunnis wh say they supprt attacks n Calitin frces. Mst Sunni Arabs clearly d want rights and privileges fr Sunnis, but they als tend t be natinalists in the sense they cnsistently favr a strng, unified Iraqi state. This has been clear frm public pinin plls in Sunni areas since mid-2003, and Arab Sunnis have ppsed the idea f splitting Iraq int federatins since it became an issue in mid Like Iraq s Arab Shi ites, plls als shw that Iraqi Sunnis are generally religius and see Islam as a key aspect f their lives, but d nt favr a thecratic state.

215 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 183 At the same time, Arab Sunnis shw far mre general supprt fr vilence against the Calitin. Surveys in mid-2003 fund that sme 37% f Sunnis supprted vilence against Calitin frces. A pll cnducted by the Calitin in summer 2005 indicated that nearly 45 percent f the ppulatin supprted the insurgent attacks. 602 The verall mtives f Arab Sunnis are cmplex, hwever, and it seems almst certain that this is true f many wh participate in the insurgency r supprt it. While plling effrts in Iraq face many bstacles and their results remain uncertain, a pll cnducted in January 2006 prvides results that tracked clsely with ther majr plls and can prvide useful insights. The pll fund that 83% f Arab Sunnis did nt feel Saddam shuld have been usted, and 93% f Iraqi Arab Sunnis thught that Iraq was mving in the wrng directin. 603 Sme 88% f Arab Sunnis apprved f attacks n US led frces. 604 A ttal f 83% wanted the US t leave Iraq in six mnths. At the same time, nly 7% f Iraqis apprved attacks n Iraqi frces and 93% disapprved. Even amng Sunnis, nly 24% apprved smewhat, and 76% disapprved, f which 24% disapprved strngly. When it came t attacks n Iraqi civilians, 99% disapprved. S few Sunnis apprved that the results were nt meaningful; nearly 100% disapprved, f which 95% disapprved strngly. 605 Ba athists, Nn-Ba athists, r Semi-Ba athists? US analysts acknwledge that Ba athist and ex-regime lyalists represent nly a part f the insurgency but sme feel they have played a key rle in leadership, rganizatin, and financing and feel they remain a key frce amng newly radicalized Iraqi Sunnis. Accrding t the CIA reprts, the Sunni lss f pwer, prestige, and ecnmic influence has been a key mtivating factr, as is unemplyment and a lss f persnal status -- direct and disguised unemplyment amng yung Sunni men has been 40-60% in many areas ever since the fall f Saddam Hussein. Many insurgents are mtivated by tribal r family grievances, natinalism and religius duty. Others are mtivated by the U.S. ccupatin particularly thse wh have lst a lved ne fighting U.S. frces and the plitical and ecnmic turmil that accmpanied the ccupatin. 606 This des nt mean that ex-ba athists d nt play a rle. The Ba ath Party did nt disslve when the CPA frmally ablished it in May It rerganized with a new structure, established a new plitbur in 2004, and at least sme elements perated frm a de fact sanctuary in Syria. 607 At the same time, many full-time and part-time Iraqi grups assciated with the Ba ath are linked mre by tribe, family, and lcality than any sense f Ba ath plitical identity. It is unclear hw much influence varius Ba athist grups nw have. Hwever, US and Iraqi Interim Gvernment fficials such as the MNF cmmander General Casey and Iraqi Defense Minister Hazan Shaalan have said they believe that Ba ath leaders in Syria crdinate with at least sme f the Ba ath sympathizers in Iraq. The ffice f the Iraqi Prime Minister called fr the arrest f six senir members f the frmer regime in March 2005: 608 Izzat Ibrahim al-duri: Believed t be the leader f the New Reginal Cmmand and New Ba'ath Party. (He died n Nvember 10, 2005.) Muhammed Yunis al-ahmad: financial facilitatr and peratinal leader f the New Reginal Cmmand and New Ba'ath Party. Rashid Ta'an Kazim: Central Ba'ath Party Reginal Chairman in Al Anbar Prvince.

216 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 184 Abd Al-Baqi Abd Al-Karim Al-Abdallah Al-Sa'adun: Recruiter and financer f terrrist activity in eastern and central Iraq. Aham Hasan Kaka al-ubaydi: A frmer intelligence fficer, and nw assciated with Ansar Al Islam. Fadhi Ibrahim Mahmud Mashadani (aka Abu Huda): Tp member f the New Ba'ath Party and a key financier f insurgent and terrrist activity. Field leaders reprtedly include Mhammed Yunis al-ahmad, a frmer aide t Saddam Hussein, and Ibrahim Sabawi, Hussein s half brther and a frmer security directr. They als benefit frm the fact that sme elements f the leadership f the Iraqi 5 th Crps are still in Msul, and Syria has prvided a cvert sanctuary fr at least sme Iraq Ba'athist leaders. 609 There were sme successes in capturing frmer Ba ath leaders turned insurgents. The frmer aide t the Chief f Staff f Intelligence fr the Saddam regime, Muhammed Hila Hammad Ubaydi (Abu Ayman), was apprehended by Iraqi frces in March f The leader f the Secret Islamic Army in the Nrthern Babil Prvince, Abu Ayman was suspected f having ties t Zarqawi and has been accused f numerus kidnappings and IED attacks. Infrmatin n his whereabuts and netwrk was btained frm his lieutenant, Abu Qatada, a Syrian captured by Calitin frces in December It seems likely that the remaining Ba'athist elements in the insurgency can benefit frm the fact that they still have access t sme f the frmer regime's mney. They d seem t have since steadily tightened their rganizatin and purged suspect members. Accrding t ne reprt, they held a majr meeting at Al Hasaka in April r May f 2004 t tighten their structure. This des nt mean, hwever, that they wuld nt be greatly vershadwed by Islamist grups if Iraq were driven int full-scale civil war. It is the Islamists wh get the publicity, drive the mre visible fighting and have develped the best prpaganda effrts. Other Natinalist Sunni Insurgents Furthermre, it seems likely that mst f the less extreme r natinalist Iraqi-dminated Sunni insurgent grups nw have a significant degree f independence frm the frmer Ba'ath leadership. Despite this, it is clear that many cperate in at least sme peratins, and that many f the elements with sme ties t ex-supprters f Saddam s regime have sme degree f central leadership and crdinatin. US experts talk f infrmal netwrks that, using tls like the Internet, crdinate peratins and exchange data n tactics, targets, and peratins. There is evidence f such exchanges between cells in Iraq and utside grups including thse in Syria and Afghanistan. Insurgent grups als use the media t get near-real-time infrmatin n what ther grups and cells are ding and t find ut what tactics prduce the maximum plitical and media impact. Nevertheless, many f the Sunni insurgent grups r cells that d nt have ties t extremist grups r frmer Ba ath rulers can get mney r sme degree f leadership frm the Ba athist structures that have emerged since the fall f Saddam Hussein. It is generally misleading t call them frmer regime lyalists (FRLs) r "frmer regime" elements (FREs). They are rather Sunni natinalists invlved in a struggle fr current pwer. This has allwed the insurgency t braden its base and establish ties t Islamic grups as well. The Search fr Pwer and the Pssibility f Dialgue The relative impact f the natinalist Iraqi Sunni insurgent grups and the smaller Islamic extremist grups is uncertain. In sme cases, MNF-I and US fficials see evidence that secular

217 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 185 Sunni grups, and even Hussein lyalists, were cperating with extreme Islamists. In Msul, Ba athists wrked with Salafists t attack American trps and derail the electin prcess. 611 While the tw grups have cnflicting visins and aspiratins fr Iraq s future and smetimes feud r even kill each ther -- their shrt-term gals are largely the same: instability and insecurity, breaking up the new Iraqi gvernment and depriving it f ppular legitimacy, keeping Iraqi frces frm becming effective, and driving the US and MNF-I frces ut f Iraq. In September f 2005, Army Maj. Gen. Richard Zahner acknwledged that the Ba athist insurgency had been surpassed by a terrrist campaign led by Zarqawi s grup. Speaking t the Washingtn Pst, Zahner said: Yu ll see sme f the ld regime elements [ut] there, mainly just t maintain pressure and, frankly, accuntability But when yu lk at thse individuals central the inflicting f huge amunts f vilence, it really is nt thse flks. The Saddamists, the frmer regime guys, they re riding this. 612 The view that Al Qa'ida in Iraq, nt Iraqis lyal t Saddam Hussein (knwn as Saddamists ), were becming the driving element behind the insurgency in the summer and fall f 2005 is, hwever, cntrversial. The natinalist Sunni insurgents have als been far mre willing and able t acquire leverage in the Iraqi plitical prcess. Fr example, sme Sunni Arab natinalist insurgents grups saw the December 15 th electins as an pprtunity t gain pwer, and called upn their fllwers t frg vilence n electin day while Al Qa'ida and its allies called fr attacks. This seems t have led t utright clashes between elements f Al Qa'ida in Iraq and Sunni natinalists in the mnths leading up t the electin, particularly in cities within the Sunni Triangle such as Qaim, Taji, Ramadi, and Yusefiya. Tensins and Clashes Between Sunni Natinalists versus Sunni Islamic Extremists? Opinins differ as t just hw much the different Sunni elements that make up the insurgency are dividing r calescing. Sme analysts suggested in late 2004 and early 2005 that Ba athists and their frmer adversaries, such as the Salafists and the Kurds, were finding cmmn cause with freign fighters. 613 Yet, there were als grwing reprts f fighting between the mre secular and mderate natinalist Sunni insurgents and Sunni Islamic extremists. This fighting has smetimes ccurred at the lcal level where it seemed mre a matter f turf than idelgy. It has als been driven by attacks by fundamentalist grups n lcal Sheiks and leaders. As has been discussed earlier, Islamist extremists have increasingly prvked brader resentments. The mre mderate and natinalist Sunni grups generally d nt apprve f mass attacks n civilians and n Iraqi Shi ites. Many d nt apprve f attempts t prvke a civil war, r t turn the Iraqi insurgency frm a struggle fr natinal pwer t a brader war fr cntrl f Islam. These prblems have been cmpunded by the split ver whether Iraqi Sunnis shuld participate in the gvernment and Iraqi frces, if nly t act as a cunterweight t the Shi ites and Kurds and withut real supprt fr the new Iraqi plitical prcess. Divisins Over Playing a Rle in the Plitical Prcess Sunni Islamist extremist mvements made Iraq's plitical prcess a primary target befre and after the January 30, 2005 electins. Such insurgents feared that a relatively secure and successful electin wuld cement Shi ite dminance in Iraq and wuld signal the demise f bth the Islamist and Ba athist visins fr the future f Iraq.

218 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 186 On December 29, 2004, Ansar al-sunna declared, All plling statins and thse in them will be targets fr ur brave sldiers. 614 Similarly, the Islamic Army in Iraq warned in mid-january 2005, D nt allw plling statins in yur neighbrhd because they put yur lives in danger. D nt als interfere with the emplyees wh wrk in these vting centers, as they will be killed. Keep away frm these places as they will be attacked. On January 23, 2005, Zarqawi released an auditape saying, We have declared an all-ut war n this evil principle f demcracy and thse wh fllw this wrng idelgy. 615 The mre mainstream Sunni grups, hwever, seem t have recgnized that failing t play a plitical rle effectively deprived the Sunnis f pwer, prvided a blank check t ther plitical factins, and meant they had little leverage t blck develpments they ppsed. This experience was reinfrced by the debates ver the new cnstitutin and the bvius cst t Sunnis f nt previusly participating in the plitical prcess. Sunni effrts t create a new plitical identity included bth the minrity that has participated in the new gvernment and plitical prcess, sme wh had byctted it, and plitical parties like the Muslim Brtherhd and Iraq Islamic Party. They als included clerical bdies like the Assciatin f Islamic Schlars, which is headed by Dr. Muthanna Harith al-dhari an Egyptian educated Islamic schlar and claims t represent sme 6,000 msques, r 80% f the ttal. 616 Iraq s new president and prime minister encuraged their effrts. The search fr a Sunni Minister f Defense, a key factr delaying the creatin f a new gvernment, examined sme 10 candidates befre chsing Sadn al-dulaimi in early May The new leaders als resisted the calls f ther r Shi ites and Kurds fr the systematic purging f all Sunnis with ties t the Ba ath, including many in the Iraqi frces. 617 While the details are unclear, the new Iraqi gvernment and the US als attempted t hld a dialgue with the mre mderate insurgents. At least ne such effrt became public. In summer 2005, a frmer Iraqi electricity minister, Iyham al-samarri, annunced that he had established a srt f cmmunicatin rganizatin thrugh which the varius insurgent grups culd cnvey their views and cncerns t bth the elected Iraqi gvernment and the Calitin. 618 Al-Samarri had a questinable past and a cntrversial tenure as electricity minister. Furthermre, it culd nt be substantiated that al-samarri had any cntact with any insurgents as he claimed. Nt lng after he asserted this ability t speak n behalf f the insurgents, militant grups criticized him via the Web saying that he did nt speak fr them and that he was spreading lies. Nevertheless, an Internet statement appeared a week later stating that the Army f the Mujahedeen and the Islamic Army in Iraq had appinted a spkesman, Ibrahim Yussef al- Shammari, t speak n behalf f the tw insurgent grups. His identity was cnfirmed n websites linked t the tw militant rganizatins. 619 This suggests sme f the militants were mving t frm plitical wings. 620 It remained unclear whether such wings wuld seek t frmally run in the electins t cme r whether they wuld seek t simply put frward cgent demands and expectatins. This participatin f Sunni insurgents in the Iraqi plitical prcess marked a prfund shift in their thinking and tactics, and led t a grwing rift between such insurgents and al Qa'ida frces in Iraq. This rift became mre evident in the fall f 2005, with clashes erupting between al- Qa'ida fighters and Sunni insurgents. 621 There were als grwing reprts f Iraqi Sunni executins f freign Sunni Islamic extremists since the first such reprts surfaced in Nvember One such case tk place n August

219 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page , 2005, when Sunni Iraqis in Ramadi tk up arms against Abu Musab Zarqawi s frces in defense f their Shi ite neighbrs. The fighting came n the heels f a prclamatin by Zarqawi that Ramadi s 3,000 Shi ites leave the city f sme 200,000 residents. The rder was given in retaliatin fr suppsed expulsins f Sunni minrities by Shi ite militias in the mstly Shi ite suth f Iraq. Yet in Ramadi, members f the Sunni Dulaimi tribe, frmed security crdns arund Shi ite hmes and fught Zarqawi s men with grenade launchers and autmatic weapns. All tld, five freign fighters and tw lcal tribal fighters were killed. 623 Similar t insurgent use f the media, in March 2006 a grup knwn as the Anbar Revenge Brigade psted an Internet statement claiming that it killed five tp members f al-qa ida during a campaign t drive them ut f Ramadi. Of these fighters fur were claimed t be al-qa ida and the fifth a member f Ansar al-sunnah. 624 Anther grup, the Anbar Revlutinaries, claimed in March t have killed 20 freign fighters and 33 f their Iraqi sympathizers. This grup, which perated in the Anbar prvince, was cmpsed f nearly 100 fighters, all f whm had family members killed by Zarqawi s al- Qaeda. 625 Many Sunnis participated in the debate ver the cnstitutin and the referendum that fllwed. During the summer and fall f Sunni leaders threatened that a cnstitutin frced thrugh withut the cnsent and cnsideratin f the Sunni ppulatin wuld result in a stepped-up insurgency. Nevertheless, many Sunni leaders and vters, including thse frm a number f insurgent-dminated r influenced areas, participated in the Octber 15, 2005 cnstitutinal referendum. In the weeks prir t the referendum, Abu Theeb, the cmmander f a cell f Sunni insurgents nrth f Baghdad knwn as the Anger Brigade, traveled the cuntryside visiting Sunni villages. The message was the same at each stp: Sunnis shuld register t vte but vte n in the referendum. Abu Theeb, wh has been fighting calitin trps fr mre than tw years, described the byctt f the January electin as a mistake. It is a new jihad There is a time fr fighting, and a time fr plitics. 626 Theeb was s determined t ensure a Sunni turnut that he supplied a lcal plling statin with his wn guards n the day f the vte. Despite an Al Qa'ida vw t kill anyne, including Sunnis, wh participated in the referendum, Theeb rdered his fllwers t prtect the lcal schl t ensure that Sunni vters wuld be safe. Theeb even reprimanded a yung fllwer fr planning an IED attack the night befre the electin, saying: I thught we agreed that nthing will happen fr the next few days. 627 Sunnis turned ut in far greater numbers fr the Octber referendum than the January 30, 2005 electin, giving mmentum t Sunni participatin in the December 15, 2005 electins fr the natinal assembly. Althugh n exact figures have been published, Sunni turnut in the Octber 15, 2005 referendum was much heavier than expected. Overall turnut in the referendum was 63 per cent, up frm 58 per cent in January. Mrever, turnut in many Shi ite and Kurdishdminated prvinces fell belw January s figures, indicating the increase in verall turnut had cme frm Sunni Arab vters. 628 This did nt mean Sunnis supprted the cnstitutin. In Salahuddin Prvince, a Sunni strnghld and hme t Saddam Hussein s family, 81 per cent rejected the cnstitutin. Elsewhere in the cuntry, vting was largely divided alng ethnic and sectarian lines. Vting in the mixed

220 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 188 prvince f Diyala, hme t bth Sunnis and Shi ites, was illustrative f this split with per cent vting yes and per cent vting n. 629 It did mean that Sunnis had engaged plitically, and nt thrugh vilence. This engagement was even mre active in the run up t the electins fr the natinal assembly. Even in Tikrit, there were mre than tw-dzen plitical grups with ffices in Tikrit by Nvember 2005, and yung men culd be fund hanging campaign psters. Sme psters even reached ut t frmer members f Saddam s party. One such pster read, Vte fr us and we prmise we will end de-ba'athificatin. 630 The end result was that numerus Sunni candidates ran, and numerus Sunnis vted. Vter turnut figures released by the Iraqi Electral Cmmissin put turnut in the December 15 electin at 70 percent, the highest in any pst-saddam era electin held t date. A ttal 10.9 f Iraq s 15.6 millin registered vters vted in the electin, and Sunnis vted heavily in every area where insurgents wh ppsed plitical actin culd nt threaten them. 631 The tensins ver these different appraches t the plitical prcess were cmpunded by the fact that many Iraqi Sunnis, even thse wh sympathized with the insurgency, strngly ppsed attacks n Sunni recruits t the Iraqi frces, and the killings f Sunnis in lcal gvernments. Iraqi Gvernment Negtiatins with Natinalist Insurgents The December 15 th electin did have a mixed impact. The Sunnis nly received abut 20% f the seats. Many cmplained abut fraud and that they were being alltted fewer seats than their Shi ite cunterparts. Sme Sunni insurgents and anti-gvernment leaders als made it clear that they culd bth participate in many aspects f the plitical prcess and supprt the insurgency. Nevertheless, a number f reprts in early January 2006 indicated that enugh prgress was taking place s that that US and Iraqi gvernment fficials were able t hld much mre prductive dialgues with grups the insurgency. These talks invlved Sunni Arab natinalists wh resented the ccupatin and were fearful f being marginalized under a Shi ite dminated gvernment. Bth sets f fficials stressed that n cmmitments were made t this grup, and that they wuld nt enter int talks with freign terrrists and pr-saddam elements. Furthermre, fficials were adamant that they wuld nt talk with figures that the intelligence services identified as having been implicated in lethal attacks n US and Iraqi frces. 632 Thugh the identities f the insurgent grups and figures invlved in the talks are unknwn, the New Yrk Times listed Muhammad s Army and the Islamic Army in Iraq as the likely grups because they are allegedly natinalist and are cmprised f frmer Ba athists. 633 Despite the talks, US fficials did nt believe that a lasting ceasefire r dembilizatin f insurgent bands was imminent largely because such grups wanted the US t establish a timeline fr withdrawal. Nnetheless, Ambassadr Khalilzad admitted in an interview in the spring f 2006 that U.S. fficials had held talks with sme grups linked t the insurgency and that he believed these talks were ne f the reasns that the number f attacks against U.S. trps declined during that perid. 634 The US effrt t reach ut t part f Sunni natinalist insurgency appears t have had tw levels. On the plitical level, US fficials hped t bring the natinalist insurgents int the plitical prcess, which wuld encurage them t give up vilence. On anther level, the US appeared t

221 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 189 want t turn the natinalists against the freign fighters and Al Qa'ida affiliates by fcusing n the differences between the insurgent grups. As ne Western diplmat stated, Accrding t Islamic dctrine, as well as demcratic principles, there cannt be a legitimate resistance against a legitimate gvernment. If we can reach an understanding with each ther, meaning the resistance, as they call it, and the calitin, then they in turn will take care f Zarqawi and the terrrists. 635 In the talks, US representatives repeatedly asked the lcatin f Al Qa'ida elements and whether the natinalist elements wuld be willing t help rt them ut. Other US effrts had already been made public in December The US released 20 prminent Sunni detainees alng with Satam Quad, a frmer Saddam supprter. Thugh US Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad stressed that the mve was nt an attempt t mllify Sunni insurgents, they reprtedly tk the release as a sign f gd will and became mre pen t talks. 636 While such prisner releases may inadvertently sften aspects f the Sunni insurgency, it prvked an utburst f prtests by Shi ites against Ambassadr Khalilzad and Iraqi Sunni leaders. A tape attributed t Abu Musab al-zarqawi was released n an Islamist website in early January that seemed t be an apparent respnse t such effrts by Iraqi and US fficials, as well as Arab states. Zarqawi sharply criticized Iraqi Sunnis and Arab cuntries fr wrking fr the frmatin f a unifying calitin gvernment in Iraq. The speaker attacked the Arab League summit in Nvember that brught the varius Iraqi factins tgether in Egypt. Reuters quted the speaker as saying; The cuntries that met in Cair were invlved in destrying Iraq and cperated with America by pening their land, air space and waters and ffering intelligence t it. 637 The speaker explained that they had nt attacked plling statins during the electin s as nt t hurt Sunnis while denuncing the Sunni Iraqi Islamist Party fr supprting the Iraqi cnstitutin. This effrt may have backfired t the pint that it frced the Zarqawi grup t change tactics. An annuncement n a website frequently used by al-qa ida in early 2006 indicated that Zarqawi had abdicated his psitin as emir n the Mujahedeen Cuncil, a grup cmpsed f six radical rganizatins in Iraq including al-qa ida, in favr f an Iraqi. 638 In a vide bradcast n the Internet, Zarqawi appealed t Muslim clerics in Iraq and asked fr their supprt in his mvement. 639 Althugh this may be an attempt by Al-Qa ida in Iraq t put an Iraqi face n what is seen by many as a freign-led Islamist extremist mvement, the levels f cmmunicatin, cperatin and cnflict between the varius insurgent mvements remains unclear. The Iraqi gvernment attempted t take advantage f this cleavage, reaching an agreement with six Sunni natinalist insurgent grups. In exchange fr recnciliatin talks, these grups pledged t denunce Zarqawi s al-qa ida mvement. 640 Despite the scattered nature f the evidence indicating a split in insurgent mvements, Iraqi Natinal Security Advisr Mwaffak Rubaie indicated that he believed such incidents were n the rise and reflected an increasing intlerance amng Iraqis f freign-led grups perating in their cuntry. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, A U.S. military spkesman in Baghdad eched these sentiments and emphasized that six majr leaders had been killed by ther indigenus insurgent grups since September 2005, and suggested that the lcal insurgents had becme part f the slutin.

222 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 190 Other reprts indicated that members f the Albu Mahal tribe, wh had frmerly clashed with Calitin frces, began directing U.S. trps t lcatins f al-qa ida hideuts in the Syrian brder area. In Ramadi, Abu Khatab, a high-ranking al-qa ida member, was run ut by insurgents lyal t lcal tribes. 641 In Samarra, lcal leaders launched a campaign t hunt dwn al- Qa ida members in a respnse t the assassinatin f Hikmat Mumtaz, the leader f the Albu- Baz tribe. 642 It is imprtant t nte, hwever, that the shifts in Sunni natinalist psitins, and their infighting with Islamist extremists, did nt have a discernable effect n the verall level f vilence in Iraq. In a ten-day perid in January, insurgents attacked U.S. frces 113 times in Ramadi, the suppsed primary area f this divisin amng freign and dmestic led grups. 643 Jeffrey White, a frmer U.S. intelligence fficer, suggested that, even if we can explit this rift between insurgent grups, it desn t mean they stp fighting us. 644 Mrever, any splits between the insurgent grups are highly dependent n the actins f the Shi ites and Kurds in the new gvernment. Bth Sunni insurgents, and Sunnis in general, have expressed grwing fears f Shi ite and Kurdish attacks and abuses since the summer f They pinted t well-dcumented abuses by sme f the Shi ite-dminated units in the special security frces and in prisns cntrlled by the Ministry f Interir that became public in the fall and winter f They als charge that Shi ite rganizatins like the Badr Organizatin have run the equivalent f death squads, that the Shi ites are pushing Sunnis ut f Basra and Shi ite neighbrhds in ther cities, and Kurdish grups are seeking t push Sunnis ut f Kirkuk and ther mixed cities and twns in the nrth. The Rle f Sunni Arab Militias This pressure n Arab Sunnis frm the Arab Shi ites and Kurds smetimes helped fuel the insurgency, but it als led thse Sunnis willing t cperate with the Calitin and new Iraqi gvernment t develp their wn frces. These effrts have als been stimulated by the rising tensins between thse Sunnis that d nt want t participate in the insurgency and the insurgents, and between the mre mderate and natinalist insurgents and the mre extreme Islamist mvements. Mst f the Sunni frces that emerged by early 2006 were lcal and infrmal, perating at the tribal and neighbrhd level. In sme cases, the end result was a frce that was nt lyal t either the insurgency r supprtive f the Calitin and new Iraqi gvernment. Sme frces were part f the insurgency, and thers were frmed t deal with the threat psed by the mre extreme Sunni Arab insurgents, such as the Zarqawi mvement. Map VI.1 belw shws the tribal and subtribal divisins in Iraq.

223 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 191 Map VI.1: Tribes and Subtribes f Iraq

224 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 192 The Psitive Side f the Militia Stry In sme cases, the Calitin and new Iraqi gvernment either helped create such militias r supprted them. In the brder area and part f Western Iraq, fr example, MNF-I and the Iraqi gvernment fund it was cheaper and mre effective t buy the lyalty f lcal tribal militias than fight the insurgents particularly in thse areas where utside insurgents had alienated the lcal residents. These develpments led US Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch t g s far as t say that "The lcal insurgents have becme part f the slutin and nt part f the prblem." 645 The Iraqi Minister f Defense, Saadun Dulaymi, encuraged these develpments, and MNF-I prvided funds, weapns, and sme training. US fficers and Ambassadr Khalilzad met with key leaders. In sme Sunni urban areas and twns, plice frces were created that came clse t being lcal militias, at least in terms f their recruiting base. In ther areas, Sunnis were rganized at the tribal r lcal level in an effrt t prtected key facilities and prjects, like il pipelines. These effrts were given further incentive when a bmbing by Zarqawi frces killed sme 70 Arab Sunnis at a recruiting statin in Ramadi in January Mithal Alusi, a Sunni Arab parliamentarian, was quted as saying that, "There is a change After these attacks, and after the electins, we find the peple are eager t be rid f the terrrists." Sheikh Osama al-jadaan, f the Karabila tribe in Anbar prvince was quted as saying that, "They claim t be striking at the US ccupatin, but the reality is they are killing inncent Iraqis in the markets, in msques, in churches, and in ur schls," althugh he als nted that, We are caught in the middle between the terrrists cming t destry us with their suicide belts, their TNT, and their car bmbs, and the American Army that destrys ur hmes, takes ur weapns, and desn't allw us t defend urselves against the terrrists. 647 These effrts cntinued in February. 648 Iraqi and US fficials issued ffers and discussed deals fr prisner release, additinal aid, and senir psitins in the army and plice fr the supprt f Sunni natinalist insurgents. These effrts included a meeting between General Gerge W. Casey. Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari, and high-ranking members f Iraq's security and intelligence agencies with sme Iraq's largest Sunni Muslim Arab tribes. Mwaffak Rubaie, the Iraqi gvernment's natinal security advisr, said that al-jaafari prmised t recruit mre Sunni Arabs int the army and plice frces and t send mre ecnmic aid t Al Anbar. Rubaie and Sunni tribal leaders at the meeting als said that al-jaafari pledged t release at least 140 prisners in cming weeks, and that mre releases wuld be frthcming. The meeting als shwed, hwever, that sme tribal leaders wanted t create their wn militias t plice their cities a mve ppsed by the central gvernment. Fr example, Sheik Osama Jadan said his Al Anbar cmmunity had already frmed an armed grup, similar t the Shi ite militias, t fight insurgents. "We started ur peratins three weeks ag, and they have been fruitful," he said. "We caught ne f [guerrilla leader Abu Musab] Zarqawi's assistants, and after an investigatin f him we handed him ver t the Iraqi army and jint intelligence." In Jubba, an area in the Sunni-dminated western Iraq near the Syrian brder, Cl. Shaaban Barzan al-ubaidi, lead the nascent plice frce. His fiery determinatin t wage jihad against the criminal, terrrist, Saddamist, [and] Zarqawist, made him a U.S. ally. Al-Ubaidi, wh claimed t have the supprt f 41 lcal sheikhs, said that he tk up the jb after mre than 42 f his relatives were killed after trying t jin the Iraqi army and plice. Unlike thers in his psitin wh dislike bth the insurgents and the Calitin, al-ubaidi praises U.S. effrts. 649

225 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 193 Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad explained that, "We are engaged with leaders, including tribal leaders and thers, t encurage them t suspend their military peratins with the aim f ending the insurgency and wrking tgether with us against the terrrists I think it is critical that the security ministries be given t peple wh are bradly accepted acrss sectarian and ethnic lines and that they are nt peple wh are sectarian r divisive and that they are nt peple with ties t militias r armed grups." The Negative Side At the same time, ther Sunni vices gave a different message. Sheikh Abdel Salaam al-qubaysi, a leader f the Muslim Schlars Assciatin, a hard-line Sunni grup with much f its base in Anbar stated that, "These are just a few sheikhs wh want t get plitical pwer by claiming t be fighting the terrrists, and t be speaking fr the resistance They are slaves in the pckets f the ccupatin. They have n weight in the streets." He als blamed the attacks in Anbar n freign Shi ites, We knw that 40,000 militants frm Iran have cme t Iraq," he says. "I dn't rule ut that they did this t prevent Sunni Arabs frm jining the Iraqi Army." 650 Sme grups became invlved in the equivalent f an auctin between the Calitin and new Iraqi gvernment and the insurgents. Sme tk the mney and cntinued t supprt the insurgency. In a number f areas, hwever, the results were psitive. Success varied by individual case. What was mre threatening was that sme Sunni Arabs sught t frm their wn militia at the natinal level t cunter Shi'ite and Kurdish frces. While sme f these were infrmal neighbrhd watch grups, thers had full-time members and names fr their rganizatins. In early February, a frce called the "Anbar Revlutinaries" emerged which ppsed the mre extreme elements f the insurgency like Al Qa ida, but als was created t help secure Arab Sunnis against Arab Shi ite and Kurdish pressure and attacks. Accrding t press reprts, this frce was cmpsed largely f frmer Ba ath lyalists, Saddam supprters, mderate Iraqi Sunni Islamists and ther Arab Sunni natinalists. It was rganized partly t resist pressure frm Arab Sunni Islamist extremists, but its main purpse was t deal with the threat frm the Shi'ite Badr Brigades. One Sunni Arab fficial invlved was quted as saying that, "The Anbar Revlutinaries are here t stay, we need them t prtect the peple Sunnis d nt have the Shi'ite Badr (Brigades) r the Kurdish Peshmerga. In these times when sectarian tensin is high, such a frce is needed." Anther was quted as saying, "It is ur right t defend urselves." Hazem Naimi, a plitical science prfessr, was quted as saying that, "Tribal leaders and plitical figures fund that al Qa ida s prgram is harming the plitical effrts and prgress the Sunni plitical leaders are making, because al Qa ida rejects all plitics...sunnis feel that the Shi'ites have taken ver the gvernment and nw it is their state The Badr Brigades are in the interir ministry and under the interir ministry's name they g t twns, kill and arrest." As sft sectarian cleansing and abductins increased in mixed neighbrhds, sme Sunnis began frming their wn militias rather than leave their hmes. Sunni msques served as places fr meeting and rganizatin, as well as inspiratin, fr such grups. Preachers issued fatwas instructing their members t purchase guns and frm a cllective defense against further acts f vilence by Shi ites. Fares Mahmud, deputy preacher f the El Kudiri Msque said, We ve made an agreement with the neighbrs that if we have anther attack, they ll pick up their

226 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 194 weapns and fight the invaders. 651 Sunding much like supprters f the Mahdi Army, he cntinued, We are depending n the sul f the peple t prtect us. Althugh at the time it was difficult t predict the future ptential fr Sunni militias, the feeling amng Sunnis that their hand was being frced despite their best wishes, parallels many f the cmments made by Shi ite leaders and militias prir t the Askariya bmbing. As Ismael Zayer, editr fr the Iraqi newspaper Al Sabah Al Jadid said, At the end f the day, if nbdy will prtect them and the gvernment wn t intervene, then they have t prtect themselves. Adnan Abbas Allawi, a middle-aged manager eched these feelings, This decisin was frced n us. We dn t want t d this, but it s nt pssible t see ur msques burned and insulted. Patience has its limits. Althugh the exact events were still unclear, it appeared that in April a tw-day gun battle in the Azamiyah district, a Sunni neighbrhd near Baghdad, was the result f a lcal Sunni militia attempting t repel what it thught were Shi ite death squads. US fficials cuntered hwever, that Calitin frces and the Iraqi Army were n patrl when they received fire frm insurgents. Later a jint US-Iraqi checkpint again tk fire, at which pint reinfrcements were called in. Althugh the residents may have mistaken U.S. and Iraqi Army patrls fr the Shi ite dminated plice, it nnetheless demnstrated that lcalized Sunni militias were capable and willing t munt a crdinated defense. Mrever, it was a testament t the increasingly plarized divisins between the security frces and the verall relatinships between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi ites. 652 Accrding t reprts, in the early mrning msques in the Azamiyah area began calling Allah Akbar and G fr Jihad! Defeat the aggressrs; signaling that the neighbrhd was under attack. Residents said that the neighbrhd security frce that had frmed in the aftermath f the February 22 Askariya bmbing t prtect their families and hmes frm Shi ite militias, tk up psitins n rftps and began firing at military vehicles. Other men went huse-t-huse urging able males t jin the fight. We defended ur neighbrhd, ur msques and ur hnr, said ne man wh was part f the battle. 653 Wrd spread thrughut the twn that the incming men were Iranians, meaning that they were part f the Shi ite grups that fled t Iran during Saddam s rule, and then returned after his fall in Bth the Badr Organizatin and the Mahdi Army are said t have ties t Iran. There were uncnfirmed reprts by sme witnesses that the Iraqi Army, which is generally mre Sunni-dminated, fught with the residents against the Shi ite-dminated plice frces f the Interir Ministry. One wman claimed that the lcal heres f Adhamiyah were rallying the twnspeple t teach [the Iranians] a lessn and urged them t supprt the Iraqi Army. 655 Regardless f whether Shi ite militias, security frces, r the Iraqi army were the nes entering the twn, the perceptin in the larger Sunni cmmunity was that it was anther example f Shi ite death squads tied t the gvernment cnducting sectarian cleansing, and their utrage was expressed accrdingly. We have evidence that sme fficials and militias are up t their necks in the killings and kidnappings that take place daily in Baghdad, said Sunni plitician Dhafi al-ani. Well knwn Sunni plitician Adnan al-dulaimi eched these sentiments and accused the gvernment f waging the ugliest frm f ethnic cleansing, against the Sunni cmmunities and blamed the existence f unleashed militia, including sme militia backed by freign pwers wh have nly ne gal that is t see Iraqis slaughtered in a sectarian war. Saleh al-mutlaq, a pssible

227 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 195 candidate fr a high level ministerial pst and the leader f the Iraqi Frnt fr Natinal Dialgue, demanded that gvernment plice frces stp their raiding, kidnapping and lting. 656 The fllwing day, al-qaeda in Iraq issued a statement prmising a new raid t avenge the Sunnis at Adhamiyah and the ther areas, and the raid will start with the dawn f Wednesday, if Gd wishes The Shiite areas will be an pen battlefield fr us. 657 While it was unclear if these Sunni neighbrhd watch grups wuld cperate r supprt the Baathist, natinalist r Islamist elements f the insurgency, reprting f the events prtrayed the acts by the Adhamiya Defense Cmmittees as a legitimate act f self defense, rather than an insurgent attack n U.S. and Iraqi frces. Fr example, the Iraqi newspaper al- Zaman asserted that the peple f Adhamiya had filed a night assault by Shi ite death squads. 658 It is clear that Sunni participatin in the gvernment, Iraqi frces, and the rle f the Sunni militia(s) is dependent n the ability f the new Iraqi gvernment t reassure Sunnis abut their day-t-day security. It is als dependent n the gvernments ability t cmprmise with Sunni s n issues like the cntrl f il and ther revenues, the nature f central versus lcal pwer, the nature f any federatin, allwing Ba ath leaders t return t the gvernment, the rle f religin in law and gvernance, and the ther key aspects that will shape Iraq s character as a state. It is als clear that further purges f Sunnis frm the gvernment, military, and security services can nly make things wrse. Such mistakes are exemplified by the implementatin withut warning f a six-mnth-ld rder frm the Iraqi Debaathificatin Cmmissin that led t the dismissal f 18 Iraqi generals, clnels, and majrs -- mst Sunni Arabs frm Anbar. 659 Assessing the Future Ptential f the Sunni Insurgency The future f the Sunni insurgency nw seems dependent n tw factrs. First, whether the Iraqi plitical prcess succeeds in becming truly inclusive r whether it heightens the sectarian and ethnic tensins and cnflicts that divide Iraq and creates a mre intense state f civil war. Secnd, hw sn and hw well the full range f Iraqi security frces can cme n-line and be effective. Failure in bth areas is quite clearly an ptin. The dds f Iraq drifting int a serius civil war are impssible t quantify but the risk is clearly serius. At the same time, the insurgency may well divide between its mre secular r natinalist elements and the Islamist extremist grups. The Natinalist Need fr Cmprmise Given their present strength, the mre natinalistic Sunni insurgents have gd reasn t seek a plitical cmprmise if the Shi ites and Kurds ffer them an inclusive gvernment and acceptable terms. They at best seem capable f paralyzing prgress, and fighting a lng war f attritin, rather than defeating an Iraqi gvernment which is dminated by a chesive Shi ite majrity, and which maintains gd relatins with the Kurds. Regardless f wh is ding the cunting, the ttal fr active and passive native Iraqi Sunni insurgents still leaves them a small minrity f Iraq's ppulatin. Unless the Iraqi gvernment divides r cllapses, they cannt bring back Arab Sunni minrity rule r the Ba ath; they cannt regain the level f pwer, wealth, and influence they nce had. They cannt reestablish the frm f largely secular rule that existed under Saddam, r reestablish Iraq as a cuntry that mst Arabs see as Sunni.

228 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 196 An understanding f these same plitical and military realities may eventually drive mst f the mre mderate and pragmatic Sunni insurgents t jin the nn-vilent plitical prcess in Iraq if the Shi'ite and Kurds elements that nw dminate the gvernment and plitical prcess act t include them and prvide suitable incentives. Such shifts, hwever, are likely t be slw and uncertain. Histrically, mst insurgent grups have a much better visin f what they ppse than what they are fr, and they have limited interest in pragmatic realplitik. Mst Sunni grups are still cmmitted t ding everything -- and smetimes anything -- they can t drive the Calitin ut and break up the peaceful plitical prcess almst regardless f the damage dne t Iraq and t Sunni areas. Richard Armitage, the frmer US Deputy Secretary f State, cmmented n the insurgency and its lack f realistic plitical gals as fllws: In Algeria, the s-called insurgents, r in Vietnam, the s-called insurgents, they had a prgram and a psitive view In Iraq that s lacking they nly have fear t ffer. They nly have terrr t ffer. This is why they re s brutal in their intimidatin. 660 The Islamist Need fr Civil War The risk als exists that the Sunni Islamist extremists have becme better trained and rganized t the pint where they are nw able t establish themselves as the dminant plitical and military frce within the Sunni cmmunity particularly if Iraq s Arab Shi ites and Kurds mishandle the situatin r react t the grwing prvcatin f bldy suicide attacks and ther killings by Ne-Salafi extremists. 661 The Sunni Islamist extremists can then try t present themselves as the nly legitimate alternative t the ccupatin, even if they fail t prvide a ppular agenda. This means they can survive and endure as lng as the gvernment is t weak t ccupy the insurgency dminated areas, and as lng as the large majrity f Sunnis in given areas des nt see a clear incentive t jint the gvernment and Iraq's plitical prcess. Much will depend n just hw willing Iraqi Shi ites and Kurds are t frget the past, nt verreact t Sunni Islamist and ther attacks designed t divide and splinter the cuntry, and cntinue t ffer Iraqi Sunnis a fair share f wealth and pwer. The US psitin is clear. The US cnsistently supprted a unified natin and inclusive gvernment. U.S. Ambassadr t Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, stated in an interview that the Ministries f Defense and Interir must be headed by thse wh have brad based supprt: The security ministries have t be run by peple wh are nt assciated with militias and wh are nt regarded as sectarian. 662 Later, Ambassadr Khalilzad went further and directly tied the future f U.S. ecnmic and military supprt t the ability f Iraqi leaders t frm an inclusive gvernment saying, We [the U.S.] are nt ging t invest the resurces f the American peple and build frces that are run by peple wh are sectarian. 663

229 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 197 VII. The Issue f Freign Vlunteers 664 The fact that yung men are being recruited frm cuntries in Nrth Africa, the Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and ther cuntries des nt mean that freign fighters dminate Iraqi Islamist extremist rganizatins. Recruiting smaller numbers f utsiders as cannn fdder, sacrifice pawns, r "martyrs" has becme all t easy in a regin where religius extremists have learned hw t explit religius feelings. This des nt, hwever, mean that thse directing the effrts f such grups, carrying an ut the supprt activity, r ding much f the day-t-day fighting are freign fighters. There is limited evidence that Iraq is a unique magnet fr freign vlunteers. Iraq is scarcely the nly center f such activity, and freign vlunteers als perate in the West, in Nrth Africa and the Levant, in the Gulf, and Central, Suth, and Sutheast Asia. Natins as diverse as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Indnesia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and the Sudan als have training centers, staging and supprt facilities, r internal cnflicts invlving ne-salafi extremists. The Israeli-Palestinian cnflict des as much t fuel Arab and Islamic anger as the Iraq cnflict, and such extremists capitalize n plitical, ecnmic, and scial prblems and tensins thrughut the Arab and Islamic wrlds. Nevertheless, Iraq has becme a critical center fr Sunni Islamist extremist activity, and currently presents the greatest threat that such extremists culd destabilize a state, and drive it twards a majr civil war. They have at least partially displaced the struggle between Iraqis, and they certainly drive it twards vilence and away frm plitical cmpetitin and accmmdatin. They are fighting a war t create a civil war in Iraq: ne that wuld make an effective secular r mderate gvernment impssible and trigger a cnflict between Sunni and Shi ite that culd spread t divide Islam and the Arab wrld. Mre bradly, they seek t make Islam a captive t a kind f vilent, intlerant, and ruthlessly exclusive idelgical mvement that wuld deprive it f a future by driving it back twards an imaginary and perverted visin f the past. In June 2005, U.S. Lt-Gen Jhn Vines, cmmanding general f calitin frces in Iraq, identified the freign fighters as the mst vilent grup in Iraq s nging insurgency. Accrding t Vines, insurgent activity amng Iraqis was being driven by mney, nt idelgy, and freign jihadists were using their financial resurces t get Iraqis t attack ther Iraqis. 665 It is unlikely, hwever, that freign vlunteers make up even 10% f the insurgent frce, and they may make up Less than 5%. While the number f freign vlunteers increased thrugh the spring f 2005, US experts feel they have since declined, largely as a result f US and Iraqi gvernment military peratins in Western Iraq and imprvements in security in the Syrian-Iraqi brder area. While sme estimates f the ttal number f such vlunteers have gne as high as 3,000, thers g frm the high hundreds t ver 1, The fact is that there is n basis fr even a credible guesstimate, and the numbers keep fluctuating ver time. The Uncertain Number, Surce, and Rle f Freign Vlunteers Freigners made up less than 600 ut f sme 14,000 detainees as f June Calitin experts estimated that they had made up less than 5% f insurgent casualties and detainees t date. 667 US experts and tp level Iraqi fficials estimated in Nvember 2005 that at least 90% f the Sunni fighters were Iraqi and the ttal might be clser t 94% t 96%. Calitin surces reprted that nly 3.8% f sme 13,300 detainees held in Nvember 2005 were freign. These

230 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 198 percentages f freigners were lwer than estimates made in the early winter f 2005, and marked a sharp cntrast t claims that the insurgency was being driven by large numbers f freign vlunteers. The percentage had nt changed significantly as f March 2006, when the ttal number f detainees was reprted as appraching 14,000. The reliance given insurgent rganizatins place n freign vlunteers is uncertain. While Al Qa ida in Mesptamia has becme virtually synnymus with freign vlunteers, its membership may well be largely Iraqi. US authrities believed Zarqawi cmmanded as many as 1,000 fighters and a much larger grup f sympathizers, as f Nvember 2005, but did nt believe freign vlunteers came clse t being a majrity. 668 The US-Iraqi peratins in Tal Afar fcused n attacking Al Qa ida in Mesptamia in September Althugh this peratin led t the capture f 1,000 suspected insurgents, nne prved t be freigners. 669 There als are freign vlunteers in ther Sunni Islamist extremist grups like Ansar al-islam (als knwn as Ansar al-sunnah), and the Islamic Army f Iraq. At least six ther smaller terrrist grups are perating in Iraq that may rely n freign vlunteers, and many f the grups supprting the "Ba'ath" seem t have freign vlunteers as well. Intelligence analysis crrbrated by infrmatin frm Internet chat rms and web sites run by Islamists indicates that such grups have established terrrist training camps fr bth freign vlunteers and Iraqi vlunteers in the muntains f nrthern Iraq and in the cuntry's western desert alng its 450-mile brder with Syria. There are als reprts f staging facilities and indctrinatin centers inside f Syria. In any case, freign vlunteers have had a special impact n the insurgency because they have been used in extreme attacks t try t prvke a civil war between Iraq's Arab Sunnis and its Arab Shi'ites, Kurds, and ther minrities. Freign Sunni Islamist extremist vlunteers d seem t have carried ut mst f the suicide car and pedestrian bmbings since These are amng sme f the bldiest and mst-publicized insurgent attacks. One US defense fficial estimated that as f July 2005, Iraqis had directly carried ut less than 10% f mre than 500 suicide bmbings. 670 Other experts put the number at well abve 30%. What is clear is that the number f such attacks accelerated sharply in the spring and summer f 2005; the Assciated Press cunted at least 213 suicide attacks as f July. US Air Frce General, and MNF-I spkespersn, Dn Alstn stated, The freign fighters are the nes mst ften behind the wheel f suicide car bmbs, r mst ften behind any suicide situatin, and Gen. Abizaid stated that the Calitin had seen a rise in suicide bmbers cming frm Nrth Africa; particularly Algeria, Tunisia, and Mrcc. 671 Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, agreed adding that freign fighters present a larger challenge t the security f the cuntry than Iraqi insurgent grups. 672 Number and Natinal Origin f Freign Vlunteers N ne knws where mst f the freign vlunteers present in Iraq at any given time have cme frm. The mix seems t vary cnstantly, and estimates differ frm surce t surce. Fr example, the US military reprted that 375 freigners s far had been detained in Iraq in 2005 as f late Octber. The percentage f freign detainees was nly a little ver 4% in early 2005, and had actually drpped by the end f Amng thse detained were: 78 Egyptians; 66 Syrians; 41 Sudanese; 32 Saudis; 17 Jrdanians; 13 Iranians; 2 Britns; and ne each frm France, Israel, Ireland and the United States. 673

231 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 199 Reuvan Paz, a respected Israeli analyst attempted t calculate the cmpsitin f freign vlunteers in Jihadi-Salafi insurgent grups by examining the natinal rigin f 154 insurgents killed in the fighting frm the battle f Fallujah thrugh March He estimated that 94 (61%) were Saudi, 16 (10.4%) were Syrian, 13% (8.4%) were Iraqi, 11 (7.1%) were Kuwaiti, 4 came frm Jrdan, 3 frm Lebann, 2 frm Libya, 2 frm Algeria, 2 frm Mrcc, 2 frm Yemen, 2 frm Tunisia, 1 frm Palestine, 1 frm Dubai, and ne frm the Sudan. He estimated that 33 f the 154 were killed in suicide attacks: 23 Saudis, 5 Syrian, 2 Kuwaiti, 1 Libyan, 1 Iraqi, and 1 Mrccan. These figures are drawn frm a very small sample, and are highly uncertain, but they d illustrate the diversity f backgrunds. 674 The Saudi Natinal Security Assessment Prject estimated that there were apprximately 3,000 freign fighters in Iraq in the spring f 2005 (See Figure VI.1). These figures, and a breakdwn by natinality, were runded best estimates, based n reprts f Saudi and ther intelligence services. They drew upn the interrgatins f hundreds f captured militants and a cmprehensive analysis f militant activities. This included interviews and analysis f activities by bth Saudi and nn-saudi militants. Intelligence reprts prepared by reginal gvernments were als cnsulted, which prvided nt nly names f militants, but als valuable infrmatin n the netwrks that they relied upn t enter Iraq and cnduct their activities. The cnclusin f the Saudi investigatin was that the number f Saudi vlunteers in August 2005 was arund 12% f the freign cntingent (apprximately 350), r 1.2% f the ttal insurgency f apprximately 30,000. Algerians cnstitute the largest cntingent at 20%, fllwed clsely by Syrians (18%), Yemenis (17%), Sudanese (15%), Egyptians (13%) and thse frm ther states (5%). Discussins with US and Iraqi experts indicated that they felt that Saudi estimates were rughly crrect, althugh they cautined that they did nt have reliable numbers fr either the ttal number f vlunteers r their rigin by cuntry. A Brkings Institutin s analysis f the numbers f freign fighters in Iraq and their cuntries f rigin cncurred with the Saudi assessment. 675 Anything like 3,000 freign fighters in Iraq wuld pse a serius threat, but the numbers wuld be largely irrelevant. All it wuld take is enugh vlunteers t cntinue t supprt suicide attacks and vilent bmbings, and seek t drive Iraqi Sunnis twards a majr and intense civil war. They als pse a threat because their actins gave Bin Laden and ther ne-salafi extremist mvements publicity and credibility amng the angry and alienated in the Islamic wrld, and because many were likely t survive and be the surce f vilence and extremism in ther cuntries. Nevertheless, even the highest estimate f freign vlunteers pales beside the estimates f Iraqi insurgents. US experts still put the ttal number f full time insurgents at arund 20,000-30,000 in December Virtually all reprts indicate the insurgency remained largely hmegrwn. Mrever, if the number f freign detainees is any measure f hw imprtant freign militants are, it indicates that it is their fanaticism and willingness t use extreme vilence that is the key issue. Much f the flw f peple and supplies acrss Iraq s brders is a factr f general brder permiability. N cuntry n Iraq s brders prevents all frms f infiltratin. Anyne with a cnvincing set f papers can crss at legal brder crssings, and minr bribes are ften enugh t gain permissin t enter. Smuggling and fees simply t jump the inspectin line are cmmn, and inspectin is ften minimal.

232 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 200 Jrdan des ffer sme security alng its brder, althugh it is scarcely sealed. The same is true f Turkey. The Saudi gvernment had sme success in its effrts t seal the brder between the Kingdm and Iraq. Hwever, it admits that traffic still crsses the brder in bth directins, with Iraqi summglers ging int Saudi Arabia and sme infiltratrs mving in the ppsite directin. Iran nw has a fld f pilgrims entering Iraq, brder checks are ften inadequate,. Neither Iran nr Iraq culd ttally halt smuggling and infiltratin even during the wrst days f the Iran-Iraq War.

233 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 201 Figure VI.2: Freign Militants in Iraq (3,000 Ttal) Other Cuntries 5% Egypt 13% Algeria 20% Sudan 15% Yemen 17% Syria 18% Saudi Arabia 12%

234 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 202 Saudi Militants in Iraq: A Case Study The Calitin and Iraqi gvernment have nt released any significant details n their estimates f the number f freign vlunteers, their rigin, r their mtives. The Saudi intelligence services have, hwever, made a majr effrt t estimate the number f Saudi infiltratrs that mve acrss the Saudi brder r far mre ften transit thrugh third states like Syria. As f August 2005, apprximately 352 Saudis were thught t have successful entered Iraq (and an additinal 63 had been stpped at the brder by Saudi security services). Of these, 150 were thught t be active, 72 were knwn frm al-qa ida cmpiled lists t be active in Iraq, were presumed in detentin (a maximum f 20 in US custdy and 3 in Kurdish), and 56 were presumed dead (See Figure VI.2). Interrgatins and ther Saudi intelligence gathering peratins revealed that these individuals did nt cme exclusively frm a single gegraphical regin in Saudi Arabia, but frm varius areas in the Kingdm, especially frm the Suth, Hijaz, and Najd. They were usually affiliated with the mst prminent cnservative tribes and were generally middle class. Mst were emplyed, many were educated, and all were Sunni. 677 Presumed Detained, 74, 21% Figure VI.3: Saudi Militants in Iraq as f September 2005 Knwn Active, 72, 20% Presumed Active, 150, 43% Presumed Dead, 56, 16% As part f a massive crackdwn n Saudi militants attempting t enter Iraq, the Saudi gvernment has interrgated dzens f natinals either returning frm Iraq r caught at the brder. The average age f these fighters was 17-25, but a few were lder. Sme had families and yung children. In cntrast, ther fighters frm acrss the Middle East and Nrth Africa tended t be in their late 20s r 30s. The Saudi infiltratrs were als questined by the intelligence services abut their mtives fr jining the insurgency. One imprtant pint was the number wh insisted that they were nt militants befre the Iraq war. Of thse wh were interrgated, a full 85% were nt n any gvernment watch list (which cmprised mst f the recgnized extremists and militants), nr were they knwn members f al-qa ida.

235 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 203 The names f thse wh died fighting in Iraq generally appear n militant websites as martyrs, and Saudi investigatrs als apprached the families f these individuals fr infrmatin regarding the backgrund and mtivatin f the nes wh died. Accrding t these interviews as well, the bulk f the Saudi fighters in Iraq were driven t extremism by the war itself. Mst f the Saudi militants in Iraq were mtivated by revulsin at the idea f an Arab land being ccupied by a nn-arab cuntry. These feelings were intensified by the images f the ccupatin they saw n televisin and the Internet many f which came frm surces intensely hstile t the US and the war in Iraq, and which repeated r manipulated wrst case images. The catalyst mst ften cited was Abu Ghraib, thugh images frm Guantanam Bay were mentined. Sme recgnized the name f a relative r friend psted n a website and felt cmpelled t jin the cause. These factrs, cmbined with the agitatin regularly prvided by militant clerics in Friday prayers, helped lead them t vlunteer. In ne case, a 24-year-ld student frm a prminent Saudi tribe -- wh had n previus affiliatin with militants -- explained that he was mtivated after the US invasin t jin the militants by stries he saw in the press, and thrugh the frceful rhetric f a mid-level cleric sympathetic t al-qa ida. The cleric intrduced him and three thers t a Yemeni, wh unbeknwnst t them was an al-qa ida member. After underging several weeks f indctrinatin, the grup made its way t Syria, and then was escrted acrss the brder t Iraq where they met their Iraqi handlers. There they were assigned t a battalin, cmprised mstly f Saudis (thugh thse planning the attacks were exclusively Iraqi). After being appinted t carry ut a suicide attack, the yung man had secnd thughts and returned hme t Saudi Arabia where he was arrested in January The cleric wh had instigated the whle affair was als brught up n terrrism charges and is expected t face a lng jail term. The Yemeni al-qa ida member was killed in December 2004 fllwing a failed attack n the Ministry f Interir. There are ther similar stries regarding yung men wh were enticed by rgue clerics int taking up arms in Iraq. Many were instructed t engage in suicide attacks and as a result, never return hme. Interrgatins f nearly 150 Saudis suspected f planning t the jin the Iraqi insurgency indicate that they were heeding the calls f clerics and activists t drive the infidels ut f Arab land. Like Jrdan and mst Arab cuntries, the Saudi gvernment has sught t limit such calls fr actin, which inevitably feed ne-salafi extremist as the expense f legitimate interpretatins f Islam. King Abdullah has issued a strng new directive that hlds thse wh cnceal knwledge f terrrist activities as guilty as the terrrists themselves. Hwever, many religius leaders and figures in Arab natins have issued fatwas stating that waging jihad in Iraq is justified by the Kran due t its defensive nature. T illustrate, in Octber 2004, several clerics in Saudi Arabia said that, it was the duty f every Muslim t g and fight in Iraq. 678 On June 20, 2005, the Saudi gvernment released a new list f 36 knwn al-qa ida peratives in the Kingdm (all but ne f thse released n previus lists had been killed by Saudi security frces, s these individuals represented the ft sldiers f al-qa ida, and they were cnsidered far less dangerus). After a majr crackdwn in the Kingdm, as many as 21 f these lw-level al-qa ida members fled t Iraq. Interir Minister Prince Nayef cmmented that when they return, they culd be even tugher than thse wh fught in Afghanistan. We expect the wrse frm thse wh went t Iraq, he

236 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 204 said. They will be wrse and we will be ready fr them. Accrding t Prince Turki al-faisal, the frmer Saudi Intelligence Chief and the new Ambassadr t the US, apprximately 150 Saudis are currently perating in Iraq. 679 In mid-nvember 2005, Iraq s natinal security adviser, Mwaffaq al-rubaie tld reprters that mst f the suicide bmbers in Iraq were Saudi citizens: We d nt have the least dubt that nine ut f 10 f the suicide bmbers wh carry ut suicide bmbing peratins amng Iraqi citizens are Arabs wh have crssed the brder with Syria. Mst f thse that blw themselves up in Iraq are Saudi natinals. But al-rubaie s cmments appeared t cnflict with findings released the previus mnth by Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch wh said sme 312 freign natinals, including 32 Saudis, had been captured while taking part in the insurgency since April. With 78 and 66 respectively, tw cuntries-egypt and Syria-made up the largest freign cntingents, accunting fr almst half f all captured freign insurgents. 680 Unlike the freign fighters frm pr cuntries such as Yemen and Egypt, Saudis entering Iraq ften brught in mney t supprt the cause, arriving with persnal funds between $10,000- $15,000. Saudis are the mst sught after militants; nt nly because f their cash cntributins, but als because f the media attentin their deaths as martyrs bring t the cause. This is a pwerful recruiting tl. Because f the wealth f Saudi Arabia, and its well-develped press, there als tends t be much mre cverage f Saudi deaths in Iraq than f thse frm prer cuntries. In cntrast, if an Algerian r Egyptian militant dies in Iraq, it is unlikely that anyne in his hme cuntry will ever knw. Fr instance, interrgatins revealed that when an Algerian cnducts a suicide bmbing, the insurgency rarely has a means f cntacting their next f kin. Saudis, hwever, always prvide a cntact number and a well-develped system is in place fr recrding and disseminating any martyrdm peratins by Saudis. Syria and Freign Vlunteers Syria s rle in the Iraqi insurgency has been a key prblem. It has allwed Iraqi insurgent grups t perate and stage in Syria, with the clear tlerance f Syrian intelligence and security fficials. Insurgent safe huses, small training and indctrinatin facilities, and funding raising activities have existed lng enugh t make it clear that Syria is at best deliberately turning a blind eye, and brder cntrls have been lse and erratic. Such tlerance can be imprtant even when it des little mre than allw vlunteers t be trained in Syria fr a few weeks. Many insurgents required nly the mst minimal training. Wearing a suicide vest r driving a suicide VBIED des nt take skill, it takes mtivatin. Being able t indctrinate yung men r wmen intensively in a clsed facility is ften the key t prviding that mtivatin. Debriefs f infiltratrs indicated it wrked best if new recruits are secure and d nt mix with actual insurgents while they are being indctrinated. Iraqi, Jrdanian, Saudi, and US fficials have all repeatedly identified Syria as a serius prblem. An April 2003 reprt by Italian investigatrs described Syria as a hub fr the relcatin f Zarqawi's grup t Iraq. Accrding t the reprt, transcripts f wiretapped cnversatins amng the arrested suspects and thers paint a detailed picture f verseers in Syria crdinating the mvement f recruits and mney between Eurpe and Iraq. 681 Large numbers f frmer Ba athists and supprters f mre natinalist insurgent grups als perate in the cuntry.

237 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 205 Syria has shwn in the past that it can crackdwn n such insurgent activities and infiltratin when it wants t -- usually when it has cme under intensive pressure frm the US r its neighbrs. Preventing militants frm crssing its 380-mile brder with Iraq des, hwever, present prblems even fr a regime as ntriusly security cnscius and repressive as Syria. Even if Syria had the plitical will t cmpletely and frcefully seal its brder, it may lack sufficient resurces t fund such an effrt (Saudi Arabia has spent ver $1.2 billin in the past tw years alne t Secure its brder). Syria has, hwever, had cnsiderable success simply by heavily screening thse wh enter the cuntry. This methd des present prblems in establishing prf f residency in Syria as well as the difficulties with verifying htel reservatins. Accrding t the Minister f Turism, rughly 3.1 millin turists visited the cuntry in 2004; the number f Saudis alne that arrived in the first seven mnths f 2005 increased t 270,000 frm 230,000 in the same perid in Syria des seem t be able t act when it wants t. There are even thse wh claim the Syrian authrities are being t frceful in their crackdwn n freigners in the cuntry. There have been reprts that Syria has engaged in the systematic abuse, beating and rbbery f Saudi turists, a charge that Syria denies. Accrding t semi-fficial reprts published in al-watan, released prisners alleged that Syrian authrities arbitrarily arrested Saudis n the grunds that they were attempting t infiltrate Iraq t carry ut terrrist attacks. The frmer detainees maintained that they were targeted fr arrest in Syria withut any charges. They went n t say that, if they had intended t sneak int Iraq, Saudi authrities wuld have kept them in custdy when they were handed ver t that cuntry. Accrding t the Syrian Minister f Turism, Saadallah Agha Kalaa, n Saudi turists have been harassed in Syria Thse wh are spreading these rumrs are seeking t harm Syria, which is a safe turist destinatin. In the murky wrld f the Syrian security services, it is difficult t discern the truth. Suffice it t say that the prblem f successfully halting the traffic f Saudis thrugh Syria int Iraq is verwhelmingly difficult, plitically charged, and peratinally challenging. There is n visa requirement fr Arabs frm sme cuntries t enter Syria. Syria des, hwever, maintain a database f suspected militants, and several dzen Saudis have been arrested at the brder. Hwever, pressuring the Syrians additinally t tighten security culd be bth unrealistic and plitically sensitive. As fr the mvement f fighters ut f Syria, mst militants leaving Syria t enter Iraq have dne s at a pint just suth f the muntainus Kurdish areas f the nrth, which is sparsely inhabited by nmadic Sunni Arab tribes, r due east frm Dair al-zawr int Iraq s Anbar prvince. Crssing near the suthern prtin f the brder, which is mainly desert and is heavily ccupied by Syrian and U.S. frces, is seldm dne. The crssing frm Dair Al-Zawr prvince was the preferred rute thrugh the summer f 2005 because the majrity f the inhabitants n bth sides f the brder were sympathetic t the insurgency, the scattering f villages alng the brder prvides ample pprtunity fr cvert mvement, and cnstant insurgent attacks in the area are thught t keep the U.S. frces therwise ccupied. Accrding t intelligence estimates, the key transit pint here fr bth Saudis and ther Arabs is the Bab al-waleed crssing. In a March 2006 Senate hearing, Gen. Jhn Abizaid assessed that it was Syrian natinal security and cncerns fr its wn internal stability that were causing it t tighten its brders. Gen. Abizaid acknwledged Syrian effrts saying, the flw f freign fighters acrss the Syrian brder has

238 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 206 decreased, and that s clear frm ur intelligence we knw that the Syrians have mved against the freign fighters. He cntinued by asserting that the Syrian s reactin was ne f self-interest and that the decrease in fighters cming acrss the brder was because the Syrian gvernment viewed them as psing a threat t Syria, and they certainly dn t want t have these rganizatins and grups perating within their wn cuntry that are ultimately ging t be a threat t their wn gvernment. 683 Iran and Freign Vlunteers Iraq als shares a lng and relatively unguarded brder with Iran, a nn-sunni nn-arab cuntry. Few Saudi and ther Sunni extremists seem t use it as a pint f entry. Saudi authrities have, hwever, captured a handful f militants wh have gne thrugh Iran and fur were apprehended after passing frm Iran t the United Arab Emirates. Iran is als a majr surce f funding and lgistics fr militant Shi ite grups in Iraq, mainly SCIRI. Accrding t reginal intelligence reprts, Iran is suspected f arming and training sme 40,000 Iraqi fighters with a gal f fmenting an Islamic revlutin in Iraq. While mst f these Iraqi Shi ites are frmer prisners f war captured during the Iran-Iraq war, there were als reprts f yung Iraqi s being recruited by Shi ite clerics t g int Iran fr religius and plitical indctrinatin and militia training. 684 Britain has reprted that Iran has supplied insurgents with mre mdern triggering devices and ther frms f assistance t help make better, mre lethal IEDs. This aid seems t be ging t bth sme Sunni insurgent grups and Shi ute anti-british hardliners in the Basra area.

239 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 207 VIII. The Uncertain Status f the Shi'ites While dmestic and freign Sunni Islamists nw dminate the insurgency, if the cnflict escalates t a majr civil war, it will almst certainly include far mre fighters and mvements frm ther ethnic and sectarian grups. As the previus chapters have shwn, the tensins between religius Iraqi Arab Shi'ites and Sunni Islamist extremist grups are particularly dangerus and there are grwing indicatrs that Shi'ites are taking revenge fr Sunni insurgent attacks. A majr civil war in Iraq still seems avidable, but the risk is all t real and Iraq faces majr plitical and security challenges that virtually ensure this risk will be serius fr at least the next year. It is als much mre likely that Shi ite mvements will becme invlved in civil cnflict than turn against the Calitin. Iraqi Arab Shi ites resent the US presence, but mst seem t realize that the fact that they are 60% f the ppulatin will give them plitical dminance if Iraq is secure enugh s that its new plitical system divides up pwer accrding t the size f given factins. The gd news is that past public pinin plls have shwn that mst Arab Shi ites, like Arab Sunnis, favr a unified Iraq and a strng central gvernment. Such plls als have shwn that Iraqi Shi ites tend t be mre religius in terms f supprt fr an Islamic state in Iraq than Sunnis. Hwever, the differences are limited and leading Iraqi clerics have nt supprted anything appraching Iran s cncept f a supreme leader, and key figures like the Grand Ayatllah Sistani have strngly ppsed direct clerical participatin in the gvernment r plitics. Key Shi'ite plitical parties like Al Dawa and SCIRI d have a strng religius character, but have s far been largely secular in their stated gals and actins. Althugh Al Dawa and SCIRI perated in Iran frm 1980 nwards, they remain Iraqi natinalists, and their gratitude t Iran is ften limited particularly because f Iran s histry f treating them n an pprtunistic basis befre the fall f Saddam Hussein. Members f Al Dawa can privately be sharply critical f Iran, and members f bth parties resent past pressure t recgnize the authrity f Iran s supreme leader. The bad news is that Shi ite are increasingly willing t take revenge against Sunnis fr the actins f Islamist extremist insurgents. Many Shi'ites have reacted t the debate ver federalism during the drafting f the cnstitutin by cming t supprt a Shi'ite federatin in the suth. The Shi ite calitin that participated in the December 15, 2005 electin is divided n this issue, but many Shi ites clearly want sme frm f separatism r autnmy. This seems t be particularly true f the il rich areas in the far suth and arund Basra. Shi'ite supprt fr a unified Iraq in n way means that Shi'ites d nt feel it is "their turn" t have cntrl ver Iraqi plitics, pwer, and wealth. Many Shi'ites feel that frmer Ba'athists shuld be punished fr their actins in the previus regime. Mst imprtant, an increasing number seem t supprt revenge r "payback" fr attacks by the Sunni insurgents. Shi ite Factins and the Varius Militias The years fllwing Saddam's fall have led t grwing tensins between Shi ite and Sunni. The seriusness f these tensins has grwn since late 2003 because f repeated Sunni insurgent attacks n Shi'ite targets. They have als been a reactin t Sunni plitics. Fr example, bth Iraq s Sunni interim president, Ghazi al-yahwar, and King Abdullah f Jrdan, sunded

240 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 208 warnings abut the risks f Shi ite dminance and pssible Iranian influence befre the January 30, 2005 electins. 685 Arab Shi'ites, in cntrast, have been increasingly plarized by the Sunni suicide attacks n Shi'ite targets, kidnappings, ver killings and disappearances described in previus chapters, which have intensified since the January 2005 electins. They are all t aware that figures like Zarqawi have threatened jihad against Shi'ites and have said they are nt legitimate fllwers f Islam. The main Shi'ite leaders in the gvernment have cntinued t seek an inclusive plitical slutin and reach ut t the Sunnis, but many f their fllwers have increasingly reacted t Sunni attacks by taking revenge r seeking t exclude Sunnis frm their neighbrhds, gvernment jbs, cntracts, and the security services. Althugh the CPA tried t establish legal barriers t maintaining militias by issuing Order 91 in April 2004, the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq (SCIRI) and the factin f Abdul Aziz al-hakim still have large militia elements. These are frces that Sunni grups have increasingly accused f cmmitting atrcities against them since the spring f Al Dawa, the Badr Organizatin, and the Iraqi Hezbllah remain ptential security prblems Sunnis feel particularly threatened by the Badr Organizatin, many f whm have been incrprated int the special security frces. The Bush Administratin summarized the risks psed by Shi'ite militias as fllws in its Octber 13, 2005 reprt t the Cngress n Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Mre than a dzen militias have been dcumented in Iraq, varying in size frm less than a hundred t tens f thusands f members. Sme were rganized in lse cellular structures, while thers had a mre cnventinal military rganizatin. Sme were cncentrated arund a single lcale, while thers had a mre reginal ftprint. Sme f them were whlly indigenus, while thers received supprt such as training, equipment, and mney frm utside Iraq. Typically, the militias were armed with light weapns and perated as cells r small units. Even if they d nt take up arms against the gvernment, militias can pse a lng-term challenge t the authrity and svereignty f the central gvernment. This was the driving frce behind the creatin f Calitin Prvisinal Authrity Order 91 and the Transitin and Re-Integratin Cmmittee. Fr the same reasn, Article 27 f the Transitinal Administrative Law and Article 9 f the draft Iraqi Cnstitutin prhibit armed frces r militias that are nt part f the Iraqi Armed Frces. The realities f Iraq s plitical and security landscape wrk against cmpleting the transitin and reintegratin f all Iraqi militias in the shrt-term. Prvided the cnstitutin is ratified in Octber, the gvernment elected in December will have a fur-year term f ffice, and it will have the task f executing the militia-cntrl prvisins f the cnstitutin. Althugh it is ften referred t as an Iraqi militia, the Jaysh al Mahdi (r Mahdi Army ) f radical Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr fught Calitin Frces and Iraqi frces in April and August f The Peshmerga and the Badr Organizatin are viewed as militias by the Iraqi gvernment and Calitin Frces, while the Mahdi Army is viewed as a ptentially insurgent rganizatin. Badr Organizatin. Officially knwn as the Badr Organizatin fr the Recnstructin and Develpment, it is the militia f the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iran (SCIRI), the largest Shi ite party in Iraq. It is reprted t have links with bth Iranian and Iraqi intelligence services and prvides prtective security fr many Shi ite religius sites as well as religius and secular leaders. Ayatllah Ali al-sistani is prtected by the Badr militia. The Badr Organizatin has been implicated in the revenge killings f Ba athists and has als been invlved in cmbat and street fighting with Muqtada al-sadr s Mahdi Army. Jaysh al Mahdi. The Mahdi Army f Muqtada al-sadr engaged in pen cmbat with Calitin and Iraqi frces in April and August f last year, mst ntably in the battles in and arund Najaf. The

241 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 209 Mahdi Army has cntinued t exist after an Octber 2004 ceasefire agreement, althugh the Iraqi gvernment has made repeated calls fr its disbandment. The exact size f the rganizatin is unknwn. There is evidence that they are supplied frm surces utside f Iraq, mst ntably Iran. This reprt was updated and reissued t Cngress in February f The sectin devted t Iraqi militias differed frm the earlier assessment. Specifically, its tne was less ambiguus as it declared that the presence f militias is a cntinuing threat t the rule f law and a ptentially destabilizing influence n bth security and gvernance. The Department f Defense's cncerns ver the integratin f these militias int ISF units differed substantially as well. In the Octber reprt, it was assessed that, The realities f Iraq s plitical and security landscape wrk against cmpleting the transitin and re-integratin f all Iraqi militias in the shrt-term. In the February reprt hwever, the self-integratin f the militias int gvernment security frces caused U.S. gvernment cncern that while nt incnsistent with the fficial plicy, it may result in security frces that may be mre lyal t their plitical supprt rganizatin than t the central Iraqi gvernment f cnstitutin. 686 The extensive rle played by Shi ite militias in death squads became increasingly apparent in the wake f sectarian vilence that stemmed frm the Askariya shrine bmbing. The numerus assassinatins that tk place during this time, many f which were cnducted by such Shi ite grups, accunted fr mre than fur times as many deaths in March as bmbings and ther mass-casualty attacks accrding t military data. 687 Indeed it is likely even mre, as many shting deaths are never reprted. This led U.S. fficials t assert in early April that Shi ite militias psed the greatest threat t Iraqi security and will be the mst daunting and lng-term challenge fr whatever new gvernment takes frm. Eching these cncerns, in an interview with the BBC that same mnth, Ambassadr Khalilzad described militia grups as the infrastructure f civil war. 688 In addressing the issue hwever, the U.S. largely deferred t the Iraqi MOI and MOD. They [the Iraqi gvernment] recgnize the prblem. But there s been n decisin as t what t d abut it, said Maj. Gen. Jseph Petersn, the tp U.S. fficer wrking with Iraq s plice frce. 689 Uncertain Links Between the Shi ite Militias and the Gvernment These militias were suppsed t have been ablished under the guidelines set ut by the CPA in the interim gvernment. Iraqi fficials state that they nw are nminally under the cntrl f the Ministry f Defense and the Ministry f the Interir. Hwever, Iraq's leaders have been ambiguus abut the rle the militias actually play. In early June 2005, Prime Minster Jaafari held a press cnference in which he lauded the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Badr Organizatin, frmerly the Badr Brigade. Iraqi President, and Kurd, Jalal Talibani jined the prime minister as well as the funder f the Badr Organizatin and SCIRI head, Abdul Aziz al-hakim, at Hakim s headquarters t celebrate the anniversary f the funding f the Badr grup. 690 The president applauded what he, and presumably al-jaafari, viewed as the militias psitive cntributins t Iraq. Talibani stated, [The Badr Organizatin] and the Pesh Merga are wanted and are imprtant t fulfilling this sacred task, t establishing a demcratic, federal and independent Iraq. 691 Addressing a variety f allegatins against the tw militias, Talibani remarked, It [Badr Organizatin] is a patritic grup that wrks fr Iraq s interest and it will nt be dragged int sectarian r any ther kind f struggle. 692 Jaafari went n t dub the Badr Organizatin a shield prtecting Iraq.

242 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 210 Shi'ites and Kurds see the militias as an imprtant aid in fighting the insurgency. In cntrast, Sunnis accuse the militias particularly the Badr Organizatin, the Mahdi Army, and plice and elements f the special security frces dminated by these militias -- f killings, intimidatin and a hst f ther crimes. In cntrast, this has led t steadily rising tensin, and divisins between Sunni and Shi ite, ver the rles the Shi'ite militias and gvernment frces with large numbers f frmer militia are playing in any revenge killings. The Rle f the Badr Organizatin Many Sunnis have vehemently cndemned the Badr Organizatin. The Badr Organizatin, and its precursr the Badr Brigade, was created by SCIRI and trained by the Iranian military. What influence the Iranians may have ver the Badr is unclear. Once mre, Sunnis assert that the Badr are the nes respnsible fr the targeting and assassinatin f a number f senir Sunni clerics, many frm the Muslim Schlars Bard. Such charges are virtually impssible t disprve. While it is far frm clear hw much the Badr Crps r ther Shi ites are t blame, sme Sunnis feel that the Badr Crps has been respnsible fr targeting Sunni leaders and figures, killing them and dumping their bdies. Baghdad s central mrgue began t detect such killings shrtly after the new gvernment was frmed n April 28, 2005, and claimed that at least 30 cases had been fund by late June. The killers were said t have wrn plice unifrms, available at a cheap price thrughut Iraq, while seizing sme victims. They als had Tytas and Glck pistls, which are mre difficult t btain. There have als been mass abductins and killings f rdinary Sunnis, like 14 Sunni farmers wh were taken frm a Baghdad vegetable market n May 5, It was pssible that insurgents have dne this t try t fment sectarian tensin, but the frequency and lcatin f many revenge killings and acts f intimidatin raises questins abut whether this is a credible explanatin fr many incidents. 693 Many Sunnis ppsed the appintment f Bayan Jabr as Minister f the Interir in April 2005, claiming that, as a member f SCIRI, he was a pawn f the Iranians. They als alleged that the ministry s Wlf Brigade, led by Abdul Waleed, was respnsible fr sme f the assassinatins f Sunni figures. 694 By the fall f 2005, many Iraqis saw Iraq s Interir Ministry and the plice as predminantly Shi ite in rientatin and the ranks f the Badr Brigade as having been incrprated int MOI plice frces. The Army, meanwhile, was seen as being predminantly Sunni in makeup. 695 Death Squads and Mystery Killings There were mre and mre reprts f revenge killing and anti-sunni strikes by bth the Shi'ite militias and Shi'ite elements in the security frces and plice during the rest f 2005, and strnger indicatins that Shi ite militias were playing a grwing rle in Iraq s lw-level civil war. 696 There are credible reprts that hundred f Sunni bdies have been fund in lcatins like rivers, desert rads, pen desert, sewage dispsal facilities, and garbage dumps since the new gvernment was frmed that April. The Baghdad mrgue reprted grwing numbers f crpses with their hands bund by plice handcuffs, and that it prcessed 7,553 crpses between January and September 2005, versus nly 5,239 fr the same perid in Sunni grups like the Mslem Schlars Assciatin have published pictures f such crpses and lists f the dead, and have claimed there are Shi'ite death squadrns. The Inspectr General f the Ministry f the Interir, General Nri Nri said that, "There are such grups perating -- yes this is crrect." In Nvember, a raid n a secret MOI

243 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 211 detentin facility in sutheastern Baghdad, which was perated by frmer members f the Badr Brigade, was linked t the death f 18 detainees reprted t have died under trture. Sme 220 men were held in filthy cnditins within this prisn and many were subjected t trture. 697 Minister f Interir Jabr denied any gvernment invlvement, and claimed that if MOI security frces and plice unifrms and cars have been seen, they were stlen. Other surces, hwever, cnfirmed that sme f the killings f an estimated 700 Sunnis between August and Nvember 2005 invlved men wh identified themselves as Ministry f Interir frces. 698 This increased the risk that Iraqi frces culd be divided by factins, decreasing their effectiveness and leading t the disintegratin f Iraqi frces if Iraq were t descend int full-scale civil war. The killing f at least 14 Sunnis culd be clearly traced t MOI arrest recrds several weeks earlier. 699 US surces als nted that a large number f members f the Badr Organizatin had jined the MOI frces, including the plice and cmmand units, since the new gvernment was frmed in April The lines between sme MOI units and the Badr Organizatin were becming increasingly blurred. During the winter f 2005 and 2006, bdy dumps became a favred tactic by insurgents and militias. Althugh this trend existed lng befre the February 22 Askariya bmbing, it increased thereafter and became part f the cyclical sectarian vilence carried ut by Shi ites and Sunnis. It wuld be almst impssible t catalgue all f the discveries, but finding ten t twenty crpses at ne site was nt uncmmn and each day usually resulted in at least ne bdy dump being reprted. Fr example, in the perid frm March 7 until March 21, ver 191 bdies were fund. Cmmn characteristics culd be fund within these mystery killings. Increasingly, the victims were relatively rdinary Shi ites r Sunnis and were nt directly wrking fr the gvernment f Calitin frces. Often times victims were taken frm their hmes r businesses in daylight by masked gunmen r men wearing plice r security frce unifrms and driving standard issue trucks. These attributes, and the fact that the bdies were almst always fund in the same cnditin-- blindflded, handcuffed, and sht in the head shwing signs f trture-- lent credibility t the claim that many f the killings were perpetrated by Shi ite militias themselves, r elements f security frces dminated by these militias. The frequency f extra-judicial killings was discussed in a UN Human Rights Reprt and linked t plice frces: A large number f extrajudicial killings, kidnappings and trture were reprtedly perpetrated mainly by members f armed militias linked t plitical factins r criminal gangs. The same methds f executin-style killings are usually used: mass arrests withut judicial warrant and extrajudicial executins with bdies fund afterwards bearing signs f trture and killed by a sht t the head. Links t the Iraqi Plice and Special Security Frces The plice expanded frm sme 31,000 men in July 2004 t nearly 95,000 in July 2005, smetimes with nly limited backgrund checks. In the prcess, substantial numbers f men frm bth the Badr Organizatin and the Mqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army jined the frce. In the case f the rughly 65,000 strng mix f MOI and plice frces in the greater Baghdad area, the men frm the Bader Organizatin generally tended t g int the MOI special security units and thse frm the Mahdi Army tended t jin the plice. While bth the Iraqi gvernment and Calitin claimed the situatin was imprving, a September 2005 reprt by the ICG suggested that the prcess f drafting a cnstitutin had helped exacerbate the existing ethnic and sectarian divisins between Iraqis. 700

244 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 212 By late 2005, US fficials and military surces were cmplaining that the MOI and Minister Jabr were nt infrming them f sme MOI and plice peratins and privately acknwledged that they had bserved prisner abuse. Cmmenting n the futility f filing reprts against the incidents, ne U.S. fficial equated it with trying t put ut a frest fire with a bucket f water. 701 They expressed particular cncern abut the actins f the MOI's Maghawir r Fearless Warrir special cmmand units, and that they were carrying ut illegal raids and killings. This 12,000-man frce had a number f Sunni fficers and had riginally been frmed under the authrity f frmer Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Since the new gvernment was frmed in April 2005 hwever, it had recruited larger numbers f new Shi'ite members. Its cmmander, General Rashid Flaih Mhammed was reprted t have acknwledged that the unit had had sme prblems. Sunni plice cmmanders like Brigadier General Mhammed Ezzawi Hussein Alwann, cmmander f the Fark Brigade, were als purged frm the MOI frces, alng with junir fficers. 702 As mentined abve, the discvery f sme 200 Sunnis held in hrrible cnditins in a bunker in Baghdad in Nvember 2005 raised further issues. Many were trtured, and the Special Investigative Unit carrying ut the detentins was an MOI unit run by an MOI brigadier general and clnel. The clnel was an intelligence fficer said t be reprting directly t Jabr. While the revelatins f large-scale abuses draw the greatest attentin, less severe, day-t-day incidents are n less imprtant and can be illustrative f the underlying sectarian tensin in Iraq. Fr example, when several plicemen arrived at an Iraqi plice statin with three suspected insurgents in plastic cuffs, U.S. Sgt. 1 st Class Jel Perez had t cut the cuffs because they were t tight and causing the prisners hands t swell and turn blue. Later, ne f the Iraqi pliceman invlved cnfided in a reprter, They [the insurgents] need t be beaten up. The Americans wnt let us I want t have tw cars and tie each hand t a different car and break them in half. 703 This and previus incidents drew cmments by bth U.S. and Iraqi fficials. U.S. military prcedure and plicy was clarified in a back-and-frth between Secretary Rumsfeld and Jint Chief f Staff Peter Pace when Pace declared, it s abslutely the respnsibility f every U.S. service member if they see inhumane treatment being cnducted t intervene t stp it. Secretary Rumsfeld cuntered, I dn t think yu mean they have an bligatin t physically stp it; it s t reprt it. Pace respectfully reiterated, If they are physically present when inhumane treatment is taking place, sir, they have an bligatin t stp it. Putting prisner abuse in perspective, frmer Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi cmmented t a British newspaper that peple are ding the same as Saddam s time and wrse. 704 In a February 2006 Department f Defense reprt t Cngress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, plice, military and justice detentin facilities were singled ut as being typically maintained at higher standards than thse f the Ministry f Interir facilities. The reprt als suggested that t crrect the imbalance, jint U.S.-Iraqi teams will cntinue t inspect Iraqi detentin facilities, with apprpriate remediatin thrugh Iraqi-led triage and fllw-up lgistical, security, public relatins, and plitical supprt. 705 At the same time, Sunni Islamic insurgents and sme Sunni plitic figures had every reasn t try t implicate the security services. Sme f the killings in late Nvember invlved key Sunni pliticians like Ayad Alizi and Al Hussein, leading members f the Iraqi Islamic Party, a member f the Sunni calitin cmpeting in the December 15th electins. Shi'ites seemed t have little reasn t strike at such targets. 706

245 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 213 At the beginning f 2006 it was clear that accusatins f retaliatin killings, and the implicatin f Shi ite-dminated MOI and security frces in acts f vilence perpetrated largely against Sunni Arabs, increased sectarian tensins and mved the cuntry clser tward civil war. This had becme a prime cncern fr U.S. Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr., wh stated during a press briefing that ne f the mst imprtant fcuses f the U.S. military in Iraq in the cming mnths wuld be t train Iraqi frces t perate within the rule f law and with respect fr human rights. In additin, he called fr effrts t prmte a greater ethnic and sectarian balance within thse frces and a spirit f natinal service. 707 In an attempt t address these cncerns, the U.S. has tripled the number f training teams being attached t Iraqi plice frces. Shi'ite and Sunni tensins had an impact n U.S. effrts t develp Iraqi frces as well. In December 2006 the US Army s 3 rd Infantry Divisin, deplyed t Baghdad, had t threaten t demte the readiness rating f an Iraqi Army divisin scheduled t take ver part f the Green Zne and t suspend the transfer f authrity indefinitely when Iraq s Defense Ministry refused t cnfirm the appintment f Cl. Muhammed Wasif Taha, a Sunni. U.S. Cl. Ed Cardn, cmmander f the 3 rd infantry s furth brigade, defended the decisin saying, The hand-ver was cntingent upn their leadership remaining where it was. Althugh the Defense Ministry eventually capitulated and cnfirmed Taha as the cmmander f the brigade, a spkesman fr the ministry indicated that it still had the right t replace Taha at a later date. 708 Abuse f pwer by Shi ite dminated security frces als presented new prblems in the suth. In the predminately Shi ite city f Basra, British trps arrested 14 Iraqi law enfrcement fficials, including tw senir plice intelligence fficers, in late January While several were released, the British claimed thse that remained in custdy, including the deputy chief f intelligence fr Basra, had been invlved in plitical crruptin, assassinatins and bmbmaking. Lcal Iraqi fficials denunced what they viewed as excessively randm arrests and threatened t suspend relatins with British frces until the men were released. Maj. Peter Cripps, a British military spkesman in Basra, defended the arrests saying that thse arrested were all part f the frmer internal affairs department that was disbanded by the Ministry f Interir and are nw in the criminal intelligence unit and the serius crimes unit. They are alleged t be fllwing their wn agenda including, crruptin, assassinatins and persecutins f citizens. 709 The British cited the rle f militias in the security frces as ne f the factrs that cntributed t the decline f the security situatin in Basra, where murder rates dubled t mre than ne per day between Nvember 2005 and February The Basra plice chief stated that mre than half f the 12,000 member frces were militia members and that he culd nly trust a quarter f his fficers. British effrts t instil humane treatment techniques in lcal plice and teach them frensic investigative methds were frustrated by the release f a vide shwing British sldiers beating a grup f yung, unarmed Iraqi bys. 710 The grwing distrust between the British and certain parts f the new plice frce resulted in UK trps being asked t leave when they arrived fr a meeting at a Basra statin t discuss equipment and prfessinal develpment. The Iraqi fficer wh instructed them t d s, said he had received a call frm his superir wh threatened his jb if he allwed the British t enter. 711 In the early mnths f 2006, these allegatins led t investigatins. In February, enugh evidence and utcry had accumulated t frce the MOI t launch an investigatin int allegatins it was supprting death squads. This investigatin hwever fcused nly n ne incident in which 22

246 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 214 Iraqi plice were briefly detained by U.S. authrities n their way t kill a Sunni prisner in their custdy. 712 This event led t the first public acknwledgement by the MOI that death squads perated within its wn department and the ministry f defense. During a press cnference in March, Bayan Jabr, Minster f the Interir said, The death squads that we have captured are in the defense and interir ministries There are peple wh have infiltrated the army and the interir. 713 Only ne mnth later hwever, Jabr made a statement t the cntrary. In April he said that these death squads were members f private security frces, nt gvernment frces. He claimed that such private cmpanies emply 180,000 security agents, many f whm are unifrmed like the plice, their cars like the plice. Similarly, he claimed that, [t]errrists r smene wh supprts the terrrists are using the clthes f the plice r the military. 714 Regardless, the immediate prblem fr the Iraqi gvernment became cntrlling elements f the ISF whse lyalties were clearly nt with the natinal gvernment, and mrever trying t get these grups t uphld the law rather than engage in r tacitly allw vilence. Fr example, after a public warning issued n April 7 by the MOI telling Iraqis nt t gather in crwded areas because f specific intelligence indicating a series f car bmbs were likely, it had t similarly warn ISF nt t impede this rder. The ministry threatened legal actin against any security fficial wh fails t take the necessary prcedures t fil any terrrist attack in his area. 715 In what may have been the largest incident at the time invlving MOI security frces, in early March gunmen wearing MOI unifrms allegedly strmed a Sunni wned security firm and abducted 50 f its emplyees. 716 The Interir Ministry denied its invlvement in the event. Later in the same mnth, investigatrs discvered and brke up a grup f plice wh ran a kidnapping and extrtin ring. Allegedly led by an Iraqi plice majr general, this grup kidnapped individuals, smetimes killing them, and frced their families t pay ransms that they then pcketed. 717 Althugh the MOI cntinued t deny that it had any rle in the increased sectarian vilence since the February shrine bmbing, accusatins munted and the accumulatin f incidents made this denial mre difficult. The cnsistency and cntinuatin f bdy dumps, the crpses ften exhibiting signs f trture and sht executin style, and strings f abductins in which the gunmen wre ISF unifrms, furthered tensin between al-jaafari and the U.S. wh had been pressuring the Prime Minister t rein in the militias. The fear generated within the Sunni cmmunity by the merging f Shi ite militias and ISF was illustrated by an advisry n a Sunnirun televisin netwrk, which tld its viewers nt t allw Iraqi plice r sldiers int their hmes unless U.S. trps were present. 718 In late March, the U.S. administratin penly viced its disapprval f al-jaafari as the next prime minister. Ambassadr Khalilzad added that due t his lack f leadership, Shi ite-led militias were nw killing mre Iraqis than the Sunni insurgency. 719 Al-Jaafari s respnse, which warned the U.S. nt t interfere with the demcratic prcess in Iraq, addressed the issue f Shi ite militias being incrprated in the security frces and his plitical alliance with al-sadr, whse supprt put him in ffice. He stated that he favred engaging with Sadr and his fllwers instead f islating him and that he viewed the militias as part f Iraq s de fact reality. He cntinued t vice supprt fr a gvernment that lks past sectarian differences and t wrk tward integrating the militias int the plice and army. 720

247 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 215 In April, Iraq s Interir Minister Jabr refused t deply any f the thusands f plice recruits trained by the jint US-UK Civilian Plice Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Althugh graduates f this prgram had been available fr ver three mnths, Jabr chse t hire thse trained utside f the prgram because he claimed he had n cntrl ver CPATT s selectin prcess. The US was cncerned that this was an attempt by the minister t sustain the sectarian makeup f the frces and cntinue t incrprate thse with allegiance t the Badr Brigade int its ranks. 721 The UN Assistance Missin fr Iraq s Human Rights Reprt specifically highlighted the threat f militias within the security frces and that it had received infrmatin regarding the actins f sme segments f the security frces, in particular the plice and special frces, and their apparent cllusin with militias in carrying ut human rights vilatins. 722 There were cncerns that even Iraqi brigades that were tuted as mixed, in that they struck a balance between Shi ites and Sunnis within their ranks, were still verwhelmingly Shi ite. There were reprts f at least ne sldier wh was prudly wearing an al-sadr t-shirt under his Army unifrm. In interviews as well, many f the sldiers privately cnfided that if they were ever asked t fight the Mahdi Army, they wuld have t quit the Iraqi frces. 723 Brig. Gen. Abdul Kareem Abdul Rahman al-yusef, a Sunni admitted that his brigade was 87% Shi ite and included members f the Badr Organizatin. Despite this, he still believed that it s nt the time t ask the militias t put dwn their arms, given that the gvernment cannt prvide security t its citizens. 724 As Lt. C. Chris Pease, deputy cmmander f the U.S. military s plice training prgrams in eastern Baghdad put it, We re nt stupid. We knw fr a fact that they re killing peple. We dig the damn bdies ut f the sewer all f the time. But there s a difference between knwing smething and prving smething. Capt. Ryan Lawrence, an intelligence fficer with the 2 nd Brigade Special Plice Transitin Team, displayed similar feelings, Training and equipping a frce, while knwing that at least sme element is infiltrated by militias, is a difficult situatin. 725 Pease als admitted that an Iraqi plice fficer had cnfided in him the reality and extent f the militia infiltratin int ISF. His assessment was that the militias are everywhere, Pease said, and his fficers weren t ging t d anything abut that because their units are infiltrated and they knw what the cst wuld be fr wrking against the militias. 726 Althugh U.S. trps can and d accmpany develping Iraqi units n raids t ensure prper treatment f detainees, as Iraqi s increasingly take the lead and missins are based n Iraqi intelligence, the line between cunterinsurgency and revenge can becme blurry fr Calitin sldiers. After a jint U.S.-Iraqi raid in March in which 10 Sunnis were runded up, ne U.S. clnel remembered thinking immediately after, Wait a sec, were we just part f sme srt f sectarian revenge? 727 Indeed, many f the sldiers wh were n their secnd tur in Iraq returned t a different war. Whereas befre the fcus was n the Sunni insurgency, it nw was abut cntaining the Shi ite militias and preventing further infiltratin int the security frces. 728 While details were still uncertain, events f a tw-day firefight in the Adhamiyah district, a Sunni neighbrhd, indicated the pssibility that a lcal Sunni militia had taken up arms against what it saw as an attack by a Shi ite death squad disguised as a plice frce. In the prcess,

248 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 216 sme lcals claimed that the Sunni dminated Army, respnding with the U.S. t engage insurgents, actually fired n the incming plice frces. 729 The Iraqi gvernment denied claims that Interir Ministry frces had been invlved. Rather it suggested that insurgent grups, prtraying themselves as plice and security frces, prvked the vilence. It specifically identified thse grups as the Islamic Army f Iraq, the 1920 Revlutin Brigades and al-qaeda. 730 While the gvernment claims culd nt be verified, al- Qaeda in Iraq did issue a statement prmising a new raid t avenge the Sunnis at Adhamiyah and the ther areas, and the raid will start with the dawn f Wednesday, if Gd wishes The Shiite areas will be an pen battlefield fr us. 731 While it was nt clear if Shi ite plice frces were even present, r if the Army was mistaken fr a plice frce as suggested by U.S. claims, the event illustrated a grwing distrust between Sunnis and Iraqi Security Frces. The threat frm Shi ite death squads, whether real r perceived, caused the twn t arm themselves, crdinate actin, and attempt t repel the invading plice frces. The Rle f Mqtada al-sadr Unlike mst Iraqi religius leaders wh are "quietists," and believe the clergy shuld nly play a limited rle in plitics, Mqtada al-sadr is an activist wh has played a cntrversial yet pwerful rle since the fall f Saddam Hussein. He is related t Grand Ayatllah Muhammad Al- Sad and Grand Ayatllah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-sadr: tw f Iraq s greatest activist clerics, bth f whm were killed by Saddam Hussein. Al-Sadr has been accused f having a hand in the murder f rival Shi ite clerics like the Grand Ayatllah Abd al-majid al-khi n April 10, He attacked the US presence in Iraq almst immediately after the fall f Saddam Hussein and denunced the members f the Iraqi interim gvernment as puppets in a sermn in Najaf as early as July 18, The Rise and Temprary Fall f the Mahdi Militia Sadr s militia began playing a rle in the intra-sect Shi ite pwer struggle as early as Octber 13, 2003, when al-sadr's men attacked supprters f mderate Shi'ite Grand Ayatllah Ali al-sistani near the Imam Hussein shrine. 732 His Mahdi Army presented a serius threat t Calitin and gvernment frces in Najaf, in Sadr City in Baghdad, and in ther Shi ite areas in the suth during much f the summer and early fall f Mqtada al-sadr called n his fllwers in Iraq t rise up and attack US frces n August 5th, and subsequent fights brke ut in three cities between his supprters and US an Iraqi security frces, especially in Najaf and Sadr City in Baghdad. US fficials indicated that US frces faced up t 160 attacks per week in Sadr City between August and September 2004 f varying severity. The defeat f Sadr's frces, and a series f plitical cmprmises, led Sadr t turn away frm armed struggle in the late fall and early winter f US fficials indicated that the number f attacks drpped significantly t between zer and five a week in early 2005, and they remained at r belw this level thrugh Nvember General Jhn Abizaid remarked in March 2005, hwever, we have nt seen the end f Muqtada Sadr s challenge. 733 Althugh Iraqi gvernment frces have been able t mve in t the area,

249 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 217 Sadr s mvement still plays a majr plitical rle in Sadr City in Baghdad, and remains active in prer Shi ite areas thrughut the cuntry. Sadr's supprters spnsred demnstratins calling fr US frces t leave Iraq in April 2005, and tp Sadr aides in his Independent Natinal Blc issued warnings t Ibrahim Jaafari, then the prime minister designate, that he must pay mre attentin t these demands r that the Sadr factin might leave the United Iraqi Alliance and becme an active part f the ppsitin. The grup als demanded the release f sme 200 Sadr activists arrested during earlier fighting and that all criminal charges against Sadr be drpped. 734 Resurgence in 2005 Sadr was able t explit the plitical weakness and divisins f ther Shi ite mvements in the suth and their lack f ability t gvern, as well as the fact ther hard-line Islamist mvements wn significant numbers f seats in lcal gvernments in key areas like Basra. 735 In summer 2005, Sadr attempted t cllect ne millin signatures n a petitin that asked the Calitin t leave Iraq in what appeared t be his burgening attempts t recast himself as a majr plitical frce within Iraq. Sadr revived the Mahdi Army, which began t be penly active in parts f Suthern Iraq such as Basra, Amarah, and Nasiriyah, and still had cells in Najaf and Qut as well. While sme US fficial surces stated the army was relatively weak, it began t hld parades again. While nly limited numbers f arms were displayed, it was clear that such weapns were still available in the places where they had been hidden during the fighting the previus year. 736 By the late spring f 2005, the Mahdi Army seemed t be the largest independent frce in Basra, played a majr rle in plicing Amarah, and had effectively struck a bargain with the gvernment plice in Nasiriyah that allwed it t perate in part the city. By the late fall f 2005, sme surces estimated that sme 90% f the 35,000 plice in Nrtheast Baghdad had ties t Sadr and the Mahdi frces. They were reprted t be playing a majr rle in pushing Sunnis ut f Shi'ite neighbrhds. 737 Unlike mst militias, the Mahdi Army had the active participatin f Shi'ite clergy, mstly "activists" wh strngly supprted Sadr. One reasn fr their rebirth was the lack f effective actin by the gvernment. Fr example, the gvernment plice in Nasiriyah had 5,500 men, but was 2,500 men shrt f its gal. 738 In August 2005, Basra plice Chief Hassam Sawadi said that he had lst cntrl ver three-quarters f his plice frce, and that men in his ranks were using their pwer t assassinate ppnents. 739 Sadr has remained publicly supprtive f the plitical prcess in Iraq, and has urged Shi ites t avid sectarian fighting with the Sunni ppulatin. At the same time, his rganizatin was accused f a rash f plitical assassinatins and kidnappings in the Shi ite suth in the summer f On August 24, 2005, an attack n Sadr s ffice in Najaf led t unrest amng Shi ite ppulatins there and in ther cities. Sadr s mvement als began t publicly reassert itself in late summer f 2005, capitalizing n the release f Hazem Araji and ther Sadr leaders frm prisn. Sadr did, hwever, cntinue t call fr calm and cntinued his public supprt f nn-reprisal. He sided with anti-federalist Sunni leaders during the drafting and review f the Iraqi cnstitutin 740 He als supprted cntinued Shi ite plitical invlvement in the new gvernment, althugh many fear that he eventually wants t see a mre fundamentalist gvernment in cntrl f Iraq.

250 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 218 His rganizatin staged several large demnstratins as a shw f strength. In mid-september, militiamen frm the Mahdi Army in Basra directly engaged in battles against US and British trps. Shtuts between supprters f Sadr and Calitin frces als erupted in Sadr City during the last week in September. On Octber 27, members f the Mahdi army clashed with Sunni gunmen utside f Baghdad. The fighting, which ccurred in the village f Bismaya in the Nahrawan area suth f Baghdad, claimed mre than thirty lives. 741 The militia battles in Octber prved t be the deadliest in mnths. Sadr, the December 2005 Electins, and the New Gvernment Sadr has pursued bth military and plitical strategies. He entered int a new plitical alliance with the tw largest Shi ite parties in the cuntry n the very same day his frces battled militias in Bismaya. The alliance brught tgether Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari s Dawa Party, the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq, and Sadr s supprters. The mve made Mqtada Sadr an even larger player in Iraqi plitics. Because f the deal, Sadr-backed candidates wuld appear n the same ticket alngside members f the Shi ite-led gvernment in the December electins. This was a reversal frm Sadr s earlier pledged t supprt the electins but said he wuld nt be supprting any particular list f candidates. Althugh US fficials were encuraged by Sadr s pledge t supprt the December 15 electins, Sadr cntinued t refuse t disband his militia, which cntinued t grw in pwer and influence in the fall f There were als reprts that many Mahdi members have jined the plice and ther gvernment security frces, cntributing t the already fragmented nature f the Iraqi security frces. After the fall f 2005, his rganizatin and ther Shi ite grups with similar beliefs were increasingly accused f plitical assassinatins and kidnappings, as have Kurdish frces in the Nrth. Sadr s Mahdi Army maintains cntrl ver certain areas in cities like Basra and Sadr City, and creates an envirnment f fear accrding t lcal accunts. 742 After the December 15 electins, Sadr s grup was awarded mre than 30 seats in the parliament. These seats kept Sadr in the Shi ite Calitin, but they were als instrumental in determining the appintment f al-jaafari as the next Prime Minister f Iraq. Al-Jaafari s ppnent, defeated by nly ne vte, was a member f SCIRI, an rganizatin that rivaled Sadr s al-dawa party. 743 Despite the fact that Sadr was nt himself an elected fficial, he and his fllwers were able t play the rle f king maker within the Shi ite calitin. This de fact plitical alliance between al-jaafari and al-sadr created tensins between these tw figures, the U.S. and ther members f parliament. As the U.S. sught t pressure al-jaafari t maintain cntrl f the militias, the Prime Minister increasingly met with dissaprval frm the Sunni and Kurdish calitins, and even frm sme within his wn party. Al-Jaafari s relatinship with al-sadr and the al-dawa party, while the surce f American frustratin with the Prime Minister, was als al-jaafari s primary base f supprt. Sadr, Iran, and Iraq After the December electins, and cntinuing int 2006, the yung cleric visited several f Iraq s neighbring cuntries in the regin. Althugh nt an elected fficial, during these visits Sadr frequently met with heads f state and ften made statements in which he appeared t be speaking n behalf f the Iraqi peple r gvernment. In Saudi Arabia, Sadr asked King Abdullah t press the U.S. t cmmit fr a date f withdrawal frm Iraq. In late January, amidst internatinal tensins ver Iran s nuclear prgram, Sadr made a statement f slidarity with

251 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 219 Tehran during a visit, pledging t cme t the defense f the cuntry frm an attack by an utside aggressr. 744 Althugh he did nt elabrate, this statement, it was made amid nging negtiatins t frm a calitin gvernment, and exacerbated Sunni fears f a Shi ite crescent based n a Shi ite dminated Iraqi gvernment aligned with Iran. In February, Sadr visited President Assad f Syria. This was fllwed by a trip t Jrdan where Sadr said in an interview with al-jazeera that there was nthing gd in Iraq s new cnstitutin. In Lebann, Sadr prfessed that he had cme t prmte peace and t imprve relatins between the Syrian peple and the Lebanese peple. 745 Sadr and the Attack n the Askariya Shrine The influence f Sadr and his Mahdi Army was evident in the vilence that fllwed the February attack n the Askariya shrine. Almst immediately after the bmbing, al-sadr rdered his Mahdi Army t prtect Shi ite shrines acrss Iraq, and blamed the U.S. and Iraqi gvernment fr failing t prtect the Askariya shrine saying, If the gvernment had real svereignty, then nthing like this wuld have happened. In a speech frm Basra, al-sadr als called fr restraint and unity amngst Iraqi s: We gt rid f the evil Saddam and nw we have a new dictatrship, the dictatrship f Britain, the US and Israel I call n Muslims, Sunnis and Shi ites, t be brthers Faith is the strngest weapns, nt arms. He als rdered his listeners t nt attack msques in retaliatin saying, There is n Sunni msques and Shi ite msques, msques are fr all Muslims it is ne Islam and ne Iraq. He als called fr a united peaceful demnstratin in Baghdad and labeled Baathists and extremists as the enemy. 746 There were numerus accusatins that despite these calls fr restraint and unity, the Mahdi Army was cnducting attacks against Sunni individuals and destrying and ccupying Sunni msques acrss Iraq. While it was difficult t prve that the Mahdi Army was respnsible fr these attacks, individual accunts by victims seemed credible. Fr example, Raad Taha, a Sunni taxi driver, was falsely accused by a Shi ite acquaintance accused him f being an insurgent. He was taken frm his apartment by eight men frm the Mahdi Army in frnt f his wife (a Shi ite) and children, and taken t a lcatin where he was beaten and interrgated fr ver a day. Althugh he was eventually released, his family fled the city. 747 Other Iraqis were nt s lucky. Mhammed al-juburi said tw f his nephews were killed by Mahdi members. One was killed in a drive by shting, the ther was abducted and discvered days later at a mrgue, executed by a gun sht wund t the head and shwing signs f trture. 748 Despite a series f crdinated retaliatry attacks carried ut in a Shi ite slum and Sadrstrnghld in Baghdad n March 13, al-sadr publicly called fr restraint again. After numerus car bmbs and mrtar attacks killed ver 50 and wunded nearly 200, Sadr avided blaming Iraqi Sunnis and instead held the U.S. and al-qa ida culpable. 749 At a news cnference, Sadr declared, I can fight the terrrists. I am able t face them, militarily and spiritually but I dn t want t slip int a civil war. Therefre, I will urge calm. 750 In the midst f this vilence, the Mahdi Militia became the primary security prvider in Sadr City. Checkpints were established thrughut the neighbrhds and patrls were cnducted by armed yung men in sccer jerseys r black unifrms nw assciated with Sadr s fllwers. 751

252 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 220 The clerics f bth Shi ite and Sunni factins played a rle in instigating and limiting the vilence and were able t escalate r deescalate by cntrlling their fllwers during this time. This activist rle f clerics was in cntrast t the secular rule that had been the nrm in Iraq bth befre and during Saddam s era. 752 The clerics are the kingmakers, the peacemakers and the war-makers, said Ismael Zayer, editr f an Iraqi newspaper. A plitical scientist at Baghdad University, Hassan Bazzaz cncurred: If the religius leaders decided t g all the way t a civil war they culd, in n time. Sadr, Civil War, the US, and the Caltin Al-Sadr wuld present additinal prblems in any mre intense civil cnflict. Sadr als has a unique ability t emply gun and ballt alike and his transfrmatin frm bscure rebelruser t hunted rebel t statesman. He cntrls the Mahdi Militia, a small army, as well as the weapns and equipment that g with it and has been willing t use vilence in the past. Yet his fllwers have als dminated the new Iraqi parliament as well as the Ministries f Transprtatin and Health. 753 Bth f these qualities add t the perceptin amng thse lyal t Sadr that he is a prvider and prtectr fr the Iraqi peple. Sadr has als cnsistently taken a hard line stance against the presence f U.S. and Calitin frces while expliting a unique ability t explit the Shi ite pr. Sadr has wn supprt amng Iraq s pr and dissatisfied Shi ites in Baghdad and central and suthern Iraq. 754 Fr example, althugh residents f Baghdad and ther middle and upper-class areas have lng referred t thse that reside in Sadr City slums as shuruqi, r easties, Sadr fllwers have turned this dergatry wrd int a label f pride and defiance. 755 In an interview, ne Sadr aide used terms such as charity and public defense when describing the duties f the Mahdi Army. Dr. Yusif al-nasry stated that the army is nt nly helping Sadr City, but all f Iraq s pr and weak citizens and has helped t build schls and clean city streets in the absence f gvernment services. 756 Yet the extent f these activities remains unclear, t the degree that they ccur at all. Additinally, these statements d nt indicate whether Sadr and the Mahdi Army genuinely see themselves in this manner, r are simply trying t prtray their rganizatin as a servant and prtectr f the peple rather than a threat t Iraqi security. Regardless, Sadr and the Mahdi Army s aid t displaced Shi ite families arriving in Sadr City, furthered their image as a benevlent frce in the Shi ite cmmunity. Thse families, which fled the sectarian vilence ccurring in their hme cities, were greeted by a netwrk f Sadr fll wers already in place t give them shelter in msques and cmmunity centers. 757 The US-Iraqi raid n the Mustafa msque, r Husayniyah strengthened al-sadr s psitin with his fllwers and the Shi ite cmmunity in general and perpetuated the Mahdi Army s image as a prtectr. While Shi ite gvernment leaders questined the peratin and called fr investigatins, al-sadr was able t rally his supprters in the street and call fr Iraqi slidarity against the US and Calitin. Suad Mhammad, the directr f the schl acrss the street frm the cmplex said, They [US and Iraqi frces] came and killed the yung peple, and we want the Imam Mahdi Army t prtect us, because they are frm us, they are Iraqi peple. Anther man, Jassim Mhamad Ali, wh ran frm the cmpund during the raid added, The nly thing I witness frm the Mahdi Army, they have hnr and are lyal t this cuntry, and they try t keep the Iraqi streets clean. 758

253 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 221 The media cverage f the event and subsequent accusatins f a massacre, which caught the U.S. ff guard, led t rumrs that the U.S. was nw perating with death squads and wuld kill peple while they are praying. Spkesmen and cmmentatrs als said that the U.S. was nw targeting Shi ites t stp the plitical prcess frm succeeding. One individual called fr a united Shi ite frnt against terrrism, whether it is Wahhabi r American. 759 One key questin, if the civil fighting des escalate t serius levels, is whether Sadr wuld seek t dminate the Shi ite side, actively reject a cntinued US presence, and turn t Iran. SCIRI might d the same thing under sme circumstances, but seems cnsiderably less likely t d s than Sadr. Internal Shi ite Divisins Shi ite splits are pssible, as are sectarian and ethnic splits. Mrever, few Shi'ites can frget that Sadr is believed t have been respnsible fr the assassinatin f Al Khi right after the fall f Saddam Hussein and fr the killing f Muhammad Bakr al-hakim, Abdul Aziz al-hakim s brther, in August Shi ite divisins culd ccur alng reginal and lcal lines as well. Basra was effectively taken ver by a lcal gvernment after the January 30, 2005 electin that was much mre f a Shi ite fundamentalist gvernment than the mainstream f al Dawa r SCIRI. The lcal plice were intimidated r pushed aside by such elements in May, and Shi ite militia jined the plice and dminated its ranks. While sme f thse accused f being invlved such as plice Chief Lt. Clnel Salam Badran --were affiliated with SCIRI in the past, mst such Islamists seem mre fundamentalist than SCIRI s leadership. There have been reprts f threats, beatings, and killings affecting liqur stres, male dctrs wh treat wmen, and even barbers cutting hair in nn-islamic ways. Individuals in plain clthes have als made threats and put pressure n lcal businesses. Sadr's Cuncil fr Vice and Virtue launched at least ne attack n secular students in Basra fr having a mixed picnic. 760 Even if such cases d nt divide Iraq s Arab Shi ites and serius issues d exist abut hw Islamic the future gvernment shuld be in Shi ite terms and wh shuld rule they may well cause even greater fear amng Sunnis and increase the risk f civil cnflict. 761 Divisins amng Shi ite grups culd put new burdens n Iraq s frces, and/r ptentially paralyze r divide key elements f the gvernment. It is nt clear if Sadr and ther Shi ite elements will hld tgether, r if splits will ccur. The risk als exists that the Kurds and Shi'ites might split in ways that culd lead t civil cnflict r that Shi ite plitics may begin t react far mre vilently t Sunni insurgent bmbings and attacks, striking back at the Sunnis rather than seeking t include them. Such a split culd lead t a vilent cnflict between Sadr s Mahdi Militia and SCRI s Badr Brigade, as each cmmands 10,000 strng militias and many f the Iraqi frces that have been infiltrated by militias are divided alng thse lines. Yet if the divisins increase peacefully and plitically, it may create an pprtunity fr Sunni parties t gain grund in a gvernment nw dminated by a grand Shi ite alliance. 762 There were indicatins in March 2006 that divisins within the United Iraqi Alliance ver the nminatin f al-jaafari as Prime Minister were creating intra-party tensins. His selectin as prime minister, which he secured nly with the help f Sadr supprters in parliament, became

254 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 222 mre cntentius as U.S. fficials penly viced preferences fr an alternative candidate and Sunni and Kurdish parties aligned in ppsitin t his nminatin. In April, a senir Shi ite plitician, Kassim Daud, called fr al-jaafari t step dwn. 763 One day later, Sheik Jalaladeen al-sagheir, a deputy t the SCIRI s leader Abul-Aziz al-hakim, declared that he was fficially suggesting anther candidate t replace al-jaafari. 764 Althugh the differences between the al-sadr and al-hakim and their respective Sh ite parties became visible during talks t frm a gvernment, the cnflict has histrical and tribal rts extending thusands f years int the past. Al-Sadr, wh thrugh his supprt fr current Prime Minister al-jaafari identifies with the al-dawa party, has rallied a destitute yuthful base thrugh his ften fiery rhetric. His family name, al-sadr, is held in high regard in the Shi ite suth. The al-hakim clan, equally well knwn and ruthless, is ften prtrayed as a wiser ld guard that funded SCIRI, the largest plitical party in Iraq. The leader f the party, Abdul-Aziz al-hakim, ppses al-jaafari as the prime minister and therefre penly cmpetes with al-sadr fr the lyalty f Iraqi Shi ites. 765 While the Hakim family largely fled t Iran during Saddam s rule, and thus is accused by al-sadr f being an Iranian creatin and subject t Iranian influence, SCIRI has mre r less wrked with the U.S. and Calitin frces. In additin, SCIRI is much mre f a frmal plitical rganizatin than al-sadr s mvement. Althugh bth families suffered under Saddam, al-sadr argues that thse wh escaped t surrunding cuntries t avid repressin shuld nt be allwed t represent the Iraqi peple in a new gvernment. 766 Al-Sadr hwever, has cntinually called fr the U.S. t leave Iraq and has penly fught with Calitin frces in the past. As stated abve, al-sadr s Mahdi Army and its affiliates have been mre grass rts based and cntinue t reach ut t pr and displaced Shi ites by prviding security and basic services, and thus have a large fllwing in and arund Sadr City. 767 Al-Sadr, whse age is fficially unknwn, is said t generally lack religius credentials. Yet histrically members f bth the al-sadr and al-hakim families have held the title f grand ayatllah. In additin, Sadr s grandfather was particularly knwn fr his religius schlarship. Mrever, marriage has and des ccur acrss tribal lines. 768 Insurgent Pressure n the Shi ites t Mve Tward Civil War Since the January 30, 2005 electin, much f the Sunni insurgent activity has been directly targeted at Shi'ite clergy and plitical leaders, Shi'ite civilians, and Shi ite institutins. Attacks have als been targeted fr key Shi'ite hlidays like the February 19 th Ashura hliday and the Muslim hly mnth f Ramadan. While mst Shi'ite leaders have cntinued t resist calls fr reprisals against Sunnis, ther Shi'ites have called fr such actin, and Shi'ite killings f Sunni clergy and civilians have increased. 769 The resistance f Shi ite leaders t this pressure t attack Sunnis caused ne US military bserver -- Brig. Gen. Jhn Custer t state in July 2005 that, The incredible vilence that the Shi'a cmmunity has endured ver last year leads me t believe that they are smart enugh and understanding f the big picture enugh t back away frm civil war at all csts. The specter f the dark clud f civil war has mved away. It is much less evident than it was last year. 770

255 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 223 Accelerating Vilence in 2005 Events, hwever, have put mre and mre pressure n Shi ite restraint. The single deadliest day fr Iraqi Shi ites was August 31 when almst 1,000 Shi ite pilgrims were killed in a stampede in Baghdad. The pilgrims were crssing the al-aima bridge en rute t the shrine f Mussa al- Kadhim when rumrs began t spread that there were Sunni suicide bmbers in their midst. The resulting panic ended in 953 Shi ites dead, accrding t the Iraqi interir ministry. Mqtada al- Sadr vwed vengeance against Sunnis, wh he believed rganized the pandemnium. Later in a sermn, Sadr spke ut against the Calitin s presence in Iraq, as it hampered a sectarian war, which he asserted had already begun. 771 Prir t the stampede, Mqtada al-sadr had publicly ppsed Shi ite participatin in sectarian warfare. As already mentined, n September 14, 2005, Iraq s Al-Qa ida leader and Sunni insurgent Abu Musab al-zarqawi declared war n Shi ite Muslims in Iraq. Accrding t the recrding psted n the Internet, the declaratin came in respnse t the recent jint U.S.-Iraqi ffensive in the twn f Tal Afar, a Sunni insurgent strnghld. Zarqawi referred t the assault as an rganized sectarian war. Earlier that day, al Qa ida said in an Internet psting it was waging a natinwide suicide bmbing campaign t avenge the military ffensive against Sunni rebels in Tal Afar. Fllwing Zarqawi s declaratin, Baghdad erupted in vilence: September 14, 2005: At least 167 peple die and mre than 570 injured as mre than a dzen bmbs explde thrughut Baghdad. Marks the single wrst day f killing t hit the capital since the US-led invasin f March A suicide bmber in a car blew himself up in Baghdad, killing 11 peple wh lined up t refill gas canisters, plice said. The blast in nrthern Baghdad, which als wunded 14, came hurs after what appeared t be a series f crdinated blasts, including ne that killed at least 114 peple. Gunmen wearing military unifrms surrunded the village f Taaji nrth f Baghdad and executed 17 men, plice said. The dead were members f the Tameem tribe, al-hayali said. The gunmen lted the village befre leaving. A Vehicle-brne imprvised explsive device explded in the Uruba Square in the Zahra district f nrthwest Baghdad. The terrrist attack killed at least 75 Iraqi civilians and wunded mre than 130. The wunded were evacuated t the Al-Shulla Hspital in central Baghdad where anther suicide VBIED detnated, causing mre civilian casualties. A Suicide Car bmb attack in ccurred in a Kadimiya market area nrth f Baghdad. At least 80 were killed and 150 injured. Task Frce Baghdad unit reprted striking a VBIED in west Baghdad. The Sldiers established a crdn and began searching the area fr triggermen. Several Iraqi civilians were wunded in the attack. There were n U.S. casualties. A VBIED detnated n a U.S. cnvy in east Baghdad. The suicide bmber was reprtedly driving against traffic befre detnating n the cnvy. Tw U.S. Sldiers received nn-life-threatening wunds in the attack. Ten minutes later, a suicide VBIED detnated near a U.S. cnvy in sutheast Baghdad with n injuries t U.S. persnnel r damage t equipment. A VBIED attack against U.S. frces in central Baghdad failed when the terrrist struck an M1 Abrams tank but did nt detnate his explsives. The tank crew reprted the driver was still alive and trapped inside the vehicle with a 155-millimeter rund. The Task Frce Baghdad unit secured the site and called fr assistance frm an explsive rdnance dispsal team. September 15, 2005:

256 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 224 Suicide bmbers cntinued t strike Baghdad, killing at least 31 peple, 23 f them Iraqi plice and Interir Ministry cmmands. A suicide bmber killed 15 plice cmmandes in the Dra district f Baghdad, plice said. Five civilians were als killed. The blast wunded 21 peple. Hurs later, tw mre bmbs detnated in the same area. Ten mre plicemen died in the explsin and ensuing gun battle with insurgents. Tw plice fficers were killed and tw wunded in Kirkuk. Three civilians were killed in an attack n a Ministry f Defense bus east f Baghdad. Three bdies f peple wh had been sht dead were fund in the Shula district f Baghdad, plice said. Three bdies were fund in the New Baghdad district. Plice said they had been sht dead. Gunmen in nrthern Baghdad killed three Shi ite pilgrims n rute t Karbala fr a religius festival. Three wrkers were killed and a dzen wunded in east Baghdad in a drive-by shting by unidentified gunmen. The attack ccurred in an area where labrers gather each day fr wrk. Vilence cntinued t escalate thrughut September, with insurgents killing mre than 100 Iraqi civilians n the last tw days f the mnth alne in the predminantly Shi ite twn f Balad, in the Sunni regin f Salah ad Din, nrth f Baghdad. 772 September 2005 was the bldiest mnth yet in terms f multiple-fatality insurgent bmbings, with 481 Iraqis killed and 1,074 wunded. 773 The wave f deadly attacks launched by Zarqawi cntinued int Octber, and President Bush warned that the vilence wuld further intensify in the run-up t the Octber 15 referendum and December electins. 774 As vilence in Iraq increased in the fall f 2005 s t did the number f sectarian incidents. In ne six-week perid, mre than 30 Iraqis died as part f sectarian attacks in the Ghazaliya neighbrhd f Baghdad. Sectarian vilence in Baghdad s mixed neighbrhds began accelerating sharply in the summer f 2005 and cntinued t d s thrughut the fall. Accrding t Iraqi gvernment statistics, the number f sectarian targeted killings almst dubled in 2005, in spite f the increased presence f Iraqi security frces n the streets. 775 In many cases, such as the Ghazaliya murders, the victims were randmly selected based n their religin and had little if any invlvement in plitics. The nging vilence als caused many Iraqis t relcate t areas where they cnstitute the majrity. Accrding t Edward Jseph f the Wdrw Wilsn Center, Once displacement starts, it is a never-ending cycle. Jseph believes the key questin will be hw the minrity cmmunity reacts after the murder f ne f its wn: If they dn t flee, if they just hang arund and then rder up sme reprisal killing a little later it s prbably less likely t be civil war. But, Jseph als ntes that the current pattern f displacement in Iraq tday lsely resembles the departure f Bsnian Muslims in the mid-1990s fllwing attacks by Serbian militias, a develpment that ended up increasing, nt decreasing, the level f vilence in that regin. As in 2004, Shi ite-sunni vilence cntinued during the hly mnth f Ramadan in On the first day f the mnth-lng hliday, a suicide car bmber targeting an Interir Ministry fficial blew himself up utside Baghdad s Green Zne, wunding several civilians. 776 That same day, an Internet message psted by Al Qa'ida in Iraq called fr additinal attacks during the hly mnth as well as a byctt f the Octber 15 referendum. The fllwing day, Octber 5, a suicide car bmb explded utside the Husseiniyat Ibn al-nama Msque in Hillah as Shi ite wrshippers gathered t pray, killing at least 24 and wunding several dzen. 777

257 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 225 Vilence in 2006 In early January 2006, vilence spiked again, killing nearly 200 peple in tw days. One suicide attack ccurred at a Shi ite shrine in Karbala killing 63 and wunding 120. As plitical grups attempted t cnstruct a gverning calitin, prtests brke ut in Sadr City where ver 5,000 Shi ites cndemned the vilence and chastised Sunni leaders. SCIRI issued a warning t the Sunni insurgents that its patience was wearing thin and that it may use the Badr Brigade t cnduct retaliatin attacks. Izzat al-shahbandar, an fficial with the Iraqi Accrdance Frnt, the main Sunni calitin party invlved in the negtiatin prcess, remarked that the current Shi itedminated gvernment was acting as an accmplice in the nging vilence by pursuing sectarian plicies and strengthening militias. 778 Accrding t Aya Abu Jihad, the wner f a stre in Baghdad, Peple are being killed because they are Shi ites, and thers are killed because they are Sunnis. Sme senir Iraqi gvernment fficials believed that the wave f sectarian vilence psed a greater threat t stability than did the pssible rejectin f the draft cnstitutin by a majrity f Iraqis: The gvernment nw is s inefficient at cntrlling the situatin that the security situatin has deterirated, and s the plitical situatin has deterirated They have t get security under cntrl, therwise [the cnstitutin] is nt ging t matter. A frmer general in the Iraqi army knwn as Abu Arab eched that sentiment, saying, Peple dn t want a cnstitutin-they want security. 779 At the same time, senir Shi ite and Kurdish pliticians still pressed fr a peaceful plitical slutin and fr an inclusive unity gvernment. Even relative hard line Shi te pliticians like Abdelaziz Hakim pressed fr mre care n the part f Shi ite frces in dealing with Sunnis. On February 8, 2006, he called fr Iraq s security frces "t cntinue strngly cnfrnting terrrists but with mre cnsideratin t human rights." The Shi ite hliday f Ashura passed in early February 2006 withut any majr incidents r attacks. In the tw years previus hwever, insurgents killed ver 230 Shi ites. Despite acts f sectarian vilence, the Pentagn maintained in February 2006 that the verall number f incidents remained lw when cmpared with ttal attacks. Hwever it did nt rule ut the pssibility that this wuld remain the case in the future. Additinally, it stated that sectarian vilence is frequently a matter f perceptin and that it was difficult t distinguish between attacks n citizens in general and thse intentinally aimed at a particular sect. 780 The bmbing f the Askariya Shrine, revered by Shi ites, caused a dramatic upsurge in sectarian vilence in late February, resulting in the deaths f well ver 300 Iraqi s in five days. Shi ite demnstratins in the streets f Iraq were numerus. Peaceful demnstratins were held acrss the Shi ite dminated suth and in ethnically mixed cities such as Kirkuk. 781 Statements by participants and average civilians gave indicatins that Shi ite resistance t sectarian cnflict may have wrn ut. A Shi ite emplyee f the Trade Ministry stated this much t a reprter: Yu have a TV, yu fllw the news Wh is mst ften killed? Whse msques are explded? Whse sciety was destryed? The same individual appeared t emphasize the advantage that sheer size wuld bring the Shi ites in any civil cnflict saying, If they have 100 peple, we have millins Lk at these peple [mtining twards the demnstratrs] I m just a drp in this cean. 782 Amid demnstratins and cndemnatins frm bth Sunni and Shi ite plitical leaders, Shi ite militias such as al-sadr s Mahdi Army sught revenge against Sunni s and carried ut numerus killings and attacks n Sunni msques. Sunni grups reciprcated.

258 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 226 By nn n the day f the bmbing, attacks n Sunni s and Sunni msques, allegedly by the Mahdi Army, were already being reprted. One such attack n a Sunni msque that ccurred in a mixed neighbrhd near Sadr City was recunted in a New Yrk Times article the fllwing day: Ahmed al-samarai, wh lives in frnt f the msque, said he saw abut seven cars full f men wearing black, the signature Mahdi dress, fire machine guns and rcket-prpelled grenades at the msque, guging a large hle in a side wall. They entered the building and led away a man wh perfrms the call t prayer, Abu Abdullah, telling his wife and three children t leave the building, Mr. Samarai said. They returned later, pured gasline in the msque, and set it n fire. Neighbrs are still lking fr Mr. Abdullah. 783 By Thursday mrning, ne Iraqi described the envirnment: We didn t knw hw t behave. Chas was everywhere. Even the mre mderate Shi ite newspaper, Al Bayyna al Jadidah, urged Shi ites t assert themselves in the face f Sunni vilence. Its editrial stated that it was time t declare war against anyne wh tries t cnspire against us, wh slaughters us every day. It is time t g t the streets and fight thse utlaws. 784 Al-Sadr rdered his Mahdi Militia t prtect Shi ite shrines acrss Iraq, and blamed the U.S. and Iraqi gvernment fr nt failing t prtect the Askariya shrine saying, If the gvernment had real svereignty, then nthing like this wuld have happened. In a speech frm Basra, al-sadr als called fr restraint and unity amngst Iraqi s: We gt rid f the evil Saddam and nw we have a new dictatrship, the dictatrship f Britain, the US and Israel I call n Muslims, Sunnis and Shi ites, t be brthers Faith is the strngest weapns, nt arms. He als rdered his listeners t nt attack msques in retaliatin saying, There is n Sunni msques and Shi ite msques, msques are fr all Muslims it is ne Islam and ne Iraq. He als called fr a united peaceful demnstratin in Baghdad and labeled Baathists and extremists as the enemy. 785 The Grand Ayatllah Ali al-sistani als hinted twards a mre active psture by Shi ites saying, If the security systems are unable t secure necessary prtectin, the believers are able t d s with the might f Gd. 786 Sunni pliticians alleged that Sunni msques in Baghdad and sme suthern cities were either attacked r actively ccupied by the Mahdi Army in the days fllwing the attacks. 787 The Assciatin f Muslim Schlars, a hard line Sunni clerical rganizatin, alleged n Thursday that 168 Sunni msques were attacked, 10 imams killed and 15 abducted. 788 Other, mre bjective estimates hwever put the number f msques attacked at arund The assciatin als made direct appeals t al-sadr t intervene and stp the vilence, apparently suspecting he was a primary crdinatr f the Shi ite attacks. Using a title f respect Abdul Salam al-kubaisi f the grup said, I call n Sayyid Mqtada Sadr and remind him what happened t the bld f bth f us in Fallujah, Karbala and Najaf. 790 In sme Sunni areas, residents, fearing attacks n their msques, erected barricades and std watch. In Al Malimin district, armed men patrlled the rf f the Sunni msque Malik bin Anas. 791 The cycle f sectarian vilence that fllwed the attack, much f which cnsisted f reprisal attacks by Shi ite militias, cntinued relatively unabated thrugh March and int April. The Islamist extremist insurgents, whse gal it was t push Iraq int civil war, apparently assessed that they had cme clse after the Askariya attack and tried t replicate the act thrugh further attacks n Shi ite hly sites.

259 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 227 Althugh it is unclear if the bmbings were related, n April 6, 7, and 8, suicide attacks and car bmbs either struck directly at r very clse t several Shi ite hly sites. On April 6, a car bmb explded near the sacred Imam Ali shrine in Najaf killing 10 and injuring 30. One day later, three suicide bmbers targeted the Baratha msque in Baghdad, a primary headquarters fr SCIRI, killing mre than 80 and wunding mre than 140. The Iraqi Health Ministry claimed that 90 were killed and ver 170 wunded. At least tw f the bmbers were dressed as wmen t hide the bmbs and slipped int the msque as the wrshippers left. The first bmb detnated at the main exit, and the secnd inside the msque as peple rushed back in fr safety. Ten secnds later, the third bmb explded. Again, the next day, a car bmb killed six peple and wunded 14 near a Shi ite shrine suth f Baghdad. 792 These bmbings were a typical tactic used by Islamist insurgents wh ften attacked Shi ite civilians n days marking religius bservatin r during religius gatherings, and ccasinally attacked msques directly. The near success f the February 22 bmbing caused these insurgents t mix the hrrr f mass casualty suicide attacks with the impact f attacking sites f religius significance in an attempt t stall the plitical prcess and prd the Shi ites int reprisal attacks and civil war. Reactin by Shi ite plitical and religius leaders was similar t that after February 22 in that they urged restraint amng their fllwers. At a rally f SCIRI supprters shrtly after the series f April bmbings, the head f the party Abdul Aziz al-hakim addressed the crwd: This natin will nt fall int the trap f sectarian war that is being pursued by Zarqawi s grup. 793 Althugh such public prclamatins f restraint and nn-vilence are plitically useful, it was unclear if such messages were being heeded by Shi ite militias which cntinued t be implicated in retaliatry abductins and killings.

260 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 228 IX. The Kurds and Other Minrities The January 2005 electins made the Kurds far mre pwerful relative t ther Iraqi factins in military and security terms than their 15% f the ppulatin might indicate. Iraqi security and stability depends n finding a pwer-sharing arrangement that gives the Kurds incentives t be part f the plitical prcess just as much as it des n develping such arrangements fr the Arab Sunnis. There is n basic plitical r ecnmic reasn such a cmprmise cannt be fund. Unfrtunately, hwever, Iraq has a lng histry f nt finding such cmprmises n a lasting basis and Saddam Hussein s legacy left many areas where Kurds were frcibly expelled and Sunni Arabs and minrities were given their hmes and prperty. Large numbers f Kurds favr independence ver plitical inclusiveness. This helps explain why the Kurdish turnut in the Octber referendum n the cnstitutin varied widely. In predminantly Kurdish prvinces, participatin was much lwer than in the January electin. Sme analysts have suggested the lwer turnut was a result f increased vter apathy amng a Kurdish ppulatin wh felt assured the Cnstitutin wuld pass. Others nted the increase in dissatisfactin with the central gvernment and the idea f remaining in Iraq amng Kurdish ppulatins. Rits and demnstratins prtesting the shrtages f gas, fuel and pwer have becme mre cmmn in Kurdish cities. 794 Sme Kurds may als have felt let dne by a Cnstitutin that did nt specifically address the status f Kirkuk r lay ut a clear path t secessin. 795 Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias The tw majr Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Demcratic Party (KDP) headed by Masud Barzani and the Patritic Unin f Kurdistan, headed by Jalal Talibani, retain pwerful militias, knwn cllectively as the Peshmerga Their current strength is difficult t estimate, and sme elements are either perating in Iraqi frces r have been trained by US advisrs. The Iraqi Kurds culd prbably assemble a frce in excess f 10,000 fighters albeit f very different levels f training and equipment. The Kurdish Pesh Merga trace their rigins t the Iraqi civil wars f the 1920s. They fught against the Saddam Hussein regime during the Iran-Iraq war and supprted U.S. and Calitin military actin in The Peshmerga grups f the Patritic Unin f Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish Demcratic Party (KDP) serve as the primary security frce fr the Kurdish reginal gvernment. The PUK and KDP claim that there are 100,000 Peshmerga trps, and they have insisted n keeping the Peshmerga intact as guarantrs f Kurdish security and plitical selfdeterminatin. Tensins Between the Kurds and Other Iraqis There are serius tensins between the Kurds, the Turcmans, and Assyrian Christians, as well as between Kurds and Arabs. At a lcal level, there are many small tribal elements as well as numerus bdyguards, and lng histries f tensins and feuds. Even if Iraq never divides alng natinal fracture lines, sme frm f reginal r lcal vilence is all t pssible. Insurgent activity in the Kurdish areas was particularly intense in the city f Irbil, which has been the site f several suicide bmbings. In summer 2005, Kurdish security fficials and the

261 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 229 KDP intelligence service annunced the arrest f apprximately six insurgent suspects wh, the authrities believe, came frm six separate and previusly unheard f militant rganizatins. The head f the Irbil security plice, Abdulla Ali, stated that there was evidence that the grups had links t internatinal terrr grups, established jihadi grups in Iraq like Ansar al-sunna, and even had links t intelligence services frm nearby cuntries. 796 This evidence was nt made public, but the Kurdish authrities stated that it appeared as thugh varius grups were wrking tgether and that, t the anger and disappintment f the Kurdish authrities, that lcal Kurds were assisting them. Tensin between the Kurds and Iraqi Arabs and ther minrities has als been critical in areas like Kirkuk and Msul. The Kurds claim territry claimed by ther Iraqi ethnic grups, and demand the return f prperty they assert was seized by Saddam Hussein, during his varius effrts at ethnic cleansing frm 1975 t The future f Kirkuk and the nrthern il fields arund it is the subject f cnsiderable lcal and natinal plitical cntrversy between the Kurds and ther Iraqis. The Kurds claim that ver 220,000 Kurds were driven ut f their hmes by Saddam in the 1970s and fighting in the Gulf War, and that ver 120,000 Arabs were imprted int Kurdish territry. The Kurds see cntrl f Kirkuk as their ne chance t have territrial cntrl ver a majr prtin f Iraq s il reserves, but Kirkuk is nw rughly 35% Kurd, 35% Arab, 26% Turcman, and 4% ther. This makes any such slutin almst impssible unless it invlves vilent means. There has been armed vilence between Kurds, Arabs, and Turcmans, as well as struggles ver sft ethnic cleansing in the Nrth, and there may well be mre vilence in the future. Many experts feel that the nly reasn Kirkuk has been relatively peaceful, and still has smething appraching a representative gvernment, is that the Kurds have nt been strng enugh relative t the ther factins in the city t impse their will by intimidatin r frce. Reprts in August 2005 indicated that gvernment plice and military frces in the Kurdish nrth were using their pwer t intimidate Arabs thrugh abductins and assassinatins. Such activity pses the threat f deepening reginal fissures. Likewise, the misuse f pwer by Calitin-spnsred frces culd deepen resentment tward Calitin frces, particularly amng the Sunni ppulatin. 797 Other Kurdish actins have exacerbated ethnic tensin in a struggle fr the cntrl f Kirkuk. There are reprts that the KDP and PUK systematically kidnapped hundreds f Arabs and Turcmans frm the city and transprted them t prisns in established Kurdish territry in an apparent bid t create an verwhelming Kurdish majrity. 798 This activity allegedly spread t Msul as well. While sme f the abductins had ccurred in 2004, reprts indicated that there was a renewed effrt fllwing the January 30 th electins that slidified the tw parties primacy in the Kurdish areas. Accrding t a leaked State Department cable in mid-june 2005, the abducted were taken t KDP and PUK intelligence-run prisns in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah withut the knwledge f the Iraqi Ministry f Defense r the Ministry f the Interir, but smetimes with US knwledge. In fact, the Emergency Services Unit, a special Kirkuk frce within the plice, was bth clsely tied t the US military and implicated in many f the abductins, alng with the Asayesh Kurdish intelligence service. 799 It shuld be nted that the head f the Emergency Services Unit is a frmer PUK fighter.

262 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 230 Kirkuk prvince s Kurdish gvernr, Abdul Rahman Mustafa, stated that the allegatins were false. Hwever, the State Department cable indicated that the US 116 th Brigade Cmbat Team had knwn abut the activity and had asked the Kurdish parties t stp. 800 Accrding t Kirkuk s chief f plice, Gen. Turhan Yusuf Abdel-Rahman, 40% f his 6,120 fficers prbably assisted in the abductins, disbeying his rders and fllwing the directives f the KDP and PUK instead. Abdel-Rahman stated, The main prblem is that the lyalty f the plice is t the parties and nt the plice frce. They ll bey the parties rders and disbey us. 801 Accrding t Abdel-Rahman, the prvincial plice directr, Sherk Shakir Hakim, refused t retire as rdered by the gvernment in Baghdad nce he was assured that the KDP and PUK wuld cntinue t pay him if he stayed n. The varius factins in Kirkuk seem t have agreed n a cmprmise lcal gvernment in June 2005, but the city cntinues t present a serius risk f future cnflict. The issue f Kirkuk tk n a new imprtance after the December 2005 electins. In the mnths prir, thusands f Kurds erected settlements in the city, ften with financing frm the tw main Kurdish parties. In additin, vilence began t rise, with 30 assassinatin-style killings frm Octber thrugh December. Kurdish plitical grups were increasingly pen abut their intent t incrprate Kirkuk int Iraqi Kurdistan and cntinue t repatriate Kurds int the city in an effrt t tip the ethnic balance in their favr. They stated they sught t accmplish this by the time f the ppular referendum in 2007, which is t determine whether the Tamim prvince will be gverned by the Kurdish reginal gvernment, r frm Baghdad. 802 The future f Kirkuk will be a central factr fr Kurdish plitical grups as they wrk t frm a gverning calitin. The reelectin f al-jaafari as Prime Minister further frustrated the Kurdish pliticians. They accused him f being slw t implement Article 58 f the cnstitutin that stipulates that the questin f the nrmalizatin f Kirkuk must take place by the end f In fact, the plitical alliance between Kurds and Shi ites, nce cnsidered natural given their cmmn grievances against the Sunni-dminated Ba ath party, was pening up t questin. 804 Kurdish views f the increased sectarian vilence between Sunni and Shi ite Arabs differed. One perspective has its rts in the histrical animsity between Kurds and Arabs. A sectarian civil war culd bring benefits t the Kurds if, as ne individual said, ur enemies [are] killing each ther. 805 Accrding t this thery, if civil war breaks ut in Iraq, the Kurds will then be justified in breaking away t frm an independent Kurdistan. In this situatin, the internatinal cmmunity wuld be frced t acquiesce t such a mve. 806 The ppsite view is mre hesitant and less ptimistic. These individuals wrry that althugh civil war may initially begin in central and suthern Iraq, it culd spread nrthward, threatening the stability and relative security they have attained since the 2003 invasin. In fact, there were sme reprts in the first mnths f 2006 that Shi ite militias were migrating nrth int cities like Kirkuk and mving int msques in the area as a prtectin frce. 807 If civil war des reach the Kurds, sme believe Iraqi Arabs, as well as Turkey, Syria and Iran wuld bject t Kurdish separatin and that cuntries such as Turkey that have sizeable Kurdish ppulatins, may intervene militarily t prevent an independent Kurdish natin. 808 Uncertain Kurdish Unity Kurdish unity is always prblematic. The Kurds have a saying that, the Kurds have n friends. Histry shws that this saying shuld be, the Kurds have n friends including the Kurds. The Barzani and Talibani factins have fught n several ccasins, and there was a state f civil war

263 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 231 between them during PUK frces were able t take cntrl f Irbil in 1994, and put an end t the first attempt t create a unified and elected gvernment that began in Barzani s KDP cllabrated with Saddam Hussein in 1995, when Hussein sent a full crps f trps int Irbil and ther parts f the area ccupied by Talibani. Tens f thusands f Kurds and anti-saddam activists fled the area, and the US did nt succeed in brkering a settlement between the tw factins until Despite past, and ptential future tensins and divisins between the PUK and KDP, leaders frm bth parties signed an agreement in January 2006, which alltted eleven ministerial psts t each grup. Minrity parties were skeptical f KDP-PUK prmises t give remaining psts t plitical factins wh did nt win a majrity and wrried that this further islated them frm any future rle in the plitical prcess. 810 The present marriage f cnvenience between the KDP and PUK has nt unified the Kurdish cntrlled prvinces in the nrth. There were minr clashes between their supprters in 1995, and these plitical divisins culd create future prblems fr bth Kurdish plitical unity and any agreement n sme frm f autnmy. Kurdish frustratin with these plitical parties manifested itself in vilent prtests in 2006 during ceremnies marking the anniversary f the March 1988 pisn gas attack by Hussein at Halabja. Prtestrs alleged that the PUK and KDP had misapprpriated millins f dllars in freign aid given t the survivrs f the attack. 811 The prtestrs als cmplained abut the shrtage f water and electricity. 812 The prtests, which began at 9am, slwly grew in number and grups began setting fire t tires and thrwing rcks at the mnument and museum dedicated t thse killed under Saddam s rule. 813 The few PUK dzen guards in frnt f the mnument, wh attempted t disperse the crwd by firing int the air, were utnumbered and frced t retreat. The prtestrs destryed museum exhibits with rcks and then attempted t set it n fire. One prtestr was killed by the gunfire frm the guards and six thers were wunded. 814 A reginal fficial, Shahu Mhammed Saed, wh accrding t reprts was ne f the targets f the peples frustratin, blamed the rits n Ansar al-islam. 815 Hwever, there seems t be little indicatin that this assertin is true. The Prblem f Resurces and Oil The Kurds als face the prblem that at present they have n cntrl ver Iraq s il resurces r revenues, and n access t any prt r lines f cmmunicatin that are nt subject t Iraqi, Turkish, r Iranian interdictin. They als have a very uncertain ecnmic future since they have lst the guaranteed stream f revenue prvided by the UN Oil-Fr-Fd prgram; Iraq can nw exprt il thrugh the Gulf and repen pipelines t Syria as a substitute fr pipelines thrugh Turkey, and there is far less incentive t smuggle thrugh Kurdish areas nw that trade is pen n Iraq s brders. The Kurds als face the prblem that Iran, Syria, and Turkey all have Kurdish minrities that have sught independence in the past, and any frm f Iraqi Kurdish autnmy r independence is seen as a threat t these states. The Turkish Questin All these prblems are still further cmpunded by the rebirth f Kurdish insurgency in Turkey, and acute Turkish pressure n the Iraqi gvernment, Iraqi Kurds, and MNSTC-I t bth deny Turkish Kurdish insurgents a sanctuary, and set any example that wuld encurage Kurdish

264 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 232 separatism in Turkey. The Turkish Kurdish Wrker Party (PKK) is a mvement that has ften used nrthern Iraq as a sanctuary, and which led t several majr divisin-sized Turkish military mvements int the area under Saddam Hussein. While estimates are uncertain, sme 6,000 PKK frces seemed t be in Iraq in the spring f 2005, with anther 2,000 acrss the brder. 816 These same factrs help explain why Turkey has actively supprted Iraq s small Turcman minrity in its pwer struggles with Iraq s Kurds. The February 2006 visit t Turkey by Prime Minister al-jaafari created cncern amng Kurdish pliticians and accusatins that the trip was carried ut in secret. 817

265 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 233 X. The Rle f Outsiders in the Insurgency The pressure fr civil war can als expand t invlve utside states. Syria very clearly tlerates and supprts Sunni ne-salafi extremist peratins n its territry in spite f its Alawite cntrlled gvernment. A brader and mre intense civil cnflict culd lead ther Arab states t take sides n behalf f the Sunnis -- althugh Bahrain, Lebann, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are just a few f the states that have deep sectarian divisins f their wn. Any majr divisins within Iraq culd repen the Kurdish issue as it affects Turkey, and pssibly Iran and Syria as well. Creating a Shi ite Crescent? The mst serius wild card in Iraq s immediate neighbrhd is Iran. Iran already plays at least sme rle in the plitical instability in Iraq and may take a mre aggressive rle in trying t shape Iraq s plitical future and security psitin in the Gulf. Sme believe that the Iranians have abandned their effrts t exprt their Shi ite revlutin t the Gulf. This view has changed since the invasin f Iraq. Officials acrss the Arab wrld, especially in Saudi Arabia and Jrdan, have expressed reservatin ver the right f Iraqi Sunnis, Kurdish and Shi ite dminance ver the Iraqi gvernment, and a new strategic Shi ite alliance between Iran and Iraq. Jrdan's King Abdullah has claimed that that mre than 1 millin Iranians have mved int Iraq t influence the January 2005 Iraqi electin. The Iranians, King Abdullah argued, have been trying t build pr-iranian attitudes in Iraq by prviding salaries t the unemplyed. The King has als said that Iran s Revlutinary Guards were helping the militant grups fighting the US in Iraq, and warned in an interview with the Washingtn Pst f a Shi ite Crescent frming between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebann: 818 It is in Iran s vested interest t have an Islamic republic f Iraq. If Iraq ges Islamic republic, then, yes, we've pened urselves t a whle set f new prblems that will nt be limited t the brders f Iraq. I'm lking at the glass half-full, and let's hpe that's nt the case. But strategic planners arund the wrld have gt t be aware that is a pssibility. Even Saudi Arabia is nt immune frm this. It wuld be a majr prblem. And then that wuld prpel the pssibility f a Shi ite-sunni cnflict even mre, as yu're taking it ut f the brders f Iraq. The same sentiment has been eched by the frmer interim Iraqi President, Ghazi Al-Yawar, a Sunni and a pr-saudi tribal leader. Unfrtunately, time is prving, and the situatin is prving, beynd any dubt that Iran has very bvius interference in ur business -- a lt f mney, a lt f intelligence activities and almst interfering daily in business and many [prvincial] gvernrates, especially in the sutheast side f Iraq. Mr. Al-Yawar asserted that Iraq shuld nt g in the directin f Iran in creating a religius riented gvernment. He was quted in a Washingtn Pst interview as saying We cannt have a sectarian r religius gvernment We really will nt accept a religius state in Iraq. We haven't seen a mdel that succeeded." 819 Bth Iranian and Iraqi Shi ites rejected these cmments. Iran called King Abdullah s cmment an insult t Iraq. Iranian Freign Ministry Spkesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, als called n Ghazi Al-Yawar t retract his statement and accused King Abdullah II and Al-Yawar f wanting t influence the electin against Iraqi Shi ites. Asefi said Unfrtunately, sme plitical currents in Iraq seek t tarnish the trend f electin there and cause cncern in the public pinin We

266 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 234 expect that Mr. al-yawar takes the existing sensitive situatin int cnsideratin and avids repeating such cmments." 820 Iraqi Shi ites als reacted t King Abdullah s cmment abut the fear f a Shi ite Crescent. Jrdan s King Abdullah was asked t aplgize by Shi ites. The Najaf Thelgical Center issued a statement, in which they accused the King f medaling in Iraq s internal affairs: 821 Distrting the truth and blatantly interfering in Iraqi affairs, prvking tribal sentiments in the regin against Iraqi Shi ites, prvking great pwers against Iraqi Shi ites, intimidating reginal cuntries and accusing them f having links with Iran, displaying a great tendency fr ensuring Israel's security and expressing wrries abut the victry f Shi ites in the upcming electins tantamunt t insulting millins f peple in Iran, wh have been insulted just because they fllw a religin that the Jrdan s king is ppsed Najaf Thelgical Center is hpeful that the Jrdanian mnarch will aplgize t the Shi ites f the regin and Iraq, and their religius authrities, because f the inaccurate remarks made against them. The Views f the Arab Gulf States The Gulf cuntries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have als made their views knwn regarding the unity f Iraq and their fear f Shi ite dminance f an Arab cuntry that allies itself with Iran. Saudi Arabia has pushed fr mre Sunni inclusiveness in the cnstitutin writing prcess, especially after their lack f participatin in the January 2005 electins. When a draft cnstitutin did nt acknwledge Iraq s Arab and Muslim identity, the General Secretary f the GCC called the Iraqi cnstitutin a catastrphe. The Saudi Freign Minister, Prince Saud al-faisal, als warned that if the cnstitutin des nt accmmdate the Iraqi Sunni cmmunity, it wuld result in sectarian disputes that may threaten the unity f Iraq. 822 Prince Saud al-faisal later urged the US t pressure Iraqi Shi ites and Kurdish gvernment leaders t wrk t bring the Iraqi peple tgether. He said, [Americans] talk nw abut Sunnis as if they were separate entity frm the Shi ite." al-faisal reiterated his fear f an Iraqi civil war saying, If yu allw civil war, Iraq is finished frever. 823 Al-Faisal als predicted that a civil war in Iraq culd have dire cnsequences in the regin and indicated the Kingdm feared an Iran-Iraq alliance. The Saudi Freign Minister asserted We (US and Saudi Arabia) fught a war tgether t keep Iran ut f Iraq after Iraq was driven ut f Kuwait. He added that the US plicy in Iraq is handing the whle cuntry ver t Iran withut reasn. Iranians have established their influence within Iraq, al-faisal said, because they pay mney... install their wn peple (and) even establish plice frces and arm the militias that are there." 824 A Clash within a Civilizatin? One shuld nt exaggerate Iraq s rle in any clash within a civilizatin. The mre dire predictins f a clash between Sunni and Shi ite that plarizes the Gulf and Middle East may well be exaggerated. The fact remains, hwever, that this is what Bin Laden, Zarqawi, and ther ne-salafi extremists are seeking. The battle in Iraq is nly part f the much brader struggle by ne-salafi extremists t capture the Arab and Islamic wrld. The utcme in Iraq will be critical but nly part f a much brader struggle. Nnetheless, the pssibility is there, shuld Iraq fall int civil war r a limited civil cnflict, fr cuntries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia t increase supprt and funding fr their respective

267 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 235 sectarian cnstituents in Iraq, Shi ite and Sunni respectively. Althugh this wuld nt be the type f clash envisined by Islamist extremists, it culd take the frm f a pwer struggle between neighbring Shi ite and Sunni cuntries that is played ut in a weakened Iraqi state. 825 As sectarian cnflict cntinued and effrts were stalled t frm a unity gvernment during the spring f 2006, it was reprted in April that intelligence fficials frm Arab states including Egypt, Jrdan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey had met t discuss the strategic and reginal implicatins f an Iraqi civil war and Iran s nging rle in the cuntry. The revelatin f this meeting came n the heels f blunt remarks by Egyptian President Mubarak that Mst f the Shiites are lyal t Iran and nt t the cuntries they are living in, and suggested that Iraq is almst clse t destructin. These suggestins were quickly denunced by Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish leaders. Al-Jaafari expressed astnishment that Egypt identifies Iraq s security prblems as a civil war. 826 One day after Mubarak made these cmments, Saudi Freign Minister Prince Saud al-faisal said that since the definitin f a civil war is peple fighting each ther within a cuntry, then Iraq is in a civil war. In additin, he suggested that the Arab League undertake an effrt t help address the nging civil cnflict. He added, hwever, that nly Iraqis themselves can stp this fighting. 827 At a British-Saudi cnference, Prince Saud al-faisal emphasized the danger psed t cuntries in the regin by a civil war in Iraq. The threat f break-up in Iraq is a huge prblem fr the cuntries f the regin, especially if the fighting is n a sectarian basis. This type f fighting sucks in ther cuntries, Prince Saud said. 828 The Prblem f Syria Bth senir US and Iraqi fficials feel that Syria may vertly agree t try t halt any supprt f the insurgency, but allw Islamic extremist grups t recruit yung men, have them cme t Syria, and then crss the brder int Iraq where substantial numbers have becme suicide bmbers. They als feel Syria has allwed senir ex-ba athist cadres t perate frm Syria, helping t direct the Sunni insurgency. As has been tuched upn earlier, these include tp level fficials under Saddam Hussein such as Izzat Ibrahim al-duri, ne f Saddam's Vice Presidents. General Gerge Casey, the cmmander f the MNF, has been careful nt t exaggerate the threat f freign interference. Nevertheless, Casey has warned that Syria has allwed Iraqi supprters f Saddam Hussein t prvide mney, supplies, and directin t Sunni insurgents, and cntinues t be a serius surce f infiltratin by freign vlunteers. 829 General Casey highlighted Syria s cmplicity in this regard when testifying befre the Senate Armed Services Cmmittee n March 8, 2005: There are frmer regime leaders wh cme and g frm Syria, wh perate ut f Syria, and they d planning, and they prvide resurces t the insurgency in Iraq. I have n hard evidence that the Syrian gvernment is actually cmplicit with thse peple, but we certainly have evidence that peple at lw levels with the Syrian gvernment knw that they re there and what they re up t. 830 The US State Department spkesman described Syria s rle as fllws in the late spring f 2005: 831 I think that what we've seen, again, are sme effrts, but it certainly isn't enugh. We d believe the Syrians can d mre. We d believe there's mre they can d alng the brder t tighten cntrls. We d believe that there's mre that they can d t deal with the regime elements that are perating ut f Syria itself and are supprting r encuraging the insurgents there.

268 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 236 And s, again, it's nt simply a matter f them nt being able t take the actins, at least frm ur perspective. Part f it is an unwillingness t take the actins that we knw are necessary and they knw are necessary. In late February 2005, the Baghdad televisin statin al-iraqiya aired taped cnfessins f insurgents captured in Iraq. Many f the men, frm Sudan, Egypt and Iraq, claimed that they were trained in Syria at least three said they had been trained, cntrlled and paid by Syrian intelligence fficials. They were instructed t kidnap, behead and assassinate Iraqi security frces. The majrity f the men expressed remrse fr their actins and said they were driven almst exclusively by mnetary rewards; there was almst n mentin f religius r natinalistic mtivatin. Syria has repeatedly and emphatically denied that it supprts r harbrs any persns invlved in the insurgency in Iraq. After mnths f American pressure and accusatins, hwever, Syrian authrities delivered a grup suspected f supprting the insurgency frm Syria t Iraqi fficials in February Amng the captives handed ver was Sabawi Ibrahim Hassan, Saddam Hussein s half-brther and a leading financier fr the insurgency. Syria s Freign Minister, Faruk al-sharaa, stated that Syria was ding all that it culd but that it needed equipment tailred t plicing the brders, such as night visin gggles. 832 There have als been reprts that Zarqawi btains mst f his new yung vlunteers thrugh Syria, and that they are recruited and transited in ways that have t be knwn t Syrian intelligence. There have als been media reprts that Zarqawi s tp lieutenants, and perhaps Zarqawi himself, have met in Syria fr planning sessins. 833 These reprts were called int questin by US intelligence assessments in June US fficials and cmmanders, as well as Iraqi fficials, acknwledge that Syria has made sme effrts t imprve its brder security and reduce infiltratin. In summer 2005, Syrian security frces fught suspected militants, pssibly frmer bdyguards f Saddam Hussein, fr tw days near Qassiun Muntain, and a sweep f the brder area with Lebann led t the arrest f sme 34 suspected militants. In a high prfile case, Syria arrested a man and his brther's wife wh they accused f facilitating militants passage int Iraq. The wman admitted n Al Arabiya satellite televisin that the brthers had crssed int Iraq t jin Saddam s Fedayeen prir t the Calitin invasin. 834 US Central Cmmand directr f intelligence, Brigadier General Jhn Custer acknwledged in July 2005 the mves that Syria had made as well as the prblems in patrlling the brder. Custer stated that Syria had blstered the frces alng the eastern brder with units relcated frm Lebann. In cmments that seemed t cntradict what ther intelligence fficials had said, Custer stated: 835 I think Syria is intent n assisting the US in Iraq...[I have] n infrmatin, intelligence r anything credible [that Syria] is invlved r facilitating in any way [the flw f insurgents int Iraq]... Culd they d mre? Yes. Are they ding mre? Yes. They are wrking very hard. As trps have been pulled ut f Lebann, we ve seen sme f thse trps g t the brder. I am cnvinced that they are nt nly ding it alng the brder but are arresting peple as they transit. The British military attaché in Damascus, Clnel Julian Lyne-Pirkis, inspected the Syrian effrts at the brder and agreed with Custer s assessment. Custer suggested that the security envirnment n the brder was a cmbinatin f a traditin f lawlessness and lack f Syrian ability t plice the area, creating a greater impressin f Syrian cmplicity than there actually was. He stated, It s nt a questin f intent it s simply capacity and capability. Yu ve gt a 600-kilmeter brder there, sme f the tughest desert, and yu have a thusand-year-ld

269 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 237 culture f smuggling. Smuggling men nw is n different than smuggling men a 1,000 years ag. It s all a smuggling ecnmy. 836 Syria faces prblems because its brder frces are relatively weak, they lack training and equipment, and much f the brder is nly demarcated by an earthen beam. At the same time, they feel Syria deliberately turns a blind eye twards many peratins, and the large number f Islamist extremist vlunteers crssing the brder. Cash curiers bring unknwn sums f cash acrss the brder. Because Iraq s frmal financial system is still maturing, and because prus brders allw fr the easy transfer f mney carried acrss by human mules, this is an effective and preferred methd fr financing the insurgency frm abrad. Syria is a particular cncern in this regard, as identified by Daniel L. Glaser. Thrugh varius sanctins prgrams, the Treasury Department has targeted Syrian individuals, entities, and fficials fr a range f issues, including harbring assets f the frmer Iraqi regime, interfering in Lebann, inadequately plicing the flw f cash acrss its brders, and failing t implement mney laundering and terrrist financing cntrls. 837 There have been cnflicting reprts ver the extent f the financial ties between Syria and the insurgency in Iraq and the degree f Syrian gvernment cmplicity. An Iraqi fficial claimed that Syria had agreed t turn ver 3 billin dllars f mney that riginated with Hussein r his supprters. President Assad hwever reduced this number significantly t 200 millin. In 2004, The U.S. asserted that the state cntrlled Cmmercial Bank f Syria was laundering mney n behalf f insurgent grups in Iraq. Anther reprt suggests that effrts t stp the flw f mney frm Syria t Iraq have nly accumulated ne billin, and that much mre is slipping by undetected. 838 Sme analysts have suggested that the regime in Damascus may view the insurgency in Iraq as a means t exprt their wn Islamist extremists wh might therwise take aim at Assad s secular regime (led by an Alawite minrity). Hwever, such a view, analysts say, is extremely nearsighted as it is quite pssible that extremists in Iraq culd crss back int Syria, bringing practical guerilla warfare experience with them much like the Mujahedeen wh fught in the Afghan war brught back t their cuntries f rigin. Such hardened and trained militants culd then pse a very serius threat t the ruling regime. As ne cmmentatr stated, They [militants and Syria] may have slept in the same bed t fight the Americans, but what s imprtant fr al Qa'ida is that it has entered the bedrm [Syria] and secured a fthld there. 839 Indeed, such views were supprted by classified CIA and US State Department studies in summer Analysts referred t the return f experienced and trained militants t their cuntry f rigin r third party cuntry as bleed ut r terrrist dispersal. 840 The studies sught t cmpare the returning Mujahedeen frm Afghanistan t thse wh fught in Iraq. Like Syria, thse cuntries culd be threatened by the fighters wh return with advanced warfare skills. 841 A Marine Crps spkesman pinted ut that if nthing else, certain techniques such as the use f IEDs had already been transferred frm Iraq t cmbat znes like Afghanistan. Experts, hwever, pint t the fact that while the Afghan war attracted thusands f freign fighters, Iraq has yet t d s, meaning that the ptential number f returning veterans wuld be much less. 842 Saudi Interir Minister Prince Nayef eched the cnclusins f the CIA and State Department studies, pinting ut that many f the terrrists that perated in Saudi frm May 2003 n were either veterans f the Sviet cnflict in Afghanistan, r had trained in the camps that perated until Operatin Enduring Freedm eliminated them. Nayef and ther Saudi fficials believe that the Saudis that return frm the cnflict in Iraq will have skills that are even mre lethal than

270 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 238 thse exhibited by the Afghan war veterans. Nayef stated, We expect the wrst frm thse wh went t Iraq. They will be wrse, and we will be ready fr them. 843 In a speech befre the UN Security Cuncil in May 2005, Iraqi Freign Minister Hshyar Zebari asked that Iraq s neighbring states d mre t prevent terrrists frm crssing int Iraq. Syria figured prminently in his speech, in which he acknwledged the effrts by the gvernment but implred the regime t make greater effrts. Zebari stated, We have learned recently that Syria has stpped mre than a thusand freign fighters frm entering Iraq frm Syria. We welcme this actin but nte that it cnfirms ur lng-held view that Syria has been ne f the main transit rutes fr freign terrrists as well as fr remnants f the previus regime. 844 Reprtedly, anther Iraqi fficial handed a list ver t the Syrians that cntained the names, addresses, and specific rles in planning attacks in Iraq f individuals living in Damascus. Accrding t the Iraqi fficial, the Syrians ignred the list. 845 One senir US intelligence fficial eched the freign minister, stating, There s n questin that Syrian territry plays a significant rle with regard t hw utside figures [mve] int the insurgency in Iraq. The prblems with the regime are a mixture f willingness and capability. 846 In January f 2006, an AH-64 Apache was dwned by a surface-t-air missile sht by an insurgent grup led by Abu Ayman. The grup reprtedly had ties t Syrian intelligence and its ranks were cmpsed at least partly by Syrian fighters. 847 Althugh it is unknwn if the SAM riginated in Syria r Iraq, in the years befre Operatin Iraqi Freedm U.S. intelligence indicated that Syria had becme an entry pint fr eastern Eurpean military equipment, such as anti-aircraft weapns and surface-t-air-missiles, n its way t Iraq. 848 A Washingtn Pst article that ran in early summer 2005 featured an interview with a prclaimed insurgent sympathizer/rganizer within Syria. The man, Abu Ibrahim, made several claims abut the insurgency and its relatin t Syria. He dubbed Syria a hub fr rganizing insurgents, and claimed that when the US pressured the Syrian gvernment in late 2004, Syrian agents tk men like him int custdy nly t be released several days later. 849 He penly admitted t ferrying men, weapns, and mney int Iraq, as well as pssibly fighting n ne ccasin, and stated that Syrian agents rutinely tailed him but that they did nt interfere with his activities. Ibrahim stated that in the early days f the war, Syrian brder guards waved buslads f wuld-be insurgents thrugh checkpints and int Iraq. 850 He claimed that he had seen a rise in the number f Saudis cming t Syria t be transprted t Iraq t jin the insurgency. Purprtedly, Ibrahim and thers were inspired by a radical Syrian preacher named Abu Qaqaa. When he asked a sheik why the Syrian gvernment had nt arrested them fr their activities, He wuld tell us it was because we weren t saying anything against the gvernment, that we were fcusing n the cmmn enemy, America and Israel, that beards and epaulets were in ne trench tgether. 851 Thugh it may be impssible t verify Abu Ibrahim s claims, they d nt appear t differ greatly frm the public statements and assessments f the US military and intelligence cmmunity. Iraq s Interir Minister, Bayan Jabr, repeated the prime minister s call t neighbring cuntries in July Jabr met with the interir ministers frm Syria, Jrdan, Kuwait, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, and reiterated that the Iraqi gvernment wanted the neighbring cuntries t d mre t staunch the flw f weapns and insurgents int Iraq. 852 The ministers released a cmmuniqué that cndemned the murder f Egypt s ambassadr, pledged t prevent terrrists frm using their territries as bases and recruitment centers fr terrrists, and called fr the rapid exchange f infrmatin n terrr suspects and their mvements. Jabr, cmmenting

271 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 239 befre meeting with the ministers, stated, I will say clearly in my speech abut the cuntries maybe withut names but they knw themselves the cuntries wh supprt directly r indirectly the insurgents. I will talk t these cuntries t stp these activities and t cut shrt these terrrists. 853 In July 2005, the US Treasury Department annunced that infrmatin btained frm Saddam Hussein s half brther and frmer advisr, Sabawi Ibrahim al-hasan al-tikriti, (wh had been captured in a raid in Tikrit fur mnths earlier) indicated that the Tikriti family was respnsible fr supplying mney, arms, explsives and ther supprt t the insurgents in Iraq frm bases in Syria. Shrtly thereafter, the US Treasury Department annunced it was blcking the assets f six f Saddam Hussein's nephews, all sns f al-tikriti. 854 Stuart Levey, the US Treasury s Under Secretary fr Terrrism and Financial Intelligence stated, This actin targets the mney flws f frmer regime elements actively supprting attacks against Calitin frces and the Iraqi peple. 855 Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary Danier Glaser asserted that cash curiers frm the regin, Syria in particular, were the primary methd fr funnelling mney t insurgents. He stated that large sums belnging t frmer Iraqi fficials wh are nw in Syria, r wh are nw cntrlled by Syria, are respnsible fr much f the financing. 856 A number f al-tikriti s sns have been particularly active in financing the Iraqi insurgency. One sn, Ayman Sabawi was captured in Tikrit in May. In late September Iraqi authrities annunced he had been sentenced t life in prisn fr his rle in funding the Iraqi insurgency and fr bmb making. Iraqi authrities had nt annunced the trial had begun and the verdict, the first against a family member f Saddam Hussein, tk many by surprise. 857 Tareq Khalaf Mizal, an Iraqi militant arrested alngside Sabawi was sentenced t six years in prisn fr his rle. Having allegedly cnfessed t ther crimes while in detentin, Sabawi is due t stand trial again in Nvember. A secnd sn, Yasir Sabawi Ibrahim was arrested by Iraqi security fficials in Baghdad n Octber 19, In a surprise twist, Damascus had pushed Sabawi ut f Syria nly a few days befre. Althugh Syrian authrities did nt hand Sabawi ver t Iraqi authrities, they prmptly infrmed US authrities abut his presence in Baghdad. US fficials passed the infrmatin nt the Iraqi Defense Ministry whse security frces then carried ut the raid n Sabawi s apartment. Believed t be secnd-in-cmmand f the Iraqi-led insurgency (behind Yunis al-ahmad), Yasir is accused f using mney frm the Ba ath Party in Syria, Jrdan and Yemen t fund the insurgency in Iraq. 858 A third sn, Omar, is suspected f being behind several attacks against US frces in Msul. 859 Despite Damascus rle in the capture f Yasir (largely seen as a gdwill gesture twards Washingtn at a time f increased tensins between the tw cuntries), a number f frmer Ba'ath Party leaders, including al-ahmad, are believed t still be in Syria. But the capture f yet anther nephew f the frmer Iraqi dictatr cnfirmed the strng ties between members f the frmer President s family and the Iraqi insurgency. US fficials cmmented that as f summer 2005, sme intelligence shwed that Syrians were prviding weapns, training, mney, and perhaps even barracks-like husing fr vlunteers wh had made their way frm Yemen, Mrcc, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Furthermre, the intelligence indicated that the makeshift staging areas fr militants preparing t crss the brder int Iraq had becme mre cmplex. 860 A series f Financial Times interviews with wuld-be militants and their families in summer 2005 revealed the extent t which Syria might be aiding the insurgency. A mther f ne fighter stated, yu g t a msque t make initial cntact.

272 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 240 Then yu are sent t a private hme and frm there fr a week s intensive training inside Syria. 861 The militants wh were interviewed claimed that they were trained in remte Syrian territry, clse t the Iraqi brder, with a fcus n hw t use Kalashnikvs, RPGs, and remte detnatrs. The fighters claimed that sme attacks were even planned frm Syrian territry. 862 Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari and Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice bth made it clear in mid-2005 that they felt that Syria cntinued t allw bth Iraqi Ba athist and Islamist extremist elements t perate inside Syria and acrss the Syrian-Iraqi brder. 863 US Lt. Gen. Jhn Vines estimated in summer 2005 that abut 150 fighters crssed int Iraq frm Syria each mnth. 864 This presented prblems fr bth Iraqi and Calitin frces because Iraq had cmparatively few brder psts, many f which were islated and had been attacked, destryed, r abandned. 865 A majr effrt was underway t rebuild them and strengthen the Iraqi brder frces, but it has made limited prgress, and the mrale and effectiveness f these brder frces is ften still lw. Washingtn s warnings t Damascus ver brder security intensified during the fall f On Octber 7, Syrian President Bashar Assad tld the pan-arab newspaper Al Hayat: They (Americans) have n patrls at the brder, nt a single American r Iraqi n their side f the brder We cannt cntrl the brder frm ne side. 866 Assad s cmments came a day after President Bush and Prime Minister Blair bth issued renewed warnings against cntinued Syrian and Iranian invlvement in Iraqi affairs, specifically their rles in giving shelter t Islamic extremists. A senir US fficial als suggested that the war might have spread beynd Iraq s brders, telling the Financial Times We are cncerned that Syria is allwing its territry t be part f the Iraqi battlefield. That s a chice the Syrians made. We think that is an unwise chice. 867 In his interview with Al Hayat, Assad said the absence f security alng the brder was hurting Syria and maintained cntrlling it will help Syria because the chas in Iraq affects us. Assad said his cuntry had arrested mre than 1,300 infiltratrs frm Iraq since the war began. 868 The fllwing day, Assistant Secretary f State David Welch respnded by saying the US was ask[ing] the Syrian gvernment nt t interfere in such matters. Welch went n t say, It appears that they are nt listening and it seems this behavir is nt changing. 869 The rhetrical exchanges, hwever, did nt prevent the Syrian Airlines Cmpany frm flying its inaugural pst- Saddam era flight between Damascus and Baghdad n Octber 11. It was the first regular flight t perate between the tw capitals in a quarter f a century. 870 On September 12, 2005, in a State Department briefing, US Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilizad said that Syria was the number ne ffender in the Middle East wrking t impede the success f Iraq. Khalilizad said Syria was knwingly allwing terrrists t use its territry fr training exercises and permitting them t transit acrss Syria int Iraq and kill Iraqis. 871 This fllwed the September 10, 2005 annuncement by Iraqi Interir Minister Bayan Jabr that Iraq wuld clse its brder with Syria at the Rabiah crssing pint near the city f Msul, beginning the fllwing day. The brder area arund Huasaybah (Qusaybah) in Iraq has been a center fr smuggling and criminal activity. Tw Muslim tribes in the area the Mahalwis and Salmanis have lng cntrlled illegal trade acrss the brder and seem t permit insurgent activity with at least Syrian tlerance. The Iraqi gvernment als prved unable t secure the area. A 400 man Iraqi unit sent in t try t secure Huasaybah in March 2000 virtually cllapsed and was frced t hide ut in a lcal phsphate plant. 872

273 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 241 The rute alng the Euphrates frm Hit and Haditha t Ubaydi, Qaim, Kirbilah, Qusaybah, and Abu Kamal in Syria has been a center and partial sanctuary fr insurgent frces and a cnduit fr vlunteers and supplies cming in frm Syria. By the spring f 2005 it became a lcatin fr sme f the insurgents wh fled frm the fighting in Ramadi and Fallujah t regrup, prmpting the US Marine Crps t launch its largest ffensive since Fallujah against insurgent frces in the area. During the peratins, US frces smetimes met stiff resistance frm bth Iraqi Sunni insurgents and Sunni Islamic extremist grups. 873 At the same time, the insurgents d nt need majr shipments f arms. Virtually anyne can g in and ut, mving mney and small critical supplies, and vlunteers can simply enter as rdinary visitrs withut equipment. US Custms and Brder Prtectin fficers are wrking t train their Iraqi cunterparts and have had mderate success in detaining ptential insurgents and arms suppliers, and in breaking up smuggling rings. Anther US CBP team f fficers and brder agents was deplyed in Iraq n February 1, 2005, t assist further in the training f Iraqis. This may help, but Iraq s brder security frces have s far been sme f its mst ineffective units. Many f its new frts are abandned, and ther units that have remained exhibit minimal activity. Yet, even if Iraq s brder frces were ready and its neighbrs actively helped, brder security wuld still be a prblem, in part because they are ften vast, uninhabited areas. This illustrates a general prblem fr bth Iraq and its neighbrs. Iraq s brders ttal 3,650 kilmeters in length. Its brder with Iran is 1,458 kilmeters, with Jrdan 181 kilmeters, with Kuwait 240 kilmeters, with Saudi Arabia 814 kilmeters, with Syria 605 kilmeters, and with Turkey 352 kilmeters. Mst f these brders are desert, deslate territry, easily navigable water barriers, r muntains. Even Iraq s small 58-kilmeter castline is in an area with cnsiderable small craft and shipping traffic, which presents security prblems. Syria has an Alawite-led regime that is mre Shi ite than Sunni, and while it sees its supprt f Sunni insurgents as a way f weakening the ptential threat frm a US presence in Syria, it als maintains ties t Shi ite factins as well. While it may tlerate and encurage frmer Iraqi Ba athist peratins in Syria, and transit by Islamist extremists, Syria als maintains ties t elements f frmerly Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi ite grups like the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq (SCIRI), Al-Da'wa and Al-Da'wa - Tanzim al-iraq that it first develped during the Iran-Iraq War. Syria s crack dwn n fighters passing int Iraq thrugh its brders, an effrt praised by US military fficials, was likely the result f brader natinal security interests and cncerns abut regime stability. 874 Indeed, despite speculatin that the Syrian gvernment was n the brink f refrm, indicatins in early 2006 suggested quite the ppsite. Far frm pening the Ba ath dminated rule t a multiparty system, Syria implemented new ppressive measures against plitical ppnents and sught methds t cpt religius elements f sciety. Fearing the gathering mmentum f Islamic plitical parties such as Hamas and the Muslim Brtherhd each f whm had electral victries in Palestine and Egypt respectively the Ba ath party f Syria attempted t head-ff similar challenges in its state by allwing religius figures a greater rle in gvernment and giving them a freer hand t cnduct their business amng their fllwers s lng as it des nt attempt t rival the Syrian gvernment. 875 The Prblem f Iran The rle Iran plays in the Iraqi insurgency is highly cntrversial. Citing Iranian surces, a Time Magazine article stated that the Supreme Natinal Security Cuncil f Iran cncluded in

274 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 242 September 2002, befre the U.S. invasin, that It is necessary t adpt an active plicy in rder t prevent lng-term and shrt-term dangers t Iran. 876 Iran certainly has active ties t several key Shi ite plitical parties. These include key elements in the Shi ite-based United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) that emerged as Iraq's mst imprtant plitical calitin in the January and December 2005 electins: the Supreme Cuncil fr the Islamic Revlutin in Iraq (SCIRI), Al-Da'wa and Al-Da'wa - Tanzim al-iraq. The Revlutinary Guard and Iranian intelligence have been active in suthern Iraq, as well as ther areas, since the early 1980s. They almst certainly have a netwrk f active agents in Iraq at present. There are als sme indicatins that Lebanese Hezbllah has established a presence in Iraq. 877 Prime Minister Allawi repeatedly expressed his cncern ver Iran s actins during 2004 and early 2005, as did ther senir fficials in the Interim Iraqi Gvernment wh see Iran as a direct and immediate threat. Iraqi interim Defense Minister Hazem Sha'alan claimed in July 2004 that Iran remained his cuntry's "first enemy, supprting "terrrism and bringing enemies int Iraq I've seen clear interference in Iraqi issues by Iran Iran interferes in rder t kill demcracy. A few mnths later Sha'alan -- a secular Shi ite wh is ne f Iran's mst utspken critics in Iraq -- added that the Iranians "are fighting us because we want t build freedm and demcracy, and they want t build an Islamic dictatrship and have turbaned clerics t rule in Iraq. 878 Sha'alan made several pints in a briefing n September 22, 2004: Iranian interventin and supprt f Sadr pse majr threats; and sme infiltratin has taken place acrss the Syria brder. Iran is behind Sadr. It uses Iranian pilgrims and sends arms, mney, and drugs acrss the brder. Iraq must have strng brder defence frces. If drs and windws are empty, n amunt f cleaning will ever get rid f the dust. In a study f Iran's rle in Iraq, the Internatinal Crisis Grup nted that an Iranian cleric and clse assciate f Ayatllah Sistani warned in Nvember 2004 that: "Iran's plicy in Iraq is 100 per cent wrng. In trying t keep the Americans busy they have furthered the suffering f rdinary Iraqis We are nt asking them t help the Americans, but what they are ding is nt in the interests f the Iraqi peple; it is making things wrse. We [Iranians] have lst the trust f the Iraqi peple [Mardm-e Aragh az dast dadeem]. 879 In cntrast, King Abdullah f Jrdan has made a wide range f charges abut Iranian interference in Iraq and went s far as t charge during the perid befre the Iraqi electin that Iran was attempting t rig Iraq s electin with up t 1,000,000 false registratins. He has since talked abut the risk f an Iraqi-Syrian-Lebanese Shi ite "axis" r "crescent." In an extrardinary interview aired n Iraqi TV n January 14, 2005, Muayed Al-Nasseri, cmmander f Saddam Hussein s Army f Muhammad, claimed that his grup regularly received arms and mney frm bth Syria and Iran. Many factins f the resistance are receiving aid frm the neighbring cuntries, he said. We gt aid primarily frm Iran. 880 On Octber 13, the Iraqi Interir Ministry annunced that Iraqi security frces had arrested 10 Iranian infiltratrs trying t enter the cuntry illegally. A ttal f 88 suspected insurgents were arrested in the raid, including ne Smali citizen. Iraqi security frces als seized a number f weapns and ammunitin caches. 881 In a similar incident in July 2005, Iraqi brder guards exchanged fire with gunmen crssing int Iraq frm Iran. The Iraqi security frces als

275 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 243 uncvered a cache f explsives, timers and detnatrs. 882 Such incidents, in additin t grwing allegatins f Iranian invlvement by Baghdad and Washingtn, suggest that Iran may have mved frm having the ability t create unrest and vilence in Iraq t actively supprting insurgents. Accrding t what several newspapers claim are classified intelligence reprts, British intelligence fficials suspect insurgents led by Abu Mustafa al-sheibani are respnsible fr the deaths f at least 11 British sldiers in suthern Iraq. 883 An investigatin f Iranian invlvement in Iraq in August f 2005 by Time Magazine identified al-sheibani as the leader f the insurgency in the suth. Accrding t the magazine, the IRGC had been instrumental in creating the al-sheibani grup and prviding it with weapns and training. US intelligence fficials als believe the grup, estimated t number almst 300 militants, is respnsible fr at least 37 bmbs against US trps in 2005 alne. 884 British fficials accused a secnd Tehran-backed militia grup, the Mujahedeen fr Islamic Revlutin in Iraq (MIRI), f having killed six British Ryal Military Plice in Majar el-kabir in In early Octber 2005, the British gvernment publicly blamed Iran fr the deaths f eight British sldiers in suthern Iraq. Althugh British fficials had cmplained t Tehran abut nging arms smuggling acrss the prus Iran-Iraq brder earlier in the year, this marked the first time Lndn fficially implicated Tehran in the deaths f Calitin trps. British fficials accused Iran s Revlutinary Guard f supplying advanced technlgy- shaped charges capable f penetrating even the tughest armr t insurgents in Iraq, and f trying t further destabilize the cuntry. 886 Eching British accusatins, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated that sme weapns fund in Iraq have clearly [and] unambiguusly riginated frm Iran. 887 The Lndn Times in September 2005 identified at least a dzen active Islamic grups with ties t Tehran. Eight were singled ut as having cnsiderable crss-brder influence: 888 Badr Brigades: A Shi ite militia frce f 12,000 trained by Iran s Revlutinary Guards and blamed fr a number f killings f Sunni Muslims. They are thught t cntrl several cities in suthern Iraq. Islamic Dawaa Party: A Shi ite party that has strng links t Iran. Its leader, Ibrahim al-jaafari, the present Prime Minister, has vwed t imprve ties between the tw neighburs. Mahdi Army: Received arms and vlunteers frm Iran during its battle against US and British trps last year. The grup s cmmander in Basra, Ahmed al-fartusi, was arrested by British frces in mid-september Mujahideen fr Islamic Revlutin in Iraq: A Tehran-backed militia blamed fr the murder f six British Ryal Military Plice sldiers in Majar el-kabir in Thar Allah (Vengeance f Gd): An Iranian-backed terrr grup blamed fr killing frmer members f the ruling Ba'ath party and enfrcing strict Islamic law. Jamaat al-fudalah (Grup f the Virtuus): A Paramilitary grup that impses Islamic rules n Shi areas and has attacked shps selling alchl and music. Al-Fadilah (Mrality): A Secret plitical mvement financed by Iran. It is thught t have many members amng prvincial fficials. Al-Quawaid al-islamiya (Islamic Bases): An Iranian-backed Islamic mvement that uses frce t impse Islamic law. A number f experts believe that Tehran-backed militias have infiltrated Iraqi security frces. In September 2005, Iraq s Natinal Security Adviser, Muwafak al-rubaie, admitted that

276 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 244 insurgents had penetrated Iraqi plice frces in many parts f the cuntry, but refused t speculate abut the extent f the infiltratin. 889 Sme reprts suggest that between 70 and 90 percent f Basra s plice frce has been infiltrated by religius and plitical factins. The Mahdi Army in particular, is believed t have almst de fact cntrl ver the plice. Nt surprisingly, crruptin and vilence is n the rise within the frce. Mre than 1,300 murders were dcumented in Basra during the first nine mnths f 2005, many f them allegedly by men in plice unifrm. 890 A secnd Tehran-backed grup, the Badr Brigades, cntrlled the city s bureau f internal affairs up until Spring All in a city nt cnsidered an al-sadr strnghld, an individual frequently assciated with these grups. There are als reprts f Iranian backed-grups exerting influence ver the lives f everyday Iraqis. Achieving a gvernment jb in Basra tday is almst impssible withut the spnsrship f ne f these grups. Teaching psts in lcal schls and universities are increasingly filled nly by thse deemed idelgically lyal t Iran. 892 Iranian gds fld lcal markets and Farsi is becming the area s secnd language. 893 The increasing frequency f such reprts in the summer and fall f 2005 led sme US and British fficials t cnclude that Iran was backing the insurgency in suthern Iraq. The exact level f Iranian influence ver the Iraqi insurgency is still unknwn hwever. Whether the Tehran regime, r elements f it, is encuraging r merely allwing attacks against Calitin trps statined in suthern Iraq is unclear. It shuld be nted, hwever, that Iran has repeatedly denied these charges. Sme American experts are mre cncerned with the ptential rle Iran culd play in any Iraqi civil cnflict, r its influence ver a Shi ite plitical majrity in ffice, than with direct Iranian supprt f a Shi ite insurgency. As General Gerge Casey put it, I dn t see substantial Iranian influence n this particular gvernment that will be elected in January. I see Iran as mre f a lnger-term threat t Iraqi security a lng-term threat t stability in Iraq. If yu lk n the ther side, I think Syria is a shrt-term threat, because f the supprt they prvide t Ba athist leaders perating inside and utside f Iraq. 894 The nature f Iranian invlvement in Iraqi plitics is multifaceted. Many f the Iraqi exile grups and militia members that lived in Iran befre the fall f Saddam Hussein were never particularly grateful t Iran during the time they had t remain in exile and are nt pr-iranian nw. The Ayatllah Sistani, Iraq's pre-eminent Shi'ite religius leader -- as well as virtually all f the influential Iraqi clergy except Sadr -- is a quietest wh ppses the idea that religius figures shuld play a direct rle in plitics. Mrever, the Grand Ayatllah Sistani has rejected the religius legitimacy f a velayat-e faqih r supreme religius leader like Iran's Khameni. The majr Iraqi Shi'ite parties that did perate in Iran befre Saddam's fall did endrse the idea f a velayat-e faqih while they were dependent n Iran, but have since taken the psitin that Iraq shuld nt be a thecratic state, much less under the cntrl f an Ayatllah-like figure. Iran s aims in Iraq may nt be t secure a religius thecracy akin t its wn, but merely t assure a Shi ite backed Baghdad gvernment friendly t Tehran. The analysis f the Internatinal Crisis Grup, and f many US experts in and utside Iraq interviewed fr this reprt d nt supprt the existence f any majr Iranian effrt t destabilize r cntrl Iraq thrugh June Hwever, the present and future uncertainties surrunding

277 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 245 Iran s rle can scarcely be ignred. Iran des seem t have tlerated an Al Qa ida presence in Iran, r at least its transit thrugh the cuntry, as a means f putting pressure n the US in spite f the rganizatin s hstility tward Shi ites. Iran may have been active in supprting grups like Al Ansar in the past, r at least turning a blind eye, and may allw crss brder infiltratin in Iraq's Kurdish regin nw. In July 2005, Kurdish intelligence fficials asserted that Ansar was based primarily in Iran and that attacks in the Kurdish areas culd nly have ccurred with Iranian supprt. Accrding t an Iraqi Kurdish reprter, the Iranian cities f Mahabad and Saqqiz are centers where Ansar recruited amng the Iranian Kurds. Such claims cannt be independently verified. Iran has nt been, and never will be, passive in dealing with Iraq. Fr example, it sent a tp-level fficial, Kamal Kharrazi, t Iraq n May 17, nly 48 hurs after Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice had left the cuntry. Kharrazi met with Prime Minister al-jaafari and Freign Minister Hshyar Zebari. He als met with ther tp fficials and key members f the Shi ite parties. His visit was at a minimum a demnstratin f Iran s influence in an Iraq gverned by a Shi ite majrity, even thugh sme key Iraqi Shi a parties like Al Dawa have scarcely been strng supprters f Iran. Kharrazi als gave an imprtant message at his press cnference, the party that will leave Iraq is the United States because it will eventually withdraw But the party that will live with the Iraqis is Iran because it is a neighbr t Iraq. 896 In summer 2005, the Iraqi and Iranian ministers f defense, Sadun Dulaimi and Adm. Ali Shamkhani, met and cncluded a five pint military agreement. The meeting, hwever, prduced cnflicting statements as t what had been agreed upn. The Iranian minister, Shamkhani, asserted that as part f the deal Iran wuld train a number f Iraqi trps. His cunterpart, Dulaimi, hwever, stated that the Iraqi gvernment was satisfied with the Calitin effrts and that Iran wuld nt be training Iraqi trps. Iran wuld, hwever, be prviding $1 billin in aide that wuld g twards recnstructin. Dulaimi cnceded that sme wuld g t the Ministry f Defense. 897 Several high level meetings between Iraqi and Iranian fficials tk place in the fall f Iraq s deputy minister, Ahmed Chalabi met with Iranian fficials in Tehran nly days befre traveling t the United States t meet with US Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice. The timing was seen by many as dd given accusatins in May 2004 by US fficials that Chalabi gave Iran classified infrmatin. 898 In mid-nvember, Iraq s Natinal Security Adviser Mwaffaq al-rubaie traveled t Tehran. While there, he signed a memrandum f understanding with the Iranian gvernment cmmitting the tw gvernments t cperate n sensitive intelligence-sharing maters, cunter-terrrism and crss-brder infiltratin f Qa ida figures. The agreement tk Washingtn by surprise: US Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad tld reprters he fund ut abut the agreement nly afterward. 899 Iraqi President Jalal Talabani traveled t Iran in late Nvember, becming the first Iraqi head f state t d s in almst fur decades. Talabani spent three days in Iran and met with bth Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatllah Ali Khamenei. Rubaie, wh accmpanied Talabani n the trip, tld reprters he asked the Iranians t use their influence with Damascus t secure Syrian cperatin in sealing ff the Iraqi brder t insurgents. 900 In their meeting, Khamenei tld Talabani that freign trps were t blame fr the nging vilence and

278 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 246 urged the Iraqi president t tell the ccupiers t g: The presence f freign trps is damaging fr the Iraqis, and the Iraqi gvernment shuld ask fr their departure by prpsing a timetable the US and Britain will eventually have t leave Iraq with a bitter experience. 901 Accrding t Talabani, Khamenei prmised t supprt the Iraqi president s effrts t end the insurgency. With regard t Iraq, Khamenei tld the fficial IRNA news agency: Yur security is ur wn security and Iran hnrs Iraq s independence and pwer We will extend assistance t yu in thse fields. But Khamenei made a pint f denying any respnsibility fr the vilence next dr, saying: Iran cnsiders the United States t be respnsible fr all crimes and terrrist acts in Iraq and the suffering and misery f the Iraqi peple. 902 Anther high-prfile Iraqi visit t Tehran tk place n Nvember 27 by Vice-President Adel Abdul-Mahdi. Abdul-Mahdi met with his Iranian cunterpart, Vice President fr Executive Affairs Ali Saeedlu t discuss the implementatin f accrds reached earlier in the mnth. Tgether, these visits seemed t mark a sign f imprving relatins between the tw cuntries in late As mentined abve, Iran s influence in Iraq is nt just f a plitical r military nature, but ecnmic as well. In additin t Iranian gvernment aid alltted fr recnstructin, Iranian businessmen have reprtedly invested heavily in restring their neighbr s infrastructure. Nnprfit grups headquartered in Iran als helped t prvide basic services t Iraqi s during the chas that fllwed the tppling f Saddam and disslutin f the Baathist gvernment. One NGO established in Tehran with ties t the Iranian gvernment, Recnstructin f the Hly Shrines f Iraq, claims that it has cmpleted mre than 300 cnstructin, cultural and religius prjects in the cuntry. Anther grup, the Organizatin f Ahl-ul-Bait, whse leadership is cmprised f Iranian mullahs, has sent ambulances, dctrs and teachers int Iraq. 903 New cmplaints regarding Iranian interference in Iraq were leveled again in March by Secretary Rumsfeld, wh accused Iran f deplying its Revlutinary Guard t Iraq. He said that Iran was putting peple int Iraq t d things that are harmful t the future f Iraq, and that it was smething that Tehran wuld lk back n as having been an errr in judgment. 904 That same mnth, President Bush asserted that Tehran has been respnsible fr at least sme f the increasing lethality f anti-calitin attacks by prviding Shi a militia with the capabilities t build imprvised explsive devices in Iraq. 905 U.S. Ambassadr t Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad made similar allegatins. He accused Iran f publicly supprting Iraq s plitical prcess while it clandestinely trained and aided Shi ite militia grups as well as Sunni insurgent rganizatins such as Ansar al-sunna. He stated that, Our judgment is that training and supplying, direct r indirect, takes place, and that there is als prvisin f financial resurces t peple, t militias, and that there is a presence f peple assciated with the Revlutinary Guard and with MOIS. 906 Khalilzad cmments came as the U.S. and Iran annunced that they had agreed t hld direct talks fr the first time n hw t reduce the vilence in Iraq. These talks, scheduled t take place in Iraq, were at the request f SCIRI leader, Abdul al-hakim, wh had slicited Iranian assistance in the past. Ambassadr Khalilzad, wh had als reached ut t Tehran s leaders, was t receive the Iranian negtiatrs when they arrived. 907

279 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 247 Bth sides came t the talks with minimal expectatins. In additin, U.S. fficials remained adamant that the discussins wuld be narrwly fcused n Iraqi security issues and wuld nt include the Iranian nuclear prgram. In statements leading up t the talks, it appeared Tehran saw them as an pprtunity t change Washingtn s behavir, while the U.S. indicated that Iran s desire t meet was an indicatin that it was realizing that its defiant psture was nt wrking. Iran s chief nuclear negtiatr, Ali Larijani, made the annuncement t the Iranian parliament saying I think Iraq is a gd testing grund fr America t take a hard lk at the way it acts If there s a determinatin in America t take that hard lk, then we re prepared t help. He went n t indicate that Iran was willing t help the U.S. in Iraq, but nly under the cnditin that the United States shuld respect the vte f the peple. Their Army must nt prvke frm behind the scenes. 908 Yet U.S. fficials such as Secretary f State Cndleezza Rice emphasized that the negtiatins wuld nly fcus n Iraq. Natinal Security Advisr Stephen Hadley added ptimistically, hwever, that Iran was finally beginning t listen. 909 The annuncement f these negtiatins drew a strng cndemnatin frm The Iraqi Cnsensus Frnt, Iraq s dminant Sunni plitical party. In a statement it called the negtiatins an bvius unjustified interference, and added It s nt up t the American ambassadr t talk t Iran abut Iraq. 910 Iran faces a dilemma. It benefits frm US supprt fr Iraq t help it deal with the insurgency and prvide ecnmic aid. Yet, it fears being "encircled" by the US presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf. Iranian fficials have threatened t destabilize Iraq if the US brings military pressure against Iran because f its alleged nuclear weapns prgram. A split in Iraq's gvernment culd lead sme Shi'ite factins t actively turn t Iran fr supprt, and the divisins in Iran's gvernment create the nging risk that hard-line elements might intervene in Iraq even if its gvernment did nt fully supprt such actin. In early 2006, hwever, these seemed t be risks rather than realities. The Prblem f Turkey The Kurdish issue in Nrthern Iraq has tw majr implicatins fr Turkey. First, Ankara is cncerned abut activities f Kurdish separatist grups in Nrthern Iraq, whse chief bjective is an independent Kurdistan in and arund Turkey. Turkey is engaging in heavy diplmacy with bth the US and Iraqi administratins t crack dwn n these rganizatins and eliminate the Kurdish rebels which were launching attacks int Turkish territry. This lng-standing cncern is the primary reasn fr the presence f Turkish intelligence and military units in Nrthern Iraq since the Gulf Operatin. Secnd, Turkey has cnsistently ppsed strng autnmy fr a Kurdish zne within Iraq, ut f the fear that it wuld create unrest and aspiratins fr independence amng Turkey's wn Kurdish ppulatin. Given the rich water supplies in the Kurdish ppulated regins f Turkey and the clssal irrigatin prject (the Sutheast Anatlian Prject) that Turkey has invested in fr ver fur decades, an autnmus Turkish Kurdistan is ut f the questin fr Turkish plicy-makers.

280 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 248 In summer 2005, Kurdish PKK rebels launched a series f attacks n Turkish frces allegedly frm bases in nrthern Iraq. In tw mnths, mre than 50 Turkish security frces were killed in attacks, mstly in the frm f planted IEDs, a weapn utilized widely by Iraqi insurgents. In July 2005, the Turkish Prime Minister threatened crss-brder actin against the rebels if the attacks did nt stp, thugh such actin is generally regarded as extremely prvcative and even illegal. Recep Tayyip Erdgan stated, hwever, that There are certain things that internatinal law allws. When necessary, ne can carry ut crss brder peratins. I hpe that such a need will nt emerge. 911 Exacerbating the debate abut crss brder peratins were the cnflicting reprts that the US, wh cnsiders the PKK a terrrist rganizatin, had rdered the Turkish military t capture the rganizatin s leaders. A member f the Turkish military claimed that the US had agreed t seize the leaders while US military spkesmen were unaware f such an agreement. The fficial US psitin seemed t be that the US ppsed any crss-brder actin as an infringement n svereignty and likely t incite further vilence between the Kurds and the varius sects ppsed t their independence r autnmy. Furthermre, the US made it clear that any discussin ver the PKK shuld center n the Iraqi gvernment. US Chairman f the Jint Chiefs f Staff Gen. Richard Myers stated, I think the difference nw is that they [Turkey] are dealing with a svereign Iraqi gvernment, and a lt f these discussins will have t ccur between Turkey and Iraq, nt between Turkey and the United States. 912 Despite the present tensin in U.S. and Turkish ties, and Turkey s relatins with Iraq, Turkey is significantly invlved in pst war recnstructin in Iraq. Turkey als ffered t assist with the training f Iraqi plice frces. The mst recent example f Turkish effrt t help the creatin f a stable and unified Iraq was the meeting held in April 2005 in Istanbul where all Iraq s neighbrs, Egypt and Bahrain cnvened t address issues related with crss brder insurgency and terrrist infiltratin. The Prblem f Jrdan Sme analysts believed that a limited number f insurgents were crssing int Iraq frm Iraq- Jrdan brder. Mst Arab Jrdanians are very much ppsed t the rise f a Shi ite dminated Iraq. While cmmentatrs fcus n the fact that Abu Musab al-zarqawi is a Jrdanian, it shuld be nted that the Jrdanian gvernment has sentenced Zarqawi t death in absentia n multiple ccasins. Thugh there may be sme Jrdanians invlved in the insurgency, Jrdan has been very cperative in its effrts t train Iraqi plice and t mnitr its brders. The Jrdanian gvernment has trained a gd number f the Iraqi security frces and is very much cncerned with extreme Islamist elements within its wn territry. King Abdullah has pledged t train ver 30,000 Iraqi military and plice within Jrdan and n January 13, 2005, the 12 th class graduated its training bringing the ttal t almst 10,000 Iraqi security frces trained in Jrdan since effrts began. 913 There have, hwever, been incidents invlving insurgents and terrrists within Jrdan s brders. In spring 2004, a plt t create a massive chemical-laced explsin ver Amman by radical Islamists was uncvered and disrupted by the Jrdanian security frces. On August 19, 2005, Katyusha rckets were fired at tw U.S. warships in Jrdan s Red Sea Aqaba prt. Nne f the rckets struck the ship. One hit a warehuse, killing a Jrdanian sldier;

281 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 249 anther explded near a Jrdanian hspital, resulting in n casualties; and the third landed utside f Eilat airprt in neighbring Israel, but failed t explde. The Iraqi branch f Al Qa ida, linked t Jrdanian Abu Masab al-zarqawi, claimed respnsibility fr the attack. Fur days later, Jrdanian fficials arrested a Syrian man, Mhammed Hassan Abdullah al-sihly, wh they accused f carrying ut the attack. Plice said three accmplices slipped acrss the brder int Iraq. 914 Jrdanian Interir Minister Awni Yirfas cnfirmed his gvernment was wrking with Iraqi authrities in rder t capture the militants. 915 In summer 2005, Jrdanian frces brke up an alleged recruitment ring in Amman. Accrding t the main defendant, Zaid Hrani, he and several ther Jrdanians crssed int Syria and barded buses in Damascus, Syria that were bund fr Iraq as the Calitin frces invaded. Hrani apparently returned hme and helped t rganize a recruitment pipeline fr Jrdanians interested in jining the insurgency in Iraq. Figuring prminently in the case was a Syrian, Abu al-janna, wh was allegedly the pint f cntact in Iraq fr the Jrdanians. Al-Janna is reprtedly a central figure in the reginal terrr netwrk. 916 A Jrdanian, Raad Mansur al-banna, is the main suspect in the suicide bmbing f a plice recruitment site in Hilla in February 2005, killing mre than On August 21, 2005, Laith Kubba, spkesman fr Prime Minister Ibrahim al-jaafari, accused Jrdan f allwing the family f Saddam Hussein t finance the insurgent campaign in Iraq in an effrt t reestablish the Ba ath Party in that cuntry. 918 As already discussed, nne f the bmbers invlved in the Nvember 9 htel bmbings in Amman were Jrdanian, but rather Iraqi natinals. It is pssible that Zarqawi drew n his wn cnnectins in Jrdan t carry ut the attacks. There are sme 400,000 Iraqis living in Jrdan, sme f whm have ties t Salafi jihadists in Iraq and might be willing t help carry ut peratins in Jrdan. Jrdanian fficials, including King Abdullah II, have refused t rule ut the pssibility that Jrdanians may have been invlved in the attacks. In the days fllwing the bmbings, Jrdanian security fficials arrested 12 suspects, mstly Jrdanians and Iraqis.

282 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 250 XI. Iraqi Views f the Threat Iraqi views f the threat can be useful indicatrs f the cuntry s status and the directin it may be heading. The U.S. cannt win the hearts and minds f Iraqis. Effective Iraqi gvernance and frces and the true key t any slutin t the insurgency and finding a slutin will depend primarily n whether Iraqi s can wrk inclusively t address issues f natinal cncern. At the same time, it is difficult t determine Iraqi attitudes and hw they view the insurgency. There is n single Iraqi view f any majr issue that affects Iraq. Iraqis disagree n details regarding almst all f the issues cvered in this analysis. Smetimes they presented very different views f hw serius they tk the threat frm Syria and Iran, hw and whether they quantified varius threat frces, and hw serius they saw given extremist, terrrist, and insurgent elements. As the plitical prcess and insurgency have cntinued, Iraqi s have als differed ver its implicatins and significance fr their lives and the future f Iraq. Iraq's View f the Threat Iraqis and the Calitin have ften judged the insurgency differently. Thrughut the cnflict Iraqi fficials have felt MNSTC-I estimates f the insurgent threat were misleading because they seemed t nly include hardcre insurgents. Sme felt that the Minister f Defense was generally crrect in including sme 200,000 sympathizers in ne guess at the threat. They agree with his statement that, It des n ne any gd t deny the insurgents have majr public supprt, particularly in Sunni areas. Our plitical prblem is much mre imprtant than ur military ne. If ne fcuses slely n the Sunni insurgency, Iraqis have seen the same fur brad grups f insurgents as the US and MNSTC-I: Zarqawi and Outside Islamist Extremist Organizatin Fighters: Cmpsed f mstly freign Arabs and frm ther cuntries. They cannt be quantified, but their numbers are small and prbably well under 1,000. The prblem is their methds f attack have great impact. Frmer Regime Elements (FRE)s: Large numbers, and a mix f true supprters f the Ba ath, alienated Sunnis, paid vlunteers, temprary recruits, and ther Iraqis. There is n way t quantify them, but sme feel it is in the 15,000 t 30,000 level depending n hw ne estimates full time ands part time fighters. Iraqi Native Islamist Extremist Organizatin Fighters: This grup is small with numbers prbably well under 500. Their methds f attack can mirrr image utside extremists and have great impact. Organized Crime: The majr surce f vilence and insecurity in at least 12 f the 18 gvernrates. Criminals ften seem t cperate with terrrists and insurgents. The seriusness and severity varies, but numbers f criminals and their incidents are very high, as is impact. Iraqis, hwever, see far mre Iraqi ppular hstility t the Calitin frces and ccupatin than many US fficials and fficers. Frm the start f Calitin ccupatin, they saw the deplyment f Iraqi frces as a critical step in winning ppular supprt fr the new gvernment, and as vital in Shi ite areas as well as Sunni. They did nt agree n hw quickly the Calitin shuld phase dwn its rle, but they have bradly agreed that the Calitin is part f the prblem and nt simply part f the slutin. Iraqis als cntinue t differ ver just hw serius the prblem f Shi ite attacks and reprisals was becming, and ver the extent t which Shi ite actins were helping t divide the cuntry alng sectarian lines. Shi ites have tended t fcus n the Sunni threat. Many Sunnis wh have supprted the interim Iraqi gvernment, r frmer fficials in it, have felt Shi ite elements f the

283 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 251 Ministry f Interir frces and the varius Shi ite and Kurdish militias were becming a serius prblem. Sme accused the Shi ite militias f atrcities against Sunnis, and bth Sunni and Shi ite Arabs accused the Kurdish leadership and Pesh Merga f supprting ethnic cleansing in the nrth, thugh the details were unclear. Iraqi Public Opinin Plls Iraqi public pinin has increasingly been divided alng ethnic and sectarian lines, but Iraqis have cnsistently had mixed feelings abut the war, the Calitin, and the insurgents. In general, Iraqis have tended t ppse the Calitin, rather than supprt the insurgents particularly Sunni Islamist extremists. Iraqi Attitudes After the Invasin The plls cnducted during the first year after the invasin generally did nt ask questins abut the insurgency. They did, hwever, prvide a cnsistent warning abut the lack f ppularity f the war and the Calitin: First pll cnducted in Iraq in August 2003 by Zgby Internatinal, revealed that just ver 50 percent f Iraqis felt that the U.S. will hurt Iraq ver the next five years and that a slightly higher number thught demcracy is a Western way f ding things and it will nt wrk here. Sme 31.6 percent felt that Calitin Frces shuld leave within six mnths; 34 percent said within ne year; and 25 percent within tw years. In additin, just fewer than 60 percent felt that Iraq shuld determine its plitical future alne and withut the help f the Calitin. 919 Sme f these findings were substantiated by a pll cnducted in May 2004 by BBC, ABC News, the German netwrk ARD and NHK in Japan. Amng these: while mre than half said that life was better a year ag under Saddam, nly 25 per cent expressed cnfidence in the US/UK ccupatin frces and 28 per cent in bth Iraq s plitical parties and the CPA. 920 USA Tday/CNN/Gallp plls published in April 2004 revealed further develpments in Iraqi perceptins f U.S. plicy, presence and peratins. Amng these was that 53 percent say they wuld feel less secure withut the Calitin in Iraq, but 57 percent say the freign trps shuld leave anyway, while 71 percent f the respndents identified Calitin trps as ccupiers. 921 In the 29 April 2004 USA Tday pll cited earlier, many Iraqis cnsidered American trps t be arrgant and insensitive: 58 percent said [Calitin Frces] sldiers cnduct themselves badly r very badly; 60 percent said the trps shw disrespect fr Iraqi peple in searches f their hmes, and 42 percent said U.S. frces have shwn disrespect tward msques; 46 percent said the sldiers shw a lack f respect fr Iraqi wmen; and 11 percent f Iraqis say Calitin Frces are trying hard t restre basic services such as electricity and clean drinking water. US/Oxfrd plls shwed 78 percent f Iraqis had n cnfidence in Calitin frces in Octber 2003 and 81 percent in June 2004 and this figure included the Kurds. While such plls, and all plls since, raised serius issues abut the adequacy f the sample, methds, and the quality f the questins asked, the results f such plls were cnsistent enugh t prvide a clear warning that nly an Iraqi gvernment and Iraqi frces wuld be perceived as legitimate, and a Calitin ccupatin might well be a preface t civil war.

284 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 252 Iraqi Attitudes in Octber 2005 Iraqi attitudes did nt change markedly during the curse f the fllwing year. Plling did, hwever, begin t ask serius questins abut the insurgency and nt simply abut attitudes twards the new Iraqi gvernment and Calitin. While many aspects f the plling remained uncertain, the Department f State fund in the fall f 2005 that Iraqis differed strikingly ver their attitudes twards the insurgency depending n whether insurgent attacks struck at Calitin frces r Iraqi civilians, The results f these plls are summarized in Figure XI.1. They shw that Iraqis did nt supprt insurgent attacks designed t prvke a civil war r attack Iraqi civilians, but differed alng sectarian and ethnic lines when it came t attacks n Calitin frces. Strikingly, many in Shi ite as well as Sunni areas apprved f insurgent attacks n Calitin frces.

285 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 253 Figure XI.1: Iraqi Perceptins f Insurgents Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Department f Defense reprt t Cngress, February 2006, p. 32. Nte: Survey was cnducted n Octber 24-27, 2005.

286 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 254 The same reprt measured Iraqi cnfidence in the Iraqi security frces by regin as f Octber and Nvember. It fcused n whether the individual plled wuld supprt r ppse himself r herself, r smene they knew jining the Army r plice frce. The results clearly shwed deep sectarian and ethnic divisins. Shi ite and Kurds generally supprted the Iraqi security frces. Many in Sunni and mixed regins shwed deep distrust. These results in Figure XI.2, and prvide a pwerful warning abut just hw imprtant making the Iraqi gvernment and Iraqi frces inclusive is in defeating the insurgency. They als prvide a warning that many Sunni Iraqis fear that the Iraqi frces d supprt the Shi ites and attacks n Sunnis, and fear that Iraqi frces might divide and becme Shi ite and Kurdish frces in an intense civil war.

287 Crdesman: Iraq s Evlving Insurgency 4/26/06 Page 255 Figure XI.2: Iraqi Supprt and Cnfidence in the Iraqi Army Surce: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Department f Defense reprt t Cngress, February 2006, p. 31.