Kovar - redirect Bernard Arthur Gattozzi. "0. By whom are you employed? Currently it is the chief of the emergency

Transcription

1 Kovar - redirect THE COURT: Mr. Boies. 2 MR. BOIES: Thank you, your Honor. 3 Good afternoon, members of the jury. 4 This is an offer of Mr. Bernard Gattozzi ' s 5 deposition. 6 "0. State your name please for the record? 7 Bernard Arthur Gattozzi. 8 "0. Are you employed? 9 ita. ita. Hr. Gattozzi? Yes, I am. "0. By whom are you employed? no. Justice department. Could you tell us what your position with the Justice Department is? Currently it is the chief of the emergency progran.s center of the secur i ty staff. "0. How long have you been in that job? Two years. "0. Did you work for the Justice Department before you were in that job? ita. Yes. "0. How long have you worked for the Justice Department? " A. About eight years now. "0. Prior to working for the Justice SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FO LE Y SQUAR E. N EW YORK. N.Y

2 Kovar. redirect R523 1 Department, who were you employed by? 2 Department of the Army. 3 "Q. And what was your job with the Department 4 of Army? 5 Well, I was a military intelligence 6 officer, generally speaking, with different assignments for 7 about eight ~nd a half years. 8 "Q. Focusing on the position you held 9 beginning in September 1967, could you describe in detail the position that you held at MACV? ita. Yes. I got in the country about September 14, '67. I was assigned to J L 2 MACV about the 6th. I was ~ ~ assigned to J-2 MACV and order of battle section of J~2 MACV son.ewhere in the director for intelligence production office, I believe. I was given the job, as I remember, initially having to do with infiltration. When I first got there, I, was given a whole bunch of studies and papers and documents to read and brush up on the general North Vietnamese Army makeup, the history of it, what had transpired to that date in the war. Later I found out pretty quick, in about a week, it was to later assign me to order of battle methodology duties with a Lieutenant Colonel F.verette Parkins as my supervisor. Basically it was to learn, I guess, a relatively new methodology of computing total SOUTHERN D ISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FO LEY SQUARE. N EW YORl<, N.Y

3 Kovar - redirect enemy strengths as devised by Colonel Park i ns. 2 "0. Would it you be fair to characterize 3 yourself as a gains and losses analyst? 4 Sure. 5 "0. Now, could you describe what fell under 6 the general category of gains? 7 Basically infiltration by the North 8 Vietnamese Army into South vietnam would be a gain... 9 Recruitment of guerrillas would be a gain. Vietcong 10 recruitment and induction would be a gain.. ll anything on 11 the plus side for the enemy. 12 "Q. So infiltration and recruitment are the 13 two bas ic... " 14 Basically, yes. 15 "0. Gains statistics? 16 Yes. 17 Ito. Could you descr i be for us what the loss 18 statisti cs would be? 19 tt A. Basically KIA, killed in action; wounded; a category that I think we called &. well, it signified the people who were not able to come back and fi~ht. They were wounded so badly that we could count them out of any future action. "Q. May I ask you whether that is the category that is referred to sometimes as 'dead of wounds'? SOUTH ERN DISTR ICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

4 Kovar ~ redirect A. Yes. They either decide or were disabled to a 2 point where they couldn't fight any more. That really 3 wasn't... as I remember it, we didn't get any real figures 4 on the that. What we would do, we applied a factor to KIA 5 to get that figure. That factor was 3 or 3.5. I forget 6 exactly what it was. It was right around in there 7 somewhere, we would add that in. 8 We would also consider POW, prisoners of war, 9 people that were captured, we would also consider hoi changs, which were people who gave up, turned themselves in, ~ ~ didn't want to fight for the north or VC any more. I think we counted them there, too. "0. Who was the i nfiltration specialist? Michael B. Hankins. no. And you worked closely with ~. what was Mr. Hankins rank at that time? We were both second lieutenants~ "0. You worked closely with Lieutenant Hankins? Yes, but not at MACV. That is why I wanted to introduce that new information. O. You have mentioned MAC V and CICV. Could you explain for us the distinction between those? " A. MACV, military.. ~ whatever MACV stood for, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, where I was first assigned in that order of battle unit. It was later moved, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

5 Kovar & redirect R526 1 or part of it was later moved, down to CICV, Combined 2 Intelligence Center, Vietnam, which was also located in 3 Saigon down the road about a mile from MACV. 4 "0. Could you tell us when you you were moved, 5 approximately? 6 " A. Approximately, some time in October, maybe 7 mid October or something like that. That is not a real 8 firm thing. 9 "0. You told us earlier that you worked Lieutenant Hankins when you were at CICV? Right, but he used to visit MACV every now and then to take a look at the methodology and some other figures and to give us figures, but we worked from the same office in CICV. "0. And that would be beginning in the middle of October? Sonlething like that. "0. Of 1967? Right. "0. When you say we had access did you have access to both collateral inteligence and all~source intelligenc? intelligence. Yes. Let's call allasource special I think that is the generice term it is given. Special intelligence, SI, would be the unclassified SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

6 Kovar; redirect term for that. 2 "0. Did Lieutenant Hankins have access to 3 both collateral inteligence and special intelligence on 4 infiltration? 5 Yes. You had to visit the estimates 6 division of MACV. It was in what in we call the tank, a 7 Secure area. B "0. Did you go to the tank? 9 Ouite often. 10 "0. How often do you go? 11 While at MACV, I would say daily, maybe 12 twice a day. 13 "0. What about after you went to CICV? Probably once every two days on the average. Some days it would be twice a day. "0. Did Lieutenant Hankins go to the tank from CICV? Yes. "0. Do you have any idea how frequently Lieutenant Hankins went to the tank? Well, for a period there we were going every day, but I would say on the average maybe about as often as I did. "0. What would the time frame be, just for clarity sake, so that we don't have to repeat it all the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

7 ~ovar & redirect time, that we are talk being about here? 2 I didn't understand. 3 "0. First, what period were you at CICV? 4 I guess it would be about mid October, '67, 5 to the end of the tour, which was about September 6, '68. 6 "0. Could you desc'ribe the situation that len 7 to your first meeting whether Colonel Morris? 8 A. After a period of time that I had been studying 9 Colonel Parkins' methodology and I guess I had been an 10 understudy of Colonel Parkins for a period of two weeks ann at that point, he, Ev, came up to me and said that we were going to visit Colonel Morris and show him what we are doing in the methodology area and in the strength figure area. I guess basically Ev brought me along to meet with Colonel Morris just to meet Colonel Morris, or for Colonel Morris to meet lieutenant that was assisting Colonel Parkins. "0. By Ev you refer to Colonel Parkins? "Q. Right. Do you have a recollection of when you your first meeting with Colonel Morris took place? It was either it first time I met with him ~& Colonel Parkins took me into his office the first time like late September, early October, maybe even earlier than that, maybe the third week in September. It was the pretty early SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

8 Kovar & redirect on in my tour. 2 "0. Could you describe what place at your 3 first meeting with Colonel Horris? 4 Generally speaking an explosion. As I 5 recall, Colonel Parkins and I went in with these long 6 ledger sheets that we tallied the strenght figures on and 7 Colonel Parkins was showing Colonel Horris the figures, 8 the methodology. I was there kind of as a looker on. To w 9 put it succinctly, Colonel Horris did not like the figures 10 that the methodology ws coming up with. He didn't like them 11 at all. 12 "0. What didn't he like about them? 13 They were too high. 14 "0. How do you know he thought they were too high? He used a word that I never heard before although I think I generally understood it. He used the word attrit. He said to Ev words to the effect that these figures do not support the assumption that we are attriting the enemy away. He did, in fact, tell us that the figures were too high. "Q. Could you be more specific about what figures you are referring to when you say the figures were too high? I guess all the of the figures ~& the main SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPOR TER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

9 Kovar & redirect force, the local force, the guerrillas, the infiltration. 2 Everything was too high. We weren't showing the trend that 3 the enemy was decreasing. The enemy was, in fact, 4 decreasing. That was what the methodology showed. 5 "Q. What did the figures which you and Colonel 6 Parkins presented to Colonel Horris show? 7 It showed at that point in history, now 8 that is, say late September, early October, it showed a 9 ~ gentle, general rise in total enemy strengths. 10 "Q. And what did it show about infiltration? 11 It showed, I would say at that point, 12 infiltration at about 10 to 12,000 a month at that point, but as we later learned, that was the beginning of something big. "Q. Exhibit 214 A purports to be a letter from Con ander James Mecham to his wife and while I believe the letter is undated I state for the record that it is o u r understanding that the letter was dated September 29, Can I ask you to read the first paragraph of that letter? "Q. Out loud. Out loud. 'A fairly interesting day today. Have a major crisis brewi ng relative to infiltration and strength figures. You will probably read about this, probably all SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAR E. NEW YORK. N.Y

10 Kovar. redirect 8531 lout of context and generally screwed up in a few days. I 2 will set you straight when they have been released'. 3 The first timing I came into confrontation, the 4 first time that I learned that there was two views of the 5 way the war was going regarding infiltration and enemy 6 strength figures, was when we walked into Charlie Morris' 7 office. I have never witnessed two people, two officers, 8 senior officers, go at it quite that heavy in disaqreement 9 over the figures. ~ That is when I came face to face with i t. 10 Now, if this is the 29th of September, obviously 11 Commander Meachant is somewhere in the area doing something 12 that he knows something about infiltration and strength. 13 He may have even been in order of battle MACV somewhere but 14 I don't have a clear &~ 15 "Q. Are you aware of anything that might be 16 called a crisis relative to infiltration strength in or " about September 29, 1967? 18 Other than this disparity of figures & 19 well, in around September of '67, the only crisis I knew 20 was, Charlie Morris didn't like our figures and, generally 21 speaking, other intelligence officers didn't like those 2 figures that we were coming up with. I guess that was the 3 crisis. I guess the crisis was && I remember the generally 4 accepted infiltration figure for that period of the war was 5 sortething like 6 to 8, 000 and we weren't coming up with 6 SOUTH ERN DIST RICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

11 Kovar a redirect to 8,000. We were coming up with, at that point in late 2 September, IIlaybe 10, 12, something like that. Maybe that 3 is the crisis. It certainly came to a head at that meeting. 4 "0. Now, you said that meeting took place when? 5 Either late September or early October. 6 "0. So, you became aware of I think you have 7 described it as a confrontation over infiltration figures 8 and enemy strength figures sometime between late September 9 and early October? 10 Yes, an explosion. I witnessed an 11 explosion between Colonel Parkins and Colonel Morris that I 12 wi 11 never forget. 13 "0. When you say 'explosion', what do you mean 14 was taking place between colonel park convince and Colonel 15 Morris? 16 "Ji.. Well, it started out gentlemanly enough. 17 We walked into Colonel Morris' office. Ev spread the 18 sheets out on able that he had there and was going over the 19 figures with him and Colonel Morris was shaking his head 20 and started to really get upset because of the higher 21 figures and said, 'this doesn't show that we are attritting 22 the enemy away'. And 'what does he think he is doing'. ' Go ~ backs and rethink this thing'. 24 And Ev would say, 'Well, it is based on hard 25 intelligence and good intelligence and the methodology is SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTH OUS E FOLEY SQUAR E. NEW YORK, N.Y. _

12 Kovar redirect sound. 2 It kind of got into a crescendo and I remember 3 that it struck me funny that P!v w.ould.. Colonel Parkins 4 would call Colonel Morris 'Charlie', which ws for a second 5 lieutenant to witness this, was quite, especially coming 6 out of school, was quite out of the ordinary because 7 Colonel Parkins was a lieutenant colonel and Charlie Morris 8 was a full colonel and lieutenant colonels don't call full ~ 9 colonels by their first name, but he kept on calling him 10 Charlie. I remember that. And I remember as the crescendo n built, poor Ev, who was bald, balding at the time, he broke 12 out in a sweat. I remember that little beads of sweat all 13 over his head because he was getting upset as was Colonel 14 Morris, because Colonel Parkins was defending his methodology and his figures and Colonel Morris wouldn't have anything to do with it, wouldn't accept it at all. "Q After your first meeting Mr. Colonel Morris, do you recall any continuing confrontation on the subject of infiltration figures particularly? With Colonel Morris or generally? "Q. Generally. As the year wore on, we, the lieutenants, generally felt that in order of battle studies, nobody wanted to hear about nor accept the f i gures that we were coming up with. SOUTHERN D ISTRICT REPO RT ER S. U.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N. Y

13 Kovar & redirect "0. Could you explain for us as concisely as 2 you can the way,infiltration figures were compiled at order 3 of battle studies? 4 Yes. Lieutenant Han~ins was the S infiltration officer, but the reason.& Han~ and I were 6 close. The reason that I ~now what his system was because 7 we used to exchange a lot of information about his figures 8 and I thin~ one time when he went on leave, he went on R 9 and R sometime, there was a big infiltration study, a crash 10 project study in infiltration that I had to take over and 11 do. 12 I remember working with his sergeants and his 13 specialists as we went through the filing system and so I 14 got to ~now his method pretty good. " Generally speaking, there were three categories 16 of NVA infiltration. There was confirmed, probable and 17 poss ible. 18 "0. What was meant by confirmed? 9 Confirmed, a figure would go in the o confirmed category if we had three separate soureces of 1 information, not three separate types of sources, but three 2 sources. For example, either three PW reports from three different PW's or a hoi chang report and a PW report and an agent report, any combination. Three i ndepennent sources. S That would go in the confirmed category. SOUTHERN D ISTRICT REPORT ERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FO LEY SQUARE. N EW YORK. N.Y

14 Kovar - redirect "0. What would go in the probable category? 2 Two independent sources. 3 "Q. And in the possible category? 4 One source, if it was reasonable. 5 "0. You said earlier that around the time of 6 your first meeting with Colonel Morris the infiltration 7 figures which you were seeing were 10 to 12,000 and I 8 assume -- is that stated monthly? 9 Yes. 10 "0. Do you have a recollection of what your 11 infiltration figures were for the month of September, three 12 months after September? 13 Let me answer it in this way. The answer 14 is no. I can't na i1 it down say by the end of December 15 what the infiltration figure looked like in September. I 16 can tell you that I remember the spread of those figures on 17 a monthly basis. 18 "0. When you say 'the spread', what are you 19 referring to? "Q. From confirmed to possible. Can you tell us what the spreao of those 22 numbers was? 23.t A. 24 "Q. 25 Generally, 15 to 35,000 a month. For what month? September, October, November, December, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE y., 1

15 Kovar - redirect January. 2 "Q. Now, when you say the spread from 3 confirmed to possible is 15 to 35,000 for the months from 4 September 1967 to January 1968 inclusive, do you mean that 5 during those months.the confirmed infiltration figure would 6 have been approximately l5,000? 7 15 to 20 was generally the confirmed 8 figure. 9 "0. And the possible figure would have been 10 what? 11 Possible, 34, 35, generally. 12 "Q. Did that infiltration rate remain fairly 13 consistent during that entire period? 14 Yes. When we looked back, what we had was a gentle rising slope from, I guess, September through December for sure. As a matter of fact, I rememher in January Hank.- we were very surprised at the December figure after the first cut. "Q. Do you recall what the December figure after the first cut was? " A. Not really, but it was pretty high. I mean, it was the highest month so far. "Q. When you say it was the highest monthaa "A I would say maybe it was, the first cut for December, who knows what it was, say 20 to 24. SOU THERN DISTR ICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

16 Kovar & redirect 8537 I "0. Is it correct to say that your initial cut 2 immediately after Septen,ber of 1967 was that the 3 infiltration in September had been 10 to 120, About that, right. 5 "0. Is that a confirmed figure or a possible? 6 Yes, that would be a low end figure. 7 "0. 10 to 12,000 confirmed at 8 Yes. 9 "Q. v.& in September was your initial cut? 10 Yes. The possible figure might go up a 11 couple of thousand. 12 "Q. Did the use of what you referred to 13 earlier as special intelligence tend to increase or 14 decrease your estimate of the infiltration rate? 15 Increase. 16 "Q. Can you explain why that would be? 17 See, with all~source intelligence, the 18 intelligence information is pretty new. You get it a lot 19 quicker than you would by collateral means. It would be 20 quick and it would be a pretty reliable piece of inforn,ation. "Q. Was the information on infiltration that you got froo, what you referred to as special intelligence" indicative of infiltration that was already indicated by collateral intelligence? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

17 Kovar & redirect MA. Some of it. Hank would go up to the tank 2 with the figures toward the end of the month and see, when 3 he was making his final tally for a month, and see what 4 all-source had picked up. He was careful though and you 5 are going to have to talk to him to get all of the 6 nitty~gritty and the details of how he did this, but I know 7 that we was careful not to double count the enemy. 8 In other words, I knew he was careful. Let put 9 it this way. If he had a PW report of a unit coming down 10 the trail that was one source. And then he went up to the 11 tank and found the same unit coming down the trail in 12 all-source you are still back to one source because we 13 weren't allowed to count that. 14 "Q. That unit, then, would have been 15 considered in what category? 16 Possible. 17 (Continued on next page) SOUTHERN D ISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _