12 A. I am. 21 Q. of :-lay? 24 intelligence at MACV? Davidson - direct ll :45 p. m. 5 THE COURT: Call the jury, please. 10 BY MR.

Transcription

1 Davidson - direct ll2 0 1 AFTERNOON SESS ION 2 1:45 p. m. 3 ( In open court; jury not present) 4 PHILLIP BURFORD DAVIDSON, Jr., resumed. 5 THE COURT: Call the jury, please. 6 (Jury present) 7 THE COURT: All rig h t. You may,noceed. 8 1-lR. BURT: Thank you, your Honor. 9 DIRECT EXA11I NATION CONTINUED 10 BY MR. BURT: 11 Q. General Davidson, are you ready, sir? 12 A. I am. 13 Q. When we broke for lunch 1 was asking questions 14 about General Davidson's move, t ransfer, to MACV, and I 15 would like to pick that up and ask a question or two that I 16 already asked, sir, just to set t he time fr~me and the 17 pl ace. 1 8 Can you tell me again, sir, when it was you wen: 19 to become chief of intelliyence at MACV? 20 A. It was either the 23 r d or the 25th of May. 21 Q. of :-lay? A Q. And how long did you remain chief of 24 intelligence at MACV? 25 A. Till on or about the 4th of May SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791 _1020

2 Davidson - di r ect Q. So a::,out two y~..:.rs? 2 A. Cor rect. 3 Q. And did you serve under Gener al Hestmo reland and 4 General Abrams? 5 A. I did. 6 Q. Tell me, sir, if you can recall,,,hat were your 7 first tasks, first order of ~riority in terms of tasks, 8 when you became chief of intelligence at MACV? 9 A. i'ih en I f irst got there Generill i-iccnristian, whom 10 I was replacing, told me that Secretar y McNamara, the 11 Secretary of Defense, was due to come into Vietnan on d 12 visit, as I recall, about the 5th or 6th of June 1967, and 13 since General t-lcchr istian would have departed the command 14 by that time, my first priority was to get read y to brief 15 Secretary Hc Na:nara. 16 Q. Can you tell me what other tasks you turned your 17 attention to, if there were any, when you reached 18 A. Basically, the rest of the tasks were 19 orientation, getting to know the organization, getting 20 various briefings, informational briefings, that sort of 21 thing. 22 Q. Did there come a time after you arrived in MACV 23 as the intelligence c~ief t h~t you did brief Secretary 24 McNama ra? A. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

3 Q., M. Q. A. Q. Davidson - direct 1122 Did you brief him more than once? No. When did you brief him? I briefed him the 6th of July And that was about six weeks after you went to 6 MACV, is that coc:ect? 7 8, M. Q. Roughly, yes. Can you tell me what part of your time was spent 9 in?re?aring for this briefing between the time you arrived 10 at MACV and the time you actually briefed Secretary 11 ~-1cNamara? 12 A. I would say 30 o r 40 percent of my time. 13 Q. And the rest of it WaS taken U?, was it, with 14 administrative matters? 15 A. With normal staff duties, including orientation, 16 briefin~s, the sort of thing that any new starf officer has 17 to have in order to fit into the headquarters in which he 18 is assigned. 19 Q. ';ihen you became chief of intelli3ence at t-lacv 20 jid you eng aye in any reorganization of the intelligence 21 d2paratus that you found there? 22 A. ~r. Burt, I have a vague memory of 23 reorganization, but I don't remember any of the details. 24 Q. Can you tell me, while you were J - 2, whet her 25 t here were some aspects of intelligence t hat were more SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQL'ARE. NEW YORK. N. Y

4 Davidson - direct impoctant to you t han o t he r aspects of intelligence? 2 A. Yes, there were s ome aspects of more impo:tanc e 3 than others. 4 Q. Could you describe those to me, sir? 5 A. Well, I think the -- one of the critical aspects, 6 particularly in the summer and early fall of 1967, was what 7 was the enemy strategy, what was his change of strate3y, 8 because we began to get reports that there had been a 9 meeting of the politburo in either March or April or May of 10 '67, and in July the ambassadors were called in, which is 11 alway? a sign with the North Vietnamese government that a 12 major change is going to be made in some kind of a major 13 policy. So this alerted us that there might be a major 14 change of strategy in the offing. This was a number one 15 matter. 16 There were a series, Mr. 3urt, of continuing 17 worries, continuing problems. For example, on the broadest IS scale, were the Chinese likely to get into this encounter, 19 even in a way of maybe replacing No rth Vietnamese troops in 20 North Vietnam, so that more North Vietnamese could come 21 down the trail, were the NOrth Vietnamese going to make 22 major reinforcements to the troops in the south. 23 One of the things that I remember concerned us 24 was had the Soviets given them surface to surface missiles, 25 lar~e surface to surface missiles, which could be fired SOUTHERN DISTJlICT REPORTERS. u.s. CO URmOUSE FOLEY SQU ".RE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - :'

5 Davidson - direct into Sout~ Viecnam Ero~ Cambodia o r Laos. 2 Th ese priit.e problems, in addition co the normal 3 operation and running of the staff section, the pre~aring 4 of the briefing, these, as r recall, were the things that 5 particularly occupied me as che J-2, in contrast to the 6 subordinaces in the J-2 section, which generally went about 7 their normal duties. 8 Q. Let me ask you, if I may, sir, what your normal 9 jay, if there was a nor~al day, was like. What did you do, 10 can you tell us, as J-2? 11 A. Well, the normal day was 13 or 14 nours. It 12 started at 7 o'cloc k in the morning, seven days a week, 13 with a J-2 briefing in which the various briefers from 14 areas throughout South Viecnam, especially intelligence in 15 these areas, would conduct a briefing, normally about minutes. 17 From there on you began to deal with the normal 18 problems incident to staff administrat ion, prepari~g. 19 briefings for the commander, for example, all sorts of 20 things that make up a brief. This went on seven jays a 21 week. 22 Q. General Davidson, do the initials cried mean 23 anyt~ing to yuu? 24 A. 25 Q. Yes. Can you tell me what that means, s i r? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQU... RE. NEW YORK. N.Y

6 Davidson - direct A. Current Intelligence I~dicatio n s a nd Estimates 2 Division. 3 Q. And can you tell us, sir, what the Current 4 Intelligence Indications and Estimates Division was? 5 A. Yes. Current intelligence -- one of the 6 breakdowns of this division which I just set forth deal s on 7 a day basis with intelligence. In other words, firsthand 8 quick information. What's the enemy doing now, what's he 9 going to be doing tomorrow? There is a constant flow. 10 I might say that they have access to all sources 11 of intelligence, which some of the other people, most of 12 the other people in the J-2 section, did not have. 13 Q. Can I interru?t you, please, sir. As you know, 14 there is an agreement with resolect to what you c 3.n testify 15 to. 16 A. I understand. 17 Q. You can use the word NSA, but I would rather not 18 have it go anywhere be yond that. 19 A. I think I prefer to stand by my statement, if I 20 may. 21 Q. Sorry to interru?t you. Please continue, sir. 22 A. Now, the estimates division was a diffe~ent 23 thing. These are the people who were taking a long look at 24 things. What's the enemy going to be doing a month from 25 now or three months from now or six months from now? SO UTHERN orstrict REPORTBS. U.S. COU RTHO US E FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.':'. - 79! 10 20

7 Davidson - direct And then there was one other office in this 2 CIIED, which was called the special secur i ty office. I t. I 5 3 just what the name implies. We were dealing in this 4 particular section with highly classified and highly 5 sensitive types of intelligence. So we had to secure it. 6 They were in a secure area, locked doors, sometimes even 7 guarded doors, and they perfor~ed the security duty. 8 Q. Do the initials -- 9 THE COURT: Just a second, please. 10 Do I understand that you are saying that the 11 initials CIIED stand for not one entity ~ut several 12 different entities doing different kinds of things? 13 THE tlitness: Sir, the CIIED is the parent unit, 14 the commanding unit, if I may use that term, over current 15 intelligence estimates and the special sesurity office. 16 They are subordinate to CIIED and constitute integral parts 17 of it. 18 Q. General Davidson, in a moment we are going to 19 have a chart up here, and let me try and draw a few boxes 20 for you. Maybe that will make it a little clearer for t h e 21 jury, for all those interested in it. 22 MR. BURT: Your Honor, with your permissic'n, it 23 will t3ke me a second. 24 I apologize in advance for my difficulty in 25 drawing lines and boxes. SOUTHERN D1STIUCT REPORTERS. u.s. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. KY

8 Davidson - direct Q. General D~vidson, I will try and ask you some 2 questions about the structure of intelligence and reporting 3 and I would like you to help me out. 4 At the top of MACV was Ca1US;~ACV, the commander, 5 is that correct, sir? 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. Where was the intelligence function placed 8 beneath that commander, sir? 9 A. To be absolutely accurate in your chart, I am 10 going to have to give you another box right off. 11 Q. Okay. 12 A. Below Ca1USMACV draw a box entitled Chief of 13 Staff. 14 Q. All right. There is the chief of staff. What 15 do I do next, sir? 16 A. Because the joint staff officers, not only J-2, 17 but the other joint staff officers, and these were generals, 18 all reported to the commander through the chief of staff. 19 The chief of staff was our boss. 20 Q. Would it be accurate to say, sir, that a line 21 comes down from here and then a series of branches? 22 A. 23 Q. Yes. Do you know how many boxes there would be under 24 this line? 25 A. If you're talking about the joint staff SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY.lQUARE. NEW YORK. N. Y. - i

9 Davidson - d irect o r g anizatio n -- 2 Q. Yes, sir. 3 A. -- there would be at least seven. 4 Q. That's more boxes than I could ever draw. All 5 right. 6 And ",here was the J-2, sir? 7 A. We l l, he wou ld be in t ~ e second box. J-l wo uld 8 be in one, J-2, J-3. 9 Q. I see. So this loiould be t he J-2? 10 A. Rig h t. 11 Q. And that was you, was it not, sir? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. I just as ked you about CI I ED. Where woul d that 14 be, sir? 15 A. Under the J Q. Would it be directly under the J-2? 17 A. No. You have to draw another line, because t he 18 ma j or s ubordinate elements of J-2 then are on another l i ne. 19 Q. Oka y. I will draw another line l ike that. 20 A. All right. 21 Q. Now what do I do? 22 A. As I recall, th~re were four major uni ts. Put 23 in one bo x and put an A i n it and call it administration. 24 Q. 25 A. All right. Adm i n. Next. Next put in a =ox i n and call it Deputy for SOUTHER:-J DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

10 Davidson - direct production, Intelligence production, DIP. 2 Q. Do you happen to recall who that person was 3 while you were J-2 at MACV, or who they were, if there was 4 more than one? 5 A. When I first got there and for a few days it was 6 then Colonel later Brigadier General Godding. He was 7 succeeded by Colonel MOrris. 8 Q. okay. Godding and then Morris were successively 9 deputies for intelligence production? 10 A. Successively, yes. 11 Q. All right. 12 There were two other boxes, just to fill the 13 chart in, but not concerned in this litigation. One was 14 counterintelligence, because one of my functions was to try 15 to prevent the enemy from getting intelligence about our 16 forces. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. And the other is collection. In other words, 19 these are the people who controlled such things as patrols, 20 side-looking airborne radar. 21 MR. BURT: Your Honor, may I approach the bench? 22 (At the side bar) 23 MR. BURT:.Your Honor, I have never heard the 24 term before, side-looking airborne radar, and I am going to, 25 with your permission, if I hear sqmething like that that I SOUTHBRN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S, COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YOR.K. N.Y. _ 79{.1020

11 Davidson - direct think may trespass the witness may inadv ertently mention 2 one of these sec~rity things I am going to cu t him off. 3 I just wanted you to know that before I did it. 4 I don't know what that is and I don't want to hear any more 5 about it. 6 Mr. Boies, do you have any problem with it? 7 MR. BOIES: I don't have any problem with it 8 here. I don't think there is any security problem with 9 side-looking airborne radar, but I don't care whether you 10?ursue it or not. 11 MR. BURT: Thank you. 12 (In open cour t) 13 BY MR. BURT: 14 Q. General Dav idson, I was asking you about the 15 intelligence structure and you were telling me a bit abo u t 16 collections. Can you tell me any more about what 17 collections did, sir? 18 A. Very quickly, it also controlled prisoner of war 19 interrogation, document inter?retation, any other sources 20 of raw intelligence. 21 Q. Did raw int~lligence come only to collections or 22 did it go somewhere else? 23 A. Raw incellige,nce came through the units which 24 collection controlled. They were separate units. 25 Collection was a management tool. They didn't SOUTHER :-.l DISTRICT REPORTER S. :.1.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

12 Davidson - direct do it themselves. They prescribed the policie= and 2 analyzed the results. 3 Q. And when you say raw intelligence, what do you 4 mean? 5 A. That's before -- those are just facts. That's 6 before it's been processed by analysts t~ try to determine 7 the meaning of it. 8 Q. SO raw intelligence equals facts, is that 9 correct, sir? 10 A. I think a better explanation, Mr. Burt, would be 11 that it's information, misinformation and disinformation. 12 There is nothing there that when you?ick up a prisoner of 13 war that you have any assurance that he is not lying to you. 14 Q. Okay. Now, did collections disseminate the raw 15 intelligence? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And to whom did it disseminate it, can you tell 18 me, sir? 19 A. It went throughout the intelligence organization, 20 to those people who had some need for it. For example, it 21 went to an agency called Combined Intelligence Center 22 Vietnam. 23 Q. Can you tell me where on this chart that 24 Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam would be, if it would 25 be on that chart? SOUTHE? l'j DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NSW YORK. N.Y. _

13 Davidson - direct A. It would be another line under t he J-2 on abo ut 2 the same line with the major staff sections. 3 Q. Like over here, you mean? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam, is that 6 correct, sir? 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. Was this raw intelligence assembled by 9 collections distributed outside of MACV? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Do you know how widely that intellig ence was 12 distributed? 13 A. I know that it was distributed in scores i: not 14 hundreds of copies. I cannot answer your question 15 specifically. 16 Q. Let me ask you another question. Would you look 17 at the board over there, the blue boa=d with the little 18 velcro things attached to it. 19 Do you know whether the raw intelligence 20 collections was distributed through COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 21 for example? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Was the.raw intelligence d.istributed, if you 24 know, from CI NCPAC to the Joint Chiefs? 25 A. Not normally, no. SOUTHER N DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YO RK. N. Y. _ ;

14 Davidson - direct : 25 Q. You do know it went to CINCPAC? A. I do. Q. Did it go to DIA? A. It did. Q. Do you know whether any of it went to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs? A. Not from my own personal knowledge at the time. Q. Now, can you tell me where on this chart, if any place on this chart, you would put CIIED, current intelligence? A. That's a section under the deputy for intelligence production. Q. NOW, CIIED, did it have more than one unit, which was his Honor's question? A. It had three. Q. And would you tell me once again what they were, sir? A. Current intelligence. Q. All right. A. Estimates. Q. Rig h t A. And 550, which is an acronym for special security officer. Q. Special security officer. A. Now, to make your chart accurate you should draw SOUTHERN D[STRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 19[.10,0

15 Davidson - direct a line from the deputy for intelligence production to CICV, 2 because he also exercised operational control over that 3 unit. 4 Q. Okay. I am going to draw an arrow. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Exercised operational control over CICV? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Did CIIED have separate offices or a defined 9 area where its people sa t? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Did you ever visit those offices? 12 A. I visited those offices on an average of five or 13 six times a day. 14 Q. A day? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Seven days a week? 17 A. Seven days a week. 18 Q. Can you tell me once again what CICV was, please? 19 A. Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam. It 20 contained both U.S. personnel and South Vietnamese 21 personnel. 22 THE COURT: What were you talking about when you 23 just said that you visited five to six times per day? Were 24 you talking about CICV or CIIED? THE IUTNESS: CIIED, your Honor. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791.'020

16 Davidson - direct Q. Now, can you tell me whether ClCV had offices of 2 its own? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Were they physically separate from the offices 5 of CIIED? A. Q. 7 Can you t~ll me where they were located in 8 relation to the offices of CIIED? 9 A. ClIED was in the Military Assistance Command 10 Vietnam headquarters. II Q. Okay. 12 A. ClCV was located in a special building in the 13 joint general staff compound, about three blocks, as I 14 recall it, from the headquarters of the Military Assistance 15 Command. 16 Q Was there any reason that CICV was physically. 17 separated from the CIIED offices? 18 A. Yes, there was one predominant reason. The 19 predominant reason was one of security. 20 Q. Could you explain that for me, please? 21 A. Well, we had not only U.S. personnel working in 22 CICV, but we had South Vietnamese personnel also, people 23 that could not be subjected to our security standards and 24 controls and investigation. So they were put off 25 separately from the CIIED, all of whom were ~nericans and SOUTHBRN DISTRICT RBPORTBRS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLBY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. _ 79'.1020

17 Davidson - direct all of whom had very high sensitive security clearances. 2 Also, you needed a great big building for CICV 3 because, as I recall, there were several hundred people at 4 work there. 5 Q. Did you visit the CICV offices from time to time? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can you tell me how re~ularly, if you did visit 8 regularly? 9 A. After the first or second orientation I would 10 probably visit CICV on the order of two or three ti~es a 11 montn. 12 Q. Two or three times a week? 13 A. A month. 14 Q. Sorry. I didn't hear you, sir. And how much 15 time did you spend at CICV, if you did spend a normal 16 amount of time, when you went there? 17 A. I think perhaps an hour, walking around, looking 18 at the various people that were working there, being seen 19 by the people who worked there, showing some interest in 20 their activities. 21 Q. General Davidson, you testified a little earlier 22 that you visited CIIED five or so times a day, I believe. 23 A. At least. 24 Q. At least. Can you tell me how much time each 2S day on the average you spent at CIIED, current intelligence? SOUTHBRN DISTRICT RBPORTI!RS, U.S. COURTHOUSE POLEY SQUARB, NBW YORK. N.Y

18 Davidson - direct '. 23 " 24 '25 A.. '... ell, not counting the morning briefing, which was in that secure area, but not counting that, I would say I would spend normally 30 minutes to an hour in that area daily. Q. Thank you. When you went to Vietnam in 1967 to become chief of intelligence did you meet a man named Colonel Gains Hawkins? A. Yes. Q. Had you met Colonel Hawkins prior to becoming chief of intelligence? A. Not to my memory. Q. Do you recall where Colonel Hawkins worked? A. He was chief of the order of battle section. Q. And do you know where that order of battle section would be placed on this rather confused chart? A. ilhen I arr ived the order of battle section would have been a part of the office of the deputy for intelligence production. Q. Right. A. It's my memory now that that office was transferred to CICV, but I am not sure that Colonel Hawkins rad not departed the command before that reorganization took place. Q. Can you tell me whether you worked with -- let me rephrase that. SOUTHBRN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE 'OLEY SQUARE. NBW YORK. N.Y. - 79' 1020

19 Davidson - direct Did CICV produce a monthly order of battle , summary? A. Yes. Q. Did you ever see that summary? A. Yes. Q. Was that summary of use to you? A. Yes, it was of some use, particularly the summary page which accompanied it, giving the enemy strengths as of the end of each month in the various categories of the enemy which we faced. Q. Can you tell me what use you made of it, if any? A. Other than the summary page, very little, because it was a document about two inches thick, with a vast amount of detail about units, individual units, 15 re~lacements, infiltration and the like. ~. I Q. Was the CICV monthly order of battle summary of use for current purposes? Am I clear? A. Yes. It was of limited usefulness. Q. Can you tell me why it was of limited usefulness? A. Well, because most of the data in there was in detail and was historical in nature, at least sometimes a month old, sometimes older. Q. Could you distinguish for me between the information produced by CIIEDand the information produced SOIJTHERN DISTRICT REPORT1!RS, U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N, y,

20 Davidson - direct by CICV? 2 THE COURT: Sustained as to form. 3 Q. General Davidson -- 4 THE COURT: I believe he testified -- correct me 5 if I am wrong -- that the order of battle section in which 6 Colonel Hawkins worked was not transferred to CICV until 7 after Hawkins' departure. 8 Is that right? 9 THE WITNESS: That's my memory, sir. 10 THE COURT: I just didn't want your question to 11 obliterate that thinking. 12 MR. BURT: Thank you, your Honor. 13 (Continued on next page) S SOUTHERN D[STR[CT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 79[.1020

21 Davidison - direct BY MR. BURT: 2 Q. Let me rephrase the question. 3 Can you distinguish for me between the order of 4 battle summaries -- between the use made of the order of 5 battle summaries and the use of infor~ation produced by 6 CIIED? I believe you have testified that prior to a 7 reorganization the order of battle section was under the 8 deputy for. intelligence production and I had assumed and 9 correct me if I am wrong -- that that order of battle 10 section was not part of CIIED? 11 A. It was not. 12 Q. Can you answer my question now? 13 A. Yes. 14 There were two differences between the 15 information produced by CIeV and the the produced by CIIED. 16 In the first place a great part of the CICV information, as 17 the order of battle summaries, was to a large e~tent 18 historical in nature, whereas the intelligence produced by 19 CIIED was current in nature, there was one other difference, 20 let me retract that and start again. 21 CICV produced information classified not higher 22 than secret, whereas CIIED produced information to the 23 highest sensitive classification that we had. 24 THE COURT: I'm afraid I think the answer leaves 2S unclear just the problem that I was directing you to. SOUTHERN DISTIlICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

22 Davidison - direct 1141 Perhaps you could clear it up by your question. MR. BURT: Yes, your Honor. Q General Davidson, was the information produced by the order of battle section when it was part of the organization of the deputy for intelligence production any different from the information produced by that order of battle section after it was transferred to CICV? Is my question clear, sir? A. Yes. To the best of my memory, there was no difference. MR. BURT: THE COURT: MR. BURT: Your Honor, does that You may proceed. Thank you. Q General Davidson, When you arrived in Vietnam, was MACV preparing an enemy order of battle? A,. Yes. Q. And you have testified I believe that the order of battle section prepared a summary of the enemy order of battle, is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. General Davidson, do you recall in the summary order of battle what the categories were whe~ '~u 3rrived? A. Ye s. Q. Were there any differences in the degree of certainty, in YOllr mind, with raspecc to the numbers in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAU. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 79'.1020

23 Davidison - direct those categories? A. You mean the validity of the numbers, Mr. Burt? Q. Sure. A. I don't understand your question. Q. Let me rephrase my question. Were one of the categor ies in the summary produced bycicv main forces? A. Main and local forces THE COURT: MR. BOIES: THE COURT: Just a second, please. Objection. You are going right back into it. 12 First of all, I think you better make your question clear 13 as to the time that you're asking about. Your original 14 question on this subject asked I think about when the 15 general first arrived in Vietnam. Make it clear exactly when you are asking about because I don't think that your last question was consistent with the first as to the time frame. BY MR. BURT: Q. Let me put a time frame on my questions. Did the order of battle section, whether it was 22 under the deputy for inte11iger~" pr.)duction or CICV, 23 prepare an enemy order of battle summary while you were-j-2? A. Q. Yes. Were there categories of the enemy contained in i SOUTHERN DISTIlICTREPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - '

24 Davidison - direct that 9rder of battle summary while you were J-2? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Can you list for me what those categories were 4 when you became J-2, if you can recall? 5 A. I'm not sure I can recall the exact nomenclature. 6 I can certainly recall the type units and type of 7 categories we're talking about. 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. The first category were main and local forces, 10 in effect, the enemy's regular troops. 11 Q Okay. Can you continue, sir? 12 A. Shall I continue, Mr. Bur t? 13 Q. Can you, please. 14 A. The second category would be administrative 15 services. These are the people who manned the hospitals, 16 logistics people, truck drivers and things like that. 17 The third category, when I got there, it would 18 be a category called irregulars. 19 As I recall, the fqurth category was one called 20 Vietcong infrastructure, political infrastructure was 21 another name. 22 Q. Can YOLI tell me, sir, whether this category had 23 components to it? 24 A. 25 Q. It did. When yo~ arrived in Vietnam? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FO~BY SQUARB. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ '

25 Davidison - direct A. Yes. 2 Q. Can you.tell me what those components were it? 3 A. There were three components. First, g.uerrillas; 4 second self-defense forces and, third, secret selt-defense 5 forces. 6 Q. Can you tell me, if you know, what these various 7 subcategories of the irregular category did? 6 A. Well, guerrillas were organized units, generally, 9 fully armed, who operated in either hamlet units -- which a 10 hamlet is a small part of a village -- or village units. 11 They were fully armed, combat effective and 12 conducted raids occasionally, blew up bridges and that sort 13 of thing. 14 The self-defense forces were people who were 15 organi~ed around the given village or hamlet and they dug 16 fortifications, conducted propaganda and they may have had 17 other functions such as putting in some kinds of mines and 18 booby traps. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. The secret self-defense operated in that area 21 controlled by the South Vietnamese government, therefore, 22 the ~~~e ~ecret. 23 Q. What did they do, sir? 24 A. They conducted propaganda. They also acted on 25 occasion as a reconnaissance agents for the Vietcong. SOUTHnN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE.. NEW YORK. N.Y

26 Davidison - dicect Q. Now, again, I'm asking you about the time when you first arcived in South Vietnam, say,the ficst month, if you will. What was your degree of certitude, if any, with respect to your estimate of the main and local force nu.liber s? A. We were very confident of it. Q. Can you tell me why? A. Yes. Because we were contacting these troops in the field, we were getting prisoners of war, we were getting documents, we were getting desertors and defectors. So we were able to keep a running count and a running 13 handle on these particular units. We were confident within perhaps one or two percent of our strength of those units. Q. General Davidson, can you tell me what degree of certitude you had with respect to the number of administrative services? A. Much less. Q. Can you tell me why? A. Administrative services by their very nature are in the rear areas. to use in Vietnam. It's not exactly the term you were able They were basically in base areas, in S logistic situations and in logistic setups so that you didn't contact them too often and so that you could get prisoners of war or documents or the other kinds of SOUTHERN DIST1\ICT REPORTERS, U,S, COURTHOUSE FOLBY SQUARE. NBW YORK. N,Y

27 Davidison - direct intelligence. 2 So we had a much less confidence in that 3 category. 4 Q. General Dav idson, can you tell me how you 5 defined what an administrative service person was? Is my 6 question clear, sir? 7 A. No, it is not. 8 Q. Could you tell me how did you decide whether a 9 person was an administrative service person; what tests 10 would have to be performed? 11 A. If you caught him driving a truck or cooking or 12 working in the hospital, he performed the test. If you 13 caught him out on the road, I doubt that you would be able 14 to identify him. 15 Q. Let me ask you with respect to the subcategories 16 here, the questions I have been asking with respect to the 17 main and local forces. Can you tell me what degree of 18 certitude you had as to the number of guerrillas that there 19 were? 20 A. Well, we were more confident in our guerrilla 21 strength figures than we were in our administrative 22 services, but a good deal less than in our main and local 23 forces. But ourselves, our- troops and the-south Vietnamese, 24 were contacting guerrillas from time to time. So we were 25 able to get some prisoners, some documents, where we could SOUTHUN DISTRICT RBPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NBW YORK. N.Y. _

28 Davidison - direct get some idea of their strength and activities. 2 Q. Can you tell me what degree of certitude you had 3 with respect to the estimate of the self-defense forces? 4 A. Very little. 5 Q. Can you tell me why, sir? 6 A. Well, by their very nature they were people who 7 stayed in their villages. They were civilians, dressed as 8 civilians, many of them were women, older men, somatimes 9 even children. You very seldom contacted them in any kind 10 of a combat operation. They had little or no organization, 11 so there was no way of getting your hand on them through an 12 organization. So we had very little confidence in any 13 figures for those two -- for the self-defense category. 14 Q. I would ask my question again: What degree of 15 certitude do you have with respect to the estimates of the 16 secret self-defense forces? 17 Very little. 18 Q. Was there any difference with respect to -- let 19 me take that question back and let me just carryon. 20 Can you tell me what degree of certitude you had, 21 if any, with respect to the estimate of the number of 22 Vietcong in the infrastructure or the Vietcong political? 23. A. Probably about the same degree of -confidence 24 that we had in guerrillas. The Vietcong infrastructure did 25 have an organization of sorts, although they were and have SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTBRS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NBW YORK. N.Y '020

29 Davidison - direct been characterized as a shadow government. By their nature 2 in South Vietnam, they were clandestine and covert. 3 Nevertheless, we were able to gain some intellige nce on 4 them. 5 So that although we would give them about the 6 same degree of reliability as we would the guerrillas. 7 Q. General McChristian -- I'm sorry -- General 8 Davidson, when you arrived in Vietnam did you attend -- and 9 we're talking about May of did you intend something 10 called a weekly intelligence update? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Can you recall whether you ever attended a 13 weekly intelligence update or WIEU at which General 14 McChristian was present? 15 A. I have a memory that General McChristian 16 attended the first WIEU I attended. 17 Q. Do you have any idea of when that WIEU was? 18 A. It should have been the Saturday after the 23rd 19 or 25th. The WIEU's were held every Saturday morning at 8 20 o'clock. I have seen a contemporary document which 21 indicates that it was held on the 29th of May that time and 22 Which was a Sunday. 23 Q. General Davidson, do you recall whether at the 24 WIEU you were at, "here McChristian was present, according 25 to your testimony, there was any briefing of estimates of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTllRS. U.S. COURT\lOUSE FOLEY SQU,",RE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

30 Davidison - direct self-defense and secret self-defense and guerrillas? 2 A. I recall no such briefing. 3 o. General Davidson 4 THE COURT: Just a second. I don't know what 5 that answer means. 6 Are you saying that you simply don't recall 7 whether or not there was such a discussion or such a 8 briefing at that particular WIEU or are you saying that you 9 believe from your recollection that there was no such 10 briefing at that WIEU? 11 THE WITNESS: I'm saying, your Honor, that I 12 cannot recall any such briefing at that ~IEU. 13 THE COURT: Well, do you remember what I just 14 asked you a minute ago? 15 THE WITNESS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: I ask it again. Are you saying it 17 is your belief based on your recollection that there was no 18 such briefing at that WIEU or are you saying that there may 19 have been but you just are not sufficiently clear in your 20 recollection of the meeting to be able to express any 21 opinion as to whether there was or wasn't? 22 THE WITNESS: It's the latt"r, your Honor. 23 TllE COURT: You just don't recall? 24 THE WITNESS: I just don't recall. 2S BY MR. BURT: SOUTHERN DISTllICT RBPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAllE. NBW YORK. N. y,

31 Davidison - direct Q. General Davidson, I would like you to look at a 2 document numbe,red Exhibit Do you have a copy of that 3 document, sir; do you have that in your hand? 4 A. I do. 5 Q. Would you take a second to glance over it, sir, 6 and I would like to ask you a question or two about it. 7 Who sent this document, sir? 8 A. I did. 9 Q. You sent i,t to whom, sir? 10 A. Major General Peterson, the J-2 or the chief 11 intelligence officer of CINCPAC. 12 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, may we understand 13 whether the witness is testifying from his recollection or 14 whether he's merely reading the document? 15 MR. BURT: That was my next question. 16 Q General Davidson, do you recall having drafted 17 this document or sent this document? 18 A. No. 19 Q. That is, you have no present recollection, is 20 that correct? 21 A. That's correct. 22 Q. Do you h'v~ a! y reason to believe that this 23 document was' not sent ilt' th'e form- as sh-own here?" 24 A. 25 No. MR. BURT: Your Honor, we would like to offer ",, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE POLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N,Y. - 7.'.1020

32 Davidison - direct this in evidence. 2 THE COURT: Is that objected to? 3 MR. BOIES: May we know the purpose for which it 4 is being offered. 5 MR. BURT: To show that it was sent and received 6 and to refresh the witness' recollection. 7 MR. BOIES: If that is the only purpose, your 8 Honor, we would have no objection to it. 9 MR. BURT: And for the fact that this is what 10 was communicated. 11 MR. BOIES: That is for the fact that it was 12 sent and received. 13 MR. BURT: I didn't distinguish. In any event, 14 yes. 15 MR. BOIES: I take it this is not being offered 16 on the state of mind issue. 17 MR. BURT: No, certainly not. 18 MR. BOIES: No objection to that offer, your 19 Honor. 20 THE COURT: You are saying it's not offered' with 21 respect to CBS's state of mind? 22 ~R. BURT: Correct. 23 THE COUR'I': All right. This Exhibit is 24 received in evidence and the jury will understand that it 25 is not offered as relating in any way to the issue of CBS' SOUTH~RN DISTRICT RI!POR.TERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLBY SQUARI!. NBW YORK. N.Y

33 1 state of mind. Davidison - direct 1152 The plaintiff says there is no contention that CBS had this document when they prepared their. documentry. (Exhibit 1501 for identification was received in ev idence) Q. General Davidson, can you tell me, having read 7 this doc~ent, what the first sentence refers to when it refers to OB strength figures"? A. I cannot, from my own memory, define the term ~OB strength figures." 11 Q Can you tell me from any other basis, other than your memor y? MR. BOIES: Objection. 14 Q General Davidson, you were Chief of Intelligence, we re you not? A. Yes. Q. And were you familiar with the OB, the order of battle, that was prepared by the order of battle section that we have discussed a few minutes ago? A. Yes. Q. Did you meet with any of the people who prepared that order of battle that was prepared by the order of battle section woile you were intelligence chief? A. Yes, I met with them. Q. Can you tell me from your past experience SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S, COURTHOUSE POLEY SQtJARE, NBW YORK, N,Y, - '

34 Davidison - direct whether you can give me your opinion as to what the phrase 2 'OB strength figur~s' refers to? 3 MR. BOIES: May we inquire whether he means '08 4 strength figures' in this particular document? 5 MR. BURT: In this particular document, which he 6 sent, although he has no present recollection. 7 MR. BOIES: Objection, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Do you wish to conduct voir dire? 9 MR. BOIES: Perhaps just a couple of questions, 10 your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Go ahead. 12 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. BOIES: 14 Q. General Davidson, with respect to the term OB ls strength figures' is that a term that was a term of art 16 that you understood as meaning a particular thing every 17 time it was used? 18 A. Not necessarily, Mr. Boies. 19 Q. Do you have any personal recollection or memory 20 as to how this phrase was used in this particular document? 21 A. I do not. 22 MR. BOIES: That's all I have, your Honor. 23 MR. BURT: May I ask another question at this 24 point, your Honor? 25 THE COURT: Yes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLSY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - '

35 Davidison - direct BY MR. BURT: Q. General Davidson, is there anything from the context of this document that would tell you what the phrase "OB strength figures" refers to? A. No. Q. General Davidson, did there come a time in July 7 of 1967 when you met with a man n~~ed George Carver? A. I have no personal recollection of meeting with Mr. Carver in July of Q. General Davidson, does the phrase -- do the initials SNIE mean anything to you? A. Ye s. Q. Can you tell us what that is? A. It's a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Q. Did there come a time in 1967 when you learned about a Special National Intelligence Estimate? A. Ye s. Q. Can you describe for me when you learned about it and what you learned about it, if anything? A. I can't recall the date that I learned that there was a revision of the 1966 SNIE. sometime in the summer of It would have been ~, I Q.. And can. you tell me what, if anything, you learned about that? A. No, I can't tell you anything that I learned SOUTHE~N DISTRICT ~EPORTUS. U.S. COU~THOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NBW YOIlK. N.Y

36 Davidison - direct about that. 2 Q. Do you recall what the subject of this SNIE was? 3 A. It was Vietnam and the war there. 4 Q. Did there come a time when MACV participated in 5 deliberations with respect to this SNIE? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. And can you recall when that was? 8 A. The first participation would have been around 9 the middle of August Q. Can you describe for me how MACV participated in 11 that, if you know? 12 We sent a team to a conference which had been 13 convened at CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, to work 14 on the strength figures to be contained in the SNIE. 15 Q. Did MACV prepare a position with respect to the 16 strength figures to take to this August meeting? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. General Davidson, I would like you to look at a 19 document which is Exhibit 252, which is in evidence; let me 20 show it to you. 21 DO you have that document in front of you, sir? 22 Let me give you a clean copy. That copy is mine A. 25 Q. Do you have Exhibit 252 in front of you, sir? Yes. And have you glanced through it? Do you want to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ '

37 Oavidison - direct glance through it and look at it? 2 'fou have reviewed it, sir? 3 A. I have read it. 4 Q. Can you tell me whether you know who drafted 5 this cable? 6 A. 'fe s. 7 Q. Who did, sir? 8 A. I did. 9 Q. I would like you to look at paragraph 2, which 10 as has the parenthesis (S). I believe that's a 11 classification of that particular paragraph? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. It says: If SO and SSO strength figures are 14 included in the overall enemy strength figure, the figure 15 will total 420,000 to 431,000, depending on minor 16 variations. This is in sharp contrast to the current 17 overall strength figure of about 299,000 given to the press 18 here." 19 Did you draft that paragraph, sir? 20 A. To the best of my memory, I did. 21 Q. Where did the figu're 420,000 to 431,000 come 22 from? 23 A. If I didn't have it in my head at the time, it 24 came from somebody in my J-2 section. 25 Q. Someone on your staff? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

38 Davidison - direct A. Somebody on the J-2 staff. yes. 2 Q. Did you know. if you can recall when YOll drafted 3 it. to whom this cable was being sent? 4 A. Yes, I recall. General Wheeler and Admiral 5 Sharp. 6 Q. Who is General Wheeler? 7 A. General Wheeler is the Chairman of the Joint 8 Chiefs of Staff. 9 Q. That box on the board Joint Chiefs of Staff? 10 A. Yes'. 11 Q. He's the chairman of that? 12 A. He was the chairman. 13 Q. Did you know that at the time? 14 A. Yes, indeed. 15 Q. Could you show me what box Admiral Sharp would 16 be in. if there is a box on that board he would be in? 17 A. On that chart. CINCPAC. CQmmander in Chief 18 Pacific. 19 Q. 20 A. 21 Q. 22 A. 23 Q. 24 A. 25 Q. Did you know who Admiral Sharp was at the time? Yes. Had you ever met Admiral Sharp? Yes. Had you ever met General Wheeler? Yes. Can you tell me who General Abrams was at the I SOUTII&RN DISTRICT RBPORTERS. U.S. COURTIIOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ "'.lolq

39 Davidison - direct time you sent this cable -- sorry -- at the time you 2 drafted this cable? 3 A. General Abrams was the deputy commander., the 4 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, but in this 5 instance he was the acting commander. 6 Q. Why was that, sir? 7 A. Because General Westmoreland is an addressee on 8 the cable, indicating he was not in the headquarters. 9 Q. I would like you to turn to paragraph 5 and you 10 may read any part of this for context, if you wish, and 11 note that there's (C), that refers to secur ity 12 classification? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And read into the record: "In our view the ls strength figures for the SD and SSD should be omitted 16 entirely from the enemy strength tables in the forthcoming 17 NIE. This will prevent the possibility that they can be 18 added to the valid figures and an erroneous conclusion 19 drawn as to an enemy strength increase." A. 22 Q. 23 it? Did you draft that paragraph, sir? To the best of my knowledge, I did. Did you believe what vou W!'ote when you drafted 24 A. 25 Q. Yes, sir. Did anyo,ne order you to draft that paragraph? SOUTHaRN DISTRICT UPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQU"RE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791.1G2G

40 Davidison - direct No. 2 MR. BURT: Your Honor, can we take a break right 3 now for about 10 minutes? 4 THE COURT: All right. Ten minute break. 5 MR. BURT: Thank you very much, your Honor. 6 (Recess taken) 7 THE COURT: Call the jury, please. 8 (Jury present) 9 THE COURT: You may proceed. 10 MR. BURT: Thank you, your Honor. 11 BY MR. BURT: 12 Q. General Davidson, at the break we were talking 13 about the cable that you drafted and in the time frame of 14 late August, 1967 and if I may take a minute to check that 15 cable, it refers to the draft NIE in part in the 16 first paragraph. I would like to ask you some more 17 questions at this time, if I ma~, about the NIE or SNIE as 18 it has been referred to in the course of these proceedings. 19 Did there come a time when a session of the SNIE 20 met in Saigon in A. Yes. 22 Q. Can you ;:~,=ah when that was, sir? 23 A. It was on or about the 11th September Q. Can you recall who the participants were in that 25 meeting, all or some? SOUTHERN DISTRICT RBPORTERS. U 3. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQl1AaE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 7.'.1020

41 Davidison - direct A. I can recall I believe all the agencies 2 represented without being able to recall all of the 3 individual participants. 4 Q. Could you tell me the agencies represented? s A. The agencies as I remember them were, from 6 Central Intelligence Agency, from the Intelligence Office 7 of the Secretary of State Department -- State Department -- 8 there was a delegation from the Defense Intelligence Agency, 9 another delegation from Admiral Sharp's headquarters, 10 Pacific Command and then there were the Military Assistance 11 Command Vietnam delegation. 12 Q. Can you recall whether there was a head of any 13 of these delegations and, if so, who it or they were? 14 A. I can recall the head of the CIA delegation, who 15 was Mr. George Carver and acted initially at least as the 16 head of the MAC V delegation. 17 I have no memory of the delegation chiefs of the 18 other agencies. 19 Q. Do you recall if Mr. Carver? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Could you describe him physically for us? 22 He's a man about five foot six, must weigh 23 around 160 pounds, has thick glasses. He had at that time 24 blond hair. I suspect it's gray now. That's about the 25 best physical description I can give you. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NBW YORK. N.Y. _