x GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, Plaintiff, COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Defendants.

Transcription

1 : UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, Plaintiff, v. 82 Civ PNL COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., GEORGE CRILE, MICHAEL WALLACE and SAMUEL A. ADAMS, Defendants x ""-. November 8, : 00 a.m. 14 ls (Trial resumed) (In open courtl jury not present) 18 MR. BURT: Your Honor, can we defer this until /"~,, the luncheon break for about ten minutes at the break? THE COURT: Defer what? : 21 MR. BURT: The point that we were going to 22 approach your Honor on. It's a question solely of 23 excisions of a few pages in outtakes of Westmoreland that. 24 we have to get a ruling on. We want to take a few pages 2S out, they want them in. The question is relevance. SOllTHERN OISTllICT RIIPOIlTERS. u.s. COUllTHOUSE POLEY SQUAll!. NEW YOIlK. N;Y. _

2 2709 THE COURT: HR. BURT: Excision from what? Outtakes of the Westmoreland interview. TH.E COURT: The Westmoreland interview is not going to be played for quite sometime, is it? HR. BURT: It's going to be played on Friday, your Honor, tomorrow. THE COURT: I don't understand. How can you play it on Friday? We have a witness on the stand who.1 was led to believe will be on the stand on direct and cross-examination for a good two full days. MR. BURT: Correct, your Honor. In the event that witness is not on the stand, I want to be prepared. THE COURT: Okay. Let's take it up perhaps at lunchtime or at the end of the day. MR. BURT: THE COURT: HR. BURT: THE COURT: HR. BURT: THE COURT: Fine. All ready to proceed? Yes, your Honor. You have a witness? Yes, your Honor. Call the jury, please. GEORGE CARVER resumed. THE COURT: Good morning. (Jury present) THE COURT: Good morning, members of the jury. SOIlTHnN DIS1'lICT RIIPOIlTD.S. u.s. COUllTHOUSE POLlY SQUAllE. NEW you. N.Y. _ Z0

3 carver direct JURORS: - Good morning. ~~URT: The clerk advised me that some f /"' are complaining that it's too hot in the courtroom. I 4 5 must say I am in agreement. We are going to see what can 6 All right. We will proceed with the examination 7 of George Carver. Mr. Burt, you may proceed. 8 MR. BURT: Thank you, your Honor DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED BY MR. BURT: Q. Good morning, Mr. Carver. A. Good morning. Q. Mr. Carver, yesterday afternoon we finished with your examination after some discussions about the Office of National Estimates. A. I do. Do you recall that, sir?, Q. I would like to back up if I could for just a moment, and ask you an additional question about your ex per i ence. I believe you testified that at sometime in the 1970's, early '70's, you ceased to be SAVA or special assistant for Vietnamese affairs, is that correct, sir?.l, A. That is correct, Mr. Burt Q. And when was that, sir? A. In September of 1973, when Mr. Colby asked me to SOUTHBlN DISTlICT UPOIlTl!lS. u.s. COUllTHOUSE POLlY $QUAU. NEW YOIllt. N.Y. _ 19\.1020

4 Carver - direct establish and then be the first incumbent on the new post 2 of deputy to DCI for national intelligence, I ceased 3 becoming special assistant for Vietnamese affairs. O. Mr. Carver, could I suggest that you bring the 5 microphone a bit closer. 6 A. Certainly. 7 O. How is that, sir? 8 A. Does that seem all right? 9 O. I think so. 10 A. Good. 11 O. After you became the -- was that deputy A. Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence 13 for national intelligence. 14 O. -- did you have any other involvement with ls cvc~t~ in Vietnam? 16 A. I did. 17 O. Can you tell me what they were or it was? 18 A. Well, I had two levels. One of my subordinates 19 in that job was the national intelligence officer for 20 Southeast Asia, who basically took over most of my previous 21 functions as SAVA, and then in the spring of 1975 I was 22 sitting peacefully at my desk one day when I got a call 23 from Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State, who 24 told me that President Ford had asked General Weyand, then 25 Chief of Staff of the United States Army, to go on an SOUTHElN DISTJ.ICT aepoj.td.s. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAt.E. NEW Yon. N.Y

5 carver - direct inspection trip to South Vietnam. This was after the North 2 Vietnamese invasion, when things were collapsing. 3 And I said "Well, Henry, that's very interesting, 4 but what has that got to do wi th me?" He said, "Well, 5 there is a seat for you on the plane. Be at Andrews Air 6 Force Base in three hours." 7 So I went with General Weyand. We spent 8 approximately ten days in South Vietnam. There were four 9 of us, as I recall, on the team. We covered the country. 10 And then on the way back I drafted most of General Weyand's 11 report, which we presented to President Ford and Secretary 12 Kissinger at Palm Springs before returning to Washington. 13 Q. Thank you, Hr. Carver. Now, yesterday at the 14 close of our session we were talking about the Office of IS National Estimates, that chart up there, and I believe you 16 testified the Office of National Estimates was a part of 17 the CIA. Am I correct, sir? 18 A. Not quite. It was a part of the office of the 19 Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as the I 20 head of the entire community and was not technically part 21 of the CIA as an institution, though administratively this 22 got a little blurred from time to time. 23 Q. Can you tell me how ONE or the Office of 24 National Estimates went about preparing a national 25 intelligence estimate? SOllTHE1N DIsnICT aeponns. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOU:. N.Y

6 Carver - direct A. I could certainly try. o. Please. A. There were two components to that office. There was a board of national estimates composed of approximately a dozen -- the number varied between 12 and very senior people, some of whom were career professional intelligence officers, some of whom were former or retired ambassadors, some of whom were active duty or retired military officers of three or even four star rank. Below the board was a staff of approximately 40 odd professionals broken out into various geographic areas / 12 and a couple of functional areas. For example, there was a staff on Soviet -- there was a Soviet military staff, et cetera. Now, an estimate -- estimate in this context is estimate capital E -- is a particular bureaucratic art form designed to give the considered judgment and opinion of the 18 entire u.s. intelligence community. Every national 19 intelligence estimate or special national intelligence 20 estimate was issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. 21 It was his estimate. 22 Now, it was prepared by the Office of National 23 Estimates. There was always one member of the board who 24 was assigned as the chairman for each given estimate, and 25 then one or two members of the staff were assigned to work SOUTHnN DIST1ICT aepouns. u.s. COUI. mouse FOLEY SQUAll. NEW you. N.Y

7 Carver - direct with him, somewhat similar to the way a law firm has a 2 partner who is arguing a case with a couple of associates 3 helping him. 4 This estimate was drafted -- first they put 5 together something called terms of reference, which was 6 what was the estimate was supposed to cover. These were 7 circulated to all the other components of the intelligence 8 community, the intelligence components of the Department of 9 Defense, the Department of State, where applicable, the 10 National Security Agency, even the Justice Department, the 11 FBI, the Treasury even at times, depending on the 12 particular subject. 13 Then there was a meeting in the national 14 estimates office in Langley to coordinate and agree on the 15 terms of reference, what the estimate was going to cover. 16 Then other members of the community were asked 17 to submit drafts or portions of the draft on particular 18 subjects of particular concern to them. For example, the 19 Treasury, if it dealt with economic matters, would submit a 20 portion of the draft on the economic question, State on 21 diplomatic, Defense on defense questions, et cetera. 22 Then a member on the staff of the Office of 23 National Estimates would prepare a complete draft. That 24 draft would be circulated. Time would be given for the 25 various other components of the community to look it over. SOUTHnN DlSTJ.ICT leponns. u.s. counhouse FOLEY SQUA1E. NEW YOll. N.Y

8 Carver - direct Then there would be meetings, usually a succession of them, 2 again, at CIA headquarters in Langley, in the suite of 3 offices occupied by the Office of National Estimates, or 4 ONE, as it was called, and these drafts would be gone 5 through line by line, paragraph by paragraph, in some cases 6 in some sentences comma by comma. 7 Once there was a final agreed draft, which 8 frequently had reservations in it from various other 9 members of the community who did not agree with the line of analysis, the_ j.. uclgtjleil~s_ilnd c_on.clus_lq.qs, it would be set up -- b fore a body that was then called the United Stat~ 12 ntelligence Board. It's now called I believe the National / 13 Foreign ~LL' e Board. ~~~~ The estimate draft would be formally considered 15 by the United States Intelligence Board, or USIB, and after 16 that formal consideration it would be issued, signed off on 17 by the Director of Central Intelligence. 18 Now, sometimes, in fact, quite frequently, 19 various other members of the intelligence community, the 20 heads of which were themselves members of the United States 21 Intelligence Board, would dissent from particular portions 22 'i '. of the estimate, and their dissents would be formally 23 recorded in footnotes. I mean, to paragraph say 16, say a 24 Soviet military estimate, where the estimate would say 2S certain things about say the SS-9, a certain form of Soviet SOl1THBN Drsnrcr upouas. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAll. NEW Yon. N.Y

9 Carver - direct hardware, the Department of Defense or the Defense 2 Intelligence Agency might not agree with that 3 interpretation, so there would be a formal footnote. 4 And so there was a procedure for coordination, 5 there was a procedure for registering dissent. But the key 6 concept behind it was that every estimate was the estimate 7 of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of 8 Central Intelligence hence could not dissent from his own 9 estimate. 10 Now, there was never a case that I can recall I can recall once we came fairly close where the Central 12 Intelligence Agency took a formal dissent from a DCI 13 estimate. It could have, because the DCI or Director of 14 Central Intelligence was presiding over the process as the 15 head of the community, not as the head of the agency, and 16 frequently or sometimes the agency officers involved in the 17 production of the estimate didn't agree with it, all of its 18 conclusions or the exact phraseology of it. 19 Does that answer your question? 20 Q. Yes. Can I belabor one point. You talked about 21 the possibility of dissents being taken from a national 22 intelligence estimate. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Can you tell me whether there was disagreement 25 from time to time in the course of preparing national SOllTHEJ.N DISnJCT UPOkTnS. u.s. COuaTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAll. NEW you. N.Y

10 Carver - direct estimates that you personally observed? ~ A. Well. no estimate that I was ever involved with, 3 and I was involved with quite a few, or ever had any 4 knowledge of, and I had knowledge of considerably more than 5 the ones that I personally helped to draft, was ever free 6 from various levels of disagreement. ~ 7 Each estimate dealt with some complex, 8 c mplicated problem involving many interpretive judgments 9 a.bout evidence which was not always clear. and there were \ 10 a ways during the preparation process, during the 11 coor ination process, lots of arguments and discuss ' ns 12 about w ~e you should come out and how particular conclusion~ ould be phrased. The proces~s~'-~e-eoaralnation process, was set 15 up to enable as many of those disagreements as possible to 16 be resolved in some manner that all parties to the process 17 found acceptable. Seldom did any single person completely 18 endorse the way it was done. And if a component taking 19 part in the process, i.e., one member of the intelligence 20 community, really felt that what finally emerged was 21 something that that component could not go along with or 22 felt very strongly had to be phrased a different way, then there was a procedure for taking a formal footnote. a formal dissent in the published text. But because they were complex issues, with ( SOtJTHnN DtsnJCT lepoj.tns. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE POLEY SQU... E. NEW YOU:. N.Y. _

11 Carver - direct _~ strong personalities, and ~~ b~ perfectly fran~_strong 2 ~~~~through the process -- you know, the greatest itch. the world is the itch to revise somebody else's prose, as we all know, and hence anybody taking potshots at something someone else had drafted involved a great deal of discussion about how it should have been done better. Q. Thank you, Hr. Carver. Now, I would like to ask J 8 you to focus on the period 1966 and A. Yes. 10 Q. I believe you testified that in 1966 at some 11 point you became the special assistant for Vietnamese 12 affairs, is that correct? 13 A. September of '66, yes. 14 Thank you, sir. And after you became the 15 special assistant for Vietnamese affairs did a man named 16 Samuel Adams come to your attention in any way? 17 A. He did. 18 Q. Did Hr. Adams come to work for you in 1966? 19 A. I am not sure whether Sam joined my staff in 20 late November-December '66 or very early January '67, but 21 at some point at the tag end of '66 or the very first few 22 week or two of '67 he joined my staff, yes. 23 Q. And did he have a desk near yours? 24 A. Since I was the head of the staff, I picked the 25 best office, which was the corner office, and Sam's office SOUTKEkN DISTllJCT UPOalns. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE POLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOU. N.V

12 Carver - direct he sat in an office about -- we had an inner suite off a 2 main corridor. And so the staff itself was sort of 3 self-contained. Beyond my office, the next one was the office of my principal deputy, and then there was one other, 5 and I think Sam's was the third one down. But there were 6 about four offices in a row past mine, all in the same 7 suite, and he occupied one of them. 8 o. Did you see Mr. Adams regularly? 9 A. Daily and at times hourly. 10 o. You say you had a principal deputy when you were 11 SAVA, special assistant for Vietnamese affairs. Who was 12 that, sir? 13 A. Well, I had several during the course of my 14 entire tenure, but in '66 and '67 it was Mr. George Allen. 15 o. Did you choose Mr. Allen to be your deputy or 16 was he a.1ready there? 17 A. I chose Mr. Allen to be my deputy. I asked Mr. 18 Allen to join the staff before I took it over, and then 19 once I was under the first special assistant for 20 Vietnamese affairs, Mr. Pier DeSilva, I was the principal 21 deputy, and then when I became Mr. DeSilva's successor and 22 became the second special assistant for Vietnamese affairs 23 I named Mr. Allen as my principal deputy. 24 o. And did you see Mr. Allen regularly? 25 A. Again, we had adjoining offices. We were in SOUlHBN OIS'nlCT UPOJ.TaS. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE POLEY SQUAll. NEW YOIJC, N.Y. _

13 Carver - direct constant conversation and interchange throughout every 2 business day the both of us were present in that office. 3 O. Did you have to hire or choose Mr. Adams or was 4 he assigned to you? S A. I asked him to join the staff on Mr. Allen's 6 recommendation. 7 O. And do you know whether Mr. Adams wanted to join 8 the staff? Did he tell you he wanted to join the staff? 9 A. I believe he did. He certainly seemed pleased 10 at the offer and accepted it immediately. 11 O. Did Mr. Adams tell you why he wanted to join 12 your staff? 13 A. Well, I think he liked Mr. Allen, I think he 14 liked working with me, I think he liked the IS responsibilities that we had, and above all, Mr. Adams 16 wanted to concentrate on research and analysis dealing with 17 certain Vietnamese problems, and he would be able to do 18 that on our staff, whereas in his former office he would 19 have had to do other things. 20 O. Did you ever read a study or are you aware of 21 any studies that Mr. Adams did on the morale of the 22 Vietcong? 23 Did you understand my quest ion? 24 A. Yes, I understood your question. Prior to 2S joining my staff, to the best of my recollection, Mr. Adams SOUTHnN DJSnJCT aepouns. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAU. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

14 Carver - direct spent several months working on a, as I recall, morale and 2 defection study. In the course of doing that he had spent 3 at least several weeks, if not several months, in Vietham 4 in I believe the spring of 1966, and I believe at that time 5 he was put under Mr. Allen's general supervision, and 6 that's how he and Mr. Allen got to know each other, and Mr. 7 Allen came to know his work, and that led in due course to 8 Mr. Allen's recommending that he join our staff. 9 Q. Do you recall having read the study you just 10 referred to in 1966 or thereabouts? 11 A. I recall having read it when it was done. That 12 was 17, 18 years ago, and I do not have much recollection 13 of it now. 14 Q. Do you have any recollection of whether that 15 study was confi rmed or not confi rmed in any way? 16 A. I remember it as being controversial, and I do 17 not think, though I could be mistaken on this 18 THE COURT: Just a second, please. What is the 19 relevance of MR. BURT: The relevance, your Honor THE COURT: Just a second. Perhaps this should.( 22 be at side bar. 23 (At the side bar) 24 MR. BURT: The relevance goes to Mr. Adams' 2S state of mind with respect to the size of the enemy -- SOInHBN DISnICT UPOuns. u.s. COUJ.1l!OUSE POLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW Yon. N.Y. _

15 Carver - direct THE COURT: How does it go to his state of mind? 2 HR. BURT: That study I believe was disproved. 3 People went out to Vietnam. They said what he said wasn't 4 so. 5 One of the possibilities of Hr. Adams' behavior 6 with respect to trying to find a larger enemy is it started 7 when he was trying to support the study, which got knocked 8 down. I wanted to demonstrate that he had a history of, 9 starting with the study, finding a much larger enemy. 10 His ego was bruised. It wasn't well-received. 11 He had to prove his point. So the enemy had to be much 12 larger. 13 HR. BOIES: Is it your contention that Hr. 14 Carver has personal knowledge of what happened when people 15 went out to Vietnam, Hr. Carver did that work, or is he 16 going to be testifying to hearsay? 17 THE COURT: I am sorry. I didn't understand. 18 HR. BOIES: Or is he going to be testifying to 19 hearsay. 20 THE COURT: On what subject? 21 HR. BOIES: As to what the conclusions were 22 about Hr. Adams' stuff. This is not a subject area that I 23 am familiar with, your Honor. 24 HR. BURT: Hr. Carver's testimony, which I have 25 just about finished eliciting what I wanted out of him, was SOUTHE1N DIST1JCT UPOuns. u.s. COUUHOUSE FOLEY SQUAU. NEW you. N.Y. _

16 Carver - direct going to be that he had personal knowledge of what happened. 2 He doesn't recall precisely how he got it. 3 I was going to drop it right there. I wasn't 4 going to spend an hour on 5 THE COURT: Personal knowledge of what? 6 HR. BURT: That the agency sent a team out to 7 Vietnam, that they looked at this question of morale and 8 defection, and they disagreed with the conclusions in the 9 study. 10 HR. BOIES: Certainly when we get to his 11 testimony as to what this team agreed or disagreed that is 12 something that I would have a hearsay objection to, among 13 other things, but certainly a hearsay objection to. 14 HR. BURT: Of course, it was and is within the 15 scop~ of Hr. Carver's duties at the CIA. He was the 16 special assistant for Vietnamese affairs. He was charged 17 with reporting to Helms on what was happening in Vietnam. 18 He testified on that at length yesterday and we will have 19 more testimony on it today. 20 HR. BOIES: It continues to be my view that the 21 mere fact that somebody receives a report in the course of 22 his business, or says he does, does not make that 23 admissible. That is, he cannot come and testify as to 24 hearsay merely because he obtained the hearsay, the oral 25 hearsay, in the course of his business. SOIJTHaN DJSnlCT leporte1s. u.s. COuaTHOUSE POLEY SQUAll. NEW you. N.Y. _

17 Carver - direct 2724 L THE COURT: Well. I am not sure that hearsay is 2 the right point. What is the point as to which you think 3 the hearsay objection is applicable. hearsay as to what? 4 Because he is not offering Adams' study for the truth of S what was in Adams' study. 6 HR. BOIES: Your Honor. as I understand. he 7 hasn't gotten there yet. but as I understand what he has 8 just said. he is going to have this witness testify that 9 people went out to Vietnam. people other than Hr. Carver. 10 and came back and made a given report. That is. he is 11 going to have this witness testify as to the contents of 12 that report. 13 THE COURT: Yes. which presumably he saw or 14 heard. he. Carver. the witness. saw or heard. 15 HR. BOIES: He may have seen it personally or he 16 may not have. We don't have that foundation. Part of the 17 problem is that we are talking about this without knowing 18 what foundation. if any. he can lay with this witness. 19 THE COURT: You're saying the hearsay point is 20 applicable to what the content of the report was. You're 21 saying that this witness is not personally familiar with 22 the content of the report. but relies on the report of 23 others as to what was in the report. 24 HR. BOIES: That is what I take it is the case 2S from what Hr. Burt has said. although I don't know that SOll'THBN DI5nICT aeportns. u.s. COURTIlOUSE POLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW you. N.Y

18 Carver - direct personally, because I have not talked to this witness about 2 it. 3 HR. BURT: Which report are we talking about? 4 We are not talking about the morale study? 5 HR. BOIES: No, we are talking about the report 6 that you say was made by people who went out to Vietnam, 7 whose names we don't know yet, but presumably you will 8 establish the foundation for. 9 I also think this whole line of questioning is 10 irrelevant. 11 HR. BURT: I discussed that. But I hadn't 12 intended to take it any further. 13 HR. BOIES: Than you have already? 14 HR. BURT: Than the next question. 15 THE COURT: What's the next question? 16 HR. BURT: The next question is did you have any 17 knowledge of what conclusions were reached with respect to 18 whether Hr. Adams' report was valid or not as the SAVA, the 19 special assistant on Vietnamese affairs. What I believe 20 his testimony will be 21 HR. BOIES: The answer to that question is 22 either yes or no. 23 HR. BURT: Exactly, yes. And do you recall what 24 they were? Is that where you have a problem? 25 HR. BOIES: Yes. When you get to the question SOU'I'HnN DlsnlCT leponns. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

19 Carver - direct of what were those conclusions, A, I think it's irrelevant, 2 B, I don't think you have at least yet laid a foundation 3 for this witness testifying to it., THE COURT: Well, on the offer of proof at the 5 side bar here I will sustain the objection. 6 (In open court) 7 BY MR. BURT: 8 o. Mr. Carver, did you meet with Hr. Adams prior to 9 his joining your staff? 10 A. Yes. 11 o. Did you discuss what his job, his obligations 12 would be, his duties? 13 A. Oh, you mean just prior to his joining my staff. 14 Yes, of course. jjj ""I 15 o. Can you tell me what Hr. Adams' job requirements 16 were? What did he have to do, what were his duties? 17 A. We had a very small staff. Therefore, I was 18 careful to be sure that everybody understood that everyone 19 was supposed to pitch in on whatever was needed, that there 20 was not this is my job, that's yours. 21 But within that, Mr. Adams' primary 22 responsibility, and the thing that I asked him to work on 23 most, was to keep abreast of the evolving study and 2' discussion of the interpretation of new evidence bearing on 25 how the Vietnamese communists in South Vietnam were SOUTHnN DlsntCT UPOkTnS. u.s. COUknlOUSE FOLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

20 Carver - direct organized, what their strengths were, how their force 2 structure was put together, all of which were matters under 3 active review, analysis and debate. 4 This was his primary field of interest and it 5 was the thing that I wanted him to follow on my behalf to 6 keep me apprised. 7 Q. Did Mr. Adams give reports to you from time to 8 time? 9 A. He did. 10 Q. Were they in written or oral form or both? 11 A. Both. 12 Q. Did you ever send Mr. Adams to represent you at 13 any meetings? 14 A. Several. 15 Q. Can you recall any meetings to which you sent 16 him to represent you? 17 A. I dispatched Mr. Adams I believe to Honolulu to 18 represent me and my staff and be an observer at an order of 19 battle conference that took place in, to the best of my 20 recollection, February or possibly early March of 1967, and 21 then I used him extensively to represent me and sit in as. ; '. 22 an observer of my staff in meetings associated with the 23 preparation of the national intelligence estimate on 24 Vietnam that was put together during the course of Q. When you sent Mr. Adams to the two meetings that SOU1l{BN DlsnJCT lepouas. u.s. COUllnJOU5E FOLEY SQUAll. NEW YOU. N.Y. _ 19'.'020

21 Carver - direct you just referred to did you tell him before he left that 2 he must report back to you? 3 A. Yes, although it was really not necessary, 4 because that was the total -- I mean, I obviously didn't 5 send him -- I sent him for the purpose and the purpose was 6 so that through him I could be kept apprised of what was 7 going on. 8 o. And while Mr. Adams worked for you did he ever 9 read any cables sent to you by others from time to time? 10 A. Frequently. 11 o. Did Mr. Adams' duties include reading documents 12 that were sent to you? 13 A. They did indeed. 14 o. Did Mr. Adams' duties include reading any 15 documents sent to Mr. Helms? 16 A. Occasionally. 17 O. Did you receive information from NSA from time 18 to time? A. 20 O. Did Mr. Adams read any of that informat ion, if 21 you know, while he worked for you? 22 A. Most definitely. In fact, screening such 23 information and flagging particular portions of it for my 24 personal attention was one of his duties. 25 o. Did Mr. Allen ever represent you at any meetings? SOUTHnN DIST1lcr nportns. u.s. couamouse FOLEY SQUARE. NEW yon. N.Y

22 1 A. Mr. Allen? 2 o. Allen. 3 A. Yes, he did. 5 to time? Carver - direct 2729 o. Did Mr. Allen prepare reports for you from time 6 A. He did. 7 o. Did Mr. Allen report back to you after he 8 attended any meeting that you may have sent him to? 9 A. Of course. 10 o. Did you tell Mr. Allen before you sent him to 11 any meetings that he had to report back to you? 12 A. I can't recall doing so, simply because it was 13 not necessary. 14 o. And why wasn't it necessary? Because it was understood that if he was going 16 to a meeting to represent me upon return he should fill me 17 in on what went on at the meeting. That was just the way 18 the staff worked. 19 o. For how long did Mr. Adams work for you, sir? 20 A. Mr. Adams worked for me -- Mr. Adams we are 21 tal ki ng about now? 22 o. Mr. Adams. 23 A. Yes. Mr. Adams worked for me for approximately months, from end of November or early January of until the end of January SOUTHnN DIsnJCT REPOkTBS. u.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAaE. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

23 Carver - direct Q. Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with any part / 2 of Hr. Adams' work for you? A. I was very satisfied with some parts and quite 4 dissatisfied with others. 5 Q. Can you tell me first what parts you were 6 satisfied with? 7 A. Mr. Adams had a great deal of enthusiasm and 8 energy and imagination and was very hardworking, 9 particularly in tackling documents and other donkey work 10 chores that other people might have shied away from. 11 Q. Can you tell me what parts you were dissatisfied 12 wi th? 13 A. Mr. Adams had a great deal of energy which was 14 not always tempered by judgment. Hr. Adams was very prone 15 to jump to conclusions and was very intolerant of people 16 who did not share the conclusions to which he jumped. 17 Q. While Mr. Adams worked for you did any parts of 18 his personality call themselves to your attention? HR. BOIES: THE COURT: Objection. Come to the side bar, please. 21 Are you objecting to this? HR. BOIES: THE COURT: Yes, your Honor. Come to the side bar. (At the side bar) 2S THE COURT: I don't understand the relevance of SOtrrHnN DISTJ.ICT aepouns. u.s. COUUHOUSE FOLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOU:. N.Y. _

24 Carver - direct this proof. I also don't understand as to the prior 2 question, which wasn't objected to. 3 MR. BURT: The question is was Mr. Adams 4 obsessive with respect to this issue and did CBS know it. 5 They talked to Mr. Carver before the show. If Mr. Carver 6 told them that Adams was obsessed, that he was unreliable 7 THE COURT : Did he? 8 MR. BURT:, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Then ask him what he told CBS. 10 MR. BURT: I want to deal with that THE COURT: No. That issue is relevant. That 12 issue is relevant. 13 MR. BURT: All right. 14 THE COURT: I mean it may be relevant. If 15 Carver told CBS things that should have led CBS or did lead 16 CBS to regard Adams as unrel iable, flaky, not to be trusted, 17 that is conceivably a relevant issue. But I don't 18 understand what the relevance apart from that is of 19 Carver's appraisal of Adams. 20 MR. BURT: What I was demonstrating is that this 21 was not a new appraisal, it was something 22 THE COURT: I don't care if it was new or old. 23 The question is whether it's relevant. What is it relevant 24 to? 25 MR. BURT: The relevance is what he told CBS. SOUTHllN DI5T1ICT UPOklUS. u.s. COUkTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAkE. NEW YOll. N.Y. _

25 Carver - direct When he said it I wanted to have a foundation for his 2 having made that statement. 3 THE COURT: It's not a foundation. It may be 4 his foundation, his personal foundation for what he told 5 them, but the only relevance is what he said to them. 6 How long he had believed it or what it was based 7 on is of no significance whatsoever, except to the extent B that he told it to them, isn't that right? 9 MR. BURT: That I don't understand, your Honor, 10 if I may, because if Carver was stating this suddenly in because he didn't like a position Sam was taking, the 12 degree, the weight of what Carver said 13 THE COURT: The weight to whom? 14 MR. BURT: The weight to CBS. If Carver was 15 just angry and said "Look, Adams took this position, I 16 disagreed with it" THE COURT: That's what I am saying. What is 18 significant is what he said to CBS. If he said to CBS 19 "I have for years felt that this guy was totally unreliable, 20 although capable of brilliant intuitions, totally 21 unreliable," that's one thing. If he said to them "I am 22 Bore at him because I didn't have sugar in my coffee this 23 morning" that's something else. But the point is what he 24 told CBS, not what his true foundation was. 25 MR. BURT: I will go on to the CBS question now. SOUTHaN DISTJ.ICT npouns. u.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAIlE. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

26 Carver - direct There is no problem with that. I can go right to it this 2 second. 3 THE COURT: There is the previous question and 4 answer. If he related the same substance as his previous 5 answer to CBS, then it's fine, if that's what he said. But 6 if he didn't relate that to CBS it's really got no point in 7 the record here, the part that he said previously about 8 satisfied about some parts and dissatisfied about others, 9 the substance of the last two or three answers on his 10 apprai~al. 11 Is it your representation that he told all of 12 that to CBS? 13 HR. BURT: The quote that I remember is often in 14 error, never in doubt. Beau mot. Carver tends to speak in 15 epigldms. 16 I thought I had the obligation to show that 17 Carver for sometime had believed this, that the man had 18 worked for him, he had the opportunity to form an opinion. 19 THE COURT: You certainly can show any facts 20 that CBS would have known about how long their association 21 was, so that CBS could judge for itself what the opinion.( '. 22 they recei ved was based on. But as to how long he had held 23 the opinion, it's only relevant to the extent that it was 24 disclosed to- CBS. 25 HR. BURT: Sure. SOtrmnN DISTRICT lepouells. u.s. COUllTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAIE. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

27 Carver - direct THE COURT: If he had held the opinion for 15 2 years but made it sound to CBS as if it were just a trivial 3 matter that he woke up with that morning, what would be 4 important would be what he said to them that day, not what 5 the true fact of his basis was. 6 All right. Let's proceed. 7 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, I will move to strike 8 the witness' last answer. I think the question that he was 9 asked was 10 THE COURT: You mean what he was satisfied with II and what he was dissatisfied wi th? 12 MR. BOIES: Yes, that was the question, and I 13 would move to strike the answer to that question. 14 THE COURT: Yes. I would appreciate it if these 15 objections would be made before rather than after the 16 harmful testimony has been gone into, because it makes it 17 much more probl ema t ic. 18 MR. BURT: Your Honor, could I continue this one 19 more second? 20 MR. BOIES: I take the court's point. I thought 21 when he asked what were you satisfied with, what were you 22 dissatisfied with, he was going to point to particular 23 areas. I think I should have been quicker to perceive the 24 problem. 25 THE COURT: I don't know what would have been SOlJ1llE1N DlSTJlCT lepoubs. u.s. COUl.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAJ.E. NEW YOll. N.Y. _

28 Carver - direct relevant if that had been the question. 2 MR. BURT: This goes to the question of truth of 3 the opinions Mr. Adams had with respect to the SO, the SSO 4 and the size of the enemy. Adams' views were not accepted 5 by Mr. Carver or the CIA back in 1967, and the reason -- 6 THE COURT: You mean the views with respect to 7 the NIE issues? 8 MR. BURT: Yes, your Honor. The reason they 9 were not accepted goes to the question of what reliability 10 Mr. Carver felt Adams had, that there was a good-faith 11 reason for not agreeing wi th him as opposed to some other 12 reason. It's a question both of what CBS knew and of the 13 reason for the position in the SNIE at the time. 14 THE COURT: If you are going to eventually ask 15 Carver whether he agreed or disagreed with the MACV 16 position, whether he believed the MACV position was 17 reasonably taken, unreasonably taken, that kind of thing, I 18 would think that his reasons for whether he did agree with 19 it or didn't agree with it would be relevant. I am not 20 sure to what extent his personal appraisal of Adams as a 21 general proposition is relevant to his appraisal of MACV's 22 position. 23 But I think you better, if you want to offer it 2t for purposes like that, you better present it in a sequence 25 where it's clear what its relationship is to the area that SOUTHBN DISTJ.ICT aepoiltas. u.s. COUllnlOUSE FOLEY $QUAkE. NEW YOkIC. N.Y

29 Carver - direct you contend is in issue. 2 MR. BURT: I will, your Honor. 3 (In open cour t) THE COURT: Members of the jury, I have stricken 5 from the record and you will disregard the last two or 6 three questions and answers, in which the witness stated 7 his personal appraisal of the work of the defendant Adams 8 or of the personality of the defendant Adams. You are to 9 disregard that matter, those last questions and answers, 10 which are stricken from the record. 11 You may proceed. 12 BY MR. BURT: 13 o. Mr. Carver, did there come a time when Mr. Adams 14 ceased to work for you? 15 A. Yes. 16 o. And do you know where he went to work after he 17 left your shop? 18 A. He went to work for a component of the office of 19 economic research. 20 o. And did there come a time when Mr. Adams left 21 the agency? 22 A. Yes. 23 o. Do you know whether Mr. Adams was dismissed or 2. resigned from the agency? 25 A. Mr. Adams resigned, to the best of my SOllTKBN D1ST&JCT llepoj.tas. u.s. COUJ.THOUSE FOLEY SQUAll. NEW YOU. N.Y. _

30 Carver - direct recollection. 2 Q. Did Mr. Adams talk to you between 1968 and the 3 time he left the agency? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Did he ever discuss with you whether he wanted 6 to have General Westmoreland court-martialed? 7 A. The best of my recollection, not at that time. 8 Adams was focused on other people at that time. 9 Q. After Hr. Adams left the agency did you have any 10 further contact with him? 11 A. I occasionally encountered him in a neighborhood 12 grocery store or on the street, but we had only very 13 sporadic and infrequent contact. 14 Q. Did Hr. Adams tell you while he worked for you 15 that he thought HACV had done anyth i ng improper wi th 16 respect to enemy strength estimates? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Can you tell me what Hr. Adams told you at that 19 time? 20 A. The exact words, no. But Hr. Adams was quite 21 incensed with HACV's institutional approach to the order of 22 battle problem and the way it handled some of the data relating to that problem. At that time, however, Hr. Adams' irritation, as I recall it, was focused on the J-2 or intelligence SOlITHERN D1STAICT REPORTERS. u.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y. _

31 Carver - direct component of MACV and not on General Westmoreland 2 personally. 3 o. When you became head of SAVA in 1966 had you 4 heard of a category of Vietcong called irregulars? 5 A. Yes. 6 o. Did you know in 1966 whether this category of 7 irregulars had any subcategories in it? 8 A. Yes, but that was one of the things we were 9 working on in ' o. Can you tell me first, sir, what those 11 subcategories were? 12 A. The term irregulars was sometimes used, the term 13 militia was sometimes used, and the irregular category, 14 although whether this was the case in '66 or became more is the case in '67 I can't recall, came to be broken up or to 16 have two major subcategories, to wit, the guerrillas and 17 the so-called militia. 18 o. When you say the so-called militia, can you tell 19 me whether there were any other names that category had? 20 A. Militia was a slightly elastic and not always 21 very precise term for such things as we subsequently came 22 to discover existed, what the communists called the 23 self-defense forces, secret self-defense forces, et cetera, 24 and militia was the general term used for these components 25 of the communist organization. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

32 Carver - direct o. Can you recall whether CIA was studying or 2. looking at the irregular category in 1966? 3 A. It was. 4 o. Can you tell me what its interest was? 5 A. Its interest was trying to find out how the 6 communists organized themselves, what the various 7 components of their organization were, what roles these 8 components played, missions and functions, and to the 9 extent that our evidence so permitted, what their size, 10 strength, capabilities were. 11 This was a period during which we were learning 12 a great deal about the communist structure and organization 13 as a great deal of additional information and evidence was 14 becoming available, so it was a subject under constant 15 study, review, discussion and modification of judgment. 16 o. Did you know whether in 1966 MACV included the 17 irregular category in its order of battle summaries? 18 A. I know it did in '67 and I am quite sure it did 19 in ' o. Did you have a view in 1966 as to whether the SD 21 and SSO were appropriately included in MACV's order of 22 battle? 23 A. By SO and SSD you mean self-defense and secret 24 self-defense? 25 o. Yes, si r SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK.. N.Y. _

33 Carver - direct A. In '66 I did not have a very strong judgment. 2 o. Can you tell me why you did not have a strong 3 judgme '66? 4 A. Because in '66 we were just beginning to learn 5 about the existence and function of such components _of the Vietnamese communist organization and I had not at that 7 time come to any firm personal opinion of how they were 8 be:s~t~d~e~-s~~c;:rl1;e:ao lc-<loihere within the total organizational 9 picture as we described it they were best put. 10 o. Was anyone else in the intelligence community i n 11 '66 looking at the question of the functions of the so and 12 SSD, if you know? 13 A. Quite a few people, yes. 14 Q. Can you recall who they were? 15 A. Well, Mr. Adams, before he joined my staff and 16 was working with the office of current intelligence, I 17 believe did some work and research on the Vietcong 18 irregulars, Mr. Dean Moore of the office of current 19 intelligence and a couple other of his associates also 20 looked into that problem, there were people in what was 21 known as the collation branch of the Saigon station, the 22 CIA station in Saigon, who did, and there were a number of 23 people in J-2 of MACV who were also researching that 24 problem. 2S Q. Let me turn your attention now, sir, to the SOUTI{ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

34 Carver - direct question of intelligence information in '66 and '67. 2 First, is there a difference between 3 intelligence information and intelligence estimates? 4 A. A great deal. 5 Q. Can you tell me what the difference is? 6 A. Information is raw data. Information is what 7 intelligence officers collect. Intelligence estimates is 8 what they produce after they have sifted, distilled, 9 weighed their data, and the whole intelligence analytic 10 process is one of turning information into intelligence or 11 estimates. 12 Q. Did the CIA prepare any estimates of the size o f 13 the SO and SSO and guerrillas in 1966? 14 A. Yes, but you have to be careful here as to 15 whether you mean estimates as a general term, small E, or 16 whether you mean estimates as capital E, as a formal 17 national intelligence estimate or special national 18 intelligence estimate. 19 Q. I mean small E. 20 A. If you mean small E, yes, it did during '_66 do 21 more than one, to the best of my recollection, estimate of 22 the si ze of such th ing s as the SO and SSO. But remember, 23 this was the period of time during which we were first 24 becoming aware of this, so precisely what estimates were 2S prepared, when during that period, I cannot now recall. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

35 Carver - direct Q. Do you know what intelligence information CIA 2 used to prepare the intelligence estimates you just 3 referred to? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. And can you tell me what information that was? 6 A. It came from a variety of sources. Two of the 7 principal ones were the direct result of allied, 8 principally American, military activ i ty. There were two 9 very large military operations conducted in, as I recall, 10 the summer or fall of 1966, one called Cedar Falls and one 11 called Junction City, which produced an enormous haul of 12 captured communist documents, running into the thousands 13 pages literally. So captured documents, as eventually 14 translated, screened, sifted, so forth, was one major 15 source. 16 Prisoner interrogations were another major 17 source. Documents taken off of prisoners or of bodies, 18 books, organization, diaries, was yet another source. 19 There was some agent, human agent, reporting from the 20 various components of the American intelligence community 21 in Vietnam. And then there was a small degree of inputs 22 from other more sensitive sources, though relatively few at 23 that time, bearing on this particular question. 24 Documents and prisoner reports were our primary 2S sources of information. SOUrnERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW VORK. N.Y. _

36 Carver - direct Q. How did the CIA come to have the documents and 2 prisoner reports? 3 A. They were distributed by MACV, in most instances. 4 Q. Can you tell me approximately 5 THE COURT: Just a second. What did you mean by 6 in most instances? 7 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, there was -- the 8 quantity of material that was provided by the U.S. military 9 Assistance Command in Vietnam, or MACV, was enormous. 10 There was also a certain amount of material provided by, 11 say, the CIA station in Saigon. But the documentary flow 12 and material flow from the Military Assistance Command was 13 ten times if not a hundred times greater than that provided 14 by the Saigon station, which is why I said in most 15 instances. 16 Does that answer your question, sir? 17 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 18 Q. Do you know whether the information that MACV 19 provided the CIA that we are discussing, prisoner of war 20 reports, documents, was supplied by MACV to any other 21 institutions of the government? 22 A. It was supplied to yes. 23 Q. How do you know? 24 A. Several ways. In the first place, actual 25 reports, either relayed electrically or sent by pouch, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUAllE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

37 Carver - direct would have distribution lists on them. There was a 2 constant interchange of those of us in the government who 3 were working on Indochina-related matters. We were 4 constantly discussing the kinds of information. we were 5 working from, and we were principally in this sphere 6 discussing MACV information. 7 MACV's information was as fast as possible and 8 in the case of electrical transmission instantaneously 9 distributed to every other component of the government with 10 any responsibility or official concern for Indochinese 11 affairs. 12 Q. Were there distribution lists on the material 13 that you received from MACV? 14 A. There was a distribution list on much of the 15 material that I received from MACV, yes. 16 Q. Did you ever read one of those lists? 17 A. I read so many of them my eyes glazed. 18 THE COURT: Let me just ask for some 19 clarification. You spoke a few minutes ago of the principal source of information being prisoner interrogations and captured documents, is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor, on the particular subjects that plaintiff's counsel was asking about, yes. THE COURT: Now, when you were just speaking a minute ago about documents with distribution lists SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

38 Carver - direct THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir. 2 THE COURT: -- did that apply to those prisoner 3 interrogations and captured documents? 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. There would be 5 summaries of some of them or the actual text of others 6 would come in. Now, normally, sir, the actual texts would 7 come in by pouch and the summaries would be more likely t o 8 be electrically transmitted by some form of cable. 9 But there was a constant flow from Saigon of 10 both the raw data and the summaries and conclusions based lion the raw data in a veritable stream of information, which 12 is what I was discussing with plaintiff's counsel. 13 Is that clear, sir? 14 THE COURT: And you say that even the raw data, 15 the translations of the documents themselves, had 16 distribution lists which transmitted them to numerous 17 components of our intelligence establishment? 18 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. The way it would 19 work is that a translation of say a particular document 20 would come in wi th a buck sl i p or cover sheet on it, 21 usually of one page, giving its title and listing the 22 various offices to which that particular document had been 23 routed. 24 Is that clear, sir? THE COURT: Thank you. SOUTIlERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK.. N.Y. _

39 Carver - direct BY MR. BURT: 2 Q. Mr. Carver, we were talking and have been 3 talking about the period of A. Right. 5 Q. Now, did the flow of documents that we have been 6 discussing from MACV continue in 1967? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Did it stay the same, increase or decrease from 9 the amount you received in '66? 10 A. Steadily increased. 11 Q. Can you give me an approximation of how much it 12 increased in '67? 13 A. Not with any precision, but there was -- the 14 quantity was always large and it kept getting larger, 15 partly because it was early '67, before many of the 16 documents that were captured in '66 got translated or even 17 cataloged and screened in even a preliminary way. So we 18 were getting the fruits of the '66 collection during the 19 early and middle months of Q. Can you recall whether there was a change in the distribution of the documents that the CIA was receiving? A. I recall no change, no. Q. Did you observe in 1967 at any time any change in the pattern of distribution of information that we have been talking about from MACV to the CIA? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

40 Carver - direct A. None. The quantity increased, but the pattern 2 of distribution did not change. It was broadcast to 3 everyone who had any interest in the subjects being dealt 4 wi th. 5 Q. Did anyone complain to you in 1966 that MAC V was 6 not distributing information, the intelligence information, 7 documents, POW reports, et cetera, that they wanted to them? B A. No. There were some complaints about the speed 9 with which translations were being made, but that's a 10 different subject. 11 Q. Did anyone complain to you in 1967 that 12 intelligence information, documents, POW reports, so forth, 13 were bei ng kept from them? 14 A. No. Frequently the reverse. They claimed they 15 were getting more in their in-box than they could handle. 16 Q. Did anyone ever complain to you that MACV was 17 refusing to give them any intelligence information for 18 which they were cleared? 19 MR. BOIES: Objection, your Honor, unless we 20 have a specification of whether when he says intelligence information he continues to mean documents and POW reports or whether he means something else and has shifted. THE COURT: Overruled. Q. Mr. Carver, let me ask the question again, sir. A. Please do. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK.. N.Y. _

41 Carver - direct Q. Earlier I asked you about whether there was a 2 distinction between intelligence information and 3 intelligence estimates. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. And you described that distinction for me. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. I have been asking you now about intelligence 8 information, the raw data. 9 A. Raw data, certainly. 10 Q. From which the estimate is made. 11 A. Precisely. 12 Q. Now, I am continuing to ask you about 13 dissemination of intelligence information, the raw data. 14 A. Right. 15 Q. Did anyone complain to you in 1967 that MACV was 16 refusing to give them any intelligence information, the raw 17 data, for which these people were cleared? 18 A. Never. 19 Q. Did you have any discussions with MACV 20 representatives in 1967 on the size of the categories that 21 were being carried in the order of battle? And let me put 22 a time frame on that. Prior to September A. 24 Q. Yes. Did any of these discussions ever take place in 25 Saigon? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YOR](. N.Y. _

42 Carver - direct A. One set did, yes. 2 Q. In the course of your discussions with MACV 3 representatives concerning the size of the categories did 4 any MACV representative ever show you a document, the raw 5 data, intelligence information, with which you were not 6 already familiar? 7 A. I can recall no such instance, no. 8 Q. Were you personally ever dissatisfied with the 9 amount of intelligence information, the raw data, that you 10 received from MACV? 11 MR. BOIES: Objection, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Overruled. 13 Q. Sir, do you have my question? 14 A. I have your question. 15 Q. Can you answer it? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Thank you. 18 A. No intelligence officer is ever satisfied with 19 the totality of his data, but I was never dissatisfied with what we got from MACV. There was never any withholding of raw data from anywhere in the community. Q. Thank you. MR. BURT: Your Honor, may we approach the bench for just a minute? THE COURT: Yes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791_1020