Blascak published, was it in your view possible to estimate a. 17 found those categories that guerrillas addressed, and they

Transcription

1 Blascak THE COURT: You want to ask any more questions, 2 Mr. Dorsen? 3 MR. DORSEN: NO, your Honor. 4 MR. BOIES: Just one question. 5 REDIRECT EXA~INATION 6 BY MR. BOIES: 7 Q. In November of 1967, when SNIE was 8 published, was it in your view possible to estimate a 9 reasonable number or range of numbers for the enemy's 10 self-defense and secret self-defense forces? 11 MR. DORSEN: Object to the form, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: What's wrong with the form? 13 MR. DORSEN: possible estimate. 14 THE COURT: OVerruled. 15 A. Absolutely. I think the data wa~ clearly there. 16 If you traced it -- as we traced it back through time we 17 found those categories that guerrillas addressed, and they 18 should have continued to be handled in some reasonable 19 fashion, not simply excluded. 20 MR. BOIES: I have no more questions, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: That's the end of your redirect? 22 MR. BOIES: Yes, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. That concludes the 24 exa'tiination. 25 Mr. Dorsen, you have nothing more? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y

2 "Cooley MR. DORSEN: Nothing more. 2 THE COURT: We will take a break. 3 (Witness excused) 4 (Recess) 5 THE COURT: Mr. Boies. 6 MR. BOIES: Thank you, your Honor. The next 7 evidence will be the testimony by deposition of Colonel B Russell E. Cooley. 9 HQ. Would you state your full na~e for the 10 record, please? 11 "A. My full name is Russell E. Cooley, 12 C OO LEY. 13 "Q. Would you state your current address and 14 telephone number? A. Current address is Prune Tree Lane, 16 Cupertino, California I1Q. Are you currently employed? 18.. A. I am. 19 "Q. And for whom are you employed? 20.. A. I am employed for Daisy Systems in 21 Sunnyvale, California as their facilities manager Q. What does your job as facilities manager entail? "A. I am responsible for all of the facets of facilities, which include maintenance, building and grounds, SOUTHERN DISTR1CT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

3 "Cool ey safety, security, telecommunications, office services. 2 "Q. Would you state for me your e d ucational 3 background? 4 " A. My undergraduate degree was obtained at 5 Clarkson College of Technology in Potsdam, New York. I 6 h a ve a Ba c helor of Science degree. My graduate training 7 was at George Washington University and my.master of 8 Science -- and I have a Master of Science equivalent in the 9 U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. I have had 10 considerable military training. 11 "Q. When did you enter military service? 12 n A. I entered military service in June "Q. And when did you leave the military? 14 " A. 1 september "Q. Could you tell me briefly what jobs you 16 held between 1979 and your present employment at Daisy 17 Systems? 18 n A. I -- immediately upon my departing the 19!TIilitary services in September 1979 I joined Fairchild 20 Ca!TIera and Instrument Corporation. I evolved through 21 several positions to the job of facilities manager, leaving 22 that job two weeks ago, taking my present employment with 23 Daisy Systems Corporation, again, as facilities manager. 24 IIQ. So if I understand you correctly, you were 25 with Fairchild from the time you left the service until SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

4 "Cooley about two weeks ago? 2 11 A. That's affirmative. 3 "Q. DO you recall how many jobs you went 4 through or evolved through before you became facilities 5 manager for Fairchild? 6 II A. Yes. If you would like, I would tell you 7 what the jobs were. 8 "Q I would like that. 9 " A. I joined Fairchild as part of a data 10 processing security team. I joined as a security 11 specialist, if - you will. From that position I became 12 manager of the MIS, MIS stand ing for Management Information 13 Systems, which, for Fairchild, just for the matter of 14 record, is a worldwide data center, a very, very large 15 organi za t ion. 16 "From manager of MIS administration I became 17 manager of corporate services. I then moved to the 18 position of manager of worldwide telecommunications, and 19 finally to facilities manager. 20 "Of note, through my evol ution of posi tions that 21 may be pertinent to this discussion the function of 22 security stayed with me throughout. I carried that and 23 evolved in my upward progression of management positions 24 within Fairchild. Other functions stayed with me also, but I think that may be more pertinent to the issue. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

5 1 "Q. "Cooley 8936 When did you first arrive in South Vietnam? 2 3 II A. October (Continued on next page) SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

6 bs6 1 "Cooley 8937 "Q. What jobs did you hold or positions in Vietnam? A. I held one job during the entire tenure in Vietnam, that of Chief of the Enemy Strength Team, Order of Ba ttle Studies, Order of Battle Branch, Combined Intellige nce Center, known as as CICV, South Vietnam, C I C V, strictly an acronym used for Combined Intelligence Ce nter. in the fall of 1967? "Q. What we re the names of your subordinates "A. The name s of the principal subordinates that worked for me we re Michael Hankins, Bernard Gattozzi, Richard McArthur, Harry Baldwin, Michael Fraboni, and other enlisted subordinates' names not recalled to me at this time. "Q. Now, exactly was it your responsibility to do as chief of the Enemy Strength Team? "A. I functioned as the deputy and day-to-da y leader of the operations of the branch, meaning the OB Studies Branch. I provided the vice counsel direction, support as needed to the analysts subordinate to me. "Moreover, as we were army personnel, I, in effect, within that branch was the senior army officer responsible to the 5l9th Military Intelligence Battalion of which we were a part of. We, meaning the Army officers and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

7 s6 "Cooley enlisted me n In that branch 2 no. I think you testified that there was an 3 organizationa l component called the Order of Battle Studies 4 Branch. And you further testified, as I recollect, that 5 you had an Enemy Strength Team that was part of the Order 6 of Battle Studies Branch. Am I correct so far? 7 "A. Continue on. I will just stand neutral on 8 that until I understand the full line of your thinking. 9 "Q. ',ell "A. Let me clarify some thing that is not as 11 complex as we seem to be getting involved with. The Order 12 of Battl e Studies Branch consisted of a chief of the branch, 13 myself, and this is an order of rank also. I functioned as 14 the deputy. My title, while it may lead one to believe 15 that it was a single entity, that I had a small enclave of 16 a team under me functionally, and this is my point functionally, my responsibilities were to those analysts 18 conducting studies, infiltration, recruiting, guerrillas, 19 and the computation of enemy strength. Computation of 20 enemy strength, mathematical computation. 21 "Q. And Lieutenant Baldwin was in charge of 22 the studies; is that correct? 23 "A. 24 "Q. Affirmative. Lieutenant Hankins was in charge of the 25 infiltration? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

8 ;6 "Cooley ita. Correct 2 nq. Mr. Fraboni was in charge of recruits? 3 "A. Yes. 4 "Q. Mr. Graham in charge of guerrillas? 5 "A. Correct. 6 IIQ. And Mr. Gattozzi was in charge of 7 computing ene~y strength? 8 ita. That is correct. 9 "Q. And this -- what you're saying, I think, 10 is that order of battle studies really consisted of these 11 five individuals you've named; other enlisted men that you 12 don't recall; the deputy to the chief, yourself and the 13 chief of order of battle studies? 14 ita. Correct. 15 "Q. What was the extent in your day-to-day 16 operation as deputy to the chief of Order of Battle Studies 17 in the formulation of estimates of enemy recruitment? 18 ita. Putting it in present day context, I 19 managed their functions, managed their functions in the 20 sense of, along with my superiors, insuring that they were 21 accomplishing their directed tasks that we were meeting the 22 assigned time goals, the suspense dates, that reports were 23 prepared in accordance with proper directives, that they 24 were done on schedule, and overall addressing problems that 25 they may come up with during their analysis. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

9 6 "Cooley Let me further put this in perspective. Our 2 group was small enough that we had a very close interaction 3 on what was going on. While the functional descriptions 4 are clearcut and delineated, we obviously had considerable 5 interplay of bouncing concepts, ideas, thoughts, analytical 6 techniques off of each other. This is a typical analyst to 7 ana lyst environment. 8 nq. What kind of documentation would the 9 United States troops generate that would be useful ita. I will give you one example. There were, 11 I'm sure numbers. But one example, not atypical of any 12 military structure, is documents called a PERINTREP, which 13 is literally intelligence report. There are other 14 documents called the Daily INTSUM, Daily Intelligence 15 Summaries. These documents are produced all the time on a 16 certain schedule basis. These were available to us as we 17 needed them or as we desired to call for them. 18 nq. Who produced the PERINTREP? 19 "A. I honestly don't know. 20 flq. What about the Daily Intelligence 21 Summar ies? 22 ita. I don't know. I'm saying these are 23 documents produced by U.S. forces, U.S. agencies, U.S. 24 activities. 25 "Q. Did you have time in your job to review SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y. _

10 s6 "Cooley all of the sources that Mr. Hankins used in formulating his 2 estimates of enemy infiltration? 3 ita. All of, no. 4 "Q. Did you have time to review some of them? 5 IIA. Absolutely. 6 nq. Did he tend to bring to your attention raw 7 intelligence reports for your {eview? 8 ita. Categorically, what he brought to me was 9 his analysis, which was in turn su?ported with maybe 10 several times of documentations or reports. 11 "Q. Would he bring the documentational reports 12 that supported his analysis to you? 13 IIA. He would generally call me over. The 14 entire room we operated in is not much large than this room 15 we're in right now. 16 "Q. You said Hankins would call you over and, 17 I gather, discuss his analysis? 18 IIA. I didn't sit behind the desk and have 19 somebody come, and it wasn't a formal proforma relationship 20 between us. I was sitting down with one or the other on a 21 continual basis, and I was, with my boss up front on 22 another issue. This 16 hour a day was one of extreme 23 dynamics. There was very, very little sit back kind of 24 relax and let som ebody come to you in either direction. 2S I'm imagining for you a dynamic analytical environment of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y

11 6 "Cooley extreme acti v ity. 2 no. Do you know, sitting here today, what the 3 r e sponsibility of the Current Intelligence Indications and 4 Estimates Division was within MACV J-2? 5 "A. My answer to that will be broad. I was 6 not part of that branch to get into detail, to say exactly 7 function by function. This organization, as I may refer to 8 it from here on, operated in an environment known as the 9 tank, which I, as well as my contemporaries and 10 subordinates, had access to, which dealt with sensitive 11 compartmented information. Their job was to deal with that 12 information, to assess it and put it in intelligence 13 documentation estimates, and the like. 14 IIQ. what wa s the relationship of Order of 15 Battle Studies to the CIIED division? 16 ita. In broad functional terms, what we 17 produced was submitted to that element. There were few 18 exceptions to that, you know, that may have occurred. In 19 general, our product was presented to the CIIED. 20 Specifically, the infiltration and strength. 21 "Q. Was this process you've described of 22 submitting your product at OB Studies to CIIED in effect 23 when you first arrived in Vietnam, or did it begin at some 24 later time? 25 HAlO I would answer that by saying that while SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

12 56 I "Cooley 8943 it most likely was in effect when I arrived, it became the rule rather than the exception upon Colonel Graham's assignment to the CIIED, which occurred shortly after my arriving. "Q. How did this process of submitting what OB Studies produce d to CIIED take place? And just for the sake of clarity, I'm trying to find out what w~s submitted and how it was submitted and to whom it was submitted. "A. The how it was submitted is the answer is a broad spectrum answer. Submission is ranked from one to one or analyst to analyst discussions, to my boss or other officers in CICV meeting with Colonel Graham or his representatives, counterparts on their side, if you will, to draft notes, to strawman-type reports. Strawman meaning in this case a draft, a theme or a draft or an outline. I'm giving you some analogies when I refer to that, to a finished product, where the report was in fact finished and ready to go should it be released. The interphase with CIIED by my officers, and general, those up the line with me, while not speaking for them, was on a very frequent basis for most part, daily, and under many conditions, multiple times a day. "0. Was there information available to any or all of the people in CIIED which was not available to yourself and your analysts in OB Studies? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK.. N.Y

13 6 "Cooley "A. Not to my knowledge. 2 "Q. You say not to your knowledge. Could 3 the re have been such information? 4 "A. The probability that there was is so low 5 it is beyond reason3ble doubt. I say that as a 6 professional intelligence officer having served some twenty 7 years in the business, knowing what the tip-offs would be 8 if other information was there. Tip-offs meaning certain 9 things that pertain to that classification. 10 no. What was your security clearance in the 11 fall of 1967? 12 "A. Subsequent to my arrival in vietnam? 13 "Q. What about at the time of your arrival in 14 Vietnam? 15 "A. TOp secret crypto. 16 flq. What about subsequent to your arrival? 17 "A. I had that plus the security 18 classification allowing access to compartmented information 19 known as special intelligence. 20 "Q. When did you get that clearance for access 21 to-- 22 "A. 23 I. Q. 24 ita. 25 IIQ. Shortly after my arrival in Vietnam. Do you remember how long? Very short. Two weeks? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

14 bs "Cooley 8945 "A. Th at would be a fair statement. I honestly don't know. It would be in a very short period of time. There was no dragging out of this at all. "Q. Did the MACV order of battle summary contain intelligence derived from the compartmentalized or special intelligence? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you know what parts of the MACV order of battle summary contained such information? A. It was inherent in the strength figures, and I would I would f ee l strong in saying, we're a little out of my arena, that it was also in the ground order of battle figur e s. "Q. Isn't it also true that if there were inte lligence in the MACV order of battle summary that r e lied on compartme ntalized intelligence, the MACV order of battle summary could not indicate the source of that particular intelligence or that the intelligence was, in fact, based on these compartmentalized sources? "A. Correct. "Q. Did you understand this in 1967 and 196B? "A. Yes. May I clarify my last answer? I feel your lead is towards a question that if I were reading this the first thing I would ask is the -- if that's the case, how do you get a document out to people that don't SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

15 6 "Cooley have this? 2 And, secondly, may the record show that while 3 you refer to this as the MACV battle of order summary, take 4 a close look at the cover of that document. That's a joint 5 u.s. vietnamese document. It has English language and it 6 has Vietmanese language. It was j~intly produced. Special 7 intelligence was incorporated in that document at a much 8 lowe r classification by incorporating it in the figures. 9 This was not questioned by the Vietnamese. 10 I had stated before, we did not have Vietnamese 11 working in the group that I was in where we had access to 12 this information to do our computations. And another way 13 that it is incorporated is by calling it an estimate. "0. Let me follow up on your answer. How do 15 you get a document out, given the restrictions that we have 16 just discussed? 17 "A. I'll try to make that clear to you, and 18 that is by incorporating it with another you covered up 19 within something else. And in this case of strength and 20 infiltration, it's incorporated in those figures. If 21 somebody were to say, 'Where did you get your figures?' we 22 could tell them the methodology. If somebody said, 'Show 23 me your documentation.' We would now have to say 'There's 24 one package. The rest of it we're going to have to talk 25 about getting access for you are beyond that.' SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. _

16 "Cooley nq. Was it permissible for you to t e ll the 2 Vietnamese in CICV that the re was such a thing as special 3 intelligence? 4 "A. It was not. 5 "Q. So not everybody who asked you for your 6 docume ntation could even be told as much as you've just 7 told me, namely, that that's one packet, this other stuff 8 is classified? 9 IIA. That's correct. 10 "Q. When did you first hear of Mr. Adams? 11 "A. In Vietnam. 12 "Q. How did you happen to here of Mr. Adams in 13 Vietnam? 14 ita. Mr. Adams was a CIA analyst and it became 15 very apparent to me upon arrival in Vietnam that there was 16 that there certainly was open conflict, if not hostility, 17 betwee n CIA and MACV's position concerning enemy strength. 18 I had heard Sam Adams' name bantered around the hall, and 19 the like of which bounced off me at the time. I had not 20 met him but his name was sure familiar to me. 21 "Q. Do you remember approximately when Mr. 22 Adams and Mr. Cri1e met with you for the first time in 23 California, without looking at anything, just, do you 24 remember? 2S "A. It was the day before the filming of my SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y ~1020

17 s6 "Cooley interview. I met with him the day before. We set down and 2 we nt over a very long e vening of discussion and asked at 3 that time if I would be willing to go on camera the 4 following evening, and agreed to that a nd did. 5 "Q. What was the premise that you say was 6 sound as t hey expre ssed it to you? 7 "A. The premise would be that the infiltration 8 figur e s, as we we re producing them, were not ever accepted 9 and reported in the official order of battle, that through 10 t heir independent rese arch they had corne up wi t h enoug h 11 doc um e ntation to bring this forward and set history 12 straight. 13 "Q. Did the y give you an understanding of wha t 14 s e tting history straigh t with respect to the infiltration 15 figures meant to them? 16 "A. No. The term 'se tting history straight ' 17 is mine. I don't recall that as theirs. It struck a 18 favorable chord with me, and I remember having considerable 19 anxiety about becoming public on a broadcast. The very 20 nature of doing that is contrary to a professional 21 intelligence background which in itself dictates what you 22 do is alway s behind the scenes. You're not visible. 23 You'r e not the person in the limelight. That's not the 24 nature of the business. So I felt uncomfortable. 25 I assure you that I put considerable thought SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

18 6 "Cooley into my agreement to go on the program, and I'm using this 2 to -- I will use, at any rate, that I felt comfortable that 3 the premise in which they were operating were of portraying 4 myself, Mike Hankins, my other analysts that are referred 5 to earlier, of our frustration, of our actions, plus all of 6 those involved in this en~ire order of battle operation, 7 that they knew what they were doing in p~~clng it together. 8 "Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Cooley, going 9 back to the fall of 1967, and the early months much 1968, 10 if a senior officer in MACV commanded a subordinate to do 11 something that the subordinate considered a wrongful act, 12 what remedies would that subordinate have? 13 In other words, what courses of action could the 14 subordinate take other than carrying out what he perceived 15 to be a wrongful work? 16 A. The answer to your question the obv ious 17 answer, which I would like to follow with a specific in 18 answer to your question, in specific answer to your 19 question, is the military is a structured organization. 20 You follow a chain of command. You go to your superior who 21 in turn goes to his and so on for resolution of problems. 22 That's the first and foremost thing that any officer or 23 subordinate enlisted man in any military service learns. 24 You always follow the chain of command. 25 "Mr. Murray, in answer to your question, that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y

19 "Cooley 8950 happe ne d. And how did it happen? Our studi e s analyst, Mike Hankins, and this happened right as I arrived, and was my e ye-ope ner, we nt to their boss, Colonel Everette Parkins, who went to his boss, and in this case that happened to be Colone l Charlie Morris, and stated this, stated this is what we're doing. We feel its wrong. It's wrong. Tha t end e d up in a hostile env ironme nt where words were said, and t h e bottom line was -- and it's in the broadcast that Colone l Parki ns, the man who followed the cha in of 10 command, wa s relieved. The term was used on the program, 11 f i red. The impact of that firing on myse lf and the peopl e 12 in just 08 Studies alone was absolutely devastating. I'm answering your question by saying that we followed that chain of command." 15 THE COURT: Let me instruct the jury that the 16 l~st testimony just read is not receive d for the truth of what the witness Cooley says happened to Parkins, but is received only as to Cooley's understanding, his belief as to what happe ned to Parkins, as that may bear on Cooley's behavior and his testimony. Q. "Q. "This Parkins incident happened very early in your tour; is that correct? 23 "A. Certainly did " Q. No~, other than following the chain of command, because I take it it is your testimony here, is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

20 bs6 "Cooley that the chain of command, you felt, was not responsive, 2 other than following the chain of command, what can an 3 officer do if he's ordered to do something that he 4 considers to be a wrongful act by his superior officer? 5 ita. There would be, most likely, two other 6 things. One would be radical, and that is to refuse to 7 carry out the order -- to refuse to carry the order out at 8 the risk of court marshal or other disciplinary action. 9 The other would be to attempt to bring it to 10 other channels that might help resolve that. One of those 11 channels would be the Inspector General channel What did you understand Mr. Crile to mean 13 by the term 'blocked' used in connection with the 14 infiltration reports? And I'm asking you what your 15 understanding was at the time of the interview, what you 16 thought Mr. Crile meant. 17 ita. Going back two years in retrospect to the 18 interview, I would have to say that my assessment of the 19 word 'blocked' followed on to the words that I had used 20 previously, those were being something that had been 21 refused, someth i ng tha t was not accepted. 22 no. And something being refused or not 23 accepted is that also what you meant when you used the 24 word 'blocked' on page 22? 2S tta. I would say that's correct. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y

21 6 "Cooley "Q. But the fact remains, does it not, Mr. 2 Cooley, that you do not know that the persons who refused 3 to acce pt your team's estimates in the fall of 1967 did so 4 in lack of good faith; is that correct? 5 "A. I will repeat my answer that I gave to 6 that moments ago. I do not know what wen t on in their head 7 at the time nor do I nor, I do not know what went on in 8 their head at that time. 9 "Q. Do you r e call that in order for an enemy 10 unit to be listed in the MACV order of battle certain 11 criteria identifying that you needed to be satisfied? 12 IIA. That was not my job nor my specialty, but 13 in answer to your question, ground order of battle, as our 14 work in studies, had to be substantiated through sound 15 methodologies, through sound analysis. 16 "Q. Do you know how long the -- what you 17 described at the top of page 36 as the criteria established 18 as to when you could carry a unit as actually existing in 19 country, how long had those criteria been in effect at MACV 20 J-2? 21 "A. I have no idea. 22 "Q. Do you know if they were in effect before 23 you arrived at MACV J-2? 24 "A. 25 "Q. I do not knoll<. Do you know whether enemy units that did SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y

22 "Cooley not meet the criteria for order of battle acceptance listed 2 in what was marked as plaintiff's deposition exhibit 106, 3 but were known to be or believed to be in South Vietnam, 4 were kept track of in the tank? 5 ita. I don't know the answer to that. 6 "Q. Do you know if units that were believed to 7 be in South Vietnam, but did not meet the criteria battle 8 acceptance as set forth in what was marked as plaintiff's 9 deposition exhibit 106, were kept track of in any other 10 place within MACV J-2? 11 "A. In South Vietnam being key word, I am not 12 aware of any of those. 13 "Q. Isn't it a fact that these analysts felt 14 that there were more enemy in South Vietnam than they could 15 document, using the criteria set forth in plaintiff's 16 deposition exhibit 106? 17 "A. I'm not saying that. I am saying they 18 felt there were more enemy in country than they were loud 19 or permitted to put into the order of battle. 20 "Q. Yes. And they "A. You're asking "Q. Aren't you also saying that they were not 23 permitted to put them in on the order of battle summary 24 because there were these criteria which we have discussed? 25 "A. I am not saying that. I used the criteria SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y

23 6 "Cooley only as.one example, and I stated before that that is only 2 could only be part of many more things. 3 IIQ. NOW, I'm unclear. Are you saying that 4 analysts in ground order of battle told you that they had 5 confirmed units? 6 ita. Had what, please? 7 IIQ. That they had confirmed units of enemy, 8 all the documentation that they needed for that unit to 9 meet the criteria for acceptance in the order of battle, 10 and nevertheless, these units were for months not accepted 11 into the order of battle? 12 A. I am not saying that. I am saying that these 13 are majors, my contemporaries, they were in charge of those corps order of battle analyst teams were telling me 15 that they felt very strong that they had units that they 16 could not add. They were not allowed to add, that they 17 couldn't get J-2 MACV to allow them to add to the order of 18 battle. That's what I'm saying. 19 IIQ. Did those analysts tell you why they 20 couldn't get J-2 MACV to allow them to add these units to 21 the order of battle? First, I'm just asking you, did they 22 tell you why? 23 I1A. I don't recall if they did. I reiterate. 24 I did not of the time, given the nature of my duty and the 25 magnitude of what we were doing, to get into that type of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

24 s6. "Cooley dialogue with them. I would direct you to the Norman 2 Houses, to the Frank Harradas for that answer. 3 no. You did say to Mr. Crile, quote, that to 4 get a highe r estimate through you had to have absolute 5 unque stioned documentation to that unit holdings, you did 6 s a y that, did you not? 7 ita. Stand on my former answer that it's out of 8 context. 9 ItQ. I'm not asking you to explain it just now. 10 I'm only asking you whether you in fact said that? 11 "A. I stand on my previous answer. It's out 12 of context. 13 "Q. You don't have any doubt that you said 14 what's written on this p age, do you? 15 IIA. I have doubt as to the interpretation of 16 your question. 17 ItQ. Well, we can get to the interpretation. 18 But I'd like to go one step at a time. You don't really 19 have any doubt that you said that to get a higher estimate 20 through you, you had to have absolute unquestioned 21 documentation to that in unit holdings? 22 "A. What I said in context is, that you had to 23 have unquestioned documentation and you had to have other 24 things that I was not -- there may have been other 25 requirements, other document, other requirements that I'm SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

25 s6 "Cooley not familiar with, not being in that shop. I said that 2 throughout this particular part of the transcript of that 3 broadcast. 4 "Q. But you didn't say all that here on page n this particular answer, did you? 6 "A. I have answered. I feel I have answered 7 your question clearly. 8 "Q. Did you understand yesterday and the day 9 before tha t during this deposition that you had an 10 obligation, and I think you did answer this, but I just 11 wa nt to be clear -- that you had an obligation to answer my 12 questions truth truthfully to the best of your ability? 13 ita. I do. 14 "Q. And you understand that even if a 15 particular answer in your mind may help one side, help 16 another side, hurt one side, hurt another side, that 17 doesn't relieve you of the obligation to.answer truthfully 18 to the best of your ability? 19 IIA. I assure you beyond a reasonable doubt 20 that anything I have said here is my answer, my information. 21 I want to remove any doubt of having been coached, prompted 22 or otherwise being led into providing answers that will be 23 favorable to one side or the other. 24 "Q. Do you know how big approximately, how 25 many men, that is approximately, were in the average SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

26 s6 "Cooley Vietc~ng main force battalion? 2 "A.. I'm sure I did at that time. I don't know 3 if I know at this time. 4 "Q. Does the number 600 sound unreasonable? 5 t1a. I wouldn't speculate on that. 6 "Q. All right. Would you agree that a 7 battalion of Vietcong main force troops is a fairly 8 formidable entity in military terms? 9 tla. No. I will qualify the answer to that 10 with a" no, because I do remember very, very clearly that 11 just because it was called a battalion did not necessarily 12 mean it represented a particular number of people. There 13 were incidents and instances where battalions were not, in 14 fact, up to battalion strength. It obviously depend upon 15 the condition of that battalion. If it was back into a 16 rest/ recovery/ refit/ regroup, it certainly isn't a 17 formidable fighting force. 18 "Q. Is it also true that there were 19 differences in the fighting capability of different enemy 20 battalions because of factors such as the experience of the 21 particular battalion in combat? 22 ita. I have no way to assess that question. 23 "Q. Were not some enemy organized units better 24 fighters than others? 25 UA. You know, where I work, we didn't keep a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

27 ;6 "Cooley t a lly chart on the number of stars that we assigned to the 2 ef f e cti veness of each of these units. Th a t was not our job. 3 "0. A fully equipped, up to strength Vietcong 4 ma in force battalion, would you consider that -- in general 5 terms ~- a fairly formidable fighting unit? 6 IIA. I stand by my previous answer. I'm not in 7 a position to address tha t. 8 "Q. Do you know if Colonel Morris was at the 9 briefing? 10 ita. That particular one? I doubt it. It was 11 within the CICV. I'm not sure Colonel Morris ever came to 12 CICV. I'm not stating that out of context. Colonel Morris 13 worked in the MACV headquarters. 14 "Q. Did Colonel Graham ever come to CICV, t o 15 your knowl edge? 16 "A. Not to my knowledge. If he did, it was it would have been very, very remote, very, very infrequent, 18 for some special briefing. Never, to my knowledge, was he 19 in the Order of Battle Studies Branch to my knowledge. 20 "Q. Did you ever ask anybody at all, at any 21 time, why Morris and Graham never came to CICV? 22 I' A. That certainly would have been a very out 23 of place question -- out of place question because the 24 answe r is quite implicit. They were a higher headquarters. 25 They operated in their own circles. I also stated a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791~1020

28 bs6 "Cooley ' buffering issue. There were lots lots and lots of people 2 in that headquarters. Colonel Morris had an entire office 3 of people outside of his office of administrators and the 4 hole punchers and staple punchers and the like. One 5 wouldn't necessarily expect that they would remove 6 themselves from that nor did they do that on a frequent 7 basis, if at all. 8 "Q. When did you first hear of Gains Hawkins? 9 "A. Again, I cannot be specific on the date. 10 Gains Hawkins is an intelligence professional. The 11 inte lligence community, the Military Intelligence Community, 12 those of us -- now it is known as the Intelligence and 13 Security Command, INSCOM over the years, as you would 14 expect of any organization, it gets smaller and smaller in 15 terms of reputations and nothing knowledge of people, in 16 that you have served with them in prior assignments and 17 you've heard of them. 18 "while I had not served a prior assignment with 19 Gains Hawkins, I knew of him and of his reputation of which 20 he was extremely well thought of. He was looked upon as a 21 very competent professinal, one to be admired. I 22 subsequently met Gains Hawkins after that, very briefly, at 23 Fort Holabird long before the case or any research started." 24 (Continued next page) 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y

29 "Cooley IIQ. Other than looking for the names of 2 persons who may have been in MACV intelligence or known 3 something about MACV intelligence in 1967 and '68, which 4 you mentioned in your previous answer Mr. Crile and Mr. 5 Adams were seeking from you, what was it as best you can 6 recall that Mr. Crile and Mr. Adams wanted from you in your 7 pre taping discussions? 8 "A. Mr. Crile and Mr. Adams came to me both as 9 researchers putting together a program that looked back years into history. They obviously had talked to a certain 11 number of people. 1: "I will add three other people to those names 13 that 1 had given you before, since we had replayed the 14 question of peo~le they had talked to in addition to 15 Gattozzi and the Jim Meacham letters, as we'li refer to 16 them. 1 believe, as 1 recall now, some two years later, 17 they spoke to Fraboni, 1 believe it was Mike Fraboni, and 18 John O'Donnell and Lieutenant McArthur, all within the 19 organization that 1 "belonged to. 20 "I believe 1 had stated a day or two ago also 21 that they impressed me with the knowledge -- the amount of 22 research that they had done, again, trying to imagine my 23 surprise some 15 years later of two individuals -- Crile 1 24 obviously had never met before, and Sam Adams, knowing him 25 by his reputation, and as 1 think I've stated, possibly SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

30 "Cooley seeing him at a briefing or two, but not ever having been 2 on a by name basis with him relationship my surprise at 3 their tremendous familiarity with the subject and the fact 4 that they ~ad talked to the other individuals, and making a 5 comment to me that they had been, in essence, in their 6 research coming across my name for some at least, Sam 7 probably made this comment specifically for some three 8 years he ~ad been coming across my name and was very 9 pleased and very happy to finally have met me in person. 10 "That first evening was a dialogue kind of back 11 and forth feeling me out to see how well I recalled things. 12 There were certain eues given to me, as you might expect, 13 such as how well do you remember what was happening, tell 14 us what happened with the Parkins firing, is a good example. 15 "How they used that in their context and how 16 they wrote it up was their business. Why they asked it and 17 their modus operandi Of integrating of what I said with 18 other text I have no knowledge of. 19 "I do know that in that specific case of the 20 Parkins firing what I said and the way it came out on the 21 program was certainly not altered. It was, in fact, 22 correct. I would feel very, very certain that they 23 substantiated ~hat either before or after with the Hankins 24 Mike Hankins, who was there at the time, and Bernie 25 Gattozzi, who was there at the time, such as myself during SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y

31 "Cooley that incident. 2 "The -- I think there's a shade of gray in here 3 to say whether they were asking me questions along only one 4 track or another track. They were in a research mode, 5 trying to gather facts, trying to assess, my knowledge. I 6 certainly at that time was open enough t o say I have a good 7 memory of this or I'm sorry, I don't recall. 8 "You might expect that given the significant 9 time that has elapsed since events of and just 10 entering into a" MR. BOIES: May I have just a moment, your H6nor? 12 Your Honor, can we approach the bench for a 13 moment? 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. BOIES: (Reading): "just entering into a discussion, as you and 17 I might trying to go back to early college days or 18 something -- and I'm using that figuratively -- that it's 19 going to jog some thoughts into my mind to say sure, I 20 remember that, and by the way, let me tell you. 21 "Subsequent to the broadcast I had probably come 22 up with several more things. We mentioned a name the other 23 day of Colonel Crysanowski. That is a very new name. I 24 couldn't remember his name as taking Colonel weiler's place 25 as chief of the order of battle branch. SO UTHER N DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

32 "Cooley "I'm leaving that as the matter -- I'm leaving 2 that as the answer to your question. 3 "0. When you said a moment ago that Hankins 4 and Gattozzi were there at the time in reference to the 5 Parkins firing did you mean to say that Hankins and 6 Gat tozzi were in the room where the confrontation between 7 Morris and Parkins took place? 8 tla. I'm saying that Hankins, Gattozzi and 9 myself were in the order of battle studies. At the time I 10 answered that question I don't know whether they were 11 physically up with Colonel Morris or in that vicinity or 12 not. 13 "I stand corrected. To me inside the office 14 meant inside the director of intelligence productions 15 office. It contained within it Charlie Morris' office, his 16 deputy, and then a very large open area which had his 17 administrative officer, several clerks', fil ing people and 18 the like, a very large area. That's how I defined office 19 to it. 20 "It, again, was an extremely powerful, 21 psychologically-affecting thing that one tends to remember 22 after 14 or so years have passed, especially for someone 23 fairly new on board, as myself. 24 "Gattozzi, Hankins and Parkins were very close. 25 They worked very close together for some period of time SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

33 "Cooley before I arrived. They worked very close on producing the 2 strength figures, Gattozzi and Hankins, the infiltration 3 figures, which went hand-to-hand. 4 "In fact, the methodology have been referred to 5 and Bernie very respectfully refers to it or the Parkins 6 methodology for doing this. 7 "The comment I made on the show of the impact 8 I'll stand on and elaborate here even further. To 9 substantiate the information, I do state and have stated 10 that while I was not in the office where this occurred, let 11 me portray for you very, very clearly the office that I 12 describe, the office of the director of intelligence 13 production, which contained Charlie Morris' office, his 14 deputy, and a large area. 15 "The offices in which Charlie Morris were -- was 16 in, along with his deputy, were of a very thin wall 17 construction. In today's parlance it would be known as 18 post and panel construction. It did not even reach the 19 ceiling. There was a sort of a mesh or filigree type of 20 woodwork at the top which allowed airflow through. 21 Certainly sound attenuation was nil. It was -- you could 22 hear most all of what went on in his office without having 23 to quiet the room down to listen. 24 "During that particular incident -- and here 25 again we'll just refresh what -- to make sure we're talking SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

34 "Cooley about the same thing. This was the incident in November 2 where Colonel Parkins brought into Charlie Morris a report 3 containing figures of enemy strength and infiltration that 4 Charlie Morris refused to accept. That confrontation 5 ensued into a conflict leading to Colonel Parkins' firing, 6 terminating, being relieved from his duties. This is 7 something that hasn't happened or doesn't happen in 8 military terms very often. When it does you can be sure of 9 the impact and how it travels. 10 "1 believe 1 stated in my interview that that 11 information came back to CICV before Colonel Parkins 12 returned. There were numbers of people who had heard t~at 13 outside of the office anc phoned that back down. It 14 literally traveled like wildfire." 15 THE COURT: Once again, as 1 said before to the 16 jury, Colonel Cooley's testimony as to how Colonel Parkins 17 came to be fired is not received for the truth of what' 18 Colonel Cooley said a~out that. 19 As Colonel Cooley himself says, he wasn't there, 20 he didn't observe it, he didn't hear it, and it's not 21 received as to the truth of how and why Colonel Parkins was 22 fired, it is received simply as to the fact that this is 23 what Colonel Cooley says he believed and understood 24 happened, insofar as that may bear on Colonel Cooley's 25 actions and Colonel Cooley's testimony. SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

35 "Cooley MR. BOIES: (Reading): 2 no. The only thing I want to find out from you, 3 Mr. Cooley -- what I want to find out from you, Mr. Cooley, 4 is did you think prior to your interview with Mr. Crile and 5 Mr. Wallace that the events of 1967 and 196B in Vietnam had 6 not been, to your knowlege, accurately presented to the 7 public concerning Vietnam? 8 ita. I left that tour in Vietnam feeling that 9 we may never be able to reconstruct accurately what 10 happened pre-tet in terms of what we were doing, and that 11 is this enormous influx of so~e 100,000 North Vietnamese 12 regulars, this order of battle or official documentation 13 not 'limiting it to that showing considerably lower figures, 14 that we may. never reconstruct how the Tet offensive 15 occurred. 16 "Q. What I was really asking you was did you 17 testify that when you left Vietnam you were of the opinion 18 that the history of let us say intelligence, MACV 19 intelligence, during your tour prior to Tet had not been 20 accurately reported as of the time you left Vietnam? 2l ita. I left with the feeling that not only was 22 history not accurate, but there was a deliberate action of 23 blocking accuracy, of blocking the truth, that didn't get 24 through. That's what made it distasteful. The word 25 disgust amplifies those words. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

36 "Cooley "I can go over that and over that of my feelings 2 of the -~ what we did, we felt so strong. It was true. It 3 was documented. We had the clearance. 4 "I opened with that this morning. We produced 5 these numbers that were -- we were not told why these 6 numbers were reject.d, these high, high, high infiltration 7 numbers. 8 flq. Do you know how long after you arrived in 9 Vietnam Colonel Parkins left? 10 I. A. Specifically, no. Shortly thereafter. 11 Jim Meacham is basically who I remember as my boss. 12 nq. Was 13.. A. Jim Meacham fell right in behind Ev 14 Parkins. 15 no. Did you happen to see Parkins at any time 16 the day before he left Vietnam? 17 ita. I don't recall. I may have. I do not 18 recall. What I do recall is great emotion around this, 19 emotion because he was extremely well thought of. I know 20 Bernie and Mike Hankins were very disturbed about this, 21 very, very upset. I don't know. 22 "Q. Let me focus your attention once again on 23 Plaintiff's Deposition Exhibit 106, the November-December 24 order of battle summary. 25 "Do you know whether the monthly order of battle SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y _1020

37 "Cooley summary had wide distribution among United States 2 government agencies during your tenure at MACV? 3 ita. Objectively, I don't know the answer to 4 that. I notice from the cover of this that you retrieved 5 it from the library of the Army War College periodicals. 6 Army War College usually retains documents of some 7 magnitude and significance. 8 "I don't know what the distribution -- I didn't 9 ever see a cover letter, or at least that I can remember, 10 of this document going out. 11 "This certainly would represent the official and 12 it has been referred to in this deposition from day one as 13 the official MACV oreer of battle. 14 "I pointed out to you at that time the other 15 symbol on the left-hand part of the page, which was don't ever forget that this was also the official order of 17 battle of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. 18 IIQ. Did you ever talk to a division level 19 combat commander for the purpose of asking them what use 20 they made of reports like that monthly order of battle 21 summary? 22 "A. No, I did not. I was not a contemporary 23 with the division level commander. I was contemporary with 24 other division level friends. And while we're talking, I 25 remember one which at the time was Captain Dan Larsen with SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

38 "Cooley the 25th Infantry Division in Cochin at the time. He 2 wasn't a contemporary. He was a captain. We were maybe a 3 year, year and a half apart. And that I'll put that 4 name in. I haven't ever talked to him since, or if it was, 5 it was so long ago, no idea where he was. 6 "That's the. type of interface I would have with 7 people, either on a friend basis, social basis. The nature 8 of my job particularly wasn't to go out and travel around 9 the country during this tour. 10 "Q. I want to show you a document that has 11 been marked as Plaintiff's Deposition Exhibit 229. Now, if 12 you would take a moment to peruse the document and let me 13 know when you're finished. 14 tla. Okay. 15 "Q. Mr. Cooley, does the document I've placed 16 in front of you and which we have marked as Plaintiff's 17 Deposition Exhibit 229 look familiar to you? And when I 18 say familiar, maybe not that particular document, but that 19 format. 20 UA. Based on the period of time that has 21 passed, I cannot say that. There -- through that time 22 frame there were literally hundreds of documents 23 referencing infiltration and the like. There was a report 24 produced called the monthl y report of inf il tration. 25 Whether it was in fact this document or another one, I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N,Y,

39 "Cooley really can't tell. 2 "0. Do you remember testifying, to sum it up, 3 that Mr. Hankins had particular methodology for computing 4 or estimating enemy infiltration in the fall of 1967? 5 "A. Yes. 6 no. Could you tell me in as much detail as you 7 can what Mr. Hankins' methodology in the fall of 1967 was 8 for computing or estimating infiltration? 9 "A.. Lieutenant Hankins was an intelligence 10 analyst, as we've described before, that worked in the 11 particular branch that I was assigned to. As such, his job 12 was to develop information on enemy, that is, North 13 Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. In doing so, 14 as an analyst, he must read, assimilate all sources of 15 information. And I use the term all sources as a very 16 specific point here that we've discussed in the term of 17 all-source intelligence. 18 "Lieutenant Hankins was exposed to, on a 19 continuing and daily basis, information that was available 20 at the MACV headquarters in the area known as the tank,,21 which was the specialist intelligence all-source area. 22 "We are exposed to all information coming in 23 from bilateral sources which would relate to U.S. forces 24 and their intelligence summaries, their periodic 25 intelligence reports, captured documents, interrogation SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S, COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N, y,