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1 "t APt SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE w UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., GEORGE CRILE, MICHAEL WALLACE and SAMUEL A. ADAMS, Defendants x (In open cour t) 82 Civ PNL October 31, :00 a.m. 15 THE COURT: Call the witness and the jury, please. DANIELO. GRAHA!'1 (Jury present) resumed. 19 THE COURT: Good ~orning. We will now proceed with the direct examination of General Graham. you may proceed. ~R. MURRY: Thank you, your Honor. CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION BY I"IR. MURRY: Mr. Murry 25 Q. General Graham, were you aware in August of 1967

2 Graham - direct that a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in progress? 3 A.. Yes, I was \~ 15 ri, ' ' ~i Q. Did you participate in any of the Special National Intelligence Estimate sessions that were held in Langley,~~-,,-r~~~~t of 1967? 1967? NO, I did not. ~~~-~..,-'.. '. ~----~l-d you travel to the United States in August of not. ~ ""JI.f,I.W~.t.Q....turn now, General Graham, to the subject of infiltration of enemy forces from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in the period of Let me ask first as part of your responsibilities as head of current intelligence indications and estimates were you required to monitor enemy infiltration into South Vietnam? A. Yes, I was. Q. Could you describe for me briefly what the sources o f information you had on enemy infiltration in South Vietnam? A. There were several sources on infiltration. One was captured enemy documents that showed that people had come in, added to various units and so forth. Another one was -- and one of the best sources -- SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N, y, _

3 Graham - direct 1860 was captured personnel that would then tell us when they had entered the country and in how big a group and then there were NSA sources which also indicated that infiltration was going on but could not tell us what the numbers were involved -- numbers of infiltrators. Q. Did there come a time in 1967 when you became aware that enemy units had begun to relocate within North Vietnam? A. Yes. In September of I believe September 1967 there was some movement of some large units, division-si e units in ~orth Vietnam, some of them moving in the direction of South Vietnam and then stopping, others moving in other directions and one of the possibilities was that those units were headed for Vietnam, although in September it was not clear to me that that was the case. Q. This movement you've just described, did that constitute infiltration at that time? A. No, it did not. Subsequently those units came on into North Vietnam -- into South Vietnam and even then it was something of a logic problem as to whether it should be called infiltration because it was, in essence, an invasion across the border of almost three divisions. Q. Did there come a time in 1967 when you learned that THE COURT: Just a second. Let me just ask SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U,S, COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y,

4 Graham - direct about that last question; 2 ~hat do you mean by the word "infiltration"? 3 If you say there was a problem, whether this 4 should be classed as infiltration, what is your definition 5 of infiltration? 6 THE WITNESS: Well, the formal definition was 7 any North Vietnamese unit -- personn~l crossing the border 8 into South Vietnam, your Honor. 9 But the connotation of infiltration is sneaking 10 peo?le into the country, not coming in with large units. 11 So there was some wonderment amongst ourselves 12 out in Vietnam as to whether we ought to count that as 13 infiltration or something else, an invasion. 14 Q Did there come a time when you reached the 15 belief that some or all of the enemy units you were talking 16 about earlier were, in fact, moving towards South Vietnam? 17 A. Yes. In January it became pretty evident that 18 those people were going to come into South Vietnam. As a 19 matter of fact, some of the lead elements, as I recall, had 20 crossed over. 21 So we were by that time quite sure that they 22 would come in and counted them as part of the order of 23 battle in South Vietnam. 24 Q. 25 come? ~here in South Vietnam did these enemy units SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

5 Graham - direct A. Well, they came just around the east end of the 2 demilitarized zone, the border between South Vietnam and 3 North Vietnam or came right through the demilitarized zone. 4 That's how they got there. 5 Q. what part of North Vietnam did they come through? 6 A. That was in the far northeast corner of South 7 Vietnam, around the marine fire base of Khe Sanh. 8 Q. Did?ersonnel in current intelligence 9 indications and estimates report the movement of these 10 units outside of ~ACV headquarters? 11 A. Yes. We reported it when the first movement 12 took place in September. lie kept very close track of those 13 divisions and any movement they made we reported and we 14 certainly reported it when they came into Vietnam. 15 Q. Did you see any evidence in the fall of 1967 of 16 infiltration of enemy forces on the order of magnitude of 17 20,000 per month in September, October, November and 18 December of 1967? 19 A. No. There was no indication of that. It was 20 running at a fairly steady rate, a good deal lower than 21 that. 22 Q. Let me turn to the subject of the Tet offensive, 23 General Graham. 24 Were you still assigned to MACV J-2 at the time 25 of the Tet offensive? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

6 Graham - direct A. Yes, I was. 2 Q. Did you still hold the post of chief of current 3 intelligence indications and estimates at the time of the 4 Tet offensive? 5 A. I did. 6 Q. Do you have a definition of what constitutes the 7 Tet offensive of 1968? 8 A. Well, the offensive actually occurred on January 9 31st and the 1st of February. That was t he main assault. 10 That's what I would call the offensive. 11 Now, after those two days the affair dragged out 12 and I believe that. for purposes of campaign ribbons and so 13 forth the Tet offensive or Tet campaign was several months 14 long in the record books. 15 But the offensive itself really took place in 16 two days. We were a bit surprised that they couldn't pull 17 it off simultaneously. We think that their orders got 18 mixed up some because they attacked first in the northern 19 two corps and the next day in the southern two corps and we 20 believed that the intention would be for them all to attack 21 simultaneously on one day. 22 Q. Do you know how many casualties the enemy 23 suffered at the Tet offensive? 24 A. Well, I know that the original -- how many 25 casualties? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORT ER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

7 Graham - direct Q. How many casualties the enemy suffered? 2 THE COURT: I don't think that's a proper form 3 of a question. You can ask him what were the most reliable 4 indicators that he was aware of as to the casualties. 5 These are not things that one can know as an absolute fact. 6 Q Did you ever see any estimates of casualties the 7 enemy suffered during the Tet offensive? 8 A. Yes. The first and most obvious kind of 9 casualty were killed, enemy killed. And in the first two 10 days some 27,000 enemy were killed in their attack. 11 There were also easily counted casualties such 12 as captured, because we captured some 2,000 to 3, I'm 13 not sure of the precise figure -- and then we added some 14 defections of people who just ran away from the fight to 15 the allied side. 16 In our view of total casualty, though, included 17 our estimate of how many would have been wounded so 18 severely that they were not going to get back into action 19 right away or maybe never get back into action and the 20 factor we used on that, and it is a factor based on 21 experience out in Vietnam, was that there would be about 22 one casualty failing to return to action for every three 23 KIA, that's for every three dead there would be one 24 severely wounded. 25 Now, we couldn't -- we had to be careful with SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

8 Graham - direct lb65 1 that as the Tet offensive because we knew of instances 2 where Vietcong units would attack in such a strange way 3 that they would lose everybody, either captured or killed. 4 I remember one instance where the Vietcong 5 didn't realize it was going to be a battle and tried to 6 march into a town up near Nha Trang in parade formation and, 7 of course, the South Vietnamese were not going to let them B march into town that way and they literally wiped out the 9 entire unit. 10 So we had to be a bit careful in applying that. 11 Our estimate for the first two days was around 42,000 total 12 casualties for the enemy force. 13 Q. Do you recall discussing the Tet offensive 14 during your interview with Mike Wallace prior to the CBS 15 broadcast? 16 A. Prior to the CBS broadcast? 17 A. Yes. When Mr. Wallace called me at my offices IB in Washington I said that I would submit to an interview if 19 in the show THE COURT: The question is simply whether you 21 recall having discussion about the Tet offensive. 22 THE WITNESS: The answer to that is yes. 23 Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Wallace that you 24 considered the Tet offensive a maximum effort by the 25 Vietcong? SOUTHERN DI STRI CT REPORT ERS. U.S. COURTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

9 Graham - direct A. Yes. 2 Q. What did you mean by that. a maximum effort by 3 4 the Vietcong? iby 5 Well. we knew at the time of the Tet offensive A. A maxi~um effort? 6 that they were literally scraping the bottom of the barrel. 7 We knew that because we were killing and capturing ~ tcong 8 soldiers. enemy soldiers. who had serious wounds that still 9 had the stitches on them and yet they had taken them out of 10 hospitals. or wherever they were. and thrown them into the 11 f i ght. 12 We also knew that they had quickly impressed 13 young villagers as they came. for instance. towards Saigon 14 or Kontum or one of the other cities and given them weapons 15 and the y didn't even have time this to tell them how to 16 operate the weapons. 17 As a matter of fact. many of the weapons weren't 18 even out of their protective covering. like we call it 19 cosmoline. It's a thick grease. When you got a weapon in 20 storage. you put it in a grease so it doesn't get rusty 21 so forth. 22 These poor kids had these we apons and had no 23 idea how to use them or either thre~ down the weapon and 24 ran away and many of them got killed not even knowing how 25 to operate their weapon. We knew there was an all-out SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUA RE, NEW YORK. N.Y

10 Graham - direct effort. They threw everything they could muster into that 2 battle and to me that was a strong indication -- and this 3 was the point I wanted to get across to Mr. Wallace -- that 4 if the total attacking force was no greater than 85,000, 5 we ll t hat doesn't prove how many VC -- how many enemy 6 troops ther~ were in Vietnam. 7 It certainly suggested that t h e figure t h at the 8 command out there held of 250 to 300,000 was in the 9 ba l lpark, where a figure twice t hat or 600,000 was simply 10 out of the question. 11 Q. Did you in the course of your duties at MACV 12 ever s e e any estimates of the size of the attacking force 13 at Tet offensive? 14 A. Yes. 15 MR. BOIES: Objection, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Just a second. 17 MR. BOIES: Objection, move to strike for lack 18 of evidentiary foundation and it calls for a conclusion of 19 the witness. 20 MR. MURRY: I merely asked him if he saw any 21 estimates. 22 MR. BOIES: He then went on to answer after he 23 answered yes or no. 24 THE COURT: Limit yourself to answering the 25 questions asked. The objection to -the question is SOUTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK. N.Y

11 Graham - direct overruled. If there is an objection to the answer, it's 2 sustained. 3 Answer only what's asked and if counsel wants 4 more of you he'll ask you a further question. 5 THE WITNESS: All right. 6 Q. What was the largest estimate you ever saw the 7 attacking force at the Tet offensive? 8 A. 84,000 men. 9 Q. General Graham, did you see the CBS broadcast 10 The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, when it was 11 aired? 12 A. Yes, I did. 13 Q. Do you recall a discussion in that broadcast of 14 something called the data base? 15 A. Yes, I do. 16 THE COURT: Hold on a second before you go on to 17 that. 18 Nhen you say the largest estimate that you ever 19 saw of the attacking force at Tet -- what was your figure 20 84? 21 THE WITNESS: 84, THE COURT: Now, do I understand you are using 23 the word Tet offensive, the way you are answering to that 24 question, the way you used it a few minutes ago to refer to 25 the first two days of fighting? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

12 Graham - direct THE witness: That's right. 2 THE COURT: That's what you mean by the 84,000? 3 THE witness: That's right, your Honor, the 4 maximum effort in the campaign. 5 Q. 1 was asking you, general, did you recall a 6 discussion in the broadcast of something called the data 7 base. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Were you aware in 1968 as to whether CICV used a 10 co~?uter with respect to its order of battle work? 11 A. Yes, I was aware. 12 Q. Let me ask you, general, did you ever attempt to 13 erase any data that was stored in the CICV computer? 14 A. I did not. IS Q. Did you ever attempt to destroy any order of 16 battle information that was held by CICV? 17 A. I did not. 18 Q. Do you recall attending any meetings in 1968 in 19 which the subject of order of battle information held in 20 CICV's computers were discussed? 21 A. Yes, I do. 22 Q. Do you recall what that meeting was about and 23 what transpired at it? 24 A. This was a meeting that occurred right after the 25 Tet offensive. The very heavy casualties known to have SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

13 Graham - direct been suffered and estimated to have been suffered by the 2 enemy was causing some severe bookkeeping problems at CICV. 3 The real problem was where do you assess those 4 casualties, who took the casualties? In some cases, of 5 course, you knew because you knew what unit and h ow many 6 people they had lost from the unit. 7 But in a lot of other cases you weren't sure who 8 those people were, whether they were from one of the 9 irregular forces or whether they were irregulars tha t had 10 been pressed into service with one of the main and local 11 force units. 12 So it was -- they had a problem over there and 13 the meeting was to determine how to solve that problem, 14 where to apply those casualties. 15 Q. Did you make any recommendations with respect to 16 the solving of this problem you say they had at CICV? 17 A. Yes, I did. My recommendation was to follow the 18 methodology of input/ output analysis, that is, to assess 19 units on the basis of which ones had been committe d and 20 known to be committed first and then to make the logical 21 assumption that other units who had been hurt and then 22 moved away had probably drawn down further on the guerrilla 23 base to replace their losses because that had bee n t h e 24 Vietcong procedure for many, many years. 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791.)020

14 Graham - direct Q. Do you recall who was in attendance at this 2 meeting? 3 A. I only remember that General Davidson and 4 Colonel Morris and I were there and some other people from 5 CICV, but I do not remember their names. 6 THE COURT: I am sorry. May I ask you to 7 explain again or explain further, in more detail, what you 8 mean by that recommendation of yours that you just 9 described? 10 You're talking about what you have previously 11 described ds how many, 27,000 killed or casualties in the 12 first two days? 13 THE WITNESS: Actually 40,000, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: 40,000? 15 THE WITNESS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: And you're talking about how to 17 assess the loss of those 40,000? 18 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 19 THE COURT: Will you describe in greater detail 20 what you meant by your last answer about how you go about 21 assessing that loss? 22 THE WITNESS: Well, some of it could be assessed 23 on the basis of which units were engaged and the losses 24 that accrued to that unit, but not all of those casualties 25 could be accounted for in that way. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

15 Graham - direct My view was that those units would probably immediately -- the unknown casualties would probably be filled up with guerrillas or irregulars of some sort, so that the drawdown, the major drawdown, would probably be against the irregular base. BY MR. MURRY: Q. General Graham, did you ever block or alter any intelligence in Vietnam? A. Block or alter? Q. Let me rephrase it so that you're very clear what I am asking. Did you ever wrongfully withhold from persons with a right and need to know intelligence information any such intelligence? MR. BOIES: THE COURT: Objection. You may rephrase the question by changing wrongfully to in a manner that you considered to be a violation of your duties and obligations. 19 MR. MURRY: Very well, your Honor Q. General Graham, did you ever withhold intelligence in Vietnam in a manner that you considered inconsistent with your duties and obligations as an intelligence officer? A. No, I did not. Q. Did anyone ever ask you in MACV to falsify any SOUTHERN DISTRI CT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTH OUSE FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK, N.Y

16 Graham - direct intellige nce on the enemy? 2 MR. BOIES: Objection. 3 THE COURT: What grounds? 4 MR. BOIES: Form, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Did anyone e ver a sk you to fa l sify 6 intelligence? 7 MR. BOIES: Yes, your Honor. 8 f HE COURT: Overruled. 9 A. No, nobody asked ~e to falsify intelligence. 10 Q. Did you ever participate in any falsification of 11 intelligence? 12 A. No, I did not. 13 Q. What was the next job you held after you left 14 :-IACIJ J-2? 15 A. I was reassigned fro~ MAC V J-2 back to Central 16 Intellige nce headquarters at Langley, Virginia, in 17 wash ington. 18 Q. And what were you doing for the Central 19 Intelligence Agency when you got reassigned? 20 A. I was reassigned to the national intelligence 21 est ima tes shop. 22 Q. wh e n did that occur, sir? 23 A. That occurred in -- I believe I reporte d early 24 August 196B. 25 Q. How did it come to be that you received that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK, N.Y

17 Graham - direct assignment? 2 A. The Central Intelligence Agency requested my 3 assignment. 4 MR. MURRY: Thank you. I have no further 5 questions. 6 CR O SS-EXA~INATION 7 BY MR. BOIE5: 8 Q. Good morning, General Graha~. 9 We heard played yesterday a part of the tape of 10 your interview with ~r. wallace in preparation for the 11 program. Were you in court when that was played? 12 A. I was not. 13 Q. Do you remembe r telling Mr. Wallace in words or 14 in substance that the people arguing against the MACV 15 position with respect to enemy strength numbers essentially 16 wa s o nly Sam Ada,ns? 17 A. No, I don't remember saying it. 18 Q. You don't remember saying that? Is that wh at 19 you said? 20 A. If you will -- I am sure you've got the record 21 there. You're paraphrasing. Perhaps I did say something 22 along those lines. I would like to see what you say I said. 23 Q. Do you recall ever believing that essentially 24 the only person who opposed the MACV view as to what enemy 2S streng t h numbers should be was Sam Adams? SOUTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

18 Graham - cross A. No, what I said was that the source of all of 2 this this is my view, at any rate; I don't recall 3 precisely what I said -- but my view was that the source of 4 all of this uproar, the source of this attempt to raise the 5 total order of battle figure to 600,000, was Sam Adams, and 6 I never ran into anybody else in CIA who agreed with Sam 7 Adams' position, although there were people in CIA who 8 thought -- who had other figures that were higher than 9 those in MACV. 10 Q. Let me try to be sure I understand what you're 11 saying. Are you saying that Sam Adams was the only person 12 that you knew that believed enemy strength was as high as ,000, but you did know other people who disagreed with 14 the ~ACV estimates? 15 A. Tnat is correct. We. even had people within MACV 16 who disagreed with MACV estimates. 17 Q. Did you ever believe at any time, sir, that 18 there was really only one guy that really disagreed with 19 the ~ACV intelligence estimates, that guy being Sam Adams? 20 MR.,~URRY: Objection, your Honor. He misstated 21 the witness' testimony. 22 THE COURT: He didn't say it was anybody's 23 testimony. He just asked a question, whether he ever 24 believed that. Overruled. 2S A. I believe what I told you before, Mr. Boies, and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

19 Graham - cross that is that the only person that was taking the position 2 that Sam Adams was taking was Sam Adams, but that there 3 were other positions that did not agree in detail with the 4 MACV position. 5 Q. And by other positions you mean other people who 6 disagreed with the MAC V position, is that correct? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Wh o were some of those people, sir? 9 A. Well, I believe that Mr. Carver thought the 10 figures should be higher, but I never heard him argue for 11 Mr. Ad ams' figures. There was a young major in DIA that 12 tended to believe that they were higher, but disagreed with 13 Mr. Adams' figures. 14 Q. Wh o was that young major, sir? 15 A. His name was Barry Williams. 16 Q. How much higher than the MACV figures did the 17 CIA's Mr. Carve r believe the estimates ought to be? 18 THE COU RT: So far as you heard him say. Is 19 that what you're asking? 20 ~R. BOIES: Insofar as he was aware, your Honor, either by hearing him say it or seeing things that he wrote. A. Well, seeing what Mr. Carver, who was eventually - stated the Director Central Intelligence position was concerned, he would have taken the high side of the spread numbers that showed up in the national intelligence SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FO LEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _

20 Graham - cross estimate of Since that was essentially his doc~~ent 2 to prepare and his position to put forward, 1 would 3 consider that to be essentially Mr. Carver's position. 4 Q. Do you know what that position was, sir? 5 A. Well, it's the top figures -- the national 6 intelligence estimate, after coordinating between CIA, DIA, 7 MACV, and all other headq~arters, was spread ~pward to 8 well, the figures that I recall -- and I will not claim 9 that these are accurate -- out somewhere from 280,000 to ,000, and 1 think he would have been on the top side of 11 that esti~ate of total fighting strength in So~th Vietnam. 12 Q. Let me be sure I understand what yo~ just said. 13 What was Mr. Carver's estimate of total fighting strength 14 in Vietna:n? 15 THE COURT: No, no. "1 think you have to be 16 careful in this question. You can ask hi~ what his 17 understanding was of Mr. Carver's position or what 18 doc~~ents or state~ents he saw or heard that he attrib~ted 19 to Mr. Carver, b~t yo~ can't ask him what was in Mr. 20 Carver's mind. 21 Q. General Graham, what was your understanding of 22 what Mr. Carver's estimate was of what you refer to as the 23 enemy's fighting strength in South Vietnam? 24 A. 1 am not s~re what fig~re -- I can't remember precisely what figure showed up in the national SO UTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y i020

21 Graham - cross intelligence estimate. I have stated that I believe that 2 the top side of that spread would have been Mr. Carver's 3 position, and that the top of that spread was something 4 over 300,000, but nowhere near the 600, Q. You said something over 300,000? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Are you essentially testifying as to your memory 8 of what was in the final Special National Intelligence 9 Estimate? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Let me see if I can get that document for you, 12 so that we have the best evidence of what your recollection 13 is. 14 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, I would show the witness 15 Exhibit 273, which I think has already been received. 16 Q. Is this the Special National Intelligence 17 Estimate that you were referring to, sir? A. Yes, it is. Q. Can you tell by looking at this what Mr. Carver's position was or what your understanding of Mr. Carver's position was as to what enemy strength in South Vietnam should be estimated at? A. I believe I can, if I can find the right page. Well, I believe that you will find in here, for instance, spread figures of some 20,000 men on political SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

22 Graham - cross infrastructure, and I would have taken Mr. Carver's 2 position to be at the high side of that spread and MACV's 3 more likely at the low end of that spread, the spread being 4 put in there to try to keep peace in the family. 5 I can't find the chart that's got them all laid 6 out. Well, here is a paragraph on -- "Considering all 7 available evidence, and allowing for some uncertainties, we 8 estimate that the current strength of the guerrilla force 9 is 70,000 to 90,000." 10 Nhere you see a spread like that, my view is 11 t ha t Mr. Carver's position would have been on the 90, end, the MACV view would have been on the 70,000, my own 13 personal view would have been lower t han both of those 14 figures. 15 Q. Just so my question is clear, General Graham, 16 what I am asking you is not what were the spread figures in 17 the report. Wh at I am asking you is if you can tell me, 18 with the report in front of you, what your best 19 understanding was of what Mr. Carver's position was in as to what total enemy strength was in South Vietnam. 21 A. Mr. Boies, I think I have told you that, that his view -- in my view his view wa s that it was somewhere over 300,000 men. Q. How much over 300,000, sir? A. I don't know. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

23 Graham - cross Q. Approxi:nately? 2 A. I can't approximate. 3 Q. As high as 400,000? 4 A. I doubt it. 5 Q. As high as 450,000? 6 A. If I doubt it at 400,000 I certainly doubt it at 7 450, do I not? 8 Q. I would have thought so, sir. But I was 9 interested primarily in whether you were any more certain 10 about it, whether you can make a statement more certain 11 than saying simply that yuj doubt it. 12 A. I cannot quote to you what Mr. Carver's estimate 13 was because I don't know what it was. I assume that it was 14 the high end of the agreed estimate. 15 Q. Well, the agreed estimate is in that document, 16 is it not, sir, or not? A. Yes, it is. Q. The agreed estimate is in that docu:nent? A. Tha t' s right. Q. The agreed total estimate is in that document, correct, sir? A. Well, I haven't seen the total figure. I can't find the total figure in here, but I suppose it is somewhere. There has got to be a spread because you've got spread figures in the internals of the figure. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. _

24 Graham - cross Q. Take as long as you need to find that total 2 strength figure in there, sir. 3 What page are you up to now? 4 A Q. Have you found the total strength figure yet? 6 A. No, I haven't. 7 Q. Please continue. 8 A. There is an estimated strength of regular 9 communist forces in South Vietnam, everybody agreeing that 10 it was at that time 118, Q. General Graham, I remind you my question is 12 A. I heard your question. I think it's going to 13 come up in pieces though. 14 Q. You don't think that there is a total estimate 15 in there, sir? Is that what you're saying? 16 A. 17 Q. 18 A. 19 Q. I am looking for it. Well, do you think there is one in there? I am not sure. You were involved in this process, were you not, 20 sir? A. Q. A. Q. A. Not very much. Not very much. Were you involved -- All right. Here is a total for you. What is that total, sir? "In sum, the communist military and political SOUTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUS E FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

25 Graham - cross lbb2 1 organization is complex," et cetera, et cetera -- 2 Q. Just tell me the total. 3 A. No, I am going to read you something. 4 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, may I ask the witness, 5 if there is a total in there, to give me the total? 6 THE COURT: If what you're reading is what you 7 believe to be an answer to the question, you may read it. B THE WITNESS: Well, there is a total in here, 9 but it is not the total of the total strength in Vietnam. 10 I want to read what it does describe when it gives the 11 tota 1, if I could, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: The question is whether the document 13 contains any figures on the total enemy strength in Vietnam. 14 Is that the question? 15 MR. BOIES: That is the question, your Honor. 16 THE WITNESS: And it's my contention that you 17 have to put a few things together in order to get the total 18 figure. 19 Q. Does that mean that there is not in that 20 document a total estimate of total enemy strength in South 21 Vietnam, sir? MR. MURRY: Objection, your Honor. A. There is a total in here for the VC/NVA military force, main and local administrative elements and guerrillas, and that is a spread figure from 223,000 to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

26 Graham - cross , Q. Let me see if I can approach it this way, 3 General Graham. What is the highest total enemy strength 4 figure t h at is contained in that document? 5 A. I now would have to find what the spread was on 6 the political infrastructure to add to that figure to give 7 you t he totals that were counted in the document. All 8 right? 9 Q. Are you telling me that there is no total in 10 t hat doc~~ent for what you have just described plus 11 political cadre? Is that what you're saying, sir? 12 A. I don't find it yet. 13 Q. If you find it let me know. 14 A. Oh, ye s He rei tis. 75,000 to 85,000 is political cadre. So you would have to add that to those 16 other two figures. So one of them would be somewha t over ,000 and one of them would be somewhat under. 18 Q. Let me be sure that I understand. You're saying 19 that there is no total enemy strength figure given in that document, that iri order to arrive at a total enemy strength figure you have to add a range of 223,000 to 248,000 plus another range of 75,000 to 85,oOo? A. That's correct. Q. Do you have any understanding why this document that was entitled a Special National Intelligence Estimate SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y i020

27 Graham - cross did not include a total esti~ated enemy strength? 2 A. No, I don't know. 3 Q. Did you ever discuss that with anyone, sir? 4 A. No. 5 Q. You said on direct examination that you attended 6 various sessions of the Saigon SNIE conference in September 7 of 1967, correct? 8 A. Yes, I did. 9 Q. How many of those sessions did you attend? 10 A. I don't recall. I think most of them. 11 Q. Did you ever hear the representatives of the CIA 12 present a CIA position at that conference? 13 A. No, I did not. 14 Q. You did not. Did you ever hear from any of the 15 other :1ACV people there that the CIA had presented a 16 position at that conference as to what the total enemy 17 strength estima t e should be? A. No, I just heard arguments about assault youth and self-defense guerrillas, and so forth, and how they might be quantified. I do not recall any riumerical position, bracket by bracket, presented as a CIA position. Q. Do you recall the CIA advocating at the September 1967 Saigon conference a total enemy strength figure of arou~d 450,000? ~R. MU RRY: Object to the form of the question, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORT ERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUA RE. NE W YORK. N.Y

28 Graham - cross your Honor. There has been no evidence that the CIA 2 advocated a particular position. 3 MR. BOIES: Your Honor, if I could respond to 4 that by directing -- 5 THE COURT: Just a second. Objection overruled. 6 You may answer the question. 7 MR. BOIES: And for 8 II. Repeat the question. 9 Q. For contextual purposes, let me direct THE COUaT: No, just repeat the question exactly 11 as you put it. 12 MR. BOIES: I am going to try to repeat it 13 exactly, your Honor. 14 Q. dere you aware that the CIA was advocating THE COURT: No. Now I change my ruling. Were 16 you aware whether the CIA was advocating you may ask hi:n. 17 (/ere you aware whether the CIA was advocating. Go on. MR. BOIES: On the grounds that the fact is not in ev idence? THE COURT: You may ask the question in the form that I just indicated. MR. BOIES: May I approach the bench, your Honor? THE COURT: No. You may ask the question indicated. Q. Did anyone ever tell you -- SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

29 Graham - cross Tri E COURT: Whether. 2 MR. BOIES: What? 3 THE COURT: Whether. 4 MR. BOIES: Whether? 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. BOIES: Can I at least put the question and 7 see whether the court will abide the question? 8 THE COURT: Come over to the side bar. 9 (At the side bar) 10 ~ R. BOIES: Your Honor, General Davidson 11 testified in this court that at the September 1967 Saigon 12 conference CIA was advocating an enemy strength figure of 13 around 450, THE COURT : What is this? Oh, General Da v idson. 15 MR. BOIES: Yes. 16 THE COURT: I don't care what General Davidson 17 testified. The fact that General Davidson testified to it does not permit the form in which you want to ask the question. MR. BOIES: Can I at side bar put the question that I want to ask? THE COURT: AR. BOIES: Yes, go ahead. I want to ask him did General Davidson ever tell him that the CIA was advocating at the September 1967 Saigon conference a total enemy strength SOUTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y

30 Graham - cross figure of around 450,000. And if he tells me yes, then I 2 have my answer; if he tells me no, then I want to ask him 3 whether he has any explanation for why, if General Davidson 4 believed that, General Davidson, his superior officer, 5 would not have told him that. 6 THE COURT: I will permit you to ask him do you 7 recall whether General Davidson ever said to you anything 8 to the effect that the CIA was advocating a total enemy 9 position of around 450,000. All right? 10 ~~. BOIES: Okay. 11 THE COURT: Further, you may ask him whether his 12 relationship with General Davidson was such that he would 13 have expected General Davidson to have told h im any such 14 matter. 15 MR. BOIES: May I put it more strongly to the 16 witness? May I put it to the witness and say General Davidson told you that total enemy strength figure being advocated by the CIA at the September 1967 Saigon conference was around 450,000, is that not correct? THE COURT: Is it not correct that General Davidson told you in 1967 in Saigon that the CIA figure was around 450,000? MR. BOIES: Yes. THE COURT: All right. You ~ay ask him that. MR. BOIES: And if he says no I would intend to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORT ERS, U.S. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y. _

31 Graham - cross read this and say -- 2 THE COURT: No. 3 MR. BOIE5: Your Honor, may I just finish? I 4 would intend to read this and say is that true or untrue. 5 THE COURT: Is what true 'or untrue? 6 ~~. BOIES: The statement that General Davidson 7 makes here. 8 THE COURT: The statement that General Davidson 9 ~akes there in no way contradicts the witness' testimony. 10 General Davidson didn't say there that he told General 11 Graham that the CIA was advocating 450, MR. BOIES: He does not say that, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: You're trying to make impeachment 14 out of things that aren't impeachment. 15 General Davidson stated that it's his 16 recollection that the CIA was advocating 450,000. Now, you 17 may ask this witness whether he has a recollection of what the CIA was advocating, you may ask him whether h e recalls whether General Davidson ever said anything to the effect that CIA was advocating 450. You may ask him those questions, but you can't impeach him by the fact that General Davidson took the stand and said that he had a recollection of 450,000. It simply doesn't impeach. MR. BOIES: May I read the witness General SOU TH ERN DISTRI CT REPORT ERS. U.S. COUR THOUSE FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y

32 Graham - cross Davidson's testimony in that regard? 2 THE COURT: You may ask the witness to read it 3 a nd ask him if it changes his recollection. 4 ~R. BOIES: May I read it out loud? 5 THE COURT: No. 6 ~ R. BOIES: All right. 7 (In open court) B BY MR. BOIES: 9 o. General Graham THE COURT: Let me just change that. If you 11 wish to, you may begin by reading the portion out loud and 12 ask whether the wi tness at the ti:ne was he told such a 13 thing by General Davidson. That you may do. 14 MR. BOIES: Thank you, your Honor. 15 BY MR. BOIES: 16 Q. Let me read, General Graham, testimony that Gener a l Davidson, your superior officer, ga ve in this court. And I am reading from pages 1288 and 1289 of t h e trial transcript. "0. And did the CIA at the Saigon September 1967 conference believe that the self-defense and secret self-defense forces should be quantified? "Ao. "Q. Yes. And should be included in the order of battle? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPOR TER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK. N.Y

33 Graham- - cross "A. That's my memory, yes. 2 "Q. And should be included in the total enemy 3 strength figure that would result from adding up the 4 individual components of the enemy? 5 "A. I believe that's correct, yes. 6 "Q. What was the total enemy strength figure 7 that the CIA was advocating at the September 1967 Sa igon a conference? 9 "A. I don't remember, Mr. Boies. 10 "Q. Do you remember approximately? 11 "A. My memory is that it was somewhere around ,000." 13 Did General Davidson ever tell you that in words 14 or in substance in 1967? A. He did not. Q. Did anyone ever tell you in words or in substance that this was a position that the CIA was advocating in September of 1967? MR. MURRY: MR. aoies: Objection, your Honor. I will withdraw the question and ask it with a whether in it, your Honor. THE COURT: No, the only problem I hav e with the question is that it's not clear whether you're asking whe~her anyone has ever told him at any time since then or whether anyone told him in Saigon in 1967 that the CIA was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, u.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

34 Graham - cross ad vocating the figure. 2 MR. BOIES: Let me break it up. 3 Q. Did anyone, General Davidson or anyone else, 4 ever tell you in words or in substance, in 1967, that the 5 CIA was advocating at the September 1967 Saigon conference 6 a total enemy strength figure of somewhere around 4S0,OOO? 7 A. No, they didn't, but I 8 Q. No one told you that? 9 A. But I could have arrived at that as a conclusion, 10 which I would expect General Davidson to do, that if you 11 wante d to add in 100,000 or more SD-SSD, that the total 12 figure would be up around -- up in that area. 13 But nobody said "We have a total military 14 strength, we, the CIA, have a total military strength 15 figure of 450,000," and that was not what was argued at 16 that conference in September. 17 what was argued was whether or not you could extrapolate from documents and come up with a believable figure on things like assault youth and secret self-defense forces and so forth. Q. When you say that that was not what was argued at the September conference you mean that was not what was argued at the September conference at the sessions you attended, correct, sir? A. That's correct. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

35 Graham - cross Q. And when you' say no one ever presented a total 2 figure you mean no one e ver presented t hat total figure to 3 you? 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. Do you have any explanation for why Ge neral 6 Davidson would have this recollection? 7 A. I think -- if I recall the way you read h is 8 answer, he didn't really recollect that either, but that 9 was a sur~isal based on the desire at least of some of the 10 CIA delegation to quantify SD-SSD. 11 Q. Let me read it again so that you h a ve the 12 precise words, General Graham. And if you would like I can 13 sho'oj you the transcript. 14 no. What was the total enemy strength figure" is MR. ~URRY: Your Honor, I object to him reading 16 this testimony THE COURT: MR. BOIES: Sustained. Let me ask, if I can, that the 19 witness look at the document. ilonor? Is that all right, your THE COURT: Yes. Q. I would direct your attention to line 6 on page 1289, the line that begins "What was the total enemy strength figure," and ask you to read at least as far down as line 14, where the answer is "Yes, that's my memory." SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COURTH OUS E FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK. N.Y

36 Graham - cross THE COURT: And what is the question that you 2 are asking him for which you're directing him to read this? 3 MR. BOIES: In his last answer, your Honor, he 4 said-- 5 THE COURT: Just tell what the question is. 6 What is the question that he should consider while he reads 7 that? B MR. BOIES: The question is, first, whether 9 General Davidson indicated here in his testimony that there 10 was a total enemy strength figure that the CIA was 11 advocating at the September 1967 Saigon conference. 12 THE COURT: We don't need this witness' 13 testimony on what General Davidson's testimony was. We 14 have General Davidson's testimony. is MR. BOIES: Your Honor, in his last answer THE COURT: It doesn't matter. That's not a proper question. MR. BOIES: -- he characterized General Davidson's testimony. THE COURT: It doesn't matter. We don't need his testimony on what General Davidson's testimony is. MR. BOIES: I would move to strike the witness' last answer insofar as it characterizes General Davidson's testimony. THE COURT: Well, I would have sustained an SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. u.s. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y

37 Graham - cross objection to the question if it had been made, and so I 2 would agree with you that the answer should also be 3 stricken. 4 Now, is there any question th3t you want him to 5 consider in reading General Davidson's testimony? 6 7 MR. BOIES: THE COURT: Not in view of your Honoi's ruling. Okay. 8 (Continued on next page) SOUTHERN DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _