Hannibal's Spies. Rose Mary Sheldon a b a Staff at The Center of Helenic Studies, College, Published online: 09 Jan 2008.

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2 ROSE MARY SHELDON Hannibal's Spies The Second Punic War ( B.C.) was one of the most decisive conflicts in the ancient world. It saw the destruction of the great mercantile empire, Carthage, and the rise of Rome as the new master of the Mediterranean. The war was so inextricably linked with the Carthaginian general who fought it that even then it took his name: Hannibal's war. A general without equal in ancient times, Hannibal brought Rome to the brink of physical, economic, political, and moral disaster yet few commentators, even military historians, have given attention to the role that Hannibal's intelligence service played in his victories. Like all commanders, Hannibal needed a vast amount of information about his enemy to stay abreast of political and military developments and successfully carry out operations. Clandestine collection was a rudimentary affair in the third century B.C., but what Hannibal lacked in technology he made up for in innovation and guile. Hannibal's intelligence requirements were complex. As supreme commander of the Carthaginian forces he needed strategic intelligence to help him decide when and where to conduct his war against a numerically superior opponent. In all of the battles Hannibal fought in Italy he was outnumbered, sometimes by as much as ten to one, yet his leadership of them made these campaigns outstanding in the history of warfare. His immediate tactical requirements were knowledge of the topography and climate, new sources of manpower for his mercenary army, and battlefields that would be favorable to his own techniques. Hannibal was also aware of his need for political intelligence. He collected information on Rome's political alliances, her party conflicts in the Senate and, most importantly, her intentions and capabilities in the upcoming war. The historical tradition that Hannibal began the war out of revenge and ambition is probably the Rose Mary Sheldon is on the staff at The Center of Helenic Studies and teaches at Georgetown University and the Defense Intelligence College. 53

3 54 ROSE MARY SHELDON product of hostile Roman propaganda. 1 Whatever he may have felt toward the Romans, his strategic and tactical plans showed solid judgment and were based on good intelligence collecting, not on emotional considerations. Hannibal's appreciation of intelligence gathering was part of a historical tradition. Carthage was founded by the Phoenicians, the premier sea-traders of the ancient world, and from them intelligence techniques known in the Middle East could easily have travelled to Carthage and the North African coast. The Kings of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and Persia all had their intelligence services and Carthage was heir to this long Eastern tradition. 2 The Carthaginians used signalling at an early date, especially in their commercial dealings. Herodotus describes how the Carthaginians summoned the native West Africans by smoke signals and then retired to their ships while the natives examined goods laid out on shore. 3 That the Carthaginians guarded their trading secrets carefully implies their early awareness of the need for security and counterintelligence. Their tin mines in northern Spain, for example, were kept secret from the Greeks who were no amateurs at seafaring. They kept the secret so well that the Greeks long believed that the tin came from islands off the Spanish coast.* Rome's attitude was in stark contrast. From earliest times the simple Latin peasant looked with disdain on anything that appeared artificial or disingenuous. The Roman government never quite outgrew this outlook. The Latin language would eventually use its name for the Carthaginians (Punica) to describe bad faith {fides Punice), which was what the Romans thought of Carthaginian "dirty tricks." The Romans never placed special agents among neighboring tribes, for example, to watch for hostile developments. The Romans relied on fides Romana fidelity to their allies and assumed that the allies would reciprocate. They left it entirely to their allies to keep them informed of events that might endanger them both. This system had an obvious flaw; it worked only as long as the ally thought it was in his best interest to keep the Romans informed. When the tribe became hostile to Rome, the entire intelligence system simply collapsed. When the two great powers went to war, it was not surprising that Carthage was the first to adapt its communications system to wartime use. Rome's expansion south into Sicily led to hostilities with Carthage and the First Punic War broke out in 264 B.C. The Greek writer Polyaenus describes the communications system that the Carthaginians set up in Sicily at this time: *Strabo Geography describes the lengths to which the Carthaginians went in keeping their commercial secrets. One ship captain purposely drove his ship off course and into shoal water to keep his route secret. The state rewarded him with the value of the cargo he lost.

4 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 55 When the Carthaginians were devastating Sicily they made, in order that all they needed would be sent to them quickly from Libya, two water-clocks of the same size, on which they marked circles with the appropriate inscriptions. These were the inscriptions: "We need warships, cargo boats, machines for besieging, foodstuffs, cattle, arms, infantry, cavalry." When they had put these inscriptions on the clocks, they kept one of them in Sicily and the other they sent on to Carthage with the following instructions: "They [the Carthaginians] must watch and when they see a fire signal in Sicily, they should let the water flow from the water-clock in Carthage. When they see another fire signal, then they should stop the flowing of the water and see which circle it had reached. When they had read the inscription they should send in the quickest way the things they had been asked for by these signals." And so it came about that the Carthaginians were always provided in the most rapid way with what they needed in their warfare. 4 Polyaenus's description echoes one given earlier by Aeneas Tacticus, 5 but its present import lies in associating the Carthaginians with great ingenuity and skill in communications. Polybius reported that during the First Punic War, Carthaginian generals kept in touch by fire signals and messengers. 6 Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal's father, is credited with inventing one of the earliest known methods of sending secret messages. Justin, 7 a rather late writer, describes how Hamilcar wrote messages on a tabella cerata, a wooden tablet, then covered it with fresh wax to look like a blank message board. Normally the message was inscribed in the wax (Fig. 1). FIGURE 1. Tabella cerata INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

5 56 ROSE MARY SHELDON But this practice long antedates Hamilcar's use of it; it was common for the Romans to ascribe the invention of clever strategems to their defeated enemies. 8 The use of secret signs and symbols was also a Carthaginian specialty and later became Hannibal's trademark. Hamilcar Barca and his sons fought valiantly for seven years but the war nevertheless ended in a victory for the Romans. The loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica led Carthage to turn to Spain to furnish the wealth and manpower recently lost to Rome. This new empire would also serve as a base of operations against Rome in the future. 9 When Hamilcar's son-in-law and successor, Hasdrubal, was assassinated in 221, the Carthaginians appointed Hannibal, Hamilcar's 25-year old son, to its Spanish command. The information service that had served the Carthaginians so well in Sicily was now extended to Spain. According to Appian, 10 Hannibal regularly sent messages to the Carthaginian Senate; and the Roman historian Livy too implies that the Carthaginians were well informed about events in Spain. Both accounts suggest a well-organized service of messengers and diplomatic couriers who operated both by land and by sea. When he describes an encounter between the Romans and troops under Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, Livy affords a brief glimpse of the working of their early warning system: The Spaniards have numerous towers built on heights, which they use both as watch-towers and also for protection against pirates. From one of these the hostile ships were first descried, and on a signal being made to Hasdrubal, the alarm broke out on land and in camp before it reached the sea and the ships; for no one yet had heard the beat of the oars or other nautical sounds, nor had the promontories yet disclosed the fleet to view when suddenly horsemen, sent off by Hasdrubal, one after another galloped up to the sailors, who were strolling about the beach or resting in their tents and thinking of nothing so little as of the enemy or of fighting on that day, and bade them board their ships in haste and arm themselves, for the Roman fleet was even then close to the harbor. 11 The rapid transmission of this sighting saved the Carthaginians from a disaster in Spain. Pliny the Elder also describes how in his time "Spain still sees the watchtowers of Hannibal and the turrets of earth placed on the mountain ridges." 12 The Carthaginian intelligence network thus contained a signalling service, watchtowers, a diplomatic pouch, and numerous messengers who travelled with extreme swiftness. THE FLASHPOINT OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR Roman intrigues from the city of Saguntum in Spain 13 made Hannibal realize that if Carthage was to enjoy unhampered commerce in her new empire in southern Spain an immediate defensive war would be necessary.

6 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 57 To Hannibal this meant acting quickly and taking Rome by surprise. The decision to force the issue at once was probably Hannibal's alone since the decision had to be made quickly and secretly. Hannibal's attack on Saguntum became the flashpoint of the Second Punic War. The Carthaginians laid siege to the city, ignoring Roman protests, and shattered the uneasy peace between them. The Romans sent envoys to Spain to negotiate a truce but Hannibal met them under the walls of the city and refused to abandon the siege. The Romans then sailed to Carthage with some Saguntine envoys to try to negotiate a peace but again Hannibal's messengers were quicker. The senate, stiffened by the Barcid family and the arrival of much of the loot from Saguntum, refused Rome's requests. 14 The Roman envoys, obviously not well informed of the political situation at Carthage, lost time naively asking the Carthaginians to surrender their great general for trial as a violator of the treaty. The Carthaginian senate, of course, refused. News of the refusal and the formal declaration of war reached Hannibal while he was at Cartagena. With a successful campaign behind him and his men well paid and settled in their winter quarters, he could begin his grand plan for the invasion of Italy with the support of his home city and the morale of his troops high. The fact that Rome was unable to defend Saguntum successfully must have reduced her reputation greatly. Hannibal's espionage network began operating immediately. His wellplaced spies at Rome discovered that the Romans were outfitting a new fleet and were planning to send an army to Spain. Having discovered this, Hannibal put his brother Hasdrubal in command there and moved his own troops north. The Romans, not having equal intelligence resources, were unaware that Hannibal did not plan on defending Spain himself. If they had they would have discovered that he intended to cross the Pyrenees and the lands of the Celts, then cross the Alps to invade Italy directly. The Roman strategy to strike at the heart of the Carthaginian empire in Spain was a sound one except for the fact that Hannibal would not be there. Knowing the enemy's plans while keeping his own a secret gave Hannibal a tremendous strategic advantage and was undoubtedly one of the greatest counterintelligence coups of the war. Hannibal's intelligence men had their work cut out for them. They needed to do reconnaissance on the terrain that the Carthaginians would be crossing and contact tribes that inhabited these areas to see whether they would be friendly and could provide troops and supplies. Although the Carthaginians were familiar with the coastal areas of Spain and Gaul, their information about the Alpine passes that led to the Rhone Valley in Gaul and the Po Valley in northern Italy was deficient; Hannibal would need this information to safeguard his enormous army on its long and treacherous journey. This reconnaissance covered a vast area but all reports came back satisfactory. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

7 58 ROSE MARY SHELDON The Tricorii who lived between the Rhone and the Durance Rivers were friendly and would not molest his army, but would furnish supplies. The Allobroges who occupied the area farther north along the River had not committed themselves but probably would not cause much trouble. Hannibal paid closest attention to the spies he had sent over the Alps into Cisalpine Gaul. He was told that the Boii and Insubres from the Po Valley would provide him with both men and supplies. Some of these tribes constituted a ready-made intelligence unit. The regular passage of Gauls between Italy and France gave them access to the latest news on what was happening in Italy. Many of these tribes resented Roman rule and were more than happy to supply information to a power that promised to liberate them. Other tribes with no specific grievance against Rome could be persuaded to fight with a promise of money or booty. Hannibal needed advance information in order to use the proper persuasion with each tribe. The picture on the Roman side is again in complete contrast. The Romans, still relying on their allies in Saguntum and Masilia for information, very often received too little, too late. Livy's account shows how poor Roman intelligence was. The Senate instructed its legates to contact various Spanish and Gallic tribes to induce them into alliance with Rome; but Hannibal's agents were quicker, and the Spanish tribesmen turned them away. Again, when Roman envoys moved to Gaul, they met with the same response: When the envoys, boasting of the renown and valor of the Roman people and the extent of their dominion, requested the Gauls to deny the Phoenician passage through their lands and cities, if he should attempt to carry the war into Italy, it is said that they burst into such peals of laughter that the magistrates and elders could scarcely reduce the younger men to order, so stupid and impudent a thing it seemed to propose that the Gauls should not suffer the invaders to pass into Italy, but bring down the war on their own heads and offer their own fields to be pillaged in place of other men's. 15 The envoy's mission failed miserably. Only Massilia, an established ally, responded to the Roman cause. The Massiliotes knew that a Carthaginian victory would ruin their trading, and so passed on to the Romans as much information as possible about Hannibal's plans. From them the Romans learned the truth: Here [in Massilia] they learned of all that had happened from their allies, who had made inquiries with faithful diligence. They reported that Hannibal had been beforehand with the Romans in gaining the good will of the Gauls, but that even he would find them hardly tractable...unless from time to time he should make use of gold, of which the race is very covetous, to secure the favor of their principle men. 16

8 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 59 The Romans were then caught in still another intelligence failure. The Boii Gauls, elated by the news of Hannibal's impending arrival, called in their allies the Insubres and overran the land in the Po Valley that the Romans had been carefully colonizing. The Romans thereupon further delayed their defense against Hannibal. The legions destined for Spain, as well as the invading force headed for Carthage, were now recalled. When the Roman expedition against Hannibal finally got under way, Scipio took five days to reach Massilia with sixty warships. Only then did he receive news that Hannibal had already crossed the Pyrenees. Scipio assumed that the hostile terrain and Gallic tribes would impede Hannibal and that there was no need for immediate panic. In reality, Hannibal was less than 50 miles away, getting his army across the Rhone delta, and using smoke signals to coordinate the crossing. 17 Roman intelligence was such that Hannibal had moved 50,000 men together with cavalry, baggage, and elephants across the Rhone before the news reached Scipio in Massilia. Scipio discovered Hannibal's whereabouts by chance. On a reconnaissance sortie, Hannibal's men stumbled into 300 of Scipio's cavalry sent on a similar mission. After a savage encounter in which on the Carthaginian side the Numidians were bested (probably because they were not equipped to operate against heavy cavalry), the Romans pursued Hannibal's detachment back to its camp. The Roman soldiers reported the size of Hannibal's encamped army to Scipio, who assumed that Hannibal was on the attack. Scipio collected his forces and returned to the enemy camp only to find it abandoned. The unthinkable then became clear: Hannibal's target was Italy. Once again the Carthaginian was a step ahead. Scipio left his own brother in command of his Spanish legions and returned to northern Italy to be waiting for Hannibal when he descended from the Alps. Hannibal's legendary crossing of the Alps was a political and military gamble, but based on the intelligence he had, the crossing appeared no more hazardous than other courses of action. The difficulties he faced in crossing were mostly military hostile tribes and the usual tactical problems of marching an army in column through narrow passes. True, he could have avoided some hardship had he crossed a month earlier; but we can only guess that resistance north of the Ebro delayed him too long or else that wrong information about the Alpine passes caused unexpected delay. In the end, the risk repaid him handsomely; the news that Hannibal had encamped his army in northern Italy panicked the Romans. The consul T. Sempronius Longus, already down in Sicily and ready to invade Carthage, now raced to northern Italy; but the first clash between Roman and Carthaginians in Italy was over before he even arrived. This mere skirmish left the consul Scipio severely wounded and established the superiority of Hannibal's cavalry. Hannibal pursued the Romans so relentlessly that Rome's Gallic allies immediately came over to him. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

9 60 ROSE MARY SHELDON HANNIBAL AS A PRACTITIONER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Once in Italy, Hannibal acted to isolate Rome from its allies. Most of Italy at this time was still not Roman, but remained a conglomeration of independent, autonomous states joined under Roman primacy. Hannibal, using a kind of psychological warfare, wanted to drive a wedge between these two groups. From his first appearance in Italy, he announced that he had come not to fight against the peoples of the peninsula but to liberate them from Roman domination. After every battle he released without ransom those allies who had been taken prisoner so that they would spread the word in their native regions about Hannibal's political goals and his generosity. This tactic helped immensely in recruiting new troops and depriving Rome of potential allies. Another aspect of this psychological warfare was discovering the frame of mind of the Roman commanders and exploiting their attitudes to his own advantage. For example, when Longus finally arrived in the north with his troops, Hannibal was able, through his Celtic agents, to determine the general's mood. After the recent Roman defeat, Longus was desperate for a spectacular victory to vindicate the Romans. Hannibal used this desperation to lure him into a trap at the Trebbia River. 18 Longus and his troops were cut to pieces and the victory sent the Carthaginians on their way through the Apennines. For all of his life Hannibal considered this his most brilliant tactical success. Another example of Hannibal's ability to capitalize on the opposing commander's state of mind came in the spring of 217 when Hannibal was moving south on his way to Tuscany. The new consul Flaminius placed himself on the road to Rome, hoping to block Hannibal's southern march and thereby make himself champion of the city. Hannibal, however, simply ignored Flaminius, went around him, and left the embarrassed consul behind to receive reports of Hannibal's men descending on the rich Tuscan villages like locusts. The psychological torture of having to watch but do nothing was too much for Flaminius. He was lured into direct battle this time a trap set for him at Lake Trasimene. The campaign exhibits Hannibal's masterly coordination of topographical knowledge with his insight into his enemy's character. From the information of his cavalry scouts and perhaps Etruscan peasants who knew the district, he acquired an accurate picture of the terrain and was thus able.to lure Flaminius into a narrow defile along the north shore on the lake. The slaughter was appalling. More than 15,000 Romans were killed with an equal number taken prisoner, and Hannibal now had virtual control over northern Italy. 19 News of the battle reached Rome two days later, but even this disaster did not mean

10 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 61 the end of bad tidings. Hannibal's intelligence network discovered that a Roman force of 4,000 cavalry was marching down the Via Flaminia. Neither the details nor the exact location of this second engagement are known, but Hannibal's advance knowledge of its approach allowed him to kill or capture the entire force. A third example of his psychological warfare occurred when the command of the Roman troops changed once again and Q. Fabius Maximus became consul. He avoided meeting Hannibal in pitched battle and instead began a long, tedious game of cat and mouse. The strategy annoyed many Romans who wanted to see the honor of the Roman legions vindicated. Rumors spread quickly that Fabius -had been paid off by the Carthaginians. Hannibal's scouts picked up these rumors and Hannibal deliberately avoided lands owned by Fabius while burning everything around them. This not only lent credence to the stories, but it also made Fabius so conscious of the damage to his own credibility that he signed over his lands to the state to prevent further speculation against him. 20 Hannibal's clever battlefield strategems not only reflect his tactical superiority but also prove his continuing ability to affect the Roman troops psychologically. His famous escape from the pass called iugum Calliculae was only one of many such examples. 21 Hannibal found himself hemmed into a valley that could be exited only by a narrow pass. To break out, he ordered his officers to collect as much dry wood as possible and tie it to the horns of his cattle. The cattle were led to the heights above the Roman army at night where the wood was ignited and the cattle sent along a high ridge creating the illusion that the Romans were outflanked. With the Romans drawn off guard and amid the confusion, Hannibal led his main force through a pass and escaped without having to strike a blow. Only a few spearmen were left behind to impersonate a fighting force. By the time daylight came and the Romans realized what had happened, Hannibal was gone. He sent some Spanish troops back to relieve the spearmen and brought them through the pass safely killing another 1,000 Roman troops in the process. EFFECTIVENESS OF HANNIBAL'S INTELLIGENCE NETWORK All these instances show vividly Hannibal's ability to set up an intelligence network that provided him with timely and accurate information on which to base his decisions. Whether he received his intelligence from deserters, prisoners of war, or by merely interrogating nearby residents, he obtained precisely the information he needed. Placing spies in an enemy's camp is certainly one of the most difficult things to do and yet at this Hannibal also succeeded. Basing one's actions on the "mood" of the opposing commander INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

11 62 ROSE MARY SHELDON is a highly speculative business even when it is based on extremely accurate intelligence; Hannibal's successful use of this tactic on more than one occasion speaks well for his intelligence people. Besides penetrating the Roman military camps, Hannibal's spies operated in the Roman capital. When Fabius transferred command of his army to M. Minucius Rufus, he did so with a warning to avoid a pitched battle at all costs. Unfortunately, Rufus represented a faction at Rome that wanted a victory over the Carthaginians. Hannibal's spies were able to follow the dissension between the two generals and capitalize on it to set another trap. 22 Rufus swallowed the bait and would have been annihilated except for the arrival of Fabius to save him. Of Hannibal's spies in Rome, we are told by Livy that one of them was caught and had his hands cut off. Other spies remained undetected and reported to Hannibal about a division in the Roman leadership over the conduct of war. Hannibal hoped to use this disagreement to stage another massive victory on the battlefield and finally to convince the remaining Roman allies to come over to him. HANNIBAL'S SLAUGHTER ON THE PLAINS OF CANNAE Hannibal found his victory on the plains of Cannae. He met the Romans in battle and used a double envelopment maneuver that has become famous among military historians. In just over five hours of battle he killed more than 50,000 Roman troops in his greatest victory on Italian soil. 23 Hannibal has been criticized for not marching on Rome immediately 24 but he comprehended correctly the problems of logistics, which his critics did not. Unable to take the city by assault, he adopted an indirect strategy in a war of attrition. Defections now began. First Capua, Italy's second largest city, came over to Hannibal, then Tarentum. But Rome's Latin allies remained loyal. Hannibal descended on Campania a second time hoping to conquer Naples and occupy a seaport only 55 kms from Carthage itself. Although he was able to lure the Neopolitan cavalry into an ambush, it was clear that Naples was not prepared to join him and it would be too difficult to take the city by assault. THE STRATEGY SHIFTS Hannibal would face this problem throughout southern Italy. He was undisputed master of the land, able to ravage at will, but his army was an army of conquest not occupation. He had no capacity for conducting siege warfare no towers or battering rams or catapults, all of which were essential for reducing cities and garrisons. He could not undertake a siege as long as there were enough Roman legions in the field to cut off his supply lines.

12 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 63 Ironically it was his own success that changed the strategy of the war. The defeat of Cannae justified the delaying tactics of Fabius Maximus. Since they could not fight successfully in open battle, the Romans would concentrate on laying siege to defected cities like Capua. The strategy on the Carthaginian side also changed. They began using all their strength to extend the war to new areas in hopes of encircling Italy. Hannibal's job was to continue the war where he was, detaching such cities as he could until the Roman senate was willing to accept a settlement. The rest of the Carthaginian forces would prepare the way by pushing the Romans out of Spain, by regaining Sardinia, and by reestablishing themselves in Sicily. We have no evidence to prove Hannibal doubted his long range plans would work. He knew the war was creating a terrible burden in the loss of life and money not only for Rome but for all of Rome's allies. His actions for the next four years suggest that he probably still felt war weariness would cause the Roman allies to turn away. Hannibal found himself more and more confined to southern Italy by a solid central Italy defended by large forces. When his effort to break the Roman position in Campania failed in 214, he tried to relieve the Roman siege of Capua and force an engagement. His move was typical in its boldness and simplicity. He tried to draw the Romans away from Capua by an attempted march on Rome. He slipped away, leaving his campfires burning, eluded the enemy and surprised them by his sudden appearance at the Colline Gate. The Romans were in total panic no enemy had come this close to the city since the Gauls in 390 B.C. The Romans actually had been warned in advance by a messenger from Fregallae, 25 but Hannibal moved too quickly. Fortunately for the Romans there were enough troops in the city for an adequate defense and besides, this was just a feint to draw the Romans away from Capua. When the strategem failed Hannibal withdrew and left for Rhegium. Realizing that Hannibal could not help them, the Capuans surrendered. This capitulation had immense significance for the war because it showed that Hannibal's two strongest talents surprise and tactical coordination were not the qualities that would defeat Rome. But Hannibal's grand strategy still had a certain feasibility. With southern Italy and its heavily Greek population in their hands, plus Bruttium and much of Lucania, the Carthaginians could have taken Sicily, secured communications with Carthage, and opened a second front in Italy. But the Carthaginian army showed the same lack of enterprise in 212 that had lost them the island in the First Punic War and Syracuse fell instead to the Romans. Hannibal's communications with Spain were still open but the news from there was also grim. The Romans had annihilated the Carthaginian forces under Hasdrubal. The victory had no real decisive effect in Spain and Hasdrubal INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

13 64 ROSE MARY SHELDON escaped, but the reinforcements intended for Italy were now diverted instead to Spain. The Romans made no attempt to drive Hannibal from Italy now. For four years he ruled the southern tip of the peninsula while he watched his forces dwindle to less than 40,000. His allies deserted him. Yet Rome, with an army of 200,000 in the field, would not approach him. Even during this difficult period, however, Hannibal's intelligence service continued to function. Livy tells a story that illustrates Rome's naivete even at this late date. The ambassadors of Philip V of Macedon, on their way to Hannibal's camp, were intercepted by a Roman patrol near Capua and brought before the Roman praetor Yalerius Laevinus. They were able to convince him of their intention to make an alliance with Rome. Laevinus was fooled by the story and not only supplied them with food, but also the exact location of Hannibal's camp. The ambassadors went straight to Hannibal with Philip's offer of alliance. 26 The ambassadors did not have the same luck on the return trip. Because of the presence of Carthaginian ambassadors, they were not able to convince the Romans they were allies. When their ship was searched, the treaty was found and destroyed. By the time a new one could be negotiated, there was nothing Philip could do to help Hannibal. Polybius' account of how Hannibal negotiated with his sympathizers in Tarentum when it was occupied by the Romans again illustrates how he could communicate with his allies and take cities without striking a blow. He put himself within striking distance of the city but employed a screening force of Numidians to prevent any news of his approach from escaping. The conspirators inside the city fixed a day for the betrayal. At midnight on the assigned day, fire signals were exchanged between the conspirators inside the city and Hannibal, who was at the tomb of Apollo Hyacinthus threequarters of a mile away. By a series of well-planned and executed signals, the gates were opened and the Roman garrison was lured into the streets, where they were killed. By morning the city was in the hands of the Carthaginians. The success of the venture encouraged Metapontum to throw off its allegiance to Rome and join Hannibal. Hannibal was not patient with those who did not provide him with accurate intelligence. When he asked guides to take him to Casinum, they misunderstood and took him instead to Casilinum. The terrain there was such that Hannibal was nearly trapped. He rounded up the guides and had them crucified. 27 We have already mentioned Hannibal's skill in using forged documents. On one occasion he sent a letter to Fabius, forged to look as if it had come from the leading citizens of Metapontum. It assured him that their city would surrender to him should he come there; they were only waiting for him to come to the city and show himself. If the Romans had not gotten

14 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 65 unfavorable auspices and postponed the march, they would have walked right into Hannibal's ambush outside the city walls. Plutarch is clear: the gods were responsible for the Romans' escape, not their intelligence service. 28 The first indication that the Romans were beginning to appreciate the importance of gathering intelligence came at the battle of Arpi in Apulia in 213, where they used their own system of relays to send military information. 29 Another incident also suggests they were learning how to counter some of Hannibal's tricks. When Hannibal defeated and killed the consul Marcellus, he immediately took the consul's ring. The Romans, remembering Hannibal's skill at forging letters, acted swiftly and sent word to neighboring city-states that Marcellus had died, that his ring was in enemy hands, and that henceforward no letters supposedly written by him should be trusted. Just such a letter reached Salapia in the hands of a Roman deserter pretending to be the late consul's messenger. The letter, sealed with the consul's ring, asked the Salapians to be ready for Marcellus' arrival. When the Roman deserters, impersonating an advance guard, arrived, they were led into the city and welcomed. The people of Salapia closed the gates behind them and killed the deserters. The Salapians had been saved by advanced warnings. 30 The Romans finally produced a man who learned from Hannibal's tactics and used them successfully for the Roman cause. Publius Scipio provided the Romans with the one thing they had lacked throughout the war a competent man who would be left in command for the duration of the war. A factor that militated against effective use by the Romans of their intelligence resources was the policy of sending in new commanders from Rome each year. Many of these commanders had to master the intelligence function from the ground up. Hannibal was his own chief of intelligence for fourteen years. Scipio's use of spies was untypical of a Roman commander. In 203 Scipio sent along to Syphax his legates and some centurions disguised as slaves. While the legates were in conference, the "slaves" were to wander around the camp in different directions and to take note of all the entrances, exits, the plan of the camp, and where each division was stationed. They were to look for the outposts and sentries and see whether the camp was more vulnerable to attack by day or by night. On each trip, a different set of "slaves" was sent so that each of the centurions could acquaint himself with the camp. When all the information was gathered Scipio decided to burn the two camps. The Carthaginians, thinking it was an accidental fire, ran out unarmed, only to be slaughtered by the waiting Roman column. 31 Scipio continued to fight on in Spain where he defeated the two other Carthaginian armies at Ilipa in 206. Polybius himself says he copied Hannibal's tactics by holding the enemy force while his cavalry wings out- INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

15 66 ROSE MARY SHELDON flanked them. 32 Hasdrubal escaped from Spain and broke through to Italy in one last attempt to reinforce his brother. Now both in Italy, Hannibal and Hasdrubal attempted to set up communications with each other. 33 Hannibal sent messages to his brother in the north asking him to bring reinforcements and giving his location. Hasdrubal wrote back describing his route along the Adriatic. They agreed to meet in Umbria near the sea and together march toward Rome. The bearers of this letter four Gallic horsemen and two Numidians crossed the entire Italian peninsula without being detected. Only when they got lost in Southern Italy did they fall into the hands of a Roman detachment near Tarentum. It was a fateful misfortune. It enabled the Romans to locate Hasdrubal's position and intercept him at the Metaurus River. Hannibal learned of his brother's defeat and capture when they threw Hasdrubal's severed head into his camp. With this he realized his last hope of reinforcements had died. Scipio now led an expeditionary force to Africa. The Carthaginian system of relays and speed messengers detected a night landing of the Roman fleet at Hippo in 205. The Carthaginian Senate was informed the next day. Since the distance from Hippo to Carthage is about 150 km this must have been quite an efficient relay. 34 Hannibal was immediately recalled from Italy and set up camp at Leptis for the winter where he reorganized his forces and recruited more soldiers and horsemen. The two forces were ready to come together for their last engagement. The site of the last encounter was Zama. When Hannibal arrived he sent out his spies to discover the size of the Roman force. In particular he must have wanted to know the strength of Scipio's cavalry since his own was still very weak. The spies were caught and, according to Polybius, 35 shown around the camp, entertained, then released and sent back to Hannibal. The story has often been doubted but there is nothing improbable about it when one considers the tremendous psychological effect it would have had on the Carthaginians not to mention the disinformation it would have spread. Scipio wanted his enemy to know he was supremely confident. But Hannibal also would have been told that there was no cavalry in the camp. In reality, Numidian cavalry reinforcements were only two days away. Unaware of this force, Hannibal thought it would be a good time to meet Scipio for negotiations. But Scipio knew from the beginning that the talks were useless; he was only buying time for the arrival of his cavalry. Scipio would choose as a meeting place the site of the final battle. It is ironic that the Romans were much better acquainted with the African terrain. Hannibal had not seen his home since he was nine but the Romans had been campaigning there more recently. Although Hannibal's spies had done their job, the information they brought back was incorrect and when Hannibal acted on it, he suffered accordingly. He was finally outgeneralled in a pitched battle, his own tactics

16 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 67 of envelopment being used against him. The Roman forces annihilated the Carthaginians in what was to be the last battle of a war begun 16 years before and which ended at Zama. REVIEW OF HANNIBAL'S INTELLIGENCE One of Hannibal's greatest assets was unquestionably his intelligence system. The main role of intelligence in combat is to avoid surprise or to facilitate surpirse of the enemy. The other major role is to permit optimum use of one's forces against the enemy by understanding his strengths, limitations, and objectives. In these things, Hannibal was successful. His victories occurred because he knew ahead of time his enemy's location, intentions, and capabilities. His ability to stay one step ahead of his adversaries became his trademark and this ability came from the effective use of his intelligence network. How the network was organized is unknown but it kept him informed of the Roman's activities and plans. His collection and analysis of tactical intelligence was flawless, Zama being the one exception. The fundamental difference in tactics between Hannibal and the Romans made it possible for Hannibal to use his intelligence assets much more efficiently than the Romans could. Hannibal relied on speed and the maintenance of the initiative with active use of his intelligence service in support of narrow goals. The Romans, on the other hand, were generally on the defensive and searching for Hannibal. Even with equivalent intelligence capabilities, Hannibal would have had a certain advantage. This is the advantage of guerilla warfare over conventional warfare in individual conflict. But guerilla warfare seldom wins wars unless their conventional opponents make egregious mistakes. In the end, Hannibal's plan failed because of the advantages possessed by the Roman political system. Hannibal was the best general and the Carthaginians were the tactically superior side, but Carthage as a whole lacked any real political aim. Hannibal was fighting not to conquer Italy but to win such a peace as should restore to Carthage the possession of Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, and Corsica and put Rome on her good behavior in other words, the status quo before the First Punic War. Rome had the superiority by sea, in manpower, the loyalty of her Latin allies, the ability to block reinforcements from reaching Hannibal, and, in the end, the offensive strategy of Scipio. A good intelligence service could not prevail against these odds. Hannibal had an extraordinary capacity for leadership he could command a mercenary army amid danger and defeat. His personal qualities, more than anything else, gave an epic quality to the war. It is not surprising that he should have also developed the best intelligence service; only surprising that the Romans took so long to learn this important lesson from him. "The INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

17 68 ROSE MARY SHELDON adequacy of the intelligence that a commander has available is in direct proportion to his interest in intelligence and his use of it." 36 Rome's interest was lacking and thus on the Roman side the war too often exemplified intelligence failure and military disaster. Hannibal was later to prove himself an able statesman as well as a general by helping to bring his city back to prosperity. But the Romans never felt safe with him in power. He was forced into exile and fled to Antioch where he tried to convince the Syrians to unite with him against the Romans. He communicated with his allies back in Carthage by means of his messenger Aristo, who used those secret signs that were always immediately recognized as his. The Romans never detected the plot. Instead, it was a faction at Carthage that sent an embassy (a group of official representatives) to Rome to report the conspiracy. Hannibal would have been willing to invade Italy again had the Syrian king, Antiochus, given him an army. But when Antiochus was defeated, Hannibal fled to Crete and finally Bithynia. Even here his strategems, ever fresh and innovative, helped turn the tide of battles. In the war between Bithynia and the much stronger Pergamum he was called in to help his host country against its larger adversary. Knowing that in naval battles the crews were scantily dressed (the rowers were often naked), he filled pottery jars with venomous snakes and hurled them at the opposing ships. When these "bombs" exploded, the shoeless crews were sent into a mass panic and the Bithynians were able to take control. 37 Not until 183 B.C. were the Roman soldiers able to track down Hannibal in Bithynia and surround his villa. Their intention was to kill him or send him back to Rome to be a central figure in a Roman triumph. The fact that the Romans would take the time to hunt down a 64-year-old man in an obscure town on the Sea of Marmora proves that he was still a valuable symbol, if not indeed an actual threat. They would never rest as long as he was alive. His last words are reported to be: "Let us release the Romans from their long anxiety since they think it too long to wait for the death of an old man." 38 When the Roman soldiers entered the villa they found him dead; a suicide, and once again, and for the last time, one step ahead of his enemies. REFERENCES 1 For the best discussion of the bad press Hannibal got from the Romans, see Howard V. Canter, "The Character of Hannibal," in Classical Journal, vol. 24 (1929), p F. Dvornik, 1974, The Origins of Intelligence Services, New Brunswick, N.J., chap Herodotus Polyaenus R. Shepherd, trans. 5 Aeneas Tacticus frag. 48. Cf. Polybius

18 HANNIBAL'S SPIES 69 6 Polybius Justin , who attributes it to Hamilcar Barca; Polyaenus 2.20 attributes it to Demaratus. 8 See Dvornik's comments, Origins, p E. T. Salmon, "The Strategy of the Second Punic War," in Greece & Rome, vol. 7 (1960), pg. 129 suggests that the Carthaginians went to Spain after their defeat in the First Punic War to make it a point d'attuni for their planned revenge against Rome. F. Groag, 1929, Hannibal als Politiker, Vienna, 1929, p. 49ff, suggests that the Carthaginians sought to regain the nearest source of silver in order to repay the huge indemnity of 241 B.C. 10 Appian6.2.10; Livy B. 0. Foster, trans., Loeb Classical Library. 12 Pliny the Elder, HN H. Rackham, trans. Loeb Classical Library. 13 For the roles of Rome, Carthage, and Masilia in the Saguntum affair, see A. E. Astin, "Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic War," in Latomus, v. 26 (1967), pp with earlier bibliography; and Tenney Frank, 1916, "Rome, Marseilles and Carthage," Military Historian, v. I, pp Livy Hannibal's messengers, however, arrived first and had time to "prepare the minds of Hannibal's adherents to prevent the opposing party from affording any satisfaction to the Roman people." 15 Livy ; B. O. Foster, trans., Loeb Classical Library. 16 Livy 21.20; B. O. Foster, trans., Loeb Classical Library. 17 Polybius ; Livy For a more detailed account of the battle at the Trebbia and the other battles of the Second Punic War, see Donald Armstrong, 1966, The Reluctant Warriors, New York. 19 Livy Livy The information about the land ownership was provided by Roman deserters. 21 Livy 22.17; Plutarch, Fabius Maximus Livy Livy mentions that besides his spies, this information was brought to him by deserters. Plutarch simply says "Hannibal kept a watchful eye on everything," Fabius Maximus Livy says that the gold signet rings of the slain Roman officials were said to have filled three bushels. For the controversy over the actual number of casualties, see B. 0. Foster in the Loeb edition of Livy, pp and Hans Delbrueck, 1921, History of the Art of War, vol. I, Berlin (Eng. edition, Westport, Conn., 1975), pp In Livy His own cavalry commander Marhabal said: "You know how to gain a victory, Hannibal, you know not how to use one." B. O. Foster, trans., Loeb Classical Library. In the same passage Livy suggests "that day's delay is generally believed to have saved the City and the empire." The criticism is moot. Hannibal probably understood the dictum written by Sun Tzu written three hundred years before Hannibal that INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

19 70 ROSE MARY SHELDON "If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. If the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain." For modern criticism of Hannibal's choice, see B. D. Hoyos, "Hannibal: What Kind of Genius" in Greece & Rome, v. 30 (1980), pp Cf. D. Armstrong, The Reluctant Warriors, p According to Livy , intelligence of Hannibal's plan was sent to the Romans. A messenger, dispatched from Fregellae, covered the-distance (100 km) in a day and a night. 26 Livy Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 6; Livy Plutarch, Fabius Maximus Livy 24.46: a system of trumpet signals. 30 Livy Livy Livy Cf. J. F. Lazenby, 1978, Hannibal's War, Warminster, pp Polybius Livy ff. The messengers, however, did not know how many of the ships had arrived nor the size of the force. In their fear, they greatly exaggerated their report. 35 Polybius ; cf. Livy ; Appian, Lib. 39. The story is often dismissed because of its similarity to the acts of Xerxes (Herodotus ) and Laevinus (Dion. Hal ), who treated spies in the same manner. Scipio may have known about these early stories and decided to use the same tactics. See F. W. Walbank, A Commentary on Polybius, Vol. II, p Cf. Zonaras 8.3.6; Eutropius 2.11; Frontinus I. Heymont, 1960, Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare, Military Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., pp Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal Livy ; "liberemus" inquit "diuturna cura populum Romanum quando mortem senis expectare longum censent."