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1 This article was downloaded by: [Dr Kenneth Shapiro] On: 08 June 2015, At: 07:45 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: Mortimer House, Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: Ethics and Genetic Engineering Paul B. Thompson Published online: 04 Jun To cite this article: Paul B. Thompson (1998) Ethics and Genetic Engineering, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 1:2, , DOI: /s jaws0102_7 To link to this article: PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content ) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

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3 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ANIMAL WELFARE SCIENCE, 1(2), Copyright O 1998, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Ethics and Genetic Engineering The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals. By Bernard E. Rollin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, xiv pages, $54.95 (cloth), $19.95 (paper). Reviewed by Paul B. Thompson Texas A & M University That readers of this journal could be unfamiliar with the work of Bernard Rollin is inconceivable. The Frankenstein Syndrome, one of two new books from him, is not only an important study of the ethical issues in genetic engineering of nonhuman animals, but an introduction to the general argument for taking animal interests into consideration when planning or evaluating research-a theme for which Rollin is already well known. In The Frankenstein Syndrome, Rollin proposes a principle for the conservation of welfare: Genetic modification of animals (in truth it matters little whether it is recombinant DNA or conventional breeding) to serve human purposes is acceptable only when the progeny are "no worse off in terms of suffering than the parent stock was prior to the insertion of the new genetic material" (p. 179). Animal research risking animal suffering would be permitted if researchers included strict protocols for monitoring suffering, and in extreme cases, terminating the experiment and euthanizing the animal(s). The principle of conservation of welfare, at first glance, offers no challenge to the status quo. However, if we read Rollin closely, we see that the principle does not sanction status quo practices of husbandry or animal research because it says nothing about how humans should treat living animals, genetically engineered or otherwise. It stated a criterion for the use of reproductive technology to create new organisms: These animals should not be worse off (have more health problems or greater tendency to suffer pain) than the parent stock. The principle thus blocks the "trade-off' reasoning that would interpret benefits to humans as compensating for harm to genetically engineered animals. There are cases such as research on human genetic disease that counterpoise compelling human needs against animal suffering Requests for reprints should be sent to Paul B. Thompson, 1360 LAEB, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

4 176 BOOK REVIEWS in a manner that makes the principle of conservation of welfare difficult to uphold. Rollin wisely made exceptions to his principle, subject to some additional requirements discussed in this article. These prescriptions expressed "the new social ethic" (p. 154) for animals, which Rollin based less on philosophical argument than on armchair sociology. Rollin hinted at empathetic and social consensus bases for the new social ethic. He never articulated either foundation with the rigor that would impress philosophers, but there can be little doubt that Rollin has the social consensus about right. Yet Rollin deduced some surprising norms from it for animal biotechnology. First, he argued that although it would be wrong to perform genetic modifications that make an animal incapable of fulfilling innate or functional needs and drives (his or her telos, in Rollin's terms), it would not be wrong to modify those needs and drives through genetic engineering. If it is possible to relieve suffering by removing basic drives, doing so should count as an improvement, even if it results in an animal with dramatically reduced capacities. Readers of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World were generally unimpressed with this argument when it was offered to justify the creation of sub-alpha humans. It is difficult to see how the new social ethic could endorse it for animals. Rollin also considered the use of animals as models for human genetic disease. Genetic engineering of animals for biomedical research is already commonplace, and it cannot be denied that significant suffering is a predictable, if unintended, consequence. Rollin said he believes that society will find the case for using animals in biomedical research to be compelling, even when it violates the principle of welfare conservation. Rollin argued that his principle places researchers under a moral obligation to render such animals surgically or pharmacologically decerebrate. He wrote, "an animal with no mentation or feeling has no welfare, or, if it does, has welfare only in the trivial sense that a plant does" (p. 205). This view of welfare is more controversial. Many would argue that disease compromises welfare without regard to a patient's awareness of pain or discomfort. It is also possible to defend the view that compromising an animal's capacity for the experience of well-being detracts from his or her welfare. On these two points, Rollin staked out a controversial position. His analyses form the touchstone that others must address. Much of the rest of the book involves Rollin summarizing material he covered in other widely read books or articles: The historical roots of scientific beliefs about animal consciousness, the positivist legacy of hostility to ethics, and the new social ethic itself. Other topics, such as democratic risk assessment, lay mistrust of expert opinion, and animal patents are given cursory treatment. Although Rollin's instincts are often right, these sections do not display the rigor characteristic of Rollin's work on issues in which biology and veterinary medicine truly matter. In truth, even the main ideas in the heart of the book-genetic engineering and animal welfare-have been in print before. Yet, this book has something that his previous writings do not, and that is a wonderful sense of Rollin, the person. Rollin's chuckle and his unique blend of

5 BOOK REVIEWS 177 erudition and New York street smarts leap from the pages of The Frankenstein Syndrome. Edification is seldom tlus much fun. Anyone who has ever shared a beer with Rollin, or heard him both charm and infuriate an audience, will relive the experience reading this book. Although such sentiments are not generally thought relevant to a scholarly review, they are especially appropriate in this review. For what Rollin taught us is that to be scientific, to be rigorous, and even to be unsentimental when the hard facts force us to a conclusion does not require us to abandon our humanity. Frankness and honest sentiment will take us far toward an understanding of our ethical obligations to animals. When fired in the crucible of philosophical rigor, they produce a work of uncanny brilliance and insight. REFERENCES Huxley, A. (1989). Brave new world. New York: Harper Collins. (Original work published 1932)