STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM

Transcription

1 Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism The University of Chicago Department of Political Science 5828 S. University Avenue Pick Hall Suite 418 Chicago, IL STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM April 6, 2015 Dr. Robert A. Pape, Professor and Director of University of Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

2 Suicide Terrorism An instrument of coercive punishment Attempts to inflict pain and the threat of future pain. Goal: to induce government to concede to demands, prompt population to pressure government to capitulate. Democracies often viewed as more susceptible to coercive punishment. Defined as attack in which the perpetrator kills himself/herself No attempted attacks are included. Issue of revealed preference. Weapon of the Weak Force Multiplier Often used when there is little prospect of achieving military goals. Historical cases predating the advent of plastic explosives: Jewish Zealots, Ismali Assassins, Japanese Kamikazes 1

3 Suicide Attack Database Searchable database on all suicide attacks from 1982 to July 2014 English using native language sources (e.g., Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, Tamil) Emphasis on collecting claims from original sources The current CPOST-SAD release contains the universe of suicide attacks from 1982 to 2014, a total of 3,976 attacks in over 40 countries Data coded for attack target and attacker variables Target type: Security, Political, Civilian Attackers: nationality, biographic data on over 900 attackers Geolocation 2 Source Verification 2

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9 Ordinary versus Suicide Terrorism Ordinary terrorism in decline 1987 = = 348 Suicide terrorism rising sharply: 3 per year in 1980s 10 per year in 1990s 25+ per year in per year in

10 Suicide Terrorist Attacks Worldwide, suicide terrorist attacks For 298, we know the ideological affiliation (88%) World Leader: Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka 78 attacks Secular group drawn from Hindu families more than Hamas (61) or Islamic Jihad (27) 30% of Muslim attacks by secular groups PKK in Turkey (14) Al Aqsa (25), PFLP (6) on West Bank SSNP (8), CP/Baa th Party (8) in Lebanon ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS NOT PRIMARY DRIVER OF WORLD SUICIDE TERRORISM 9

11 Tamil Suicide Terrorist Attack 10

12 Causal Logic of Suicide Terrorism Strategic Level Coercive Power Social Level Mass Support Suicide Terrorism Individual Level Personal Motive 11

13 Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism Purpose: Coerce democracies to withdraw military forces from territory terrorists prize Key Patterns: Timing = campaigns Goals = national self-determination Targets = democratic states 12

14 Motivation and Targets of Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, Region/Dispute Homeland Status Terrorist Goal Target a Democracy Lebanon, US/F/IDF military presence US/F/IDF withdrawal Yes West Bank/Gaza IDF military presence IDF withdrawal Yes Tamils in Sri Lanka SL military presence SL withdrawal Yes (after 1950) Punjab, 1995 Indian control Punjab autonomy Yes Kurds in Turkey 1990s Turkey military presence Turkey withdrawal Yes (after 1983)* Chechnya, Russia military presence Russian withdrawal Yes (after 1993) Kashmir, Indian military presence Indian withdrawal Yes Arabian Peninsula, US military presence US withdrawal Yes Iraq, US military presence US withdrawal Yes 13

15 Hezbollah (1985): Great and necessary objectives were to put an end to foreign occupation and to adopt a regime freely wanted by the people of Lebanon to expel the Americans, the French and their allies putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land. LTTE (1987): Our martyrs are extraordinary human beings Let us continue to struggle to expel the enemy forces who have occupied our sacred land. Chechen rebels (2003): As you have seen and noticed, most of the suicide attacks were carried out by women particularly the wives of the mujahedin who were martyred, are being threatened in their homes They do not accept being humiliated and living under occupation. AQ fatwa: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty of every Muslim who can do it in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa mosque and the holy mosque[mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. 14

16 Nationality of AQC Suicide Attackers Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database Rev 4/2014. Data current through 12/31/

17 Main Conditions of Suicide Terrorism 1. Military Occupation either by foreign government (Israel vs Palestinians) or national government (Sri Lanka vs Tamils) where occupation means the occupied group believes it cannot change the political (and other) institutions governing them. 2. Religious Difference between the occupier and occupied communities (Jewish occupiers vs Islamic occupied, Buddhist vs Hindu, Shi'a vs Sunni). 3. The occupier is often a Democracy that holds meaningful elections. 16

18 Suicide Attacks by Campaign, Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 17

19 Logic of Suicide Terrorism Post 2003 New Campaigns occurring in response to new occupation Afghanistan Iraq Nigeria Somalia Old Campaigns ending as occupation declines Lebanon West Bank/Gaza Beginning to See Suicide Campaigns against Non-Democracies still small % China Syria Iran Predominately Muslim because US occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, the two biggest cases 18

20 Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, by Year Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 19

21 Distribution of suicide attacks by target types Afghanistan, By Year Total, % 6% % Security Political Civilian Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 20

22 Nationality of Suicide Attackers in Afghanistan (N=200) % Region, 2% Other, 4% 20 0 Afghanistan Pakistan Tajikistan Tunesia Jordan Palestine Russia UAE Yemen Germany Source: Lexis/FBIS/Video/Claims 21

23 Thousands US and NATO forces in Afghanistan NATO US Source: Brookings Afghanistan Index 22

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25 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Pakistan, Attacks 84 Attacks 33 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 19% 19% Security 15% 18% 63% 18% 63% Civilian Political 21% 64% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 24

26 Troops (Thousands) Afghan and Foreign Forces in Afghanistan US 150 NATO ANA ANP Source: Brookings Afghanistan Index 25

27 Confirmed suicide attacks against security targets in Afghanistan, NATO ANA ANP ALP Foreign Afghan

28 Suicide Attacks in Iraq From AQI to the Islamic State, AQI MSC ISI ISIS IS Led by Jordanian Al- Zarqawi extreme violence undermines appeal Unclaimed Claimed Umbrella organization, led by Egyptian al-masri Zarqawi killed The Surge New objective to establish Islamic state, led by Iraqi Abu Omar al-baghdadi until death, Abu Bakr al-baghadi replaces in 2010 al-masri and al-baghdadi killed Group expands to Syria and proclaims Caliphate Coalition airstrikes begin US Withdrawal CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 27

29 What Changed in Anbar, ? US/Coalition (Iraq) US/Coalition (Anbar) COIN 1:50 (Anbar) Sons of Iraq (Anbar) Sept ,000 34, ,000 5,000 Sept ,000 38, , ,000 28

30 What Happened to Sunni Insurgents? Est Total Insurgents Total Killed In Prison Sons of Iraq (Anbar) Jan ,000-5,000 Aug ,000 Sept ,000 15,000 28,000 5,000 Mar ,000 (& Militias) 70,000 Supporters 1,000-2,000 AQ 18,000 37,000 Sept ,000-2,000+ AQ 19, , ,000 29

31 Sunni Awakening Decline 120K 100K 80K 60K 40K 20K 0K

32 Who is ISIS? Evolved from AQI, current leader is Abu Bakr al-baghdadi, took power after US killed previous leaders, radicalized following US operation against Fallujah in Leadership = 25 commanders, 1/3 former Saddam military officers Has relationships with Iraqi Sunni tribal militias, but murky and fluid Recent CIA estimate 20-31K in both Syria and Iraq, possibly 15K foreign fighters, 2K Western (mostly in Syria) but figures highly uncertain De facto control over Sunni majority areas 31

33 ISIS s Stated Territorial Ambitions ISIS divides Iraq and Syria into 16 Wilayats or Regional Commands? 32

34 Nationalities of Confirmed ISIS Suicide Bombers, By Nationality By Region Saudi Arabian Iraqi Tunisian Syrian Moroccan North African Libyan Egyptian Lebanese Turkish German Palestinian Algerian Australian Chechen British Dutch High likelihood that largest proportion of unknown are Syrian and Iraqi 70% 8% 10% 9% Iraq/Syria Region North Africa 2% 1% Europe Oceania Origin Unknown Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 33

35 Nationalities of identified suicide bombers linked to confirmed suicide attacks, by campaign % local bombers % of bomber nationalities known 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% Afghan Taliban AQC AQIM Chechens Hezbollah AQI/ISIS LTTE Pakistani Militants Palestinian Groups PKK/Dev Sol Syrian Rebels AQAP Shabaab Afghans Saudis, Egyptians & Yemenis Moroccans, Tunisians & Algerians N. Caucasians Lebanese Iraqis Sri Lankans Pakistanis Palestinians Turks Syrians Yemenis Somalis Afghan Taliban AQC AQIM Chechens Hezbollah AQI/ISIS LTTE Pakistani Militants Palestinian Groups PKK/Dev Sol Syrian Rebels AQAP Shabaab % Home % Foreign % Known % Unknown 34

36 The ISIS Threat & Policy Implications Current Situation: ISIS threat today is mainly regional: Instability in the Persian Gulf Threat to Western countries exists, but is low lone wolf or small groups, not 9/11 Key Goal in Fight Against ISIS: Contain regional instability and keep threat to West low Best Strategy: Off-Shore Balancing: Over the horizon air, naval power and special forces, plus economic empowerment of local groups Key to success: Creating New Sunni Awakening, driving wedge between core ISIS and nationalist/tribal Sunnis Sunnis should lead the fight against ISIS Should we expect attacks on US and Western homelands? *If US/Western Militaries takes lead in crushing ISIS* 35

37 Air power halts ISIL expansion Kobani Mosul Dam Aleppo Raqqah Mosul Erbil Deir ez Zour Kirkuk Amerli Haditha Hit Ramadi Baghdad 36

38 but not consolidation Raqqah Mosul Erbil Deir ez Zour Kirkuk Bayji Haditha Hit Ramadi Baghdad 37

39 Air strikes and ISIS territorial control 38

40 Back Up Slides 39

41 Airstrikes Total, by Country, Aug. 8-Dec. 1, Iraq Syria Total Aug Sep Oct Nov 40

42 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, Attacks 237 Attacks 195 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 23% 13% 64% 28% 10% 62% Security Civilian Political 22% 10% 68% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 41

43 ISIS Command and Control Command is dispersed Organization only sets policy Leaders are mobile and not centralized The military council is made up of Ba athist military council Have military expertise and want to regain power Almost all were imprisoned Identities are known for many top commanders Sources: al-akhbar, Financial Times, the New York Times. Deputies for Iraq and Syria (2 people) Caliph Al-Baghdadi Shura Council (8 to 13 people) Military Council (3 people) Position Name Nationality Caliph Ibrahim al-samarrai Iraqi War Minister Neaman al Zaidi Iraqi Interior Minister Hazem Abdul Razzaq al-zawi Iraqi Security Chief Abu Safwan Rifai Spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha Syrian Military Commander Tarkhan Batirashvili Chechen Anbar Commander Shaker Wahib al-fahdawi Iraqi 42

44 Alternative: Off-Shore Balancing Rely on air, naval, and rapidly deployable ground forces vs Al Qaeda camps Transition over 2-3 years Train/equip local groups for self-protection Empower Pashtuns who reject Al Qaeda 43

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46 Mali: 2011 to 2013 Distribution of Suicide Attacks A L G E R I A Suicide Attacks Target Types 94% Civilian Political Security Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database Rev 4/

47 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Afghanistan, Attacks 180 Attacks 116 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 5% 14% 81% 18% 9% 73% 15% Security 9% Civilian Political 76% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 46

48 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Pakistan, Attacks 30 Attacks 17 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% Security 29% 43% 6% 51% 53% 47% Civilian Political 12% 59% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 47

49 Suicide Attacks by Campaign, Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 48

50 Suicide Attacks by Campaign, Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 49

51 Confirmed Suicide Attacks Syria and Lebanon,

52 Confirmed Suicide Attacks Iraq, Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 51

53 Confirmed Suicide Attacks Pakistan, Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 52

54 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Over space by Group Total Attacks, by Group ISIS JN Other Unclaimed Target Types, by Country Iraq 62% 28% ISIS Jabhat al-nusra Free Syrian Army Kurds Azzam Brigades Unclaimed Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 150km Syria /Leb 64% 25% 0% 50% 100% Security Civilian Political 18% 73%9% 53

55 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, 2014 Over Space by Group Total Attacks, by Group ISIS JN Other Unclaimed Target Types by Country 4 Iraq 69% 22% Syria ISIS /Leb 73% 22% Jabhat al-nusra Free Syrian Army Kurds 0% 50% 100% Azzam Brigades Security Unclaimed 150km 18% 73%9% Civilian Political Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 54

56 Campaign Share of All Suicide Attacks % % Occupied Not Occupied Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 55

57 Pakistan: 2003 to Suicide Attacks 0 Target Types 18% 63% 19% Civilian Political Security Distribution of Suicide Attacks Source: US National Park Service, Copyright: 2014 Esri, HERE, DeLorme 56

58 Distribution of Confirmed Suicide Attacks: Syrian and Lebanon, Attacks 78 Attacks 51 Attacks 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% >40% 6% 100% 25% 23% 52% Security Civilian Political 22% 72% Source: CPOST Suicide Attack Database: Data current through December, 2014 (confirmed attacks only) 57

59 Military Occupation Key: National/Communal identity = Self-Determination Palestinian nationalism in Israel Pashtun nationalism in the tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan Foreign Occupation creates environment conducive to suicide terrorism Government seen as illegitimate, apostate Potential for atrocities which can prompt revenge motives (Abu Ghraib) Can trigger social logic as potential attackers perceive a threat to their community, ethnicity, religion, and way of life Religious difference can be a particularly salient cleavage Threatens local community s way of life 58