The weakening of the Arab States. Pan-Arabism re-revisited after the invasion of Iraq. Peter Seeberg

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1 CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK Working Paper Series No. 11, May 2007 The weakening of the Arab States. Pan-Arabism re-revisited after the invasion of Iraq Peter Seeberg Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies

2 Peter Seeberg Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies University of Southern Denmark Campusvej Odense M, Denmark 2

3 Introduction The recent tragic situation in Iraq, the political turmoil in Lebanon following the war between Israel and Hezbollah, the war-like situation in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah, the political and economical problems in Syria (and several other Arab states) etc. are expressions of a general tendency towards a political crisis in the Arab world. This working paper claims that the development in the Middle East in the later years can be characterized as a general weakening of the Arab states. The political crisis or weakening of the Arab states has been significantly worsened since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but started before this to understand the recent crisis it is necessary to go back to the development in the 1990s, including the consequences of the Kuwait-war in and its significance for the development in Iraq and the Middle East. By invading Kuwait, a neighbouring Arab state, Saddam Hussein also launched a devastating attack on Pan-Arabism. The concept of Pan- Arabism is still being exploited by some of the Arab leaders as a rhetorical framework for criticism against Israel, the West, the US, Zionism, imperialism etc. It is at the same time frequently being used by radical Arab leaders as an instrument of criticism towards alleged conservative Arab states considered being too much oriented towards the West and the support of the US. The struggle over the narrative of Pan-Arabism is in this way contributing to the split between the Arab states, thereby explaining the low level of Arab cooperation, as described by Asher Susser: The Arab League is an empty vessel ( ) Never mind doing anything about the current conflagration, the Arab collective is incapable even of convening to talk about it. The Middle East, therefore, is no longer the "Arab world," at least in the sense that it is not the Arab states that set the regional agenda. (Susser 2006) The working paper discusses the reasons for the decline of the Arab states, stating that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the foreign policy rivalry between the Arab states represent the main reasons for the recent misery. The situation is seen in a historical perspective by drawing lines to the 3

4 developments of the Arab world in the last decades and back to the origins of Pan-Arabism and the thinking of its founding fathers, raising the question if Pan-Arabism was ever viable as anything but a kind of restorative utopia. The weakening of the Arab states is today, at the state-level, counteracted by a strengthening of Iran, Israel and Turkey, but at the same time by non-state-actors like Hezbollah and Hamas both supported by Iran and to some degree by Syria. The paper seeks to develop the discussions about the weakening of the Arab states further by looking at the recent weaknesses and conflicts between the Arab states, tracing the origins of these conflicts in the historical process of (lack of) development of the Arab world. The first part of the paper presents the discussion about the weakening of the Arab states focusing on the recent situation in the Arab world. Secondly the paper looks into the origins and development of Pan- Arabism focusing on Iraq and the Ottoman Empire, the works of Sati al- Husri, Ba ath Socialism etc. Thirdly the paper describes the decline of the Arab states taking its point of departure in the Kuwait-war of , the development in the 1990s, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the development up to the situation after the war in Lebanon in July and August The paper concludes by arguing that a general weakening of the Arab states is a reality in the Middle East of today and that the invasion of Iraq and foreign policy rivalry between the Arab states constitute the main reasons for the misery of the Arab world. The recent development of the Arab States For years Iraq was the bulwark towards Iranian influence in the Arab world, but since the invasion in Iraq in March 2003 it has been transformed into something that almost is the opposite: a state dominated by Shi ites. Also therefore Iran after the tragic development in Iraq stands stronger in this part of the Arab world where a few years ago it was almost surrounded by hostile Sunni regimes (Patten 2007). The strategy of Iran is thus to work for that Iraq not again emerges as a military threat against Iran. This is made possible by supporting the 4

5 Shi ites of Iraq taking for granted that Shi ites would normally not go to war against each other. This is the fulfillment of a strategic objective, as it seems to be perceived by the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well as the religious leaders around Ayatollah Khamenei, which was missed in the earlier conflicts with their dangerous neighbour. There are good reasons to be skeptic towards the simplified scheme of a Sunni-Shi i divide, but even though the concept of a Shi ite crescent as termed by King Abdullah of Jordan is not accepted, probably the narrative of the deepened contradiction between the principal schools of thought of Islam has become widely spread in the Arab public. The recent Iraqi tragedy is one of the most explicit examples of what in this working paper is called the weakening of the Arab states. Iraq hardly goes for a state any longer at least not in the traditional Weberian sense defined as an entity claiming the monopoly on legitimate force. Iraq is occupied by the US, but even though this is the case, anything but law and order prevails. And the Iraqi state does not constitute a coherent system but a Shi ite-dominated chaos which never has implemented the complex political system, which was designed by international experts on constitutional law to secure the rights of the Sunni and Kurdish minorities, and their influence according to their numbers in the regions where they are represented. The weak as far as political legitimacy is concerned but in a military sense strong Iraq during the time of Saddam Hussein is no longer one of the main Arab states. And an important expression of this is the millions of refugees that have left the country since the invasion and the maybe even larger amount of internally displaced persons, marginalized in an Iraq without resources to take care of its own population, as documented by UNHCR and several other sources. (Harper 2007; UNHCR 2007). The widespread terror by militias, daily suicide bombings and the attacks on the occupying forces underline the impression of a country in disintegration if not decay. It is a historical fact that an imagined community of Iraq never existed, but its predecessors, the provinces of Bagdad, Basra and Mosul, did not back in the time of the Ottoman Empire represent a higher degree of moral or political legitimacy either. There is no 5

6 tradition of claiming an Iraqi unity and more and more it seems that the cohesion sustained by the extremely repressive regime under Saddam Hussein is deteriorating. Iraq is in a state of civil war and does hardly any longer constitute a coherent entity. A similar weakening of Syria has not taken place. Syria is still intact as a state, but the regime is under heavy pressure both from the inside and from the outside. Since they were forced to leave Lebanon in the spring of 2005 in connection with the so-called Cedar-revolution following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, Syria has been playing second fiddle to Iran as far as influence in Lebanon is concerned (Rabil 2003). And the traditional alliance between Iran and Syria has almost entirely ceased to exist (Lesch 2005). This is partly due to the fact that the main rationale of this alliance was the common interests of containing Iraq while being led by Saddam Hussein. Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon Iran doesn t need Syria to secure its interests in Lebanon any longer and can even see a foreign policy advantage in replacing Syria as the dominant foreign entity in Lebanon (Schmidt 2006). In the earlier well-functioning triangular alliance between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah it seems that Syria now has become the weaker part, having difficulties exploiting Hezbollah as a foreign policy instrument in its attempts to exert influence in Lebanon since they were forced to withdraw in the uproar triggered by the murder of Hariri in February 2005 (El-Solh 2004; Ziadeh 2006). Hezbollah has on one side become too independent as actor and at the same time too much in agreement with the interests of Iran. And Syria which no longer maintains its previous role as an important Arab state can do very little about these conditions. It has to recognize firstly that the other Arab states are concerned about Iran s increasing influence in the Mashreq and secondly that by being dissociated from the Islamic Republic of Iran it avoids making concessions to the Islamist movements in Syria. The problem for Syria is the declining influence in Lebanon which became obvious during the autumn of 2006 (Quilty 2007) following the war between Israel and Hezbollah and the strengthening of Iranian foreign policy influence in the Mashreq. 6

7 The war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 further revitalized the discussions about old and new regional conflicts in the Middle East and once again pointed to the disagreements, discrepancies and even wars that together constitute the sad story of Pan-Arabism (El-Solh 2004). During the first phase of the Lebanon-war Jordan, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia were critical towards the Hezbollah, claiming that the organization took the Lebanese people as hostages pursuing goals that most of all were identical with the foreign policy interests of Iran. Later they toned down their criticism apparently because the war against Israel became highly popular among the Arabs. The war was not surprisingly broadcasted as the ultimate defeat for Israel in the Hezbollah satellite channel Al Manar, but also in normally more moderate news channels like Al Jazeera or Al Arabiyya, Hassan Nasrallah stood forward as the icon of resistance against Zionism. Hezbollah stood after the war as the moral winner of the conflict at least according to the media. But as we have seen before the Lebanese reality is more complex as that. According to Shibley Telhami 40 per cent of the Lebanese, asked to describe their attitude to Hezbollah after the war, said that they viewed the organization more positive, while 30 per cent viewed the organization more negative (Telhami 2007). The important point, though, was that Pluralities of over 40 per cent among Sunnis, Christians and Druze expressed more negative views, while an overwhelming majority of Shiites expressed positive views. (Telhami 2007) Barry Rubin claimed in a polemical comment that the lesson to be learned from the Lebanon-war of 2006 was that Islamism is about to repeat the history of Arab nationalism (Rubin 2007). His first point was that the apparent victory could be seen as an illusionary triumph because it would reassure that many years will have to pass by before economic and political progress can take place in Lebanon and in the Arab World. And his second point about the development was the increasing rise of non-state actors in the region, of which the Hezbollah of course is one of the most significant examples (Seeberg 2007). And furthermore we see political and social problems in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt etc. combined with overall tendencies of lack of 7

8 development as demonstrated by the various Arab Human Development Reports published since the turn of the century. This can also be seen as a result of a general weakening of the Arab states perceived as pan-arabism in a wide sense of the term as claimed by this working paper. These developments will be discussed in the third part of the paper. Iraq and the historical development of Pan-Arabism Historically the development in Iraq during the 20 th century has been of great significance for the general development in the Middle Eastern region and, coincidently, reflects in various ways the rise of Pan-Arabism, its development and collapse. The occupation of the English colonial power of the Ottoman provinces Baghdad, Basra and Mosul during the First World War, the foundation and independence of the Iraqi State in 1932, the foundation of the republic in 1958 and its subsequent historical development during the Ba ath Party and Saddam Hussein s regime, along with the unsolved political situation after the American invasion in 2003, represent significant phases in the process of government building in both Iraq and the Arab world. The historic background of the working paper is based on the assumption that Iraq as well as other modern Arab states can be considered as heir or successor states to the Ottoman Empire. And that continuity can be found in the history of ideas and in the politics of the modern political movements that arose in the transformation process from the fall of the Ottoman regime to the rise and development of the modern Arab states. This continuity is also present in the failed attempts of the Arab states to realize Pan-Arab ambitions. The point is that the development in Iraq has conduced greatly to the present conception of Pan-Arabism which is, firstly, that the movement lacks inner dynamics and impetus and, secondly, that it no longer holds political-ideological elements of significance to the Arab world (Hudson 1999). In the following the development of Arab nationalism is briefly outlined and the key features of its ideological and political mindset is presented the central theme being the development in discourses of 8

9 nations and states by Arab intellectuals who in the 20 th century formulated the basic elements of the ideological foundation for Arab nationalism. According to recent analyses, the representation of The Great Arab revolt against the Ottomans as a popular rising is of mytological character. Thus, the Israeli historian, Efraim Karsch, claims in Empires of the Sand, that the Arab leader in Mecca, Sharif Hussein, in general cultivated his own interests and that the Arabs viewed the revolt with skepticism or indifference (Karsch 2004). Likewise, the Iraqi born political scientist, Adeed Dawisha, states that it was a diffuse revolt, if anything, with only limited support from the Arab masses and that the revolt had nothing to do with Arab nationalism: The Great Arab Revolt came to be enshrined in nationalist memory and historiography as the patriotic spark that would ignite the Arab nationalist movement, gain Arab independence, and launch the Arabs on their quest for political unity in one state under one government. In reality, however, the terms on which the revolt was originally launched had little to do with Arab nationalism. (Dawisha 2003) The Ottoman regime and Arab Nationalism A first difficulty of the Arab movement was to say who the Arabs were. (Lawrence 1926) An essential factor concerning the creation of an Arab nationalism was related to the problems of the sultan regime in the 19 th century. The regime consisted of local self-governments scattered throughout the Ottoman province. They gained independence as the central government experienced difficulties in preserving the great empire. In the case of Iraq, Ottoman- Persian conflicts caused an unstable situation that for extended periods of time was characterized by a relative autonomy in the Iraqi region and also founded future contrasts between some of the religious groups in Iraq and in particular the main contrast between Shi i and Sunni Muslims. Firstly, the Ottomans power rested on the Sunni Muslims in the cities, while the Shi i Muslims to a higher extent were supported from 9

10 Persian side. These contrasts were already in the onset a factor of instability and have prevailed to the present day. They have contributed heavily to the difficulties in maintaining Ottoman dominance. The second and more important reason for Ottoman failure in Iraq was the weakness of the empires own central government and its deteriorating control over its provinces. (Marr 2004). Contrary to other parts of the empire, the control was temporarily improved during the 19 th century. In the South the holy Shiite cities of Kerbala and Najaf were brought under the leadership of Baghdad, and in the Kurdish areas the autonomy of the local clans was limited as they were forced to accept the Turkish dominance. Irrespective of this, movements in Iraq were also developing which sought to promote ideas of modernity dressed in a nationalistic, European inspired linguistic garb. Parallel to the development in the Turkish parts of the Ottoman regime, the Arab provinces changed character and became areas where political reform ideas were developed, which can also be seen as a result of a growing foreign influence. The increased interaction between Arab intellectuals who had studied at European universities, colonial officials who inspired to political reforms or might even partake in the clash with the Ottomans, was significant to the development of intellectual environments in the cities of the Middle East, and for the concern of some, with a foundation in the Ottoman colonial administration. Gradually, a political Arabism was rooted in the political movements. This can be interpreted as forerunners of Pan-Arabism in the 20 th century. The Arab world was not a desert at the dawn of the 20 th century that remained in an undeveloped splendid isolation. There was in the relative few larger cities, by the end of the 19 th and in the beginning of the 20 th century, an intellectual elite of a considerable size linked to administrative centers, universities and local well-to-do groups who frequently had contact with Europe. An indication of the growing Arab self-awareness was the Arab convention in Palestine in 1931 which had the purpose of finding strategies against the growing Zionist influence in that area. On this occasion, Arab leaders formulated the viewpoints that would later form the basis of much 10

11 political organizing in the Arab world. According to Choueiri, these views were put together in three points (Choueiri 2000): 1. The Arab countries form an integral and indivisible whole. Hence, the Arab nation does not accept or recognize the divisions of whatever nature to which it has been subjected. 2. All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the achievement of total independence within one single unity; it being understood that every endavour which aimed at confining political activities to local and regional issues is to be fought against. 3. Since colonialism is, in all its forms and manifestations, incompatible with the dignity and paramount aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will resist it with all the means at its disposal. There was in the wording an attempt to establish a counter strategy towards a growing Jewish influence in the region, but in addition, the convention contributed to a local rise of Pan-Arab political parties and organizations, but also movements of a more local, nationalistic nature (Rogan and Shlaim 2001; Morris 2002; Pappe 2004). In continuation of the Jerusalem convention, the first Pan-Arab political party, AIP, Arab Independence Party, was founded, which was established by Palestinian political activists on August 13 th, The aim of the organization was primarily to cultivate Palestinian interests, but their documents revealed that the principles of the organization were the complete independency for the Arab territories, their indivisible unity and the Arab sector of Palestine becoming a part of Syria. The activities were first and foremost aimed at the Jewish settlements and the mandatory power including the Balfour Declaration s promise to the Jews of a homeland (Morris 1999). In August 1933 the LNA, the League of Nationalist Action, was founded. The participants at the founding convention, which took place in Lebanon, came from Iraq and Syria (Choueiri 2000). This organization can be viewed as a predecessor of the movements that rose in the Arab world after the Second World War, of which the Arab League is the best known and most significant one. The leading promoter of the organization, the Lebanese lawyer Farid Zayn al-din, attempted along with the remainder of 11

12 the leadership of the organization, to propagate its foundation to the remaining Arab countries. During the years leading up to the Second World War, a complicated process took place where other organizations gradually became more significant as representatives of Arab nationalism a development which was seen in the Levant in particular where intellectuals from the cities in the region were leading ideologists in these movements. The ANP, Arab Nationalist Party, came to play a leading role in this process not the least in connection with the political confrontations of the World War. In Iraq the development was filled with contrasts and marked by social as well as religious boundaries which could be traced in the perception of the national question: On one hand were the Arab nationalists, interested in building up the institutions of state and expanding Iraq s influence in the Arab world; hence they were drawn into Arab politics. On the other were the social reformers, moved by growing awareness of social discontent and discrepancies in wealth and opportunities. They were more focused on Iraq and had more appeal to minorities and the shi i. (Marr 2004) These movements became significant in influencing the relation between the English Mandatory Power and the political movements in Iraq, but also in the region in general. The independence of the Arab states were affected by the pre-war polarizations that were in progress, both in regards to the question of potential alliances as well as the status of the religion in parliamentary systems of the Middle East. As for Iraq and the role of the Arab Nationalist Party, political events were more complicated as Iraq, unlike Kuwait, was nominally independent with a parliamentary system already in place and a more vigorous configuration of party politics. (Choueiri 2000). According to Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, the history of Arab nationalism can be divided into four phases (Abu-Rabi 2004). The first phase is described as the Ottoman phase. Here the development of reforms took place as mentioned in connection with the Tanzimat period of Turkey and as a result of this. The phase lasted until the end of the First World War and the establishment of the mandatory system in The second phase is the 12

13 inter-war period, the period where the mandatory system was predominant in the Levant and where the intellectual Pan-Arabism developed and gradually settled in its various forms. The phase ended with the founding of Israel in May 1948 and the war in prolongation hereof. The third phase is the period from 1948, from Nakbah to the 1970s, where the defeat in the Six-day War of 1967, Nasser s death in 1970 and the new President Sadat s special view on the possibilities of Egyptian foreign policy, contributed to the most significant disruption up to then in the Arab movement in the shape of the Camp David Accords in Finally, the fourth phase which signifies the period from Camp David up to present, a period where Pan-Arabism disclosed its weaknesses in political and military defeats, interdisagreements and exposures of lack of solidarity. The Arab League presented itself, at first, from the time of its establishment as an important exponent of Pan-Arabism. The organization was founded March 22 nd, 1945 among the promoters and the first member states was Iraq (Choueiri 2000). The organization became known to the international public in the 1960s, not least due to the famous passing of the three no s at the fourth Arab summit in Khartoum in 1968: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel. At the seventh Arab summit in Rabat in 1974, PLO was declared the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and thereby laid the grounds for a long lasting tradition for, on a rhetorical level, support for the Palestinian fight against the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank a support which in reality turned out to be a cover for attending to own foreign policy interests by the individual Arab states. However, the history of the Arab League as organization is also characterized by disruption: in 1977 Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen agreed on boycotting the Arab League summits in Cairo protesting against Sadat s visit in Jerusalem. In 1979 Egypt was suspended because of the Camp David Accord and the Arab League head quarters were moved to Tunis. In 1987 the Arab countries expressed support to Iraq in the war against Iran and turned it into an individual matter if they wished to (re- )establish diplomatic relations with Egypt. The Arab League has thus played an essential role in Egypt s exclusion and the resulting division of 13

14 the Arab world. The League tried half-heartedly to lift the embargo against Iraq, and after the American invasion of Iraq March 20 th, 2003 the organization admitted the newly established Governing Council as a member and as a representative of Iraq. Sati al-husri, the Arab Nation and Ba ath Socialism In 1922 Sati al-husri issued a directive to the history teachers in Iraqi public schools: The basic goal of historic studies in elementary schools is to teach the history of the fatherland and the past of the nation. The ultimate objective to be derived from this is the strengthening of patriotic and nationalistic feelings in the hearts of the students. Therefore the history of Iraq and of the Arab nation should be the core of historical studies. And for the history of other countries, it should not be studied in the first courses except as it relates to the history of Iraq and of the Arabs ( ) The ideas of the unity of the Arab nation and the Arabism of Iraq should be brought out clearly from the beginning (Dawisha 2003). Sati al-husri can be seen as the personification of the continuity from progressive environments in the late Ottoman Empire to the new political movements in the Arab world. Sati al-husri was an important exponent of Arab nationalism, but he was far from being alone in the Arab history of theories and ideas. It can be argued that two processes were established in the Arab world which had great impact on the development of Arab nationalism. Firstly, there was an interest in discovering one s national roots and secondly, and more concrete, there was a development of political movements which specified the Arab nationalism in the form of organizations which could unify the national community. To Sati al-husri the nation is an ethnic community, a secular popular community, regardless if this community is displayed in a predominant Islamic realm. As Adeed Dawisha states: Husri s nationalism is emphatically secular and intellectually extricated from Islamic political thought, even though Islam is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the Arab People. In his national formulation, Husri contends that, unlike language and history, religion does not consitute a fundamental element of national formation (Dawisha 2003). 14

15 The nation must build on three fundamental elements which are: a) compulsory conscription; b) universal suffrage and c) universal education. The central ideological elements of the nation are: love for the homeland and thereby the nation, the language and the common Arab history. In other words, a nationalism which is indistinguishable from the ideas of 19 th century Europe. The influential Egyptian President Nasser represents, according to Husri, a type of incarnation of the Arab the person who more than any other person is capable of unifying the Arab nation and it must thus be assumed that Husri has considered the joining with Syria in 1958 as an attempt that did not, under pretence of the Pan-Arab visions, aim at placing Syria under Egyptian hegemony, but as one of the most positive situations in modern Arab history. Sati al-husri was born in San a, Yemen in 1879, but was educated in Istanbul in history, French, mathematics and science. He worked as a teacher for a few years and thereafter took up an administrative position as a legal worker in Kosovo. He returned to Istanbul where he published educational reviews for some time, which led him to a position as a director of a Teachers' Institute. He traveled to Europe (France, Switzerland, Belgium) and acquired new progressive insights within the field of education. Sati al-husri became Director of General Education in Iraq and held this position for an extended period of time. The British deported him from Iraq in 1941, charged with German nationalist sympathies. After the Second World War, the Arab League was founded and Sati al-husri, who in the meantime had been back in Damascus, became the leader of the League s Institute of Arab Studies and thereby functioned as a type of ideological leader of the Arab League. He gradually retired during the second half of the 1950s, ended his career in Beirut, and died in Baghdad in To Sati al-husri it was about the Arab world finding its own path i.e. determines what could function as a staging of the Arabism and hereafter, to implement an ideological rearmament through enlightenment, education and political development. In addition to Sati al-husri, the Syrian 15

16 Qustantine Zurayg is often mentioned as the one who in particular insisted that there existed something unique Arab (an essence ) that had been affected by the European and which was crystallized in a vision that led towards an Arab nation. Arabism and Pan-Arabism Every Arabic-speaking people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab. And if he does not recognize this, and he is not proud of his Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made him take this stand ( ) under no circumstances, should we say: As long as he does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabness, then he is not an Arab. He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes. (Sati al-husri: Selected Studies on Arab Nationalism) With Arabism and Pan-Arabism we are dealing with a project that has no history being linked to a progressive political process, which to a higher extent is the case with European nationalism. This might explain some of the nationalistic excesses in the Arab world in the same way as this explanation (the lack of democratic traditions) has been utilized in explaining the aggressive nationalism in German and Italian fascism in the 20 th century (Arendt 1973). Among the Arab ideological notions, which decisively put the nation on the agenda, was the Ba ath movement in Iraq and Syria and Nasserism in Egypt. The Ba ath ideology has a distinct ideological community with Nasserism: It concerns Arab unity and socialism and both projects turn into nation builders in the Arab world. In 1940 the two Syrian intellectuals, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-din al-baytar, founded a debate forum in Damascus, which they named The Arab Resurrection (Ba ath). They published writings containing revolutionary and socialist messages that were also influenced by Arab nationalism. In 1947 the first Ba ath party was founded in Syria which would promote unity and freedom (implied: from Western colonialism, imperialism etc.) for the Arab nation, for humanism etc (Choueiri 2000). 16

17 It was an Arab socialism which, in its practical form, most of all reminded of the static and repressive regimes of the Eastern bloc prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, but in its ideological basis it implied essential references of something specifically Arab a compound of Arab regionalism, nationalism and European socialism. The Ba ath socialism s ideological statements indicate that the crucial characteristic of the movement was to be nationalistic, populist, socialistic and revolutionary (Dawisha 2003). It was the intention of Aflaq and his ideological companions that a united Arab socialistic movement should be established, and until 1966 there was a form of united Arab leadership in Damascus which was subsequently divided due to different developments in the Arab states where the movement was represented. It may be argued that the most essential unifying ideology in the Arab world during the postwar period has been socialism with its local manifestations in Ba ath socialism which formally is still the principal Government ideology in Syria (and up to 2003 in Iraq). The purpose of the movement was to establish a unified Arab nation which had so far been divided in Arab countries. Until 1966, an outline of a united Arab leadership existed in Damascus which split up and resulted in a fraction in Beirut in 1966 and a corresponding fraction in Baghdad in The individual Ba ath movements of the Arab countries developed in various ways and to a very limited extent moved toward functioning as a unifying entity (Tibi 1997). The Socialist Ba ath Party in Iraq, which was founded as The Arab Socialist Ba ath Party in 1950, was illegal and counted 208 members in The party took power in Iraq in 1963, but it was relinquished again, yet it finally regained power during the 1960s. Up to 1970, the State apparatus and the structure of the party merged, and with the founding of The National Progressive and Patriotic Front in 1973 under Ba ath Party leadership total dominance was realized. Saddam Hussein ruled the Ba ath regime in Iraq from July 1979 until the invasion of Iraq in March After Iraq s war against Iran during the period , it was possible to discern a softening of the Ba ath socialism, particularly with 17

18 regards to privatization of parts of the State-governed economy. However, politically, there was never also long before he was appointed president any doubt among the political elite in Iraq about who held actual power: Saddam Husain wanted there to be no doubt about his own capacity to dominate the RCC and the government, forcefully showing that independent opposition such as that seen in the Shi i cities would not be tolerated (Tripp 2000). The contradictions between the Sunnis and the Shi ites were held in an iron grip during the Saddam-period, leaving no religious movement the ability to gain political influence. Iraq and the Collapse of Pan-Arabism Pan-Arabism was invented before World War 2 and experienced its political highlight after the war. While the phase was concluded with the Camp David accords in , the most important symbol of Arab nationalism realized was the UAR, the unification of Syria and Egypt under Nasser from 1958 to The fall of the same alliance can be said to represent the opposite, the most dramatic breaking down of Pan-Arab statebuilding (Abu-Rabi 2004). But in between these two extremities, a development takes place where republican Iraq refuses to join the alliance and instead follows a nationalistic policy, which would be more permanently pronounced during the second half of the 20 th century in Iraq. The development during the Second World War is significant in order to comprehend the Iraqi conception of the significance of international relations. Iraq has never forgiven British policy towards Iraq during the war, as Halliday points out: As for Iraq, no one can comprehend the depth of nationalist feeling there in the 1980s and 1990s, without taking into account resentment at the suppression of the Rashid Ali rising of 1941 and the illegal British reoccupation of the country that followed (inter alia, a major ideological element in the nationalist upbringing of one Saddam Hussein, born 1937). (Halliday 2005) Halliday divides the development during the Cold War into four phases with regard to the Middle East. During the first phase, from 1946 to 1955, the main issue is the USSR seeking influence in Turkey and Iran. During this phase the USSR does not hold the strength to challenge the 18

19 West, according to Halliday. During the following phase the situation has changed: This was to change dramatically in the second phase, which lasted from 1955 to 1974: now the USSR established itself as the major ally of a number of radical Arab nationalist regimes, the most important of which was Egypt, but also including Iraq, Syria, later Libya and South Yemen. (Halliday 2005) Iraq is, as one of the Arab core countries, participating in founding Pan-Arabism both within the organizational cooperation and within interstate initiatives. However, Iraq is not involved the same way as Egypt and Syria in the military conflicts with Israel. When the Arab states lost the June War in 1967 this was a sign for a Pan-Arab retreat, which to begin with had consequences for Israel s immediate enemies and Egypt in particular whose leader, Nasser, more than anyone else represented the Arab cause and conveyed the Arab message to the Arab people through his many great speeches. The political retreat in prolongation of the war in 1967 was therefore also Nasser s immense personal defeat, an opposing image of his status as the great leader of the Arab world. From the Khartoum summit and henceforward in the Arab history, focus was on the national state rather than the national Arab. A number of other phenomena contributed likewise to the foundation of the collapse of Pan-Arabism with the Camp David Accord in as the most decisive one. The Accord was heavily criticized from an Iraqi point of view and since 1977 i.e. after Sadat s trip to Israel, the Knesset speech etc., the Iraqi people became spokesmen of a radical critique of Egypt s courtship with Israel and USA. Ba ath socialism has a final breakthrough in Iraq in Here, the inner circle around Ahmad Hasan al-bakr and Saddam Hussein succeeded in taking power in a coup. Al-Bakr became president and ruled for 11 years. In July 1979, Saddam Hussein succeeded as the president, a position he held for 24 years until the American invasion of the country in March 2003 put an end to one of the world s most dictatorial regimes Saddam Hussein was located in the famous underground hole nine months later, on December 13 th,

20 Syria was the underdog in relation to Nasser s Egypt and in relation to Iraq the situation was similar. Saddam Hussein was compared to Hafiz al-assad the greater, and more essential leader who, based on a relation between the two Ba ath-led regimes, attempted to rise as a Pan-Arab leader (Tibi 1998). There was not a new situation in the relation between Iraq and Syria the Syrian-Iraqi relation had since the First World War been dominated by Iraq which, as the weightiest of the two parties, was inclined to take the leading role. However, Iraq did not accomplish to seriously establish a relation to Syria where such a role could be carried out. The relation between Syria and Iraq denotes the contrast in the Arab world between (pan-)national unity and national interest. Until the Kuwait War in , Iraq contained the weightiest party after the Kuwait War and the Iraqi defeat it was Syria that was dominating by virtue of its new orientations. With the coups in Iraq, which consolidated the Ba ath regime in Iraq and Assad s assumption of power in Syria in 1970, a situation was brought about where disruption between Iraq and Syria became reality. This circumstance contended until peace was settled between Egypt and Israel and which brought Syria and Iraq back on peaceful terms. This was, however, rendered, first by Iraq s continuous demands of being the leading entity, not merely in the relation between Iraq and Syria, but also in the Arab world as a whole an idea that not alone was unacceptable to Syria, but also, among others, to Saudi-Arabia. Secondly, because of Iraq s persistence to reject the two central UNresolutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, resolutions 242 and 338 this was a part of Iraq s self projection as the Arab world s radical defender of the Arab core questions, including the Palestinian question. Thirdly, Iraq s demand for action against Egypt following Sadat s visit to Jerusalem and the agreement on the Camp David Accord with Israel in accordance with the attempt to be in the lead of the line of rejection. Fourthly, because of Saddam Hussein s assumption of power in Saddam Hussein s notorious delusions of grandeur were incompatible with the levelheaded Hafiz al-assad, the Sphinx of Damascus, who had acquired his name via a foreign policy based on realpolitik. 20

21 Hafiz al-assad s foreign policy manifested itself distinctly in two decisive situations, where Syria had a fall out with Iraq. The final break between Iraq and Syria was a result from Syria s policy during the war between Iran and Iraq in , where Syria chose sides in favour of Iran. And yet more decisively in , where Syria during the Second Gulf War chose sides in favor of the West the USA led coalition against Saddam Hussein. Coincidingly, an ease of tension in relation to Egypt began which enabled a new potential alliance. This was normalized in 1991 where the peace process was initiated by the Madrid summit. It led to a problem of justification for Syria to explain why USA suddenly became an acceptable ally and why Iraq all of a sudden became the opposing enemy. It became useful in this connection that anyone could recognize the Iraqi threat: 1 million men carrying arms under the leadership of a dictator that made no one in the Arab world (or outside) feel safe. However, the Kuwait War and the American-led counter invasion in January 1991 changed the image of threat in the Arab world. Iraq no longer constituted the same threat against its neighboring states. In this perspective, the general interests of the remaining Arab states amounted to create a situation in that part of the region where these goals could be pursued: First, Saddam Hussein s regime had to be weakened. The American policy was in accordance with the security policy interests of Iraq s neighboring states it was a unique situation that the American interests in weakening Saddam Hussein s regime were identical with the interests of the remaining Arab states. The second goal was to maintain the structure of the Iraqi State. The reason why George Bush, the then American president, pursued this goal was because he considered that a divided Iraqi State would likely cause instability in the region. Mehdi Mozaffari wrote back in 1992 a working paper on the occasion of the one-year anniversary for the ending of the Kuwait War, wherein he claimed that the war did not lead to significant changes in connection with the interrelations of the individual Arab states. All regimes in power prior to the war were still in power. There were no uprisings or 21

22 coups. The war had, thus, surprisingly stabilized the regimes in the Middle East. However, one significant change had taken place on the regional level, according to Mozaffari. The change was that Pan-Arabism was no longer an ideology, or a political project for that matter. Others as well have argued that the Kuwait War can be seen as the final, decisive collapse of the Pan-Arabism. As is well known, the Kuwait War was historically contemporary with the final collapse of the USSR and the two phenomena led the then American president George Bush to launch the concept of a new world order. This new world order was not only a characteristic of the global development, but also the end of the Arab dream. Bernard Lewis is one of the significant exponents of this point of view: The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1991 and the ensuing Western military response is historically significant for two main reasons. First, it symbolized the end of the Cold War rivalry and thus, the end of either American or Soviet domination of the Middle East. Russia is incapable, today, of playing the imperial role and the United States is unwilling. The Gulf War, which began as an inter-arab war, also signified the death of panarabism - i.e, the belief that the Arabs form one nation and should thus unite to form one Arab state (Lewis 1996). The Iraqi State and Saddam Hussein are, according to Lewis, responsible for the collapse of Pan-Arabism no more, no less. More sober analyses yet indicate that the causes why a Pan-Arab community has not been realized are much more complicated. The core of the problem is, first of all, that the Arab region has failed to develop an Arab community which can compete with national, local or regional efforts in attending to own interests. Secondly, it is a question of power. The most important Middle Eastern states, including Iraq, will not accept a role as a second rank power in the region and they are moreover preoccupied with demonstrating themselves as the Arab leader or as a part of a leadership (Pollack 2004). Thirdly, there is the issue that the Arab countries have not succeeded in initiating forms of collaboration that can promote development of the region. 22

23 On the contrary, it can be noted that the Arab community rather than moving in the direction of being realized is moving in the opposite direction at the closing of the 20 th century and at the beginning of the 21 st century the Arab project appears to be farther from being realized than ever. There are various explanations on why things have turned out the way they have. These circumstances are broadly represented in the Arab world, but apply to Iraq in particular. To begin with, a low level of political legitimacy characterizes the regimes. The leaders are not elected in democratic elections and they have no public support, nor do the political systems have public support. The opposition does not assert itself per se, but remains secret and silent. There is no political democracy and the people have no real influence on the political systems of the countries. The type of leadership is ruthless and is not engaged in finding widely supported political solutions. The political leaders are rarely chosen based on real professional qualifications, but rather on the merits of membership in the ruling political party, connections with the right people etc. The political leaders are often poorly educated in contrast to the situation in the Western world. There is no real desire to establish a political community with other state leaders as this might threaten one s own position as a dominant dictator. Lastly, these states have no ideology of unity that has any form of popular response. In prolongation hereof: there is no ideology of unity as such in the Arab world that could constitute a foundation for interstate cooperation and Pan- Arabism cannot either constitute or substitute such an ideology. Secondly, the Middle Eastern states have had difficulties in complementing each other financially. On the one hand, some of the strongest economies in the region produce the same type of goods, i.e. primarily oil. On the other hand, the poorer countries in the region produce likewise the same types of goods, which are mainly agricultural products. Thus, the trading opportunities are limited; the countries cannot build an exchange so that the supply of goods in the region is able to complement each other. By closer examination of the existing trade, it is revealed that the trade is in fact low. The Middle Eastern economies are typically dominated 23

24 by the State. The current regimes are inclined to have control of the decisions made by the large co-operations and this result in an extensive state interference in the economies. In some of the cases, this is directly linked to the ideology upon which the states are built. In prolongation hereof, the economies are subjected to central planning that is not always as efficient, especially given that the public sectors are enormous, extremely bureaucratic and inefficient (Hudson 1999). Thirdly, the Middle Eastern states are weak. All Middle Eastern states are as mentioned earlier, dictator states, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, which have popular support only to a very low extent. They are therefore surrounded by extensive security measures, paramilitary police forces, and secured public buildings. It seems as an almost paranoia like situation, but it is because the states and their leaders which appear to be invincible and display their power very offensively are in fact weak, and the systems are in some of the cases even fragile and uphold their power purely by raw violence. These types of political environments do not encourage interstate cooperation. Such cooperation could lead to a weakening of the dictator states and disclose incompetence and incapability etc. On top of that, the states are in many ways artificial. They are founded by outside powers, European colonial powers which cleaned up the region after the First World War. The drawn state lines are to some extent referred to as lines drawn in the sand rather than natural divisions based on geographic and demographic or ethnic conditions. Nevertheless, the leaders in the region will seek to preserve these territories that constitute their states, tooth and nail, which often leads to conflicts between ethnic groups within the borders of the states which may consider themselves belonging to a different state or demand independence, to separate from a political supremacy that is not considered as one s natural political leadership. The Middle East lacks natural unifying centers. For a number of years after the Second World War, Egypt functioned as such a center, but Nasser s political leadership pushed some of the Middle Eastern states away and with Sadat s Western oriented policy in the 1970s, 24