him. What happened? He was asked whether he wouldn't. reconsider the question of his evidence.

Transcription

1 t him. What happened? He was asked whether he wouldn't reconsider the question of his evidence. BY MR. NQKT/J s I have given Your Lordship almost a verbatim report of what went on. He was asked why he did not accept the assurance of the Minister, that he should accept the assurance of the Minister, and also that is there nothing else behind his unwillingness to give evidence. I do not see that that is the function nor th4 = right of a police officer to go and interrogate a witness like that, Your Lordship. BY ME. JUSTICE RUMPFF i But he isn't a witness. BY MR. NOKWE s He is going to be a witness, Your Lordship. It is merely a question of time, he is not a witness now. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF s He may be. BY MR. N0KW2 3 He may b^, that is so, and he is being precognised by the Defence. BY MR. JbSTIC-. RUMPFF s At the moment he is not a witness. BY MR. NOrVJ s Your Lordship, heis being precognised by the Defence - has been precognised. A witness, surely Your Lordship, doesn't become a witness until he has given evidence. And he is an - a co-conspirator in this case, Your Lordship. BY MR. JUSTIC-i RUMPFF s An alleged co-conspirator.

2 BY MR, NOKWE s I can only say that the simplest way in which the Grown could have found out that which they wanted to find out was to ask the Defence at what stage do you want to call Professor Matthews, because it is going to be determined by the Defence. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF S Well, we have heard the statement by Mr. Nokwe, and the explanation b- Mr. Trengove, We don't think that any irregularity has been committed and we don't propose to take any steps in this matter. BY MR. TRJNGOVI s My Lords, the Accused Nokwe has mentioned the matter that people may be interrogated under the Emergency Regulations, and those people may turn out eventually to be their witnesses. If the Accused Nokwe could give the Crown a list of the witnesses they intend calling, the ;rown may be able to assist the Defence in that respect. ALBERT JOHN LUTHULI, under former oath; CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TRENGO^ CONTINUED s Mr. Luthuli, at the adjournment yesterday I had been questioning you on the part of the report which dealt with the failure of the people to give an unequivocal answer as to what thev should do? That is correct, My Lord. Now that is mentioned as a failure and a weakness of the campaign? That is correct. Now could you tell me how the position would have been improved if a clear and unequivocal answer had been given as to what the people should do?

3 What effect would that have had? Well, My Lords, I do not know that it would have effected the position very much in view of what did take place, but it must be realised that this is a post mortem report and it is poirtlng out a weakness and saying, this wasn't done it 5 should have been done. I don't know that it would have changed the position very much. You personally regarded the campaign in the Western Areas as a defeat, the r-suit of the campaign, didn't you? You felt that the African National Congress 10 had suffered a defeat in the Western Areas in regard to its campaign? Yes, it had, in pertain respects, My Lord. In what respect, Mr. Luthuli? Well, for an example, I think that as that report indicated our 15 own organisational machinery wasn't co-ordinated, and I think My Lords, thure was an indication, I have no proof of it, that most of the people who did go went willingly - not in the sense of having shown resistance, so that from that general point of view there would be 20 a certain amount of defeat from our point of view. You mean the fact that people were prepared to go willingly, that you regarded as a defeat? And the fact that the government succeeded in removing the people without any incident occurring? No. I have said 25 that information My Lords, was to the effect that the people who did go, went there not just merely willingly, because in any case we had said that people should show some resistance. Now they didn't show any resistance. 3o to that extent it would be a defeat, from that point-. 30 of view. And then I have already said also My Lord, from the point of view of the fact that we didn't get

4 information to co-ordinate our plans, to that extent too it was a failure. But those are weaknesses in your campaign. But what was the defeat that you suffered? I have already indicated it, My Lord. 5 The fact that people didn't show enough resistance? That is correct. You see, you say in a number of your reports that the people were removed at the point of the "bayonet, and at the point of a rifle. Is that correct? I 10 wouldn't recall, My Lord, I don't recall. But certainly My Lord, in that situation one can't go into details. There were people who moved, they seemed to go with the willingness which is not accompanied by a show of 'we don't want to', and to that extent we would regard it 15 as a defeat. They didn't go far enough in their resistance and unwillingness? I do not know that they even resisted, some of them, My Lord. BY MB. JUSTICE RUMPFF : Now, Mr. Luthuli,... Just before you go on. How many troops were alleged to have been there on that day? BY MR. TMGOYL s Between two and three thousand. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF : '"sre they armed? BY MR. TR^NGOVE : The allegation is that they were armed. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF s And were there police as well?

5 BY MR. TR5NG0VE : Between two and three thousand police, My lord, and the reports say that the government created a state of sffiage. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF s 5 I am only on the facts at the moment. Is the evidence that they were armed with rifles? BY MR. TRil'NGOVh : Those are the allegations "by the A.N.C., My Lords. The report itself at page 3 says, "It was compelled 1< to use a force of three thousand police and army personnel to effect the removals. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF ; Mr. Luthuli, do you remember from the information you got at the time, whether the police were armed 15 with rifles? My Lords, I wouldn't recallspecifically. Apparently it may have beem. Now having regard to that particular day, and when the government anticipated the removal, and the fact that the people were faced with let us assume thr^e thousand armed police,20 what resistance did you want them to commit in order not to have a defeat for the A.N.C.? Well, My Lords, one would expect - I am going My Lord on the information being correct, it may be incorrect, that there are some who just simply willingly went. That is they showed No, my question is this. Having regard to that force of armed police, what resistance would Jpou have expected in order to have made the occasion not a defeat for the African National Congress? Well, My Lords, I can't say specifically, but I would have desired 3Q people to show a reluctance to go, a mere reluctance to go, and in the absence of that and in fact I think that

6 (A.J1 LUTHULI) the... BY Ṭ 1R. JUSTICE RUMPFF : Y.hat form should the reluctance take? I moan we are now using resistance and reluctance. You say they should he reluctant to go? Now to what extent should 5 they have shown, in what way should they have shown their reluctance in order to have made this an occasion not a defeat for the A.N.C.? My Lord, I take it that even with the presence of the armed forces, if they were armed, the police arhuld still come to the house of the man and 10 demand him to leave. And then I think that in that circumstance one wo Id expect a determined man at least to - well, I have used the word reluctant, to indicate to the officer that he was not really anxious to leave his home. 15 And if he done that and left, would there then not have been a defeat in this manner? Well, of course, My Lord, it would be very difficult to know just what would have transpired between an individual and the police, it is true, but subsequent information does 20 become important in the question of defeat, in the sense that it is private (?), because we - there were people who did not simply show the spirit at all, of the A.N.C. It is in that sense, My Lord. You see, the difficulty that one is faced 25 with is the - to get a compromise between the two statements, one you wanted no incident whatsoever, violent incident? That is correct. You didn't want that at all? That is quite correct. 30 Nevertheless on the other hand, not withstanding the comparatively strong force of police, which

7 was brought in to help with the removal, there is the point of view that there was not strong enough resistance. Now I am trying to find out what should one expect then? I see your point, My Lord, but I wonder whether really the first statement that I made, it was really quite 5 relevant, because as I say it is information that one got and I think that the government did say so too, that the people - at least some people did just go one can almost say joyfully, and therefore in that sense... Was there information that on that day in 10 the face of that police force, that people went joyfully? T^ere was information to that effect, My Lord. I think in the press of the time, People whom, I think, seem to have just been going on normally as if the van had been brought and then they just willingly and 15 happily went to the lorries. So from that point of view, My Lords, I may be dancing round the same tune, we would regard it as a defeat in the sense of the absence of the spirit. BY MR. TRijNGOVL : 20 Mr. Luthuli, just for your information on the question of the state of affairs on the day of removal, Exhibit A. 49, which is the Twelfth Annual Conference Report of the African "ational Congress Youth League, in the Executive Report under the heading 25 "Western Areas Removal", the report states that the day of the 9th February, 1955 "will be remembered in history as the day of struggle amongst the African people. It was on this day that the Nationalists prepared to remove thousands of people from Sophiatown. It was on this day 30 that 2,000 police, armed with sten guns, rifles, pistols, drawn bayonets, etc. marched in military fashion on the

8 (A.J. LUTHULI) people." That was the state of affairs on the 9th accor- * ding to the Executive Report? Of the Youth League? Is the position that Youth League Reports contain untruths and the parent body's reports contain the truths? No, My Lords, I am not challenging the 5 facts there, I don't know, but I am merely pointing out that that is the report of the Youth League. I am not in a position to challenge the facts there. If the Executive Report of the Youth League makes that statement, and knowing the Executive of the 10 Youth League in 1955, do you accept that as correct? Surely My Lords, without one satisfying himself I am not in a position to say that I accept that as correct. I am not in a position to say. So Mr. Luthuli, you would rather not say 15 that you accept this as correct? Because I don't know the situation. I mean if I knew the situation then I would be in a position to say I accept it or not. Well, Mr. Luthuli, surely you must have known by reason of subsequent enquiries, you must have 20 known whether the police were armed with bayonets and rifles and sten guns on that day? Or don't you even know that? My Lords, I wouldn't catagorically say that they were armed with bayonets. I mean, one has read in the press that th^y wore, but at the moment I 25 really cannot say catagorically they were armed. I am not prepared to go as far as that. You never enquired into that position? I don't know that I enquired into it. I don't recall. Mr. Luthuli, I find it very difficult for 30 a man in your position - that he shouldn't be aware of these circumstances. It takes a lot of time to refresh i

9 your memory. L.L.M. 81, which is the African National Congress Report to the National Conference in Bloemfontein under the heading "Western Areas Removal Scheme" - I have quoted this to you already, it refers to the fact that early on the morning of the 9th February military trucks and more than two thousand policemen with military force were used for the forcible removal of the people, and thanks to the guidance of A.N.C. leadership, a bloodbath was avoided, which the government had intended to bring about. Do you accept the position, Mr. luthuli, that p.0 the police were there armed, two thousand police and army personnel? I accept it. In view of the report I do. And armed with the intention of removing the people? I do. 15 Now in the light of that, you say the people should have showed more resistance that they did? I have already explained that. You say that? Is that correct? The African National Congress attitude was that in spite of that 20 state of affairs the people should have shown mere resistance and more unwillingness? I didn't use the word more resistance. I merely said that information was that there were some people who didn't show any resistance and spirit at all. I think I explained that. 25 The question of more doesn't arise at all. And they should have shown an unwillingness in the face of that force? Surely I think as I have already indicated in reply to My Worships here, I have expressed my view on that point. In a situation like 30 o that where you would expect - or rather where you have indicated that people must show a spirit of unwillingness

10 and you got some people going there with no indication of that spirit at all, I think you would he perfectly justified in saying that from that point of view it would he a defeat. I don't think - I don't see any point in questioning it. 5 The majority of the people on that day, Mr. Luthuli, the majority of the people, was their spirit one of complete submission or were the majority of the people incenced and was there resistance - was their resistance strong? My Lord, I wouldn't be able to 10 divide the group in terms of majority and minority, but it is a fact that there was that, and it is as one recalls that even the government did indicate that people went there willingly, so I can lot say the proportion,my Lord. I cannot help the Crown there. 15 BY MR. JUSTICE BEKKER J Mr. Luthuli, you stated in the course of your evidence that speaking for yourself when you state your case you must make it perfectly clear to the people what you are after, that has been your belief. Clarify 20 your case, state your case well, state your demands clearly? That is correct, My Lord. That was your view all along? That is correct, My Lord. ^o you happen to know whether the members 25 of the National Executive were aware of your - of that trend of thought, that what you do you must state your case absolutely clearly to the people. whether they shared that view or not? Do you know My Lords, I would assume that they would. 30 No, apart from assumption - one would assume so, naturally. Do you know whether they...? I have

11 never heard any contradiction to it. Have you ever told them as a matter of ordinary common sense, when you state your demands you must do so in perfectly clear terms? You see, what I have in mind - I want to "be quite frank with you - this 5 deals with the weakness in your campaign that the National Executive felt that people hadn't been given a clear indication as to what they should do? That is correct, My Lord. You have said in the course of your evidence 10 speaking for yourself, when you deal with the people you must make the thing perfectly clear to them? Quite correct, My Lord. I am just pausing to consider why wasn't that done? Why didn't the A.N.C. say to the people, now 15 look here, this is what you should do? My Lords, I think it is correct to say that insofar as I said yesterday, the position between the Western Areas people and the Working Committee, it didn't seem that the liason there was such as gave information, and My Lords, I think 20 that I might satisfy you if I were to refer to something to which I might refer more later. For an example, in the... BY MR. JUSTICE B.JCK^R : " v ell, if you are going to deal with it later 25 do so, but just make a note of what I have asked you and then you can refer to it again. I would like to know this. Inasmuch as you were of the view as leader that your demands and/or your case, whatever it may be, must be made clear to the people, how did it come about that 30 that was not done in the case of the Western Areas Campaign, in the sense that the people were not told

12 what they should do. I'll be glad if you will just consider that question and deal with it later on. BY MR. TRENGOVL s Mr. Luthuli, according to the official African National Congress attitude, the presence of a 5 large force of police assembled at Sophiatown on that day was due to the fact that the indignation and hostility of the masses in the Western Areas had been aroused to such an extent that the government was compelled to use three thousand policemen to effect the removal. Do you 10 know that that was the African National Congress attitude? That is correct. And do you know that the African National Congress regarded that as one of its achievements? That is correct. 15 Now here you have a position that the indignation and hostility of a large mass of people is aroused to such an extent that three thousand armed policemen have to be used to effect the removal of a hundred and - a hundred or a hundred and fifty families. That is cor- 20 rect, is it not? That was the position? I have already said so. Now in those circumstances, does the African National Congress say that some of the 150 families failed them because in those circumstances they went 25 willingly? My Lords, as I have already indicated, in the light of what I have said, I would still hold to what I have said. Now Mr. Luthuli, in those circumstances how do you justify the statement that it was the govern- 30 ment that triud to provoke a bloodbath on that day? My Lords, I think that statement has reference to this,

13 that this was a removal of people, the African National Congress was not asking the people to resist by violence, and from our point of view, we didn't see the cause and I still don't now see the cause for such a large force. But you have said that the large force - 5 the government was compelled to use this large force on account of the state of hostility and indignation amongst the mass of the people in the Western Areas? That is correct. But you see, you arouse the people 10 and because people are aroused, which is good from our 10 point of view, then the government goes to the extent of bringing a large force. Now I say, and I still say, such a large force in my view is not warranted in view of the fact that there was no - from the point of view of the A.N.C., it's police, there was no indication of? :> violence on the part of the people-. BY MR. JUSTICE BEKKER : But assuming a small force had been brought in, might there not have been a bloodbath? There could have been, yes. 20 So wouldn't it be necessary for a large force to avoid a bloodbath, rather than a small force...? I don't follow, My Lord. If the indignation and hostility of the people had been roused to this extent, would it have 25 been wise for the government to send in a small force which could possibly lead to bloodshed? If you have the people aroused, filled with hostility, and you send in twenty policemen armed...? My Lord, I am saying aroused, politically aroused, but not in the sense of 30 violence. In other words, one wasn't anticipating that the people would resist by violence, My Lord.

14 My difficulty is this, Mr. Luthuli. If the people were hostile, politically or otherwise, but if they were hostile...? Hot hostile in the sense of violence, My Lord, I don't think... No, well, they were just annoyed, hostile 5 in that sense? Yes. A hundred and fifty annoyed families. Would it have been wise for the government to send in say twenty armed policemen? Might that not have precipitated trouble in the sense of violence, as opposed to the 10 other position, a hundred and fifty families annoyed, and to avoid violence the government sent in three thousand policemen? Well, My Lord, I don't know. It would seem to me that a large force - it can work two ways, My Lord. The large force can bring about a 15 greater resentment on the part of some people who are reckless, than would a small force, My Lord. I mean I concede it might work both ways, but... But what would you do if you were in the position of the government, to avoid bloodshed, would 20 you have sent in a small force or a large force? Well, My Lords, it would depend upon what I would be believing at the time. If I realised that the people were likely to be violent... No, I am putting it on this basis. A 25 hundred and fifty families, full of indignation and whose hostility had been aroused to such an extent that the government had to send in a force, now that is the premise...? But My Lord, I don't know really that I would send such a large number. 30 Would you send in a small number? 'Would you dare to do it? It might not be a small number,

15 (A.J. LUTHULI) say of fifty, "but I wouldn't send such a large number as was sent, My Lord. Really, I don't know, it is speculation, but I don't know that I would send such a large number. BY MR. TRENGOVL! 5 Mr. Luthuli, why was the fact that the government was compelled to send three thousand policemen, why did the African National Congress regard that as an achievement? Well, My Lords, I don't know that I can explain satisfactorily the expression achievement, 10 except only that in the sense that it was proved at the time people had been aroused, there were indications that people had been aroused, and to that extent it would be an achievement. which they had been aroused? And also an indication of the extent to 15 i That would be correct. And therefore the government sending a large force is an indication of the fact that people apparently, apparently the people seemed to have been aroused. And by whom would these people have been 20 aroused to that extent? My Lord, there had been a good deal of agitation extending over quite a period, and among the agencies that did so you had the A.N.C, as well as other groups in that area. You regarded this as an achievement for 25 the Congresses, because it was their propaganda and their agitation that had aroused the people to this pitchy My Lord, we would not exclude of course the other people who in the Western Areas as had been indicated, were also carrying on propaganda, in fact 30 long, long before the African National Congress came in on a National basis, propaganda had been going on in that

16 area "by groups in that area. Mr. LuthuM, if there had been a greater unwillingness on behalf of the people who were to be removed, if there had been a greater unwillingness on the 9th of February to go, would the possibility of a 5 riot or a bloodbath have been increased or not? My Lords I don't know that it would have made any difference in the light of our expectation as to the increase in the possibility or riots or not, because we were not expecting rioting, we were not expecting violence. 10 You were expecting a bloodbath, by reason of the conduct of the government, you were expecting a bloodbath? I think I have explained before what one might read into that expression. One must not read into that expression necessarily that the people are going to 15 resist by violent action, because we have iaade the expression bloodbath, merely meaning that the police took strong action against the people, and the people suffered and some died. Mr. Luthuli, the Congress movement held 20 the view that on that day the situation in the Western Areas was so tense that if one person had thrown a stone out of his turn there would have been.a violent clash between the police and the masses, if one untoward incident had occurred there would have been a violent 25 clash? I don't know wtether that was Congress view, but there was the possibility. I have never heard of that view in Congress. of it, but it could be. It could be, I have never heard The possibility would be there of course, I don't know that it was a Congress view, I 30 am not sure about that. Oan I put it to you that your conclusion

17 that you were defeated in the Western Areas, that you suffered a defeat, that that is based on this faioure of somebody to resist to a point where there would have been a bloodbath? That is the conclusion of the Crown, I don't share it. 5 What was the wise guidance that the African National Congress gave that avoided a bloodbath on that day? - - My Lords, in the light of Congress attitude the guidance of the African National Congress to people on that day would be a 1 the lines that I have already 10 indicated. The line that you have indicated is that Congress gave no guidance at all? Those were the lines that you have indicated up to this point, that Congress gave no guidance to the people at all? I 15 think I'll deal with that point a little more fully - I have views that My Lordship has asked - I was going to deal with the situation that obtained in Western Areas towards the end, and whether one ought - what the Congress holds was passed on to the people in full may 20 be another question, but I do hold, My Lords, that the people in Western Areas knew the Congress point of view in the matter. I hold that. The masses? A large number of people knew. I hold that a large number of people knew 25 generally the policy of the African National Congress. Certain specific things may not have passed on to them, but I do hold very strongly that they knew. Well, will you deal with that now, because it arises out of this question I put to you. What is 30 this wise guidance that the A.N.C. gave and that averted the bloodbath? My Lords, the guidance which the

18 African National Congress expected people in the Western Areas to give to the people... No, not what the African National Congress expected its people to give. What was the wise guidance that the African National Congress gave to the people 5 of the Western Areas, in fact gave? My Lords, I must assume - I definitely must assume that this spirit of the African National Congress was conveyed to the people of the Western Areas. I must assume that. There may be certain deficiencies, but I must assume that, and I 10 think that is correct, and there are deficiencies. For an example - as I said I will deal with that later - it is true that there w^re some speeches in the Western Areas which seemed to indicate a contrary view, but the general spirit and propaganda of the African National 15 Congress was along those lines. Let us not work with assumptions, Mr. Luthuli. Do you or do you not know what the propaganda was that was actually spread by the African National Congress to the people at the Western ^reas, for a period 20 of eight months before the date of removal? I know the nature of the propaganda in general, that the propaganda was that you must not willingly move, that I know. And I have, My Lords, since come tc know that there were speeches given by some people which are quite contrary 25 to A.N.C. policy. But now. I cannot say, My Lords - I don't share that view that those speeches might have been of such a nature in fact as to make people abandon A.N.C. policy. When did you find out about these speeches? 30 I heard about them here in Court. For the first time? I think in the

19 Preparatory Examination one did hear of them hazily. I have come to hear of them more here in Court. Here for the first time you realised that Congress view was propagated in a different way to what you expected it would "be? By some people, not all. 5 There were...? There were hundreds, and hundreds of meetings and rcany people who spoke in those meetings. By some people. Who were the people that spoke officially on behalf of the African National Congress at these 10 hundreds and hundreds of meetings over that period? Who were they, spoke with the official sanction of the African National Congress? arranged at different levels. My Lords, meetings are They could be arranged at branch level, arranged at provincial level, arranged 15 at national level. I am not in a position to say so and so spoke, so and so spoke, I cannot do that. In fact I am not in a position. Have you studied or have you investigated the nature of the propaganda that was made on behalf of 20 the A.N.C. over that period? I have not, except just reading from the press, I have not. So that this Executive Report of 1955 to which you were a party, and which speaks of the wise guidance by which the African National Congress averted 25 a bloodbath, is that based on assumption or on fact? It must be on fact, I was merely saying from my point of view. You ask me for a point of view. But it is also correct that the propaganda of the African National Congress to people not to be violent, surely 30 that must help. I don't think it is an assumption. The very fact that over a period the African National

20 Congress aays to people don't "be violent, don't be violent, I submit that that must help in situations like this. When you say - this statement that people mustn't be violent, are you using that word metaphorically 5 or in what sense? I mean it would describe the policy of the African National Congress of non-violence. And would that be consistent with the statements made at meetings that people should not move even if they were to sacrifice their lives? That is 10 quite consistent. The two things mean the same? Quite consistent, in the light of the explanations I have already made to the Crown as to what I mean by don't move and to what extent you might get an individual on 15 his own resisting. I have made that explanation time and time againr- to the Crown. Mr. Luthuli, the Freedom Volunteers were called upon to play a major part in building up the resistance of the people in connection with this removal 20 in the Western Areas? That is correct. What was it that these Freedom Volunteers had to do? connection? What were their duties in this particular My Lords, I wouldn't add anymore to the duties of the Volunteers other than what one has already 25 said, namely this that the Volunteers were supposed to move amongst the people, explain to them our point of view regarding the removal and call upon them not to voluntarily remove and carry out generally our point of view amongst the people. 30 Lid they have to do any secret work? ij

21 "^id they have to do any underground work? No. Did they have to wait for a particular call on a certain day and then perform a specific task as a group of volunteers? A call from some volunteer 5 in chief or whoever it was? My Lords, I have already indicated generally what would be expected of the Volunteers in carrying out the propaganda. Well, I want to read to you Mr. Luthuli, a portion of a speech made by - alleged to have been 10 made by G. Sibande. Do you know G. Sibande? I do. Now it was at this meeting on the 27th June, 1954, the Anti-Epartheid Meeting in the Trades Hall, Johannesburg, it is in Volume 39? page That meeting really marked the beginning of the - what 15 one might call the co ncerted campaign by the Congresses in connection with the Western Areas. It is also the meeting at wnich Vundhla spoke. We have already had his speech. It was called under the auspices of all the Congresses. Sibanle is called upon to "make the call for 20 Volunteers". You know you issued the call for 50,000. Now this is what Sibande says at page 7775 : "We are also in the midst of our struggle, our holy war is coming. Under-these conditions we appeal for Volunteers who shall obey the instructions of Congress, men and 25 women who shall be faithful to the orders of Congress, Where we are going we shall go in darkness. We shall work in the dark, we shall go through black forests, then when we get into that river we shall start breathing. We do not know what river is that, there may 30 be blood flowing in that river. Thuro might be anything, but we are going there. These Volunteers who are so

22 anxious to do this job, we must tell them this, whether they want to know whether they want to be given orders now or tomorrow, that must not worry them. They must just wait for the call. 'Vhen the bell strikes then we shall do something. They shall get the call. Someone 5 has been complaining that our people are sent to the farms. Now we are also going to be sent to those farms. We shall apply all tactics underground, openly, we will do all this, you can believe, you an rest assured that the Africans are hard people." And then he deals with 10 people in other countries and he continues on page 7776, at line 7, "Many people ask these Volunteers should they be regarded just ^o go and organise, just for the removal scheme. Dr. Verwoerd knows v^ry well that we are waiting for him. One thing with Verwoerd, he will be learnt a 15 lesson. We are not going to do the things he expects. We have wasted time thinking, and we shall do things our own way. We therefore appeal to you Volunteers to wait and see what orders are given out. Don't cast your eyes only on the Western Removal Scheme, there are many 20 other things where we can hit Malan very hard", and then he continues with his speech. Now would that be a fair statement of what the volunteers had to be ready for?- My Lords, my immediate reaction, subject to further reading of it, would be this, that a lot of things are 25 mixed up there, a confusing speech, and in a way it would confuse people on A.N.C. policy. Now my experience is that you have got to read - previously, in some of these that I have already road, one finds that he either revises opinion or strengthens his opinion. 30 My Immediate reaction would be this, a speech likely to confuse. I can comment on several expressions. For one

23 thing, My Lord, one mustn't create the impression - it would be very wrong of me to create it, namely that a Volunteer would carry out house to house work only, there are several duties of volunteers, quite legitimate duties, they may be called upon to do. But the question 5 of secret and things like that, that didn't arise at all. So that my own reaction, subject to revision in reading, would be it is a confusing speech. In that regard I would say I don't like it. This statement that they are going through 10 the river and that there might be blood in that river and that they are going to work in the dark, is that correct? My Lord, I don't like to say it is correct, but allow me to read it, but I have already indicated my general attitude towards the thing. 15 ^o you know why that type of statement is allowed to be made when Volunteers are called for!?' Unless Mr. Sibfende explains himself, how would I know? But he is called by the African National Congress to make t..is call for volunteers? That is so.20 I take it they would call somebody who is fully informed as to what would be expected of Volunteers? That isquite correct. I dcn't know that one can say when one stands up to speak, if he should say something which may not be in line with policy you 25 would therefore syy that in fact that person speaks for the group. He might have been asked to speak. How often do you get, My Lords, even in other quarters people standing up and making statements that would simply contradict what they regard as policy, or you 30 might have two responsible people contradigting one another. Is that your explanation of this - how this

24 can arise? I am merely saying what my preliminary attitude is, I have already stated my preliminary attitude, subject o my reading and confirming or otherwise. When you want me to go into details and say what do you mean by this river and that, why did he speak like that, 5 I can't explain for Sibande, surely. Mr. Luthuli, on the date of removal, on the night prior to the removal, volunteers were called into Sophiatown to rescue people, do you know that? Yes I do. 10 Why was that done? My Lords, that was done because there were some people who must have indicated - I wouldn't know the details, My Lord, but that would be done because some people indicated their desire not to go to Meadowlands, and they were removed to 15 somewhere else to avoid going to Meadowlands. But your attitude was not that people should not go to Meadowlands. Your attitude was that they should not go willingly - the A.N.C. attitude? My Lord, of course if there were people who would indicate that 20 they didn't want to go to Meadowlands, we would go out of our way to help them g-> elsewhere. Definitely. That wouldn't be a contradiction of our stand to people who would eventually go to Meadowlands. Do you know hew many of the 150 families 25 didn't want to go? That I wouldn't know. You see, Mr. Luthuli, your explanation of why these people were evacuated seems to me quite contrary to anything that you said in connection with the resistance of the people up to this moment. 30 Was the attitude that if people didn't want to go to Meadowlands at all, the African National Congress would

25 ffl prevent the police from getting hold of them? No, My Lord. I have already said that there is no contradiction on the general stand of unwillingness, and I have also siid that I do not know the details of the circumstances insofar as those people are concerned, but if people 5 indicated their willingness not to go to Meadowlands, if they say we don't want to go to Meadowlands, if you can get us some other place to go to, it was quite legitimate for the people there to help them. I can't see any contradiction personally, and I think it would 10 have been their duty to help them. I can't see any contradiction personally. It would have been their duty to help them. Not that it was part of policy to say that originally we shall evacuate people so that they don't go to Meadowlands, but where on that date it was 15 said that we would rather not go to Meadowlands at all, it seems to me their natural duty to assist them. Were you going to leave this to the day of removal to decide whether or not you should evacuate people if the jolice come to get th~m? My Lord, I 20 have already said that it was not part of general policy, so that I cannot give you the details surrounding those people who were in fact moved to some other place, but I am saying the fact that they were moved away is no contradiction at all. 25 If it was not part of general policy, why were the Volunteers called in for this specific task on the night prior to the removal? It is in fact possible that the people there may have heard just a day or so that some people were interested in evacuating. It is 30 quite possible. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF : If the government had not anticipated, would

26 all the hundred and fifty families been evacuated? No, My Lord, I mean insofar as I know the situation, there was no specific plan or propaganda to evacuate people. BY MR. TMGOVE s 5 You see, Mr. Luthuli, coming back to the view of your dismal ignorance of Congress affairs, because this Report of the Secretariat says at page 3, dealing with the situation in the Western Areas, "In this situation which obtained just prior to the removals, it was 10 agreed by the Secretariat that efforts should be directed to inducing and assisting as many of the proposed evacuees to remove further into Sophiatown and to attempt to ensure that no families would go to Meadowlands. Before adequate and effective steps could be taken to implement 15 this, the government acted, throwing the arrangements into confusion. Nevertheless, the Volunteers went into action and despite the shortness of notice^ adverse weather conditions et cetera, succeeded in evacuating some thirty families". It is quite clear Mr. Luthuli 20 from this passage that the intention was, and a plan had been made to evacuate the one hundred and fifty families in an attempt to get nobody to go to Meadowlands. If that - and that plan had been made sometime prior to the 8th of February? My Lords, fortunately 2 5 for me, although the Crown tries to allege that I do not know - which I don't agree to - I had already said in the general propaganda there was no question of evacuating people and I did say that people working oon the spot, it is possible situations would arise where 30 people would want to be evacuated and not want to go to Meadowlands, I have already said that, and surely My Lords,

27 it would be expecting really too much to think that one would know of the detailed operations in any area mmnmtely, - I don't see the contradiction personally from general policy. I am not asking you any details at all. 5 The secretariat made a plan beforehand for the evacuation of families. Do you accept that? Yes, but the secretariat was on the spot, and that was not part of general propaganda. It may be, when it came close to the government acting, the Secretariat then felt that it should 10 act that way there. Now surely you don't expect a man at Groutwille to know by the flash of a minute what the Secretariat is doing? It is official alright, but it was not part of propaganda. The Secretariat would be debarred in the light of what might be obtaining at the 15 time to act, in a special situation. If that is an index of my ognorance of Congress affairs, well I leave it to you. Mr. Luthuli, I didn't suggest that it was part of propaganda. I put it to you that that plan had 20 been made and apparently you didn't know about it? It is quite possible, and I am not even surprised now that I hear it. I wouldn't be surprised if the people on the spot would decide on such an issue. Up to a few minutes ago you didn't even 25 know of it, Mr. Luthuli? It is quite possible, and I am not ashamed of it either. It might come as a matter of report to me, but the fact that I didn't know doesn't mean much at all. It would come by way of report that in the course of this andthis they did that 30 and that. But that you should suggest that I should know of that before, would retard (?) operations. COURT.tiDJOURNS.

28 ALBERT JOHN LUTHULI, under former oath; CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. IRENGOVE CONTINUED : Mr. Luthuli, I just want to refer in connection with this Report of the Secretariat on the Western Areas - I just want to refer you to the last portion of 5 it, page 6, under the heading of "What must he done?" Now Mr. Luthuli, when the first removals had been completed, that was not the end of the campaign? No, that wouldn't be the end of the campaign, My Lord. Now this report, here the Secretariat 10 makes the following statement, "What must be done? We must keep clear in our minds the objective of the campaign. Simply stated, this is to arouse the people and to organise them in a campaign of resistance to apartheid. The basis of such resistance to take the form of 15 non-collaboration, of a quantity and quality which must compel the government to use all its resources to impose its will at any and every stage. Non-collaboration, both from the mass and the individual, designed untimately to strain the resources of the authorities and create 20 a situation more favourable to the movement and for more positive - more direct and positive action. The immediate task in the Western Areas is that of ensuring that resistance grows, that nobody collaborates with the authorities and that those who are removed to Meadowlands 25 are removed by force, and that the M-Plan is put into operation. The aim should be to make it necessary for the authorities to employ ever more and more forces to effect removals." Mr. Luthuli, is - does that report of the African National Congress represent the view of 30 the African National Congress of what still had to be done in connection with this campaign? It does, My

29 Lord, it does, My Lords, in a general way. So that, Mr. Luthuli, the African National Congress wanted to compel the authorities to use even more forces than those that were employed on the first occasion with the removal? My Lords, that is why I 5 said in a general way. I don't know what the report might have had in mind when it says "compel" it to use more "forces." BY ME. JUSTICE KENNEDY s Assuming Mr. Luthuli that more forces meant 10 more police cr more arms, what would happen? My Lords, insofar as - I agree quite in toto with the rest without questioning - these other portions, "the aim should be to make it necessary for the authorities to employ ever more and more forces to effect removals", if that My Lord, is 15 intended to mean that the primary aim of the African National Congress is in fact to get the government to employ forces, then I would say - no, I wouldn't agree with that point of view. But on the other hand if it is intended to mean that by our resistance, our growing 20 resistance as from past experience the government would use more force, not necessarily that we organise with the view - specifically with the view of getting them to use more forces, that would be an entirely different matter, My Lord. 25 BY MR. TRENGOVE : Mr. Luthuli, to me your explanation is unintelligible. You see, in the previous paragraph it dpeaks of using more force,and in that paragraph it speaks of employing more forces. So I want to put it to 30 you that one can only put one construction on that, and that is that the people must resist so that the government

30 must employ force to remove them and they must resist to compel the government to use a greater number of forces, men, armed men, to remove the people. Can you suggest any other possible construction on those two paragraphs? No, I have no other possible construc- 5 tion to suggest other than the one that I suggested, what I have already indicated, My Lord, that is it if is intended to mean that the purpose of organising is to force the government, that being the primary aim, then I wouldn't agree with that. But I don't know that the 10 other point of view would be altogether as the prosecutor tries to say, namely this that as we use - as the resistance grows from past experience the government would - well maybe in the normal course of things use more forces, not that we set out to invite the use of more 15 forces. As I say, I wouldn't agree with the other construction. Just this, Mr. Luthuli, that is a statement of what has to be done? That is correct. So that, in building up the resistance, the 20 African National Congress knows exactly what it has in mind. It has that in mind? It doesn't. Just while you have that document in front of you, if you look at the first paragraph of "wha> has to be done", the last number of lines, where it says 25 that the resistance must be built up in such a way - it says that the "non-collaboration" is to be of such a nature that the powers of the government are taxed to such an extent that it would provide the African National Congress with the opportunity for more positive and 30 direct action. Now what does that report envisage? What more positive and direct action did the African National

31 A(A.J. LUTHULI) Congress have in mind as the government is weakened by their campaigns? My Lord, my view of that is this, that if people would not co-operate and increase their show of resistance to apartheid, increase the pressure in other words, and the government would show no sign 5 of meeting the demands of the people, notwithstanding the fact that people are not collaborating with the government, then the African National Congress would continue and build up its resistance more and more, increase its pressure. 10 What type of action is envisaged by the more positive and direct action which the African A *ational Congress will employ when once the resources of the government have been sufficiently taxed? My Lords, it is difficult for one to specify and say this 15 form and that form of action, but whatever form would be found advisable under certain circumstances within the policy of the African National Congress, it would be employed. Now I wan't here specifically say this and that and that. I moan when you say you will not colla- 20 borate with the government, there are various forms in which you may not collaborate with the government. What can be more positive and more direct as a form of struggle than the campaign in the Western Areas and the form of struggle there employed? Surely 25 My Lords, the form of struggle employed in the Western Areas could not be regarded as the last form - because afterall what form was employed except agitating and asking people not to move? Now there are other... And removing them? Removing those who 30 desired to be removed. But that doesn't exhaust My Lords other possibilities within the framework of policy

32 as to what you may use. I don't say that it exhausts it, I want to know what other form of action was contemplated that was more positive and direct than the form of struggle employed in the Western Areas? My Lords, I don't know 5 that the Secretariat had in mind any form - any specific form when they said so or they werem rely stating a general outlook that ycu would use more positive forms. Well, if they did have any specific form in mind, I wouldn't know. But I am merely saying here now that there are 10 other forms, that could be used within the framework of policy. BY MR. JUSTICE BEKKER : Mr. Luthuli, will you just refresh my memory. This Report, to what extent were you a party to it or 15 otherwise? My Lord,... BY MR. JUSTICE RIJMPFF : Mr. Trengove, is this - its heading is "Report of the Secretariat on the Western Areas". BY MR. TRENGOVE s 20 My Lords, according t>: the evidence, is the Report of the Secretariat of the A.N.C. on the Western AreasCampaign. BY MR. JUSTICE RUIiEPFF ; Was this given, according to the evidence, 25 to a C ongress meeting? Presented at a meeting or not? BY MR. TRENGOVE : I wouldn't be able to say, My Lords. BY MR. JUSTICE BEKKER ; Lo you know this document at all, Mr. 30 Luthuli? No, My Lords, I dnn't recall. I mean - let me say I don't recall quite honestly seeing this document

33 before. In the normal course of affairs wo Id you or would you not be a party to it or responsible for it or carry knowledge of it? Well, My Lords, normally a report of that kind would go to the Working Committee 5 and might eventually find its way into the Executive. On the other hand, it could happen that it wasn't presented to the Executive, that I wouldn't know. But until it really does come, to the Working Committee and the Executive, one wouldn't know about it. I must also sat 10 this, My Lords, it may sound a kind of excuse, but it is just a fact that about this time really, the time of the removals, it wasn't even a question of a ban with me, which made things difficult, it was just at a period when I was in hospital sick, so that there would be some 15 things that might go past me, so that I can't say that didn't reach the Executive, I am not in a position to say For what period were you in hospital? The 1st of January up to the beginning of April, 1955, 20 I was in hospital, and then when I left hospital of course for quite some time I was supposed not to do any work. But I was in hospital during that period, My Lord. BY MR, JUSTICE RUMPFF s Fresumably the report was intended to be 25 a report from the Secretariat to the National Executive? Thab would be so, My Lord. Normally I take it the Secretariat in an event of this nature would report to the National Executive? Through the Working Committee. Apparently 30 the report was drawn by the Secretariat on behalf of the Working Committee, and then finally to the Executive, My Lord, that is quite correct.

34 BY MR. JUSTICE BEKKSR : And the other report, L. L. M. 81, the report to Conference on the Western Areas, can you recall to what extent you were a party to that document?? My Lord I am a party to this extent that generally the 5 Report is drafted and the draft is sent to those of us who cannot he present, and we may comment, and then the Secretary in the light of that,... I have in mind a different thing, I am not on the general position. Can you recall in fact whether 10 this report had come to your knowledge beforehand and whether it had your blessing before it went to Conference, that is this L. L. M. 8l, the report to the 1955 National Conference. Just to make it clear, Mr. Luthuli, you see there are th.ro e positions. Either you don't remember^ 15 and you say I can't remember. Or you can say, I do remember I never saw this report. Or the other is, I do remember and I did see the report and I sanctioned it. Now in that sense, to what extent were you party to it in fact? I think you did send a message to that Conference, 20 that is one thing. Now what I would like to know is the Report, not your message? I am looking at the Report, My Lord. V>ell, I'll tell you what, take your time about it, you can let me know later on. Just make a 25 note of it and deal with it later on? What I was trying to look at - because th^re were two Conferences, one in December and then a special one later, I was trying to make sure just which one it is. What Conference is that? It is loose 30 sheets of paper, so that I can't just tell, it is not bound together, so that I cannit say,

35 BY MR. THENGOVE : My Lords, that is the Report to the 1955 Conference in Bloemfontein in November. There was a special conference early in 1956 yo consider finally this question of the Freedom Charter. But the Annual National 5 Conference at which the National Executive Report was considered, that is the one, My Lords? May I ask from the Crown please, these loose sheets of paper I take it were found by the Special Branch from various people. They are generally bound My Lord, thit is one - this report was found in a number of places. That was the one alleged to have been found in the possession of Moretsele which is the same as L.L.M. 81. We don't know why it is in that condition. 15 Mr. Luthuli, just before I step off that question, this taxing of the resources of the government and then resorting to more positive and direct action, now you say you don't know what the Secretariat had in mind in using that phrase? Except that I interpret 20 it as meaning more pressure. You can't think of any other form of action which would be more direct and more positive than the nature of the action taken in the Western Areas? My Lords, all I can say is this that in planning out you 25 think of forms that are appropriate for a particular thing. Just to illustrate - I don't know whether I am safe now within the Emergency Regulations with the examples that I quote - really I don't know. BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF : 30 Well, if you think you are not you had» better not quote the example, if it is an example?

36 I am not sure, because I just want to indicate because you haven't really exhausted forms of non-collaboration with the government. BY MR. TRENGOVE : Well, quote a theoretical example, Mr. 5 Luthuli? Well, for instance now there is an American - thereis a slogan connected with the American War of Independence, "No taxation and no representation". Now I don'tknow that the African National Congress has now come to a point to say to the people don't pay taxes 10 and things like that. What I mean, My Lords, is that when you sit down really at Conference and think of forms, I can't in Court... BY MR. JUSTICE RUMPFF ; That would be a type of mass Defiance Cam- 15 paign, wouldn't it? Not to pay taxes? 1 es, but it still would be a form of pressure insofar as the State is concerned, My Lord. All I am trying to say is this, My Lord, that I can't in Court here say that this form and that form and that I would exhaust the forms that might 20 be used. Apart from the fact whether you remember this document or not, I just want to read this paragraph again to you, because theri might be an argument on this that in the circumstances of the case, having 25 regard to the evidence, it may mean something, and I want your opinion on that meaning or that possible meaning. The paragraph reads - this is after the campaign ; "We must keep clear in our minds the objective of the campaign. Simply stated this is to arouse the 30 people and to organise them in a campaign of resistance to apartheid." Now the first campaign referred to is not

37 the campaign in regard to the Western Areas, apparently, it is the Resist-Apartheid Campaign? Of which the Western Areas was a part. Yes, at that stage it included it. "The basis of such resistance is to tak- the form of non- 5 collaboration of a quanity and quality wliich must compel the government to use all its resources to impose its will at any and every sta^e." Now 'hon-collaboration of a quantity and quality", would that include action similar to what took place at Meadowlands, in other 10 words an unwillingness to go, and industrial action? *e s, My Lord» In your view, could that include that? Yes, My Lord, I think my immediate reaction would be to include that- 15 To uaa-"of a quantity and quality which must compel the government to use all its resources to impose its will." In this case you had the police necessary to remove the people from Meadowlands, had there been industrial action, well there would havebeen 20 a straining of resources, I take it? That is so, My Lord. Then it goes on, "Non-collaboration both from the mass and the individual, designed ultimately to strain the resources of the authorities and create a 25 situation more favourable to the movement". Now this might mean, apparently, that all your non-collaboration must beof such a nature to strain the resources of the authorities to create a situation. Then it goes on, "straining of the situation more favourable to the 30 movement, and for more direct and positive action". Now assume you have a refusal to move or a refusal to pay

38 taxes and you have a stay at home strike, assume you have that, could it be then said that there is now a situation more favourable for direct action? If so, what action was contemplated? Well... In other words, if I may repeat it, if 5 you have a situation where you are straining the resources of the authorities, the police and everybody, through a variety of methods, then apparently this paragraph says a situation has arisen for more direct and positive action. Now what could that mean? You see, I am putting 10 to you a certain way of reading this. You employ certain methods to have a condition in which all the resources of the state are strained, and then it says,tohentirhat situation has arisen, it may be a situation favourable for direct and positive action? I follow, My Lords, 15 I wouldn't - I really wouldn't... You see, the inference might be here and it might be argued that if this is to be read in this way that I have done it, then it means only one thing. That may be the argument. That if you have the authorities or 20 the state in a position of extreme strain, then the only direct and positive action maybe open revolution? I follow, My Lord. I wonder if My Lordship would allow me to exercise my mind a bit more to it. I would very much like you to consider this. 25 BY ME. TEflNGOVL : Mr. Luthuli, while you are considering it, I want to suggest to you that that is exactly what the African National Congress had in mind? My Lords, regardless of what interpretation I might even myself 30 later ut to that, I am positive as I could ever be positive that that is not the mind of the African National

39 Congress to go outside its policy. On that I am positive, whatever interpretation I may give to that on relection in reply to the prosecutor. Mr. Luthuli, just finally and just subject to anything that you might have to say on the Western 5 Areas Campaign, just this, that you will agree that a campaign like the Western Areas as contemplated by the African National Congress and conducted to the extent set forth in that memorandum, that that campaign would seriously disturb and impair and endanger the existence 10 and security of the state? - I have already expressed by point of view regarding that, My Lords, but I think I had better repeat it, and it is this that insofar as endangering the security of the state, the African National Congress doesn't work with that in mind. It 15 does work to bring a stronger pressure on the government, but it has no intention, it has said so, of destroying the existence of the state. I didn't ask you - you see, Mr. Luthuli, I didn't ask you the intention of the African National 20 Congress. I asked you, I put it to you that that type of campaign - leave aside the intention for the moment - that that type of campaign conducted in that way and to that extent hs envisaged by that report, constitutes a danger to the safety and security of the state, 25 whether it was intended or not? My Lord, speaking as a layman, I generally associate personally endangering the security of the statg more with armed force. You could weaken the state economically and things like that, but I sort of associate security of the state 30 with when people rise in revolt, in armed revolt against the state, or make plans to that effect. Now I am talking

40 as a layman. So that your answer to that question is no? Yes. That it doesn't endanger the safety and security of the state, that type of campaign. Is that your answer? That is what I would say, My Lord. CAS3 RilMANDAD TO TH5 18TH MAY, I960. COURT ADJOURNS.

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