A Case against the Tripartite Model for Iraq

Transcription

1 A Case against the Tripartite Model for Iraq Since the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and subsequent violence between Iraq s ethnic and religious communities, there has been a growing body of literature among Western analysts and researchers favouring the partition of Iraq into three autonomous regions. The proponents of such tripartite model for Iraq, the current US Secretary of State John Kerry included, have argued that the mutual mistrust among Iraq s Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs have become too endemic for Iraq to survive as a unified entity and proposed the partition of Iraq into autonomous regions based along these ethnic and religious identities to foster peace. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq in 2014 and its subsequent surge across Iraq saw major Sunni Arab cities such as Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah and Mosul fall into their hands. Now in 2016, all these cities but Mosul have been fully liberated by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In Mosul, the group is fighting a losing battle and has already lost the eastern half of the city. By all estimates, the group will be fully expelled from the city over the next weeks, thus ending the group s ambitions of statehood in Iraq. Already, efforts are under way to consider how Iraqi society can be healed and how the return of the Islamic State (or the rise of a similar group) can be prevented. Amidst these efforts, propositions and models for the partition of Iraq were renewed among many Western analysts who argue that the sectarian policies of Baghdad under the government of Nouri al-maliki were partly responsible for the group s rise and that Baghdad, under disproportionate influence of Tehran, is not suited to rule over a Sunni Arab regions. The purpose of this paper is to refute some of the most common premises of the Tripartite Model for Iraq. The first chapter of this paper argues that the Tripartite Model of Iraq based on Sunni, Shia and Kurdish divisions is an oversimplified outlook that does not account for the internal divisions within these ethnic and religious groups. The paper, in particular, highlights the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) which, despite being touted as a model for democracy in Iraq, has suffered from corruption and political divisions that has resulted with the extended closure of its parliament. This chapter also refutes the marginalisation hypothesis put forward by the supporters of the Tripartite Model for Iraq. We point out that the endemic level of poverty has remained high in the predominantly-shia regions in the south compared to the predominantly Sunni regions in the west, pointing out that ordinary Shia Iraqis themselves have not benefited from the Shia-centric governance that Maliki is accused of fostering. Furthermore, this paper points out that the Iraqi Shia beliefs are

2 different from that of Iran, expressively disagreeing with the Iranian Wilayah al-faqih system that assumes patronage of all Shia regardless of nationality. The second chapter analyses the accusations of sectarianism within the ISF and the accusation that Sunni Iraqis fear the ISF and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-shaabi PMU) that support them, suggesting that the entirety of the PMU is Iranian backed, Shia and have sectarian goals. This chapter analyses the composition of the PMU in particular, highlighting the participation of not only Sunni Iraqi brigades and tribes within the PMU but also Assyrian and other minorities. This chapter also looks at the revenge attacks committed in cities such as Tikrit after the Iraqi Government liberated them, highlighting that the majority of such attacks were organised by Sunni tribes in the local area themselves. We also point out instances in Fallujah where the Iraqi Government swiftly clamped down on units accused of sectarian violence, highlighting Baghdad s efforts to promote a nonsectarian vision. The third chapter discusses the dangers of dividing Iraq along sectarian lines, pointing out that such division will not erase ethnic and sectarian tensions. Within this framework, we point out the unfeasibility of partitioning West Iraq in a way that puts Sunni Iraqis, Assyrians, Shabaks, Yazidis, Kakais, Turkmen and other minorities together without consideration for the endemic mistrust towards Sunni Iraqis by other groups due to the perception that many Sunni Iraqis supported the Islamic State. We argue that supporters of the Tripartite Model have failed to account how trust and reconciliation could be fostered within these groups, potentially leading into further breakup of West Iraq as these groups seek their own autonomy. We further argue that such sectarian division will weaken pan-iraqi nationalists and secularists, reinforcing and reifying sectarian divisions that strengthen Iran s influence on Baghdad. Rather than an independent entity, we argue that West Iraq will likely fall under the influence of Saudi Arabia and point out that some analysts expressively encourage this process taking place resulting in Iraq becoming a proxy battleground for two regimes whose competition for influence has already caused immense suffering in Syria and Yemen. With this in mind, we argue that these will not be the ideal conditions for the emergence of a strong civil society in Iraq that respects rights. In the fourth chapter, we propose a future roadmap for Iraq, advocating not partition but unity. We refer to Prime Minister Haider al-abadi s decentralisation model of 2015 as a positive example that should be built on and implemented in a bid to encourage strong institutions, transparency and the rule of law in a manner that will encourage the emergence of a strong civil society that will hold its governments

3 responsible for their decisions. We agree that Iraq today faces many challenges but argue that this is borne not out of sectarianism (although sectarianism certainly played a role) but corruption that has caused suffering for all Iraqis. Thus, we conclude that the solution needs to be one that encompasses all Iraqis. The Tripartite Model of Iraq: A Premise based on Reductive Assumptions The argument to divide Iraq into a tripartite state is dangerously premised on a crude understanding of the populations within Iraq. Specifically, the homogenisation of Sunnis in the West, Shias in the South and Kurds in the North. This view is not only reductive and misinformed but also incredibly dangerous for the future of the region. Simultaneously, any homogenisation of these groups signifies an erasure of other peoples, in this instance namely the erasure of Assyrians, Shabaks, Yazidis, Kakais and Turkmen, to name but a few of the ethnic groups that compose the rich tapestry that is Iraq s social fabric who would inevitably lose out in this hypothetical partitioning. A very basic knowledge of Iraq would reveal that dividing along ethno-sectarian lines in this crude manner will only entrench and reify identity politics. Furthermore, this reductive approach to peoples within these hypothetical three regions also neatly erases the existing political, tribal and subethnic divisions that exist and currently perpetuate conflict and violence. A quick glance at Iraqi Kurdistan, which is often touted as an exemplary model of democracy and stability in comparison to the rest of Iraq, and indeed the rest of MENA region, would showcase deeply entrenched political divisions and corruption that are manifesting themselves through repression and violence. This political divide (although there are many deeper divides that exist along other lines) is most starkly visible between the two major cities of Sulaymaniya (a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK - stronghold) and Erbil (the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party s - KDP - stronghold) with many tensions remaining and manifesting themselves since the end of the Kurdish Civil War in The current KRG president, Masoud Barzani, who is also head of the KDP, has been in office since its establishment in its current form (post-transitional constitution) in His presidency has been riddled with accusations of corruption which is perhaps most notably marked by his increasingly authoritarian grip over the region. Barzani s official presidential term ended in June 2013, but was extended through a KDP-PUK agreement through to August 20 th Since then, his presidency has ended and Barzani has refused to step down from power. This has spurred violence and unrest throughout the Kurdish region that has resulted in at least five deaths 1. By the end of 2015, the KDP was governing without support from other political parties, parliament had been suspended, and the speaker of the Iraqi 1 Iraq , Freedom House, 2016, < [Accessed 04 November 2016]

4 Kurdistan Parliament (IKP), Yousif Mohammed, a Gorran party member, was barred from entering into Barzani s city stronghold of Erbil. Furthermore, there has been widespread violence towards journalists who are critical of the KDP with a recent case in August 2016 leading to the interrogation and murder of a journalist in broad daylight by Kurdish security forces 2. There is much that can be said empirically to emphasise the corruption within the KRG. For the purpose of this paper, however, we only sought to illustrate a few examples to explain this point. Creating an autonomous region alone is not enough to resolve conflict and violence, especially when these regions are created along tripartite visualisations that ignore internal tensions manifested along political party lines. It is also not an attempt to exalt Baghdad s government either; on the contrary as stated, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the primary problem within Iraqi governance is that of corruption that will not be resolved with a division of territory, but instead will be reproduced under new conditions. The tripartite Iraq thesis also posits a second glaring problem that emanates from its crude and reductive homogenisation. It is usually built off the assumption that Baghdad s government is a Shia government that benefits Shias and marginalises other groups, primarily the Sunni Arab population. This rhetoric has proliferated in several media outlets, think tank pieces and has consequently given birth to the marginalisation thesis on an unprecedented level 3. Reading Iraqi politics through the narrow prism of this marginalisation thesis provides a fairly compelling argument for the tripartite state. Yet, sectarian marginalisation as a paradigm of Iraqi politics is highly problematic and does not reflect the deeper structural issues at hand. The thesis claims that Baghdad s government is a Shia one that serves Iraqi Shia interests 4, primarily at the expense of Sunni Arabs that suffer due to the inherent sectarianism of the Shia government (despite Sunnis being overrepresented demographically in government). The problem with this idea is that it misrepresents the realities on the ground. The empirical evidence actually suggests that the marginalisation thesis is an inadequate lens through which grievances should be analysed. Findings from the World Food Programme suggest that the poorest districts in Iraq account for 62% of Iraq s total Central/South population (predominantly Shia areas that would come under the Shia region in the proposed tripartite solution). The reports notes that Basrah Governorate is particularly 2 UN in Iraq Condemns the Killing of Kurdish Journalist in Kurdistan, E-Kurd Daily, 16 August 2016, < [Accessed 08 November 2016] 3 Harith Hassan al-qarawee, Iraq s Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion, Carnegie Middle East Center, 23 April 2014, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 4 ibid

5 noteworthy in that all of its districts are classified as having either high, or very high chronic poverty rates [...] Districts with the highest rates are located towards the east and include al-madiana, al-qurnah, Shatt al-arab, Abu al-khasib, and al-faw. Al-Basrah district (containing the governorate capital Basrah city) was reported as having the lowest chronic poverty rate within the governorate (34%); a figure still high by national standards. Furthermore, according to the 2014 UNDP report on Human Development in Iraq, indicators of the standard of living of the Iraqi individual for the year 2012 report that the provinces with the highest rate of poverty are indeed Shia dominant provinces in the South. Muthanna Province reports 52.5% of the population to be living in poverty; Qadisiya Province reports 44.1%; Maysan Province reports 42.3%; and Dhi Qar Province 40.9%. Comparatively speaking, Anbar Province, the largest and most significant province within the proposed West Iraq, reports only 15.4% individual poverty; and Salahuddin only 16.6%. The data suggests that those suffering most are indeed the Shia in the south, which poses a problem for the sectarian Sunni marginalisation theory. This does not mean, however, that other forms of marginalisation do not exist and that those in Anbar may face in comparatively higher numbers to southern states. What it does show, however, is that those in the Shia South are not benefitting as a consequence of a so-called sectarian Shia government, rather the opposite. Shias are worse off than many of their fellow Sunni countrymen, so again, this points towards a rather different problem to sectarianism that is rooted within structural incompetency. Another consideration is the intra-shia rivalry and differentiation that exists. There is a trend to equate Baghdad s government and indeed the wider Shia population with that of Iran. This is a problem that demonstrates poor knowledge of Shia social dynamics. The majority of Iraqi Shias are followers of the Najaf Hawza, the religious seminary that is currently led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-sistani. This seminary is traditionally known for being a quietist seminary in comparison to Iran s socio-politically active one. There has been a clear desire by the Najaf s clergy to emphasise their belief in separation between religion and state, in contrast to the Wilayah al-faqih system in neighbouring Iran. As Khoei explains Sistani, like the vast majority of Shia clerics based in the city of Najaf, is well-known for his opposition to Wilayat al-faqih. This is the Iranian model of theocracy which compels Shia clergy to hold political power based on a jurisprudential interpretation of Islam that Ayatollah Khomeini put into practice in Iran following the Islamic Revolution in Sistani has not only rejected this dogma, but

6 has even explicitly called for a civil state in Iraq rather than a religious state. His is a theological position based on an orthodox interpretation of Shia Islam that can never be compatible with theocracy 5. Far from sectarian Militias: Minority Participation in Iraqi Security Forces Supporters of the Tripartite Model for Iraq often cite the damage inflicted by Iraqi Security Forces and the Popular Mobilisation Units in Tikrit and Ramadi as proof that Sunni Arabs in Iraq have little reason to trust the security provided by Baghdad. Such claims often suggest that the Iraqi Security Forces are entirely Shia and conflate them with the PMU who are often referred to with terms such as Shia Militias or Iranian-backed Shia Militias to suggest that they are nothing but a proxy by Iran to exert its sectarian influence across the whole of Iraq, against the will of the Sunni Arabs and other groups. Perspectives like these lack nuances and fail to acknowledge the many tribal, regional, ethnic, religious and political factors in play within the ISF and PMU. The first problem with such perspectives is the implication that the damage done to cities held by the IS were the result of wanton destruction by the ISF and the PMU, and not a result of battlefield conditions that has made such destruction a bleak, inescapable reality. In cities such as Ramadi, which has suffered the heaviest damage so far, the Islamic State was known to make judicious use of IEDs and booby traps on houses and facilities to slow down the ISF advance, allowing a relatively small number of militants to defend the city for months 6. These IEDs and traps either exploded when ISF fighters triggered them in error, often causing casualties to their own, or were remotely detonated in order to provide safe passage to government forces. In either instance, the outcome was that the buildings were damaged beyond repair and outright destroyed. Regrettable as such an outcome was, the alternative would have allowed the militants to retain their positions even longer. Suggesting that the damage done was borne out of wanton destruction and not the reality of modern guerrilla warfare denigrates those who have fought and died against the Islamic State and propagates the group s narrative of sectarian violence against Sunni Arabs. Moreover, in conflating the ISF and PMU as one entity and claiming that they are all Shia, supporters of the Tripartite Model for Iraq effectively erase the existence of other groups that participate within these organisations in significant numbers. For instance, although the ISF and PMU are made of predominantly Shia numbers, Sunni Arabs in particular have joined government forces once the Iraq Karen Leigh, Islamic State Lays Booby Traps in Ramadi, The Wall Street Journal, 06 December 2015, < [Accessed 04 November 2016]

7 counteroffensive against the IS gained full momentum. Many new Sunni battalions, each one consisting of fighters, have been formed in the Sunni areas in Diyala, Anbar, Nineveh and Salahuddin, not only joining the liberation efforts on their own capacity but also linking up with existing group, including those that have been accused of being backed by Iran 7. In addition to individual Sunnis, major Sunni Tribes have joined up and led liberation efforts against the IS in the territories held by the group under the umbrella of the Tribal Mobilisation Units (Hashd al- Ashairi operating semi-autonomously from the Popular Mobilisation Units) 8. A December 2015 estimate puts the total numbers of Sunni Iraqis within the PMU as high as 40, In a similar vein, Assyrian Christians who have been displaced by the Islamic State form an important portion of the PMU, the Nineveh Plains Units, which is officially recognised as the representative of Iraqi Assyrians. Portraying the ISF and the PMU consisting solely of Iran-backed Shia Iraqis and pushing for the division of Iraq on sectarian lines denigrates and erases the efforts of the Shias, Sunnis, Assyrians and other minorities who have overcome sectarian and ethnic boundaries to present a vision of a united Iraq and perpetuates the black-and-white sectarian vision that the Islamic State seeks perpetuate. This is not to deny that revenge attacks have taken place within areas liberated by the ISF and the PMU. Yet such attacks have been consistently condemned by the leadership of these organisations, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-sistani, whose fatwa galvanised many Iraqis to join the PMU and specifically prohibited revenge attacks 10. Furthermore, the Iraqi Government prevented the PMU from participating in the liberation of Fallujah and Mosul to assuage the fears of the local populations. Where reports of abuses have emerged, Baghdad sent the Federal Police to stop these abuses and Sistani issued a condemnation of such actions 11. All of these developments are indicative not of a concerted anti-sunni policy but the exact opposite. 7 Suadad al-salhy, Iraqi Sunnis join Shia Militias to fight IS militants, Middle East Eye, 15 June 2015, < [Accessed 04 November 2016] 8 Jonathan Steele, Sunni tribes joining Shia militias as war against IS heats up in Iraq, Middle East Eye, 01 December 2015, < >, [Accessed 04 November 2016] 9 Mohammed Sabah, Sunni Contentment of Abadi After Including 40,000 Fighters in the Popular Mobilisation Forces and Monthly Payments for IDPs, Almada Press, 20 December 2015, < [Accessed 08 November 2016] 10 Luay al-khatteeb, What Do you Know About Sistani s Fatwa, Huffington Post, 10 July 2014, < [Accessed 04 November 2016] 11 Salam Khoder, Fallujah Civilians: Militias Take Turns to Torture Us, Al-Jazeera English, 16 June 2016, < [Accessed 04 November 2016]

8 The efforts to persecute the perpetrators of these revenge attacks are contingent on identifying the culprits of these attacks. The role Shia that groups have played in abuses of civilians and revenge attacks should in no shape or form be denied. However, attributing all revenge attacks on sectarian motives and overlooking the role played by intra-sunni tribal allegiances in revenge attacks - with those attacks in Tikrit getting particular attention - risks having an incomplete picture of the situation that can then lead to the passing of unrealistic policies. Indeed, the importance of tribal politics in Iraq s Sunni regions is a topic that gets overlooked by outside observers on a regular basis. This is unfortunate, as analysing tribal politics and looking at their histories of allegiances evidences a continuity that has stretched since the rule of Saddam Hussein, over the course of the Coalition invasion in 2003, the Sahwa Movement, the rule of Nouri al-maliki and the rise of the Islamic State 12. Awareness of such links renders the events that took place following the liberation of Tikrit clearer. In Tikrit, the main spate of revenge attacks begun when the Salahuddin local police entered the city, after the ISF and PMU pushed IS militants out of the city. Eyewitnesses report that members of the police, most of whom hailed from local Sunni tribes that had sided against the Islamic State, conducted an organised revenge campaign against members of the Albu Ajail and al-dour tribes that had sided with the groups. Where Shia members of the PMU were involved, they were reportedly encouraged by tribe members to do so 13. Similar dynamics have been at play in the villages in Nineveh that were liberated from the Islamic State. Reports of the revenge attacks in these areas implicate members of the Sunni Sab awi tribe that operated as part of the Tribal Mobilisation Units 14. Such intra-sunni tribal rivalries will not end if West Iraq is partitioned into a separate autonomous region. Instead, they will vie for local resources and founts of power, likely seeking support from tribal networks that extend into other parts of the Middle East. Tribal law and justice, which already flourishes as a result of weak central authority 15, would likely take precedence in West Iraq, where most other support networks (state or otherwise) have declined heavily, perpetuating practices such as blood 12 Robert Tollast, The Civil Wars of Iraq s Sunni Tribes: Fault Lines Within 8 Sunni Tribes and Sub-Tribes, , 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, 28 March 2016, < [Accessed 04 November 2016] 13 Suadad al-salhy, What Really Happened in Tikrit after ISIL Fled, Yahoo News, 07 April 2015, < [Accessed 04 November 2016] 14 Iraq: Tribal Militia Tortured Detainees In Revenge Attacks During Mosul Offensive, Amnesty International, 02 November 2016, < [Accessed 04 November 2016] 15 Oumayna Omar, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, The Arab Weekly, 22 January 2016, < [Accessed 04 November 2016]

9 money and honour killings, and potentially inhibiting reconstruction, development and the emergence of a pluralistic civil society. Concerns regarding revenge attacks and human rights abuses should be acknowledged and efforts taken to prevent them from occurring while ensuring that those who suffered will have justice. However, the simplistic narratives and policies presented by the supporters of a tripartite Iraq not only paints an incomplete and inaccurate picture, but risks perpetuating the very sectarianism they decry and falsely accuses those who have fought against the Islamic State (while falsely exonerating others). Consequently, this erases the achievements of those who have overcome such constructs on the course of a wider vision for pan-iraqi unity. Entrenched Sectarianism, Proxy Warfare and Lawlessness: The Risks of Partition The basis of feasibility regarding a Tripartite Model of Iraq often suggests that the hypothetical West Iraq would be free of sectarian or ethnic divisions and espouse a pluralistic and secular method of governance that prevents rule through the tyranny of the majority 16. Contradictorily, despite denigrating sectarianism and making a bid for a system that overcomes ethno-sectarian divisions, the concept and suggested boundaries of West Iraq are still steeped deeply within the ethno-sectarian conceptions of provinces and territories that implicitly legitimises the ambitions of Arabs and ignoring (at best) and erasing (at worst) groups such as Turkmen (who are both Shia and Sunni), Yazidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Shabak minorities who also inhabit Nineveh and Salahuddin. Although the majority of Sunni Arabs were not supportive of the Islamic State, the perception that they were complicit in the group s actions resonates strongly among these minorities. Many leaders from these minority groups have already expressed doubts on whether they will be able to return to a normal life once their homes are liberated from IS or whether they can trust their Sunni Arab neighbours again Thus, the notion of partitioning West Iraq based on Sunni-Arab demographics and forcing all these other minorities to trust the majority Sunni Arabs whom they see complicit in the crimes of the Islamic State highlights a fundamental lack of understanding of the dynamics at work in the region. 16 Michael Pregent, Kevin Triutte, West Iraq: The Search for Leaders and Leverage Hudson Institute, October Eszter Zalan, For Iraqi Christians, A Bittersweet Homecoming, Foreign Policy Magazine, 28 October 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 18 Emma Graham-Harrison, Sinjar Still Gripped by Fear A year After Liberation from ISIS, The Guardian, 31 October 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016]

10 Many Yazidi 19, Turkmen 20 and Assyrian 21 politicians have already discussed the possibility of their own communities having an autonomous region similar to the Kurdish Regional Government. Under these circumstances partitioning West Iraq under the boundaries that adhere to Sunni Arab demographic boundaries is not going to foster unity within this hypothetical new region. Instead, it will simply legitimise further partitioning, as these minorities seek to form their own autonomous regions, ultimately leading to a total breakup of West Iraq. While the prospect of a secular, pluralistic form of governance in West Iraq is not impossible, the tripartite hypothesis lacks any nuance on how this can be achieved. An oft-cited claim is the Sunni Arab rejection of sharia law and embrace of secularism, supported by nearly 80% of Iraqi Sunnis backing Ayad Allawi s secular Iraqiya Coalition during the 2010 elections. Such an approach, however, fails to account for the complexities of tribal and factional politics that are prevalent in Sunni Arab regions or the conception of secularism in the minds of Sunni Arabs. For most of his reign, Saddam Hussein s policies of the Ba ath Party worked towards erasing Shia identity to the point of irrelevance, leaving many Sunni Iraqis simply unaware such an identity even existed 22. In many ways, the legacy of erasure and ambivalence can last a lot longer than one of active persecution and there are many such legacies to overcome and reconcile. And yet, instead of providing a clear roadmap on how secular pluralistic governance in West Iraq can be achieved alongside communal trust and reconciliation, the tripartite hypothesis suggests that such a system would spontaneously emerge by necessity. The line of magical thinking that predicted the spontaneous emergence of a stable Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein has already inflicted vast damage on the Iraqi society. Under the current circumstances, pursuing a similar line of magical thinking that predicts the spontaneous emergence of a stable post-partition Iraq risks perpetuating the damage and humanitarian suffering it has suffered. Another frequent and damaging assumption promulgated by outside observers of the Tripartite Model of Iraq is that nearly all Shia politicians are under the influence or payroll of Iran. Such an assumption envisages that any policy taken by Baghdad is merely an extension of Tehran s own policies that favour the Shia and is inherently sectarian against the Sunni Arabs. The narrative that all Shia politics 19 Sarbaz Yusuf, Iraqi Yazidis Demand Autonomy, Ara News, 11 January 2015, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 20 Wassim Bassem, Iraq s Turkmens Call For Independent Province, Al-Monitor, 14 October 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 21 Cengiz Çandar, Christian Minority in Iraq Seeks Autonomy in post-mosul Iraq, Al-Monitor, 01 November 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 22 Rasha al-aqueedi, The Once and Future Mosul, The American Interest, 26 September 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016]

11 of Iraq are under Tehran s control and that the Sunni Arabs are being marginalised has been used by groups like IS and al-qaeda to justify their insurgencies and also form the cornerstone of those that support a tripartite Iraq. The argument goes that the control exerted on Baghdad by Tehran will not be accepted by Sunni Arabs and that partitioning West Iraq will allow them and their allies to have a legitimate government. As discussed above, this assumption is highly inaccurate and Iraqi Shias are highly factionalised, with only a fraction that actively supports Iranian primacy. However, breaking apart the population of Iraq along sectarian lines will likely discursively entrench and promote sectarian identities across Iraq, providing further ground for instability and conflict. Partition along such lines disregards the political, tribal, class and family identities of Iraqis by shoehorning them into their religious backgrounds. Such enforced partition will see both Shias and Sunnis fall back to their religious identities just like they were forced to in the aftermath of 2003 and the subsequent, sectarian constitution that was passed by the Coalition authorities. Rather than curbing Tehran s influence, such a move would potentially see Tehran s influence in Baghdad rise, as secular or pan-iraqi politicians in Baghdad would be deprived of their basis for a pluralistic society. A similar process would potentially take place in West Iraq. One of the arguments for the economic feasibility of West Iraq is that a Sunni Arab-majority autonomous region would likely receive significant investment and support from Saudi Arabia, overcoming Riyadh s frosty relations with Baghdad at present. The assumption that Saudi Arabia would provide economic support and investment in West Iraq without pushing for social, political and religious alignment is naïve and dangerous to make. Saudi Arabia has a history of supporting mosques that espouse its particular brand of conservative Islam, shares its ideological basis with the Islamic State and al-qaeda, and infamous for its lack of tolerance 23. The suggestion that West Iraq should become autonomous on grounds that it is being oppressed by the sectarian theocracy of Iran, and be supported by Saudi Arabia instead is self-contradictory and does not lend itself to a pluralistic system. Under these circumstances, the partition of West Iraq from Baghdad is not going to lead to a peaceful resolution of conflict but rather create an even more toxic environment that perpetuates sectarianism. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have supported proxies along sectarian lines in Bahrain, Yemen 23 Emma Henderson, Saudi Arabia funding Islamic extremism in the West, German vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel Claims, The Independent, 07 December 2015, < [Accessed 07 November 2016]

12 and Syria and this has led to immense suffering in all these countries 24. In Iraq, both these countries have tried to exert similar influence but have found their influence fluctuating amidst currents of Iraqi national identity and attitudes towards religious governance among both Shias and Sunnis. With the battle against the Islamic State in full swing and many Sunni groups participating in the liberation efforts, the sense of national unity among Iraqis is stronger than it was over the past few years. Partitioning Iraq at this point would put an end to that, turning Iraq from an independent country that can bridge the differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran into a proxy battleground where both countries vie for influence at the cost of the Iraqi people. The act of forcefully partitioning Iraq along sectarian lines would also deprive each region of checks and balances that would be present in an ethnically and religiously diverse society with a united Iraqi identity. In ethnically and religiously diverse societies with a common state identity, the culture and laws reflects and protects such diversity as long as the populations are integrated and (in post-conflict situations) reconciled. Such protection becomes absent when a society is divided along ethno-religious lines or are poorly integrated, with one particular identity promoted over another. This was noted under the Arabisation policies under Saddam Hussein. More recently, the Kurdish Regional Government has been accused of engaging in Kurdification in their own territories against Arabs 25 and Assyrians 26. As already mentioned above the KRG has been suffering from its own crisis of governance. A Roadmap for the Future: Institutions, Transparency and the Rule of Law The new republic of Iraq is a young state that has been through several upheavals thus far. It is on the cusp of overcoming the greatest existential threat that the region has faced in recent times; a threat that many believed would reach Baghdad within the space of a few months and indeed radically alter the Iraqi state forever. As this paper is being written, however, the de facto capital of the Islamic State, Mosul, is on the verge of being completely liberated by Iraq s combined security forces and in turn, on the cusp of defeating IS within Iraq. Over the course of this conflict, including the on-going liberation efforts of Mosul, we have seen Iraqis from different tribal, ethnic, religious and political backgrounds come together under a united Iraqi identity to free their land of IS. Thus the solution cannot be to further divide, but rather to foster that national identity. 24 Annabelle Quince, Iran and Saudi Arabia: Divisions, Proxy Warfare and Chaos in the Middle East ABC News, 09 February 2016, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 25 Denise Natali, Iraqi Kurdish land grabs anger Sunni Arabs, al-monitor, 29 January 2015, < [04 November 2016] 26 Ashur Giwargis, Assyrians need protection from Islamisation and Kurdification, Middle East Monitor, 09 September 2014, < [Accessed 04 November 2016]

13 We are under no illusion that the end of IS in Iraq means the end of Iraq s problems. Nor do we assert that the post-is landscape is one in which solutions will present themselves readily or fall into place neatly. We are, however, asserting that division cannot be the solution to the misdiagnosed problems. As this paper has clearly stated, the overarching problems within Iraq is not explicitly a sectarian marginalisation problem (although sectarianism has certainly played a role), but rather a deeper structural and institutional problem of corruption that has caused suffering across the population of Iraq. The decentralisation programme proposed by Prime Minister Haider al-abadi in August 2015 as part of a broader reform package was a step in the right direction, despite significant deficiencies in parts 27. The programme promised economic, political and administrative reform that was opposed by Abadi s Shia rivals (further dispelling the notion of a united Shia governmental bloc). A main tenet of this programme was to decentralise administrative and financial powers to provincial councils, and, whilst this is a progressive position that we believe is fundamental to the future of Iraq, there are several steps that the Iraqi Government must take to ensure that this programme is effective and leads to the desired results. Rule of law and good governance are impossible without a move towards fiscal transparency. The dense opacity within Iraqi fiscal decision making removes the potential for any accountability of law makers and thus reproduces the conditions for corruption within government, no matter what the intention of good-willed individual politicians may be. According to the 2015 Corruptions Perception Index, Iraq is ranked 161 st out of 167 countries in levels of corruption 28. These results are staggering given that Iraq is a purportedly democratic nation state with electoral pluralism that ranks highly in comparison to the rest of the MENA region. To explain this phenomenon further, further data must be analysed that can elucidate the origins of Iraq s problems. The 2015 Democracy Index lists Iraq as having very good political participation with a score of 7.22/10 ranking it equal to nations like the United States who also ranked 7.22/10 and higher than the United Kingdom which scored 6.67/10. Despite strong political participation, however, Iraq scored below average on electoral process (4.33/10), political culture (4.38/10), and civil liberties (4.41/10) 29. This indicates that sectarianism does not play a large role in grievances from the government. This is also further reified by the fact that according to the Muhasasa system Iraq has in place, Sunnis are in fact 27 Mustafa al-kadhimi, Abadi s Decentralisation Initiative, Iraq Business News, 12 September 2015, < [Accessed 07 November 2016] 28 Iraq 2015, Transparency International, 2015, < [Accessed 08 November 2016] 29 Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety, The Economist, < [Accessed 08 November 2016]

14 overrepresented based on the demographic realities of Iraq s social makeup. However, what really puts Iraq in a crisis is that functioning of government scored 0.07/100 ranking 162 nd out of 167 countries. To explain this further, Worldwide Governance Indicators score Iraq very low on Control of Corruption, ranked at only 4%. Similarly, Rule of Law ranks at 4%, Absence of Violence ranks at 3%, and Accountability ranks at 15%. When compared to other countries, a strong correlation is found between control of corruption, rule of law, accountability, and the absence of violence. This trend is replicable and almost identical across all countries 30. What this data suggests is that despite Iraq s significant gains in its transition to a democracy, without controlling corruption and accountability, the Iraqi state cannot achieve the rule of law necessary to having good governance, and in turn provide the basic goods and services necessary to keep the population happy. Furthermore, without accountability there can be no change or justice that is necessary in a state that adheres to the rule of law, an essential facet to addressing grievances of all sections of Iraqi society that suffer as a consequence of corruption. To overcome this, we propose the introduction of a fiscal transparency programme that demands the government to produce a detailed report in addition to a citizen s budget that is easily accessible to the wider population. A completely transparent budget will enable the strengthening of NGOs and civil society groups who can successfully hold the government accountable for poor planning, distribution or execution of proposed plans. Literature also suggests that governments with fiscal transparency are less likely to implement poor policy due to the watchful eye of its populace 31. Once a transparent system is in place, the decentralisation programme suggested by Prime Minister Abadi in 2015 becomes a more feasible option. Decentralisation as it currently stands will simply reorganise the same problems of opacity and corruption from the central government to local government, essentially spreading the problem out further, rather than fixing it. On the other hand, with fiscal transparency, decentralisation becomes a far more lucrative and promising step towards reconciliation. Complete transparency would enable local provincial councils to have greater autonomy over their budgetary and administrative decision making processes whilst also allowing local civil society groups to hold their provincial bodies accountable. 30 Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq, The World Bank, 2015, < [Accessed 08 November 2016] 31 Dr. Martin Lodge, Keeping a watchful eye: doctrines of accountability and transparency in the regulatory state, London School of Economics, 2003

15 Policies towards building up transparency and strong institutions that counter corruption would also allow for local economic development in areas of Iraq that has been neglected over the past years. When arguing for partition, supporters of the Tripartite Model cite the economic malaise and stagnation suffered by the Sunni Arab regions of Iraq as an indictment for Baghdad s sectarianism. They suggest that West Iraq possesses significant natural resources, ranging from land along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers that can be developed for agricultural and commercial farming, rich phosphate and gas reserves and modest sources of oil. The argument goes that if the local industry and commercial capacities were to be developed and modernised, it would lead to a diversified, dynamic economy that would develop without being hampered by Baghdad 32. On its own, this is not an inaccurate diagnosis but draws a faulty solution. Baghdad has remained over-reliant on oil for revenue and when the oil prices were high, it was able to shore up public services and patronage networks around the whole country, with little incentive to build up other sectors. This process was not confined to West Iraq but the whole country. As has been displayed above, it has not just been West Iraq that has failed to see economic development (and in fact West Iraq has enjoyed some of the lowest individual poverty rates in Iraq), the predominantly-shia central and southern regions of Iraq have also remained the most underdeveloped and deprived parts of the country despite the majority of Iraq s oil wealth being located there. This is because rather than engaging in a Shia-centric statebuilding as accused by advocates of the Tripartite Model, Baghdad has used the southern oil has to prop up public services and patronages in regions that do not contribute to the economy reciprocally (including the Kurdistan Regional Government which has been left unable to pay for its own public services despite its vast, independent oil wealth). When the 2014 oil shock hit, it not only lowered revenue, the lack of diversification has prevented other sectors from picking up the slack, leaving the Baghdad in the throes a financial crisis. Previous attempts to develop sectors such as the automotive and construction industries have fizzled out not due to sectarian affiliations but massive levels of corruption that has reduced investor confidence and allowed unskilled-but-connected individuals to take positions of importance, thus perpetuating the cycles of incompetence and corruption 33. As the data above has demonstrated, this process has been replicated across the whole of Iraq, not simply among the Shia. Partition will not resolve 32 Michael Pregent, Kevin Triutte, West Iraq: The Search for Leaders and Leverage Hudson Institute, October Wassim Bassem, Iraq's corruption continues unchecked, al-monitor, 25 February 2015, < [Accessed 09 November 2016]

16 these issues, it will simply replicate the patterns of corruption seen across the whole of Iraq on a provincialized level. As mentioned above, the application of the aforementioned decentralisation plan proposed by Prime Minister Abadi to delegate administrative and financial powers to provincial councils in conjunction with the implementation of policies reduce the opacity of the Iraqi fiscal system can help enable the strengthening civil society groups that can successfully hold the government accountable for poor planning, distribution or execution of proposed plans. The application of such policies will ensure that corruption across the whole of Iraq is reduced and permit West Iraq s economy to develop and support the whole of Iraq in a manner that benefits all Iraqis without becoming subservient to the interests of other powers. Concluding Remarks The suggestions mentioned are but a rudimentary starting point for a more serious and engaged discussion about the future of Iraq. A peaceful and prosperous future is possible, but it cannot happen without controlling State corruption. This begins with instilling a culture of transparency with a focus on fiscal/budgetary transparency. In doing so, Iraq will begin to take the right steps towards reconciliation and a future that is united. Dividing Iraq, as demonstrated throughout the course of this paper, is not only unfeasible, but actually detrimental to the multiplicity of peoples in Iraq and the wider stability of the region. A united Iraq that works towards decentralisation under the right conditions is the key to securing a stable and promising future.