Nasir al-din Shah and the Failure of Reform

Transcription

1 Nasir al-din Shah and the Failure of Reform Abstract During the nineteenth century, the Iranian state was in need for modernization to compete with the Western powers. However, the patrimonial system of governance impeded the implementation of reforms, as Nasir al-din Shah, the ruler of Iran, subjected others under his patriarchal rule and exploited political power as his personal property. Although the Shah acknowledged the importance of establishing a modern bureaucracy in order to develop effective means of control, he feared that introducing elements of modernity would jeopardize his absolute power and reduce his ability to exploit arbitrary control over his subjects. In light of Weber s theories concerning the structure of patrimonial state, this essay argues that the Shah s paranoia that reforms would compromise monarchial authority impeded his ability to improve the government, educational system, and finances, which eventually weakened his rule. Essay In Economy and Society, Weber asserts that under a patrimonial state there is no separation between private and official bureaucratic elements. Instead, one master subjects others under his patriarchal rule, and exploits political power as his personal property. 1 Nasir al-din Shah understood that the prevalence of the aforementioned trends within the Qajar system were promoting inefficiency, and that it was necessary to implement reforms to develop effective means of controlling the state. However, he was unable to impose lasting changes because he feared that introducing elements of modern bureaucracy would reduce his ability to exploit absolute power over his subjects. 2 This essay will show that Nasir al-din Shah s paranoia that reforms would compromise his monarchial authority impeded his ability to improve government, education, and finances, and resulted in weakening the Qajar rule. 1 Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp Weber, p

2 Nasir al-din Shah s paranoia of losing power through reform programs was implanted at an early stage of his reign. Prior to inheriting the crown in 1848, however, the young prince had been influenced by his tutor Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani, later known as Amir Kabir, and was motivated to improve the state his father had left. Mohammad Shah had squandered Iran due to ongoing venality and nepotism, and by appointing his tutor as Prime Minister, Nasir al-din Shah hoped to improve administrative efficiency. 3 But rather than introducing radical changes, Amir Kabir wanted to redefine the parameters of patrimonial state by establishing a centralized, well-financed government with a strong army and expanding bureaucracy. Contrary to his depiction as a manipulative premier who controlled the seventeen-year old ruler, he constantly urged the Shah to participate in the affairs of the state, suppose I am ill and do not recover soon, you should not suspend your duties or remain constantly dependent on a servant. 4 His active participation was not only vital for centralizing the power in the person of the monarch, but also for receiving backing for his reforms. However, Nasir al-din Shah began to lose interest in the minister s program. Although Amir Kabir had increased monarchial control, promoted administrative efficiency, and remedied financial drain, he scrutinized the Shah s activities and restrained his access to the treasury. The young ruler s idea of exploiting his power was splurging money on entertainment, women, and hunting, and, believing that his rights were being constrained, he started seeking for the means of asserting independence. In addition, he was gradually falling under the influence of the court and his mother Mahd Ulya, who were planning to remove Amir Kabir because he had limited their access to the Shah and cut royal pensions as part of his reform program. 5 The growing pressure from the ruling classes stimulated Nasir al-din Shah s insecurity that the Prime Minister was limiting his power. This reached its boiling point once Amir Kabir decided to change the royal decree concerning his half-brother Abbas Mirza. 3 Michael Cook, ed., The New Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp Abbas Amanat, The Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, pp

3 After Mohammad Shah s death, Abbas Mirza and his mother had remained in Tehran, and were constantly being harassed by Mahd Ulya. In his attempt to reduce the tension at court and to remove potential threat to his rule, Nasir al-din Shah appointed his halfbrother as the governor of Qum, which, according to Abbas Amanat, was synonymous to exile. Amir Kabir, however, believed that Abbas Mirza kept the crown in check, and, motivated to keep him at court he underestimated the Shah s sensitivity concerning this issue and sent the prince back to the capital. 6 Hearing that the Prime Minister had changed the royal decree confirmed Nasir al-din Shah s paranoia that his authority was being threatened, and, after reaffirming his brother s post, he dismissed and executed Amir Kabir in This experience embedded bias within the Shah concerning reformist bureaucrats and their programs, and the fear of losing power within their hands continued to haunt him for the rest of his life. 7 This led him to believe that the fulfillment of his every command was the rightful means of exercising control, which removed the possibility of increasing his efficiency of governing Iran. The first aspect this essay considers is Nasir al-din Shah s fear that reforming the government would undermine his authority. Although he understood that an expanding bureaucracy would improve the tools of governance, he was unwilling to relinquish his right to exploit political power as his personal property, and decided to enforce his patriarchal rule. In 1851 the Shah granted premiership to Mirza Agha Khan Nuri, and began to appoint and dismiss officials at his whim. This reversed the course of reform, and reintroduced nepotism and bribery, which undermined central control and stimulated corruption. By 1858, the Shah realized that although he had reasserted absolute power, Iran was falling apart. In addition to facing Babi assassination attempt in 1852, his troops suffered a humiliating defeat in the Anglo-Persian war of 1856 and lost Herat and Afghan territories to Britain. Seeing this as the fault of Mirza Agha Khan Nuri s lax conduct in office, the Shah convinced himself that premiership was inconsistent with royal absolutism, and after abolishing the post he took control of the government. 8 6 Abbas Amanat, The Downfall of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir and the Problem of Ministerial Authority in Qajar Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 23 (1991), pp Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, pp Nikki Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1999) p

4 But, instead of centralizing and increasing bureaucratic efficiency, the Shah reshuffled the government multiple times. At first he established a loosely allied six-minister cabinet, and, by 1870, he had grouped twenty-six personal advisors under the Consultative Council. Although he enjoyed determining the fate of the officeholders, the Shah finally realized that he lacked specialized knowledge to effectively govern the state, and appointed Mushir al-dawla, the Minister of Justice, as Prime Minister. The new premier attempted to centralize political power around a nine-minister cabinet, and to introduce changes within the army, treasury, and legal system. 9 However, it was difficult to reform a government that had been disorganized for twenty years. Leading officials who had benefitted from corruption and bureaucratic instability were unwilling to succumb to the premier s reforms, and demanded his removal from the office. 10 Recalling his experience with Amir Kabir and fearing he would be unable to contain the momentum, the Shah dismissed Mushir al-dawla. Left without effective tools of governance, his power grew increasingly despotic and arbitrary towards the end of his reign, which weakened the Qajar rule. In addition to his fear that reforming the bureaucracy would undermine his power, Nasir al-din Shah refrained from implementing changes within the educational system. According to Weber, education in modern states promoted specialized knowledge that was indispensable for bureaucracies. 11 This explains the reason the Shah initially expressed enthusiasm and backed Amir Kabir in founding the Dar al-funun. Although it was primarily meant for training officers, here the students received both military and liberal arts education under European professors. 12 Curzon was impressed by the curriculum and high level of performance in this institution, yet he expressed disappointment that there had been no changes within the public educational system. In Persia and the Persian Question, he claims that despite the vast availability of schools, 9 Shaul Bakhash, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, (London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Center, 1978), pp Bakhash, pp Weber, pp John Lorentz, Iran s Great Reformer of the Nineteenth Century: an analysis of Amir Kabir s Reforms, Iranian Studies, vol.4, no.2/3 (Spring-Summer, 1971), p

5 they were controlled by the mullahs who forced children to memorize the Quran and neglected their development of skills in reading and writing. In addition, religious colleges provided the only option for secondary education for the masses, which impeded the promotion of secular schooling and the development of a progressive society. 13 Part of the reason Nasir al-din Shah hampered reforms was because in the absence of trained teachers, the ulama monopolized the educational sphere. After the Babi assassination attempt in 1852, he perceived them as the defenders of the true religion and the pillars of his authority, and, therefore, frequently fell under their influence while considering social reforms. 14 But, most importantly, the Shah was gradually becoming paranoid that European tutelage would endanger his rule. While he was unwilling to challenge the ulama prerogatives, he asserted that his power was founded on the illiterate masses, and, introducing European liberal ideas would undermine his authority. 15 Despite the available funding and ongoing interest in introducing new curriculums through the establishment of private institutions, such as Maktab-e Moshiriyyeh and Madraseh-ye Nezami in the 1870s, the Iranian people gained no access to secular schooling, and were to remain subjected under the Shah s absolutist umbrella. 16 The final aspect that this essay considers is how Nasir al-din Shah s desire to control the treasury hindered reforms within Iran s financial system. As previously mentioned, the Shah felt that Amir Kabir was constraining his authority by limiting his spending capacity. Rather than increasing the efficiency of the economic sphere by developing financial sectors, after dismissing the minister he reasserted patriarchal control and began treating the treasury as his personal safe. In addition to liberally draining the funds, the Shah imposed taxes wherever he deemed necessary. But, it was difficult for him to obtain money through taxation only. Since the governorships were unpaid, and nomadic tribes such as Luristan seasonally changed location without a trace, the collected taxes rarely reached the capital. This was a good source of income for the local rulers and the 13 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (Elibron Classics, 2005), pp Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, pp Monica Ringer, Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2001), pp Ringer, pp

6 members of the court, who adamantly opposed Amir Kabir and Mushir al-dawla s attempts to regulate the system. 17 Instead of upsetting the ruling classes, the Shah resorted to authoritarian and patriarchal means of accumulating capital. Nasir al-din Shah believed that granting titles and privileges was the means of exercising his authority. Therefore, instead of reforming the financial sector, he chose to sell offices in exchange for large sums of money. 18 He was always in need for cash to fund his trips to Europe and to refurbish the palace, while he enjoyed collecting precious stones, and playing with a seventy-carat diamond that he carried around. 19 He also increased his funds by selling foreign concessions. For example, Baron Julius de Reuter paid the Shah 40,000 to attain seventy year monopoly over railways, factories, irrigation, minerals, and all forms of modern enterprise. 20 Although this plan eventually failed due to both domestic and foreign opposition, he granted Henry Wolff the concession to issue banknotes and to establish the Imperial Bank of Persia. 21 Nasir al-din Shah s obsession to secure his authority and to exercise control by treating the treasury as his personal coffer hindered reforms within the financial department, which would have improved his efficiency in governing the state. 22 Over the course of his rule, Nasir al-din Shah became paranoid of losing authority over reforming the Qajar system. This started at an early stage of his leadership, and it influenced his decisions while attempting to implement changes within the government, education, and finances. Although he understood that reform programs were necessary to improve his tools of governance, his fear of losing arbitrary power over his subjects prevented him from doing so. Left with no means of effective control, by the end of his reign the Shah had lost all interest in reforms, and appointed his wife s fourteen-year-old 17 Reza Sheikholeslami, The Patrimonial Structure of Iranian Bureaucracy in the Late Nineteenth Century Iranian Studies, vol. 11 no. 1 (1978), pp Bakhash, pp Edmond Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand, eds., Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1992), p Curzon, pp Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, p Weber, pp

7 nephew as Amir Kabir. 23 Unlike his predecessor, the young premier was easy to manipulate, which, to the Shah s delight, upheld the authority and safeguarded the power of the crown. 23 Bosworth and Hillenbrand, p. 9. 7

8 Bibliography Primary Sources Curzon, George, Persia and the Persian Question (Elibron Classics, 2005). Weber, Max, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Secondary Sources Amanat, Abbas, The Downfall of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir and the Problem of Ministerial Authority in Qajar Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 23, (1991). Amanat, Abbas, The Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997). Bakhash, Shaul, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, (London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Center, 1978). Bosworth, Edmond, Hillenbrand, Carole, eds., Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1992). Cook, Michael, ed., The New Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Keddie, Nikki, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1999) Lorentz, John, Iran s Great Reformer of the Nineteenth Century: an analysis of Amir Kabir s Reforms, Iranian Studies, vol.4, no.2/3 (Spring-Summer, 1971). Ringer, Monica, Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar Iran, (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2001). Sheikholeslami, Reza, The Patrimonial Structure of Iranian Bureaucracy in the Late Nineteenth Century, Iranian Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (1978). 8