LAHORE GRAMMAR SCHOOL JOHAR TOWN SENIOR BOYS CAMPUS JTMUN 2018 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL STUDY GUIDE

Transcription

1 LAHORE GRAMMAR SCHOOL JOHAR TOWN SENIOR BOYS CAMPUS JTMUN 2018 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL STUDY GUIDE

2 Topic A: Sectarianism UNHRC: The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the UN responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them. It has the ability to discuss all the thematic human rights issues. It meets the UN office in Geneva. The Human Rights Council replaced the former Human Rights Commission on Human Rights. Introduction to the topic: Although the world we live in is supposedly being called as a Global Village, there still are extraordinary sectarian differences across and within cultures and communities globally that not only force us to question this very claim but also, rather more importantly, lead to conflicts. The friction present due to these conflicts often then results in rivalries and thus wars, in other words these conflicts are just a little less aggravated version of war. Being a constant threat to world peace and thus basic human rights, it is an important issue worthy enough to be catered by our committee. We will shed light towards its various aspects and examine its impact on the global community. Sectarianism refers to the differences that exist within political or religious sects. While it is most commonly labeled as political and/or religious, there exist other denominations of ethnic identity, class or region for citizens of a state that too contribute to the complexity of a sectarian situation. In essence, it is a form of bigotry, discrimination and hatred which arises from such denominations when relations of either superiority or inferiority are attached to it. The behaviors and attitudes that should ideologically be referred to as sectarian are extremely varied. For instance, members of some sects or groups may believe that the success of their aims would only be possible if people from the other group aggressively enter to the folds of their group, while others of some faction may perceive that the achievement of their political or religious agendas would require internal opponents to be converted. Sometimes under political or economic pressure a group may attack the members of another faction which it holds responsible for their own decline. Similarly, it may as well expel those who do not support their definition of orthodox belief. Furthermore, the objectors from this orthodoxy may secede from the orthodox organization and become the practitioners of their newly reformed belief, or the holders of a perceived former orthodoxy. Other than that sectarianism maybe prevalent in the form of a group s nationalistic ideas or it may as well be a product their cultural ambitions, or exploited by demagogues. While there is not one agreed upon definition that can be referred to as sectarian behavior these are just some examples for delegates to understand the idea of it. In each case, we must notice that there is always some another group which becomes a subject of sectarianism and faces the consequences that comes with it. Amidst that there also exist people with non-sectarian mindsets who support the notion that free association and tolerance of different beliefs along with their harmonious co-existence is what makes up a successful peaceful human interaction or in other words a secular world. They 2

3 espouse political and religious pluralism while negating a strong sense of dualism that roots from sectarianism. History/ Background: Within Islam there has been conflict at various periods between Shias and Sunnis; Shi ites consider Sunnis to be damned, due to their refusal to accept Hazrat Ali as the first Caliph and accept all the following descendants of him as infallible and divinely guided. While on the other hand many Sunni religious leaders, including those inspired by Wahhabism and other ideologies have declared Shias as heretics and/or apostates. It is this very sectarian conflict that is prevalent for decades now in the Middle East and as it is being dragged on more and more lives are being lost day by day. Iran representing Shias and Saudi Arabia representing the Sunnis through Wahhabi Ideology are the two key players in this conflict. The Middle East currently being a proxy-war ground for the representatives of Shia and Sunni groups, The Egyptian coup d etat done towards President Morsi in 2013, the current Syrian Civil War at the moment, and the fighting between Shia-Sunni camps in Iraq are all a part of sectarian conflict. In addition to this, with the security gap built due to these events, terrorist organizations such as the Islamic state and the Levant (ISIL) and ideologies such as Neo- Zarqawism have come about. In Iran alone 114,000 people have died. In just 2015 alone, 21,000 civilians have died in Syria. The ancient rivalries between the Sunni-Shia worlds have ignited conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries including the Syria Civil war and the violence currently paralyzing Iraq. Growing sectarian clashes have also been sparking the revival of radical armed networks which have been posing a threat beyond the region, especially groups such as Al-Qaida, ISIL and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Two countries which see themselves as the leaders of Islam have used the sectarian conflicts for their own ambitions. The competing leadership between the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran will shape the balance between Sunnis and Shias in the future of the region especially in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen. Modern tensions had started after the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini wanted to implement an Islamic government ruled by the guardianship of the jurist which has been a controversial topic between Sunnis and Shias. Khomeini with this in mind tried to inspire further an Islamic revival by preaching unity and supporting groups in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Lebanon and Iraq with specific Shia agendas. As no support was given to Sunni groups, sectarian suspicions were on the rise which led Saudi Arabia to promote Wahhabism to counter the shia threat. The United States had fought ISIL effectively in 2008 by arming and training more than 80,000 Sunni locals in Iraq. With the American insurgency ending in the year of 2010, the Sahwa militias were not integrated into the Iraqi army by the Maliki government for fear of a Sunni majority. This was the first major crack between the Sunni and Shia population after the 3

4 American insurgency. With the former Sunni Sahwa militias unemployed, extreme terrorist groups like ISIL had offered them both arms and employment in exchange for the militias fight for them. Unemployment and a deep hatred for the Shia Maliki government, had led to a drastic rise of ISIL in Iraq. The later expansion of ISIL to Syria was dependent on the non-present border security between Syria and Iraq as ISIL militants were free to go and return across the border without having any security hesitations. The Syrian civil war has also been a chessboard for both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Groups on ground such as Hezbollah and the Free Syrian army (FSA) are being used to control and annex regions within Syria by the Sunni Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the Shia Iran. Power struggles between the Sunni and Shia groups are taking place with arms being given and in effect to this conflicts are increasing in the region day by day. A risk of a spillover to neighboring countries of Turkey and Lebanon is also present. Due to the diverse views on the interpretation on Islam, Pakistan is also under serious threat of sectarian cruelty for the last three decades. In Pakistan sectarian clashes are responsive to two major events; Iranian revolution and Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Problems: Terrorism/ Discrimination against minorities; On May 13, more than 40 people were killed and at least 13 injured in a gun attack on a bus carrying members of the minority Ismaili Shi i sect in Karachi, Pakistan. [1] This was not the deadliest attack of the year, as that dubious honor goes to a suicide bombing in a district in Sindh, which left 61 Shi a dead in January. Yet the brazen nature of the attack carried out in daylight in the bustling megacity of Karachi by gunmen who reportedly boarded the bus and shot at passengers indiscriminately was striking even in a country where over 2,000 people have been killed and 3,500 injured in sectarian attacks in the past five years. The large majority of these victims have been members of the Shi i sect of Islam who comprise approximately 15 percent of the country s population (although precise numbers are unknown). Data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), shown in the graph below, demonstrate that there has been an upward trend in the number of individuals killed and injured in sectarian attacks in Pakistan from 1989 to the present. Indeed the number killed and injured annually has not dipped below 500 in the last 12 years, demonstrating a startling level of consistency and indicating the long-running nature of this problem. 4

5 What is noteworthy about the sectarian attacks in recent years is that they have become increasingly deadly. In fact, the number of total sectarian incidents has decreased since their high point in the early to mid-1990s (2007, when over 300 incidents were reported, is an exception). The 1990s saw tit-for-tat killings between Sunnis and Shi a, often carried out by the extremist Sunni group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the extremist Shi i group Sipah-e- Muhammad Pakistan (SMP). Shi i political parties and militant groups alike were formed largely in response to the Islamization policies of General Zia ul-haq s government ( ), which favored an orthodox Sunni interpretation of Islam, and they drew moral and material support from the revolution in neighboring Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia helped finance an elaborate network of religious seminaries (madaris) largely of the Ahle Hadith and Deobandi schools of thought. This led many observers to term the Sunni-Shi i conflict in Pakistan during the 1980s and into the 1990s a proxy way between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 5

6 The more recent attacks, on the other hand, have featured the Shi a as overwhelming victims. While members of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ, formerly the Sipah-e-Sahaba) have been targeted in attacks in Karachi, Islamabad, and elsewhere, large-scale attacks have centered on imambargahs (Shi i mosques), Shi i neighborhoods, or buses carrying Shi a. Shi a are, of course, not the only victims. Members of other subsects of Sunni Islam, such as those following the Barelvi school of thought, have also suffered from this violence. Barelvi mosques and madrasas, for example, have been forcibly occupied by the more financially well-off Deobandis. [ Because these outfits have material and personnel linkages to other terrorist groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or al-qa ida, they are often well equipped to employ violence to achieve their objectives. A second feature of the current crop of sectarian attacks is their geographical spread. The map below, created using the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies online database and conflict map generator, shows that more than half of the districts in Pakistan have experienced at least one sectarian attack since Sectarianism manifests in different forms as well; for example, the abduction and forced conversion of Hindu girls and attacks on Sufi shrines in Sindh have also begun to garner national attention. Many have argued that sectarian outfits and clerics associated with sectarian mosques are often able to fill a void left by an absentee state and local elite bent on maintaining inequality. This may particularly be the case in urbanizing districts in the country. 6

7 Sectarian Intolerance; An increase in sectarian conflict and violence does not necessarily mean that sectarian intolerance is also increasing in society. One could imagine, for example, that violence is perpetrated by a handful of militant organizations that have the capacity to inflict damage at a large scale without ever receiving mass support. Indeed, holding prejudicial opinions about another religious, ethnic, or sectarian group does not automatically suggest that the prejudiced individual will carry out violence against the group, or even condone acts of violence. Violence may also serve as the cause, rather than the effect, by altering intergroup relations either positively or negatively. Pakistanis, for the most part, recognize that sectarian relations in the country are fraught. According to 2012 Pew data, 78 percent of Pakistanis surveyed believed relations between Sunnis and Shi a are a moderately big or very big problem. Individuals who were economically less well-off were more likely to believe that sectarianism is a greater problem than those who were more affluent. Yet in another Pew survey carried out among 1,450 Pakistanis, 35 percent of those who responded said that they did not consider Shi as to be Muslims. In fact, a full 50 percent of the Sunnis who chose to respond to the question did not consider Shi a to be Muslims. Nearly 64 percent did not believe Ahmadis were Muslim, while only 6 percent said they were. This result was consistent for Shi a Muslims and Sunni Muslims alike. Sixty percent believed that there was only one true understanding of Islam. 1,172 of the 1,450 surveyed said that they would not feel comfortable if their son or daughter married a Christian. A majority approximately 73 percent of respondents believed that the controversial blasphemy law is necessary in Pakistan, while only 5 percent believed that it unfairly targets minorities. Perhaps surprisingly, Shi a Muslims were significantly more likely than Sunni Muslims to believe so, although the number of individuals identifying as Shi a in the sample was small, and this relationship was not robust for models that controlled for education. The blasphemy law has attracted much attention in the last few years, as the potential of its misuse has become violently apparent. Those accused of blasphemy are often subjected to attacks or threats or are killed. For example, in 2012, a teenage Christian boy was accused of sending text messages containing blasphemous content, and his home was attacked by a mob in Karachi. A man arrested in a Qur an desecration case was beaten to death by a mob that stormed a police station. Other such examples abound. Many believe that allegations of blasphemy are often leveled in order to solve local, petty disputes. Such examples of mob justice indicate that increasing intolerance in Pakistan is proving deadly. In a 2013 study by the Pew Research Center, Pakistan had the highest possible score on the social hostilities involving religions index, which measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations, and social groups. This includes religion-related armed conflict or terrorism, mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons, and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. This index thus tries to take into account individual-level hostilities as well attacks by militant organizations. In addition to giving a general sense of the pervasiveness of intolerant views in Pakistan, such data can help to begin identifying the individual-level predictors for sectarian tolerance in the country. For example, in the Pew data cited above, Shi a were more likely to believe that there 7

8 could be multiple interpretations of Islam, and this was statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Also, more educated Sunnis were significantly more likely to believe that Shi a were Muslim and were also significantly more likely to believe that the blasphemy law unfairly targeted minorities. Proxy War/ Armed Conflict; The proxy conflict can be traced back to the Iranian revolution in 1979, when the monarchic Imperial State of Iran became an Islamic republic. The revolutionaries called for the overthrow of monarchies and secular governments to be replaced with Islamic republics, much to the alarm of Iran's smaller Sunni-run Arab neighbors Saudi Arabia, Ba'athist Iraq, Kuwait, and the other Persian Gulf states, most of whom were monarchies and all of whom had sizable Shia populations. Islamist insurgents rose in Saudi Arabia in 1979, Egypt and Bahrain in 1981, Syria in 1982, and Lebanon in Saudi Arabia's image as the leader of the Muslim world was undermined in 1979 with the rise of Iran's new theocratic government under Ayatollah Khomeini, who challenged the legitimacy of the Al Saud dynasty and its authority as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. King Khalid initially congratulated Iran and stated that "Islamic solidarity" could be the basis of closer relations between the two countries, but relations worsened substantially over the next decade. In response to the 1987 Mecca incident in which Shia pilgrims clashed with Saudi security forces during the Hajj, Khomeini stated: "These vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back...mecca is in the hands of a band of heretics. Iran also called for the ouster of the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia and Iran see one another as enemies, and are locked in an escalating competition for influence and dominance of the Middle East. That rivalry goes far beyond just words, with both countries backing militant groups and proxy forces throughout the region, particularly in Syria. Their competition is a major driver of conflict in the Middle East, including the growing violence along Sunni-Shia lines. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced in 2016 that it had executed more people in a single day than most death penalty countries, including the United States, kill in an entire year: 47, at 12 different sites across the country. Some were killed by beheading, according to the Guardian, and others by firing squad. What makes the mass execution most significant is not its scale but rather the name of one man among the 47, many of whom were Sunni jihadists and al-qaeda terrorists. That name is Nimr al-nimr: a prominent religious leader from Saudi Arabia's Shia minority. Nimr's execution outraged the Middle East's Shia communities and the leaders of Shia-majority countries. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-abadi condemned the execution, warning of "repercussions" for regional security. Iran threatened vague consequences, with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards telling Saudi Arabia to expect "harsh revenge." Protests broke out in Bahrain, Pakistan. In Iran, protesters set fire first to a Saudi consulate building in Mashhad and then to the embassy in Tehran. The government's choice to kill Nimr wasn't just about this one religious leader. For Saudi Arabia, Nimr represented the danger of internal Shia dissent, behind which it saw Iran's nefarious hand and perhaps also an opportunity to generate more support for its struggling war in Yemen. For Shia throughout the region, though, Nimr was a symbol of Saudi Arabia's oppression of Shia, and of the dangers that Shia face in the mostly Sunni Middle East. The Saudi government appears to view Nimr as someone who committed 8

9 two major crimes: stirring up Shia sectarianism and encouraging Saudi Shias to side against their own country and with Iran. The conflict isn't really about religion, even if it's expressed along religious lines. Rather, it's driven by the cold war struggle for influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Because both are theocracies, and Iran claims to represent the world's Shia and Saudi Arabia claims to represent its Sunnis, they have sought to fight one another on Sunni-Shia lines thus making that religious division much more violent and fraught. There is indeed a religious division between Sunni and Shia Islam, going back to the first generations of the religion's founding in the seventh century. Sunni and Shia have gotten along fine for much of the Middle East's history, and the Sunni-Shia divide was just not so important for the region's politics. In the 1980s, for example, the biggest conflict in the Middle East was between two Shia-majority countries Iran and Iraq with Sunni powers backing Iraq. That changed in 2003, when the United States led the invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. Saddam was hostile to both Iran and to Saudi Arabia (despite Saudi support for his 1980s war against Iran), and those two countries saw him as a wild-eyed threat. He held the Middle East in a precarious sort of balance. When the US toppled Saddam, it removed that balance, and opened a vacuum in Iraq that both Saudi Arabia and Iran attempted to fill so as to counter one another. Because Iraq was mostly Shia (Saddam had been Sunni), Iran tried to exploit sectarianism to its advantage, backing hard-line Shia groups that would promote Iranian interests and oppose Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia. It also put pressure on the new Iraqi government to serve Iranian interests, which came to be equated with Shia interests. In this way, political maneuvering in post-saddam Iraq that was not primarily about religion came to be expressed as about religion. It helped deepen the Sunni-Shia divide there so severely that this divide today defines Iraq. In 2011, when the Arab Spring began upending governments across the Middle East, both Saudi Arabia and Iran again tried to fill the vacuums, and that often meant supporting violence. It also meant deliberately amping up Sunni-Shia sectarianism to serve their interests. In Yemen, for example, Saudi Arabia saw the Shia Houthi insurgency as an Iranian puppet (Iran did support the insurgency, though this support is easy to overstate). So to isolate Iran's influence in Yemen and to gin up support for Saudi Arabia's intervention there, it tried to make the war about Sunni versus Shia. Iran played a role in this, as well (albeit a smaller one), aiding insurgents whose Shia identity it hoped would make them effective anti-saudi proxies. This is a big part of why the Middle East is so divided today between Sunni and Shia: In weak states, Iran and Saudi Arabia have tried to position themselves as the patrons of their respective religious clans so as to assert influence, and they have ginned up sectarianism to promote fear of the other side. Sectarianism is just a tool. But that sectarianism has become a reality as Middle Eastern militias and political parties line up along sectarian lines and commit violence along those lines. In Baghdad after 2003, people who had once lived in mixed Sunni- Shia communities divided themselves into Sunni neighborhoods and Shia neighborhoods. Sunni areas formed Sunni militias, and Shia did the same, at first to protect from one another, then to drive out the other group, and eventually to kill one another. You can see the same thing unfolding on a national scale in Syria. The violence at first had little to do with religion: It was about the Syrian people versus a tyrannical government. But the Syrian government is allied with Iran, which means it is hostile to Saudi Arabia, so the Saudis 9

10 see it as their enemy. The Saudis and other Sunni Gulf states armed Syrian rebels who are Sunni hard-liners, knowing their anti-shia views made them more hostile to Iran and more loyal to Saudi interests. Iran used much the same strategy, portraying the Syrian war as a genocidal campaign against Shia. This helped Tehran attract Shia militias from Iraq and Lebanon that would fight for Iranian interests. Making the Syrian civil war as sectarian as possible also ensures that the Syrian government, which is Shia, will remain loyal to Iran. It's important to understand that the Middle East is mostly Sunni. So for Saudi Arabia, it might seem like a winning strategy to promote sectarianism, and to align itself with Sunnis and thus force Shia to align themselves with Iran. By forcing a Sunni-Shia divide, the Saudis can make sure they are on the stronger side. You can see this, for example, in how Saudi Arabia funded Sunni extremists in Syria, helping to turn an initially non-sectarian civil war into a sectarian conflict. (Syrian leader Bashar al-assad, though Shia, did this as well, cynically hoping to make the opposition toxic and force Iran to back him, which worked.) But Iran has used sectarianism as tool as well. While one could argue that Iran was at times backed into this strategy by Saudi Arabia if the Saudis support Sunnis to isolate Iran, Iran could be expected to back Shia to hold on to some influence it also pursued it aggressively, for example in Iraq and now in Syria. It did not always begin the sectarian competition, but it was happy to join Saudi Arabia in playing that game. Anti-Shia sectarianism might help drive Saudi-backed Islamist militias, but it also feeds into ISIS, which poses a real threat to Saudi Arabia. ISIS frequently targets Shia, including in Saudi Arabia itself this May, it claimed a Shia mosque attack within Saudi Arabia that killed 21. But it's not just that. Saudi Arabia may have to choose between using anti-shiism as a political tool at home and abroad and the very real threat that extremists taking anti-shiism too seriously will bring the fight back home with unpredictable consequences for the stability of Saudi Arabia and the wider region. This is a threat to Saudi leaders as well. ISIS explicitly seeks to destroy the Saudi government. Though it is a common misconception among Americans that Saudi Arabia supports ISIS, in fact the two are very much enemies. If you will forgive the cliché, sectarianism has always been a double-edged sword for Saudi Arabia, serving short-term political aims while also creating potentially terrible long-term problems for the Middle East and Saudi Arabia itself. Sectarianism did not cause the war in Syria, but it is making that war a lot worse. Sectarianism also did not cause ISIS, but it, and one in which shortsighted Saudi policies did not exactly hurt. Past Actions and possible solutions: A four stage roadmap; By keeping the drivers of the sectarian conflict and terrorism in mind, a four stage roadmap could be followed by the Middle Eastern countries: The first stage consists of bringing the two conflicting parties together based upon both nationalist and sectarian values as the Arab League shares both the Arabic language of Syria, and also possesses countries within itself with a Shia majority. 10

11 In the second stage, the common points of the parties and their differences should be put down. These being both sides are Muslim, but little differences within the sects of two sides being present. Influence should be made to both sides with the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood as this is the most common ground to both sides. The third stage consists of drawing a roadmap for the differences present by taking the opinions of both groups. Differences such as civilian brothers not being safe, not enough representatives within government and lack of justice regarding the prosecution of Sunni s and Shia s and should be discussed. Within the last stage, an independent investigation commission should be setup to: a) monitor both parties as to whether reformations in the representation of parliament, and also reformations in the justice system have taken place, b) to bring together moderate religious leaders to put an end to fundamentalist sectarian ideas among the public. The commission should consist of five members, two independent representatives from the Shia party these being from both religious and political bodies, two independent Sunni representatives from religious and political bodies also, an independent representative from a global governmental body such as the Arab League or Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to monitor the reconciliation process, and finally an independent observer not related to any party. This could be Japan or Switzerland. Security guarantees should be given by Turkey and Russia as both countries are close allies to the parties. As the people of both parties are warweary, problems will not be present in the acceptance of the reconciliation process. After the initial plan has been accomplished, regional integration should take place upon social activities. The Arab league should head an international peace youth forum for Shia and Sunni s to promote peace and tranquility among upcoming generations. This can be done interchangeably between Saudi Arabia and Iran each year. With this taking place, the learned trauma from the initial conflicts between the two parties will diminish. Organizations involved in working for the cause eradicating/preventing this issue: Amnesty International is one of the most established NGOs that fight for universal human rights. Throughout time, they have exposed many cases related to the discrimination against various sects, and they have an elaborated network around the world that together monitors the potential threat to human rights. Many universities nowadays have societies linked to Amnesty and have raised attention amongst students in tertiary education, using different kinds of propaganda such as videos, posters and so on. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) has adopted many resolutions concerning the elimination of sectarian differences or any sort of discriminations against minority sects. Past UN resolutions 11

12 The United Nations Security Council, on Nov. 22, 1967, unanimously passed the following resolution, Resolution 242, which stated: "The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting." Resolution 242 is the cornerstone for what it calls a just and lasting peace. It calls for a negotiated solution based on secure and recognized boundaries recognizing the flaws in Israel s previous temporary borders the 1948 Armistice lines or the Green Line 1 by not calling upon Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories, but rather from territories occupied. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 in 1967 following the Six-Day War.2 It followed Israel s takeover of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. The resolution was to become the foundation for future peace negotiations. Yet contrary to Arab contentions, a careful examination of the resolution will show that it does not require Israel to return to the June 4, 1967 Armistice lines or Green Line. Resolution 242 was approved on November 22, 1967, more than five months after the war. Although Israel launched a pre-emptive and surprise strike at Egypt on June 5, 1967, this was a response to months of belligerent declarations and actions by its Arab neighbors that triggered the war: 465,000 enemy troops, more than 2,880 tanks and 810 aircrafts, preparing for war, surrounded Israel in the weeks leading up to June 5, In addition, Egypt had imposed an 12

13 illegal blockade against Israeli shipping by closing the Straits of Tiran, the Israeli outlet to the Red Sea and Israel s only supply route to Asia an act of aggression in total violation of international law. In legal parlance, those hostile acts are recognized by the Law of Nations as a casus belli [Latin: Justification for acts of war]. Beside this resolution, another resolution was adopted by the UN in 1973, resolution 343 with the similar aim resolving the conflict. Furthermore, in 2007, resolution 1770 by the Security Council broadened the responsibilities of the four-year-old Mission, whose existing mandate expires today. Among other things, the measure authorized the head of UNAMI to advise, support and assist the Iraqi Government in advancing an inclusive, national dialogue and political reconciliation, reviewing the Constitution, setting internal boundaries, and dealing with the millions of Iraqis who have fled their homes. Key aspects: 1. Religion and (its link to) sectarianism; 2. Politics and (its link) to sectarianism; 3. The economic aspect: i. How the financial situations of sects trigger conflict; ii. The financial damage conflicts have caused; iii. How the lack of expertise and finance have hindered peacemaking efforts; iv. Possible sources and uses of finance to minimize and prevent conflict; 4. Implications of previous conflict; 5. Key stakeholders and their role in increasing/reducing the divide among sects. Bibliography 13

14 Syed Raza Hassan, Gunmen Kill 43 in Bus Attack in Pakistan s Karachi, Reuters, May 13, 2015, [2] Ubaidullah Shaikh, At Least 60 Killed in Blast at Shikarpur Imambargh, Dawn, January 31, 2015, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Ayesha Siddiqa, A Closer Look at Tahirul Qadri s Thesis, The Express Tribune, January 2, 2013, See, for example, Haroon Ishaq, Forced Conversion Grieves Hindu Community in Sindh, Daily Times, August 15, 2014, /forced-conversion-grieves-hindu-community-in-sindh. Huma Yusuf, Sindh s Sectarian Challenge, Foreign Policy, February 5, 2015, Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Spring 2013, survey/. Timeline: Accused under the Blasphemy Law, Dawn, August 18, 2013, Pew Research Center, Religious Hostilities Reach Six Year High, January 14, 2014, 14