I. This Book is Based on a Series of Lectures Delivered by Clark in 1966 at Wheaton College (1)

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1 Forward by John Robbins I. This Book is Based on a Series of Lectures Delivered by Clark in 1966 at Wheaton College (1) II. A Summary of Clark s Scripturalism (2) A. Stated: 1. Epistemology: Propositional Revelation (the most important) 2. Soteriology: Faith Alone 3. Metaphysics: Theism 4. Ethics: Divine Law 5. Politics: Constitutional Republic B. Familiarized: 1. Epistemology: The Bible Tells Me So 2. Soteriology: Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and You Shall Be Saved 3. Metaphysics: In Him We Live and Move and Have Our Being 4. Ethics: We Ought to Obey God Rather Than Men 5. Politics: Proclaim Liberty Throughout the Land III. The Axiom: Propositional Revelation of the Bible (2) A. Every Worldview Has An Axiom--A Starting Point Nothing can come before one s axiom or it would not be the axiom, what preceded it would. B. Thomas Aquinas Aquinas unsuccessfully attempted to combine two axioms into his philosophical system: sense and revelation. A secular axiom of sense experience derived from Aristotle with the Christian axiom of revelation from the Bible. C. Today s Dominant Epistemology among Protestants and Roman Catholics is Inductive Empiricism 1

2 1. Traditional apologetic methodologies are all logical fallacies: sense experience cannot prove truth 2. Trust in science is futile: science cannot discover truth as it s based on the fallacy of induction All inductive arguments in the last resort reduce themselves to the following form: If this is true, that is true; now that is true, therefore this is true. This argument is, of course, formally fallacious. [Bertrand Russell, cited by Robbins on page 4] a. Scientific philosophers have recognized this and have attempted to save face by abandoning any claim to knowledge Karl Popper, a scientific philosopher, has written in this regard: First, although in science we do our best to find the truth, we are conscious of the fact that we can never sure whether we have got it.... [W]e know that our scientific theories always remain hypothesis... in science there is no knowledge in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle understood the word, in the sense which implies finality; in science, we never have sufficient reason for the belief that we have attained the truth.... Einstein declared that his theory was false: He said that it would be a better approximation to the truth than Newton s, but he gave reasons why he would not, even if all predictions came out right, regard it as a true theory.... Our attempts to see and to find the truth are not final, but open to improvement.... our knowledge, our doctrine is conjectural;... it consists of guesses, of hypotheses rather than of final and certain truths. [cited by Robbins, pages 4-5] D. True Christian Epistemology is Deduced from God s Revelation Clark s theory of knowledge parallels his doctrine of salvation: both are gifts from God. Man cannot save himself and he cannot gain knowledge on his own terms. Scripturalism bases knowledge on the Bible s propositions and the logical inferences of those propositions. Logic--reasoning by good and necessary consequence--is not a new principle not found in Scripture and added to the Scriptural axiom; it is contained in the axiom itself. The first chapter of John s Gospel may be translated, In the beginning was the Logic, and the Logic was with God and the Logic was God. [Robbins, 3] 2

3 Introduction: A Wide and Deep Swath by Carl F.H. Henry I. Clark s Epistemology (11) A. The Superiority of Christian Revelation According to Henry, a dominant feature of Clark s contribution to education is a rigorous logic that continually seeks out and evaluates the reigning tenets of the age, and alongside their weaknesses exhibits the superiority of the Christian revelation. [11] B. Clark an idealist but not an absolute idealist Clark believed epistemology to be basic and God as the Supreme Principle. In this sense he was an idealist (reality is fundamentally and basically intellectual rather then physical). But he was not an absolute idealist. Man must have a priori equipment--that learning, contrary to Aristotle and Locke, is not simply an empirical process. While Clark shares the emphasis of Plato and Kant that man s mind is not a blank, he is neither a Platonist nor a Kantian; with the Calvinistic theologians he insists on the fall and depravity of man. Conservative theologians insist that man is born with a sinful nature, not merely that he becomes sinful by imitating Adam; that is, man comes to life s experiences with an a priori moral tilt. If they are willing to admit that man is not born ethically a blank, asks Clark, why should they deny that man is not born intellectually a blank? Why not stress that man has a prior equipment, inborn categories of thought or innate ideas, that do not arise from experience, but without which he cannot think anything, and which control his reactions to experience? [Henry, 12-13] C. The laws of logic are an aspect of the image of God in man. D. The Reformers and Revelation 1. The Reformers best expounded the Christian doctrine of revelation One does not find a good and complete theory of revelation until one comes to the Reformation. Calvin, Luther, and the other Reformers insisted on sola Scriptura and on the inerrancy of Scripture, as well as its being the sole source of our knowledge. [Clark, 13] 2. The failure of Aquinas natural theology Aquinas admitted that natural theology gives man no special revelation or truth about salvation. 3

4 II. Biographical Sketch of Gordon Clark (14) A. Clark s childhood 1. Born on August 31, Father was a minister (50 years at Bethel Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia) a. Graduate of Princeton with continued studies in Scotland B. Clark s studies 1. A.B. in philosophy from Reformed Episcopal Seminary in PA 2. Studies in Heidelberg in Doctorate in Greek philosophical studies III. Clark s Teaching: Philosophy / Apologetics (15) A. Heidelberg (1927) B. Reformed Episcopal C. Wheaton (1936) 1. Controversy over Clark s Calvinism and subsequent resignation D. Butler University (1945) IV. Clark s Theology / Philosophy (17) A. Scripturalism 1. Thoroughly Calvinistic 2. Ethics must be derived from Scripture a. No ethics can be deduced from a non-christian base V. The Dominant Hegelianism of the Early to Mid Nineteenth Century (19) A. Definition of Hegelianism from Encyclopedia Brittanica: Hegelianism is a tradition of philosophy which takes its defining characteristics from a philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, which can be summed up by a favorite motto 4

5 by Hegel ( ), the rational alone is real, meaning that all reality is capable of being expressed in rational categories. All of Hegel s work was an effort to synthesize the conflicting religious and cultural elements of Christian tradition, Greek classicism, the Enlightenment and the Romantic movement into a meaningful, coherent unity. He did this by replacing Aristotle s concept of static and constant being with the idea that all being is constantly in motion and constantly developing through a three-stage process popularly known as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.... These three stages were found throughout the whole realm of thought and being, from the most abstract logical process up to the most complicated and organized human activity, the historical succession of political and philosophical systems. Shortly after Hegel s death, his school diverged into three currents of thought: the conservative Rightist Hegelians who developed his philosophy along lines compatible with Christian teachings and conservative politics; the Young Hegelians, or leftists who took up the theory of dialectic and historical progression and developed schools of materialism, socialism, rationalism, and pantheism; and the centrists who concentrated on logic and the philosophical system itself, which they diffused throughout the Western world. In Britain, Hegelianism strongly influenced the rise of British idealism. B. Hegalianism was on the decline by the mid-19th c. and gave way to Logical Positivism (which subsequently declined as well) The weakness of absolute idealism, as Clark sees it, was that the Hegelian categories never connected with actual science as practiced in the nineteenth century; toward the end of that century distinguished physicists like Vogt and Buchner reacted against Hegelianism and became outright materialists. The weakness of logical positivism is its empiricism. From an empirical theory, Clark stresses, one cannot derive a norm of any sort. To emphasize the usefulness of science outside its own limited sphere, Clark points out that science cannot determine its own value.... By science bombs are made and cancer may soon be cured.... But can experientialism demonstrate that either the destruction of cities or the extension of life is good? The value of science depends on the value of life; but the value of life, and therefore the value of science itself, must be determined by some sort of general philosophy. And it is my conviction that... the only position that satisfactorily manages all these problems is the revelational philosophy of Christian theism. [19-20] Even though secular philosophers could not answer him, Clark did not foresee a large-scale return to Christianity in the secular intellectual arena. The only meaningful basis for every aspect of life--not to mention eternity--comes by way of God s revelation. 5

6 I. Lecture One of the Wheaton Lectures: Secular Philosophy A. Epistemology (26) 1. Is the world material, spiritual, or both? a. Relates to materialism, dualism and idealism (1) Idealism: in metaphysics, the belief that everything that exists is either a mind or dependent on a mind for its existence 2. Two basic types of epistemology: a. Rationalistic (Plato / Hegel) (1) Plato Plato held that the objects of knowledge, constituting the real world in distinction to the half unreal world of sensation, were suprasensible, unchangeable Ideas. [28] These ideas give us concepts and categories (i.e. math, logic). Cf. Plato s Parmenides. Classification, required for teleology, assumes ideas. Unless we can use concepts and talk of groups of things, philosophy would be impossible. [28] It is impossible to abstract mathematical concepts from experience. [28] The failure of Platonism to descend from heaven to earth, or, if you wish, to ascend from earth to heaven, leaves the theory ineffective. Man before birth may have been omniscient, but here below the Platonic cave in which man is a prisoner actually has no opening. Platonism, therefore, cannot be accepted as the solution to our problem. [28] (2) Hegel Hegelianism claimed to explain everything through a categorical system of thesis, analysis, anti-thesis, synthesis. This practice continues until all issues are resolve in the Absolute Spirit. (a) Kierkegaard contended that Hegelianism leaves no room for Hegel b. Empirical (Aristotle / Sartre) (1) Aristotle Aristotle rejected Platonism and grounded knowledge on sensory experience via empirical data. He asserted that there are primary realities (Socrates, Mt. Olympus) and secondary realities (man, 6

7 horse, mountain). He moves from the specific (a specific man, or mountain) to the general (any man or mountain). However, a specific mountain is made of individual materials (rocks, earth). What makes it primary? It can also be argued that a particular man, or horse, is not exactly the same today as he/it was yesterday. In Aristotle s conception, how can a man be executed today for a crime he committed a year prior? One cannot base categories, much less ethics, on existential grounds. Aristotle cannot account for knowledge. He cannot account for concepts and categories. He cannot account for the law of non-contradiction. (a) On page 32 Clark offers this verbose paragraph without explanation or definition: Whether Leibniz can justify the individuality of his monads is a different question, for Leibniz has a totally different epistemology. But for empiricists, both for Aristotle s so-called conceptualism and all the more for William of Occam s thorough-going nominalism, the physical continuum and the Heraclitean flux prevent the identification and even the existence of individuals. i. Leibniz: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Germany, in He was a rationalist philosopher. He believed the nature of truth consisted in the connection or inclusion of a predicate in a subject. His reality consisted of God and immaterial monads. Material objects are illusions. [cf. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] ii. Monads: From μονος = unit. An elementary individual substance reflecting the order of the world and from which material properties are derived. Term first used by the Pythagoreans as the name for a beginning number of a series from which all following numbers are derived. [cf. Brittanica.com] iii. Conceptualism: * Universals vs. Particulars Conceptualism is a theory that applies to the matter of universals. Universals stand in contrast to particulars. * Individuals and Universals (Properties) Individual objects (like apples) have properties (like redness or greenness). These properties are universals. Universals = Properties. Individuals are singular objects that exist over time, but only in one place. Universals may change over time. Each person is a unique individual, but that individual changes over time 7

8 (aging, learning, growing, etc.). The properties, or universals, of each individual make that person who he or she is. These work out in a subject/predicate structure. Take the sentence, The shirt is dirty. The shirt = Individual; dirty = Universal. Two people may each hold an apple -- an individual that is unique and limited to a singular space-time, but each apple shares a universal (redness). The universal they share is in two places at once. Philosophically, the question is asked, If universals are real, what are their properties? According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (s.v. Universals ):... suppose we were to destroy one of the apples mentioned above. We d have one fewer individual, to be sure. Would there be a diminishment of redness itself? It doesn t seem so, since redness is held to be an entity in its own right. Nor does it seem to make sense to say that redness increases when another apple ripens and turns red. These considerations suggest that a universal is wholly present in each of its instances, and that the existence of a universal in one place is unrelated to its simultaneous existence at any other place. It s not clear, however, how universals could be both wholly present in each of the places they exist, and, at the same time, present in many different places at once. Universals cannot be material, since materiality can only be in once place at one time. According to philosophers, this then relates to a problematic issue of causation. * Problem and Nature of Universals The problem of universals is a well-known phrase in philosophical circles. It refers to the role universals play in the solution to various problems. For example, many scientists engage in what s called postulating entities -- the belief in the existence of unobservable phenomenon such as black holes, nutrinos, and quarks. Universals fill a similar role in philosophy. In philosophy, some contend that predicates must have referents to be meaningful. Universals fill this role. Often we predicate properties of individuals. When we say that both cherries and rubies are red, for instance, we seem to say individuals share common properties, those that make cherries, cherries, those that make rubies, rubies, and those that make both red. Predicates are said of many subjects, then, but is there anything in reality to match the linguistic one-overmany? Are there general truths? Is there commonality in nature, in reality, or is commonality imagined and illusory, perhaps a mere product of language? If the latter, how can we accommodate the intuition that it is the world, and not our conventions, that make predications true or false? The problem of universals arises when we ask these questions. Attempts to solve this problem divide into three broad strategies: Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism. [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Universals. ] 8

9 - Realism Extreme Realism (Plato): In order to explain the qualitative identity of an individual you must accept that another identity exists called a universal. If apples are red, there is a universal of redness that identifies the individual, something Plato called a form. Accordingly, there are three components. First, the individual (apple). Second, the redness that exists in or with the apple. Third, the form of red that manifests itself in items like apples. Question: what is the nature of the form? In Plato s Realism, forms are immaterial and thus outside of time and space. This is problematic and Plato claimed that the forms participate in the individuals in some way. Strong Realism (Aristotle): The key to this position is its rejection of independently existing forms. As we noted... Extreme Realists posit an explanatory triad involving an individual, the quality of this individual, and Form that grounds the quality of this individual (and that one, and others). Strong Realists, in contrast, resist this triad. When an individual has a quality, there is simply the individual and its quality. No third, independent thing is needed to ground possession of the quality. A universal, on this view, just is the quality that is in this individual and any other qualitatively identical individuals. The universal red, for example, is in this apple, that apple, and all apples that are similarly red. It is not distinct and independent from the individuals that have this color. Beause it is a universal it can exist in many places at once. According to Strong Realism, the universal red in my apple is numerically identical to the red in yours; one universal is in two individuals at once. It is wholly present in each place where it exists. [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Universals. ] This view makes Strong Realism immune from Aristotle s Third Man Argument (infinite regression). Objections to Realism: There are general objections to realism, such as the Strangeness Objection (universals are too odd and undefinable to be accepted into our world view), and the Third Man Argument (the problem of infinite regression). - Nominalism There are at least two Nominalist strategies: 1) Organize individuals into sets based on resemblance. Account for qualitative identity/resemblance by appealing to commonalities of set membership. A red apple belongs to a set of red things. 9

10 2) According to trope theory properties are particulars. Tropes are a type of individual. A red apple is distinct from a red wagon even if the two are qualitatively identical. A set of red tropes will only have red items in it. - Conceptualism A final strategy for avoiding universals comes by making generality not a feature of reality, but instead a feature of our minds and the concepts or ideas in minds. Conceptualism thus seeks a third way, as they see it, between the excesses of Realism, and the unilluminating resemblance relations of Nominalism. Because many individuals can fall under the same concept, Conceptualism hopes to accommodate the intuition that qualitative identity and resemblance are grounded in the sharing of something, but in a way that doesn't appeal to dubious items such as universals. According to this view, individuals a and b are red because the concept of redness applies to both. The concept red is general, not because it denotes a real non-individual, but only because many diverse particulars fall under, or conform to, that concept. iv. William of Occam: William of Occam ( ) was an English Franciscan friar and scholastic philosophertheologian, is believed to have been born in Ockham (a small village in Surrey). He believed "only faith gives us access to theological truths. The ways of God are not open to reason, for God has freely chosen to create a world and establish a way of salvation within it apart from any necessary laws that human logic or rationality can uncover." Ockham was a pioneer of nominalism who contended that only individuals exist, rather than - individual universals. Ockham is sometimes considered an advocate of conceptualism rather than nominalism, for whereas nominalists held that universals were merely names, i.e. words rather than existing realities, conceptualists held that they were mental concepts, i.e. the names were names of concepts, which do exist, although only in the mind. Therefore, the universal concept has for its object, not a reality existing in the world outside us, but an internal representation which is a product of the understanding itself and which supposes in the mind the things to which the mind attributes it; that is, it holds, for the time being, the place of the things which it represents. It is the term of the reflective act of the mind. Hence the universal is not a mere word, as Roscelin taught, nor a sermo, as Peter Abelard held, namely the word as used in the sentence, but the mental substitute for real things, and the term of the reflective process. [Wikipedia, s.v. William of Ockham] v. Heraclitean flux: According to both Plato and Aristotle, Heraclitus held extreme views that led to logical incoherence. For he held that (1) everything is constantly changing and (2) opposite things are identical, so that (3) everything is and is not at the same time. In other words, Universal Flux and the Identity of Opposites entail a denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction. Plato indicates the source of the flux doctrine: "Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things go and nothing stays, 10

11 and comparing existents to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same river" (Cratylus 402a = DK22A6). [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Heraclitus] (2) Aristotle s problem with categories (32 ff.) Relation: Categories and relationships are necessary for knowledge. A head cannot be known as a head unless one has knowledge of a body. Quality: In contradistinction (and refutation) of Aristotle s contention that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only... the distinction between quality and relation cannot be maintained. [33] Aristotle admits that some things can be both qualities and relatives. [33] This analysis of the categories destroys Aristotelian epistemology because the categories are supposed to be grasped by an infallible intuition, inductively arising from sensible particulars. [33] As for Nietzsche: (3) The British empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume fare no better Nietzsche strangely manages to agree with Aristotle, if only on one point: a mind with a form of its own will distort our knowledge. But for Nietzsche the mind has a form of its own: possibly not the a priori forms of Kant, but nonetheless a mode of action that modifies whatever it receives. Therefore, argues Nietzsche, the facts of nature never reach our consciousness without being simplified, adjusted and interpreted. The activity of knowing, as it has developed in the human race, is a simplifying device and we never grasp things as they are. Logic begins by comparing things and equalizing them. But in reality no two things are equal. Not only are two rocks on a mountain different, but even to two peas in a pod. Logic therefore, when it says all peas are vegetables, falsifies phenomena. To speak logically about all peas not only equalizes all peas it reduces all vegetables to intellectual puree. [35] According to Nietzsche, we can never know if the world of things truly corresponds to our thought. This, apparently for Nietzsche, applies to the laws of logic as well. As a behaviorist, Dewey concurs. 3. Final comment on the existentialism of Sartre: Existentialism is so blatantly irrationalistic that everyone knows it repudiates all eternal principles. Existence precedes essence, and no predetermined guide lines, either of divine degree or of psychological determination, or of logical principle, restrict or anticipate how existence may product essence. All is chaos. [37] B. Science (37) 11

12 1. Epistemology prejudges science 2. The failure of empiricism to sustain truth 3. Science a. Science as induction always in flux (no settled science ) b. Failure to arrive at any settled scientific law If science can neither explain the workings of nature nor identify the elements of its composition, those materialists, naturalists, or atheists who have sometimes so dogmatically claimed scientific authority for their views are left without a foundation. [41] c. What is science? Operationalism identifies science as manipulation, not as description. The focus is on what scientists should do. The view that science discovers the truth has waned. Science is not a cognitive enterprise. After all, why should one think that the scientific results of the present will endure when those of the past have not. C. Ethics (43) Secular philosophy cannot provide any direction in ethics. For example, Kant fails at two points: 1) His categorical imperative (operate according to the maxims that you would wish to be universally held). Utilitarianism, founded by Jeremy Bentham, identified good as pleasure (and the greatest good is that which suits the greatest number). Utilitarianism followed Kant and dominated nineteenth century thought. However, utilitarianism cannot determine what the greatest good is, much less what is good for the greatest number. This is a philosophy of tyrants like Stalin and Hitler. Existentialism has also failed in regard to ethics. Existentialism s chief source of failure is the subjective nature of its epistemology. Most, with Nietzsche, outright deny or set limits to the law of non-contradiction. Existentialism ends in nihilistic despair. D. Religion (54) 1. Humanism as the religion of the contemporary west 2. The problem of subjectivity 12

13 II. Lecture Two: The Axiom of Revelation No philosophical worldview is possible without presuppositions. Aristotle rejected a priori forms on the basis that they would distort empirical data. Rather, he favored universal judgments gained by way of experience. But experience cannot afford universals. Hume noted that experience is limited to the past and does not exist in the future. A. A Suggested Axiom (59) Scripture is the foundational axiom. This must be true for Christianity as we would not know any particulars about God apart from revelation. Any axiom must be able to account for all aspects of existence, from epistemology to ethics and the existence of God. Dogmatism is more than adequate for this task. B. God Otherwise Unknowable (60) As Clark points out, God cannot be deduced from any superior principle that His selfdisclosure in revelation. [60] Indeed, natural (general) revelation exists and is an innate feature of man being created in God s image. Clark contends that a prior revelational knowledge of God, however, is necessary for one to see His handiwork in creation. C. Does this Beg All Questions? (62) Does the argument put forth so far engage in question begging? The answer is no as all theories depend on an axiom. Axioms and theorems must be differentiated. Theorems are not axioms. The distinction between axioms and theorems is for the purpose of arranging derivative truths under a basic or comprehensive truth. [63] D. Is the Principle Broad Enough? (63) Does verbal revelation cover all of life such as science, mathematics, and history? First, what do secular philosophies offer other than skepticism (and despair)? Second, the Scripture gives us the foundation upon which to ground all areas of life. Foundational to this is logic. E. The Law of Contradiction (64) The law of non-contradiction must be established if we are to know anything at all. No knowledge is possible apart from it. F. Logic and God (65) God is omniscient and is the source of all knowledge, knowledge that He has eternally known. A proposition is true because God thinks it so. [66] Cf. Psalm 147:5; 1 Sam. 2:3; Eph. 1:8. The knowledge of God depends on His own sovereign will and nothing external to Him. 13

14 The prologue to John s Gospel, chapter 1, verse one, may be rendered In the beginning was the Logic, and Logic was with God, and Logic was God. The law of contradiction is God s thinking; logic is the activity of God willing. As Clark asserts, God and logic are one and the same first principle, for John wrote that Logic was God. [68] F. Logic and Scripture (69) The propositions of the Bible are the very thoughts of God, the very mind of God. If, therefore, God has spoken, he has spoken logically. The Bible displays this logical pattern of God s thought. The Bible is the axiom, not logic (Kant) or God (Spinoza). The important thing is not to presuppose God, but to define the mind of the God presupposed. [72] G. Logic in Man (72) From Col. 3:10 we conclude that rationality, truth, or logic is the locus of man being created in the image of God. There could be no righteousness, or sin, apart from rationality. Barthian theology and Pietism both reject this premise. A knowledge of God, His requirements, and right thinking about Him are required for righteousness, something to which animals cannot attain. Then again, animals who cannot sin, also cannot be righteous the reason being that they are non-rational. Hence the image of God, which distinguishes man from animals, is basically logic. [74] The fact that rational thinking, or logic, is a constituent element in the imago dei, demands that truth be the same for man as for God. Thomism, on the other hand, views the nexus of truth to be analogical. H. Analogy (77) Analogous truth falls short. It is not truth. Truth must be univocal. And if God is omnipotent, He certainly possesses the ability to communicate univocal truth, apart from sensation, to finite man whom He created in His own image. God gave man the gift of language and the ability to understand propositional thoughts. I. An Alternate View (79) The knowledge of God is not contrary to verbal revelation. Contrary to the contentions of critics like Archbishop Temple, the Scriptures are perspicuous. J. Biblical Intellectualism (86) Any attempt to denigrate knowledge (and logic) falls short of the Scriptural ideal, whether such denigrations come from liberals, the neo-orthodox, or pietists. Apart from verbal revelation, we would have a silent God (or a finite god who depends upon paradox or analogy). The New Testamant commends knowledge, as does the Old (cf. Eph. 1:17-18; 1 John 5:20; 1 Cor. 15:34; 14

15 Proverbs). True unity is one of doctrine and knowledge (1 Cor 1:10). In this regard, there is no disjunction between head and heart. K. Trivial Technicalities (87) Some (such as a Spinozist0) may complain that dogmatism does not have a set of axioms clearly formulated. If that s the case, so be it, as the number of verses in the Bible is too great for any Euclidean system! Dogmatism operates on a single axiom: the Bible is the Word of God. But though single, it is fruitful because there is embedded in it the law of contradiction, plus the nature of God... plus the thousands of propositions thus declared true. [88] Complete deduction, however, is unattainable; nor can it properly be demanded. Such a demand could be made only by a thoroughgoing Spinozist; and to such a one we point out again that even Spinoza did not deduce the events of history... [89] John Dewey, on the other hand, rejected certainty in secular epistemology. Cf. his Quest for Certainty. What about everyday knowledge? A knowledge of who my wife is, or that I am feeling hungry? This question fails to take into account the whole argument. What is the essence of immutable truth? Science and history text books disagree with each other on many points. Dogmatism avoids this dilemma. As Calvin writes: I call that knowledge, not what is innate in man, nor what is by diligence acquired, but that which is delivered by the Law and the Prophets. [92] L. Conclusion and Application (92) 15

16 III. Lecture Three: Several Implications A. Dooyeweerd (94) 1. His 15 Laws Dooyeweerd attempted to cover all areas of knowledge within his system. He viewed the universe under fifteen different ontological laws: 1) Pistical aspect (faith); 2) Ethical aspect; 3) Juridicial aspect; 4) Aesthetic aspect; 5) Economic aspect; 6) Social aspect; 7) Linguistic aspect; 8) Historical aspect (culture molding); 9) Analytical aspect (logic, thought); 10) Psychical aspect (sensation); 11) Biotic aspect (life); 12) Physical aspect (life); 13) Movement aspect; 14) Spatial aspect; 15) Numeric aspect. That Dooyeweerd builds each of these upon the other is problematic as each cannot be isolated in its own categorical sphere apart from the others. 2. His theory of cosmic time a. Dooyeweerd attempts to differentiate different aspects of time (time order and time duration) 3. The philosophical dilemma of time a. The difference between logical and temporal order b. Dooyeweerd s special meaning of time as it relates to faith 4. Time and history cannot be divorced B. History (102) Despite pleas (and attempts) to the contrary, the recording of history is not an objective endeavor on the part of the historian. The sources one chooses, the events one covers (or emphasizes), the limitation of source material (and its accuracy), as well as the bias of the historian all mitigate against a purely objective view of history. Further, what about the meaning of history? Secular history cannot attach substantial meaning to the Jewish Holocaust or Stalin s genocide? Dogmatism can, however. Revelation gives us the meaning and significance of history. 1. The failure of neo-orthodoxy C. Politics (107) Christianity is not neutral on the subject of political systems. Locke and Rousseau, however, attempted to formulate a political system on secular grounds (Eg. social contract). Those who 16

17 believe that the surrender of individual rights to the government in totalitarian fashion may lead to utopia have a naive view of human nature, what the Bible describes as depravity. Rousseau borrowed his ideas on the governmental separation of powers from the Scottish Covenanteers who understood the depravity of men. The big question is whether a government can rule by right rather then by force. Augustine held that coercive governments were necessitated due to sin. Clark sees Genesis 9:6 as an incipient example of human government. The right to private property is defended by laws against theft. One essential restriction on government that we see in Scripture is the protection of Christian liberty (Eg. the protection of the baby Moses in violation of the decree given to the midwives and the declaration of the apostles that obedience to God was paramount). These are unalienable rights. Furthermore, God has given the state the power of wage war, execute murderers, and collect taxes. Dogmatism steers a path between anarchy and totalitarianism which secular philosophies cannot. C. Ethics (112) 1. Theoretical basis for ethics a. Ideas exist in the mind of God b. The problem of evil solved (1) God is not subject to any law external to Himself [God] did not therefore will such things because they were in themselves right and He was bound to will them; but they are therefore equitable and right because He wills them. [Zanchius, p. 114) God s justice is not ours: what is unjust for us may not be so for him, since He is above the law which we obey. [Zwingli] 2. Practical application of ethics a. Justice and the inescapability of Divine law b. Secular theories cannot give a basis for ethics or a reason why the 10 Commandments are a good moral guide 17