THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE. THE JEWS-OF EUROPE Affl(NORTH AFRICA. A Report of Trends and Developments, July - November, 1950

Transcription

1 THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE THE JEWS-OF EUROPE Affl(NORTH AFRICA A Report of Trends and Developments, July - November, 1950 Prepared by The Paris Office of the American Jewish Committee

2 - 6 2 " NORTH AFRICA MOROCCO (Jewish population, about 260,000) Any effort to help the 260,000 Jews in Morocco achieve improvement in their status must take into account the complex Moroccan political and social situation which, today, is in delicate balance. The pressure of growing nationalism among the Arab masses, the desire of the Sultan of Morocco to have increased powers in his own right, the fear of the French that their North African empire might explode under them as their colony in Indo-China has all these elements are pulling in different directions on the Moroccan scene. It becomes increasingly urgent, therefore, to consider what may be the position of the Jews in a ohanging Moroccan political situation, and to see how Jewish rights may be protected and improved. Thanks to the initiative and the efforts of the Amerioan Jewish Committee there is now available for the first time a comprehensive and accurate study of the legal and social status of the Jew in Morocco. This is "The Legal Position of the Morocoan Jew" by Andre Chouraqui, Laureate of the University of Paris Law Faculty. This volume was prepared at the instigation of the AJC and financed by it, and was sponsored in France by the Alliance Israelite Universelle. Mr. Chouraqui's conclusions «- which in themselves show how much improvement is needed are that there must be the drafting of a Moroccan nationality law by whioh Jews can acquire full citizenship; effective guarantee of publics liberties; free access to public office by Jews; increase in number and more democratic choice of Jewish representatives in the government council attached to the French Resident-General's office; formation of an independent Moroccan magistrature; and improvements in the corps of rabbinical offices and the status of the Jewish community organizations. He points out that progress toward betterment of Jewish status has been made since the French took power in 1912, and that the Sultan has issued statements affirming the equality of all his subjects, Moslem and Jewish alike, which are important even though the equality they mention is theoretical. "Slowly, it is true, but continually there is a growing movement...to accomplish essential reforms in Morocco," declares Mr. Chouraqui. He is hopeful that the reforms he outlines can eventually be aooomplished; but most of them must be reoognized as Jewish aims rather than as a working program under actual present conditions. N\ In October, the Sultan of Morocco came to Paris. He was received with great pomp and given the honors of the city but he was not given that for which he had come, increased powers. The position of the Sultan was fixed by the treaty of Algeciras in When they entered the country, the French left the old absolute Moroccan feudal hierarchy standing. On it, they imposed a parallel administrative system which, soon, had all the real governing powers. The Sultan became little more than a figurehead: his only power was to refuse to sign a decree passed by the French, but he soon realized that such an attitude of "negativism" was ineffective, and he used it but rarely. French military might pacified the country, bringing under the domination of the

3 Sultan some areas which he, himself, had not been able to control. Because it was decided to retain the original Moroocan feudal structure, however, one effect of the entry of the French military was to give the WMMftwttMy corrupt Moroccan pashas and local rulers a more effective weapon for maintaining their hold on the Arab masses, whom they exploit unmercifully. French rule became a sanction for this system, /Aocording to one prominent French journalist who just returned from a survey of Morocco, Claude Bourdet, even such rudimentary popular controls as once existed over the appointment of local sheiks -r one being the occasional hanging of the local ruler ivho had gone too far in his exploitation and terrorism have now disappeared in the name of order. The main preoocupation of the French administration, which is primarily a polioe administration, is to "have something" on all local rulers, to make them amenable* Bourdet says. There has been a complete stifling of any possible growth of real Moroccan politioal parties, which are forbidden,* There is effective censorship and even certain issues of conservative French newspapers like Le Monde oannot be sold if the authorities think that they contain material "harmful 1 ' to the present regime in MoroocojJ The Frenoh position is that all these things are justified by the considerable improvements they have brought into Morgcoo since They imposed peace on the land. They built an excellent network of roads. In some regions, like that of Casablanca, they have made an almost modern land, and have built up industry, electric power, ports and agriculture. This is all true but the benefits of all these improvements, the Arabs feel, have gone to the Europeans in Morocco or to their feudal masters. Since 1930 the French have been facing politioal opposition in Morocco. A Moroccan Aotion Committee was formed by a small group of moderate intellectuals who wished to establish a program of accelerated reforms on the social and political level in cooperation with the French. This France did not accept, though it did increase its own welfare program. Rejection of the moderate advocates of Moroccan independence helped strengthen the hand of Arab nationalist extremists. So, too, did a number of events that occurred in Tffiorld War II. First, the Atlantic Charter was taken seriously by Arab leaders, who have argued constantly and to the great discomfiture of the French that its ideals should be applied to them. Second, American liberation in November 1942, brought the Arab the idea that there were countries richer and more powerful than France, which lost stature by comparison. Third, beoause Morocco was subject to martial law during the war and because there was strict food rationing, discontent of the Arabs mounted and nationalist agitation gained converts. Fourth, the Arabs saw Moslem countries throughout the Middle East shake off European politioal control, in Suria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine and become independent states. Fifth, aftfor the war, Arab soldiers who had seen life in Europe and who, indeed, had been welcomed as liberators there, once again had to submit to humiliating regulations when they returned to Morooco. Almost nothing was provided for them in the way of employment, housing, etc. and these disciplined, trained x-soldiers began to swell the ranks of the discontented.

4 All this, oombined with the social degradation and exploitation of the Arab, is adding to the strength of the Arab nationalists. There are now at least two Moroccan nationalist parties. The most important is the Istiqlal, the Morqccan Independence Party. The other is a small splinter group, the Moroccan Democratic Party. Istiqlal, with adherents even in the government councils set up by the French in formal adherence to Moroocan self-rule, is quite influential. In January, 1944, it sent a memorandum to the Sultan proclaiming that French and Spanish Morocco (both are nominally ruled by the Sultan) had the right to independence. Riots broke out in Rabat, Casablanca and Fez and had to be put down by French armored columns in Rabat. Whether because of extreme nationlist pressure or because of certain French acts he did not care for (reports vary) or because of his own ambitions, the Sultan did come out, a few years later, with an official demand for Moroccan independence* In a speech at T&ngiers in 1947 he demanded that Morocco should come under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. The former French Resident Commissioner-General for Morocco, the highest French offioer, was immediately recalled and mie of France'^a'bslest soldiers was sent in his place, General Juin. Ilal^-i]»«Sept ember I'S'tiqlal issued another manifesto urging an end to French "colonialisms" the Sultan's unssuccessful Paris trip was the latest move for independence. Are the Moroccans ready for independence? ' The French say no, claiming there are not enough officials, administrators and technicians capable of operating a government, that Morocco has not the resources to stay on its own feet. The Sultan and the nationalists obviously think otherwise. The United Nations, incidentally, ias ;h,provided them with an excellent talking points for the U.W. has B^earfe-Iy 1 decided that Libya should become an independent state and, from any point of view, Libya is a much less developed country than Morocco.,) > For the Jew, the present Moroocan situation holds a double tragedy. On the one hand, the French, trying to keep Arab feelings from becoming inflamed, do not want to do anything which might excite them* Granting improvements in status to Jews can excite the Arabs on two counts; because the beneficiaries are people they consider inferior to them, or their enemies; and because if Jews are given benefits, the Arabs will certainly feel they should get more benefits. On the other hand the Arab desire for nationlist independence, if satisfied, will probably have grievous results for the Jews. Though they have lived in Morocco for oenturies, Jews almost certainly will not be considered citizens of Morocco they will be fortunate if they are not openly persecuted, harried and driven from the country once complete Arab independence is a reality. The interest of the Jew in Morocco, therefore, cannot lie in the Arab drive for independence even though it is quite true that the basic poverty and exploitation in Morocco today affects Jews as well as Arabs and even though it will be difficult to get any major gains under the present French" Sherifian regime. Certain possibilities for such gain do exist, however, as will be seen below.

5 Nonetheless, it would be folly not to recognize that, in the not-toodistant future, the Arab drive for independence in Morocco must succeed in part or in full. Can one build Jewish defenses against the arrival of that day, so that Jews can be ready for it when it comes? This is a fundamental problem not only for Morocoo but for all North Africa now under French rule. The wretchedness and misery in which the overwhelming mass of Jews live in Morocco has been described in previous reports. The filth and the disease of the mellahs, the orowding of as many as eight or ten persons to a room, the lack of the most primitive sanitary faoilities affect tens of thousands. To add to his physical misery the Jew is as the Couraqui study of his status shows at the bottom of the legal and sooial ladder in a country which has four different legal systems. He has his own courts for such personal matters as marriage and divorce, and his own local community councils, but these last (dominated by clerical authorities and a few rich persons whose line of authority runs back to the Middle Ages and whose thinking is all too often of the same era) do little for him. Yet, improvements have been made in the status of the Jew. There is growing up a younger generation of Jews in Morocco today who are dissatisfied with the status and role of their fathers and who see the possibilities of a better life. Until the last few years, this element has been impotent for the most part, unorganized, and unable to make any dent in the existing situation. Now, however, these elements are gaining encouragement and impetus thanks to the achievements of non-moroccan Jewish agencies that have come from the ouside and done work in that oountry. Their numbers increase as more and more persons educated by the Alliance Israelite Universelle grow up, making for a more literate Jewish population than previously existed. They have seen what the Joint Distribution Committee has been able to do in feeding, hygiene and medioal work, in cooperation with OSE. They realize that there are community and Morocoan resouroes which are not being tapped and whioh are available. The younger elements are finally beginning to make themselves felt. First, their influence was mainly verbal and in print. Though they could not accomplish much, they did manage to make themselves heard through their own newspaper, the Hoar, and even to get their point of view across in the Voice of the Communities, the paper of the community councils. Youth groups' like the' Charles Netter organization, the Eclaireur Israelite (Jewish Boy Scouts), the Former Students of the Alliance and the Federation of Youth Organizations are undertaking various small projects on their own, usually designed to help the mellah children in some way. In one city, Fez, the younger groups have been able to get some of their members elected to the community council. One of the results was the oleaning-up in Fez of archaic Jewish religious schools not worthy of the name a cleaning-up in the physical sense and in the substitution of modern teachers for ancient professors and rabbis whose ideas of education were largely medieval.

6 In the largest city,, Casablanca, there are signs that the criticisms and the pushing of the younger elements are also beginning to have effect. The community council is displaying greater activity, and is embarking on such projects as the building of a home for the aged, and a Talmud Torah; it is interested in creating some new kindergardens and is thinking of establishing a large soup-kitchen. One should not make the mistake of thinking of soupkitchens in American terms, as mere relief feeding centers in plaoes like Morocco have a proven and positive publio-fhealth value, for experience has shown that even small supplemental diets aid in the perpetual fight against disease. Most important of all, it appears that the Casablanca building project for Jews may finally get under way. The razing of the mellah is a sine qua non for the improvement of Jewish life in Morocco, but such razing cannot be accomplished until the Jews now in the mellahs are given a place to live. Jewish groups have been so slow to take advantage of a 300 million frano building credit from the French government that even non-jewish papers like the ^Vigie" have attacked them, arguing that additional funds could have been obtained if the original credit had been used up to now. One Jewish community, that of Sefrou, was struck by tragedy on the day of its Sucooth celebration when a flash flood struck the city, killing 21 persons, wounding 3, leaving 1,500 persons without shelter, knocking down 60 houses and destroying 127 stores within 12 minutes. The reaction of Morocoan authorities and Jewish organizations was immediate, and emergenoy help came from all quarters. Temporarily, the homeless persons are being sheltered in tents, and in the Alliance and Habonim schools, As a result of the catastrophe, it is believed that the Sefrou housing project, under consideration for several years, will now get top priority. According to La Voix des Communautes, leading Jewish paper in the country, it is probable that a hundred lodgings will be constructed in the shortest possible time to house those now without shelter. What are the Jewish community resources available for undertaking improvements in Morocco? The Jewish population is organized into 51 communities. They are financed by taxes on kosher wine and meat and a few local donations. How unsatisfactory this system is oan be seen from the fact that the total annual budget of all 51 communities is only about 90 million francs($250,000) of which Casablanoa spends about 38 millions. In the last year, however, French contributions for various Jewish projects have increased. Where, in 1949, the French contributed 7 million francs to the budget of the communities, this year it contributed 28 millions. Other French appropriations made toward Jewish work are: the granting of 300 million francs (over -<i850,000) for the Jewish building project in Casablanca; about $42,000 for construction of a Jewish dispensary and the same amount for a Talmud Torah; over $11,000 to the OSE for children's homes, and 4,000 square meters of land for the building of kindergardens.

7 The community fuaad-raising method hardly touches the Jews best able to give, the nucleus of -wealthy Jewish businessmen in Morocco. Similarly, Moroccan Jewish leaders of the old-school are extremely hesitant about pressing the French for increased appropriations for Jewish needs, and are quite timid, for the most part, in their relations with the government. A crucial era is now approaching in Morocoo, however, when such timidity can be extremely costly. One reason that the French have been declaring they cannot leave Morocoo is that, they point out, Morocco is not just a Mpslem country. The Frenoh must stay, they argue, to protect the rights of the non-moslems the Europeans and the Jews. This argument has been advanced with increasing frequency and intensity of late. If the Jewish community leaders take the French at their word, this argument oan provide an excellent talking-point for getting increased benefits from the French government. In addition, it is almost axiomatic in North African lands that demands for increased political and economic independence are usually met with social and welfare programs of some kind. The Sultan having been refused his greater political powers, one can expect that the French are working on some sop to ease the pressure in Morocoo, and an increased program of public works oan be expected. If Jewish leadership in Morocco (and in France) is alert and oan see to it that Jewish projects are fitted into this new program from the beginning, the opportunity may have arrived to make real gains in Jewish housing, health, and suoh areas as vocational education.

8 TUNISIA (Jewish population, about 105,000) The political independence of Tunisia is further advanced than that of Morocco. The French have been in Tunisia since 1870, and a greater part of the population has come under the influence of European civilization and ideas than in Morocco. Tunis became a protectorate of France in 1881 and the treaty between the Bey of Tunis and the French gives considerable autonomy to the local government. Since the first World War there has been continuous conflict between the lioslem population and the French authorities concerning the Arab demands for complete independence. One nationalist party in Tunisia is that called the "Destour", which is composed of old-established Tunisians still faithful to their feudal principles. More important is the "Neo-Destour" party, even more extreme in tendency, founded in under the leadership of Habib Bourcuiba, the present Tunisian nationalist leader. Bourguiba, though arrested by the French before the war and liberated by the Germans in 194-0, incited the Tunisian people to fight for the Allies, His relations with the Bey of Tunis were strained in the past but during the past year these relations have become more cordial. He made a tour of Tunisia in 1950 and was generally acclaimed as a liberator. During this tour he stopped at the city of Gabes, where he called together the representatives of the Jewish community and assured them of his friendship for the Jews. In a visit to Paris he proposed a seven-point program to the French which would have meant the Tunisians would become masters in their own country and exercise all public and police functions with, for the time being, some French help. His attitude toward the French is "Domination no. Collaboration yes." The political crisis in Tunisia calmed down at the end of this summer when the former Resident General (who had prepared his own program of changes) was withdrawn and a new Resident General, M. Perillier, appointed. Perillier accepted certain proposals demanded by the Tunisians, granting some increase in local autonomy and taking the "Neo-Destour" party into the government. Bourguiba continues to press for national independence. The situation of the individual Jew in Tunisia is better than that of the Jew in Morocco he can, for example, become a French citizen by naturalization, and, on the whole, he is more Europeanised. The local Jewish community organizations, however, appear to be ingrown and with rather limited and traditionalist viewpoints in many regards, As in Morocco, there is considerable hesitation on their part toward approaching French and Tunisian authorities for certain improvements or for assistance. This was demonstrated in the last few months through the re-evaluation and overhaul of Tunisian Jewry's Halukah system of giving welfare assistance. The Halukah is an ancient method of giving assistance whereby limited community funds are divided more or less equally among apparently needy families, without any investigation of the need or the adequacy of the help given. Tunis, for instance, has been spending about 16,000,000 francs a year on such help (about ^5,000). Investigation of this system under the impetus of the Joint Distribution Committee not only showed that savings could be

9 made in distribution of funds but, of greater import, that there/aid facilities in the municipal and national Tunisian governments that had never been touched, though Jews were quite eligible for the relief thus offered. The administration of Jewish relief funds in Tunis became the center for a local scandal when it was discovered that one member of the community council had been handling these funds improperly. This revelation led to the resignation of the entire council, although no suspicion of mismanagement ever fell on any but this single member. Though this resignation was refused by the authorities, the full council did not return to office but left the running of local affairs to a committee of three of its members. Whether the full council will eventually return to office or new elections will be held is not yet clear. Rabbi Meiss Cohen was appointed the new president of the Rabbinical Tribunal, which decides cases involving the personal status of Jews in Tunisia, such as marriage and divorce, according to rabbinical law. The entire structure of the rabbinical courts seems due for reorganization, however. With the approval of the Chief Rabbi of Tunisia, David Bembaron, a reorganization project has been submitted to the Tunisian government. In the education field, the question has also been raised whether full advantage is being taken of government facilities that do exist. A coordinating committee on which all existing education institutions in the city of Tunis are represented, as well as some lay leaders, was recently established. This is to investigate all phases of the education work now being done, how it can be improved and how more help can be obtained. During the past few months there was a sharp increase in the teaching of Jewish subjects and Hebrew in Tunisia, due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency and the help of the JDC. An Israeli teacher has been brought in to supervise this program} and he also hopes to introduce Hebrew literary circles, musical groups and general cultural activities* Two projects that have received the most enthusiastic support of the» Tunisian Jewish community, however, are vocational training and the organization of youth sport groups. A local CRT committee has been organized, and a plan to build a school for 4.00 boys and girls in Tunis has been approved. Pending completion of the permanent institution, CRT plans to operate a temporary school for 100 boys this year. Another organization, Apprenticeship for Young People, seeks to place 100 boys and girls in skilled and semi-skilled trades this year with employer cooperation. Open-air yotith sport-clubs have been established in Tunis and Gabes and these serve as a kind of primitive community youth centers where interest is awakened in Hebrew and Jewish subjects in general. The Tunisian Jewish community groups are, therefore, open to persuasion and favorable to modern methods, and adopt them when they are properly presented and assiduously furthered. There is one difficulty, however, which is basic and inhibits much progress r the influence of the strong rabbinical group which does not care for new methods or ideas. This influence is at its

10 worst in the Jewish community of Djerba where, for instance, womens' eye diseases could not be treated because there was only a male nurse to administer the eye-drops. But even in the more modern cities many of the younger men and especially the younger women are subject to what is known as "secondgeneration conflict" in the United States their ideas and that of their more rigidly orthodox parents differ widely. With respect to two of their fundamental problems, the Jewish communities are in no position to do anything without considerable outside help. One is the position of the 20,000 Jews in the interior. There have been anti-jewish outbreaks in this area and it is feared that there may be morej the 20,000 Jews are not safe where they are and it is hoped that it will be possible for them to move to the coast or to emigrate. This will depend on the Jewish Agency and JDC emigration schedule. The other great problem of Tunisian Jewry is the razing of the "hara" or ghetto ~ of Tunis which is as wretchedly filthy and disease-ridden a habitat as any "mellah" in Morocco. For more than a decade action on Jewish housing projects in Tunis have been demanded, as well as the cleaning up of the "hara." In September, the Tunis Municipal Council made a study of the hara, promised certain improvements, and is considering an enlarged building project. The Jewish communities are improving their status and situation, taking advantage of outside aid, and are beginning to move away from their traditional policies and methods* It is not unreasonable to expect that they will make further gains during the coming months.

11 ALGERIA (Jewish population, about 130,000) Algeria is part of France and hor "departments" are considered as French "departments", or states. Nonetheless, the civilization brought in by the French and the elevation of 1.0 si ems to important political posts have given rise to a spirit of independence in this country, too, and a wish to fight what is called "colonialism." This is particularly true in the southern areas of the country, in the department of Constantine. The Algerian Jews in the north are known as "assimilated" Jews and they are French citizens, making up about one-and-a-half per cent of Algeria's^ population. They provide, however about 30 per cent of the country's civil servants, doctors, dentists, laxjyers and similar professions. There has been a considerable improvement in the Arab-Jowish situation in northern Algeria. Only two years ago the Jews of Algeria were pursuing a strict policy of "non-conspicuousnens", rarely venturing to congregate except for religious reasons and not daring to present their views on secular Jewish causes. In the last six months or so things have gotten much better: Algerian Jews now indulge only in Zionist activities, hold public meetings, raise funds for Icrwl and make no secret of the coming and going of I- raeli emissaries. Curiously enough, in this country the growth of the Arab nationalist^ spirit has served to lessen anti-semitism, it is believed by Algerian Jewish leader, M. Elie Gozlan. Whereas the Jews used to be a common target of the. 8 million Arab Iloolems and the 1,300,000 Europeans, the rise of nationalism has now channeled much Arab feeling aginst the European element and the French, and Jcus are no longer being particularly menaced as Jei^s, according to M# Gozlan. The situation of the Jews in the south in no way compares with the situation of those in the north. Here they are Berber Jeirs, not French citizensj they have suffered from minor Arab attacks and, for a while, there was an exodus of Jews from the interior to the north. The southern part of Constantine province lias been evacuated of Jews in recent months* The northward movement of the others has been checked by Jewish communal leaders. Most of them are anxious to go to Israel, but movement out is slow because other countries are given emigration priority, and the quota of emigrants from Algeria is quite small. The bulk of northern Jewry has decided to stay in Algeria, however, and Jewish community leaders there are irritated at what they consider undue interference of Israeli representatives in local affairs. So strong was this irritation with the Paris office of the Middle East Department of the Jewish Agency that the three leading Algerian community organizations including the Alferian Zionist Federation made public a statement in which they de- / clared: ** "Algerian Jewry does not refuse outside cooperation: on the contrary, conscious of its duties, it knows how fruitful such coordination can be, and

12 all outside help will be welcome. But to give help or to be interested in the Jewish community of Algeria does not, however, give the right to dominate that community, nor to decide for her. Furthermore, any action, any propaganda by outside organizations or their delegates can only be carried out with the aid of competent, local Jewish organizations. Any idea of putting Algerian Jewry before a fait accompli will encounter difficulties, reserves, even the legitimate opposition of Algerian Jex/ry." Internally, Algerian Jewry has organized itself so that the Federation of Jewish Communities in Algeria is the official representative of the Jews and undertakes religious, cultural and welfare activities. The Algerian Jewish Committee of Social Studies is, by common agreement, the Jewish representative in local political questions. The working ties of each of these organizations with the local Jewish community groups throughout Algeria still need to be strengthened in practice; but the general acceptance of the Federation and the Social Studies Committee as the representatives of Algerian Jevrry is not at all questioned.

13 LIBYA (Jewish population, about 15,000) When Jewish emigration from Libya is completed, it is expected that 3-5,000 Jews will still remain in that country, almost all of them in the city of Tripoli, lit present tx^o Libyan provinces Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are governed by the British and a third province, Ferzan, is governed by the French. By January 1, 1952, at the latest, however, Libya is due to become an independent state* The new state will undoubtedly be a Moslem state. There are about 800,000 Arabs in Tvipolitania, another 200,000 in Cyrenaica and about 4.0,000 in Fezzan. As opposed to this there are minority groups of about,40,000 Italians, and a few hundred Greeks and Maltese, plus the Jews that will remain. The position of the Jews and the other minority groups in a Moslem Libya has not yet been settled. The Arabs are willing to consider the Jews as Libyan nationals, but they are not willing to give this status to the other minorities. The Jex^s have, until now, made common cause with the other minority groups in representations before the United Nations Commissioner for Libya, Mr. Adrian Pelt. Both at Geneva where the Economic and Social Council discussed the Libyan situation and at Lake Success where it came before the General Assembly of the U.N.., AJG representatives have asked, independently and through the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, that: The fundamental rights outlined in the Human Rights Charter be incorporated in the Libyan constitution, as one protection for members of minorities. That among these rights special attention be given to the right to emigrate without the undue loss of property. That the United Nations instruct the Libyan National Assembly to form a committee to meet with minority group representatives, in order to establish methods by which protection of minorities will be guaranteed. By making the protection of minorities a United Nations problem instead of purely an internal Libyan problem, it is hoped that the maximum benefits can be obtained for whatever group of Jews that may eventually remain in Libya. The United Nations General Assembly has recommended that the Libyan National Assembly be convened by the beginning of the next year, and a provisional government formed by April 1, This plan proposed by the U.N. Commissioner Pelt V&B almost upset in the General Assembly voting because the Arab countries insisted that the delegates to the Libyan National Assembly be elected rather than appointed.