The Politicization of Shari ah: Behind the Implementation of Shari ah in Aceh - Indonesia. Arfiansyah

Transcription

1 The Politicization of Shari ah: Behind the Implementation of Shari ah in Aceh - Indonesia Arfiansyah A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University, Montreal December, 2009 Arfiansyah 2009

2 Abstract Author: Title: Department: Degree: Arfiansyah The Politicization of Shari ah: Behind the Implementation of Shari ah in Aceh-Indonesia Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University Master of Arts This thesis studies the political factors of the implementation of shari ah law to end a long and bloody conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. It argues that the Indonesian government did not mean to separate the secularist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka ( Free Aceh Movement or GAM) from the Acehnese civilians, who are predominantly traditional Muslims and whose culture has been assimilated with Islamic teaching since the twelfth century, by granting the implementation of Islamic law in the region. This thesis provides an alternative explanation for the development of shari ah as a resolution to the conflict in the region. Contrasting existing explanations about the implementation of shari ah in modern politics in Aceh, this study analyzes more closely the reasons that the Indonesian government was so willing to grant the implementation of shari ah in Aceh. It is important to note that shari ah was part of a larger concession granting regional autonomy in order to end the three-decades of conflict in the region. Aside from analyzing the sources of the conflict that led to the emergence of two different rebellions in Aceh (the first was a religious movement and the second was a secular ethno-nationalist revolt), this thesis will investigate the Indonesian government s motivations for granting shari ah to the Acehnese within the secular legal system of Indonesia. This thesis will analyze the Indonesian political situation from 1997 to 1999, which led to the granting of special autonomy and additionally shari ah to the Acehnese government. This study will also analyze the importance and the development of shari ah in the region beginning with its initial granting in 1999 until its comprehensive implementation. The analysis is focused on two fundamental elements, Qanun (Islamic pieces of legislation) and the Shari ah Courts of Aceh. Most importantly, and running through both elements, this thesis will show how shari ah was used politically by Indonesian nationalists and GAM, although both sides bore ideologies that were predominantly secular. i

3 Resumé Author: Title: Department: Degree: Arfiansyah La récupération politique de la shari ah: Un regard sur l introduction de la shari ah dans la région d Aceh en Indonésie Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University Master of Arts Cette thèse explore les facteurs politiques derrière l application de la shari ah visant à mettre fin au long conflit dans la région de l Aceh, en Indonésie. Nous soutenons que le gouvernement indonésien n a pas souhaité diviser le mouvement laïque Gerakan Aceh Merdeka («mouvement pour un Aceh libre» ou GAM) et les civils acehnais, ce dernier composé en majorité de Musulmans et associé d emblée tant à l enseignement islamique depuis le 12 e siècle de notre ère qu à l introduction de la shari ah dans la région d Aceh. Cette thèse propose une nouvelle explication à l adoption graduelle de la shari ah comme cadre de résolution du conflit dans la région d Aceh. S inscrivant en contraste avec les explications existantes sur l introduction de la shari ah dans le contexte politique moderne d Aceh, cette étude analyse les raisons qui ont poussées le gouvernement indonésien à donner le feu vert à l adoption de la shari ah dans la région d Aceh. Notons que la shari ah faisait partie d une plus large concession accordant l autonomie régionale à Aceh comme condition de règlement du conflit entre Aceh et le gouvernement central qui perdurait alors depuis trois décennies. En plus d analyser les sources du conflit qui a mené à l émergence des deux différentes rébellions d Aceh (la première de nature religieuse, la seconde ethno nationaliste), cette thèse explore les motivations du gouvernement indonésien d accepter l adoption de la shari ah à l intérieur du système juridique indonésien. La période de l histoire politique indonésienne couverte par cette étude s étend de 1997 à 1999, soit jusqu à l octroi de l autonomie politique au gouvernement acehnais et à l adoption de la shari ah comme cadre de résolution des conflits. Cette thèse analyse également le développement de la shari ah dans la région, de son autorisation par le gouvernement central en 1999 jusqu à son adoption effective. L analyse examine essentiellement deux éléments fondamentaux, soient le Qanun (lois islamiques) et les cours shari ah Aceh, pour démontrer comment deux groupes laïques, les nationalistes indonésiens et le GAM, ont utilisé la shari ah pour leur stratégie politique. ii

4 A Note on Translation The translation of Arabic names and terms used in this research are in accordance with the scheme that is employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University. Indonesian names and terms are written according to the new formal Indonesian spelling adopted in However, certain personal and organization names are spelt the way they are spelled in the texts utilized; in which some authors are still using old spellings such as Soeharto instead of Suharto and Soekarto instead of Sukarno. Some examples of differences between the new and old spelling are: ch, dj, sj, and tj; become kh, j, sy, and c; respectively. The differences in translation from Arabic to English and Indonesian are: Arabic English Indonesian ث th ts ح h h ذ dh dz ش sh sy ص ض ط ظ sh dh/dl th zh iii

5 Acknowledgements I have benefited from the generous assistance of many people in the course of completing this thesis; to them I would like to express my deep appreciation. It seems more than appropriate to start by expressing my sincere gratitude to the Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project for the financial assistance it has provided for me during my studies at McGill University. Without it this research could not have been completed. I present my sincere thanks to Wendy Allen, the previous director of the project, and Lina Kafayan, the current director. Also, thank you to Lori Novak, Salema Nawas and Chelsea Oliver for their help during my stay in Canada. I am indebted to Prof. Malik Abisaab and Prof. Philip Buckley for steering me to the topic of this research. However, many special thanks are due to Prof. Uner Turgay who acted as my academic supervisor and thesis supervisor. His assistance, advice and his personal approach were extremely effective and made my studies and research more meaningful. My gratitude also goes to Hendro Prasityo and M. Ali Munhanif for their criticism and careful guidance during this project. Also my gratitude goes to Professor Sahrizal, Dr. Ridwan Nurdin, Drs. Jamhuri, and all those who provided me with research materials from Aceh for giving a local perspective on this issue. Thanks also to Charles Douglas Fletcher and Philip Duguay, who edited this research with sharp eyes, and to all the Indonesian students at McGill University for their warm friendship and help during my stay in Canada. iv

6 Above all, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents who always support and have faith in me. They are everything to me and were the first teachers in my life. They passed on their ambitions taught me the importance of pursuing knowledge. Their words and support have brought me to this part of the world, which I never imagined that I could reach. I dedicate this work to them. v

7 Table of Contents Abstract... i Resumé... ii A Brief Note on Translation... iii Acknowledgements... iv Table of Contents... vi Introduction... 1 Chapter One: A. The First Rebellion: Fighting for Islamic Identity B. Finding Resolutions C. The New Order: Eliminating Ethnic Identity Chapter Two: The Emergence of GAM: Ethno-Nationalist Revolt and the Granting of Shari ah law A. Economic Grievances and Military Campaigns B. Aceh after the New Order: Special Autonomy and Shari ah Law C. Disputing the Granting of Shari ah Law Chapter Three: The Development and Politicization of Shari ah A. Qanun Regulations B. Mahkamah Syar iyah: Disputing the Comprehensive Implementation of Shari ah Conclusion Bibliography vi

8 Introduction The Aceh Province of Indonesia has a long, rich and very different history from that of the central Indonesian state and other modern day Indonesian regions. Current Indonesian political institutions are more a reflection of the Javanese past, influenced by Hindu-Buddhist cultures. Islam was eventually spread to the Hindu-Buddhist Javanese in the 13 th century. Islamic teachings were mixed with Hindu-Indian culture and mystical teachings. 1 For over a thousand year, the Acehnese region has had a strong Muslim culture, reflected by centuries of Islamic Kingdoms, 2 a sea-lane trade economy that linked it to Middle Eastern empires, and strong local political institutions which were divided into three branches: Sultanate, ulama, and local aristocrats (Ulee Balang). 3 During European colonialism, Dutch forces occupied the central Indonesian state and some other outer Indonesia s islands for about 300 years. Aceh was only under Dutch 1 Islam was spread to Indonesia from India after its assimilation with Indian-Hindu mystical traditions. This particular mixture of Islam was easily accepted by Indonesians, and in particular the Javanese who were adherents of Hinduism, Buddhism, and animism for about 1500 year before the 13 th century. After three centuries, Islam became the dominant religion in Java Island, assisted by the fact that Indonesians started making continuous contact with Middle Eastern peoples. Since then, some Buddhist mystic terms were Arabized and Radja (King in Buddhist term) was gradually replaced by Sultan. Clifford Geertz, (1983): Abangan, Santri, Priyayi dalam Masyakat Jawa. (Jakarta: PT. Dunia Pustaka Jaya), 170. While large numbers of Java Island were Muslim, and Buddhist and Hindus had been Arabized, most of the Javanese still kept practicing previous traditions, through mystical traditions. Growingly, people were studying and practicing more pure forms of Islamic teaching, without mixing it up with other teachings. Max L Gross, (2007): A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia. (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College), 85. Soekarno himself was inspired by the great Javanese kingdoms of the past, specifically their brand of politics and traditions, which were told through Wayang Kulit stories. Like the characters in these stories, Soekarno showed a tendency to bring together some contradictory ideas that emphasized the sovereignty of God and forms of more modern themese related very much to Marxism. In doing so, he rejected any form of organized religions. Craig A Lockard, (2009): Southeast Asia in World History. (New York: Oxford University Press), Before Aceh was unified into a single state, it was the site of several small Islamic Kingdoms. Marco Polo visited one of these, Perlak, in Giving us the first evidence of an Islamic sultanate in Southeast Asia. Another early Kingdom, Pasai, has been described as an important centre for the diffusion of Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago. By the early 16th century, the various kingdoms had been unified under Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (d. 1530?) of Aceh. James T Siegel, (1969): The Rope of God. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 4. 3 Ibid, p Introduction. In Verandah of Violence, edited by A. Reid. (Singapore: Singapore University Press), 9. 1

9 colonial control for about 50 years, during which time Dutch control was relatively weak due to a strong and continuous organized resistance led by ulama. 4 During the 1945 Indonesian revolution, central Indonesian leaders wanted to unify the whole archipelago under a common identity within a strong nation state. Their vision was influenced by Javanese history, particularly the Madjapahit Kingdom, 5 which encompassed almost all parts of presently-held Indonesian territory and even some parts of modern Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. 6 Acehnese people, even during the Indonesian revolution, generally preferred to establish an independent nation or at least a strongly autonomous region where Islamic law could be applied. The story laid out in this thesis is set firmly with this background in mind and with these different views of history. During this revolution, the central Indonesian state and the Acehnese (represented by the role of ulama in large part) seemed to some extent understand and sympathize with the aspirations of the other side. Central Indonesia wanted to create a new strong nation comprised of hundreds of ethic groups spread across the archipelago. Sometimes gross miscommunication marked relations between the two sides, particularly on the topic of a future state ideology. 7 The Acehnese (and also some other regions strongly 4 M. Nur El Ibrahimy. (1986): Teungku Muhammad Daud Beureueh: Peranannya dalam Pergolakan Di Aceh (Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung), According to the Javanese history, which large numbers of Indonesian nationalists were inspired, that Indonesian people were a nation of common origin, Indo-China or Vietnam. They were a single people who lived scattered through the entire Indonesia archipelago, from Sabang in Aceh to Merauke in West Papua. These people were united by Javanese kingdoms of early ages: at the time of Darmawangsa and Madjapahit, under the kings of Raden Widjaja, Hajam Wuruk, and patih (general) Gadjah Mada. However, some people argued that the nationalism of Indonesian was not based on that great history, but Indonesian nationalism emerged from the common grievance under the same colonialism, Dutch. Kahar Muzakar, (1970): Down with the New Madjapahitism. In Indonesian Political Thinking ( ), edited by H. F. a. L. Castles. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), Craig A Lockard, (2009): op.cit, Unknown, (1970): Manifesto of the Atjeh Rebels In Indonesian Political Thinking ( ), edited by H. F. a. L. Castles. (Ithaca and London Cornell University Press),

10 influenced by Islam such as West Java and Makassar 8 ) wanted an Islamic state or at least to have an autonomous province where Islamic law could be applied. 10 The miscommunication was worsened by the presence of uncompromising groups in both camps. Central Indonesia, which was led by Soekarno, sought to a future state under a secular ideology. The Acehnese ulama, led by Daud Beureuh, wanted to apply a form of Islamic law in their own region which emphasized the great history of Acehnese Islamic kingdoms and Muslim culture they had cultivated over centuries. This miscommunication led to the armed conflict until It was continued until 2005 by a non-religious orientation (secular) separatist movement, Aceh Free Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM). 12 After more than twenty-five years, in 1999, Indonesia granted an autonomy to the region and allowed the Acehnese government to apply a comprehensive set of Islamic laws to its citizenry. 13 Now, Aceh is the only province in Indonesia that has officially implemented Islamic Law (shari ah). 14 The implementation of shari ah has been a part of the solution to the long history of political instability in the region. 8 Following the Dutch agreement to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in December 1949 Darul Islam, established and led by Soekarmadji Kartosuwiryo in West Java, refused to recognize the authority of the new republican government led by Soekarno and proclaimed an independent Islamic state. Darul Islam found support in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and other areas of the county outside of Java. Max L Gross, (2007): op.cit, 38, Eric Eugene Morris, (1983): Islam and Politic in Aceh: A Study of Centre-Periphery Relations in Indonesia, (Cornell University), Taufik Adnan Amal & Samsu Rizal Panggabean, (2003): Syariat Islam di Aceh. In Syariat Islam: Pandangan Muslim Liberal, edited by Burhanuddin. (Jakarta: Sembrani Aksara Nusantara), Michael L. Ross, (2005): Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia, In Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, edited by P. C. A. N. Sambanis. (Washinton DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank), Michelle Ann Miller, (2006): What's Special about Special Autonomy in Aceh? In Verandah of Violence; The Background to the Aceh Problem. edited by A. Reid. (Singapore: Singapore University Press), Aceh is located in the very north of the Sumatran Island and comprises 4,163,250 people. Biro Tata Pemerintahan. (June 2008): Laporan Kependudukan. Banda Aceh: Sekretariat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Unlike in other parts of Indonesian provinces where the implementation of shari ah law is limited to issues of personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, infaq (donation) and waqf (gift), hajj (pilgrimage), and zakat (alms) (the first four issues regarding personal status are referred to as 3

11 The first rebellion of the Acehnese against the Indonesian government started in 1955, ten years after Indonesia s declaration of independence from Dutch colonialism. To the Acehnese, the Indonesian government failed to fulfill the demand for the application of shari ah in the region. Indeed, the implementation of shari ah was the only condition that the Indonesian government had to fulfill if it wanted the Acehnese to join the war against the Dutch. 15 The demand for the implementation of shari ah was based on the Acehnese indentifying with the ancient Islamic empire in Aceh, which lasted from the twelfth to the nineteenth century. Within this period Islamic traditions took root in local cultures and has exerted a strong influence until the present day. 16 The Indonesian federal government in Jakarta failed to fulfill their demand, and a rebellion ensued. The rebellion was led by the Acehnese ulama Assembly (PUSA), and was spearheaded by a charismatic leader, Daud Beureueh ( ). 17 He sought an autonomous region in which shari ah could be practiced. private Islamic law, while hajj and zakat are referred to as public law, as there are no articles within either law regulating Muslims to perform hajj and zakat), the implementation of shari ah law in Aceh covers all issues including political, economic, education, health, social, cultural and other issues. These issues are regulated by and based on Islamic law. Azyumardi Azra, Arskal Salim, (2003): The State and Shari'a in the Perspective of Indonesia Legal Politics, In Azyumardi Azra, Salim Arskal (ed.), Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), Syahrizal, M. (2007): Pelaksanaan Syari'at Islam di Aceh Dalam Kerangka Sistem Hukum National, In Samsul Rijal, (ed.), Dimensi Pemikiran Hukum Dalam Implementasi Syariat Islam di Aceh. (Banda Aceh Dinas Syariat Islam Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam), M. Nur El Ibrahimy. (1986): op.cit, The Acehnese war against the Dutch started in 1873 until the arrival of Japan in 1942 at the invitation of the ulama to defeat the Dutch. Although the war against Aceh was the longest war in the history of Dutch-Indies colonialism. While the Dutch succeeded in abolishing the Acehnese Empire in 1903, they could not conquer the Aceh region completely. Taufik Adnan Amal & Samsu Rizal Panggabean, (2003): op.cit, Anthony Reid, (2006): Colonial Transformation: A Bitter Legacy. In Verandah of Violence; The Background to the Aceh Problem, edited by A. Reid. (Singapore: Singapore University Press), The Islamic empire in Aceh existed from the twelve century to the beginning of nineteenth century when the Dutch occupied the region. The official application of shari ah as a basis for empire policies began in the fifteenth century, which was known as Qanun Syara Kerajaan Aceh (shari ah regulation of Aceh Empire). The Qanun Syara Kerajaan Aceh covered matters of comprehensive Islamic law, customary, taxation, Aceh traditions and mores and the governance system. They were based on the Qur an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Taufik Adnan Amal & Samsu Rizal Panggabean, (2003): op.cit, Eric Eugene Morris, (1983): op.cit,

12 After seven years of guerilla warfare ( ), Daud Beuereuh succeeded in securing the Acehnese demand through several negotiations with the Indonesian government. Essentially, Acehnese leaders secured the establishment of a shari ah court, and set the basis for the implementation of Islamic law in the region. 18 However, with the change of power from the first president of the Indonesian Republic, Soekarno ( ) to Soeharto ( ) in 1967, policies toward the Acehnese also began to change. For the sake of the unity and the uniformity of Indonesia, the new government introduced a secular system as the sole official state-ideology for all Indonesian citizens. In doing so, Soeharto ignored all the statutes which gave the Acehnese certain privileges and tried to abolish Acehnese Islamic identity. He also muted any discussion about the implementation of shari ah in the region. Additionally, in order to pursue economic development and enforce national stability, Soeharto assigned military forces to defend vital national interests, such as the liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility located in North Aceh. 19 As the Indonesian government took the lion s share of the riches produced from the LNG project in North Aceh, another revolt led by GAM emerged in The demands of this opposition group were more extreme than the previous one. The new demand was for the formation of an independent Acehnese nation. Furthermore, in 18 Kirsten E. Schulze, (2003): The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (26): 242. Al-Yasa Abubakar, (2005): Syari'at Islam di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam: Paradigma, Kebijakan dan Kegiatan. (Banda Aceh: Dinas syari'at Islam), Tim Kell, (1995): The Root of Acehnese Rebellion, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project), 31-33, Eric Eugene Morris, (1983): op.cit, In 1971, the Mobil Oil Company discovered natural gas and claimed it as one of the largest natural gas finds in the world. The large revenue from the LNG has gone to three parties, Mobil oil, Pertamina (an Indonesian state-owned company) and JICLO of Japan. The Acehnese enjoyed almost none of the profits from the LNG production and the company employed only very small numbers of local staff. The International Centre for Transitional Justice, HRWG, Kontras & Imparsial (2008): Kasus Keterlibatan: Exxon Mobil di Pengadilan karena Perannya dalam Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Aceh. In Studi Kasus. (Jakarta), Michael L. Ross, (2005): op.ciy, 40. 5

13 contrast to the religious orientation of the first rebellion, the new rebellion was secular in nature and was based on concepts of ethno-nationalism. In response, the Indonesian government sent thousands of troops to Aceh in 1989 and declared the region a military operation zone for the next ten years. 21 The decade long military campaign led to the death of countless innocent civilians in the province. As a result, the GAM rebellion became militarily and politically stronger as many Acehnese, the majority of whom were victimized by the military campaign, shifted their allegiance towards the rebels. This moved the GAM from being a marginal movement to become the very symbol the resistance against the Indonesian government. The central government s oppressive measures against GAM became unpopular in Indonesia after President Soeharto resigned in The next President, B.J. Habibie, who held the presidency for one year, initiated the first steps of reforming relations with GAM by passing a series of new regulations. One of these regulations was Law No. 44 (1999), dealing with the Special Status of the Aceh Region, which became a precedent for subsequent dealings with Aceh. 22 This regulation was followed by the approval of the so-called NAD Law in 2001 by President Megawati Soekarno Putri. One of the provisions of the law was to grant a comprehensive implementation of Islamic Law in Aceh. 23 Since then, all aspects of Acehnese community life, including politics, economics, education, health, and social and cultural affairs, have been ruled by shari ah encapsulated, Qanun. Qanun, which are based on shari ah, constitute the legal corpus of 21 Ibid, 44. Kirsten E. Schulze, (2004): The free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization, East West Centre Washington Policy Studies 2: Michelle Ann Miller, (2006): op.cit, Jemadu Aleksius, (2006): Democratisation, the Indonesian armed Forces and the Resolving of the Aceh Conflict. In A. Reid (Ed.), Verandah of Violence: the Background to the Aceh Problem. (Singapore: Singapore University Press),

14 Acehnese regional regulations (Peraturan Daerah or PERDA) that operate under the Indonesian legal system. Under the hierarchy of legal instruments in Indonesia, the Qanun is similar to provincial regulations of other parts of Indonesia, all of which operate under national statutes and presidential decrees. 24 Given the fact that the conflict was between two secular groups, GAM and the Indonesian government, this research will investigate why the Indonesian government offered to implement shari ah for the Acehnese. After all, this concession was designed to end a conflict that was secular in nature while such a solution for the first, more religiously oriented rebellion was ignored. There are two arguments which help explain the motivation of the Indonesian government in granting the implementation of shari ah law in Aceh. The first and most popular explanation is that the Indonesian government offered the implementation of shari ah as a mere political tool to discredit the secularist GAM before the conservative Acehnese community and regain Acehnese support for the Indonesian government. This argument was favoured by those who touched upon the issue without serious study. It was likely based on the timing of when shari ah was granted to the Acehnese as one of the political solutions for the worsening Aceh conflict after the collapse of the Soeharto regime. The implementation of Islamic law was not offered to Aceh when the situation was better. I propose here that it was mainly the timing that led some scholars to argue 24 T. Lindsey, M.B. Hooker, R. Clarke, J. Kingsley. (2007): Shari'a Revival in Aceh. In Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia; Ideas and Institutions, edited by R. M. F. a. M. E. Cammack. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press),

15 that shari ah was only a political ploy used by the central government to discredit GAM s Islamic credentials. 25 This argument might be correct if we look at the secular ideology of GAM and the Acehnese Islamic culture cursorily. Shari ah was given by the Indonesian government as a cultural mobilization to discredit GAM from the traditional Acehnese Islamic population and to maintain the Indonesian elite s interest in keeping the unity of the Indonesia Republic from disintegration. However, this argument appears insufficient if we look at the motivations of the grassroots supporters of GAM. One of their campaigns was for the re-establishment of the sultanate of Aceh upon gaining independence from the Indonesian Republic, and the implementation of shari ah law in a similar fashion as it was practiced during the ancient Acehnese Islamic kingdom. The campaign was designed to capture the trust of the Acehnese community and it was successful in the creation of un-armed GAM groups that were comprised of Muslim students and teachers at Islamic boarding schools, called Dayah. 26 This phenomenon might suggest that the use of shari ah as an Indonesian political tool to discredit GAM was inappropriate as both the Indonesian government and GAM realized the importance of shari ah in persuading the Acehnese population to come to one side or the other. Although, shari ah was never a part of both parties main goals and 25 Rusjdi Ali Muhammad, (2003): Revitalisasi Syari'at Islam di Aceh; Problem, Solusi, dan Implementasi Menuju Pelaksanaan Hukum Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu), 45. Hasnil Basri Siregar, (2008): Islamic Law in a National Legal System: A Study On the Implementation of shari ah in Aceh, Indonesia. Asian Journal of Comparative Law 3 (1): Article 4, 22. John R. Bowen, (2003): Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of public reasoning. (United Kingdom Cambridge), 232. International Crisis Group, (2006): Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh. In Asia Report No 117. Jakarta/Brussel, 5. Edward Aspinall, (2007): From Islamism to nationalism in Aceh, Indonesia. Nations and Nationalism 13 (2): Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, (2001): Whither Aceh? Third World Quarterly 22 (3):

16 strategy to discredit each other from the community, it became an arena within which to win over the hearts of Acehnese Muslims. Moch Nur Ichwan provides clearer insight into the reason for the use of shari ah in resolving the Aceh conflict. 27 His argument is based on an analysis of Megawati s efforts to solve the Aceh conflict. He argues that the implementation of shari ah in Aceh was merely the central government s attempt to develop a religious approach to resolve the status of Aceh within Indonesia. It was intended to advance the agenda of protecting the unity of Indonesia against the separatist aims of GAM. However, he said, the term religion was never specifically mentioned by the Megawati government, which still opted for a persuasion and dialogue approach to deal with the rebellion. Furthermore, the Council of People s Representatives (DPR) and Supreme Advisory Council (DPA) of Indonesia suggested the need to take more comprehensive steps in the fields of politics, economics, law, social order, security, and information retention and dissemination. The Megawati government did not specifically mention the term religion because the ideology of GAM was not religious and the formation of an Islamic state was not part of its platform. GAM intended to establish a secular republican-monarchy state in Aceh, not a theocratic state. As the conflict worsened, Ichwan added, President Megawati issued a presidential decree on the Enhancement of the Special Treatment of the Situation of Aceh. This decree mandated the use of a religious approach as one of the steps to be taken to create security in Aceh and to maintain the region as part of the unity of a united Indonesian 27 Moch. Nur.Ichwan, (2007): The Politics of Shari'atization; Central Governmental and Regional Discourses of Shari'a Implementation in Aceh. In Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia; Ideas and Institution, edited by R. M. F. a. M. E. Cammack. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press),

17 Republic. Thus, the Department of Religion Affairs was commissioned to define and implement this directive and to initiate a special program for Aceh. On one hand, this argument is valid if shari ah was proposed by President Megawati as the first approach instead of military and economic options to solve the Acehnese conflict. Then, similarly to the first argument, the implementation of shari ah, which Ichwan called a religious approach, was deployed as a cultural approach to discredit GAM. On the other hand, although this explanation provides a clearer answer to the question of why shari ah was offered by the Indonesian government in order to pacify the secular rebellion, it is insufficient. This argument ignores the role of President Habibie who put forward the foundation for the implementation of shari ah law in Aceh and President Abdurrahman Wahid who strengthened the implementation of shari ah. Ignoring these crucial figures in the granting of shari ah to Aceh obscures the explanation of shari ah as one of the basic commitments of the Indonesian government to deal with the Aceh conflict. Therefore, it is inadequate in explaining the reason for the granting of shari ah in Aceh. In this thesis I will propose an alternative explanation for the issue that the granting of shari ah was not designed specifically to isolate and pacify the secularist GAM rebellion, but instead shari ah was to form a large part of the concession package (special autonomy) offered to the Acehnese community including GAM in order to keep the region within the Indonesia Republic. This concession included special jurisdiction over the Acehnese culture and education system, the implementation of shari ah law, the 10

18 involvement of the ulama in regional policy-making and in general, and widened selfgovernance for the Acehnese. 28 All of these concessions were very broadly defined. In addition to my analysis of the conditions of Indonesia during the monetary crisis of 1997 through 1999, I develop my argument based on Milton J. Esman s peacemaking theory, which states that equitably distributed economic growth might can resolve or at least reduce conflict. 29 This is in line with the Indonesian situation where the root of the conflict revolved around the central government s unjust distribution of wealth, exploitation of local resources, and oppression toward periphery regions. This was evident not only in Aceh but also in other regions, such as Kalimatan, Irian Jaya and Riau. 30 Following the logic of Esman s explanation, one can agree that the Habibie policy on regional autonomy was aimed at eliminating the society-wide disappointments of the regions. By giving autonomy in the management of their home affairs, the central government hoped that economic performance could be increased in the provinces. Thus, when the regions started to enjoy the benefits of increased economic activity, the source of their resentment could be decreased if not eliminated. Even Though Specifically for Aceh, the Indonesian government offered the implementation of shari ah, I contend that shari ah was less important to the Indonesia government than the special autonomy measures, which were the main solution to restore the central-periphery relations after being ruined by the Soeharto regime. The argument goes owing to an absence of a serious and comprehensive implementation of shari ah 28 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 44 Tahun 1999 tentang Penyelenggaraan Keistimewaan Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh. Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1999 Nomor For more detail on this theoretical explanation see Milton J. Esman, Economic Performance and Ethnic Conflict In Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies edited by J. V. Montville. (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Book), Adam Schwarz, (Jul. - Aug, 1997): Indonesia after Suharto. Foreign Affairs 76 (4): 128. Donald K Emmerson, (May-Jun., 2000): Will Indonesia Survive? Foreign Affairs 79 (3):

19 during the conflict. The Habibie government did not initiate the idea of shari ah. It was proposed by the Acehnese delegation to the Indonesian House of Representatives as one of the possible solutions to end the conflict. 31 Since the orientation of the Habibie reform was to maintain the territorial integrity of the Indonesian Republic, all options aside from independence would be acceptable. The Indonesian crisis in economic, politics, and security from 1997 to 1999 made the option of shari ah become a viable option to maintain the unity of the Indonesian Republic, although implementing shari ah law opposed the secular ideology of Indonesia. In addition, this concession of shari ah was broadly defined, which led to vague and varied interpretations as to how shari ah would be implemented. 32 In the similar way to other explanations, Shari ah was offered as a means of cultural mobilization to so Indonesian elites could maintain their interests in Aceh by recognizing and respecting the strong identity of the Acehnese (Islamic) culture, which was distinctly formed and developed since the twelfth century. 33 The Jakarta elites desired to end the conflict and to maintain the unity of the Indonesian Republic. However, the granting of shari ah was not to isolate GAM from the traditional Muslim community. The intention was to avoid separation by offering special autonomy plus shari ah to the Acehnese in general and more specifically to GAM. If the Habibie government intended to discredit GAM - that is render its obsolete before the traditional 31 Husaini Husda, (2007): Sejarah Pemberlakuan Syari'at Islam di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. In Syariat Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, edited by F. I. a. A. M. Zain. (Banda Aceh Dinas Syariat Islam Provinsi Aceh Darussalam), Article 4 of Law No.44 of 1999 stated that the performance of religious life in Aceh is conducted in accordance with the shari ah for all Muslim citizens. This statement is very broad and vague concerning how shari ah and which part of Islamic law would be implemented. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 44 Tahun 1999 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Keistimewaan Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh. Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1999 Nomor Taufik Adnan Amal & Samsu Rizal Panggabean, (2003): op.cit,

20 Muslim Acehnese - I assume there would have been detailed formulae set out to implement shari ah from the very beginning. That was also in 2000, when President Abdurrahman Wahid formally announced the comprehensive implementation of shari ah in Aceh. His announcement was not followed by any legislation, such as national statutes or presidential decrees, which guaranteed the status of the implementation of shari ah in Aceh. Also, until the end of President Megawati s administration in 2004, the Indonesian government still had not formulated an exact format of how shari ah law would be implemented in the region and had not equipped the implementation with proper institutions, such as the Shari ah Court with full authority over criminal cases. 34 I think that if shari ah was solely an Indonesian government tool to discredit the secularist GAM and to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese, the infrastructure for proper application of shari ah would have been one of the priorities for the Habibie administration and the subsequent presidents. This would demonstrate that the Indonesian government was not anxious to support the implementation of shari ah in Aceh. However, the shari ah itself turned out to be a political tool to maintain both the Indonesian government and the GAM s interest in Aceh. What is more, Habibie s decision on the Aceh conflict was based on his political belief that a democratic and socio-economic approach to issues might be effective as a 34 Although, President Megawati released the Law No. 18 of 2001 to strengthen the previous President Abdurrahman Wahid s announcement about the status of the implementation of shari ah in Aceh, the statute was still vague as to the status and the authority granted to the shari ah court, as the operational institution for the implementation of shari ah. Looking at Megawati s nationalist political ideology and the fact that she was surrounded by Military advisors, her stance on the statute likely was perforce due to the worsening situation in Aceh and due to the fact that statute was prepared by the previous President Abdurrahman Wahid. This is strengthened by the provision of Presidential Decree No. 11 of 2003 which she ratified. The decree limited the jurisdiction of shari ah court to jurisdiction over the existing religious court which was widely spread across the country. See Keputusan President Nomor 11 Tahun 2003 Tentang Mahkamah Syar iyah dan Mahkamah Syar iyah Provinsi di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 13

21 solution for the Aceh conflict and to restore the centre-periphery relationship. He was aware that the previous government under Soeharto was very oppressive toward Aceh and exploited the local natural recourses without returning any significant benefits back to the region. 35 The autonomy appeared to be the main solution for the Indonesian crisis, but by agreeing to all the Acehnese demands (except independence) in the form of special autonomy plus shari ah law, the Habibie government hoped that the sources of conflict in Aceh could be removed or at least reduced significantly. The Indonesian government succeeded in securing the trust of the ulama via assurances on the issue of shari ah and special autonomy. Regaining the ulama s trust was only a small result which the Indonesian government expected from the concessions it offered to all of the Acehnese people and GAM. Since the Indonesian government won the trust of the ulama, GAM supporters at the grassroots level started campaigning for the issue of shari ah by promising that they would re-establish the Aceh sultanate system when independence was achieved, in which shari ah could be successfully implemented. 36 The phenomenon of shari ah mobilization as a political tool to gain support from the Acehnese community was only an effect of the granting of shari ah as GAM was unwilling to abandon the independence idea in favour of accepting the special autonomy plus the shari ah was another effect. In addition to discussing the motivation of the Indonesian government in granting shari ah, this study will also analyze the development of shari ah from its application by Law No. 44 of 1999, until it came into being in the form of a comprehensive legal system 35 Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, (2006): Detik-Detik Menentukan Jalan Panjang Menuju Demokrasi. (Jakarta: THC Mandiri), Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, (2001): op.cit,

22 covering matters such as criminal law, which came out of intensive negotiations between Aceh and Jakarta. Additionally, I will show how the granting of shari ah was utilized by the Indonesian government and GAM to help obtain the support of the population of Aceh. In doing so, this research will be divided into three chapters. In the Chapter One, I will discuss the emergence and collapse of the first religious rebellion organized by the Acehnese ulama association or PUSA, which was spearheaded by Daud Beureueh, and the Indonesian government s response. Daud Beuereuh s struggle resulted in the ratification of a national statute granting special jurisdiction to Aceh Province over its cultural and educational affairs, and allowing Aceh to implement shari ah law to a very limited extent. However, soon after the second Indonesian President Soeharto came into power, he stopped continuing this implementation for the sake of conformity and unity under a new national secular ideology, Pancasila, which was introduced to all peripheries of Indonesia. 37 In Chapter Two, I will discuss the emergence of GAM, its ideology and the common grievances it shared with the Acehnese people. Here, I will also discuss how GAM developed and how Soeharto and his successor, Habibie, dealt with the movement which eventually led to the granting of shari ah by the Habibie government in By describing the general Indonesian political and economical situation from 1997 to 1999, during which Indonesia faced the challenge of separation from several peripheral provinces, in this section I will argue that the use of shari ah was not designed specifically to be a political tool for the Indonesian government in order to discredit and 37 Donald W. Wilson, (1989): The Long Journey from Turmoil to Self-Sufficiency. (Jakarta: Rakan Offset Jakarta),

23 pacify GAM supporters, but it was just one of the main concessions offered to GAM and the Acehnese in the form of a special autonomy package to keep Indonesia unified. As shari ah came from the top as one part of the resolution strategy for the Acehnese conflict in which, as an after effect, the central government succeeded in securing the trust of the ulama, Chapter Three will discuss how the ulama struggled for a more comprehensive implementation of this system of law. The process of implementation of shari ah will be analyzed through gauging the development of two fundamental elements of the implementation process in the region: the development of Qanun which are related directly to Islamic law, and the launching of the Shari ah Court or Mahkamah Syar iyah as an operational institution for the implementation of shari ah. More importantly, through these two factors in this chapter I will show the halfhearted attempts made by the Indonesian government to grant comprehensive implementation of shari ah, particularly during Megawati s administration. Also, I will discuss the effects of the granting of shari ah as an effort to convince and persuade the Acehnese population, thus politicizing the use of shari ah. This continued until the Indonesian government placed the region under martial law in 2003 in order to defeat GAM. Martial law was imposed due to Megawati s despair over GAM s unwillingness to abandon its demand for independence instead of accepting the special autonomy and shari ah law package. There are many studies on the political situation in Aceh particularly since the region s conflict was internationalized just before the Tsunami swept through the coastal areas of the province in Although the types of studies about the politics of shari ah 16

24 in Aceh are not new, I hope this research will provide an alternative explanation as to the interplay of shari ah and politics in region. In so doing, I will employ local and international senior scholarly works and reports on the Aceh conflict such as work by Arskal Salim, Al Yasa Abu Bakar, Anthony Reid, Kirsten E Schulze, Michelle Ann Miller and Edward Aspinall. Additionally, I will employ Habibie s work Detik-Detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi (Crucial Moments: a Long Way to Indonesian Democracy), Qanun related to Islamic law and Indonesian statutes related to the conflict such as Indonesian Law No. 44, of 1999 on the Special status of the province of Aceh, and Law No. 18, of 2001 on the Special Autonomy for Special Region of Aceh as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province (which is so called the NAD law) as my primary resources. 17

25 Chapter One A. The first rebellion: Fighting for Islamic Identity The little known province of Aceh exploded onto the international stage on December 26, 2004 when a horrific Tsunami slammed against the Sumatran Island in the East and the Indian coastline in the West. Over 160,000 people died, more than 4% of the population of Aceh, of which the majority were women. 38 Millions of dollars in public and private infrastructure were destroyed in just a few minutes. Soon afterward, peace became a real possibility as the Indonesian government, which had pursued an antiinsurgency campaign in the area for more than twenty-five years, returned to the negotiating table with the secessionist group known as GAM. 39 Since then, the political, economic and socio-cultural landscapes of Aceh have rapidly evolved. Aceh prides itself as the Serambi Mekkah (Verandah of Mecca). The nickname itself indicates the centrality of Islamic teaching for the people. Islamic nuances can be felt everywhere and manifested in various forms, such as in the way the Acehnese dress and establish social relationships, and the omnipresent sound of the call to prayer everywhere one goes among many other examples. Acehnese history informs us that from the seventeenth century to the establishment of administrative control by Dutch colonial authorities in the late nineteenth century, formal justice was meted out by an Islamic judge (qadi), who was appointed by the Sultan and other local officials. 40 As in 38 David Webster, (2007): From Sabang to Merauke: Nationalist Secession Movements in Indonesia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 48 (1): 95. Anthony Reid, (2006): op.cit, p David Webster, (2007): op.cit, Amirul Hadi, (2004): Islam and State in Sumatra: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Aceh. Edited by W. K. A. R. Wielandt. Vol. 48. (Leiden-Boston: Brill), James T. Siegel, (1969): The Rope of God. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press),

26 many places in the Muslim world, Acehnese law was a fusion of Islamic law and traditional customary practices which varied from one local area to another. With the arrival of the Dutch, the authority of the qadi was gradually reduced and finally religious courts were no longer recognized. Criminal justice fell under the jurisdiction of the colonial courts, and the Dutch tried to shift other matters, such as land and inheritance issues to customary councils (Adat) which were headed by Ulee Balang (local aristocrats). 41 James T. Siegel noted that the jurisdictional shift was intended to weaken the influence of the ulama over the Acehnese people and to keep the peace they won after approximately forty years of trying to conquer the Aceh Empire. Therefore, because the ulama were largely alone in their opposition to the Dutch and because they fought to reform and build a new society, the Dutch, on the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, attempted to make the Ulee Balang into colonial administrators and chiefs of Adat as a means to control government and to maintain the relative peace they achieved. 42 To the Acehnese, the religious ulama represented the struggle for the restoration of Islamic law to its rightful place as a key element in the Acehnese resistance to the Dutch, and later to the republican government under President Sukarno. 43 This portrayal suggests that Aceh was united on this point, but this belies the deep cleavages that began to emerge in the 1940s and 1950s between the local Ulee Balang who mostly supported 41 Rusjdi Ali Muhammad, (2003): op.cit, 48. Husaini Husda, (2007): op.cit, James T. Siegel, (1969): op.cit, James T. Siegel, (1969): op.cit, From their arrival, the Dutch already recognized the disharmonious relationship between the Ulee Balang and the ulama. The Ulee Balang took advantage of the Dutch arrival to strengthen their position and power in the community, trade, and politics and land mastery. Before Dutch colonialism, particularly after the Sultan s power and influence were diminished, the Ulee Balang had very huge autonomy over large areas and became more independent from the kingdom. The Dutch recognized their ambition and tendencies and used the situation to defeat the Sultan that was supported by the ulama. M. Nur El Ibrahimy, (1986): op.cit, H.A. Basiq Djalil, (2006): op.cit, Anthony Reid, (2006): Colonial Transformation: A Bitter Legacy, In A. Reid, (ed.), Verandah of Violence; The Background to the Aceh Problem, edited by A. Reid. (Singapore: Singapore University Press),