Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka

Transcription

1 Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 Jeffrey Hopkins Dual language edition by Craig Preston UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

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3 Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka Website for UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies (Union of the Modern and the Ancient: gsar rnying zung `jug khang): umatibet.org. UMA stands for "Union of the Modern and the Ancient" and means "Middle Way" in Tibetan. UMA is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

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5 Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 Jeffrey Hopkins Dual language edition by Craig Preston UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies uma-tibet.org

6 Education in Compassion and Wisdom UMA Great Books Translation Project Supported by generous grants from the Yeshe Khorlo Foundation, the Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, the Silicon Valley Community Foundation, and a bequest from Daniel E. Perdue Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations. Publications are available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies 7330 Harris Mountain Lane Dyke, VA USA Version: October, 2017 ISBN: Library of Congress Control Number: Hopkins, Jeffrey. Chandrakīrti defends buddhapālita against bhāvaviveka: jam-yang-shay-pa s great exposition of the middle: chapter six, opposite of the consequences, 2/ by Jeffrey Hopkins. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, Dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Dbu ma chen mo. 4. Wisdom Religious aspects--buddhism. I. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, II. Title.

7 Contents Technical Notes... 7 Preface... 9 Jam-yang-shay-pa... 9 The Great Exposition of Tenets The Great Exposition of the Middle Ngag-wang-pal-dan Editions consulted Part One: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets: Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita Part Two: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chandrakīrti Responds to Bhāvaviveka How Chandrakīrti explains that Buddhapālita does not have the fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] {2 parts} a. How Buddhapālita does not have the fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] {2 parts} 45 1) How the first two fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] do not apply {2 parts} A) How [Buddhapālita] is faultless in terms of autonomous [syllogisms] {2 parts} 47 1' How [Buddhapālita] did not state an autonomous [syllogism] {3 parts} a' There is no need for an autonomous [syllogism] 47 b' An autonomous [syllogism] has no capacity 57 c' It is not reasonable to use autonomous [syllogisms] 62 2' How it is not necessary [for Buddhapālita] to avoid the fallacies propounded by others with respect to an autonomous [syllogism] B) How [Buddhapālita] is faultless in terms of other-approved [syllogisms] {2 parts} 87 1' [Bhāvaviveka s] objection that the fallacies of not expressing a reason and an example in terms of an other-approved [syllogism] remain as they were ' [Chandrakīrti s] answer to that {2 parts} a' How the first fallacy [mentioned] in that objection does not exist {2 parts} 91 1" Reason why other-approved [syllogisms] mainly are not set out here 91

8 6 Contents 2" Explanation that even if it were necessary to express an other-approved [syllogism, Buddhapālita] has expressed such 101 b' How, despite the second fallacy the faults adduced are not cleared away here there is no problem 108 2) How the third fallacy does not apply Part Three: Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, Defending Buddhapālita s Refutation of Production from Self Abbreviations Bibliography Sanskrit and Tibetan Works Other Works...191

9 Technical Notes Please notice that: Full bibliographical references are given in the footnotes at first citation. For translations and editions of texts, see the Bibliography. The names of Indian Buddhist schools are translated into English in an effort to increase accessibility for non-specialists. For the names of Indian scholars and systems cited in the body of the text, ch, sh, and ṣh are used instead of the more usual c, ś, and ṣ for the sake of easy pronunciation by non-specialists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. In parentheses the usual transliteration system for Sanskrit is used. Transliteration of Tibetan is done in accordance with a system devised by Turrell Wylie; see A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 22 (1959): The names of Tibetan authors and orders are given in essay phonetics for the sake of easy pronunciation and internet accessibility.

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11 Preface This is the second of four volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self: 1. Buddhapālita s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata s Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 2. Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yangshay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 3. Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 4. What does it Mean to be a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa s Great Exposition of Special Insight and the Four Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 4. The present book provides two Tibetan explanations, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü ( /1722) of Chandrakīrti s response to Bhāvaviveka s criticism of Buddhapālita. Included also is a complete translation of the relevant section of Chandrakīrti s Clear Words. The topics involved in this series are used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena falsely appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. This controversy has received world-wide scholarly attention as has been brilliantly documented in Anne MacDonald s magnificent In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One. a JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü b was born in the northeastern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Earth-Mouse year of 1648 east of the Blue a Vienna: Verlag der Österreichishen Akademie der Vissenschaften, b jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003),

12 10 Preface Lake. At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became a novice monk, excelling among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. He went to Lhasa at age twenty-one to further his studies at the Gomang College of Dre-pung Monastic University. Arriving in Lhasa in1668, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple, where the statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī. Six years later he received full ordination and at twenty-nine entered Gyumay Tantric College. From age thirty-three he spent two years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-pung. At the age of thirty-eight he authored the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. During this same period he also wrote another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He wrote the Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Roar in 1689, which is the outline of the present book, and published the Great Exposition of Tenets its prose auto-commentary ten years later in At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang College and in 1710 at sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded a highly influential monastery at Tra-shi-khyil. a Seven years later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and from the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2. b Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-lug-pa by this time, Jam-yang-shay-pa s influence on the Ge-lug-pa order has been considerable. His life manifests a a bkra shis khyil. b See Maher, Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism, 164.

13 Preface 11 pattern typical of many influential Tibetan religious figures child prodigy, learned scholar, disseminator of the religion, politician, priest to political personages, monastery leader, yogi, magician, popular teacher, and prolific writer. THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS Jam-yang-shay-pa s Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Roar, a published in 1689, is written in unusually terse, sometimes opaque nine-syllable lines, largely devoid of customary grammatical endings and particles. b An oral tradition reports that the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jam-yang-shaypa s composing it in an inspired state hearing the sounds of a lute-like instrument played by the goddess Svarasvatī. His prose autocommentary called Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, published ten years later in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, and includes most but not all of the words of the root text within the commentary. Monumental in length, the Great Exposition of Tenets expands greatly on the root text through citing sources, unraveling issues, and suggesting other issues. THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE The second text translated here is a portion of Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngagwang-tson-drü s c Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle, Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, d also called Great Exposition of the Middle, a a There are two editions of the Root Text in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Collected Works, the second also containing interlinear annotations; on a few occasions it contains material contrary to his commentary in the Great Exposition of Tenets and, therefore, may indicate an early commentary or may have been authored by a student. b Tag-tshang s root text, on the other hand, contains sufficient grammatical endings and particles to be readily understood. His autocommentary, however, is sometimes difficult to follow because he uses the root text within explanatory sentences but cites it only by a syllable or two and and so forth (sogs); the difficulty is that the words of the root text are integral parts of the commentary, which, therefore, can be understood only by the reader s supplying the remaining words of that phrase, line, or lines of the root text. In translation, I have supplied the missing words so as to make it accessible. c jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, /1722. d dbu ma jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug

14 12 Preface commentary on Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa s a Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle. b It belongs to the debate-oriented decisive analysis (mtha dpyod) genre and is the textbook (yig cha) for the study of Tsong-kha-pa s The Illumination of the Thought at Go-mang Monastic College. In most Ge-lug-pa colleges there are a separate generalmeaning commentary and a separate decisive analysis commentary for seminal texts such as Chandrakīrti s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle, but in the Go-mang Monastic College Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought is taken as the general-meaning commentary on Chandrakīrti s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle, and Jam-yang-shay-pa composed a very lengthy decisive analysis. Our topic, nevertheless, is based only partially in Chandrakīrti s Supplement but mainly in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words which is brought into the Great Exposition of the Middle because of its crucial role in highlighting the difference between Buddhapālita s and Chandrakīrti s system from Bhāvaviveka s system. NGAG-WANG-PAL-DAN The Khalkha Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-pal-dan was born in Urga present day Ulaanbaatar, the capitol of Mongolia in the Fire-Serpent year of c He received his monastic training in the Ge-lug-pa monastic college of Dra-shi-chö-pel and at the age of forty in 1836 was appointed to the seat of Doctrine Master d of Urga, and thus he is more commonly known as Pal-dan-chö-jay. e He went to Tibet in 1843 in connection with the funeral service of the Fifth Je-tsun-dam-pa, the reincarnation of Tāranātha, the second most important figure of the Jo-nang-pa sect, and in 1847 relinquished the post of Doctrine Master of Urga. It seems that he remained in Tibet at the Go-mang f College of Dre-pung g Monastery, west of and at that time outside of the city of Lhasa. He also avidly studied and ngogs/ dbu ma chen mo. a Tsong-kha-pa blo bzang grags pa, b dbu ma la jug pa i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal. c These first two sentences are drawn from Lokesh Chandra, Eminent Tibetan Polymaths of Mongolia (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), 24. d chos rje. e dpal ldan chos rje. f sgo mang. g bras spungs.

15 Preface 13 sometimes wrote about the textbook literature of the Lo-sel-ling a College of Dre-pung. He composed seven volumes of many works on a wide range of topics. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s extraordinary depth is exemplified in his extensive commentary b titled Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness, c almost as long Jam-yang-shay-pa s text itself. d The Great Exposition of Tenets, e despite being monumental in length, is often cryptic in its references and meaning (atypical for Jam-yang-shaypa whose style is usually relatively clear); it is also laden with copy-editing problems. Seeing the tremendous value of the Great Exposition of Tenets, Ngag-wang-pal-dan sought to make it more accessible through lengthening, explaining, and identifying source materials and through expanding on issues. He also raises qualms about the relevance of certain source quotes and frequently corrects misprints, faulty citations, and other copyediting problems in the Old Go-mang edition, f though he forswears trying to make a list of what requires copy-editing. g His attention to detail manifests the great value he put on the text, bringing tremendous clarity to what a I have a vague memory of being told that Ngag-wang-pal-dan was removed from the comforts of the community of the Go-mang College fourteen times, which I speculate was due to his occasional preference for the positions of the Lo-sel-ling College. b 505 folios, Guru Deva edition. c grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4-5, (Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983). d 545 folios, bla brang edition. e Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets : Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong), Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje, vol. 14 entire (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). f Some of his corrections indicate that he did not have the Tra-shi-khyil edition. g He says (stod, ha, 179.2): Since, in general, I have not tried to write down the very many mistakes in wording (yig nor) here in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets, I have mostly neglected them. and (dngos, tha, 215.5): Although in general there are very many tiny mistakes in wording in all of the omniscient Jam-yang-shay-pa s textbook literature on philosophy and in particular in the Great Exposition of Tenets, such as the genitive case where the instrumental case should be and the instrumental case where the genitive case should

16 14 Preface otherwise is an unusually abstruse work. His annotations are a necessary key for the Great Exposition of Tenets through providing rigorous contextualization and non-partisan critique. The Annotations are invaluable as they reveal the systematic background of Jam-yang-shay-pa s citations which, without this contextualization, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what the author intends. Until one understands that Jam-yang-shay-pa intends his text to in some ways function as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Tsongkha-pa s system, many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Ngagwang-pal-dan saw this need and provided contextualization. His annotations do indeed untie the knots of a great many difficult points especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus I used it extensively for both understanding the meaning and adding bracketed material in my Meditation on Emptiness and Maps of the Profound. a EDITIONS CONSULTED Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, also called Great Exposition of Tenets were consulted: b 1. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, so named because of being scanned in Mundgod, Karnataka, India, at Go-mang College in December 2016 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. This version was likely originally printed at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, while Jam-yang-shay-pa was abbot of Go-mang College. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) 2. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. TBRC W : (PDF of bla brang bkra shis khyil: bla brang bkra shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: 2011 a b be, I have not tried here to write [all of ] them down, and hence have mostly neglected them. See the Bibliography. The earlier Lhasa Go-mang edition is yet to be acquired.

17 Preface 15 TBRC bla brang. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jamyang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always. These two editions are the sources of five other available editions: a. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. In the Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdorje: Reproduced from prints from La-brang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje) TBRC W1KG : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang. b. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1996). Abbreviated reference: 1996 Mundgod revision. c. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Codex based on the 1996 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999). Abbreviated reference: 1999 Mundgod. d. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 2000). Abbreviated reference: 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod. e. grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho. Musoorie, India: Dalama, Abbreviated reference: 1962 Dalama. Two main editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate, also called Decisive Analysis of the Middle and Great Exposition of the Middle were consulted:

18 16 Preface 1. dbu ma la jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs. Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, so named because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi and then scanned for the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. (To be made available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) 2. dbu ma la jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs. TBRC W22186-I1KG10676: 1-442a.3, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil, a mdo. a Abbreviated reference: 2011 TBRC bla brang. This edition, which is a revision of the above edition, was printed in La-brang-tra-shi-khyil monastery founded by Jam-yang-shay-pa after his return to Am-do. In general, it is the preferred edition, though not always. These two editions are the sources of four other available editions: a. dbu ma la jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs. In the Collected Works of Jamdbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Bkrashis-'khyil Blocks, 15 vols., vol. 9, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Abbreviated reference: 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang. b. dbu ma la jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs. TBRC W : 1-442a.3, a PDF of: Mundgod, South India: Gomang College, 1997 (revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek Demo edition). Abbreviated reference: 1997 revision of Ngawang Gelek bla brang. c. dbu ma la jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs. Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2007) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Gomang College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: 2007 Taipei codex reprint. d. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka a This edition was provided to the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies by the late E. Gene Smith ( ) in 2010.

19 Preface 17 State, India. It is likely a slightly revised version of the 1999 codex mentioned in item #c. It has been edited in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang and other sources. In the body of the book and occasionally in notes Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness from any of three editions are cited in indentations with borders on the top, bottom, and right side to demarcate it clearly from Jam-yang-shaypa s text: 1. grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor. Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Tibetan digital reprint edition of a typeset edition: In TBRC W Abbreviated reference: Annotations Sarnath Edition. 2. grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor. In Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols Delhi: Guru Deva, Tibetan digital reprint edition of a printing of the Urga blocks: In gsung bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W Part One and W Part Two. Abbreviated reference: Annotations Urga Edition. 3. grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Mundgod, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2007; rpt. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, n.d. Abbreviated reference: Annotations Taipei Edition.

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21 PART ONE: Jam-yang-shay-pa s GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS: Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita

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23 Presentation of Tenets: Lion s Roar Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Genuine Path to Omniscience བ པའ མཐའ མ པར བཞག པ འ ལ ང གད ང འ ད ངས ཀ ན མཁ ན ལམ བཟང གསལ བའ ར ན ཆ ན ན མ ཞ ས བ བ གས ས with Jam-yang-shay-pa s own commentary on the root text: Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings བ མཐའ མ བཤད རང གཞན བ མཐའ ཀ ན དང ཟབ ད ན མཆ ག གསལ བ ཀ ན བཟང ཞ ང ག ཉ མ ང ར གས མཚ དག འ ར བ ཀ ན ང ཞ ས བ བ གས ས and with Ngag-wang-pal-dan s word-commentary and annotations from his: Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Awareness བ མཐའ ཆ ན མ འ མཆན འག ལ དཀའ གནད མ ད ག ལ གསལ གཅ ས ན ར ཞ ས བ བ གས ས Chandrakīrti, a having refuted Bhāvaviveka well, established it as not shared. a 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, ca 11a.6; 2011 TBRC bla brang, pha, 14a.4; 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod,

24 22 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets བས ལ གས བཀག ན མ ང མ ན པར བ བས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Word Commentary on Root Text: The master Chandrakīrti, having refuted Bhāvaviveka s system well, established the thought of Nāgārjuna s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom as not shared with the Autonomy School and below. བ དཔ ན བ ག གས པས ལ གས ན ག གས ད ལ གས པར བཀག ནས ཤ འ དག ངས པ རང ད པ མན ཆད དང ན མ ང མ ན པར བ བ After Bhāvaviveka opened the way of the Autonomy Middle Way School, the master Chandrakīrti refuted autonomy in the master Bhāvaviveka s system; having, moreover, not just refuted it but refuted it well, he established the system of the Consequence School as not shared with the Autonomy School and below because although Buddhapālita opened the mere way of the Consequence School, it was not clear whether to assert autonomy or not, whereas Chandrakīrti demonstrated in many ways: that Buddhapālita did not assert autonomy proofs that it is not suitable for Proponents of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms] and, oppositely, the damages to autonomous syllogisms and establishment by way of the object s own character and thereby established [the Consequence School] as unshared, as in, for instance, Chandrakīrti s autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle saying, May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared. a a Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence cites and discusses the passage: [Chandrakīrti] describes his own system as unshared with the commentaries [on Nāgārjuna s thought]* by other Proponents of the Middle. His Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle says (Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 [Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 406.9, commenting on stanzas XIII.1 and 2): May scholars ascertain that just as, except for Nāgārjuna s Treatise on the Middle, this doctrine called emptiness is not expressed non-erroneously in other treatises, so the system that appears in this [treatise]

25 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 23 set out together with objections and answers to any [other] system does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other treatises. Therefore, it should be understood that a certain [scholar s] propounding that just what are propounded ultimately in the system of the Sūtra School are asserted conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School is a proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjuna s Treatise on the Middle. At the end of also saying such with respect to the system of Great Exposition School (Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra, 407.1), [Chandrakīrti] says: This is because a supramundane doctrine is not fit to be similar to a mundane doctrine. May scholars ascertain that this system is unshared. Through the reason of his own system s not being shared with other Proponents of the Middle Way School, [Chandrakīrti] posits that one who asserts that what are propounded ultimately by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent External] Objects [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] are propounded conventionally by the Proponents of the Middle Way School does not know the Middle Way suchness. The reason is that, in the [Consequentialists ] own system, even conventionally, phenomena that are established by way of their own character are not asserted, whereas those [Proponents of True Existence] only posit [all phenomena] in the context of that [establishment of objects by way of their own character]. If one falls from either of the two truths, one also falls from the other; therefore, it is not suitable that a supramundane doctrine which has not fallen from the mode of the two truths be similar in terms of either of the two truths with a mundane doctrine that has fallen from the two truths. Therefore, this system of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] in terms not only of the ultimate but also of the conventional is not shared with the schools of the Proponents of True Existence. *The bracketed additions are mostly drawn from Ta-drin-rab-tan s Annotations, འ ག འག ལ ལས ཇ ར ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས མ གཏ གས པར བ ན བཅ ས གཞན ལས ང པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བའ ཆ ས འད ན ཅ མ ལ ག པར མ བ ད པ ད བཞ ན ཁ བ ཅག ག ས འད ར གས གང ཞ ག བ ལ ལན དང བཅས པར བ ད པའ གས འད ནས འ ང བ ད ཡང ང པ ཉ ད ཀ ཆ ས ར བ ན བཅ ས གཞན ན མ ད ད ཞ ས མཁས པ མས ཀ ས ངས པར [64a] མཛད གས ལ ལ ད འ ར ཁ ཅ ག ག ས མད པ མས ཀ གས ད ན དམ པར ས པ ད ཉ ད ད མ པ མས ཀ ས ཀ ན བ འད ད ད ཞ ས ས པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ན ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས ཀ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མང ན པར མ ཤ ས པ ཁ ནས ས པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཤ ས པར འ ཞ ས ག ངས ཤ ང ག བའ གས ལ ཡང ད ར ག ངས པའ མཐར འད ར

26 24 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets ཞ ས པ ལ གས ན ག ས ད མ རང ད པའ ལ བ ད འ ས བ དཔ ན བ ག གས པས བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན གས ཀ རང ད བཀག ད ཡང བཀག ཙམ མ ན པར ལ གས པར བཀག ནས ཐལ འ ར བའ གས རང ད པ མན ཆད དང ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པར བ པ [G11b] ཡ ན ཏ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཐལ འ ར བའ ལ ཙམ ཡང རང ད བཞ ད མ བཞ ད མ གསལ བ ལས བས སངས ས བ ངས རང ད མ བཞ ད པ དང [L14b] ད མ བས རང ད མ ར གས པའ བ ད དང བ ག གས རང ད ཀ ར བ དང རང མཚན ལ གན ད ད མང བ ན ནས ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པར བ པའ ར ཏ འ ག འག ལ ལས གས འད ན ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཞ ས མཁས པ མས ཀ ས ང ས པར མཛད གས ལ ཞ ས པ འ Concerning this, first [Chandrakīrti] refutes [Bhāvaviveka]: When Buddhapālita demonstrates internal contradictions in the other side, flinging at the Sāṃkhyas the [absurd] consequences of senseless and endless re-production by way of reasons such as earth that exists in its own entity, why would the other side not be overcome? འཇ ག ན ལས འདས པའ ཆ ས ན འཇ ག ན པའ ཆ ས དང མ ངས པར མ ར གས བའ ར ཏ གས འད ན ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཞ ས མཁས པ མས ཀ ས ང ས པར འ ཞ ས ག ངས ས རང ག གས ད མ པ གཞན དང ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ས ད ན གཉ ས ཀ ས ད ན དམ པར ས པ མས ད མ པའ ཀ ན བ འད ད པས ད མའ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མ ཤས པར འཇ ག པའ མཚན ན རང ག གས ལ ཐ ད ཡང རང ག མཚན ཉ ད ཀ ས བ པའ ཆ ས མ འད ད ལ ད དག ན ད འ ང ནས འཇ ག པ ཤ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ར

27 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 25 If, though they see their internal contradictions, they stubbornly persist, they would not be overcome even though syllogisms are stated to them. Both consequences and reasons [that is, syllogisms] can engender the mere perception of contradiction in an opponent. Therefore, Buddhapālita does not assert autonomous [syllogisms], and you [Bhāvaviveka] are reduced to only liking autonomous [syllogisms]. ད ལ དང པ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ག ངས ཅན ལ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ས ས གས ཀ མཚན ག ས ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཐལ བ འཕངས ཏ ཕ ར ལ བ ལ ནང འགལ བ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཕ ར ལ བ མ བ ག གལ ཏ ནང འགལ མཐ ང ཡང བ ན འད ངས ན ད ལ གས ར བཀ ད ཀ ང མ བ ག ལ ཕ ར ལ པ ལ འགལ བ མཐ ང བ ཙམ ཐལ གས གཉ ས ཀས བ ད ས པའ ར རང ད ན སངས ས བ ངས མ བཞ ད ལ ཁ ད རང ད ལ དགའ བ ཙམ ཟད ད ཞ ས འག ག པ ན Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 156) says: a We [that is, Chandrakīrti] view all of these fallacies as unreasonable. How? About this, respectively, his saying because [Buddhapālita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example (gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa i phyir dang, hetudṛṣtāntānabhidhānāt) is not reasonable. Why? [Buddhapālita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self: b You [Sāṃkhyas] propound that from self [means] that a In separate citations Jam-yang-shay-pa quotes the first sentence and final clause; I have provided the rest to establish the context and treated the material, therefore, as a single passage. b La Vallée Poussin s Sanskrit (15.4) reads is inquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent (vidyamānasya punarutpāde prayojanaṃ), but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops this in accordance with the Tibetan.

28 26 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [that is, the existent] is produced. a However, we [Buddhists] do not see that there is purpose in the production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. Still, you [Sāṃkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of logical feasibility and contradicts your own assertion. When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects from stating a reason and an example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if opponents are not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting their own assertions, then due to their shamelessness they also just would not be overcome by reasons and examples. We [Consequentialists] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] sets out inferences even at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference. ཚ ག གསལ ལས ན འད དག ཐམས ཅད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པར ཁ བ ཅག ག ས མཐ ང ང [ཇ ར ཞ ན ད ལ ར ཞ ག གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས གང བ ད ན མ ར གས ས ཅ འ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད དང ད ཉ ད འ ཞ ས ས པ ཡ ན ལ ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ མཐ ང ཞ ང ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མཐ ང ལ ཁ ད ཀ ས ས པ ར ཡང བར མ འད ད ཅ ང ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མ འད ད ད ད འ ར ཁ ད ཅག ག ད པ ན འཐད པ དང ལ བ དང རང ག ས ཁས ངས པ དང འགལ བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཕ ར ལ པ བདག ལས བར འད ད པ ལ འ བར ད པ ཡ ན ཏ གང ལས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ བཀ ད པ འ ས དང བཅས པར འ ར བ འད དག ཙམ ཞ ག ག ས བ ད པ ན ཅ ཕ ར ལ པ ཁས ལ ན པར མ ད དམ འ ན ཏ ཕ ར ལ པ རང ག ཁས ངས པ དང འགལ བས བ ད པས ཀ ང a In accordance with J. W. De Jong s splendid Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā (p. 29, n. 15.5) svata iti hetutvena tad eva cotpadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamānaṃ hetutvena bravīṣi tad eva cotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan (bdag las zhes bya ba ni yod pa rgyu nyid dang de nyid skye o zhes smras pa yin la).

29 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 27 མ ག ན ན ད འ ཚ ང ཚ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ གཉ ས ཀ ས ཀ ང ག པར མ འ ར བ ཉ ད ད ཁ བ ཅག ན ན པ དང ན ཅ ག ད པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན ད འ ར བ དཔ ན ན གནས མ ཡ ན པར ཡང ས དཔག པ ཚང བར ད པ ན ]ཞ ས དང བདག ཉ ད ས དཔག པ ལ དགའ བ ཉ ད མང ན པར ད པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས It follows that it is not suitable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences: because when those are asserted, any of the four positions has to be asserted, but Proponents of the Middle do not assert any of the four positions, and because that is the thought of a Superior father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Āryadeva]. ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད མ ར གས པར ཐལ ད ཁས ལ ན ན གས བཞ གང ང ཁས ལ ན དག ས ཀ ང ད མ པས གས བཞ གང ཡང ཁས ངས པ མ ད པའ ར དང ད འཕགས པ ཡབ ས ཀ དག ངས པ ཡ ན པའ ར དང And: Since Buddhapālita does not assert an autonomous [syllogism] such as Eyes ultimately are not produced from self because of existing, it is not necessary to clear away fallacies adduced by another with respect to that reason. Even if one needs to state an other-renowned reason and example, he stated them. Since only the opponent has asserted the opposite of the consequences, how could it be that we have contradicted [a tenet of the Middle Way School], and so forth! Also, that consequences clear away another s position is the Superior [Nāgārjuna s] thought. Though the Superior [Nāgārjuna] made a commentary, he did not use syllogistic statements. Thereby, [Chandrakīrti] established well that it is not suitable to use autonomous [syllogisms].

30 28 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མ ག ད ན དམ པར བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས པ འ རང ད མ འད ད པས གས ད ལ a [L15a] གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ བསལ ཡང མ དག ས གཞན ག གས ཀ གས དཔ བ ད དག ས ནའང བ ད ལ ཐལ བའ བ ག ད ན ཕ ར ལ པ ཁ ནས ཁས ངས པས ཁ བ ལ བ མཐའ དང [G12a] འགལ བ ས གས ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ང ཐལ འ ར ག ས གཞན གས ས ལ བའང འཕགས པའ དག ངས པ ཡ ན ལ འག ལ པ མཛད ཀ ང འཕགས པས ར ངག མ མཛད པས ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད མ ར གས པ ལ གས པར བ ཅ ས པ ན Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 157) says: b Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva explains: c Even over a long period of time Censure cannot be expressed Of one who has no position of existence, Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence. ཚ ག གསལ ལས ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད ག ས དཔག པ བར ར གས པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ཏ གས གཞན ཁས ལ ན པ a Correcting rtags de pa in 2011 TBRC bla brang (14b.6) to rtags de la in accordance with 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa (11b.7). b Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first and last sentences with an ellipsis in the middle; I have filled in the entire citation, which also appears below in Part Three, 159ff. c XVI.25; P5246, vol. 95, ; Lang, Āryadeva s Catuḥśataka, 150. For Chandrakīrti s commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff. For extensive discussion of the four alternatives according to Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, n. 500.

31 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 29 མ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས པ ནས [ད ད ཡང འཕགས པའ ས ཡ ད དང མ ད དང ཡ ད མ ད ཅ ས གས ན གང ལ འང ཡ ད མ ན པ ད ལ ན ན ར ང པ ནའང ཀ ན ཀ བ ད པར ས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བཤད ད Also, Nāgārjuna s Refutation of Objections says: a If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence]. Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless. If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension], Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognitions observing Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me. ད པ བ ག པ ལས ཀ ང གལ ཏ ངས དམ བཅས འགའ ཡ ད ད ས ན ང ལ ན ད ཡ ད ང ལ དམ བཅའ མ ད པས ན ང ལ ན མ ད ཁ ན ཡ ན གལ ཏ མང ན མ ལ ས གས པའ ད ན ག ས འགའ ཞ ག དམ གས ན ན བ པའང བ ག པར ན ད མ ད ར ང ལ ཀ ན ཀ མ ད ཅ ས ག ངས ས When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapālita] have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhāvaviveka stated] The inner sensespheres are not produced from self (nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med de, nādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni) which the Sāṃkhyas would object to as follows: b a Stanzas 29 and 30; P5228, vol. 95, See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. The brackets in the first stanza are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, dbu, 59a.6; in the second stanza they are from Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong-kha-pa s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (New Delhi: Chos- phel-legs-ldan, 1972), b Here Chandrakīrti cites the hypothetical objection by a Sāṃkhya that Bhāvaviveka himself raised and answered; see the previous volume, 165, 249, and 251.

32 30 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets What is the meaning of this thesis? Does from self [mean] from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established [for us]. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes. ko yam pratijñārthaḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmakāt svata uta kāraṇātmakāditi/ kiṃ cātaḥ/ kāryātmakāccet siddhasādhanaṃ/ kāraṇātmakācced viruddhārthatā/ kāraṇātmanā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāditi// dam bcas pa di i don gang yin/ ci bdag las shes bya ba bras bu bdag nyid las sam/ on te rgyu i bdag nyid las yin grang / de las cir gyur/ gal te bras bu bdag nyid las na ni grub pa la sgrub bo// rgyu i bdag nyid las na ni gal ba i don nyid du gyur te/ skye ba dang ldan pa thams cad ni rgyu i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba i phyir ro zhe a གང ག ཚ ད ར ད མ པས རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པར ད འ ཚ གང ལ ག ངས ཅན པ དག ག ས དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན འད གང ཡ ན ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ག ང ད ལས ཅ ར འ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ ཡ ན ལ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཏ བ དང ན པ ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན བའ ར ར ཞ ས བར གང ལ ག ངས ཅན པ དག ག ས ར ག པར ད པར འ ར ལ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བའ རང ག ད ཀ དམ བཅའ བ ག ལ ཡ ད Also, how could we [Consequentialists, Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhāvaviveka] because of existing (yod pa i phyir, vidyamānatvāt) which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a a The Tibetan is from the Golden Reprint (vol. 112, 14.6).

33 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 31 Sāṃkhya] or being an object of contradiction and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or being an object of contradiction! Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapālita. ཁ བ ཅག ལ ན གང ཞ ག བ པ ལ བ པ ཉ ད དམ འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཞ ང བ པ ལ བ པ ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ ང བར བའ ར འབད པ ད པར འ ར བ ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བའ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང ག ལ ཡ ད ད འ ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པར ཐལ བར མ འ ར བ ཉ ད ཀ ར བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ད འ ལན བ ད པར བ མ ཡ ན ན [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might think: [I might allow that] since, according to Proponents of the Middle, the position [that is, the thesis], the reason, and the example [of an autonomous syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences (rang gi rgyud kyi rje su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other s thesis through an inference established for both [parties] (gnyi ga la grub pa, ubhayasiddha). Still, one must express contradiction of the other s thesis through one s own inference (rang gi rjes su dpag pa, svata evānumāna). Hence, one must have a a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of fallacies of position, reason, and example. Therefore, since [Buddhapālita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Sāṃkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapālita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means]. ཅ ཡང ད མ པ མས ཀ ར ན གས དང གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ དག མ བ པས རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ར བདག ལས བ དགག པའ དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན བ པ དང གཉ ག ལ བ པའ ས དཔག པས གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བསལ བར མ ར མ ད གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བ ལ རང ག ས a rang nyid la yod pa bya dgos.

34 32 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པར ན དག ས པས རང ཉ ད ལ གས ལ ས གས པ དང གཏན ཚ གས དཔ འ ན དང ལ བ དག ཡ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར ད མ བ ད པའ ར དང ད འ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ཉ ས པ ད ཉ ད འ ར ར མ ན Answer: That is not so. Why? Those [such as Sāṃkhyas] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapālita] wish to generate ascertainment of something which they hold as a thesis in others in just the way that they have ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Proponents of the Middle] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the general procedure for just the other party [here, the Sāṃkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis that they themselves assert [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapālita s consequences rather than for Buddhapālita to proceed to set forth an other-approved inference]. However, this [reason that Sāṃkhyas state to a Proponent of the Middle to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reason for the other [party, the Proponent of the Middle]. Because there are no reason and example, the proof of the meaning of their thesis is just a statement of outflows of [their own] assertions; therefore, since they have asserted a position that is devoid of logical feasibility, they deceive only themselves, due to which they cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, [due to being faulty] just this inability of their attempt to prove the meaning of their thesis is the clearest repudiation of their [position]. What need is there here to still express damage [to their position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of their view that something exists and yet needs to be re-produced has been shown, and upon the Sāṃkhya s presentation of their own view in syllogistic inference, the Proponent of the Middle has given answers showing its illogicality.] བཤད པར ད ན ད ར མ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར ད ན གང ཞ ག གང ག ས དམ བཅས པ ད ས ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ང ས པ བཞ ན གཞན དག ལ ང ས པ བ ད པར འད ད པས ད ན འད འ འཐད པ གང ག ནས ཁ ང ད པའ འཐད པ ད ཉ ད གཞན ལ བ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར རང ག ས ཁས ངས པའ དམ བཅས པའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན ཕ ར ལ པ ཁ ནས ཉ བར དག ད པར

35 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 33 བ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན ར ཞ ག གས ཡ ན ན འད ན གཞན ལ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང མ ཡ ན ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ ད པའ ར རང ག དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན ཁས འཆ ས པའ ས འ ངས པ འབའ ཞ ག ཉ བར བཀ ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར འཐད པ དང ལ བའ གས ཁས ངས པས འད ན བདག ཉ ད ཁ ན ལ བར ད པས གཞན ལ ང ས པ བ ད པར མ ས ས ཞ ས བར གང རང ག དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ལ ས པ མ ད པ འད ཉ ད འད འ ན འ ན པ ཆ ས གསལ པ ཡ ན ཏ འད ར ས དཔག པས གན ད པ བ ད པ ལ དག ས པ ག a ཅ ཞ ག ཡ ད [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might say: Nevertheless, contradiction by one s own inference [that is to say, by an inference acceptable to Sāṃkhyas] must, without question, be expressed. ཅ ཡང རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ གད ན མ ཟ བར བ ད པར བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ན Answer: The master Buddhapālita also just expressed such. How? For he said, Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless (dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du gyur ba i phyir, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthyāt). In that, the [word] their (de dag, tad) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] those which [already] exist in their own entities. Why? This is because [Buddhapālita s subsequent statement], The production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless (dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnams la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do, na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanamasti), is his commentary on that abbreviated statement [and, therefore, it must be carried over to the shorter statement]. Moreover, this [longer] statement [ those which already exist in their own entities ] contains a concordant example [ a manifest pot ] renowned to the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] that possesses the predicate of the proposition [ senseless production-again ] and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is, the probans] (bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa i chos, sādhyasādhaa Jam-yang-shay-pa (above, 96) cites this as ko rather than go.

36 34 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets nadharma) [ already existing in its own entity ]. In [Buddhapālita s longer statement], already existing in their own entities contains the reason. [In the shorter statement itself] because production would be just senseless contains the predicate of the proposition [once it is changed to production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) is senseless in accordance with the longer statement]. ད ཡང བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཇ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར ད ས ན འད ད བཤད པ ཡ ན ཏ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར ར ད ལ ད དག ཅ ས བ འད ས ན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན འད ར རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན མད ར བཞག པའ ངག ད འ འག ལ པའ ངག ཡ ན ལ ངག འད ས ན ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ གཞན ལ རབ ག གས པ བ བ པར བ དང བ པར ད པའ ཆ ས དང ན པ ཉ བར ག ང བ ཡ ན ན ད ལ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཞ ས བ འད ས ན གཏན ཚ གས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བ འད ས ན བ བ པར བའ ཆ ས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན Concerning that, just as in: A sound is impermanent because products are impermanent. It is seen that products are impermanent, like, for example, a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product; therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is impermanent. product which is manifested by the syllogistic application is the reason, so here also: Things [such as a nonmanifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production-again of what already exists in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen here that a pot and so forth that already abide in front [of oneself] and that already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth that already exist in their own entities even at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at the time of what

37 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 35 already exist in their own entities does not exist. the reason already existing in their own entities which is manifested by the syllogistic application and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting production-again expresses contradiction through the Sāṃkhya s own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Sāṃkhya]. Therefore, how is it that [Bhāvaviveka] says, That is not reasonable because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason and an example! ད ལ ཇ ར མ ག ས པ མ ག པའ ར ར ས པ ན མ ག པར མཐ ང དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ན ད བཞ ན ཡང ས པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འད ར ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པའ ས པ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན པ ད བཞ ན འད ར ཡང དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ཡང བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར འད ན ཇ ར མ པ ལ ས གས པ མ ན ན གནས ཤ ང གསལ བ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ མ ས པར མཐ ང བ ད བཞ ན འཇ མ པའ ག ང ལ ས གས པའ གནས བས ན ཡང གལ ཏ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ མ པ ལ ས གས པ ཡ ད ད མ ས མས ན ན ད འ ཚ ཡང རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ལ བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ད ར ན གཏན ཚ གས ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པ ཡང བ དགག པ ལ མ འ ལ པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ག ངས ཅན ལ རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ མཛད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད ས ན ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས ཅ ད པར ད Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed [by Buddhapālita], but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] were not avoided. How? For, Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself], which has a manifest form, a manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something that already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. b Since the proposition is: a mngon par gsal ba i rang bzhin, abhivyaktarūpa. b Or, according to the Sanskrit, and [thus] due to being established [for the Sāṃkhyas] here it is held as the example ; the Tibetan does not translate upadānaṃ (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 21.10).

38 36 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature are predicated with a negation of production, how could [the Sāṃkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism has] the fault of a position [that is, thesis] that is proving what is already established or have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism] has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are produced from self]?! གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པ མ ཡ ན པ འགའ ཞ ག མ ཟད ཀ གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན ཅ ར ཞ ན ག ངས ཅན པ དག མ ན ན གནས པའ མ པ མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན ཅན ན ཡང མང ན པར གསལ བར མ འད ད ཅ ང ད ཉ ད འད ར དཔ ཉ ད བ པའ ང བ ཡ ན པའ ར ལ ས པའ ང བ ར ར ཅ ང མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན མ ཡ ན པ བ བཀག པས ཁ ད པར ས པ ན བ བ པར བ ཡ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ ར བ པ ལ བ པའ གས ཀ ན ཉ ད ད གས པའམ གཏན ཚ གས འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད ད གས པ ག ལ ཡ ད Therefore, even if [Buddhapālita] did express contradiction [of, or damage a to, the Sāṃkhya view] through self[-approved] inference, b [the Sāṃkhyas] would not set forth the fallacies that [Bhāvaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapālita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party, since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [by Bhāvaviveka to Buddhapālita s presentation] are just senseless. ད འ ར རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ ན ཡང ཇ ད ས པའ ཉ ས པ བ ད པ མ ད པའ ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ མ ད པ ཉ ད ད ད འ ར ན འ ན པ འད དག ན འ ལ པ མ ད པ ཉ ད ད ཞ ས ཤ ས པར འ Because the term and so forth in a pot and so forth (bum pa la sogs pa, ghaṭādika) is expressed with the intention of includa De Jong (n ) corrects the Sanskrit to anumānabādhācodanāyām, which translates as damage (gnod pa). b That is to say, a syllogistic statement approved by the Sāṃkhyas.

39 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 37 ing all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapālita s syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (snam bu, paṭa) and so forth. a མ པ ལ ས གས པ ཞ ས བ ས གས པའ ས ན བར འད ད པའ དང ས པ མ ས པ བ བར འད ད པའ ར མ ལ ས གས པ དག ག ས མ ང ས པར འ ར བ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapālita indicates] this other syllogism: Objects other than the person which [Sāṃkhyas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, like, for example, the person. [In that brief statement by Buddhapālita] this example [of another syllogism] is expressed. b ཡང ན ར བ འད ན ལ གཞན ཡ ན ཏ རང ལས བར བའ ས ལས ཐ དད པའ ད ན མས ན བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ར ས བཞ ན ན ཞ ས དཔ ར བ ད པ འད ཉ ད དཔ ར བ ད པར འ [Certain Sāṃkhyas might object that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation [rather than production]. Even so, manifestation is designated with the term production, and due to the qualitative similarity [between produca With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means in Tibetan, is frequently used as the second after pot, it strikes me that it is merely because of the similarity in sound between the two words in Sanskrit, ghaṭa and paṭa, an amusing play on sounds. b Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, 240b.6) appears to take example as referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas according to La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 22, n. 3) it might refer to the example in this syllogism (the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main thesis would also be realized. However, the person does not appear to fit Chandrakīrti s context, for Chandrakīrti appears to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced. This is probably why Jam-yang-shay-pa usually takes the subject to be things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth instead of just as things. In the second syllogism, Chandrakīrti provides another all-inclusive subject; thus the issue does not revolve around the example (which in the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest state), and thus Jam-yang-shay-pa s opinion is preferable; the reference is more likely to an example of another syllogism.

40 38 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets tion and manifestation] with respect to earlier nonapprehendability and later apprehendability the term production just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [that is, production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state]. གལ ཏ ཡང བ བཀག པས མང ན པར གསལ བར བ ལ གན ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན པ ད ན ཡང བའ མང ན པར གསལ བ ལ བཏགས ནས ན དང མར མ དམ གས པ དང དམ གས པར ཆ ས མ ན པས བའ ས མང ན པར གསལ བ ཉ ད བ ད པའ ར འད བཀག པས གན ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན ན Moreover [a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapālita s] having anything that expresses the meanings you have expounded, how was such analysis found? ཡང ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག ད པར ད པ མ ད པར མ པར ད ད པ འད འད ཇ ར ད ཅ ན བཤད པར Answer: These meaningful statements a [by Buddhapālita], due to having great import, contain an abbreviation of the abovementioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I Chandrakīrti have said] that is not indicated in them. བཤད པར ད ན ག ངག འད དག ན ད ན ཆ ན པ ཅན ཡ ན པས ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན བ ས ནས འ ག པ ཡ ན ལ ད དག ཀ ང བཤད ན ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག བདག ཉ ད འ ན པར ད པ ཡ ན པས འད ར མ བ ན པ ང ཟད ཀ ང མ ད ད Furthermore, the opposite meaning of the consequences [which is that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly] is related only with the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production is a nonaffirming negation]? b Through a Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10, 7, n.4) objects to La Vallée Poussin s (Prasannapadā, 23, n.1) editing the text from atha vākyāni to arthavākyāni in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag di dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 of Vaidya s edition suggests that La Vallée Poussin could be right. b The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 23.4) reads, And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet.

41 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 39 proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that they will give up their assertion of production from self]. a Therefore, how could the master Buddhapālita following the unerring system of the master Nāgārjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite re-production, are not asserted] b have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the system of the Middle Way School]! ཐལ བར འ ར བ བ ག པའ ད ན དང ཡང ཕ ར ལ པ ཉ ད འ ལ པ ཡ ན ག ཁ བ ཅག ན མ ཡ ན ཏ རང ལ དམ བཅའ བ མ ད པའ ར ར ད འ ར ཁ བ ཅག ལ བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བ ག ལ ཡ ད ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པ བ བས པས ཕ ར ལ པ ལ ཉ ས པ མང པ ཅ ཙམ འ ར བ ད ཙམ ཁ བ ཅག མང ན པར འད ད པ ཁ ན ཡ ན པས གང ལས འད ལ གཞན ག ས ག གས ད པར འ ར བ བ དཔ ན བ ཀ གས ན ཅ མ ལ ག པའ ས འ ང བ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ལ ག གས དང བཅས པའ ཚ ག ག ང པ ཉ ད ག ལ ཡ ད a When proponents of the absence of inherent existence adduce a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that they are subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner] c with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker s intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapālita s] adducing consequences [here] has the effect only of refuting the other party s thesis [that re-production is sensible and finite]; d hence [he] does not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences. e Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, b Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, c The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-day Namkha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 619.2ff. d Tsong-kha-pa s Ocean of Reasoning, e Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, above, 140) remarks that Chandrakīrti is saying that Buddhapālita s consequences here at this point of refuting production

42 40 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets རང བཞ ན མ ད པར བས རང བཞ ན དང བཅས པར བ ལ ཐལ བ བ བས པ ན ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན ཅན ཐལ བར ག ལ འ ར ཏ མས ན ད ག པ དང ཞགས པ ཅན བཞ ན བ པ རང དབང མ ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན ན འ ན ཅ ཞ ན ས པ ཡ ད ན བ པ འ བ ད པར འད ད པའ ས ད པ ཡ ན ན ད འ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ན ཕ ར ལ པ འ དམ བཅའ ལ འག ག པ ཙམ ག འ ས ཅན ཡ ན པའ ར ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན འ ར བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན Moreover, in this way the master [Nāgārjuna] mostly eradicates others positions by way of only adducing consequences such as through: a Space does not at all exist Before [its] definition. If space existed before [its] definition, It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist]. and: b If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form s causes [the elements], It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence]. Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless. and likewise: c from self do not project their opposite meaning but that Chandrakīrti is not saying that no consequences project their opposite meaning. See the layout of the five types of consequences in my remark at that point. a Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom, V.1. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined. The bracketed addition in the first citation is from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition. In this and the next two notes the identification of what is being refuted in these three quotes is from Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 621.1ff. b IV.2. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities. The bracketed additions in this citation are from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, , Varanasi 1973 edition. Tsong-kha-pa (129.8) says that this projects its opposite meaning; I presume that the other two also do so. c XXV.4.

43 Overview of Bhāvaviveka s Response to Buddhapālita 41 Nirvāṇa is not an effective thing (dngos po, bhāva). [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There are no effective things Without aging and death. and so forth. If the master [Nāgārjuna s] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapālita s statements also not considered that way! ད ར ཡང བ དཔ ན ན ནམ མཁའ མཚན ཉ ད ར ལ ན ནམ མཁའ ང ཟད ཡ ད མ ཡ ན གལ ཏ མཚན ལས ར ར ན མཚན ཉ ད མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཞ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ག གས ཀ ན མ གཏ གས པར ག གས ན ག གས ཀ མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཏ ད ན གང ཡང མ ད པ ན གང ན འང མ ད ཅ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ངན འདས པ དང ས པ མ ན ཤ འ མཚན ཉ ད ཐལ བར འ ར དང འཆ བ མ ད པ ཡ དང ས པ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པས ཕལ ཆ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ཁ ནའ ནས གཞན ག གས ས ལ བར མཛད ད ཅ བ དཔ ན ག ངག མས ན ད ན ག ངག ཡ ན པའ ར ད ན ཆ ན པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པས ར བ མའ ཉ ད གས ན ན བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ངག དག ཀ ང ཅ འ ར ད ར ཡ ངས མ ག Objection [by a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka]: a It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length. འ ན ཏ ར བའ ངག ས པར ད པར ད པ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན འག ལ པ མཁན པ མས ཀ གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ན ] Answer: That also is not so because when even the master [Nāgārjuna] commented on his Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements. b a Following Yamaguchi, De Jong ( Textcritical Notes, p. 30, n. 25.3) says that both this question and the response are spoken by Bhāvaviveka; however, Gom-day Nam-khagyal-tshan ( ) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the disputants, which are obvious. This reading fits the pattern of the section better than that suggested by Yamaguchi and De Jong. b As Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences (623.1) points out, the fact that Chandrakīrti does not mention the Akutobhayā adds credence to the argument that it is not an auto-commentary on the Treatise on the Middle.

44 42 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of Tenets ད ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ཏ ད པ བ ག པའ འག ལ པ མཛད པ ན བ དཔ ན ག ས ཀ ང ར བའ ངག མ ག ངས པའ ར ར ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations: a According to Chandrakīrti, it is not suitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomous syllogisms because autonomous syllogisms do not exist, since the two autonomous syllogism b and self-powered syllogism c are equivalent, because Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence explains that something generating an inference realizing a thesis upon having ascertained the two subjects d and the mode of the reason in the manner of [their being] self-powered, without involvement in the opponent s assertions, is the meaning of an autonomous [syllogism]. ཙ ག གས ར ན ད མ པས རང ད ཀ ར བ ཁས ལ ན པ མ ར གས ཏ རང ད ཀ ར བ མ ད པའ ར ཏ རང ད ཀ ར བ དང རང དབང བའ ར བ གཉ ས ད ན གཅ ག པའ ར ཏ ར ལ ག ཁས ངས ལ མ འཁ ས པར ཚད མས ད ན ག ད གས ནས རང དབང ཆ ས ཅན གཉ ས དང གས ཀ ལ མས བ ལ ང ས པར ས ནས བ བ གས པའ ས དཔག ད པ གཅ ག རང ད ཀ ད ན ཡ ན པར ལ གས བཤད ང པ ར བཤད པའ ར ར a b c d dbu ma pa, tsa, 7.3. rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba. rang dbang ba i sbyor ba. That is, the subject of the thesis and the subject of the example.

45 PART TWO: Jam-yang-shay-pa s GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE: Chandrakīrti Finds Buddhapālita without Fallacy Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate / Great Exposition of the Middle ད མ འ ག པའ མཐའ ད ད ང ར གས གཏ ར མཛ ད ཟབ ད ན ཀ ན གསལ ལ བཟང འ ག ང གས ཞ ས བ བ གས ས Key to the colorization: The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Black words mostly are merely neutral information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in. Jam-yang-shay-pa s text is at the margin; comments by others are indented in a three-sided box and named to clearly distinguish them from Jam-yangshay-pa s text.

46

47 3. How Chandrakīrti explains that Buddhapālita does not have the fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] {2 parts} ག མ པ སངས ས བ ངས ལ ན མ ད ལ བས བཤད ལ ལ This a has two parts: how Buddhapālita does not have the fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] and refutation of Bhāvaviveka s system. b སངས ས བ ངས ལ ན མ ད ལ དང ལ གས ན ག གས དགག པ གཉ ས a. How Buddhapālita does not have the fallacies [adduced by Bhāvaviveka] {2 parts} དང པ [སངས ས བ ངས ལ ན མ ད ལ ]ལ This has two parts: how the first two fallacies do not apply and how the third fallacy does not apply. ན དང པ གཉ ས མ འ ག པའ ལ དང ག མ པ མ འ ག པའ ལ ལ Hopkins: To review: The three fallacies that Bhāvaviveka alleged against Buddhapālita are that 1) he did not express a proper reason, 2) his reasoning does not avoid the fallacies adduced by a Sāṃkhya, and 3) his words afford an opportunity for refutation by an opponent. The first questions whether the reason and example could successfully prove the predicate. The second is concerned with what the predicate is not produced from self means, including production of the manifest from the unmanifest principal, and so forth. a b 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 154b.3; 2011 TBRC bla brang, 210a.5. The first part is presented in this book; the second is in the next volume.

48 46 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle We never found out why Bhāvaviveka thinks that Buddhapālita s reason is inadequate why can Buddhapālita s statement, as framed by Bhāvaviveka, not prove the lack of production from self? All Bhāvaviveka says is that Buddhapālita does not state a reason like his! Earlier, Jam-yang-shay-pa framed Bhāvaviveka s objection this way: The fault that the syllogism indicated by that [brief commentary] does not express a reason and an example capable of proving that there is no production from self because although Buddhapālita s commentary in its verbal reading (tshig zin la) states: The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because production would be senseless and endless, what Buddhapālita actually intended (bsam tshod la) to state was because production is sensible and has an end. It follows that in that case [Buddhapālita s commentary] is reduced to a mere thesis and that this syllogism cannot prove that there is no production from self because it does not express a reason and an example that can refute production from self as in [my own that is, Bhāvaviveka s own commentary]: The subjects, the inner sense-spheres such as an eye, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence. 1) HOW THE FIRST TWO FALLACIES [ADDUCED BY BHĀVAVIVEKA] DO NOT APPLY {2 PARTS} This has two parts: how [Buddhapālita] is faultless in terms of autonomous [syllogisms] and how [Buddhapālita] is faultless in terms of other-approved [syllogisms]. དང པ [ ན དང པ གཉ ས མ འ ག པའ ལ ]ལ རང ད ཀ དབང ས པའ ན མ ད ལ དང གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས པའ [L210b] ན མ ད ལ གཉ ས Hopkins: Jam-yang-shay-pa here does not separate out the first

49 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 47 two fallacies which are 1) lack of an adequate reason and 2) avoiding the fallacies adduced by a Sāṃkhya. Rather, he makes a single category of the two fallacies. He treats both with regard to the challenges about autonomous syllogisms. A) HOW [BUDDHAPĀLITA] IS FAULTLESS IN TERMS OF AUTONOMOUS [SYLLOGISMS] {2 PARTS} དང པ [རང ད ཀ དབང ས པའ ན མ ད ལ ]ལ This has two parts: how [Buddhapālita] did not state an autonomous [syllogism] and how it is not necessary [for him] to avoid the faults [Bhāvaviveka] mentioned with respect to an autonomous [syllogism]. རང ད མ བཀ ད པའ ལ དང རང ད ལ ས པའ ཉ ས པ ས ལ མ དག ས པའ ལ གཉ ས 1' How [Buddhapālita] did not state an autonomous [syllogism] {3 parts} དང པ [རང ད མ བཀ ད པའ ལ ]ལ This has three parts: there is no need for an autonomous [syllogism], an autonomous [syllogism] has no capacity, and it is not reasonable to assert autonomous [syllogisms]. རང ད ལ དག ས པ མ ད པ དང ད ལ ས པ མ ད པ དང རང ད ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པ ག མ a' There is no need for an autonomous [syllogism] དང པ [རང ད ལ དག ས པ མ ད པ ]ན All of the fallacies that Bhāvaviveka [found in Buddhapālita s refutation of production from self] are not reasonable because the honorable Chandrakīrti, as will be explained, saw [them to be unreasonable]; Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 156) says:

50 48 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle We [that is, Chandrakīrti] view all of these fallacies as unreasonable. It follows that, among the many fallacies expressed by Bhāvaviveka, there is no fallacy of [Buddhapālita s words] not being able to refute production from self due to not expressing a reason and an example of an autonomous [syllogism] because the purpose, or fruit, of your [Bhāvaviveka s] stating a reason and example of an autonomous [syllogism] this being the capacity of [causing the other party to] accept that there is no production from self can [be found] even through Buddhapālita s debating with contradictory consequences; Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 157) says: When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects [derived] from stating a reason and example, would the opponent not accept it? ལ གས ན ག ན ཐམས ཅད མ ར གས ཏ འཆད འ ར ར བའ ཞབས ཀ ས གཟ གས པའ ར ཏ ཚ ག གསལ ལས ན འད དག ཐམས ཅད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པར ཁ བ ཅག ག ས མཐ ང ང ཞ ས ས ལ གས ན ག ས ན བ ད མའ ནང ག རང ད ཀ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ བདག འག ག མ ས པའ ན མ ད པར ཐལ ཁ ད ཀ ས རང ད ཀ གས དང དཔ བཀ ད པའ དག ས པའམ འ ས བདག མ ད པར ཁས ལ ན པའ ས པ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས འགལ བ ད ཀ ཐལ འ ར ག ས བ ད ནས ཀ ང བ པའ ར ཏ ད ཉ ད ལས གང ལས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ བཀ ད པ འ ས [G155a]དང བཅས པར འ ར བ འད ཙམ ཞ ག ག ས [287] བ ད པ ཅ ཕ ར ལ པ ཁས ལ ན པར མ ད དམ ཞ ས ས Hopkins: What is the purpose of stating an autonomous syllogism? It is to produce a certain effect in the listener. The effect in

51 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 49 this case is to cause the listener to assert that there is no production from self. The purpose is its capacity to get the other person to assert that there is no production from self. Buddhapālita can achieve this purpose by debating with consequences that express contradiction in the opponent s perspective thereby accomplishing the same goal. Chandrakīrti s first answer is not that there is no such thing as an autonomous reason, but that anything that you could gain from it can be accomplished with a consequence. Chandrakīrti s response seems to suggest that he viewed the first fault adduced by Bhāvaviveka as being that Buddhapālita did not express any syllogistic reason at all; he stated only consequences not that Buddhapālita did not state an autonomous syllogism. Indeed, Buddhapālita s two reasons look like a consequence. [In the quote from Chandrakīrti s Clear Words] the term just in just these indicates, so to speak, that through mere consequences one can generate [the effects derived from stating a reason and example] because: (1) through the expression of the two consequences internal contradictions in production from self are indicated, (2) [the opponent] also can perceive [those contradictions] as indicated, and (3) [the consequences] can show that the logical feasibility ( thad pa) for the existence of production from self is devoid of reasoning. འད ཙམ ཞ ག ཅ ས ས ཐལ འ ར ཙམ ག ས བ ད བ པར བ ན པ ར ཡ ན ཏ ད ལ ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས བ ད པའ བདག ལ ནང འགལ བ ན ཅ ང བ ན པ ར མཐ ང ཡང ས བདག ཡ ད པའ འཐད པ ར གས པ དང ལ བ ཡ ན པར ན བ པའ ར Hopkins: What else could an autonomous reason beyond these? The first [part of the reason which is that through the expression of the two consequences internal contradictions in production from self are indicated] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 156) says: [Buddhapālita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent

52 50 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle who asserts production from self: a You [Sāṃkhyas] propound that from self [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [that is, the existent] is produced. b However, we [Buddhists] do not see that there is purpose in the production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. དང པ [ད ལ ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས བ ད པའ བདག ལ ནང འགལ བ ན པར ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས གང ག ར [L211a] བདག ལས c ཞ ས བ ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད དང ད ཉ ད འ ཞ ས ས པ ཡ ན ལ ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ མཐ ང ཞ ང ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མཐ ང ལ ཞ ས ས The second [part of the reason which is that through the two consequences (the opponent) also can perceive (those contradictions) as indicated] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 156) says: Still, you [Sāṃkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. གཉ ས པ [ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ ས བ ན པ ར མཐ ང ཡང ས པར ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ཁ ད ཀ ས ས པ ར ཡང བར མ འད ད ཅ ང a In the Tibetan this clause is found appended to the citation establishing the third reason, but in English it more properly belongs at the head of the three. La Vallée Poussin s Sanskrit (15.4) reads is inquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent (vidyamānasya punarutpāde prayojanaṃ), but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops this in accordance with the Tibetan. b In accordance with J.W. De Jong s splendid Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā (29, n. 15.5), svata iti hetutvena tad eva chotpadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamānaṃ hetutvena bravīṣi tad eva cotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan. c Correcting both editions (2015 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 155a.2, and 2011 TBRC bla brang, 211a.1) to gang gi phyir bdag las in accordance with Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, svata iti, 15.5, and the Tibetan as cited below.

53 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 51 ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མ འད ད ད ཞ ས ས The third [part of the reason which is that the consequences can show that the logical feasibility ( thad pa) for the existence of production from self is devoid of reasoning] is established because a Sāṃkhya could not find an example, for a Buddhist, of something that although already produced, is produced again, this being an example in the proof of such [production from self], because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 156) says: Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of logical feasibility and contradicts your own assertion. and so forth. Not only does this differ from how the Epistemologists (tshad ma pa, *prāmāṇaka) [assert] that contradictory consequence generate [steps in the process of realization], but also, since they are the chief opponents, it is a great error to cite this [to support how consequences function in the systems of the Epistemologists]. ག མ པ [བདག ཡ ད པའ འཐད པ ར གས པ དང ལ བ ཡ ན པར ན བ པར ] བ ག ངས ཅན ག ས སངས ས པ ལ ད ར བ པའ ས ཟ ན ར ཡང བའ དཔ མ ད པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས ད འ ར ཁ ད ཅག ག ད པ ན འཐད པ དང ལ བ དང རང ག ཁས ངས དང འགལ བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཕ ར ལ པ བདག ལས བར འད ད པ ལ འ བར ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས ས གས ག ངས པའ ར འད ལ ཚད མ པའ འགལ བ ད ཐལ འ ར ག ས ད ལ དང མ འ བར མ ཟད གས འ གཙ བ ཡ ན པས ད འ ན པ འ ལ བ ཆ ན པ ར འ ར ར Hopkins: How does a consequence act in the Epistemologists system in a way different from the system of the Consequence School? In the Epistemologists system, a consequence is stated for the sake of breaking down the pointedness (rtse), or vibrancy

54 52 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle (stsal), of the opponent s position, after which a syllogism is stated to explicitly communicate the thesis being proven. Consequentialists similarly say that if the opponent is somewhat dull, then the opponent will need both a consequence and a syllogism that is, first a challenge to his/her position and then an explicit presentation of the correct position but if the opponent is sharp, the opponent will gain the import of the second part just from the impact of the consequence. That is the difference between how Epistemologists and Consequentialists use consequences. Jam-yang-shay-pa makes a somewhat caustic comment: since they are the chief opponents, it is a great error to cite this [to support how consequences function in the systems of the Epistemologists]. Although the chief opponents in this section on refuting production from self are the Sāṃkhyas, the chief opponents in the sense of those who accept inherent establishment among the Buddhist systems are the Epistemologists. Jam-yang-shay-pa must mean that it is a mistake to quote this passage from Chandrakīrti in order to show how consequences work in the Epistemologists system. Let us consider whether a sharp opponent understands the corresponding syllogism when a consequence is stated? It follows that the subject, I, does not arise dependently because of being inherently established. In understanding the import of that consequence, does a sharp opponent take to mind the syllogism: The subject, I, is not inherently established because of arising dependently. It would certainly seem so, for if based on the statement of this consequence, you realize emptiness, you know what the reason is. Or does a consequence function in a different way so that you are not going through those steps? Do we have to say that the syllogism, in a sense, does appear to the person s mind? Can we hold that even if the person does not mentally utter in words: The subject, I, is not inherently established because of arising dependently, the full force of this appears to the mind. Maybe the person must

55 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 53 understand the impact of the syllogism though not through its format, or is it a different matter? I invite you to the Khalkha Mongolian Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa s brilliant explanation which is in the footnote. a a Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa offers a brilliant and intriguing explanation of how a consequence can promote realization; first he describes how consequences by the Buddhist schools other than the Consequence School function, and then he details the unusual way consequences generate realization according to the Consequence School. (The explanation below is mixed with citations from Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa; also in the initial brief form the entailment is stated first, but in the longer form, given later, it is not. This material on the two procedures is adapted from oral teachings of the late Geshe Gedün Lodrö of Gomang College and, later, of Hamburg University, where he became a Professor.) In the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti traditions utilized by those schools, the full process of debate is as follows for proving, for instance, that a sprout is empty of true existence because of being a dependent-arising: 1. Statement of a consequence implying a proof of the opposite It follows that the subject, a sprout, is not a dependent-arising because of being truly existent. This type of unwanted consequence is stated for the sake of breaking down the pointedness, or vibrancy, a of the opponent s adherence to a wrong view. Through having been demonstrated inner contradictions in his or her own system namely, that a sprout is truly existent, that a sprout is a dependent-arising, and that whatever is a dependent-arising is truly existent the opponent becomes doubtful about her or his own view. This prepares the opponent for the statement of the reasoning proving that a sprout is empty of true existence, thereby becoming a suitable vessel for the second step. 2. Statement of reasonings that establish the presence of the reason in the subject, the entailment, and the counter-entailment a. Statement of reasoning that establishes the presence of the sign in the subject The subject, a sprout, is a dependent-arising because of being produced from causes and conditions such as a seed, earth, and water. The reason of this syllogism need not be further established because it is obvious from common experience. If it were necessary to establish every reason if there were not an appeal to obvious experience the number of reasons required to establish the presence of the original reason in the subject would be limitless, and there would be no opportunity to realize the basic thesis. This is why it is said that all reasoning meets back to obvious experience. Still, if the opponent is not yet satisfied, it is not the proper occasion for proving to this person that a sprout is empty of true existence. Other indirect means are required to bring the person to the point of recognizing the obvious dependence of a sprout on causes and conditions.

56 54 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle b. Statement of reasoning that establishes the entailment The subject, a dependent-arising, is empty of true existence because inherent, or independent, existence is opposite to dependent-arising. The usual case is that the mind that explicitly realizes the entailment also implicitly realizes the counter-entailment and vice versa; therefore, only either the entailment or the counter-entailment needs to be established. This is because explicitly realizing that the sign exists in only similar cases implies realization that the sign is only nonexistent in dissimilar cases. Similarly, if the sign is explicitly realized as only nonexistent in dissimilar cases, it is implicitly realized as existent only in similar cases. However, here there is no dissimilar class since there is nothing that is not a dependent-arising. 3. Correct statement of proof for similar instances Whatever is a dependent-arising is necessarily empty of true existence, as in the case, for example, of a reflection; a sprout is also a dependent-arising. A person of very sharp intellect would also grasp the opposite, and, therefore, for this person the next step would not have to be stated; or the fourth step might be stated and not the third. The choice of whether to state a proof for similar or dissimilar instances is determined by the type of opponent. If the party is dominated by indecision, not being able to decide whether a spout is a dependentarising or not, a proof for similar instances is stated. If dominated by the opposite view that a sprout is not a dependent-arising, a proof for dissimilar instances is stated. However, to all except the very sharp, both must be proved. The stater bases the decision of what is necessary on the opponent s responses during step two and to questions asked. 4. Correct statement of proof for dissimilar instances Whatever is a non-dependent-arising is necessarily not contingent on another. No example can be stated because a non-dependent-arising does not exist and the same is so for something that is noncontingent on another. 5. Restatement of the correct statement of proof for either similar or dissimilar instances This is done for the sake of generating in the opponent a simultaneous awareness of the three modes of the reason which is its presence in the subject, the entailment, and the counterentailment. This awareness is also called a mind apprehending the reason and is the direct cause of the inferring consciousness realizing that a sprout is empty of true existence. At this moment the opponent becomes a correct, or proper, or full-fledged second party (the first party is the stater) of a debate in that this person is prepared for the basic reasoning that a sprout is empty of true existence because of being a dependent-arising.

57 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy Statement of the basic syllogism The subject, a sprout, is empty of true existence because of being a dependent-arising. The now full-fledged second party realizes that a sound is empty of true existence, after which this person ceases to be a second party that is to say, a party to this debate because of having finished realizing the thesis. In this way, the prescribed mode of debate in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti traditions is played out over many steps. However, Consequentialists hold that for sharp opponents the mere statement of a consequence, It follows that the subject, a sprout, does not rely on anything because of being inherently established, can generate in a proper second party a consciousness inferring that a sprout is empty of inherent existence. (Since Autonomists and others use consequences as the first step in a long process of reasoning, it is not the usage of consequences that singles out Consequentialists but their assertion that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient to generate in another a consciousness realizing a thesis.) Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa s point is that according to the Consequence School the thesis, or proposition, that a sprout is empty of inherent existence is realized while the functioning of just the awareness ascertaining that a sprout is a dependent-arising remains active. He holds that from the force itself of ascertaining that the reason (dependent-arising) is a property of the subject (a sprout), a combination of the two, a sprout s emptiness of inherent existence and a sprout s dependent-arising, dawns to an inference realizing that a sprout is empty of inherent existence. He shows how Tsong-kha-pa s statements indicate that this is accomplished through reasoning by way of a consequence, not a syllogism, even though Tsong-kha-pa does not explicitly speak of consequences. As Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa says: The reason why a combination of the two, appearance and emptiness, dawns to that inference is that this party has already realized that inherent establishment entails noncontingency on another through the functioning of the consequence, It follows that the subject, a sprout, does not rely on anything because of being inherently established. To explain this [Tsong-kha-pa] says: a because they have realized that what is inherently established does not rely on another and have realized with valid cognition that the two, this [nonreliant inherent existence] and dependent-arising are contradictory. When faced with the unwanted consequence, It follows that the subject, a sprout, does not rely on anything because of being inherently established, an appropriate other party puts it together that inherent establishment entails nonreliance on another and realizes that inherent establishment and dependent-arising just cannot go together. Thus, realization of the entailment occurs first, and this forms a context for the subsequent understanding that a sprout is a dependent-

58 56 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle arising to immediately prompt realization that a sprout is empty of inherent establishment. In the process of syllogistic reasoning as laid out above, however, establishment of the presence of a reason in the subject occurred before establishment of the entailment, this being the order of Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa s description of syllogistic reasoning when he said, unlike in the Autonomy School and so forth in which it is asserted that other valid cognitions must be involved such as that initially the property of the subject is established, and after that in order to establish the entailment a common locus of the sign and the predicate of negandum is refuted, and so forth. This was Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa s clue for framing Tsong-kha-pa s exposition as a special feature of consequential reasoning. Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa continues: Hence, to this inference realizing through the sign of dependent-arising that a sprout is empty of inherent establishment both a sprout s emptiness of inherent establishment and a sprout s dependent-arising appear, and moreover, the appearance [of the sprout] as empty of inherent establishment is from the force of ascertaining it as a dependent-arising, and the appearance of it as a dependent-arising is from the force of realizing it as empty of inherent establishment, whereby when the party sees sprouts and so forth, this person sees them as dependent-arisings, and due to this also induces ascertainment that they are empty of inherent establishment. The sequence is that: 1. From the statement of the unwanted consequence, It follows that the subject, a sprout, does not rely on anything because of being inherently established, an appropriate party understands that inherent establishment entails nonreliance on another and realizes that inherent establishment and dependent-arising are just at odds. 2. Then, this allows for understanding that a sprout is a dependent-arising to immediately prompt realization that a sprout is empty of inherent establishment. 3. That realization of the emptiness of inherent establishment affects subsequent perception of phenomena such that they appear to be dependent-arisings. 4. And this appearance of phenomena as dependent-arisings in turn induces ascertainment of those phenomena as empty of inherent establishment. Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa cites his source: To explain this [Tsong-kha-pa] says: Hence, through dependent-arising itself they gain ascertainment of the emptiness that negates inherent existence, and therefore they become accustomed immediately upon seeing, hearing, or being mindful that sprouts and so forth rely on causes and conditions to contemplating the principle of the absence of inherent existence through just that fact. At that time this called the combination of the two appearance and emptiness occurs for that person, whereby these called emptiness going as the meaning of dependent-arising and realizing the profound dependent-

59 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 57 b' An autonomous [syllogism] has no capacity གཉ ས པ [(རང ད )ད ལ ས པ མ ད པ ]ན It follows that if [consequences] are able to show such inner contradictions and [the opponent] sees the inner contradictions yet stubbornly persists in not accepting [that there is no production from self], then even though one demonstrated signs and examples of autonomous [syllogisms] to him/her, they would have no capacity because even though at that time [the opponent] sees the fallacies, he/she denies them. ད འ ནང འགལ ན བ ཅ ང ནང འགལ མཐ ང ཡང ཁས མ ལ ན པར བ ན འད ང ན ད ལ རང ད ཀ གས དང དཔ བ ན ཀ ང ས པ མ ད པར ཐལ ད འ ཚ ཡང ན མཐ ང ཡང བ ན པར ད པའ ར Hopkins: At this point Chandrakīrti is arguing that a consequence (thal gyur, prasaṅga) alone is sufficient, and thus this is the context for the formulation in Tibet of the name Consequentialist (thal gyur pa, prāsaṅgika). Chandrakīrti is saying that there is not any need for a syllogism, but later he says, Well, if you want a syllogism, then there is an other-approved correct sign if we have to have it, then it is there. Therefore, Ge-lug-pa scholars draw what might seem a arising also are just this. Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa has completed his profoundly complex presentation of how realization engendered by consequences can differ from realization produced from syllogistic reasoning, whereby he has avoided using the twofold formula of, Emptiness is the meaning of dependent-arising, and dependent-arising is the meaning of emptiness, and instead of this has given an explanation uniting these two perspectives in one realization. He has laid before us the crown jewel to which his commentary has been leading; the crescendo has been reached. Cited from Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Middle Way School of Buddhism: Mutual Reinforcement of Understanding Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 4, (UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org, 2015), ; for further points dealing with how this presentation is embedded in surrounding cultural concepts and approaches, see the material following this citation.

60 58 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle startling conclusion: Syllogisms are used in the Consequence School. The complaint, therefore, is not against syllogisms, it is against the notion of autonomous syllogisms. Still, it seems to me that here there is no need to specify autonomous syllogisms; the point here would be the same for just syllogisms. In such a situation, to then state a syllogism is of no help. It would be difficult to posit any particular reason for specifying that the problem is limited to autonomous syllogisms. Hence, it seems to me that at this point Chandrakīrti is saying that there is no need for any sort of syllogism because a consequence is sufficient. Ge-lug-pa scholars say that for a sharp opponent you do not need to state the syllogism after you state the consequence, but for a dull person if the consequence does not bring about realization, then a Consequentialist does need to state a syllogism. If we accept this, then supposing a particular Sāṃkhya were a dull person, then both a consequence and a syllogism would need to be stated, and this would contradict Chandrakīrti s claim that a consequence is sufficient. This is a conundrum. With regard to the first fault that Bhāvaviveka finds in Buddhapālita s refutation, because [Buddhapālita does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example. Maybe it just means that Buddhapālita did not express a reason and an example at all not that his reason was not a proper reason. In other words, maybe Bhāvaviveka is saying that there was no syllogism stated at all. In that case, we could clearly count three fallacies. However, when Nāgārjuna states a consequence, Bhāvaviveka also finds in it a syllogism; so why would he not find a syllogism in Buddhapālita s statement? If he did see a syllogism, what is it? The subjects, things, are not produced from their own entities because their production is purposeful and has an end. If Bhāvaviveka did indeed see saw a syllogism in Buddhapālita s statement, then is the problem that Bhāvaviveka considers that the reasons are not suitable and hence have to be reversed, in which case the predicate of the proposition also has to be changed: With respect to the subjects, things, there is not just an elimination of production from self because their production is purposeful and has an end.

61 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 59 According to Jam-yang-shay-pa, this is the syllogism Bhāvaviveka saw. Because Bhāvaviveka saw these reasons in an absurd form in Buddhapālita s statement, we can conclude that he saw absurd consequences in the reasons. Thus, the consequences he saw are: It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is purposeless because of being produced from its own entity. It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is endless because of being produced from its own entity. Jam-yang-shay-pa lists these two as the consequences that Bhāvaviveka saw. When we turn these consequences into syllogisms, we get: The subject, a shoot, is not produced from its own entity because its production is purposeful. The subject, a shoot, is not produced from its own entity because its production has an end. The opposite of the predicates of the consequences are put as the reasons of the syllogisms. According to Ge-lug-pa scholars, Bhāvaviveka s opinion is that whatever is a syllogism is necessarily an autonomous syllogism, and whatever is a correct sign is necessarily an autonomous correct sign. Tsong-kha-pa a is clear that autonomous syllogism means a correct sign in which the three modes presence of the sign in the subject, forward entailment, and counter-entailment are established from their own side, but is it that clear for Chandrakīrti? Might it just mean that a In his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo) Tsong-kha-pa did not write about the Opposite of the Consequences but rather wrote about Compatibly Appearing Subjects treated in the next book in this series in detail. Then he wrote his The Essence of Eloquence (legs bshad snying po). Between the time of writing the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and The Essence of Eloquence, he developed a different opinion on the main source quote for the topic of compatibly appearing subjects; therefore, in The Essence of Eloquence he wrote a small portion on Compatibly Appearing Subjects concerned with that main source quote, where in an aside he makes the amusing remark that he has changed his reading but that it still has to do with refuting autonomy (rang rgyud). Then, in his Ocean of Reasoning (rigs pa i rgya mtsho) a commentary on Nāgārjuna s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom he again writes about the Opposite of the Consequences without saying anything about Compatibly Appearing Subjects.

62 60 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle Bhāvaviveka himself approves of it? In changing some consequences to syllogisms one takes the opposite of the reason and the opposite of the predicate and transposes the two; one might think that this is the context in which this topic is called Opposite of the Consequences, but this is not the case. Since Bhāvaviveka sees the following consequence in Buddhapālita s commentary on Nāgārjuna: It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is senseless because it is produced from its own entity. the opposite of the predicate (production is sensible) is something that Bhāvaviveka knows Buddhapālita could accept. However, Chandrakīrti points out that Bhāvaviveka sees the wrong consequence due to not utilizing the extensive explanation. The actual consequence is: It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its re-production is senseless because it is existent in its own entity. Since the consequence is its re-production is senseless, the question is: who asserts the opposite of that consequence? Who asserts, There is sense in its production again? The Sāṃkhyas do. Hence, the meaning of Opposite of the Consequences is the opposite of the consequences is asserted by the Sāṃkhya, not by us. Chandrakīrti says that the opposite of the consequences is not related with us (below, 170); it is only related with the opponent. Buddhapālita s actual (that is, according to Jam-yang-shay-pa) two consequences are: It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its re-production is purposeless because of existing in its own entity. It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is endless because though already existent in its own entity, there is purpose and necessity in its re-production. Buddhapālita s consequences as Bhāvaviveka saw them: It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is purposeless because of being produced from its own entity. It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is endless because of being produced from its own entity.

63 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 61 Regarding Buddhapālita s consequences as Bhāvaviveka saw them, Bhāvaviveka finds a real fallacy there, but since he does not put the brief indication together with the extensive explanation, is he just playing when he proceeds to the further fallacies? Perhaps. We could say to Bhāvaviveka, In commenting on the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras when it says ultimately things do not exist, you yourself apply the specification of the object of negation with the term ultimately to other places in the same sūtra where such a qualification is not explicitly made, so why do you not make the same type of extension with regard to what Buddhapālita says? However, we could defend Bhāvaviveka by saying that the two are not parallel; Buddhapālita is setting out a logical statement with a subject, a predicate, and a reason, and it is not so difficult to say re-production instead of just production. [That even though at that time (the opponent) sees the fallacies, he/she denies them] entails [that a demonstration of signs and examples of autonomous syllogisms would have no capacity] because we Consequentialists do not debate with unfit stubborn disputants, and your, Bhāvaviveka s, rushing [to state] signs and examples of autonomous [syllogisms] even to those who are not proper participants of such debate is a mere liking for propounding reasons; Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 157) says: However, if opponents are not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting their own assertions, then due to their shamelessness they also just would not be overcome by reasons and examples. We [Consequentialists] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] sets out inferences even at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference. [ད འ ཚ ཡང ན མཐ ང ཡང བ ན པར ད ན ད ལ རང ད ཀ གས དང དཔ བ ན ཀ ང ས པ མ ད པས ]ཁ བ ཐལ འ ར བ ཁ བ ན ལ བའ འ ས མ ཡ ན པའ བ ན པ དང མ ད ལ ལ གས ན ཁ ད རང ན ད འ ད པའ གནས མ ཡ ན པར ཡང རང ད ཀ གས དཔ འཚང ག ད པ ན གཏན ཚ གས བ ལ དཁའ བ ཙམ

64 62 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ ད ཉ ད ལས འ ན ཏ [L211b] ཕ ར ལ པ རང ག ཁས ངས དང འགལ བས བ ད པས ཀ ང མ བ ག ན ད འ ཚ ང ཚ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ གཉ ས ཀ ས ཀ ང ག པར མ འ ར ར [G155b] ནས [ཁ བ ཅག ན ན པ དང ན ཅ ག ད པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན ད འ ར བ དཔ ན ན གནས མ ཡ ན པར ཡང ས དཔག པ ཚང བར ད པ ན བདག ཉ ད ས དཔག པ ལ དགའ བ ཉ ད མང ན པར ད པ ]ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ང Hopkins: Here the term inference is used for syllogism. If an opponent persists in a line of argument after being shown the inner contradictions of their position, then there is no point in debating with that person. Chandrakīrti is saying that Bhāvaviveka s persistence in stating the syllogistic form of the same meaning when the person did not even get the consequence indicates his over-fascination with syllogisms. At this point Chandrakīrti is speaking of the fact that there is no need to state a syllogism at all to a stubbornly persistent opponent; it appears that he is not even talking about autonomous syllogisms even though Jam-yang-shay-pa specifies autonomous just above. Is it the case that if an opponent does not get a consequence, there is no point in stating a syllogism? The consequence and the syllogism are saying the same thing in two different ways, and sometimes it seems helpful to say something in two different ways, even when a person does not get it. c' It is not reasonable to use autonomous [syllogisms] ག མ པ རང ད ད a མ ར གས པ ན It follows that if one is a Proponent of the Middle who refutes all extremes a Above, this heading was announced as It is not reasonable to assert (khas len) autonomous [syllogisms].

65 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 63 as in the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra, one should not use autonomous inferences, that is to say, syllogisms (rtags sbyor), in which the three modes [of the sign] are established from their own side because [a Proponent of the Middle] has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth. མཐའ ཐམས ཅད མད ཏ ང འཛ ན ལ པ ར བཀག པའ ད མ པ ཡ ན ན ལ ག མ རང ང ས ནས བ པའ རང ད ཀ ས དཔག པ གས ར མ ར གས པར ཐལ མཐའ བཞ ལ ས གས པའ གས གཞན ག ཁས ལ ན མ ད པའ ར Hopkins: Jam-yang-shay-pa says that a Proponent of the Middle does not use a syllogism in which the three modes are established from their own side because a Proponent of the Middle has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth. He makes it clear that Consequentialists do assert other positions, but do not assert other positions within the four extremes. Chandrakīrti is not so clear. It follows [that a Proponent of the Middle has no assertion of other positions among the four extremes and so forth] because: 1. [a Proponent of the Middle] does not have a position of asserting any extreme the extreme of existence which is that [phenomena] inherently exist, the extreme of nonexistence which is that [phenomena] utterly do not exist, the extreme of both existence and nonexistence which is that [phenomena both] inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or [the extreme of neither which is] a truly established emptiness or center that is an abandonment of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence 2. the honorable Superior [Nāgārjuna] says that I do not have any thesis contradictory with the system of the Middle Way School. [མཐའ བཞ ལ ས གས པའ གས གཞན ག ཁས ལ ན མ ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པའ ཡ ད མཐའ དང གཏན ནས མ ད པའ མ ད མཐའ དང རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པ དང རང བཞ ན ག ས

66 64 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle འཇ ག པའ ཡ ད མ ད གཉ ས ཀའ མཐའ དང ཡ ད མ ད ཀ མཐའ གཉ ས ངས པའ ང པའམ ད ས བད ན བ ཀ མཐའ གང ཡང ཁས ལ ན པའ གས མ ད པ གང ཞ ག ད མའ གས དང འགལ བའ དམ བཅའ གང ཡང ང ལ མ ད ཅ ས འཕགས པའ ཞབས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: It is interesting that in listing the third extreme he says, the extreme of both existence and nonexistence which is that [phenomena both] inherently exist and inherently disintegrate. In illustrating the nonexistent side of the pair, why did he say inherently disintegrate instead of utterly do not exist? He frames it this way because when he gets to the fourth, he does not want to say, the extreme that phenomena neither inherently exist nor utterly do not exist, because if that were the fourth, there would not be the fault that it would be right! Conventional existence is neither inherently existent nor utterly nonexistent; therefore, when the four extremes are put together, they have to be juggled. You might think that with a tetralemma, a fourfold problem built from two items, if the two items are black and white, for instance, the first would be black, the second would be white, the third would be black and white, and the fourth would be neither black nor white. But here you don t do it that way. The question is, do these four, the way that they are stated here, include all possibilities? No! Let us examine this more closely. If you refute like so: The subject, a table, is not inherently produced because of not being produced from self, not being produced from other, not being produced from both, and not being causelessly produced, does that refute all possibilities of production of the table? It refutes all forms of inherent production but not all forms of production. That is the only way it can work and still leave dependentarising. However, the way Jam-yang-shay-pa has stated it here, there is no symmetry, and so how could it work? Can you find a

67 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 65 way to make it symmetrical? In order to retain that things conventionally exist, you cannot frame the four in a symmetrical way. There are a couple of different ways of framing it, but are any symmetrical? It is symmetrical in that it eliminates all possibilities of inherent existence, but when you lay out the four, you would think that the third one would be a combination of the first two but it is not. So this suggests that the Ge-lug way of framing the four is forced, and yet if you do not force it, how can conventional existence be rescued? If it is nonsymmetrical, it would be nihilistic. Leaving it symmetrical, you refute all production whatsoever. Some say that you should refute all production whatsoever since what is left over is just illusory. There is not anything like this sort of formulation by Jamyang-shay-pa in any Indian text; it became clear in Tibet. You might claim that it is implicit in the Indian texts, but I call this a type of Tibetan Buddhism. Other schools are also characteristically Tibetan Buddhism in a different way, whereas Tsong-khapa and his followers step forward and say that Not existent, not nonexistent, not both-existent-and-nonexistent, and not neitherexistent-nor-nonexistent if taken superficially is nonsense. Tsong-kha-pa says that is not existent means the same as is nonexistent ; you cannot say not existent and then say not nonexistent. As Tsong-kha-pa says in his Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Practiced by Persons of Three Capacities: a Therefore, distinctions: between the two that something is not existent (yod pa min pa) and that something does not exist (med pa) [whereas these actually have the same meaning], and between the two that something is not non-existent (med pa min pa) and that something exists (yod pa) [whereas these actually have the same meaning] are reduced to merely being differences in mode of expression. No matter how much one analyzes how the meanings of both of those appear to the mind, there is no difference at all; a See Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa s Final Exposition of Wisdom (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 95.

68 66 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle hence, to propound that one falls or does not fall to extremes through those modes [of expression] is exhausted as fixation on mere words. Is not, not, not, not different from is not existent, is nonexistent, and so on? Returning to Jam-yang-shay-pa, in citing the fourth extreme he says, [the extreme of neither which is] a truly established emptiness or center that is an abandonment of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. This fourth extreme is not worded as just the negative of the third; note that his qualification of the third has not helped with the fourth at all. In addition, he has to qualify the fourth with truly established. The first [part of the reason which is that (a Proponent of the Middle) does not have a position of asserting any extreme the extreme of existence which is that (phenomena) inherently exist, the extreme of nonexistence which is that (phenomena) utterly do not exist, the extreme of both existence and nonexistence which is that (phenomena both) inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or (the extreme of neither which is) a truly established emptiness or center that is an abandonment of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence] is established because Āryadeva s Four Hundred (below, 157) says: a [Even over a long period of time Censure cannot be expressed] For one who has no position of existence, Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence. དང པ [རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པའ ཡ ད མཐའ དང གཏན ནས མ ད པའ མ ད མཐའ དང རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པ དང རང བཞ ན ག ས འཇ ག པའ ཡ ད མ ད གཉ ས ཀའ མཐའ དང ཡ ད མ ད ཀ མཐའ གཉ ས ངས པའ ང པའམ ད ས a XVI.25, citation lengthened by the preceding two lines in brackets; P5246, vol. 95, For Chandrakīrti s commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff; Karen Lang, Āryadeva s Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, Indiste Studier, 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), 150. This is quoted in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, P5260, vol. 98, 4.5.4; the Sanskrit is La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 16.4; Buddhist Text Series, no. 10, For extensive discussion of the four alternatives according to Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, n. 500.

69 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 67 བད ན བ ཀ མཐའ གང ཡང ཁས ལ ན པའ གས མ ད པར ] བ བཞ བ པ ལས ཡ ད དང མ ད དང ཡ ད མ ད ཅ ས གང ལ གས ན ཡ ད མ ན པ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: About this stanza from the Four Hundred, Ngag-wangpal-dan s Annotations to Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets cites Tsong-ka-pa s Great Exposition of Special Insight in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path: a [This passage about existence, nonexistence, and so forth] is cited [by Chandrakīrti] as a source showing that [Proponents of the Middle] who assert imputed existence which negates substantial existence in the sense of [the object s] being established by way of its own nature are not [that is, cannot be] repudiated by the two, (1) Proponents of Things as Existent b who are [Proponents of Permanence] asserting that [phenomena] are established by way of their own nature and (2) Proponents of Things as Nonexistent c who are [Proponents of Annihilation] asserting a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source [showing that Proponents of the Middle] have no system; since it is very clear that the positions of [inherent] existence, [utter] nonexistence, and so forth [that is, both of those and not both] are also like the positions propounding the two [extremes of permanence and annihilation, they are to be refute] in accordance with the earlier occasions of refuting the four alternatives and the mode of clearing away the propositions of existence and nonexistence. Since on the occasion the mode of clearing away the propositions of existence and nonexistence inherent existence and utter nonexa dbu ma pa, kha, 115.6; brackets are from Four Interwoven Annotations, Delhi edition, vol. 2, 254a.4/ See also Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, Joshua W.C. Cutler, editor-in-chief, Guy Newland, editor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, ), vol. 3, 243. b dngos po yod par smra ba. c dngos po med par smra ba.

70 68 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle istence and refuted, it is suitable to put together the four alternatives as refuting: 1. inherent existence 2. utter nonexistence 3. both 4. and a truly established category that is neither. ད ར རང ག ང བ ས བ པའ ས ཡ ད ཁ གས པའ བཏགས ཡ ད འད ད པ མས ལ དང ས པ ཡ ད པར བ རང ག ང བ ས བ པར འད ད པ དང དང ས པ མ ད པར བ ག གས ས གས ཀ དང ས པ མས ཀ ད ན ད པ ཐམས ཅད ཁ གས པར འད ད པ གཉ ས ཀ ས ན མ འ ན པའ ཤ ས ད ངས པས ན རང གས མ ད པའ ཁ ངས མ ང ལ ཡ ད མ ད ལ ས གས པའ གས ཀ ང གཉ ས བའ གས ཡ ན པར ཤ ན གསལ བས ར བཞ འག ག པ དང ཡ ད མ ད བ ས ལ ལ ག བས བཤད པ བཞ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས ས ཡ ད མ ད བ ས ལ ལ ག བས ན རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པ དང གཏན ནས མ ད པ བཀག པས ན བཞ འག ག ལ ཡང རང བཞ ན ག ས ཡ ད པ དང གཏན ནས མ ད པ དང ད གཉ ས ཀ ཡ ན པ དང ད གཉ ས ཀ མ ཡ ན པའ ང ག མ བད ན པར བ པ འག ག པ ལ ར ང ལ The fourth alternative is specified as truly established since a category that is composed of neither of the positions that is, that

71 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 69 objects are neither inherently established nor utterly nonexistent is affirmed since objects do indeed exist conventionally as neither inherently established nor utterly nonexistent. Ngag-wang-pal-dan cites an earlier passage from Tsong-kapa s Great Exposition of Special Insight that offers a slightly different layout of the four alternatives: a It might be thought, In Middle Way texts all four alternatives thingness or inherent existence, nonexistence, both, and not both are refuted; and since phenomena not included in those in those also do not exist, reasoning refutes all. Response: About this, between the two [meanings] of thingness as indicated earlier, b although the thingness in the sense of establishment by way of its own entity is refuted no matter how it is asserted as any of the two truths, thingness in the sense of that which is able to perform a function is not refuted in conventional terms. If non-thingness also is asserted as non-things in the sense of uncompounded [phenomena] established by way of their own entity, such non-things also are refuted. Likewise, those that are both things established by way of their own entity and non-things, or uncompounded [phenomena,] established by way of their own entity are refuted, and the not both that are established by way of their own entity also are refuted. Hence, all modes of refuting the four alternative should be known this way. If the four alternatives are refuted without affixing such qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that something is] an existent thing (dngos po yod pa) and a nonthing (dngos po med pa) are refuted and then both are refuted saying not both, it would explicitly contradict [one s own] assertion also to make the refutation, not not both. If you insist that despite this there is no fault, it is as [Chandrakīrti] says, We do not debate with the insane. ཡང ན ད ཉ ད ལས ད མའ ག ང མས ནས དང ས པ འམ རང བཞ ན ཡ ད པ དང མ ད པ དང གཉ ས ཀ a See also Great Treatise, vol. 3, 189. b That which is able to perform a function (don byed nus pa) and inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis yod pa).

72 70 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle དང གཉ ས ཀ མ ན པའ བཞ ཐམས ཅད བཀག ལ ད ར མ འ ས པའ ཆ ས ཀ ང མ ད པས ར གས པས ཐམས ཅད འག ག ག མ ན འད ན ར བ ན པ ར དང ས པ ལ གཉ ས ལས རང ག ང བ ས བ པའ དང ས པ ན བད ན པ གཉ ས གང ཡ ད པར འད ད ཀ ང འག ག ལ ད ན ད ས པའ དང ས པ ན ཐ ད འགག པ མ ཡ ན ན དང ས པ མ ད པའང འ ས མ ས མས ལ རང ག ང བ ས བ པའ དང ས མ ད འད ད ན ན ད འ བའ དང ས མ ད ཀ ང འག ག ག ད བཞ ན ད འ བའ དང ས པ ཡ ད མ ད གཉ ས ཀར ཡང འག ག ལ གཉ ས ཀ མ ཡ ན པ རང ག ང བ ས བ པའང འག ག པས བཞ འག ག ལ ཐམས ཅད ན ད ར ཤ ས པར འ ད འ བའ ཁ ད པར ར མ ད པར བཞ ག འག ག ན དང ས པ ཡ ད པ དང དང ས པ མ ད པ འག ག པའ ཚ ད གཉ ས ཀ མ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས བཀག ནས ར ཡང གཉ ས ཀ མ ཡ ན པའང མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བཀག ན ན ཁས ངས དང ས འགལ བ ཡ ན ལ ད ར ཡ ན ཀ ང ན མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ན ན ཁ བ ཅག ན པ དང ན ཅ ག མ ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པ ར ར In both cases, the alternatives must be carefully qualified so that conventional existence is not ruled out. The four alternatives, therefore, are all-inclusive only in the sense of including all pos-

73 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 71 sibilities of inherently existent phenomena when these are refuted, it can be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. The four do not include all possibilities of existence. Ngag-wang-pal-dan identifies another presentation of the four alternatives by Tsong-kha-pa s student Khay-drub in his Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate; there it is considered whether a chair, for instance, is a truly established existent, a truly established nonexistent, a truly established category that is both of those, or a truly established category that is neither. This version is the most symmetrical in that all four alternatives are considered as being qualified by true establishment or inherent existence. Ngag-wang-pal-dan says: Since the meaning is: It is not a truly established existent, also is not a truly established nonexistent, is not a truly established third category that is both, and is not a truly established third category that is not both, we do not have any problems, and solely the manifestly sublime arises. གཞན ཡང ང ན ཆ ན མ ལས ཡ ད པ ཡང བད ན པར བ པ མ ཡ ན མ ད པ ཡང བད ན པར བ པ མ ཡ ན གཉ ས ཀ ཡ ན པའ ང ག མ བད ན པར བ པ མ ཡ ན གཉ ས ཀ མ ཡ ན པའ ང ག མ བད ན པར བ པ མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བའ ད ན ཡ ན པས ན ཁ བ ཅག ལ ད པ ཅ འང མ ད ཀ མང ན པར མཐ བ འབའ ཞ ག འ ང བར འ ར ར ཞ ས བཤད པ ཡང ཡ ད ད The second [part of the reason which is that the honorable Superior (Nāgārjuna) says that I do not have any thesis contradictory with the system of the Middle Way School, ] is established because Nāgārjuna s Refutation of Objections says: a a Stanza 29; rtsod bzlog, vigrahavyāvartanī; P5228, vol. 95, See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. The brackets are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, dbu, 59a.6.

74 72 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence]. Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless. གཉ ས པ [ད མའ གས དང འགལ བའ དམ བཅའ གང ཡང ང ལ མ ད ཅ ས འཕགས པའ ཞབས ག ངས པ ] བ ད ག ལས གལ ཏ ངས དམ བཅས འགའ ཡ ད ད ས ན ང ལ ན ད ཡ ད ང ལ དམ བཅའ མ ད པས ན ང ན ན མ ད ཁ ན ཡ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: Since Nāgārjuna says, I do not have any thesis, why do Ge-lug-pas say that Proponents of the Middle have theses? Tsong-kha-pa explains thesis here through referring to the context in the Refutation of Objections itself. Nāgārjuna says that nothing inherently exists, and so a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things asks, Do your words inherently exist or not? If they do not inherently exist, then they cannot refute anything, but if they do inherently exist, then you have contradicted your thesis that nothing inherently exists. Nāgārjuna responds with the above stanza which means, If I had any thesis [that my words inherently exist], then I would have the fault [of contradicting my own thesis that no phenomenon inherently exists]; but since I do not have any thesis [that my words inherently exist], I am faultless. As for the first fault alleged by Proponents of [Truly Established] Things that if Nāgārjuna s words lack inherent existence they could not refute anything why would they say that? Many assert that for something to have capacity it must inherently exist. For instance, there are many so-called Proponents of the Middle who use this same sort of idea. They say that because these things do not inherently exist, they are not able to perform a function (don byed nus pa) the definition of thing (dngos po, bhāva), and, therefore, Proponents of the Middle have no theses. Tsong-kha-pa says that these people are not any more elevated than Proponents of [Truly Established] Things because the Proponents of [Truly

75 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 73 Established] Things are the ones who find inherently established and able to perform a function to be inextricable. They say that things inherently exist because they are able to perform a function. The so-called Proponents of the Middle use the same principle when they say that things are not able to perform a function because they do not inherently exist. According to Tsongkha-pa, both mis-identify the meaning of inherent existence. Even though these so-called Proponents of the Middle sometimes say they have no system, it seems to me that their methods work through refuting all possibilities in the tetralemma not existent, not nonexistent, not both-existent-and-nonexistent, and not neither-existent-nor-nonexistent whereby the mind moves to a different plane, something like a nonconceptual level. Through this, progress is made. It seems to be that some sūtras and treatises are trying to throw conceptuality into confusion in order to stop it. Ge-lug, however, attempts to refine the presentation within conceptuality but still eventually in order to get beyond conceptuality. However, in Ge-lug terms to deny all members of the tetralemma without any qualification, as was made above, is utter nonsense! Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 157) says: Also, it is not reasonable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. ཇ ད ད ཉ ད ལས ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད ཀ ས དཔག པ ར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གས གཞན ཁས ལ ན པ མ ད པའ ར ཞ ས ས Hopkins: Notice that Chandrakīrti specifies autonomous inferences. However, could this term mean one s own inferences, something that Proponents of the Middle themselves accept an inference that is in one s own continuum (rang rgyud, svatantra)? If rang rgyud, svatantra did mean own continuum rather than autonomous, it would be evidence for the position that Proponents of the Middle have no views, have no system since Chandrakīrti would mean, Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make own continuum inferences because

76 74 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle of not asserting other positions. Indeed, Chandrakīrti says because of not asserting other positions ; he does not explicitly say because of not asserting other positions among the four extremes. Jam-yang-shay-pa adds these words. Although it is not reasonable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomy, nevertheless, if that is asserted, one is not necessarily not a Proponent of the Middle because there are many Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School. [That there are many Proponents of the Middle Way Autonomy School] entails [that although it is not reasonable for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to assert autonomy, nevertheless, if that is asserted, one is not necessarily not a Proponent of the Middle] because: 1. they also prove with limitless reasonings that all phenomena do not truly exist, due to which they are higher than Proponents of the Mind Only School, whereby they are not suitable to be a school of tenets other than the Middle Way School, and 2. the noncontradiction of asserting what is not suitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert and being a Proponent of the Middle is like the noncontradiction of having minor infractions of codes formulated [for monastics] and being a monastic. [L212a]ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས ཀ ང ད ཁས ངས ན ད མ པ མ ཡ ན པས མ ཁ བ ད མ རང ད པ མ ཡ ད པའ ར [ད མ རང ད པ མ ཡ ད ན ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས ཀ ང ད ཁས ངས ན ད མ པ མ ཡ ན པས མ ཁ བ པས ]ཁ བ ད དག ག ས ཀ ང ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད བད ན མ ད ར གས པ མཐའ ཡས པས བ པས ས མས ཙམ པ ལས མཐ བས ན ད མ པ ལས བ མཐའ གཞན མ ང བ གང ཞ ག ད མ པས ཁས ལ ན མ ང བ ཁས ལ ན པ དང ད མ པ མ འགལ བ ན བཅས ང མ དང འགལ བ དང དག ང མ འགལ བ བཞ ན ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: There are natural unseemlinesses (kha na ma tho ba) like

77 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 75 killing. The ten nonvirtues are natural nonvirtues since they are part of the natural fabric of the way beings are natural laws. There are also formulated unseemlinesses like sleeping on a high bed. Sleeping on a high bed is a formulated unseemliness for a monastic because it is part of a formulated code that is not a part of natural law; its purpose is to prevent pride. It is possible to contradict formulated vows and still be a monastic though not the more substantial, natural vows. Similarly, Jam-yang-shay-pa is saying that Autonomists assertion of autonomous inferences is like contradicting a minor formulated code in the Discipline. The first [part of the reason which is that they also prove with limitless reasonings that all phenomena do not truly exist, due to which they are higher than Proponents of the Mind Only School, whereby they are not suitable to be a school of tenets other than the Middle Way School] is established because Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence says: a Since those scholars [the Autonomists] refute through many approaches of reasoning the tenet that all phenomena truly exist and assert well that [all phenomena] do not truly exist, they are Proponents of the Middle. དང པ [ད དག ག ས ཀ ང ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད བད ན མ ད ར གས པ མཐའ ཡས པས བ པས ས མས ཙམ པ ལས མཐ བས ན ད མ པ ལས བ མཐའ གཞན མ ང བར ] བ ལ གས བཤད ང པ ལས མཁས པ ད དག ཀ ང ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད བད ན པར ཡ ད པའ བ མཐའ ར གས པའ མ ནས འག ག ཅ ང བད ན མ ད ལ གས [G156a] པར ཞལ ག ས བཞ ས པས ད མ པ ན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The second [part of the reason which is that the noncontradiction of asserting what is not suitable for a Proponent of the Middle to assert and being a Proponent of the Middle is like the noncontradiction of having minor infractions of codes formulated (for monastics) and being a monastic ]is established because Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence says: b a In the part on the Autonomy School near the end of the section titled How autonomous signs are not asserted. b Just after the previous citation.

78 76 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle This does not contradict [Chandrakīrti s] statement that it is not right for whoever is a Proponent of the Middle to use autonomous [syllogisms], just as although it is not right for a monastic having [commitment to] formulated codes to transgress those formulated codes, through merely transgressing those [that person] is not necessarily not a monastic. Nāgārjuna s Refutation of Objections and Āryadeva s Four Hundred are not indicating that Proponents of the Middle do not have theses because it is explained that they posit the four theses of no production from the four extremes, because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 150) says, It also is to be put together likewise for the [other] three theses. This refutes many Tibetans, to be explained in the Decisive Analysis. གཉ ས པ [ད མ པས ཁས ལ ན མ ང བ ཁས ལ ན པ དང ད མ པ མ འགལ བ ན བཅས ན མ དང འགལ བ དང དག ང མ འགལ བ བཞ ན ཡ ན པ ] བ ལ གས བཤད ང པ ལས ད མ པ ཡ ན ན རང ད མ ར གས པར ག ངས པ དང མ འགལ ཏ བཅས ན དག ང ག ས བཅས པ དང འགལ བ མ ར གས ཀ ང ད དང འགལ བ ཙམ ག ས དག ང མ ཡ ན མ དག ས པ བཞ ན ན ཞ ས ས ད ག དང བཞ བ པས ད མ པ ལ དམ བཅའ མ ད པར བ ན པ མ ཡ ན ཏ མཐའ བཞ ལས བ མ ད པའ དམ བཅའ བཞ བཞག པར བཤད པའ ར ཚ ག གསལ ལས ད བཞ ན དམ བཅའ བ ག མ པ ལ ཡང ར བར འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར འད ས བ ད [L212b] མང པ བཀག མཐའ ད ད འཆད འ ར ར Hopkins: That Proponents of the Middle have negative theses is obvious as in the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom : Not from self, not from others,

79 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 77 Not from both, not causelessly Are any things Ever produced anywhere. Chandrakīrti explicitly calls them theses. Also, Proponents of the Middle have positive theses as when Nāgārjuna, for instance, says in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment, I assert dependently arisen activities as like dreams and magicians illusions, and in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says: Those who assert dependent things As not real and not unreal. Like a moon in water Are not captivated by views. 2' How it is not necessary [for Buddhapa lita] to avoid the fallacies propounded by others with respect to an autonomous [syllogism] གཉ ས པ རང ད ལ གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ ས ལ མ དག ས པའ ལ ན It follows that although on this occasion Buddhapālita did not avoid the fallacies propounded by others, there is no fault because Buddhapālita not only does not assert autonomous [syllogisms] established by valid cognition in compatible appearance to the two parties but also if he did assert such, it would not be reasonable. སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བས འད ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད པར ཐལ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ལ ལ གཉ ས ལ མ ན ང ཚད མས བ པའ རང ད ཙམ ཡང ཁས མ ངས ལ ལ ན ཡང མ ར གས པ ད འ ར Hopkins: Buddhapālita does not use autonomous syllogisms, so why should he clear away faults with respect to one here! But there s more: When Sāṃkhyas, for instance, establish that some-

80 78 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle thing exists, they cannot differentiate between existence and existence from that something s own side, and, therefore, a valid cognition establishing it as existing establishes it as existing from its own side. If you debate about something in order to prove anything positive about it, not just a mere negation as in proving that a permanent self does not exist, the subject has to be established by valid cognition. Say you are a Consequentialist debating with a non- Consequentialist. In the system of the opponent, the consciousness that certifies the existence of the subject certifies it as existing from its own side, but for the Consequentialist the consciousness that certifies the existence of the subject does not certify it as existing from its own side. Hence, there cannot be something established by valid cognition that exists in compatible appearance in the systems of the two parties. a Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 160) says: [ ]answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapālita. and (below, 159) : When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express autonomous inferences, ད ད ད ཉ ད ལས བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ད འ ལན བ ད པར བ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས དང གང ག ཚ ད ར ད མ པས རང ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ད འ ཚ ཞ ས ག ངས Hopkins: Again, we could take autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag pa) just to mean inferences that you yourself believe in, rather than laying a heavy reading of autonomous establishment on it as Ge-lug-pa scholars do. That is the crux of the debate between the Ge-lug and non-ge-lug. I do not know if there is anyone in Sa-kya like Ren-da-wa, Tsong-kha-pa s teacher who took autonomous the way Tsong-kha-pa does. a rgol phyi rgol gnyis kyi lugs la mthun snang du yod pa.

81 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 79 If, prior to the citation of sources, [you made the challenge]: [That Buddhapālita not only does not assert autonomous (syllogisms) established by valid cognition in compatible appearance to the two parties but also if he did assert such, it would not be reasonable] does not entail [that although on this occasion Buddhapālita did not avoid the fallacies propounded by others, there is no fault,] it follows that such is entailed because Buddhapālita did not state an autonomous [syllogism] like Bhāvaviveka s: The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence. a and hence he does not have the fault of not avoiding fallacies regarding the thesis and reason. ཤ ས ད ག ང [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ལ ལ གཉ ས ལ མ ན ང ཚད མས བ པའ རང ད ཙམ ཡང ཁས མ ངས ལ ལ ན ཡང མ ར གས པ ད ཡ ན ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བས འད ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད པས ]མ ཁ བ ན [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ལ ལ གཉ ས ལ མ ན ང ཚད མས བ པའ རང ད ཙམ ཡང ཁས མ ངས ལ ལ ན ཡང མ ར གས པ ད ཡ ན ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བས འད ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད པས ]ཁ བ པར ཐལ ད ར ན ལ གས ན ག ས མ ག ས གས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ཞ ས པའ རང ད མ བཀ ད པས དམ བཅའ དང གས ལ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ པའ ན a don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no zhes; na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavaditi. The Sanskrit is from Poussin. Here Jam-yangshay-pa inexplicably drops ultimately (don dam par, paramārthatas), whereas in the section on Bhāvaviveka s attack it is included as in, The subjects, the inner sense-spheres such as an eye, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence.

82 80 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle མ ད པའ ར Hopkins: The subjects of the syllogism are the internal sensespheres ; the predicate is are not produced from self ; the reason is because of existing ; the example is intelligence. The Tibetan of the example shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin is a mere translation of the Sanskrit caitanya and is not an extension of it to include the reason ( existing ). As Bhāvaviveka s commentator Avalokitavrata says: With respect to intelligence (shes pa yod pa, caitanya), the nature of the person (skyes bu, puruṣa) is called intelligence in the texts of the Sāṃkhyas and so forth; it is a variant a of the proposition of self. The example is compatible with the Sāṃkhyas. Given Bhāvaviveka s criticism of Buddhapālita, it is incredible to me that this is Bhāvaviveka s syllogism. For example, I immediately want to ask, What does produced from self mean? However, we can take Bhāvaviveka s criticism of Buddhapālita back to the fact that Buddhapālita has an introductory passage and a concluding passage which seem to indicate his opinion that Nāgārjuna is establishing the existence of conventionalites; therefore, based on that motivation, Bhāvaviveka decided that Buddhapālita is proving an affirming negative whereas Bhāvaviveka is clear as crystal that he is proving a nonaffirming negative since he opens with a statement that he is only proving a nonaffirming negative. This is the only way one can justify both Bhāvaviveka s criticism of Buddhapālita and his own display of a syllogism that seems to have the very faults that he finds in Buddhapālita. It follows [that Buddhapālita did not state an autonomous (syllogism) like Bhāvaviveka s: The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence. b a rnam grangs. b don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no zhes; na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt caitanyavaditi. The Sanskrit is from Poussin. Here Jam-yang-

83 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 81 and hence he does not have the fault of not avoiding fallacies regarding the thesis and reason] because: 1. How could [Buddhapālita be said] to have the thesis, [Eyes and so forth] are not produced from self, with regard to which if are not produced from self is proving that [eyes and so forth] are not produced from the entity of an effect, it is necessary to avoid the fallacy of proving what is already established [for the Sāṃkhya] and if it is proving that [eyes and so forth] are not produced from the entity of a cause, it is necessary to avoid the fault of contradiction [that is, proving the opposite for a Sāṃkhya]?! [དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ཞ ས པའ རང ད མ བཀ ད པས དམ བཅའ དང གས ལ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ པའ ན མ ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ དམ བཅའ ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད ཅ ས པ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས མ བར བ ན བ ཟ ན བ པའ ན དང འ བདག ཉ ད ལས མ བར བ ན འགལ བར འ ར བའ ཉ ས པ ས ལ དག ས པའ དམ བཅའ བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས པའ དམ བཅའ ག ལ ཡ ད Hopkins: What are the other-approved inferences that Chandrakīrti finds in Buddhapālita s text? Jam-yang-shay-pa states them as: With respect to the subject, things, their re-production is senseless because of being existent in their own entities. With respect to the subject, things, their production is endless because though existent in their own entities, there is necessity and purpose in their re-production. 2. Similarly, [Buddhapālita] did not state [as Bhāvaviveka did] as a reasoning, [Eyes and so forth] are not produced from self because of shay-pa inexplicably drops ultimately (don dam par, paramārthatas), whereas in the section on Bhāvaviveka s attack it is included as in, The subjects, the inner sense-spheres such as an eye, are not ultimately produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence.

84 82 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle existing, in which, upon examination, if this existing is said [to mean] existing from [the time of] the entity of the causes, it is necessary to avoid the fallacy of contradiction [which is that the reason, for a Sāṃkhya, proves the opposite that things are produced from self], and if it is said [to mean] existing at the time of the manifest effect, it is necessary to avoid the fallacy of proving what is already established [for Sāṃkhyas since Sāṃkhyas do not hold that the manifest requires production, that is, manifestation]. ད བཞ ན གས ལ བ གས ནས ཡ ད པའ ར བདག ལས མ བར བ པའ ཡ ད པ འད འ [G156b] བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ད པ ཟ ར ན འགལ བ དང འ ས གསལ [L213a] བའ ས ཡ ད པ ཟ ར ན བ ཟ ན བ པར འ ར བའ ན ང དག ས པའ གས ཀ ང མ བཀ ད པའ ར Hopkins: Buddhapālita did not state a reasoning for which it is necessary to get rid of such faults. The first [part of the reason (see #1 above)] is established because we [that is, Buddhapālita and, by extension, Chandrakīrti] did not state are not produced from self as the predicate of the proposition of these two consequences. Hopkins: At this point, the discussion focuses on the consequence. The predicate of the proposition of the consequence is their reproduction is senseless. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 159) says: [When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express autonomous inferences,] how could [Buddhapālita] have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhāvaviveka stated] The internal sense-spheres are not produced from self (nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med de, na ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni) which the Sāṃkhyas would cause to be overturned as follows: What is the meaning of this thesis? Does from self [mean] from the entity of the effect or from the entity of

85 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 83 the cause? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established [for us Sāṃkhyas]. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes. དང པ [དམ བཅའ ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད ཅ ས པ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས མ བར བ ན བ ཟ ན བ པའ ན དང འ བདག ཉ ད ལས མ བར བ ན འགལ བར འ ར བའ ཉ ས པ ས ལ དག ས པའ དམ བཅའ བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས པའ དམ བཅའ ག ལ ཡ ད པ ] བ ཁ བ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཐལ འ ར འད གཉ ས ཀ བ བ འ ཆ ས མ བཀ ད པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས གང ལ ག ངས ཅན ག དམ བཅའ ད ན འད གང ཡ ན ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ག ང ད ལས ཅ ར འ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ ཡ ན ལ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཏ ན ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ནས བའ ར ར ཞ ས པར གང ལ ག ངས ཅན པ དག ར ག པར ད པར འ ར བ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བར རང ད ཀ དམ བཅའ བ ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ས ས The second [part of the reason which is that similarly, (Buddhapālita) did not state (as Bhāvaviveka did) as a reasoning, (Eyes and so forth) are not produced from self because of existing, in which, upon examination, if this existing is said (to mean) existing from (the time of) the entity of the

86 84 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle causes, it is necessary to avoid the fallacy of contradiction (which is that the reason, for a Sāṃkhya, proves the opposite that things are produced from self(, and if it is said (to mean) existing at the time of the manifest effect, it is necessary to avoid the fallacy of proving what is already established (for Sāṃkhyas since Sāṃkhyas do not hold that the manifest requires production, that is, manifestation)] is established because we Consequentialists did not put forward as commentary [on Nāgārjuna s refutation of production from self] the autonomous sign, because of existing, but rather stated [because of] already existing in their own entities as the reason of a consequence, Hopkins: It is essential to notice that here Jam-yang-shay-pa strays from his earlier statement of the reason as because of existing from the time of their causes. I think that his earlier statement should be changed so that it reads as this one does: because of already existing in their own entities. Jam-yang-shay-pa uses this reason, or minor variations of it, throughout his text except for that first time. because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 160) says: Also, how could we [Consequentialists, Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhāvaviveka] because of existing (yod pa i phyir, vidyamānatvāt) which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya] or being an object of contradiction and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or being an object of contradiction! གཉ ས པ [ད བཞ ན གས ལ བ གས ནས ཡ ད པའ ར བདག ལས མ བར བ པའ ཡ ད པ འད འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ད པ ཟ ར ན འགལ བ དང འ ས གསལ བའ ས ཡ ད པ ཟ ར ན བ ཟ ན བ པར འ ར བའ ན ང དག ས པའ གས ཀ ང མ བཀ ད པ ] བ ཐལ འ ར བ ཁ བ ས འག ལ ཚ ག ད ས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས པའ རང ད ཀ གས མ བཀ ད པར རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད ཟ ན པ ཐལ འ ར ག གས བཀ ད པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས ཁ བ ཅག ལ ན གང ཞ ག བ པ

87 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 85 ལ བ པ ཉ ད དམ འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཞ ང བ པ ལ བ པ ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ ང བར བའ ར འབད པར ད པར འ ར བ ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བའ གཏན ཚ གས [L213b] ཀ ང ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ས ག ངས པའ ར Although the way the fallacies adduced [by Bhāvaviveka] with respect to [Buddhapālita s] reason and predicate of the proposition must be explained separately as [I have] in this way, none of the earlier scholars of Opposite of the Consequences a brought it out. Therefore, [I] have distinguished these points well. གས ཆ ས ལ བའ ཉ ས པ མ ད ལ ས ས ར འད ར བཤད དག ས ཀ ང ཐལ ག པ མ ས མ ཐ ན པས ལ གས པར ཡ ད ད Hopkins: Earlier (60), I related how the name Opposite of the Consequences is from Chandrakīrti who says that the opposite of the consequences is related with the opponent, not with us (below, 170). The opposite of the first consequence is Things production-again is sensible, which is accepted by the Sāṃkhya, not by the Consequentialist. One might think that the name Opposite of the Consequences only refers to Bhāvaviveka s reversal of Buddhapālita s two consequences, which, as Jam-yang-shay-pa presents how Bhāvaviveka sees them in Buddhapālita s brief indication, are: With respect to the subject, things, it follows that their production is senseless because they are produced from self. With respect to the subject, things, it follows that their production is endless because they are produced from self. Bhāvaviveka sees these two as consequences that project a proof a thal zlog pa.

88 86 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle (sgrub byed phen pa i thal gyur). a The opposite of the reason ( they are produced from self ) is reversed into they are not produced from self and is made into the predicate; the opposite of the predicate ( their production is senseless ) is reversed into their production is sensible. Because Bhāvaviveka saw a consequence that projects a proof, he had to reverse it to get at its actual meaning. Thus one might think that Opposite of the Consequences refers only to Bhāvaviveka s reversing this consequence and the next one, but it appears that the original meaning of the name more directly applies to Chandrakīrti s statement that the opposite of the consequences is related with the opponent, not with us the opposite of the first consequence being There is sense in their re-production, which is accepted by the Sāṃkhya, not by the Consequentialist. Still, Bhāvaviveka s reversal of the consequences is a step in the process since the focus of the issue is whether Buddhapālita asserts the opposite of the consequences, and when Bhāvaviveka sees consequences that project a proof and reverses the two members, he does it within the context of assuming that Buddhapālita accepts what Bhāvaviveka is doing. Since Chandrakīrti is correcting Bhāvaviveka s estimation of what was to be reversed and who accepts them, we could say that Opposite of the Consequences refers not only to the opposite of the consequences as Chandrakīrti saw them but also, by extension, to what Bhāvaviveka saw as the consequences and their opposites, which are indeed (from the home viewpoint) mis-readings of Buddhapālita. Opposite of the Consequences then refers to the whole drama of getting the opposite of the consequences straight what they are, who asserts them, and who does not assert them which involve delineating how Bhāvaviveka misreads all of these. Through this [it can be understood that] even if one states the otherapproved [syllogism], The subjects, eyes and so forth, are not produced from self because of existing like, for example, intelligence, it is necessary to clear away the fallacies adduced by another [that is, a Sāṃkhya] as Bhāvaviveka [says about Buddhapālita but fails to recognize about his own syllogism]. This is because those qualms are generated with respect to it and there is such an other-approved inference. a On five types of consequences see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness,

89 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 87 འད ས ན མ ག ས གས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པའ གཞན ག གས བཀ ད ན ཡང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ ལ གས ན ར ས ལ དག ས ཏ ད ལ ད གས པ ད ལ ད འ འ གཞན ག གས ཀ ས དཔག ཡ ད པའ ར Hopkins: Even if one did not state an autonomous syllogism but instead stated such an other-approved syllogism, the same problems would still arise. B) HOW [BUDDHAPĀLITA] IS FAULTLESS IN TERMS OF OTHER-APPROVED [SYLLOGISMS] {2 PARTS} གཉ ས པ [གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས པའ ན མ ད ལ ]ལ This has two parts: [Bhāvaviveka s] objection that the fallacies of not expressing a reason and an example in terms of an other-approved [syllogism] remain as they were and [Chandrakīrti s] answer to that. གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས པའ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན ས ན གནས [G157a] པའ ད པ དང ད འ ལན གཉ ས 1' [Bhāvaviveka s] objection that the fallacies of not expressing a reason and an example in terms of an other-approved [syllogism] remain as they were A hypothetical qualm: A certain master Bhāvaviveka says: It follows that the aforementioned fallacy of not expressing a reason and an example and the fallacy of not clearing away the fault adduced by another still cannot be avoided because

90 88 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle although it is allowed that you, Chandrakīrti, have avoided those two [fallacies] with respect to an autonomous [syllogism], there are [still] the fallacies of not expressing a reason and example of an other-approved [syllogism] and not clearing away its faults. དང པ [གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས པའ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན ས ན གནས པའ ད པ ]ན བ གས པ མཐའ བ ང ག ད གས པ ན བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན ན ར ར བཀ ད པའ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ན ད ང ང མ བ པར ཐལ རང ད ཀ ད གཉ ས ག གས ཁ ད ཀ ས ངས ག ཀ ང གཞན ག གས ཀ གས དཔ མ བ ད པ དང ད འ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ན ཡ ད པའ ར The first corner of the reason [which is that it is allowed that you, Chandrakīrti, have avoided those two (fallacies) with respect to an autonomous (syllogism)] is established because it is true that since Proponents of the Middle do not have compatibly appearing reasons and so forth proving truthlessness, they do not demonstrate damage to another s, a Sāṃkhya s, thesis of production from self through autonomous [syllogisms]. [རང ད ཀ ད གཉ ས ག གས ཁ ད ཀ ས ངས ག པ ] གས ར དང པ བ ད མ པ ལ བད ན མ ད བ པའ གས ས གས མ ན ང བ མ ད པས རང ད ཀ ས གཞན ག ངས ཅན ག བདག དམ བཅའ ལ གན ད པ མ བ ན པ བད ན པའ ར Hopkins: Again Bhāvaviveka is saying something that the actual Bhāvaviveka never would since he accepts compatibly appearing reasons and so forth even when proving truthlessness. My hunch is that Bhāvaviveka s insistence on syllogisms suggests that he believes in compatible appearance; he does not have to say it in so many words.

91 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 89 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 161) says: [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might think: [I might allow that] since, according to Proponents of the Middle, the position [that is, the thesis], the reason, and the example [of an autonomous syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences (rang gi rgyud kyi rje su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other s thesis through an inference established for both [parties] (gnyi ga la grub pa, ubhayasiddha). ད ཉ ད ལས ཅ ཡང ད མ པ མས ཀ ར ན གས དང གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ དག མ བ པས ནས [རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ར བདག ལས བ དགག པའ དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན བ པ དང གཉ ག ལ བ པའ ས དཔག པས གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བསལ བར ]མ ར མ ད ཅ ས ང [Jam-yang-shay-pa continues with his depiction of Bhāvaviveka s hypothetical objection:] The second reason [which is that there are (still) the fallacies of not expressing a reason and example of an other-approved (syllogism) and not clearing away its faults] is established because whereas it is necessary to state for the Sāṃkhya a position, that is, a probandum, a reason, and an example devoid of fallacy and it is necessary to clear away faults adduced with respect to that [syllogism, Buddhapālita] did not express those and did not at all clear away its faults. Hopkins: You state your syllogism and then you clear up any qualms. According to Bhāvaviveka, one should do these things, but Buddhapālita did not do either: he neither stated a syllogism nor cleared up any faults with respect to it. [གཞན ག གས ཀ གས དཔ མ བ ད པ ད འ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ ] [L214a] གས གཉ ས པ བ ག ངས ཅན རང ཉ ད ལ གས ཏ བ བས དང གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ ན དང ལ བ འག ད དག ས པ

92 90 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle དང ད ལ ས པའ ཉ ས པ ས ལ དག ས པ ལ ད དག མ བ ད པ དང ད འ ཉ ས པ ས ལ བ གང ཡང མ ས པ ད འ ར Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 161) says: [The hypothetical Bhāvaviveka continues:] Still, one must express contradiction of the other s thesis through one s own inference a (rang gi rjes su dpag pa, svata evānumāna). Hence, one must have b a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of fallacies of position, reason, and example. Therefore, since [Buddhapālita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Sāṃkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapālita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means]. ད ཉ ད ལས གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བ ལ རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ ན དག ས པས རང ཉ ད ལ གས ལ ས གས པ གས དང གས ཀ དང དཔ འ ན དང ལ བ དག ཡ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར ད མ བ ད པའ ར དང ད འ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ཉ ས པ ད ཉ ད ད འ ར ར མ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར 2' [Chandrakīrti s] answer to that {2 parts} གཉ ས པ ལན ལ This has two parts: how the first fallacy [mentioned] in that objection does not exist and how, despite the second fallacy the faults adduced are not cleared away here there is no problem. a b Jam-yang-shay-pa calls this other-approved (gzhan grags). rang nyid la yod pa bya dgos.

93 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 91 ད པ ད འ ན དང པ མ ད ལ དང ན གཉ ས པ ས པའ ཉ ས པ འད ར མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད ལ གཉ ས a' How the first fallacy [mentioned] in that objection does not exist {2 parts} དང པ [ ད པ ད འ ན དང པ མ ད ལ ]ལ This has two parts: the reason why other-approved [syllogisms] mainly are not set out here and an explanation that even if it were necessary to express an other-approved [syllogism, Buddhapālita] has expressed such. འད ར གཙ བ ར གཞན ག གས མ བཤད པའ མཚན དང གཞན ག གས བ ད དག ས ནའང བ ད པར བཤད པ གཉ ས Hopkins: In other words, it is important to know that we do not mainly use other-approved syllogism; rather, we mainly use consequences, but Buddhapālita is faultless even in terms of otherapproved syllogisms because they can be seen in what he says. 1" REASON WHY OTHER-APPROVED [SYLLOGISMS] MAINLY ARE NOT SET OUT HERE It follows that it is not that a self-approved reason definitely must be stated in that way for all opposing parties because due to the fact that even a consequence can demonstrate, as before, inner contradiction and logical unfeasibility there is not at all any further purpose on this occasion in definitely having still to necessarily demonstrate an other-approved inference to the opposing party. དང པ [འད ར གཙ བ ར གཞན ག གས མ བཤད པའ མཚན ]ན ལ ཀ ན ལ རང ག གས ཀ གཏན ཚ གས ང ས པར འག ད དག ས པ ད ར མ ཡ ན པར ཐལ ཐལ འ ར ག ས ཀ ང ར ར ནང འགལ དང འཐད པ མ ད པར ན བ པའ མཚན ད ས ན

94 92 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle བས [G157b] འད ར ང ས བ ང ལ ལ གཞན ག གས ཀ ས དཔག བ ན པའ དག ས པ ག པ ད གད ད ཅ ཡང མ ད ར Hopkins: As a central question which we do not have straight here: When you state a consequence and the other person understands a point, does the corresponding syllogism appear to that person s mind or not? Is it by way of the appearance of the corresponding syllogism to your mind that the other party understands it? Similarly, when in meditation you use a consequence and the meaning finally gets through to you, does the corresponding syllogism appear to your mind or not? Take, for example, the following consequence: It absurdly follows that the subject, I, am not a dependentarising because of being inherently established. What you want to understand in meditation is I am not inherently established. Do I understand this by route of the following appearing to my mind: The subject, I, is not inherently established because of being a dependent-arising. Or, if not, is there another way through which I could understand I am not inherently established? You have to understand I am not inherently established the probandum has to appear to your mind but does the reason with its entailment have to appear to your mind? How could you understand this point unless the reason and the entailment appear to your mind? Mr. X asked me one day whether the corresponding syllogism has to appear to your mind for you to understand the thesis, and I said yes that is the way I was taught. You do not have to state it but it has to appear to your mind. He was wondering if there was some other way it could work. He did not have another way, but he was wondering if there was another way that a consequence worked. As I mentioned earlier, look at the brilliant explanation by Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa in footnote on page 53. To return to Jam-yang-shay-pa, he says, [Since even a consequence can demonstrate inner contradiction and logical unfeasibility, there is not at all any further purpose on this occasion in

95 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 93 definitely having still to necessarily demonstrate an other-approved inference. In other words, there is no way of making a definite rule about demonstrating an other-approved inference to the opponent, whereas Bhāvaviveka is saying that there absolutely must also state a syllogism. Does Jam-yang-shay-pa not insist on stating syllogism because it already appears to the other person s mind? However, he does not say this; he merely says that the person can see the inner contradictions and illogicality of holding otherwise and, from that, can perceive absence of production from self or absence of inherent establishment. Let us look again at the consequence: It absurdly follows that the subject, I, is/am not a dependentarising because of being inherently established. Now, being a Buddhist, you would naturally want to hold that you are a dependent-arising you have conviction in this fact. Therefore, when you hear, The I is not a dependent-arising because of being inherently established, and you reflect that whatever is inherently established would necessarily not be a dependent-arising, it conflicts with your conviction that you are a dependent-arising. Thus the very fact that you perceive that the statement entails something counter to your conviction as a Buddhist is what makes the consequence effective and powerful. In short, you indeed understand the entailment and you know that you are a dependentarising therefore, you have those two necessary elements of the syllogism. So, it looks as if the consequence prompts an understanding containing within it all the features of the corresponding syllogism. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 161) says: That is not so. Why? and (below, 162) : What need is there here to still express damage [to their position] by way of inference! [In the Tibetan translation, the word] ko a is an old term for still (da gdod). a ko. The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 164) cites this as go rather than

96 94 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ད ཉ ད ལས ད ན ད མ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན ཞ ས དང [L214b]འད ར ས དཔག པའ གན ད པ བ ད པ ལ དག ས པ ཀ ཅ ཞ ག ཡ ད ཅ ས ས ཀ ཞ ས པ ད གད ད ཀ བ ང ཡ ན ན It follows that although there are no other-approved reasons expressed in accordance with the two consequences of the earlier occasion, one can demonstrate to a Sāṃkhya the inner contradictions and the logical unfeasibility of the existence of production from self because the mode of occurrence of inner contradictions for a Sāṃkhya who is debated against with the two consequences, as explained earlier, has already been established and on this occasion the statement [by the Proponent of the Middle through these two consequences], This argument of yours is devoid of logical feasibility, is the clearest repudiation of this [opponent]. ར ག ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ བས ར བ ད པའ གཞན ག གས ཀ གཏན ཚ གས མ ད ཀ ང ག གས ཅན ལ ནང འགལ དང བདག ཡ ད པའ འཐད པ མ ད པར ན བ པར ཐལ ར ར ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ ས བ ད པའ ག ངས ཅན ལ ནང འགལ འ ང ལ བ བས ཟ ན ལ ད འ བས ཁ ད ཅག ག ད པ འད ན འཐད པ དང ལ བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས པ འད འད འ ན འ ན གསལ ཤ ག ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: It is helpful to remember that within Chandrakīrti s answer to Bhāvaviveka, we are dealing with How Buddhapālita is faultless in terms of other-approved syllogisms, and within that topic we are dealing with The reason why other-approved syllogisms mainly are not set out here. Now, what are the two consequences on the earlier occasion mentioned at the beginning of this sentence? It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its re-production is senseless because of being existent in its own entity.

97 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 95 It follows with respect to the subject, a shoot, that its production is endless because, though existent in its own entity, there is necessity and purpose in its re-production. Even though there are no other-approved reasons corresponding to these two consequences, Consequentialists point out to the Sāṃkhya through these consequences that the Sāṃkhya s argument is fallacious, and this is sufficient Consequentialists do not need to put forward their own syllogisms. Not only is that sufficient, it is the clearest repudiation of the opponent. It follows [that the mode of occurrence of inner contradictions for a Sāṃkhya who is debated against with the two consequences, as explained earlier, has already been established and on this occasion the statement (by the Proponent of the Middle through these two consequences), This argument of yours is devoid of logical feasibility, is the clearest repudiation of this (opponent)] because (1) that is the clearest repudiation, and (2) if it is not, the Sāṃkhya must prove the opposite, that is, that there is production from self, and (3) a Sāṃkhya cannot prove to a Buddhist that there is production from self. [ ར ར ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ ས བ ད པའ ག ངས ཅན ལ ནང འགལ འ ང ལ བ བས ཟ ན ལ ད འ བས ཁ ད ཅག ག ད པ འད ན འཐད པ དང ལ བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས པ འད འད འ ན འ ན གསལ ཤ ག ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ན འ ན གསལ ཤ ག གང ཞ ག ད མ ཡ ན ན ག ངས ཅན ག ས ད ལས བ ག བདག ཡ ད པར བ དག ས ལ ག ངས ཅན ག ས སངས ས པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པར བ མ བ པའ ར Hopkins: After a Buddhist has stated two consequences of their view, if the Sāṃkhyas do not feel the impact of the repudiation, they should respond by proving their own view. Rather than Consequentialists having to go on and state an other-approved syllogism, the Sāṃkhya should prove to the Consequentialists what the Sāṃkhyas hold if they want to persist in their view. One might contend that this line of thought plays into the hands of those who say that Proponents of the Middle have no thesis of their own but merely disprove other persons theses. The

98 96 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle contrary evidence, however, is that Chandrakīrti goes on to say that Buddhapālita s explanation contains other-approved syllogisms if one wants them; this strongly suggests that he does not object to merely stating other-approved syllogisms; Chandrakīrti s objection seems to be to the imperative to state them on all occasions, as Jam-yang-shay-pa has stated above. The first corner of the reason [which is that that is the clearest repudiation] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 162) says: Therefore, since they have asserted a position that is devoid of logical feasibility, they deceive only themselves, due to which they cannot generate ascertainment in another. and (below, 162): In this way, [due to being faulty] just this inability of their attempt to prove the meaning of their thesis is the clearest repudiation of their [position]. [ད ན འ ན གསལ ཤ ག ཡ ན པ ] གས ར དང པ བ ད ཉ ད ལས ད འ ར འཐད པ དང ལ བའ གས ཁས ངས པས འད ན བདག ཉ ད ཁ ན ལ བར ད པས གཞན ལ ང ས པ ད པར མ ས ས ཞ ས དང གང རང ག དམ བཅའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ལ ས པ མ ད པ འད ཉ ད འད འ ན འ ན པ ཆ ས གསལ པ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The second corner of the reason [which is that if it is not (the clearest repudiation), the Sāṃkhya must prove the opposite, that is, that there is production from self] is established because at that time it is right for the Sāṃkhya to become the challenger and thereupon to prove to the Proponent of the Middle that production from self exists. It follows [that at that time it is right for the Sāṃkhya to become the challenger and thereupon to prove to the Proponent of the Middle that production from self exists] because in that case for challengers who wish to demonstrate to another a meaning that they hold as a thesis, the statement of proofs proving the meaning that is their thesis is the general procedure of disputants, or proponents of reasoning. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 161) says:

99 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 97 Those [such as Sāṃkhyas] who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapālita] wish to generate ascertainment of something which they hold as a thesis in others in just the way that they have ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Proponents of the Middle] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the general procedure for just the other party [here, the Sāṃkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis that they themselves assert [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapālita s consequences rather than for Buddhapālita to proceed to set forth an other-approved inference]. [ད མ ཡ ན ན ག ངས ཅན ག ས ད ལས བ ག བདག ཡ ད པར བ དག ས པ ] གས ར གཉ ས པ བ ད འ ཚ ག ངས ཅན ག ས ལ ས ནས གཞན ད མ པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པའ བ ད ར གས པའ ར [ད འ ཚ ག ངས ཅན ག ས ལ ས ནས གཞན ད མ པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པའ བ ད ར གས པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ར ན རང ག དམ བཅས པའ ད ན གཞན ལ ན འད ད པའ ལ [L215a] ག ས རང ག དམ བཅའ ད ན ད བ པའ བ ད འག ད པ ན ལ བའམ ར གས འ གས ཡ ན པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས གང ག ར ད ན གང ཞ ག གང ག ས དམ བཅས པ ད ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ང ས པ བཞ ན གཞན དག ལ ང ས པ ད པར འད ད པས ད ན འད འཐད པ གང ག ནས ཁ ང ད པའ འཐད པ ད ཉ ད གཞན ལ བ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར རང ག ས ཁས ངས པའ དམ བཅས པའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན ཕ [G158a]ར ལ ཁ ནས དག ས པར བ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན ར ཞ ག གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས

100 98 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle The third corner of the reason from above [that is, that a Sāṃkhya cannot prove to a Buddhist that there is production from self] is established because this reason [stated] by a Sāṃkhya to a Buddhist to prove that production from self exists is not, for a Proponent of the Middle, a correct reason. It follows [that this reason (stated) by a Sāṃkhya to a Buddhist to prove that production from self exists is not, for a Proponent of the Middle, a correct reason] because the reasons stated by a Sāṃkhya such as: The subject, a shoot unmanifest at the time of [its] causes, is produced from its own entity (1) because the nonexistent is not produced and (2) because the causes [of one thing] are distinct from the causes [of another], and so forth are not established for a Proponent of the Middle. ག ང ག [ག ངས ཅན ག ས སངས ས པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པར བ མ བ པ ] གས ར ག མ པ བ ག ངས ཅན ག ས སངས ས པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པར བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས འད ན གཞན ད མ པ ལ གཏན ཚ གས ཡང དག པ མ ཡ ན པའ ར [ག ངས ཅན ག ས སངས ས པ ལ བདག ཡ ད པར བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས འད ན གཞན ད མ པ ལ གཏན ཚ གས ཡང དག པ མ ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ག ངས ཅན ག ས ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ ག ཆ ས ཅན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ལས མ ད པ མ བའ ར དང ས ས ར ང ས པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད པའ གས ས གས ད མ པ ལ མ བ པའ ར Hopkins: In the system of the Middle Way School, can nonexistents be produced? You might think that a nonexistent is produced because something previously nonexistent is newly produced. a Indeed, something previously nonexistent is newly produced whereas something previously existent is not newly produced since it already exists. Still, the fact that something previously a sngar med gsar du skye ba.

101 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 99 nonexistent is newly produced does not entail that nonexistents are to be produced because if the nonexistent is produced, then something nonexistent such as the horn of a rabbit could be produced. Hence, the conclusion is that even though something previously nonexistent is newly produced, in general a nonexistent is not produced; rather, an existent is produced. So with that in mind, the first reason, because the nonexistent is not produced, in the hypothetical Sāṃkhya s syllogism above: The subject, a shoot unmanifest at the time of [its] causes, is produced from its own entity (1) because the nonexistent is not produced and (2) because the causes [of one thing] are distinct from the causes [of another]. is established for a Buddhist; however, it does not entail the predicate is produced from its own entity and hence is not a valid reasoning. The meaning of the second reason, because the causes [of one thing] are distinct from the causes [of another] (rgyu so sor nges pa i phyir) needs to be explicated: Everything is not produced from everything things have individual causes, and from this fact the Sāṃkhyas draw the conclusion that effects must already reside in the causes. They feel: What could make the causes individual except for the fact that their individual effects already reside with them? That is the meaning of the Sāṃkhya s second reason. Buddhists, however, say that the potential of a thing abides with its causes and not with the causes of something else. This is different from saying that the actual effect abides with its causes in nonmanifest form, though perhaps not as different as one might initially think. It follows [that the reasons stated by a Sāṃkhya are not established for a Proponent of the Middle] because at that time there are no [fully qualified] reason in that [proof] and example that possesses the two the reason and the predicate. [ག ངས ཅན ག ས ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ ག ཆ ས ཅན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ལས མ ད པ མ བའ ར དང ས ས ར ང ས པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད པའ གས ས གས ད མ པ ལ མ བ པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད འ ཚ ད འ གས དང

102 100 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle གས ཆ ས གཉ ས ན ག དཔ མ ད པའ ར a Hopkins: What does it mean to say that there is no reason? I think that it means that since there is no entailment between the reason and the predicate, the reason is not a correct or fully-qualified reason. What does it mean to say that there is no example that possesses the reason and the predicate? It means that there is no example of something that is produced from itself and has individual causes. If something is to serve as an example with respect to a particular syllogism, it must possess the predicate and the reason. Take, for example, the following syllogism: The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product like, for example, a pot. For pot to be a good example it must be characterized by the predicate and the reason; in this case, it must be impermanent and a product, and indeed it is, and similarly a pot is an example that possesses the reason, product, and the predicate, impermanent. However, there is no such example for the hypothetical Sāṃkhya s syllogism above. [That at that time there is no (fully qualified) reason in that (proof) and there is no example that possesses the two the reason and the predicate] entails [that the reasons stated by a Sāṃkhya are not established for a Proponent of the Middle] because therefore the proofs, aside from only being outflows of their own assertions, are nonexistent proofs. [ད འ ཚ ད འ གས དང གས ཆ ས གཉ ས ན ག དཔ མ ད ན ག ངས ཅན ག ས ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ ག ཆ ས ཅན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ལས མ ད པ མ བའ ར དང ས ས ར ང ས པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད པའ གས ས གས ད མ པ ལ མ བ པས ]ཁ བ ད ས ན བ ད རང ག ཁས ངས ཀ ས འ ངས པ ཙམ ལས བ ད མ ད པ ད ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: In other words, since the statement is only an outflow of a The Old Go-mang edition (158a.3) has a further der thal/ de i dpe med pa i phyir/ which is absent from 2015 TBRC bla brang edition most likely due to being redundant.

103 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 101 Sāṃkhyas own assertions, they are not proofs a they are not correct signs. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 162) says: However, this [reason that Sāṃkhyas state to a Proponent of the Middle to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reason for the other [party, the Proponent of the Middle]. Because there are no reason and example, the proof of the meaning of their thesis is just a statement of outflows of [their own] assertions. ད ཉ ད ལས འད ན གཞན ལ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང མ ཡ ན ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ ད པའ ར རང ག དམ བཅའ པའ [L215b]ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན རང ཉ ད ཁས འཆ བའ ས འ ང བ འབའ ཞ ག ཉ བར བཀ ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར ཞ ས ས 2" EXPLANATION THAT EVEN IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO EXPRESS AN OTHER-APPROVED [SYLLOGISM, BUDDHAPĀLITA] HAS EXPRESSED SUCH གཉ ས པ གཞན ག གས བ ད དག ས ནའང བ ད པ ན A b [hypothetical] Bhāvaviveka objects: It follows that even here on this occasion it is right definitely to express a self-approved inference c because the Supramundane Victor in many sūtras set out the five reasons and so forth and in Nāgārjuna s texts there also are many, due to which the setting out of only consequences would disagree with these. To state this mode of objection, Chandrakīrti s Clear Words says: a sgrub byed. b 2016 Old Go-mang Lhasa, 158a.5; 2011 TBRC bla brang, 215b.1. c Here, self-approved inference means other-approved inference since here self and other both refer to the Sāṃkhyas.

104 102 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might say: Nevertheless, contradiction by one s own inference [that is to say, by an inference acceptable to Sāṃkhyas] must, without question, be expressed. ལ གས ན ན ར བས འད ར ཡང རང ག གས ཀ ས དཔག པ ང ས པར བ ད ར གས པར ཐལ བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས མད མར ཡང གཏན ཚ གས ས གས བཤད ལ བ ཀ ག ང ནའང མ ཡ ད པས ཐལ འ ར ཁ ན བཤད པ ད དག དང མ མ ན པར འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས པའ ད ལ ན ད ཉ ད ལས ཅ ཡང རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ གད ན མ ཟ བར བ ད པར བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ན ཞ ས ས Hopkins: In the first sentence the phrase on this occasion means on this Middle Way occasion of refuting production from self. What are the five reasons? I assume that these are the five main reasonings proving emptiness: (1) the diamond nodes (refutation of production from self, other, both, and neither), (2) the refutation of production of the four alternatives one cause producing one effect; many causes, one effect; one cause, many effects; and many causes, many effects; (3) the refutation of production of an existent effect, of a non-existent effect, of an effect that is both existent and non-existent, or of an effect which is neither existent nor non-existent; (4) the reasoning of dependent-arising, and (5) lack of being one or many. For them to be Jam-yang-shaypa s referents here, they would have to be set out as syllogisms in sūtra and not as consequences. Though Nāgārjuna does use consequences, he does not always use consequences. In answer, [Chandrakīrti says that] it follows that even if an other-approved inference needed to be demonstrated, Buddhapālita did express [such] because Buddhapālita s Commentary explains that Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless. Objection: [That Buddhapālita s Commentary explains that Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again]

105 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 103 would be just senseless, ] does not entail [that even if an other-approved inference needed to be demonstrated, Buddhapālita did express (such)]. Response: It follows that there is entailment because this passage also indicates the following full-fledged application of a sign [that is, a syllogism]: With respect to the subjects, things such as nonmanifest shoots and so forth which are in the potential entities of their causes, [their] production-again is senseless, or purposeless, because of already existing in their own entities like, for example, an already manifest pot. ལན ལ གཞན ག གས ཀ ས དཔག ན དག ས ན ཡང སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ད པར ཐལ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ འག ལ པ ལས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ འག ལ པ ལས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བཤད ན གཞན ག གས ཀ ས དཔག ན དག ས ན ཡང སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ད པས ]མ ཁ བ ན ཁ བ པར ཐལ ག ང འད ས རང ག འ ས པའ [G158b] ང བ ར ར ཅ ང མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ ག ས གས དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང བ ད ན དམ དག ས པ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད ཟ ན པའ ར དཔ ར ན མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན ག མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པའ གས ར མ དག གཅ ག ཀ ང བ ན པའ ར Hopkins: There are a great many differences between Buddhapālita s terse formulation and Jam-yang-shay-pa s representation of it as a syllogism. For instance, Buddhapālita s subject is things, whereas in Jam-yang-shay-pa s rendition it is things such as nonmanifest shoots and so forth which are in the potential

106 104 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle entities of their causes. Moreover, what was the reason in Buddhapālita s statement has become the predicate in Jam-yang-shaypa s reformulation because the reason in Buddhapālita s original statement is itself a consequence. Specifically, Jam-yang-shay-pa puts the phrase would be senseless which is in Buddhapālita s reason in the position of the predicate. Indeed, the part of Buddhapālita s statement that is in the reason slot looks like a consequence, but the corresponding predicate is their production would be senseless not their production-again is senseless. In addition, the reason that Jam-yang-shay-pa gives, because of already existing in their own entities, does not seem to be anywhere in Buddhapālita s statement. Because of these seeming discrepancies, Jam-yang-shay-pa proceeds to show how his reading is justified. It follows [that this passage (in Buddhapālita s Commentary Things are not produced from their own entities because their production [again] would be just senseless, ) also indicates the following full-fledged application of a sign (that is, a syllogism): With respect to the subjects, things such as nonmanifest shoots and so forth which are in the potential entities of their causes, (their) production-again is senseless, or purposeless, because of already existing in their own entities like, for example, an already manifest pot.] because this passage: 1. indicates such subjects and such an example 2. also indicates the reason, and 3. also indicates the predicate of the proposition. The first [part of the reason which is that this passage indicates such subjects and such an example] is established because their in the brief indication [where it says, their production would be just senseless ] indicates examples, those which are established in their own entities, and also subjects. It follows [that their in the brief indication (where it says, their production would be just senseless ) indicates examples, those which are established in their own entities, and also subjects] because this statement in the extensive explanation, There is no need for production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of things that already exist in their own entities, is the extensive explanation of the brief indication. [That this statement in

107 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 105 the extensive explanation, There is no need for production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of things that already exist in their own entities, is the extensive explanation of the brief indication] entails [that their in the brief indication (where it says, their production would be just senseless ) indicates examples, those which are established in their own entities, and also subjects] because this statement in the extensive explanation contains examples possessing both the reason and the predicate. [ག ང འད ས རང ག འ ས པའ ང བ ར ར ཅ ང མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ ག ས གས དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང བ ད ན དམ དག ས པ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད ཟ ན པའ ར དཔ ར ན མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན ག མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པའ གས ར མ དག གཅ ག ཀ ང བ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ག ང འད ས ད འ འ ཆ ས ཅན དང དཔ བ ན པ གང ཞ ག [L216a] གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང བ ན བ བ འ ཆ ས ཀ ང བ ན པའ ར དང པ [ག ང འད ས ད འ འ ཆ ས ཅན དང དཔ བ ན པ ] བ མད ར བ ན ག ད དག ག ཞ ས པས དཔ རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ པ དང ཆ ས ཅན ཡང བ ན པའ ར [མད ར བ ན ག ད དག ག ཞ ས པས དཔ རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ པ དང ཆ ས ཅན ཡང བ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ས བཤད ཀ དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས པ འད མད ར བ ན ག ས བཤད ཡ ན པའ ར [ ས བཤད ཀ དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས པ འད མད ར བ ན ག ས བཤད ཡ ན ན མད ར བ ན ག ད དག ག ཞ ས པས དཔ རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ པ དང ཆ ས ཅན ཡང བ ན པས ]ཁ བ ས བཤད ཀ ངག འད ས གས ཆ ས གཉ ས ན ག མ ན དཔ བ ང བ ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: The section within Buddhapālita s statement called the brief indication says, their production would be just senseless.

108 106 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle At first blush, it seems difficult to maintain that when he says, their production, from it we supposedly derive a fairly elaborate subject: Things such as nonmanifest shoots and so forth which are in the potential entities of their causes. To repeat: It is being claimed this entire subject is in the word their found in Buddhapālita s reason clause: Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless Indeed, the antecedent of their is things, and Jam-yang-shaypa clarifies what type of things should not require productionagain but which Sāṃkhyas hold do require re-production, or manifestation things such as nonmanifest shoots and so forth which are in the potential entities of their causes. Jam-yang-shay-pa claims that the example, an already manifest pot, is also to be found in the word their. This may seem a bit thin, but something like an already manifest pot is the only sort of thing that Sāṃkhyas would agree does not require re-production, or manifestation. How does their indicate establishment in their own entities? When Buddhapālita says, Things are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless, the word their must mean things already existent in their own entities because if it meant anything else, Buddhapālita would be talking nonsense, and in addition, he is talking to a Sāṃkhya who would understand it that way since the subject has to be nonmanifest so that the predicate no need for re-production, or manifestation will be contrary to the Sāṃkhya position. Also, the example must be something that the Sāṃkhya already understands does not require production since a manifest pot is not produced again. How does Jam-yang-shay-pa, based on Chandrakīrti, prove that these things are in the brief indication? Because Buddhapālita s further exposition is an extensive explanation of that brief indication. In the more extensive version Buddhapālita does indeed say, things existent in their own entities (dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa). This indicates that in the phrase their

109 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 107 production in the brief indication their means things existent in their own entities. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 163) says: Answer: The master Buddhapālita also just expressed such. How? For he said, Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless (dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du gyur ba i phyir, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthyāt). In that, the [word] their (de dag, tad) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] those which [already] exist in their own entities. Why? This is because [Buddhapālita s subsequent statement], The production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless (dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnams la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do, na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanamasti), is his commentary on that abbreviated statement [and, therefore, it must be carried over to the shorter statement]. Moreover, this [longer] statement [ those which already exist in their own entities ] contains a concordant example [ a manifest pot ] renowned to the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] that possesses the predicate of the proposition [ senseless production-again ] and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is, the probans] (bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa i chos, sādhyasādhanadharma) [ already existing in its own entity ]. ད ཉ ད ལས ད ཡང བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ད པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས པ ནས [ཇ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར ད ས ན འད ད བཤད པ ཡ ན ཏ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར ར ད ལ ད དག ཅ ས བ འད ས ན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན འད ར རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན ]མད ར བཞག པའ ངག ད འ འག ལ པའ ངག ཡ ན ལ ངག འད ས ན ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ གཞན ལ རབ ག གས པ བ བ [294] པར བདང བ པར ད པའ ཆ ས དང ན པ ཉ བར

110 108 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle བ ང བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས The second reason [which is that this passage also indicates the reason] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 164) says: In [Buddhapālita s longer statement], already existing in their own entities contains the reason. [ག ང འད ས གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང བ ན པ ] གས གཉ ས པ བ ད ཉ ད ལས ད ལ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཞ ས བ འད ས ན གཏན ཚ གས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས The third reason [which is that this passage also indicates the predicate of the proposition] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 164) says: [In the shorter statement itself] because production would be just senseless contains the predicate of the proposition [once it is changed to production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) is senseless in accordance with the longer statement]. [ག ང འད ས བ བ འ ཆ ས ཀ ང བ ན པ ] གས ག མ པ བ ད ཉ ད ལས བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བ འད ས ན བ བ པར བའ ཆ ས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས [The statement in Buddhapālita s Commentary that Things are not produced from self because their production (again) would be just senseless, ] also indicates a correct other-approved [syllogism] which takes the nonexistence of production from self as its thesis because it states: The subjects, objects other than the person, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, like the person. [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ འག ལ པ ལས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བཤད པ ]ཡང བདག མ ད པ དམ བཅའ ས པའ གཞན ག གས ཡང དག གཅ ག ཀ ང

111 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 109 བ ན ཏ ས ལས ཐ དད པའ ད ན མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ར ས [L216b] བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བཀ ད པའ ར Hopkins: For this syllogism to work, the Sāṃkhyas should already assert that the example, the person, is not produced from self and that it exists in its own entity, and indeed they do. To render the example itself as a syllogism: The subject, the person, is not produced from self because of existing in its own entity. They would accept this syllogism because in Sāṃkhya theory the person (skyes bu, puruṣa), as opposed to the nature (rang bzhin, prakṛti), is permanent and unproduced, and thus they accept that the person, or fundamental consciousness, is not produced from self. Still, I question whether they would accept the entailment which is that whatever exists in its own entity is not produced, since they hold that nonmanifest pots and so forth exist in their own entities but require production, that is, manifestation. Therefore, it follows that even in terms of an other-approved [syllogism] Buddhapālita does not have the fallacy of not expressing a sign and an example because those words of [his] commentary set out such by way of a proof statement having five branches. ད ས ན སངས ས བ ངས ལ གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས ཀ ང གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན མ ད པར ཐལ འག ལ ཚ ག ད ས བ ངག ཡན ལག ན ག [G159a] ནས བཤད པའ ར Hopkins: Before Jam-yang-shay-pa s presentation of Chandrakīrti s favored proof statement having five branches, let us consider the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system of proof statements having only two branches: 1. the entailment together with an example, such as:

112 110 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle Whatever is a product is impermanent like, for example, a pot. This corresponds to the major premise in Western terminology. 2. the presence of the reason in the subject, a such as: Sound also is a product. This corresponds to the minor premise in Western terminology. The conclusion sound is impermanent is not manifestly stated because it is considered to be obvious. Similarly, in the type of syllogism that is used in the debating courtyard, such as: The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product. what is suppressed is the entailment, or major premise. My opinion is that the two-branched syllogism of Dharmakīrti where the conclusion is suppressed could not be disqualified as a syllogism because the conclusion is patently present despite not being explicitly stated; also, the type used in the debating courtyard also is merely a convenient form of statement. It follows [that those words of (Buddhapālita s) commentary set out such by way of a proof statement having five branches] because those words of commentary indicate that existing in their own entities is a correct sign through [a five-membered proof statement]: [1. Thesis:] With regard to things [such as a nonmanifest pot and so forth], their production-again is senseless. [2. Pervasion:] That production-again is senseless pervades [or applies to] all cases of things already existing in their own entities. [3. Example:] Like an already manifest pot. [4. Exemplification:] Just as an already manifest pot already exists in its own entity, so things [such as a nonmanifest pot] already exist in their own entities. [5. Summary:] Therefore, because things are already established a Literally, the attribute of the subject (phyogs chos, pakṣadharma).

113 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 111 in their own entities, the production-again of things is senseless. [འག ལ ཚ ག ད ས བ ངག ཡན ལག ན ག ནས བཤད པ ]ད ར ཐལ འག ལ ཚ ག ད ས 1. དང ས པ མས ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད ད 2. དང ས པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད ན ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད པས ཁ བ པའ ར 3. དཔ ར ན མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན ག མ པ བཞ ན 4. མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན ག མ པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན པ ད བཞ ན དང ས པ མས རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན པ ཡ ན ན 5. ད བས དང ས པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན པའ ར དང ས པ མས ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད ད ཞ ས པས རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ གས ཡང དག བ ན པའ ར because of being like, for example, that the syllogistic formulation: [1. Thesis:] A sound is impermanent. [2. Pervasion:] Whatever is impermanent is pervaded by product. [3. Example:] Like, for example, a pot. [4. Exemplification:] Just as a pot is a product, so a sound is also a product. [5. Summary:] Therefore, because a sound is a product, it is impermanent. indicates that product is a correct sign. དཔ ར ན ན མ ག ས ན མ ག པས ཁ བ པའ ར

114 112 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ས ན མ ག པས ཁ བ དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན མ པ ས པ ད བཞ ན ཡང ས ད འ ར ཡང ས པའ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས པའ ཉ བར ར བས ས པ གས ཡང དག བ ན པ བཞ ན ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: Let us step back for a moment: Chandrakīrti is saying that if an other-approved syllogism is needed, then there is an other-approved syllogism in what Buddhapālita said. The fact that he says such means that syllogisms are acceptable in his system; otherwise, he would say, We Consequentialists only use consequences; syllogisms are totally inappropriate. Thus, we have to conclude that there is some sort of syllogism that is allowed, and there is some sort that is not allowed. The general Ge-lug explanation is that other-approved syllogisms are allowed while autonomous syllogisms syllogisms in which the three modes of proof are established from their own side are not allowed. Chandrakīrti complains about Bhāvaviveka s syllogism, yet he allows Buddhapālita to have a syllogism: Buddhapālita s is properly formulated whereas Bhāvaviveka s is not. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 164) says: Concerning that, just as in: A sound is impermanent because products are impermanent. It is seen that products are impermanent, like, for example, a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product; therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is impermanent. product which is manifested by the syllogistic application is the reason, so here also: Things [such as a nonmanifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production-again of what already exists in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen here that a pot and so forth that already abide in front [of oneself] and that already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so

115 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 113 if you think that there are pots and so forth that already exist in their own entities even at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at the time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist. the reason already existing in their own entities which is manifested by the syllogistic application and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting production-again expresses contradiction through the Sāṃkhya s own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Sāṃkhya]. Therefore, how is it that [Bhāvaviveka] says, That is not reasonable because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason and an example! ད ཉ ད ལས ད ལ ཇ ར མ ག ས པ མ ག པའ ར ར ཞ ས པ ནས [ ས པ ན མ ག པར མཐ ང དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ན ད བཞ ན ཡང ས པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འད ར ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པའ ས པ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན པ ད བཞ ན འད ར ཡང དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ཡང བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར འད ན ཇ ར མ པ ལ ས གས པ མ ན ན གནས ཤ ང གསལ བ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ མ ས པར མཐ ང བ ད བཞ ན འཇ མ པའ ག ང ལ ས གས པའ གནས བས ན ཡང གལ ཏ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ མ པ ལ ས གས པ ཡ ད ད མ ས མས ན ན ད འ ཚ ཡང རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ལ བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ད ར ན གཏན ཚ གས ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པ ཡང བ དགག པ ལ མ འ ལ པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ག ངས ཅན ལ རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ མཛད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད ས ན ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ ] གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས ཅ བ ད པར ད ཅ ས ས Although there are many discordant identifications of the five branches, in conjunction with what is explicitly indicated [in Chandrakīrti s text] they are taken in accordance with many of our own [Gelug-pa] scholars explanation of the five: thesis, pervasion, example, exemplification, and summary because this earlier explanation was done in

116 114 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle that manner. ཡན ལག འ ང ས འཛ ན མ མ ན པ མང ཡང དང ས བ ན དང ར ན དམ བཅའ དང ཁ བ [L217a] པ དང དཔ དང ཉ ར གཏ ད དང མ ག ད ར རང ར མཁས པ མང པ ས བཤད པ ར ས ར བཤད པ འད ད འ དབང ས པའ ར ར There is a way of associating [the explanation] with these [five] because: 1. A sound is impermanent, indicates the thesis. 2. Whatever is a product is pervaded by impermanent, indicates the pervasion. 3. Pervaded by it, like, for example, a pot, indicates an example. 4. Just as a pot is a product, so a sound is also a product, indicates the exemplification. 5. The remainder [ Therefore because of being a product, a sound is impermanent, indicates the summary. [དམ བཅའ དང ཁ བ པ དང དཔ དང ཉ ར གཏ ད དང མ ག ད ]ད དང ར ལ ཡ ད ད མ ག ཅ ས པ དམ བཅའ དང ས ན མ ག པས ཁ བ ཅ ས པས ཁ བ པ དང ད ས ཁ བ དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པས དཔ དང མ པ ས པ བཞ ན ཡང ས ཞ ས པས ཉ ར གཏ ད དང ག མས མ ག ད བ ན པའ ར Hopkins: The exemplification does not mean the example but rather means taking the example over to the meaning. Also, if the literal rendering [of Chandrakīrti s text] is associated [with five branches] in accordance with the speech of the sovereign of scholars,

117 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 115 Tag-lung-drag-pa, a it is very good because [Chandrakīrti s] commentary (below, 164) clearly describes five branches: 1. Thesis: A sound is impermanent. 2. Sign: Because products are impermanent. 3. Demonstration of the pervasion in an example: It is seen that whatever is a produced is a produced is pervaded by impermanent, like a pot. 4. Applying the example to the meaning: Like a pot, a sound also is a product. 5. Summary: Therefore, because of being a product, a sound is impermanent. a stag lung grags pa. Tag-lung-drag-pa ( ) is sometimes identified as the second of the four annotators in the Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path ; however, Elizabeth Napper in her Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 221, explains his position in the process of Ngag-wang-rab-tan s annotations:(tibetan names are spelled in this book s format) About Ngag-wang-rab-tan, identified in the Delhi edition as the second annotator [of Tsong-kha-pa s Great Exposition of Special Insight], almost no information is available. The preface to the Delhi edition reports that he wrote down the explanation by his teacher, Jam-yang Kön-chog-chö-pel ( jam dbyangs dkon mchog chos phel), of an oral tradition descended from Tag-lung-drag-pa (stag lung brag pa). Jam-yang Kön-chog-chö-pel was the thirty-fifth holder of the throne of Gan-dan; a very famous teacher of his time, he lived from and transmitted the lineage of the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to the fifth Dalai Lama. Tag-lung-drag-pa himself was the thirtieth holder of the throne of Gan-dan and lived from Although known as Tag-lungdrag-pa, the name of a place in Western Tibet, his given name was Lo-drö-gyatsho (blo gros rgya mtsho). He was a monk of the Jang-tsay (byang rtse) College of Gan-dan Monastery who did a great deal to further that College and one of the main details mentioned about him in the Yellow Cat s Eye Gem is that he was someone who held the lineages of Tsong-kha-pa s Great and Small Expositions of the Stages of the Path. The Berkeley edition of the Annotations identifies Tag-lung-drag-pa Lodrö-gya-tsho as the second annotator; however, this is probably a loose identification, referring to the tradition of the annotations rather than the actual person who wrote them down since other sources support the Delhi text identification. A-khu-ching She-rab-gya-tsho says that Ngag-wang-rab-tan wrote down explanations by Kön-chog-chö-pel of the oral lineages of Gung-ru Chö-jung (gung ru chos byung) and Tag-lung-drag-pa. A-kya-yong-dzin says that what is known as the annotations of Tag-lung-drag-pa is a lineage descended from his teachings, set down at a later time by either Yar-lung-chö-dzay Lo-sang-tan-dzin (yar klung chos mdzad blo bzang bstan dzin) or Kha-rog Ngag-wang-rab-tan (kha rog ngag dbang rab brtan).

118 116 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ཡང མཁས དབང ག ང ག གས པའ ག ང ར དང ས ཟ ན ར ན ཤ ན ལ གས ཏ ན མ ག ས པ མ ག པའ ར ས ན མ ག པས ཁ བ པར མཐ ང མ པ བཞ ན མ པ བཞ ན [G159b] ཡང ས པ ཡ ན ད འ ར ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ཞ ས དམ བཅའ དང གས དང དཔ ལ ཁ བ པ བ ན པ དང དཔ ད ན ཉ ར ར དང མ ག ད ཡན ལག འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པའ ར The first reason [which is that (Chandrakīrti s) commentary clearly describes the branch of the thesis] is established because in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, A sound is impermanent, describes the thesis. The second [reason which is that (Chandrakīrti s) commentary clearly describes the branch of the sign] is established because in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, because products are impermanent, indicates the sign. The third [reason which is that (Chandrakīrti s) commentary clearly describes the branch of the demonstration of the pervasion in an example] is established because in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, It is seen that products are impermanent, like, for example, a pot, a very clear demonstration of the pervasion in an example. The fourth [reason which is that (Chandrakīrti s) commentary clearly describes the branch of applying the example to the meaning] is established because in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, Likewise, a sound also is a product, is a very clear application of the example to the meaning. The fifth [reason which is that (Chandrakīrti s) commentary clearly describes the branch of summary] is established because in Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is impermanent, indicates the summary. Modes of explanation of the five branches other than these two are not reasonable because they do not fit together with Chandrakīrti s commentary. [དམ བཅའ འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པ ] གས དང པ བ ད ཉ ད ལས ད ལ ཇ ར མ ག ཞ ས དམ བཅའ བཤད པའ

119 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 117 ར གཉ ས པ [ གས འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ས པ མ ག པའ ར ཞ ས པས གས བ ན པའ ར ག མ པ [དཔ ལ ཁ བ པ བ ན པ འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ས པ ན མ ག པར མཐ ང དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པས དཔ ལ ཁ བ པ བ ན ལ ཤ ན གསལ བའ ར བཞ པ [དཔ ད ན ཉ ར ར འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ད [L217b] བཞ ན ཡང ས པ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས པས དཔ ད ན ཉ ར ར ཤ ན གསལ བའ ར པ [མ ག ད འག ལ པས གསལ བར བཤད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ད འ ར ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས པས མ ག ད བ ན པའ ར ཡན ལག བཤད ལ འད གཉ ས ལས གཞན མ ར གས ཏ བའ འག ལ པ དང མ འ ར བའ ར b' How, despite the second fallacy the faults adduced are not cleared away there is no problem Hopkins: Up to this point, we have been concerned with Chandrakīrti s refutation of the first fallacy alleged by Bhāvaviveka against Buddhapālita, namely, that he did not have a proper reason, or syllogism. What Chandrakīrti has shown is that 1) one does not need the type of reason that Bhāvaviveka has and 2) if one does indeed need such, Buddhapālita did have an other-approved inference since there is a reason and example in Buddhapālita s statement. Now Jam-yang-shay-pa turns to Chandrakīrti s refutation of the second fault adduced by Bhāvaviveka that Buddhapālita did not clear away faults adduced by a Sāṃkhya.

120 118 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle It follows that even though the faults adduced are not cleared away here [in Buddhapālita s syllogism], there is no fault because: 1. if through the sign of existing in their entities it is proved that the production-again of nonmanifest things is senseless, there is no fault of there being qualms (1) of [proving] what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya], (2) of contradictions [which is that the reason, for a Sāṃkhya, proves the opposite that things are produced from self], or (3) that [its application] is indefinite [due to not being all-inclusive], and 2. also if through that sign it is proved in the perspective of a Sāṃkhya that things other than the person are not produced from self, there is no fault of there being qualms (1) of contradiction or (2) indefiniteness. གཉ ས པ [ ན གཉ ས པ ས པའ ཉ ས པ འད ར མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད ལ ] ས པའ ཉ ས པ འད ར མ བསལ ཡང ན མ ད པར ཐལ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ གས ཀ ས དང ས པ མ གསལ བ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད བ ནའང བ ཟ ན དང འགལ བ དང མ ང ས ད གས པའ ཉ ས པ མ ད པ གང ཞ ག གས ད ས ག ངས ཅན ང ར ས མ ན པའ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ ནའང འགལ མ ང ས ཀ ད གས པའ ཉ ས པ མ ད པའ ར The first [part of the reason which is that if through the sign of existing in their entities it is proved that the production-again of nonmanifest things is senseless, there is no fault of there being qualms (1) of (proving) what is already established (for a Sāṃkhya), (2) of contradiction (which is that the reason, for a Sāṃkhya, proves the opposite that things are produced from self)], or (3) that (its application) is indefinite (due to not being allinclusive)] is established because (1) at that time there are no qualms of proving what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya] or of contradiction and (2) at that time there are also no qualms of indefiniteness. དང པ [རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ གས ཀ ས དང ས པ མ གསལ བ ར

121 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 119 ཡང བ ད ན མ ད བ ནའང བ ཟ ན དང འགལ བ དང མ ང ས ད གས པའ ཉ ས པ མ ད པ ] བ ད འ ཚ བ ཟ ན བ འགལ ད གས པ མ ད པ གང ཞ ག ད འ ཚ མ ང ས ད གས པ ཡང མ ད པའ ར If you [incorrectly] say that the first [part of the reason which is that at that time there are no qualms of proving what is already established (for a Sāṃkhya) or of contradition] is not established, it follows that even in terms of an other-approved [syllogism] Buddhapālita not only is without the fallacy of not expressing a reason and an example but also is without the fallacy of not clearing away the faults adduced by another because the master [Buddhapālita] states in the perspective of a Sāṃkhya [the syllogism]: About the subject, a clay pot nonmanifest at the time of [its] causes, its production-again is senseless because of existing already established in its own entity, like, for example, a manifest pot. [ད འ ཚ བ ཟ ན བ འགལ ད གས པ མ ད པའ གས ]དང པ མ བ ན སངས ས བ ངས ལ གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས ཀ ང གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན མ ད པར མ ཟད གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ན ཡང མ ད པར ཐལ བ དཔ ན ག ས ག ངས ཅན ག ང ར ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ མ ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང [G160a] བ ད ན མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན ནས ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན མང ན གསལ ག མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས བཀ ད [L218a] པའ ར The reason [which is that the master (Buddhapālita) states in the perspective of a Sāṃkhya (the above syllogism)] has already been established. [That the master (Buddhapālita) states in the perspective of a Sāṃkhya (the above syllogism)] entails [that even in terms of an other-approved (syllogism) Buddhapālita not only is without the fallacy of not expressing a reason and an example but also is without the fallacy of not clearing

122 120 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle away the faults adduced by another] because (1) at that time he is without the fallacy of a position such that the Sāṃkhyas, upon analyzing the thesis, [would say that Buddhapālita is trying] to prove what is already established [for them] and (2) he also does not have the fallacy of a contradictory reason. The first [part of the reason which is that at that time he is without the fallacy of a position such that the Sāṃkhyas, upon analyzing the thesis, (would say that Buddhapālita is trying) to prove what is already established (for them)] is established because [Buddhapālita is stating] a proof within taking as the proposition something that Sāṃkhyas have not realized, that is, that the production-again of such a [nonmanifest] pot is senseless but is not proving that the already manifest is not produced again, whereby [Sāṃkhyas] have no qualms that what is already established [for them] is being proven. [ བ དཔ ན ག ས ག ངས ཅན ག ང ར ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ མ ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན ནས ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན མང ན གསལ ག མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས བཀ ད པ ] གས བ བས ཟ ན [ བ དཔ ན ག ས ག ངས ཅན ག ང ར ས ན མང ན པར མ གསལ བའ མ ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད བ ཟ ན ནས ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན མང ན གསལ ག མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས བཀ ད ཡ ན ན སངས ས བ ངས ལ གཞན ག གས ཀ དབང ས ཀ ང གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན མ ད པར མ ཟད གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ན ཡང མ ད པས ]ཁ བ ད འ ཚ ག ངས ཅན ག ས དམ བཅའ ལ བ གས ནས བ ཟ ན བ པའ གས ཀ ན མ ད པ གང ཞ ག གཏན ཚ གས འགལ བའ ན ཡང མ ད པའ ར དང པ [ད འ ཚ ག ངས ཅན ག ས དམ བཅའ ལ བ གས ནས བ ཟ ན བ པའ གས ཀ ན མ ད པ ] བ ག ངས ཅན ག ས ད འ འ མ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད མ གས པ འད ར བ བ ར བ ང ནས བ པ ཡ ན ག མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན ར ཡང བ མ ད པར བ པ མ ཡ ན པས བ ཟ ན བ

123 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 121 པའ ད གས པ མ ད པའ ར Hopkins: There is no fallacious position that is, a fallacious combination of subject and predicate because the subject is something that is not manifest. The proposition that the production-again of an nonmanifest pot is senseless is not already established for a Sāṃkhya quite the contrary. However, if the subject were a thing already manifest, the senselessness of its re-production would already be established for a Sāṃkhya. Let us backtrack: In answer to the first fault attributed by Bhāvaviveka to Buddhapālita, that is, that Buddhapālita did not indicate a reason and example, Chandrakīrti says that a reason and example do not need to be stated since a consequence is indicated, and that such a consequence is able to reverse an opponent s thesis. He then says that if, however, a reason and example are necessary, then a reason and example are to be found in what Buddhapālita said. Then in response to the second and third faults, Chandrakīrti indicates that the reason and the example, which he has exposed as already being in Buddhapālita s statement, are flawless. Hence, there seem to be three separate steps; however, in order for Chandrakīrti to effectively answer the first fault adduced by Bhāvaviveka in other words, if the first fault is that Buddhapālita did not show a proper reason then for Chandrakīrti to show that Buddhapālita does give a proper reason, the second and third faults must be addressed right along with addressing the first fault as sub-sections of that response. Thus Chandrakīrti s response to the first fault is not separate from his responses to the other two. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 166) says: For, Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself], which has a manifest form, a manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something that already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. b a mngon par gsal ba i rang bzhin, abhivyaktarūpa. b Or, according to the Sanskrit, and [thus] due to being established [for the Sāṃkhyas] here it is held as the example ; the Tibetan does not translate upadānaṃ (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 21.10).

124 122 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle and (below, 166): How could [the Sāṃkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism has] the fault of a position [that is, thesis] that is proving what is already established [for them]?! ད ཉ ད ལས ག ངས ཅན པ དག [མ ན ན གནས པའ མ པ མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན ཅན ན ཡང མང ན པར གསལ བར མ འད ད ཅ ང ད ཉ ད འད ར དཔ ཉ ད བ པའ ང བ ]ནས ཡ ན པའ ར ལ ཞ ས དང བ པ ལ བ པའ གས ཀ ན ཉ ད ད གས པ ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ས ས Hopkins: To reiterate what Chandrakīrti sees as Buddhapālita s syllogism: With respect to the subject, a nonmanifest clay pot, and so forth, its production-again is senseless because of already existing in its own entity. The form of this syllogism is just like the actual consequence in that the predicate and the reason are in the same place as in the actual consequence they are not reversed as in Bhāvaviveka s syllogism. As Chandrakīrti sees it, the consequence that Buddhapālita stated is not reversed to make the syllogism he does not view it as a consequence projecting a proof. a It is important to entertain the idea, contrary to Ge-lug-pa scholarship, that the quarrel is not about a proper reason in which the three modes of the reason are established from their own side, but rather just about how to read what Buddhapālita said: Bhāvaviveka s way in which Buddhapālita appears to contradict tenets of the Middle Way School and so forth, and Chandrakīrti s way in which Buddhapālita s statement is flawless milking it for a good syllogism. What indication do we have that this controversy is about establishment of things by way of their own character? So far, we do not seem to have seen any indication! The second [part of the reason Buddhapālita also does not have the fallacy a sgrub bya phen pa i thal gyur.

125 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 123 of a contradictory reason] is established, for Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 166) says: Since the proposition is: those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature are predicated with a negation of production, and: how could [the Sāṃkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism] has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are produced from self]?! གཉ ས པ [གཏན ཚ གས འགལ བའ ན ཡང མ ད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ས པའ ང བ ར ར ཅ ང ནས [མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན མ ཡ ན པ བ བཀག པས ཁ ད པར ས པ ན ]བ བ པར བ ཡ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ ར ཞ ས དང གཏན ཚ གས འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད ད གས པ ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ས ས It follows that the second reason [which is that at that time there are no qualms that the reason is indefinite (due to not being all-inclusive)] is established because if someone objects, Well then, it follows that since [Buddhapālita] says a pot and so forth, such is not being proven with respect to all that have production because he has mentioned no more than only a pot and so forth, [the answer is: that no more than only a pot and so forth are stated] does not entail [that the senselessness of re-production is not being proven without respect to all that have production] because the term and so forth contains all that have production. It follows [that the term and so forth contains all that have production] because therefore there is no indefiniteness here by way of woolen cloth and so forth. [ད འ ཚ མ ང ས ད གས པ ཡང མ ད པ ] གས གཉ ས པ བ ཁ ན ར འ ན མ ས གས ཞ ས པས ན ཐམས ཅད ལ ད ར མ བ པར ཐལ ཁ ད ཀ ས མ ས གས ཙམ ལས མ ས པའ ར ཟ ར ན [ མ ས གས ཙམ ལས མ ས ན ན ཐམས ཅད ལ ད ར མ བ

126 124 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle པས ]མ ཁ བ ས གས ས ན ཐམས ཅད འཛ ན པའ ར [ས གས ས ན ཐམས ཅད འཛ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ས ན མ ས གས ཀ ས འད ར མ ང ས པ ཡང མ ད པའ ར Hopkins: The problem here is with the formulation of the subject whether the syllogism applies to all produced things as it has to do. Since Chandrakīrti s rendition of Buddhapālita s argument reads a pot and so forth, it is flawless because and so forth contains all other produced phenomena. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 167) says: Because the term and so forth in a pot and so forth (bum pa la sogs pa, ghaṭādika) is expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapālita s syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (snam bu, paṭa) and so forth. ད ཉ ད ལས མ པ ལ ས གས པ ཞ ས པའ ས གས པའ ས ན བར འད ད པའ དང ས པ མ ས པ བ བར འད ད པའ ར མ ལ ས གས བདག ག ས མ ང ས པར ར པ ཡང མ [L218b]ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས The second root reason [which is that also if through that sign it is proved in the perspective of a Sāṃkhya that things other than the person are not produced from self, there is no fault of there being qualms (1) of contradition or (2) indefiniteness] is established. [For] it follows that such [fallacies of] (1) [proving of] what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya], (2) contradiction, and (3) indefiniteness do not exist in the master [Buddhapālita s] words of commentary because these words of commentary also indicate another syllogism in which [proving] what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya], contradiction, indefiniteness, and so forth do not come. གས གཉ ས པ [ གས ད ས ག ངས ཅན ང ར ས མ ན པའ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ ནའང འགལ མ ང ས ཀ ད གས པའ ཉ ས པ

127 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 125 མ ད པ ] བ བ དཔ ན ག འག ལ ཚ ག འད ལ བ ཟ ན འགལ བ དང མ ང ས པ ད འ མ ད པར ཐལ འག ལ ཚ ག འད ས བ ཟ ན དང འགལ མ ང ས པ ས གས མ འ ང བའ ར བ གཞན གཅ ག ཀ ང བ ན པའ ར It follows [that these words of commentary also indicate another syllogism in which (proving) what is already established (for a Sāṃkhya), contradiction, indefiniteness, and so forth do not come (1) because in the perspective of Sāṃkhyas this [syllogism]: The subjects, things other than the person, are not produced from [their own] entities because of existing in their own entities, like the person. is expressed [by Chandrakīrti] as an example of this passage of brief indication in the master [Buddhapālita s] commentary, Things are not produced from their own entities because their[ ] and (2) because it is easy to realize that this does not incur the qualms of any of Bhāvaviveka s three fallacies. [འག ལ ཚ ག འད ས བ ཟ ན དང འགལ མ ང ས པ ས གས མ འ ང བའ ར བ གཞན གཅ ག ཀ ང བ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ག ངས ཅན ག ང ར ས ལས གཞན པའ དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད [G160b] རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ར ས བཞ ན ན ཞ ས པ འད བ དཔ ན ག འག ལ པ ལས དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག ཞ ས པ མད ར བ ན ག ག ང འད འ a དཔ ར བ ད པའ ར དང འད ལ ལ གས ན ག ན ག མ གང ག ཡང ད གས པ མ ཡ ང བ གས བའ ར a See the next footnote.

128 126 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 168) says: Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapālita indicates] this other syllogism: Objects other than the person which [Sāṃkhyas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, like, for example, the person. [In that brief statement by Buddhapālita] this example [of another syllogism] a is expressed. ད ཉ ད ལས ཡང ན ར བ འད ན ལ གཞན ཡ ན ཏ ནས [རང ལས བར བའ ས ལས ཐ དད པའ ད ན མས ན བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ར ས བཞ ན ན ཞ ས དཔ ར བ ད པ འད ཉ ད ]དཔ ར བ ད པར འ ཞ ས ས Hopkins: The subject is specified as objects other than persons because in the Sāṃkhya system persons b are permanent; Sāṃkhyas already assert that the person is not produced from self because they say that it is not produced at all. Therefore, when Buddhapālita says, Things are not produced from their own entities, things means things other than the person. Here Chandrakīrti indeed uses what would seem to be Buddhapālita s probandum are not produced from self. He thereby indicates that for him it is permissible to prove are not produced from self. One might think that this does not refute certain Sāṃkhyas who, rather than asserting production from [causes that are] the same entity [as the effect] assert manifestation [of what previously was unmanifest]. Response: It follows that this is not the case because manifestation has a My reading of this sentence in Chandrakīrti differs here from that in my Meditation on Emptiness (p. 488); the new reading is based on the spelling of Jam-yang-shay-pa s statement above in the 2011 TBRC bla brang edition, 218b.3, (Ngawang Gelek edition, 438.3) of gzhung di i dper brjod rather than gzhung dis dper brjod as in the 2015 Old Gomang, 160b.1, and the Musoorie edition, b skyes bu, puruṣa.

129 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 127 also been refuted upon its being included here within the term production. It follows [that manifestation has also been refuted upon its being included here within the term production ] because the two production and manifestation are qualitatively similar in that something nonmanifest earlier [becomes manifest] later. a ད ཡང ག ངས ཅན པ ཁ ཅ ག རང ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བར མ འད ད པར གསལ བར འད ད པ མ ཁ གས མ ན ད ར མ ཡ ན པར ཐལ འད ར མང ན པར གསལ བ ལ ཡང བའ ས བ ས ནས བཀག པའ ར [འད ར མང ན པར གསལ བ ལ ཡང བའ ས བ ས ནས བཀག པ ]ད ར ཐལ བ དང གསལ བ གཉ ས ན དང ས མ མང ན པར ཆ ས མ ན པའ ར Hopkins: These Sāṃkhyas speak of manifestation (gsal ba) and dissolution (thim pa) back into an unmanifest state rather than production and cessation. One finds this vocabulary in Buddhism in the discussion of the stages of consciousnesses of death. In these discussions, thim pa is glossed as to cease or ceased. In other words, in the Buddhist version, one consciousness ceases and the other becomes more manifest, while in the non-buddhist way, the entity of the one actually dissolves into the other. Another Buddhist in which the vocabulary of manifestation (gsal ba) and dissolution (thim pa) occurs is during deity meditation and emptiness yoga, when a syllable appears on a moon disc with everything emerging from that syllable. Another is when light rays shine forth from a moon, gather up everything in the universe, and bring it to dissolve into the moon. That is not a case of cessation these all dissolve into the moon. The moon then becomes the source out of which everything again emerges. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words says: [Certain Sāṃkhyas might object that] a refutation of production a Jam-yang-shay-pa s text may be corrupt given the lack of clarity compared to the citation from Chandrakīrti just below, but the meaning is nevertheless clear.

130 128 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle does not harm a proponent of manifestation [rather than production]. Even so, manifestation is designated with the term production, and due to the qualitative similarity [between production and manifestation] with respect to earlier nonapprehendability and later apprehendability the term production just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [that is, production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state]. ད ཉ ད ལས གལ ཏ ཡང བ བཀག པས ནས [ མང ན པར གསལ བར བ ལ གན ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན པ ད ན ཡང བའ མང ན པར གསལ བ ལ བཏགས ནས ན དང མར མ དམ གས པ དང དམ གས པར ཆ ས མ ན པས བའ ས མང ན པར གསལ བ ཉ ད བ ད པའ ར འད བཀག པས གན ད པར ད པ ]མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས About this, a [hypothetical] Bhāvaviveka might say, It follows that it is not feasible that such a mode of demonstrating an other-approved [syllogism is to be found in Buddhapālita s explanation] because in these words one does not see means of expression that indicate such expressed meaning. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 169) says: Moreover [a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapālita s] having anything that expresses the meanings you have expounded, how was such analysis found? འད ལ ལ གས ན ན ར གཞན ག གས ཀ བ ན ལ ད འ མ འཐད པར ཐལ ཚ ག འད ར བ ད ད ན ད འ [L219a] ན པའ ད ས མ མཐ ང བའ ར ཟ ར ཇ ད ད ཉ ད ལས ཡང ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག ད པར ད པ མ ད པར མ པར ད ད པ འད ག ལས ད ཅ ན ཞ ས ས Answer: It follows that although [Buddhapālita] did not extensively indicate such words, he did explain that meaning because this speech of the master [Buddhapālita] indicates all those meaning in a condensed way and hence has great import. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 169) says: Answer: These meaningful statements [by Buddhapālita], due to

131 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 129 having great import, contain an abbreviation of the above-mentioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated in them. ད ལ ཚ ག ད ར ས པར མ བ ན ཀ ང ད ན ད ར བཤད པར ཐལ བ དཔ ན ག ག ང འད ས བ ས ནས ད ན ད ཐམས ཅད ན པས ད ན ཆ ན པ ཅན ཡ ན པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས བཤད པར ད ན ག ངག འད ན ད ན ཆ ན པ ཅན ཡ ན པས ནས [ ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན བ ས ནས འ ག པ ཡ ན ལ ད དག ཀ ང བཤད ན ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག བདག ཉ ད འ ན པར ད པ ཡ ན པས ]འད ར མ བ ན པ ང ཟད ཀ ང མ ད ད ཞ ས ས 2) HOW THE THIRD FALLACY DOES NOT APPLY གཉ ས པ [ ན ག མ པ མ འ ག པའ ལ ] With respect to [Buddhapālita s] not having the third fallacy the fallacy of having to assert the opposite meaning it follows that because of four [reasons] there is no fallacy that these words of commentary contradict a tenet through asserting the opposite meaning of the two consequences: 1. the opposite meaning of the two consequences is related only with the Sāṃkhya and not with the master [Buddhapālita] 2. these two consequences do not project their opposite 3. this is shown to be the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] 4. and commentators also do not definitely need syllogistic statements. ན ག མ པ བ ག ད ན ཁས ལ ན དག ས པའ ན མ ད ལ ན འག ལ ཚ ག འད ས ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ བ ག ད ན ཁས ངས ནས བ མཐའ དང འགལ བའ ན མ ད པར ཐལ ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ བ ག ད ན དང ག ངས ཅན ཁ ན འ ལ ག བ དཔ ན

132 130 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ལ མ ཡ ན པ དང ཐལ འ ར འད གཉ ས ཀ ས བ ག པ མ ཕ ན པ དང ད འཕགས པའ དག ངས པར བ ན པ དང འག ལ པས ཀ ང ར ངག ང ས པར མ དག ས པ བཞ པ ད འ ར The first [reason which is that the opposite meaning of the two consequences is related only with the Sāṃkhya and not with the master (Buddhapālita)] is established because we did not state consequences like you Bhāvaviveka thought which was: l. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self. 2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self. but rather stated that [their] production-again is senseless and endless. It follows [that we stated that (their) production-again is senseless and endless] because (1) although the term again (slar yang, punar) is not in the brief indication, you [Bhāvaviveka] did not think that [the brief indication] must be taken in accordance with the extensive explanation of the meaning and (2) a Sāṃkhya has assertions of the opposite of senseless production-again and endless production. དང པ [ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ བ ག ད ན དང ག ངས ཅན ཁ ན འ ལ ག བ དཔ ན ལ མ ཡ ན པ ] བ ཁ བ ཅག ག ས ལ གས ན ཁ ད ཉ ད ཀ ས དག ངས པ ར ག དང ས པ ཆ ས ཅན ད ན མ ད པར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ད ཆ ས ཅན བ ག པ མ ད པར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ཞ ས པའ ཐལ འ ར མ བཀ ད པར ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད བཀ ད པ ཡ ན པའ ར [ཁ བ ཅག ག ས ལ གས ན ཁ ད ཉ ད ཀ ས དག ངས པ ར ག དང ས པ ཆ ས ཅན ད ན མ ད པར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ད ཆ ས ཅན བ ག པ མ ད པར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ཞ ས པའ ཐལ འ ར མ བཀ ད པར ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད བཀ ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ [L219b] མད ར

133 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 131 བ ན ལ ར ཡང ག མ ད ཀ ང ད ན ས བཤད ར ད དག ས པ ཁ ད ཀ ས མ དག ངས ལ ག ངས ཅན ལ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཀ བ ག པའ ཁས ལ ན ཡ ད པའ ར Hopkins: Here we get completely clear about why this whole section is called Opposite of the Consequences. Buddhapālita s first consequence in refuting production from self is: It follows that the subjects, things, are produced again senselessly because of being produced from self (or because of existing in their own entities). The opposite of the thesis is not asserted by Buddhapālita he does not assert that things production-again is sensible; only the opponent, the Sāṃkhya, asserts that the production of what is already existent yet is nonmanifest. For them, re-production is sensible and finite because a thing is produced once when it achieves its own entity in its causes and it is produced a second time when it becomes manifest and does not need to be produced again. When does it achieve the entity of its first production in its causes? Perhaps when the main causes come together. It is in this context that Chandrakīrti says that the opposite of the consequences is only related with the opponent (the Sāṃkhya), not with us (Proponents of the Middle). That could sound like a general statement, The opposites of consequences are always related with the opponent, not with us, and thus would contribute to the false impression that Consequentialists have no assertions. However, Tsong-kha-pa and his followers hold that Chandrakīrti s statement is limited to these two consequences the context must be taken into account. (See the contextualization of Nāgārjuna s statement in his Refutation of Objections that he has no thesis, above, 71.) Some say that Consequentialists negative theses but do not have any positive theses. However, there are places where Chandrakīrti says that the opponent should assert such-and-such; also Nāgārjuna says that because there are no phenomena that are not dependent-arisings, all phenomena are empty. Was Bhāvaviveka so thick that he did not think to take Buddhapālita s brief indication in the context of the more extensive

134 132 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle explanation, or is his point that Buddhapālita s individual statements should be taken at face value? I agree with Bhāvaviveka that the brief indication should include the word again since it is so vital to the meaning the fact that it does not shows that the brief indication is poorly formulated. However, if Bhāvaviveka thought that it was merely poorly formulated, why did he carry on so much and not just say that he thought that Buddhapālita expressed it more sensibly immediately thereafter? Perhaps he was choosing in debate to take Buddhapālita at his weakest point and humorously carry on from there. Bhāvaviveka, intentionally missing the term again that is in Buddhapālita s extensive explanation but not his brief indication, knows that Buddhapālita also does not assert the opposite of the thesis as it stands in the brief indication and thus speculates with it. The first [reason which is that although the term again (slar yang, punar) is not in the brief indication, you (Bhāvaviveka) did not think that it must be taken in accordance with the extensive explanation of the meaning] is established because Tsong-kha-pa s Explanation of (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Ocean of Reasoning says: Bhāvaviveka did not think that [Buddhapālita] was flinging [the consequences] that production-again is senseless and endless but instead held that [Buddhapālita] was flinging [the consequences] that production in general is senseless and endless and thereupon propounded that [Buddhapālita] asserted the opposite meaning. དང པ [མད ར བ ན ལ ར ཡང ག མ ད ཀ ང ད ན ས བཤད ར ད དག ས པ ཁ ད ཀ ས མ དག ངས པ ] བ ར གས པའ མཚ ལས ལ གས ན ག ས ཀ ང ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད འཕངས པར མ དག ངས པར ར བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཐལ བ འཕངས པར བ ང ནས བ ག ད ན ཁས ལ ན དག ས ཞ ས ས པའ ཞ ས དང and Khay-drub s Great Compilation [Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate] says: Therefore, Bhāvaviveka s estimation of Buddhapālita s thought

135 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 133 [was that he was flinging] these two consequences: l. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self. 2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self. and so forth. ང ན ལས ད ས ན ལ གས ན ག ས སངས ས བ ངས ཀ དག ངས པ ངས པ ན དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བ ད ན མ ད པར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ད ཆ ས ཅན ག མ ད བར ཐལ བདག ལས བའ ར ཞ ས པའ ཐལ འ ར འད གཉ ས ཞ ས ས གས ག ངས པའ ར The second [reason which is that a Sāṃkhya has assertions of the opposite of senseless production-again and endless production] is established because Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 170) says: Furthermore, the opposite meaning of the consequences [which is that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly] is related only with the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production is a nonaffirming negation]? a Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that they will give up their assertion of production from self]. b Therefore, how could the master Buddhapālita following the unerring system of the master Nāgārjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite reproduction, are not asserted] c have said any words that would a The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 23.4) reads, And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet. b Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, c Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences,

136 134 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the system of the Middle Way School]! གཉ ས པ [ག ངས ཅན ལ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཀ བ ག པའ ཁས ལ ན ཡ ད པ ] བ ད ཉ ད ལས ཐལ འ ར བ བ ག པའ ད ན དང ཡང ཕ ར ལ པ ཉ ད འ ལ ག ཁ བ ཅག ན མ ཡ ན ཏ རང ལ དམ བཅའ བ མ ད པའ ར ཞ ས པ ནས [ར ད འ ར ཁ བ ཅག ལ བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བ ག ལ ཡ ད ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པ བ བས པས ཕ ར ལ པ ལ ཉ ས པ མང པ ཅ ཙམ འ ར བ ད ཙམ ཁ བ ཅག མང ན པར འད ད པ ཁ ན ཡ ན པས གང ལས འད ལ གཞན ག ས ག གས ད པར འ ར བ བ དཔ ན བ ཀ གས ན ཅ མ ལ ག པའ ས འ ང བ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ལ ག གས དང བཅས པའ ཚ ག ]ག ངས པ ཉ ད ག ལ ཡ ད ཅ ས ས Hopkins: This is the important source quote from Chandrakīrti about Opposite of the Consequences. You would think that instead of saying, because we do not have a thesis, he might say, because on this occasion we do not have any such thesis. The issue of there being greater force to a more dramatic statement is similar in the Mind-Only School. In early Yogācāra, no one says that there are no external objects they say there are no objects. From context you can understand, I claim, that this means that there are no external objects; but Jan Willis, Ueda, Schmitthausen, and Wayman say that in early Yogācāra meaning Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and so forth there is no refutation of external objects. However, when, for example, they say there are no objects in dreams and similarly that is the way it is with regard to all objects, there is a certain force in saying, No objects. Even if you accept that there are objects that are of the same entity as consciousness, there is a practical force to saying, There are no objects, that you do not get when you say, Objects exist but are not a different entity from the consciousness perceiving them. Perhaps it is similar here in Chandrakīrti s statement

137 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 135 when he says that there is no thesis. The experiential trap in the Ge-lug-pa type of refinement is that with regard to mind-only when it is said that objects such as forms do exist, one might not get the impact that they are not external entities: since it has already affirmed that objects do exist, what appears to you comes to be affirmed, and forms indeed undeniably appear to be external objects; thus you end up affirming that they are external objects. Similarly, in the Ge-lug presentation of the Consequence School, it is said that everything does exist, but we do not know the conventional mode of existence of these objects, that is, we do not know them as fraudulent, as veilings. When Ge-lug-pas keep repeating that these objects are conventionally existent, established by valid cognition, and so forth, this may tend to over-substantialize these objects. As the Ge-lugpa scholar Tan-dar-lha-ram-pa (bstan dar lha ram pa, 1759-?) said, it would be better to have the view of the earlier schools that seem to refute too much than to have this system of those who seem to add something onto the object and then refute it. This has been the thrust of my work within Ge-lug-pa: to make sure that I get the point that I do not know these objects as veil truths, I do not experience these objects as veil truths, but experience them as if they were ultimates. To return to Chandrakīrti s statement, if we do not have any inherently existent thesis, it is like having no thesis! The only thesis we could think of before you had realized emptiness would be an inherently existent thesis. To talk too much about the world, objects, and theses that remain after the negation of inherent existence and that are illusory-like or like illusions (sgyu ma lta bu), to say anything more than that they are illusorylike, to use reasoning to establish these conventionally existent things too much, is to start missing the point about the absence of inherent existence which is the central thrust. Yet, on the other side of this issue, even as far as India goes, Chandrakīrti says that even conventionally this system is uncommon because it does not assert this and does not assert that, does assert this and does assert that, so it must be recognized that he is putting pressure on the conventional establishment of objects. In any case, the message is that the way things appear has to be refuted we can take little solace in the fact that we have some valid cognition.

138 136 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle It is easy to realize that Tibetans explanation that this [means that] in general Proponents of the Middle do not have theses is not logically feasible. བ ད དག ག ས འད ས ད མ པ ལ དམ བཅའ ར མ ད པར བཤད པ མ འཐད པར གས The second root reason [which is that these two consequences do not project their opposite] is established because on this occasion when a Consequentialist, a proponent of no inherent existence, is establishing for a Sāṃkhya, a proponent of inherent existence, the consequences of senseless and endless production-again, [those consequences] do not become consequences projecting their opposites. It follows [that on this occasion when a Consequentialist, a proponent of no inherent existence, is establishing for a Sāṃkhya, a proponent of inherent existence, the consequences of senseless and endless production-again, those do not become consequences projecting their opposites] because [Buddhapālita] did not state [those] consequences wanting to project their opposites but rather for the sake of refuting the opponent s thesis [of production from self], these are only unwanted consequences to that [opponent]. [ཐལ འ ར འད གཉ ས ཀ ས བ ག པ མ ཕ ན པ ] གས གཉ ས པ བ བས འད ར རང བཞ ན མ ད ཐལ འ ར བས རང བཞ ན བ ག ངས ཅན ལ ར [G161b] ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཐལ བ བ བ པ ན བ ག པ འཕ ན པའ ཐལ འ ར མ འ ར བའ [L220a] ར [ བས འད ར རང བཞ ན མ ད ཐལ འ ར བས རང བཞ ན བ ག ངས ཅན ལ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཐལ བ བ བ པ ན བ ག པ འཕ ན པའ ཐལ འ ར མ འ ར བ ]ད ར ཐལ ཐལ བ བ ག པ འཕ ན འད ད ནས བཀ ད པ མ ཡ ན པར ཕ ར ལ ག དམ བཅའ འག ག ཆ ད ད ལ མ འད ད པའ ཐལ བ ཙམ ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: The two consequences do not project their opposites in any way: we are neither to reverse the positions of the predicate

139 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 137 and reason nor reverse them in place. It is obvious that Buddhapālita did not state these consequences wishing to project the opposite because we know that he does not assert that there is sense in production-again. [That (Buddhapālita) did not state (those) consequences wanting to project their opposites but rather for the sake of refuting the opponent s thesis (of production from self), these are only unwanted consequences to that (opponent)] entails [that on this occasion when a Consequentialist, a proponent of no inherent existence, is establishing for a Sāṃkhya, a proponent of inherent existence, the consequences of senseless and endless production-again, (those consequences) do not become consequences projecting their opposites] because terms do not coerce the speaker but instead accord with the speaker s wish in speaking, like [I] think, for example, a Buddhist s [usage of the] word consciousness and a Sāṃkhya s [usage of the] word consciousness. [ཐལ བ བ ག པ འཕ ན འད ད ནས བཀ ད པ མ ཡ ན པར ཕ ར ལ ག དམ བཅའ འག ག ཆ ད ད ལ མ འད ད པའ ཐལ བ ཙམ ཡ ན ན བས འད ར རང བཞ ན མ ད ཐལ འ ར བས རང བཞ ན བ ག ངས ཅན ལ ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཐལ བ བ བ པ ན བ ག པ འཕ ན པའ ཐལ འ ར མ འ ར བས ]ཁ བ མས ན བ པ དབང མ ད ད པ མ ཡ ན ག བ པ འ བ ད འད ད ཀ ས ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ནང པའ ཤ ས པ ཞ ས པ དང ག ངས ཅན ག ཤ ས པ ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག བཞ ན ན མ པ Hopkins: Consciousness in the Buddhist sense of the term and consciousness in the Sāṃkhyan sense of the term are very different and have different meanings in accordance with who is speaking. For a Buddhist consciousness is impermanent, whereas for a Sāṃkhya consciousness is equivalent to person (skyes bu, puruṣa) and self (bdag, ātman) and thus permanent. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 171) says: When proponents of the absence of inherent existence adduce a

140 138 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it be that they are subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner] a with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker s intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapālita s] adducing consequences [here] has the effect only of refuting the other party s thesis [that re-production is sensible and finite]; b hence [he] does not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences. ད ཉ ད ལས རང བཞ ན མ ད པར བས རང བཞ ན དང བཅས པར བ ལ བ པ ན ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན ཅན ག ལ འ ར ཏ ནས [ མས ན ད ག པ དང ཞགས པ ཅན བཞ ན བ པ རང དབང མ ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན ན འ ན ཅ ཞ ན ས པ ཡ ད ན བ པ འ བ ད པར འད ད པའ ས ད པ ཡ ན ན ]ད འ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ན ཕ ར ལ པ འ དམ བཅའ བ འག ག པ ཙམ ག འ ས ཅན ཡ ན པའ ར ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན འ ར བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས Hopkins: The line, Adducing consequences has the effect only of refuting the other party s thesis, could serve, out of context, as a source for the position that consequences never express one s own opinion because consequences have the effect only of refuting the other party s thesis. Contextualization is crucial. This also is as just explained but is not with respect to all consequences. འད ཡང བཤད ཟ ན ར ཡ ན ག ཐལ འ ར ཀ ན ལ མ ཡ ན ན a The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-day Namkha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 619.2ff. b Tsong-kha-pa s Ocean of Reasoning,

141 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 139 Hopkins: This refers to the five types of consequences laid out earlier in this text, some of which project their opposite and some of which do not. The list of five types of consequences, as fleshed out orally by Ge-dun-lo-drö, is: 1. Consequence generating an other-approved inference, that is, generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and entailment approved in the opponent s system Example: It follows that the subject [of this consequence], a shoot, is not a dependent-arising because of being objectively existent. This type is also called a consequence implying its opposite meaning. It both contradicts the opponent s assertion that a sprout is a dependent-arising and implicitly establishes that a sprout does not objectively exist. The other-approved syllogism projected by the consequence is: The subject, a sprout, is not objectively existent because of being a dependent-arising. The above consequence would be flung at a Buddhist proponent of objectively existent things. The Autonomy School and the other lower Buddhist systems accept that all impermanent things are dependent-arisings at least in the sense that they arise dependent on an aggregation of causes and conditions, and they also accept that the very sign of their dependent-arising proves their objective existence. For them, if things did not objectively exist, they would not exist at all. If, after the statement of the consequence, the opponent were still recalcitrant, the opponent s answer would be, The opposite is entailed, meaning that whatever is a dependent-arising is objectively existent. However, the answer would not hit the mark because the meaning of objectively existent is existing under its own power, thereby contradicting dependent-arising. The opponent might require more consequences to reveal the self-contradiction. However, for one who is ready to realize such self-contradiction, the above consequence is sufficient to generate a consciousness inferring that a sprout does not objectively exist and, by extension, that all phenomena do not objectively exist. 2. Consequence through similarity of reason

142 140 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle Example: It follows that a sound apprehending ear consciousness sees colors and shapes because a color and shape apprehending eye consciousness ultimately sees colors and shapes. If an eye consciousness ultimately saw colors and shapes, then it would be under its own power, that is, would not depend on the eye sense that endows it with the ability to perceive colors and shapes but not sounds. Since consciousnesses would apprehend their objects without dependence on their respective senses, an ear consciousness would also absurdly apprehend colors and shapes. The thesis being projected is that an eye consciousness and, in general, sense consciousnesses do not ultimately perceive their objects. The projected thesis here, however, is not, as in the previous example, the subject plus the opposite of the reason. 3. Contradictory consequence Example: It follows that the subject, the ox-generality that is a permanent thing, does not pervade its many particular instances because of being a partless unity. This consequence merely demonstrates a contradiction in the opponent s view and neither projects the opposite meaning, like the first type of consequence, nor uses a similarity of reason, like the second. The opposite meaning would be: The subject, the ox-generality that is a permanent thing, is not a partless unity because of pervading its many instances. It is true that the ox-generality is not a partless one because it has as many parts as the number of oxen it pervades or encompasses; however, the ox-generality is impermanent because all instances of ox are impermanent; thus, the subject of the thesis, the permanent ox-generality, does not exist and, therefore, could not be proved to possess the quality of the reason, that is, it could not be shown that the permanent ox-generality has as many parts as the number of oxen it pervades. The projected thesis of this consequence is not its opposite meaning but that an ox-generality that is a permanent thing does not exist. Another projected is: The ox-generality has parts because of pervading its many particular instances.

143 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 141 The opponent here is a non-buddhist Vaisheṣhika. The other types of consequences are contradictory, but this type is merely contradictory in that it does not share the special qualities of the other four types. 4. Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one s own assertion Example: It follows that the subject, a shoot, is senselessly reproduced because of already having attained its own entity. A Sāṃkhya accepts that re-production is sensible in the sense that what has already attained existence in its non-manifest state still requires production to become manifest. Therefore, the consequence of senseless re-production expresses an inner contradiction of this position. Furthermore, since the view being proved by this consequence is that there is no production from self, the Consequentialist s own assertion is being proven. The issue is not that only some consequences prove something, either positive or negative, for all correct consequences prove something. Rather, this type of consequence is distinguished by its particular force, as in the example where no production from self is proved but the opposite of the reason is not implied. 5 Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis If someone said that it followed that the form aggregate exists inherently because the feeling aggregate exists inherently, this consequence could be stated: It follows that the reason the feeling aggregate inherently exists cannot prove that the form aggregate inherently exists because the reason and thesis are equally difficult to prove. Even if there were inherent existence, there is no difference in difficulty of realization in establishing that the feeling aggregate inherently exists and that the form aggregate inherently exists. To fulfill the purpose of generating the inference of a thesis in another, the establishment of the sign (reason) as present in the subject must be easier than the realization of the thesis. For instance, a sound is proven to be an impermanent thing through the sign of its being a product. Though impermanent thing and product are synonyms because all instances of the one are instances of the

144 142 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle other, being a product can serve as a correct sign of being an impermanent thing, for being a product is easier to understand than being an impermanent thing. To be a product means to be made, and a mere snapping of the fingers can demonstrate that a sound is made or created by causes and conditions. That products are impermanent, that is, that they necessarily disintegrate moment by moment, is harder to realize. Therefore, when the reason is as hard to establish as the thesis, the reason is not suitable. The third root reason [which is that this is shown to be the thought of the Superior (Nāgārjuna)] is established because refutation in that way through consequences is the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjuna] because Nāgārjuna s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom (V.1cd) says: If space existed before [its] definition, It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist]. and (IV.2abc): If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form s cause [the elements], It would follow that a form is causeless [because dependence on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence]. and so forth. [ད འཕགས པའ དག ངས པར བ ན པ ] གས ག མ པ བ ཐལ བས ད ར འག ག པ འཕགས པའ དག ངས པ ཡ ན པའ ར ཤ ལས གལ ཏ མཚན ལས འ ར ན མཚན ཉ ད མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཞ ས དང ག གས ཀ ན མ གཏ གས པར ག གས ན a ག གས ན མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཏ a Correcting gzugs ni gzugs ni rgyu med par/ thal bar gyur in the 2015 Old Go-mang, 161b.5, to gzugs na gzugs ni rgyu med par/ thal bar gyur in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang, 220a.5, and the Peking (vol. 98, 5.5.3) which accord more with the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 24.10) rupaṃ prasajyate/ahetukaṃ and with Tsong-kha-pa s commentary (129.1, Varanasi 1973 edition).

145 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 143 ཞ ས ས གས ག ངས པའ ར Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 172) says: In this way, the master [Nāgārjuna] mostly eradicates others positions by way of only adducing consequences such as through: a Space does not at all exist Before [its] definition. If space existed before [its] definition, It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist]. and: b If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form s cause [the elements], It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence]. Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless. and likewise: c Nirvāṇa is not an effective thing (dngos po, bhāva). [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There are no effective things Without aging and death. and so forth. a Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom, V.1. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined. The bracketed addition in the first citation is from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition. In this and the next two notes the identification of what is being refuted in these three quotes is from Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 621.1ff. b IV.2. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities. The bracketed additions in this citation are from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, , Varanasi 1973 edition. Tsong-kha-pa (129.8) says that this projects its opposite meaning; I presume that the other two also do so. c XXV.4.

146 144 Chandrakīrti s Defense of Buddhapālita: Great Exposition of the Middle ད ཉ ད ལས ད ར ཡང བ དཔ ན ན ནས [ནམ མཁའ མཚན ཉ ད ར ལ ན ནམ མཁའ ང ཟད ཡ ད མ ཡ ན གལ ཏ མཚན ལས ར ར ན མཚན ཉ ད མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཞ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ག གས ཀ ན མ གཏ གས པར ག གས ན ག གས ཀ མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཏ ད ན གང ཡང མ ད པ ན གང ན འང མ ད ཅ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ངན འདས པ དང ས པ མ ན ཤ འ མཚན ཉ ད ཐལ བར འ ར དང འཆ བ མ ད པ ཡ དང ས པ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པས ]ཕལ ཆ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ཁ ནས གཞན ག གས ས ལ བར མཛད ད ཞ ས ས གས ག ངས པའ ར The fourth root reason [which is that commentators also do not definitely need syllogistic statements] is established because it is not reasonable that you assert that extensive statement of syllogisms is the system of commentators. It follows [that it is not reasonable that you assert that extensive statement of syllogisms is the system of commentators] because [Nāgārjuna] did not set out syllogisms in his auto-commentary on the Refutation of Objections. Chandrakīrti s Clear Words (below, 173) says: Objection [by a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka]: It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length. Answer: That also is not so because when even the master [Nāgārjuna] commented on his Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements. [འག ལ པས ཀ ང ར ངག ང ས པར མ དག ས པ ] གས བཞ པ བ ཁ ད [L220b] ཀ ས ར ངག ས པར འག ད པ འག ལ པ མཁན ག གས ཡ ན པར འད ད མ ར གས པའ ར [ཁ ད ཀ ས ར ངག ས པར འག ད པ འག ལ པ མཁན ག གས ཡ ན པར འད ད མ ར གས པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ག རང འག ལ ལས ར ངག མ ག ངས པའ ར ད ཉ ད ལས འ ན ཏ ར བའ ངག ནས [ ས པར ད པར ད པ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན འག ལ པ མཁན པ མས ཀ གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ན ད ཡང ཡ ད པ མ

147 How Buddhapālita s Refutation is without Fallacy 145 ཡ ན ཏ ད པ བ ག པའ འག ལ པ མཛད པ ན ] བ དཔ ན ག ས ཀ ང ར བའ ངག མ ག ངས པའ ར ར ཞ ས ས Hopkins: I wonder whether Chandrakīrti sees in Bhāvaviveka s insistence on syllogistic statements a tendency toward accepting that the subject is validated similarly in the systems of both parties of the debate compatibly appearing subjects (chos can thun snang ba), the topic of the next volume.

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149 PART THREE: Chandrakīrti s Clear Words, Defending Buddhapālita s Refutation of Production from Self

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151 Commentary on (Nāgārjuna s) Fundamental Treatise on the Middle : Clear Words ད མ བའ འག ལ པ ཚ ག གསལ བ Now a the master [Nāgārjuna] wishing to show that dependent-arisings are qualified by no cessation and so forth and thinking that through refuting production cessation and so forth are easily refuted begins the composition with a refutation of production. Also, since when production is examined by others, they consider that it is from self, other, both, or causelessly, he, having concluded that it is not logically feasible in all ways, explains: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not causelessly Are any things Ever produced anywhere. na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpyahetutaḥ/ utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana// bdag las ma yin gzhan las min/ gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min/ dngos po gang dag gang na yang/ skye ba nam yang yod ma yin// ད ན བ དཔ ན ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང བ འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པས ཁ ད པར འཕགས པར ར པ བ ན པར བཞ ད ནས བ བཀག པས འགག པ ལ ས གས པ དགག པ བར དག ངས ཤ ང ཐ ག མར བ དགག པ མ པ མཛད ད བ ཡང གཞན ག ས བ གས པ ན བདག གམ གཞན ནམ གཉ གའམ མ ད པ ཞ ག ལས ག ག ང ན ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ ཡ ན ན མ ང ས པར མཛད ནས བཤད པ བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས a Golden reprint, vol. 112, 12.1ff.; sde dge, 118.3ff./ 59b.3ff..

152 150 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན In that, jātu (nam yang; ever) means kadā cit (gzhar yang; when). The term kvacana (gang na yang; anywhere) is a word for a support (rten, ādhāra), a synonym of kvacit ( ga zhig na yang; somewhere). The term kecana (gang dag; whatever/any) is a word for the supported (brten pa, ādheya), a synonym of kecit (su dag; whatever). a Hence, it is to be put together thusly: Not from self are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. b naiva svata utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana kecana/ bdag las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin no// It also is to be put together likewise for the [other] three theses. c ད ལ གང དག ཅ ས བའ ན ན པའ ཚ ག དག ཅ ས བའ འ མ ག ངས ས གང ན ཡང ཞ ས བའ ན ན ག ཚ ག འགའ ཞ ག ན ཡང ཞ ས བའ འ མ ག ངས ས ནམ ཡང ཞ ས བ ན གཞར ཡང ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ད འ ར བདག ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ ནམ ཡང a The translation follows the order of the Sanskrit of Chandrakīrti s text; in the order of the Tibetan translation, it reads: b c In that, the term kecana (gang dag; whatever/any) is a word for the supported (brten pa, ādheya), a synonym of kecit (su dag; whatever). The term kvacana (gang na yang; anywhere) is a word for a support (rten, ādhāra), a synonym of kvacit ( ga zhig na yang; somewhere). Jātu (nam yang; ever) means kadā cit (gzhar yang; when). That is to say: Whatsoever things are not ever produced anywhere from self. That is to say: Not from others are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. gzhan las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin no Not from both are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. gnyis las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin no Not causelessly are whatsoever things ever produced anywhere. rgyu med las dngos po gang dag gang na yang skye ba nam yang yod pa ma yin no

153 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 151 ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ད ར ར བར འ ད བཞ ན དམ བཅའ བ ག མ པ ལ ཡང ར བར འ Question: When it is delimited that [things] are just not produced from self, is it not that it would just be asserted that [things] are produced from other? Answer: It is not, because of wishing to express a nonaffirming negation a and because production from other is also refuted. གལ ཏ བདག ལས བ མ ཡ ན པ ཉ ད ད ཞ ས བར ང ས པར ག ང བ ན གཞན ལས འ ཞ ས མ འད ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བ མ ཡ ན ནམ ཞ ན མ ཡ ན ཏ མ ད པར དགག པ བ ད པར འད ད པའ ར དང གཞན ལས བ ཡང འག ག པར འ ར བའ ར ར The reasoning due to which it comes to be that [things] are not produced from self is to be ascertained by way of [my] Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle and so forth as in: b There is no point in the production of something from itself [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself because it would have already attained existence]. Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has been produced be produced again. འཐད པ གང ག ས བདག ལས བར མ འ ར བ ད ན ད ལས ད ན འ ང ན ཡ ན ཏན འགའ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ས པར ར པ ར ཡང བར ར གས པ འང མ ཡ ན ཉ ད a med par dgag pa, prasajyapratiṣedha. Correcting med par dgag par In the Varanasi 1978 edition, 10.6, to med par yang dag par in accordance with Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 12.6, and the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 13.5). b P5262, vol. 98, , VI.8c-13; La Vallée Poussin s translation is Muséon, n.s. v.11, Brackets are mostly from Chandrakīrti s own commentary, P5263, vol. 98, ff. Chandrakīrti cites only the first two lines and adds and so forth ; I have included the remainder of his presentation from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound,

154 152 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words If it is thought that the already produced is produced again, The growing of a shoot, and so forth, would not be found here [in the world]; The seed would be produced endlessly. How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [shoot? For, according to you, seed and shoot are not other.] [ ས ཟ ན ར ཡང བར ཡ ངས ག པར འ ར ན ན ག ལ ས གས མས ཀ བ འད ར ད མ འ ར ཞ ང ས བ ན ད མཐར ག པར རབ བ ཉ ད འ ར ཇ ར ད ཉ ད ཀ ས ད མ པར འཇ ག པར ད པར འ ར For you, the shoot s shape, color, taste, capacity, and maturation Would not be different from those of its creator cause, the seed. If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed, it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it, Then how could it have the nature of that [seed]? ད ས བ ན ག ལས ཐ དད ག འ ད བས དང ན ཁ ད ག ར ས ན པའ ཐ དད ཁ ད ལ མ ད པར འ ར གལ ཏ ར ག བདག ག དང ས པ བསལ ནས ད ལས གཞན ང བ ར འ ར ན ད ཚ ད ཡ ད ཉ ད ཇ ར འ ར If for you the seed is not other than the shoot here [in the world], Just as the seed [is unapprehendable at the time of the shoot], the shoot would not be apprehendable. Or, because they are one, just as the shoot [is apprehendable], So the seed would be apprehendable [at the time of the shoot]. Therefore, this [non-otherness of the seed and shoot] is not to be asserted. གལ ཏ ཁ ད ཀ ས བ ན ག འད ར གཞན མ ཡ ན ན ས བ ན བཞ ན ག ཞ ས ད བ ང མ ད པའམ ཡང ན ད དག གཅ ག པས ཇ ར ག འད བཞ ན ད ཡང ག ང ཡ ད འ ར ད འ ར འད ན ཁས མ ངས Though the cause has disintegrated, the effect is seen; Hence, even the world does not assert that they are the same. Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self Is not admissible in suchness or even in the world. གར ར ཞ ག ན ཡང ད ཡ འ ས མཐ ང བའ ར ད དག གཅ ག པ ཡ ན ཞ ས འཇ ག ན ག ས ཀ ང ཁས མ ལ ན ད ར དང ས པ བདག ལས འ ང ཞ ས རབ བ གས པ འད ད ཉ ད དང ན འཇ ག ན ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན

155 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 153 If production from self were asserted, the produced and the producer, Object and agent, would be one. Since they are not one, Production from self is not to be asserted Because of the fallacies extensively explained [here and in Nāgārjuna s Treatise]. བདག ལས བར འད ད ན བ ད པར དང ད ད དང ལས དང ད པ པ ཡང གཅ ག ཉ ད འ ར ན ད དག ན གཅ ག ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པས ན བདག ལས བར ཁས ང བར མ ན ཆ ར བཤད པའ ཉ ས པར ཐལ བར འ ར ར ར ]ཅ ས བ ལ ས གས པས ད མ ལ འ ག པ ལ ས གས པའ ནས ང ས པར འ Also, the master Buddhapālita says: Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless and because production would be endless. It is thus: the production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced. na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ/ tadutpādavaiyarthyāt/ atiprasaṅgadoṣācca/ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanamasti/ atha sannapi jāyeta/ na kadā cinna jāyeta// a dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du gyur ba i phyir dang / shin tu thal bar gyur ba i phyir ro (or: skye ba thug pa med par gyur ba i phyir ro)/ dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnams la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do// ci ste yod kyang skye na nam yang mi skye bar mi gyur ro// བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཀ ང དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཤ ན ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར a La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 14.1.

156 154 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ མས ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཅ ཡ ད ཀ ང ན ནམ ཡང མ བར མ འ ར ར ཞ ས ག ངས ས About this, someone [namely, Bhāvaviveka] expresses faults: That is not reasonable (1) because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example, and (2) because [the reasoning as Buddhapālita states it] does not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would be expected to adduce], and (3) because [Buddhapālita s] words also afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system] since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from the meaning put forward, and hence what becomes evident is the meaning of the opposite of the thesis and the property of that [that is, the opposite of the reason] things are produced from other and production has effects and production has an end a due to a The Sanskrit, as Chandrakīrti cites it (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 15.1), rather than presenting this as three points as the Tibetan in Bhāvaviveka s text does (dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba gyur ba dang / skye ba bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par gyur ba i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Karmapa sde dge bstan gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, as well as in Avalokitavrata s commentary, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, ; Karmapa sde dge bstan gyur, vol. 98, 148,3), reframes Buddhapālita s syllogism in its opposite form: parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt janmanirodhācceti (Things are produced from other because production has effects and because production has an end.) The Tibetan of Chandrakīrti s text, nevertheless, is as above: dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba gyur ba dang / skye ba bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du gyur ba dang /skye ba thug pa yod par gyur ba i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Peking ; and Karmapa sde dge bstan gyur, ; Tibetan Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Sanskrit into Tibetan, however, as: dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba yin te/ skye ba don yod pa nyid yin pa i phyir dang skye ba thug pa yod pa yin pa i phyir ro/ Because of the unanimity of the Tibetan versions on this point (except for mine) and because Tsong-kha-pa and Jam-yang-shay-pa speak to these versions, I use their casting of the meaning as three points but cite the Sanskrit version throughout.

157 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 155 which [Buddhapālita] would contradict tenets [of the Middle Way School]. tadayuktaṃ/ hetudṛṣtāntānabhidhānāt/ paroktadoṣāparihārācca/ prasaṅgavākyatvācca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyaktau parasmādutpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt/ janmanirodhācceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt// a de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa i phyir dang gzhan gyis smras pa i nyes pa ma bsal ba i phyir ro// thal bar gyur ba i tshig yin pa i phyir skabs kyi don las bzlog pas bsgrub par bya ba dang de i chos bzlog pa i don mngon pas dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba gyur ba dang / skye ba bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par gyur ba i phyir mdzad pa i mtha dang gal bar gyur ro// b འད ལ ཁ ཅ ག ག ས ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས བ བ པར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར པའ ར བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས ན a La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, b This is the reading in the Golden Reprint, vol. 112, As cited in Avalokitavrata s commentary on Bhāvaviveka s Lamp for (Nāgārjuna s) Wisdom (P5259, vol.96, ) it reads: de ni rigs pa ma yin te/gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa i phyir dang / gzhan gyis smras pa i nyes pa ma bsal ba i phyir ro// glags yod pa i tshig yin pa i yang phyir te/ skabs kyi don las bzlog pas bsgrub par bya ba dang de i chos bzlog pa i don mngon pas dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba gyur ba dang / skye ba bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa yod par gyur ba i phyir mdzad pa i mtha dang gal bar gyur ro// For comments on the text see the notes in the two previous chapters.

158 156 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words We [that is, Chandrakīrti] view all of these fallacies as unreasonable. How? About this, respectively, his saying because [Buddhapālita] did not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example (gtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjod pa i phyir dang, hetudṛṣtāntānabhidhānāt) is not reasonable. Why? [Buddhapālita] is inquiring in the following way of an opponent who asserts production from self: a You [Sāṃkhyas] propound that from self [means] that the existence [of things that involve production acts] as a cause and that just it [that is, the existent] is produced. b However, we [Buddhists] do not see that there is purpose in the production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) of the existent, and we also see that [such production] would be endless. Still, you [Sāṃkhyas] do not assert that the already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate [that is to say, your position of production from self] is devoid of logical feasibility and contradicts your own assertion. ན འད དག ཐམས ཅད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པར ཁ བ ཅག ག ས མཐ ང ང ཇ ར ཞ ན ད ལ ར ཞ ག གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས གང བ ད ན མ ར གས ས ཅ འ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད དང ད ཉ ད འ ཞ ས ས པ ཡ ན ལ ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ མཐ ང ཞ ང ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མཐ ང ལ ཁ ད ཀ ས ས པ ར ཡང བར མ འད ད ཅ ང ག པ མ ད པར ཡང མ འད ད ད ད འ ར ཁ ད ཅག ག ད པ ན འཐད a La Vallée Poussin s Sanskrit (15.4) reads is inquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the existent (vidyamānasya punarutpāde prayojanaṃ), but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops this in accordance with the Tibetan. b In accordance with J. W. De Jong s splendid Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā (p. 29, n. 15.5) svata iti hetutvena tad eva cotpadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamānaṃ hetutvena bravīṣi tad eva cotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the Tibetan (bdag las zhes bya ba ni yod pa rgyu nyid dang de nyid skye o zhes smras pa yin la).

159 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 157 པ དང ལ བ དང རང ག ས ཁས ངས པ དང འགལ བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཕ ར ལ པ བདག ལས བར འད ད པ ལ འ བར ད པ ཡ ན ཏ When [Buddhapālita] debates through just these [consequences] that have the effects from stating a reason and an example, would the opponent not accept it? However, if opponents are not overcome even through debate by way of contradicting their own assertions, then due to their shamelessness they also just would not be overcome by reasons and examples. We [Consequentialists] do not debate with the crazily stubborn. Therefore, when the master [Bhāvaviveka] sets out inferences even at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his own liking for inference. གང ལས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ བཀ ད པ འ ས དང བཅས པར འ ར བ འད དག ཙམ ཞ ག ག ས བ ད པ ན ཅ ཕ ར ལ པ ཁས ལ ན པར མ ད དམ འ ན ཏ ཕ ར ལ པ རང ག ཁས ངས པ དང འགལ བས བ ད པས ཀ ང མ ག ན ན ད འ ཚ ང ཚ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ གཉ ས ཀ ས ཀ ང ག པར མ འ ར བ ཉ ད ད ཁ བ ཅག ན ན པ དང ན ཅ ག ད པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན ད འ ར བ དཔ ན ན གནས མ ཡ ན པར ཡང ས དཔག པ ཚང བར ད པ ན བདག ཉ ད ས དཔག པ ལ དགའ བ ཉ ད མང ན པར ད པ ཡ ན ན Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva [Four Hundred, XVI.25] explains: a a XVI.25; P5246, vol. 95, ; Lang, Āryadeva s Catuḥśataka, 150. For Chandrakīrti s commentary see P5266, vol. 98, 279.2ff. For extensive discussion of the four alternatives according to Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, n. 500.

160 158 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words Even over a long period of time Censure cannot be expressed Of one who has no position of existence, Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence. ད མ པ ཡ ན ན ན རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པར བ ར གས པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ཏ གས གཞན ཁས ངས པ མ ད པའ ར ར ད ད ཡང འཕགས པའ ས ཡ ད དང མ ད དང ཡ ད མ ད ཅ ས གས ན གང ལ འང ཡ ད མ ན པ ད ལ ན ན ར ང པ ནའང ཀ ན ཀ བ ད པར ས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བཤད ད Also, Nāgārjuna s Refutation of Objections says: a If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence]. Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless. If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities Of direct perception and so forth did observe some [inherently established objects of comprehension], Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your own system] and refute [others], but since [valid cognitions observing Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to censure me. ད པ བ ག པ ལས ཀ ང གལ ཏ ངས དམ བཅས འགའ ཡ ད ད ས ན ང ལ ན ད ཡ ད ང ལ དམ བཅའ མ ད པས a Stanzas 29 and 30; P5228, vol. 95, See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. The brackets in the first stanza are from Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets, dbu, 59a.6; in the second stanza they are from Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Tsong-kha-pa s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (New Delhi: Chos- phel-legs-ldan, 1972),

161 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 159 ན ང ལ ན མ ད ཁ ན ཡ ན གལ ཏ མང ན མ ལ ས གས པའ ད ན ག ས འགའ ཞ ག དམ གས ན ན བ པའང བ ག པར ན ད མ ད ར ང ལ ཀ ན ཀ མ ད ཅ ས ག ངས ས When in that way a Proponent of the Middle just does not express autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapālita] have an autonomous thesis [such as Bhāvaviveka stated] The inner sense-spheres are not produced from self (nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med de, nādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni) which the Sāṃkhyas would object to as follows: a What is the meaning of this thesis? Does from self [mean] from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cause? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you have the fallacy of] proving what is already established [for us]. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cause, then [your reasoning] is an object of contradiction because [according to us Sāṃkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] causes. ko yam pratijñārthaḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmakāt svata uta kāraṇātmakāditi/ kiṃ cātaḥ/ kāryātmakāccet siddhasādhanaṃ/ kāraṇātmakācced viruddhārthatā/ kāraṇātmanā vidyamānasyaiva sarvasyotpattimata utpādāditi// dam bcas pa di i don gang yin/ ci bdag las shes bya ba bras bu bdag nyid las sam/ on te rgyu i bdag nyid las yin grang / de las cir gyur/ gal te bras bu bdag nyid las na ni grub pa la sgrub bo// rgyu i bdag nyid las na ni gal ba i don nyid du gyur te/ skye ba dang ldan pa thams cad ni rgyu i bdag nyid du yod pa kho na las skye ba i phyir ro zhe b གང ག ཚ ད ར ད མ པས རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པར ད འ ཚ གང ལ ག ངས ཅན པ དག ག ས དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན འད གང ཡ ན ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས a Here Chandrakīrti cites the hypothetical objection by a Sāṃkhya that Bhāvaviveka himself raised and answered; see the previous volume, 165, 249, and 251. b The Tibetan is from the Golden Reprint (vol. 112, 14.6).

162 160 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words བ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ག ང ད ལས ཅ ར འ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ ཡ ན ལ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཏ བ དང ན པ ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན བའ ར ར ཞ ས བར གང ལ ག ངས ཅན པ དག ག ས ར ག པར ད པར འ ར ལ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བའ རང ག ད ཀ དམ བཅའ བ ག ལ ཡ ད Also, how could we [Consequentialists, Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti] have a reason [such as that stated by Bhāvaviveka] because of existing (yod pa i phyir, vidyamānatvāt) which would be either [a case of] proving what is already established [for a Sāṃkhya] or being an object of contradiction and with respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the fault that we would be] proving what is already established or being an object of contradiction! Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need] to be expressed by the master Buddhapālita. ཁ བ ཅག ལ ན གང ཞ ག བ པ ལ བ པ ཉ ད དམ འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ཞ ང བ པ ལ བ པ ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ ང བར བའ ར འབད པ ད པར འ ར བ ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བའ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང ག ལ ཡ ད ད འ ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པར ཐལ བར མ འ ར བ ཉ ད ཀ ར བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ད འ ལན བ ད པར བ མ ཡ ན ན

163 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 161 [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might think: [I might allow that] since, according to Proponents of the Middle, the position [that is, the thesis], the reason, and the example [of an autonomous syllogism] are not established, autonomous inferences (rang gi rgyud kyi rje su dpag pa, svatantraanumāna) are not to be expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and would not clear away the other s thesis through an inference established for both [parties] (gnyi ga la grub pa, ubhayasiddha). Still, one must express contradiction of the other s thesis through one s own inference (rang gi rjes su dpag pa, svata evānumāna). Hence, one must have a a position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of fallacies of position, reason, and example. Therefore, since [Buddhapālita] did not express such and did not avoid the fallacies of those [which a Sāṃkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapālita] just has those faults [of not stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies that a Sāṃkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means]. ཅ ཡང ད མ པ མས ཀ ར ན གས དང གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ དག མ བ པས རང ག ད ཀ ས དཔག པ མ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ར བདག ལས བ དགག པའ དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན བ པ དང གཉ ག ལ བ པའ ས དཔག པས གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བསལ བར མ ར མ ད གཞན ག དམ བཅའ བ ལ རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པར ན དག ས པས རང ཉ ད ལ གས ལ ས གས པ དང གཏན ཚ གས དཔ འ ན དང ལ བ དག ཡ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར ད མ བ ད པའ ར དང ད འ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ཉ ས པ ད ཉ ད འ ར ར མ ན Answer: That is not so. Why? Those [such as Sāṃkhyas] who [upon a rang nyid la yod pa bya dgos.

164 162 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words being pressed by the consequences set forth by Buddhapālita] wish to generate ascertainment of something which they hold as a thesis in others in just the way that they have ascertained it, should demonstrate to others [that is, Proponents of the Middle] just that logical proof through which that meaning is understood. Therefore, it is respectively the general procedure for just the other party [here, the Sāṃkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a thesis that they themselves assert [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapālita s consequences rather than for Buddhapālita to proceed to set forth an other-approved inference]. However, this [reason that Sāṃkhyas state to a Proponent of the Middle to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reason for the other [party, the Proponent of the Middle]. Because there are no reason and example, the proof of the meaning of their thesis is just a statement of outflows of [their own] assertions; therefore, since they have asserted a position that is devoid of logical feasibility, they deceive only themselves, due to which they cannot generate ascertainment in another. In this way, [due to being faulty] just this inability of their attempt to prove the meaning of their thesis is the clearest repudiation of their [position]. What need is there here to still express damage [to their position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of their view that something exists and yet needs to be re-produced has been shown, and upon the Sāṃkhya s presentation of their own view in syllogistic inference, the Proponent of the Middle has given answers showing its illogicality.] བཤད པར ད ན ད ར མ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར ད ན གང ཞ ག གང ག ས དམ བཅས པ ད ས ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ང ས པ བཞ ན གཞན དག ལ ང ས པ བ ད པར འད ད པས ད ན འད འ འཐད པ གང ག ནས ཁ ང ད པའ འཐད པ ད ཉ ད གཞན ལ བ ད པར དག ས ས ད འ ར རང ག ས ཁས ངས པའ དམ བཅས པའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན ཕ ར ལ པ ཁ ནས ཉ བར དག ད པར བ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན ར ཞ ག གས ཡ ན ན འད ན གཞན ལ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ང མ ཡ ན ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ ད པའ ར རང ག

165 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 163 དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ན ཁས འཆ ས པའ ས འ ངས པ འབའ ཞ ག ཉ བར བཀ ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར འཐད པ དང ལ བའ གས ཁས ངས པས འད ན བདག ཉ ད ཁ ན ལ བར ད པས གཞན ལ ང ས པ བ ད པར མ ས ས ཞ ས བར གང རང ག དམ བཅའ བའ ད ན ག བ པར ད པ ལ ས པ མ ད པ འད ཉ ད འད འ ན འ ན པ ཆ ས གསལ པ ཡ ན ཏ འད ར ས དཔག པས གན ད པ བ ད པ ལ དག ས པ ག a ཅ ཞ ག ཡ ད [A hypothetical Bhāvaviveka] might say: Nevertheless, contradiction by one s own inference [that is to say, by an inference acceptable to Sāṃkhyas] must, without question, be expressed. ཅ ཡང རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ གད ན མ ཟ བར བ ད པར བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ན Answer: The master Buddhapālita also just expressed such. How? For he said, Things are not produced from self because their production would be just senseless (dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de/ de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du gyur ba i phyir, na svata utpadyanti bhāvāḥ/ tadutpadavaiyarthyāt). In that, the [word] their (de dag, tad) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] those which [already] exist in their own entities. Why? This is because [Buddhapālita s subsequent statement], The production-again of things already existing in their own entities is purposeless (dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid yod pa rnams la ni yang skye ba la dgos pa med do, na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanamasti), is his commentary on that abbreviated statement [and, therefore, it must be carried over to the shorter statement]. Moreover, this [longer] statement [ those which already exist in their own entities ] contains a concordant example [ a manifest pot ] renowned to the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] that possesses the predicate a Jam-yang-shay-pa (above, 96) cites this as ko rather than go.

166 164 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words of the proposition [ senseless production-again ] and the attribute that is the means of proof [that is, the probans] (bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa i chos, sādhyasādhanadharma) [ already existing in its own entity ]. In [Buddhapālita s longer statement], already existing in their own entities contains the reason. [In the shorter statement itself] because production would be just senseless contains the predicate of the proposition [once it is changed to production-again (yang skye ba, punarutpāda) is senseless in accordance with the longer statement]. ད ཡང བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཇ ར ཞ ན གང ག ར ད ས ན འད ད བཤད པ ཡ ན ཏ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར ར ད ལ ད དག ཅ ས བ འད ས ན རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ཞ ན འད ར རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན མད ར བཞག པའ ངག ད འ འག ལ པའ ངག ཡ ན ལ ངག འད ས ན ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ གཞན ལ རབ ག གས པ བ བ པར བ དང བ པར ད པའ ཆ ས དང ན པ ཉ བར ག ང བ ཡ ན ན ད ལ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཞ ས བ འད ས ན གཏན ཚ གས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཞ ས བ འད ས ན བ བ པར བའ ཆ ས འཛ ན པ ཡ ན ན Concerning that, just as in: A sound is impermanent because products are impermanent. It is seen that products are impermanent, like, for example, a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product; therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is impermanent.

167 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 165 product which is manifested by the syllogistic application is the reason, so here also: Things [such as a nonmanifest pot and so forth] are not produced from self because the production-again of what already exists in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen here that a pot and so forth that already abide in front [of oneself] and that already exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on being produced again, so if you think that there are pots and so forth that already exist in their own entities even at the time of the lump of clay and so forth, then production even at the time of what already exist in their own entities does not exist. the reason already existing in their own entities which is manifested by the syllogistic application and which is unmistaken with respect to refuting production-again expresses contradiction through the Sāṃkhya s own inference [that is, an inference acceptable to a Sāṃkhya]. Therefore, how is it that [Bhāvaviveka] says, That is not reasonable because [Buddhapālita] does not express a reason and an example! ད ལ ཇ ར མ ག ས པ མ ག པའ ར ར ས པ ན མ ག པར མཐ ང དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ན ད བཞ ན ཡང ས པ ཡ ན ཏ ད འ ར ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ར མ ག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འད ར ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པའ ས པ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན པ ད བཞ ན འད ར ཡང དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ཡང བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར འད ན ཇ ར མ པ ལ ས གས པ མ ན ན གནས ཤ ང གསལ བ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བ ལ མ ས པར མཐ ང བ ད བཞ ན འཇ མ པའ ག ང ལ ས གས པའ གནས བས ན ཡང གལ ཏ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ མ པ ལ ས གས པ

168 166 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words ཡ ད ད མ ས མས ན ན ད འ ཚ ཡང རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ལ བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ད ར ན གཏན ཚ གས ཉ བར ར བས གསལ བར ས པ ཡང བ དགག པ ལ མ འ ལ པ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ག ངས ཅན ལ རང ཉ ད ཀ ས ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ མཛད པ ཡ ན ཏ ད ས ན ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས ཅ ད པར ད Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not expressed [by Buddhapālita], but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by the other [party, the Sāṃkhya] were not avoided. How? For, Sāṃkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in front [of oneself], which has a manifest form, a manifests again, and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example [of something that already exists in its own entity and is not produced again]. b Since the proposition is: those which are potential entities and do not have a manifested nature are predicated with a negation of production, how could [the Sāṃkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism has] the fault of a position [that is, thesis] that is proving what is already established or have the qualm that [Buddhapālita s syllogism] has the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not that things are not produced from self but that they are produced from self]?! གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པ མ ཡ ན པ འགའ ཞ ག མ ཟད ཀ གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན ཅ ར ཞ ན ག ངས ཅན པ དག མ ན ན གནས པའ མ a mngon par gsal ba i rang bzhin, abhivyaktarūpa. b Or, according to the Sanskrit, and [thus] due to being established [for the Sāṃkhyas] here it is held as the example ; the Tibetan does not translate upadānaṃ (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 21.10).

169 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 167 པ མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན ཅན ན ཡང མང ན པར གསལ བར མ འད ད ཅ ང ད ཉ ད འད ར དཔ ཉ ད བ པའ ང བ ཡ ན པའ ར ལ ས པའ ང བ ར ར ཅ ང མང ན པར གསལ བའ རང བཞ ན མ ཡ ན པ བ བཀག པས ཁ ད པར ས པ ན བ བ པར བ ཡ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ ར བ པ ལ བ པའ གས ཀ ན ཉ ད ད གས པའམ གཏན ཚ གས འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད ད གས པ ག ལ ཡ ད Therefore, even if [Buddhapālita] did express contradiction [of, or damage a to, the Sāṃkhya view] through self[-approved] inference, b [the Sāṃkhyas] would not set forth the fallacies that [Bhāvaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that [Buddhapālita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the other [party, since they would not adduce them]. For these reasons, it should be known that these [two] objections [by Bhāvaviveka to Buddhapālita s presentation] are just senseless. ད འ ར རང ག ས དཔག པས འགལ བ བ ད པ ན ཡང ཇ ད ས པའ ཉ ས པ བ ད པ མ ད པའ ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ མ ད པ ཉ ད ད ད འ ར ན འ ན པ འད དག ན འ ལ པ མ ད པ ཉ ད ད ཞ ས ཤ ས པར འ Because the term and so forth in a pot and so forth (bum pa la sogs pa, ghaṭādika) is expressed with the intention of including all things asserted as being produced, [Buddhapālita s syllogistic statement] also does not become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (snam bu, paṭa) and so forth. c a De Jong (n ) corrects the Sanskrit to anumānabādhācodanāyām, which translates as damage (gnod pa). b That is to say, a syllogistic statement approved by the Sāṃkhyas. c With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means in Tibetan, is frequently

170 168 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words མ པ ལ ས གས པ ཞ ས བ ས གས པའ ས ན བར འད ད པའ དང ས པ མ ས པ བ བར འད ད པའ ར མ ལ ས གས པ དག ག ས མ ང ས པར འ ར བ ཡང མ ཡ ན ན Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapālita indicates] this other syllogism: Objects other than the person which [Sāṃkhyas] propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, like, for example, the person. [In that brief statement by Buddhapālita] this example [of another syllogism] is expressed. a ཡང ན ར བ འད ན ལ གཞན ཡ ན ཏ རང ལས བར བའ ས ལས ཐ དད པའ ད ན མས ན བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ ར ས བཞ ན ན ཞ ས དཔ ར བ ད པ འད ཉ ད དཔ ར བ ད པར འ [Certain Sāṃkhyas might object that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation [rather than production]. Even so, manifestation is designated with the term production, and due to the qualitative similarity [between production and manifestation] with respect used as the second after pot, it strikes me that it is merely because of the similarity in sound between the two words in Sanskrit, ghaṭa and paṭa, an amusing play on sounds. a Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, 240b.6) appears to take example as referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas according to La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 22, n. 3) it might refer to the example in this syllogism (the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main thesis would also be realized. However, the person does not appear to fit Chandrakīrti s context, for Chandrakīrti appears to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced. This is probably why Jam-yang-shay-pa usually takes the subject to be things such as a non-manifest pot and so forth instead of just as things. In the second syllogism, Chandrakīrti provides another all-inclusive subject; thus the issue does not revolve around the example (which in the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest state), and thus Jam-yang-shay-pa s opinion is preferable; the reference is more likely to an example of another syllogism.

171 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 169 to earlier nonapprehendability and later apprehendability the term production just expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting it [that is, production] does not damage [the assertion of the manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest state]. གལ ཏ ཡང བ བཀག པས མང ན པར གསལ བར བ ལ གན ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན པ ད ན ཡང བའ མང ན པར གསལ བ ལ བཏགས ནས ན དང མར མ དམ གས པ དང དམ གས པར ཆ ས མ ན པས བའ ས མང ན པར གསལ བ ཉ ད བ ད པའ ར འད བཀག པས གན ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན ན Moreover [a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapālita s] having anything that expresses the meanings you have expounded, how was such analysis found? ཡང ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག ད པར ད པ མ ད པར མ པར ད ད པ འད འད ཇ ར ད ཅ ན བཤད པར Answer: These meaningful statements a [by Buddhapālita], due to having great import, contain an abbreviation of the above-mentioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence, there is nothing [in what I Chandrakīrti have said] that is not indicated in them. བཤད པར ད ན ག ངག འད དག ན ད ན ཆ ན པ ཅན ཡ ན པས ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན བ ས ནས འ ག པ ཡ ན ལ ད དག ཀ ང བཤད ན ཇ ད ས པའ ད ན ག བདག ཉ ད འ ན a Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10, 7, n.4) objects to La Vallée Poussin s (Prasannapadā, 23, n.1) editing the text from atha vākyāni to arthavākyāni in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag di dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 of Vaidya s edition suggests that La Vallée Poussin could be right.

172 170 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words པར ད པ ཡ ན པས འད ར མ བ ན པ ང ཟད ཀ ང མ ད ད Furthermore, the opposite meaning of the consequences [which is that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly] is related only with the other [party, the Sāṃkhya,] not with us because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how could we be contradicting [the tenet of the Middle Way School that the refutation of production is a nonaffirming negation]? a Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the other party [so that they will give up their assertion of production from self]. b Therefore, how could the master Buddhapālita following the unerring system of the master Nāgārjuna [in which production from other, as well as sensible and finite re-production, are not asserted] c have said any words that would make him susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for another [to show contradiction with the system of the Middle Way School]! ཐལ བར འ ར བ བ ག པའ ད ན དང ཡང ཕ ར ལ པ ཉ ད འ ལ པ ཡ ན ག ཁ བ ཅག ན མ ཡ ན ཏ རང ལ དམ བཅའ བ མ ད པའ ར ར ད འ ར ཁ བ ཅག ལ བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བ ག ལ ཡ ད ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པ བ བས པས ཕ ར ལ པ ལ ཉ ས པ མང པ ཅ ཙམ འ ར བ ད ཙམ ཁ བ ཅག མང ན པར འད ད པ ཁ ན ཡ ན པས གང ལས འད ལ གཞན ག ས ག གས ད པར འ ར བ བ དཔ ན བ ཀ གས ན ཅ མ ལ ག པའ ས འ ང བ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས a The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 23.4) reads, And, due to that, there is no contradiction with a tenet. b Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, c Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences,

173 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 171 ལ ག གས དང བཅས པའ ཚ ག ག ང པ ཉ ད ག ལ ཡ ད When proponents of the absence of inherent existence adduce a consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how could it follow that they are subject to the opposite meaning of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker powerless like [an executioner] a with a club or noose [forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord with the speaker s intention in speaking. Therefore, [Buddhapālita s] adducing consequences [here] has the effect only of refuting the other party s thesis [that re-production is sensible and finite]; b hence [he] does not come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences. c རང བཞ ན མ ད པར བས རང བཞ ན དང བཅས པར བ ལ ཐལ བ བ བས པ ན ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན ཅན ཐལ བར ག ལ འ ར ཏ མས ན ད ག པ དང ཞགས པ ཅན བཞ ན བ པ རང དབང མ ད པར ད པ མ ཡ ན ན འ ན ཅ ཞ ན ས པ ཡ ད ན བ པ འ བ ད པར འད ད པའ ས ད པ ཡ ན ན ད འ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ན ཕ ར ལ པ འ དམ བཅའ ལ འག ག པ ཙམ ག འ ས ཅན ཡ ན པའ ར ཐལ བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན འ ར བ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན a The bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are from Gom-day Namkha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 619.2ff. b Tsong-kha-pa s Ocean of Reasoning, c Jam-yang-shay-pa (Great Exposition of the Middle, above, 140) remarks that Chandrakīrti is saying that Buddhapālita s consequences here at this point of refuting production from self do not project their opposite meaning but that Chandrakīrti is not saying that no consequences project their opposite meaning. See the layout of the five types of consequences in my remark at that point.

174 172 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words Moreover, in this way the master [Nāgārjuna] mostly eradicates others positions by way of only adducing consequences such as through: a Space does not at all exist Before [its] definition. If space existed before [its] definition, It would follow it was without definition [at that time, due to which it would not exist]. and: b If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently] Separate from the form s causes [the elements], It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent existence]. Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is causeless. and likewise: c Nirvāṇa is not an effective thing (dngos po, bhāva). [For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There are no effective things Without aging and death. and so forth. If the master [Nāgārjuna s] statements are considered to be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful statements and thus of great import, why are the master Buddhapālita s statements also not considered that way! ད ར ཡང བ དཔ ན ན ནམ མཁའ མཚན ཉ ད ར ལ ན ནམ མཁའ ང ཟད ཡ ད མ ཡ ན གལ ཏ མཚན ལས ར a Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom, V.1. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that a definition inherently subsists in what is defined. The bracketed addition in the first citation is from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, 136.7, Varanasi 1973 edition. In this and the next two notes the identification of what is being refuted in these three quotes is from Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, 621.1ff. b IV.2. Through an absurd consequence Nāgārjuna is refuting that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities. The bracketed additions in this citation are from Tsong-kha-pa s commentary, , Varanasi 1973 edition. Tsong-kha-pa (129.8) says that this projects its opposite meaning; I presume that the other two also do so. c XXV.4.

175 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words: Defending Buddhapālita 173 ར ན མཚན ཉ ད མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཞ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ག གས ཀ ན མ གཏ གས པར ག གས ན ག གས ཀ མ ད པར ཐལ བར འ ར ཏ ད ན གང ཡང མ ད པ ན གང ན འང མ ད ཅ ས བ དང ད བཞ ན ངན འདས པ དང ས པ མ ན ཤ འ མཚན ཉ ད ཐལ བར འ ར དང འཆ བ མ ད པ ཡ དང ས པ ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པས ཕལ ཆ ར ཐལ བ བ པ ཁ ནའ ནས གཞན ག གས ས ལ བར མཛད ད ཅ བ དཔ ན ག ངག མས ན ད ན ག ངག ཡ ན པའ ར ད ན ཆ ན པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པས ར བ མའ ཉ ད གས ན ན བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ངག དག ཀ ང ཅ འ ར ད ར ཡ ངས མ ག Objection [by a hypothetical Bhāvaviveka]: a It is the custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at length. འ ན ཏ ར བའ ངག ས པར ད པར ད པ གང ཡ ན པ འད ན འག ལ པ མཁན པ མས ཀ གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ན Answer: That also is not so because when even the master [Nāgārjuna] commented on his Refutation of Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements. b a Following Yamaguchi, De Jong ( Textcritical Notes, p. 30, n. 25.3) says that both this question and the response are spoken by Bhāvaviveka; however, Gom-day Nam-khagyal-tshan ( ) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the disputants, which are obvious. This reading fits the pattern of the section better than that suggested by Yamaguchi and De Jong. b As Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan s Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences (623.1) points out, the fact that Chandrakīrti does not mention the Akutobhayā adds credence to the argument that it is not an auto-commentary on the Treatise

176 174 Chandrakīrti s Clear Words ད ཡང ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ཏ ད པ བ ག པའ འག ལ པ མཛད པ ན བ དཔ ན ག ས ཀ ང ར བའ ངག མ ག ངས པའ ར ར on the Middle.

177 Abbreviations co ne = co ne bstan gyur. TBRC W1GS co ne dgon chen: co ne, Dharma = the sde dge edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma Press: the Nying-ma Edition of the sde-dge bka'-'gyur and bstan- 'gyur. Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, Golden Reprint = gser bris bstan gyur (Sichuan, China: krung go i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib jug khang, 1989). Grags pa & rnam rgyal = Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable, Mundgod, India: SOKU, Karmapa sde dge refers to the sde dge mtshal par bka gyur: A Facsimile Edition of the 18th Century Redaction of Si tu chos kyi byung gnas Prepared under the Direction of H.H. the 16th rgyal dbang karma pa (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1977). Peking = Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, sde dge = sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bstan ḥgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, The catalogue numbers are from Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, And A Catalogue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism. Edited by Yensho Kanakura. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, TBRC W23703 (PDF of Delhi, India: Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1977). stog Palace refers to the Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur (Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979). TBRC = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (

178

179 Bibliography 1. SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS Avalokitavrata (spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs) Explanatory Commentary on (Bhāvaviveka s) Lamp for (Nāgārjuna s) Wisdom prajñāpradīpaṭīkā shes rab sgron ma i rgya cher grel pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3859). TBRC W :4-575 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5259, vol Bhāvaviveka (legs ldan byed, c ?) Blaze of Reasoning / Commentary on the Heart of the Middle Way : Blaze of Reasoning madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā dbu ma i snying po i grel pa rtog ge bar ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3856). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5256, vol. 96. Partial English translation (chap. 3, 1-136): Shōtarō Iida. Reason and Emptiness. Tokyo: Hokuseido, Heart of the Middle Way madhyamakahṛdayakārikā dbu ma i snying po i tshig le ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3855). TBRC W :4-82 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5255, vol. 96. Partial English translation (chap ): Shōtarō Iida. Reason and Emptiness. Tokyo: Hokuseido, Partial Sanskrit and Tibetan edition (chaps. 1-3): Annette L. Heitmann. Textkritischer Beitrag zu Bhavyas Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Kapitel 1-3. Copenhagen: Videnskabsbutikkens Forlag, Kobenhavns Universitet, Lamp for Nāgārjuna s Wisdom, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle prajñāpradīpa shes rab sgron ma Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3856). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). P5253, vol. 95 Toh. 3853, dbu ma, vol. tsha English translation and Tibetan text (chapters 3-5, 17, 23, 26): William Ames. Bhāvaviveka s Prajñāpradīpa: Six Chapters. PhD diss., University of Washington, Buddhapālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, c ?) Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti dbu ma rtsa ba i grel pa buddha pā li ta Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3842). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5254, vol. 95; Toh. 3842, vol. tsha; Tokyo sde dge vol. 1; Golden Reprint, vol Edited Tibetan (Ch.1-12): Max Walleser. Bibliotheca Buddhica 16. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, English translation of Ch.1: Judit Fehér. Buddhapālita s Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti Arrival and

180 178 Bibliography Spread of Prāsaṇgika-Mādhyamika Literature in Tibet. In Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kūros, vol. 1, edited by Louis Ligeti, Budapest: Akadmiai Kiado, Tibetan edition and English translation of Ch.18: Christian Lindtner. Buddhapālita on Emptiness. Indo-Iranian Journal 23 (1981): Annotated translation and edited Tibetan text: Akira Saito, A Study of the Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti. Ph.D. thesis. Australian National University, Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century) Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle madhaymakāvatārabhāṣya dbu ma la jug pa i bshad pa / dbu ma la jug pa i rang grel Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3862). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5263, vol. 98. Also: Dharmsala, India: Council of Religious and Cultural Affairs, Tibetan: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, French translation (up to chap. 6, stanza 165): Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Muséon 8 (1907): ; Muséon 11 (1910): ; Muséon 12 (1911): German translation (chap. 6, stanzas ): Helmut Tauscher. Candrakīrti-Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 5. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā dbu ma rtsa ba i grel pa tshig gsal ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3860). TBRC W :4-401, vol. a (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5260, vol. 98. Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Sanskrit: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, Also, J.W. de Jong. Text-critical Notes on the Prasannapadā. Indo-Iranian Journal 20, nos. 1/2 (1978): and nos. 3/4 (1978): Also, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and French translation of the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti that concludes Clear Words: J.W. de Jong. La Madhyamakaśāstrastuti de Candrakīrti. Oriens Extremus 9 (1962): English translation (chaps. 1 and 25): T. Stcherbatsky. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad: Office of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927; rev. reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, English translation (chap. 2): Jeffrey Hopkins. Analysis of Coming and Going. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Partial English translation: Mervyn Sprung. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti translated from the Sanskrit. London: Routledge, 1979; Boulder: Prajñā Press, French translation (chaps. 2-4, 6-9, 11, 23, 24, 26, 28): Jacques May. Prasannapadā Madhyamaka-vṛtti, douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, French translation (chaps ): J. W. de Jong. Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā. Paris: Geuthner, 1949.

181 Bibliography 179 French translation (chap. 17): É. Lamotte. Le Traité de l acte de Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 4 (1936): German translation (chaps. 5, 12-26): Stanislaw Schayer. Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā. Krakow: Naktadem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci, German translation (chap. 10): Stanislaw Schayer. Feuer und Brennstoff. Rocznik Orjentalistyczny 7 (1931): Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle madhyamakāvatāra dbu ma la jug pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3861). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Tibetan: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, English translation: C. W. Huntington, Jr. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (chap. 6): Stephen Batchelor. Echoes of Voidness by Geshé Rabten, London: Wisdom Publications, See also references under Chandrakīrti s [Auto]commentary on the Supplement. Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century) Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition pramāṇavārttikakārikā tshad ma rnam grel gyi tshig le ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4210). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5709, vol Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Sanskrit: Dwarikadas Shastri. Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrtti. Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, Also, Yūsho Miyasaka. Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan), Acta Indologica 2 ( ): Also, (chap. 1 and autocommentary) Raniero Gnoli. The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, English translation (chap. 2): Masatoshi Nagatomi. A Study of Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavarttika, Book I. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, English translation (chap. 4, stanzas 1-148): Tom J.F. Tillemans. Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇavārttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna), vol. 1. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Dignāga (phyogs kyi glangs po, sixth century) Compilation of Prime Cognition pramāṇasamuccaya tshad ma kun las btus pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4203). TBRC W :3-29 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5700, vol English translation (partial): M. Hattori. Dignāga, On Perception. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

182 180 Bibliography Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (sgom sde nam mkha rgyal mtshan) ) Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakīrti s) Clear Words, Written by Jam-pay-yang Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan thal bzlog gi dka ba i gnas gtan la bebs pa jam pa i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa i tshig gsal gyi lde mig in The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4 New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yoṅs-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, ) Explanation of (Dharmakīrti s) Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition : Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Illumination of the Path to Liberation tshad ma rnam ʼgrel gyi tshig leʼur byas paʼi rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa / rnam ʼgrel thar lam gsal byed Tibetan editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma) TBRC W4CZ2710.5: (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, 1999). Tibetan editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyal tshab rje) TBRC W : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, ). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In tshad ma rnam grel gyi rnam bshad. TBRC W665: (PDF of zhang kang: zhang kang then ma dpe skrun kung zi, 2000). Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Guru Deva, Also: Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, /1722) Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par byed pa'i mtha' dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W :1-288 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis khyil, bla brang brka shis khyil dgon, publishing date unknown). Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]). Tibetan edition: Published at Lhasa, Tibet: Go-mang College, date unknown. Acquired by Jeffrey Hopkins in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). English translation of section one: William Magee. Principles for Practice: Jam-yang-shay-pa on the Four Reliances with Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. English translation of section two: William Magee. Questioning the Buddha About Contradictions in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. English translation of section three: William Magee. Buddha s Answer Dispelling Contradiction in the Sūtras. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma jug pa i mtha dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang jug ngogs

183 Bibliography 181 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje). TBRC W : (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje). bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Also available at: TBRC W Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje, vol. 9 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also available at: TBRC W1KG Buxaduor, India: Gomang, Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje, vol. 9. (entire). Mundgod, India: Gomang College, Also available at: TBRC W Beijing, China: Pe cin yug hran shin 'gyig par khang, Mundgod, Karnataka, India: Drepung Gomang Library, Translation of the section on the two truths: Guy M. Newland s Ph.D. thesis, The Two truths: A study of Mādhyamika philosophy as presented in the Monastic textbooks of the Ge-lug-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism. Translation of the beginning: Jules Levinson, What Does Chandrakīrti Add to Nāgārjuna s Treatise? UMA Translation Project Publication, Translation of the beginning of chapter six: Craig Preston, Meaning of The Manifest, Vessels for the Teaching of Emptiness, Nāgārjuna s Lives, and Ten Samenesses: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Introduction. Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six. Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six. Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulf illing All Hopes of All Beings grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong In the Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Labrang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1996). Abbreviated reference: 1996 Mundgod revision. Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 2000). Abbreviated reference: 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod. Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962 [based on the old Go-mang edition]. Abbreviated reference: 1962 Dalama. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje) TBRC W1KG : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang. Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W : (PDF of bla brang bkra shis khyil: bla brang bkra shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: 2001 TBRC bla brang. Tibetan scanned edition: scanning of old Go-mang edition by Jongbok Yi at Mundgod in Abbreviated reference: 2017 old Go-mang. English translation (entire root text and edited portions of the autocommentary and Ngag-wangpal-dan s Annotations): Jeffrey Hopkins. Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (beginning of the chapter on the Consequence School): Jeffrey Hopkins. Meditation on Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston:

184 182 Bibliography Wisdom Publications, English translation of root text with Lo-sang-kön-chog s commentary: Daniel Cozort and Craig Preston. Buddhist Philosophy: Losang Gonchok's Short Commentary to Jamyang Shayba's Root Text on Tenets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Translation of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Daniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998). Translation into complex-character Chinese: Su-an Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins Easy Access to Jamyang-shay-pa s Maps of the Profound: Autonomy School. Translation into complex-character Chinese: Su-an Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins Easy Access to Jamyang-shay-pa s Maps of the Profound: Consequence School.. Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Roar / Presentation of Tenets: Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience grub mtha rtsa ba gdong lnga i sgra dbyangs / grub pa i mtha i rnam par bzhag pa khrul spong gdong lnga i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba i sgron me Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bzhad-pa i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the Tra-shi-khyil blockprint with some corrections ]. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje / bla brang par ma). TBRC W : (PDF of bla brang bkra shis khyil: bla brang bkra shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In kun mkhyen jam dpal zhal lung sogs nyer mkho i skor phyogs bsgrigs. TBRC W30060: [s.l.]: [s.n.], [2002] Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje). TBRC W : (PDF of Go-mang college[?], 1997[?]. Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W8LS [s.l.]: [s.n.], [n.d.]. Jang-kya Röl-pay-dor-je (lcang skya rol pa i rdo rje, ) Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer s Teaching / Presentations of Tenets grub mtha i rnam bzhag / grub pa i mtha i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po i mdzes rgyan Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (rol pa i rdo rje). TBRC W :7-220 (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go bod brgyud mtho rim nang bstan slob gling nang bstan zhib jug khang, 1995). Edition cited: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, Also: Lokesh Chandra, ed. Buddhist Philosophical Systems of Lcaṅ-skya Rol-pahi Rdo-rje. Śata-piṭaka Series (Indo-Asian Literatures), vol New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, Also: An edition published by gam car phan bde legs bshad gling grva tshang dang rgyud rnying slar gso tshogs pa, English translation of Sūtra School chapter: Anne C. Klein. Knowing, Naming, and Negation, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Commentary on this: Anne C. Klein. Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transformative Religious Experience. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of Autonomy School chapter: Donald S. Lopez Jr. A Study of Svātantrika, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of part of Consequence School chapter: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness Yoga: The Tibetan Middle Way, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Jñānagarbha (ye shes snying po, eighth century) Autocommentary of Differentiation of the Two Truths bden gnyis rnam byed pa i grel pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : 8-32 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). English translation with critical edition: Eckel, Malcolm D. Jñānagarbha s Commentary on the

185 Bibliography 183 Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, Differentiation of the Two Truths satyadvayavibhaṅgakārika bden pa gnyis rnam par byed pa i tshig le u byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : 4-8 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Kamalashīla (pad ma i ngang tshul; ca ) Illumination of the Middle madhyamakāloka dbu ma snang ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3887). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5287 Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, ) Compilation on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa i bstan bcos skal bzang mig byed Tibetan digital reprint edition: In dbu ma stong thun chen mo. TBRC W00EGS :9-481 (PDF of Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 1, New Delhi: ed. lha mkhar yongs dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (mkhas grub rje). TBRC W1KG : (PDF of bla brang par ma: bla brang bkra shis khyil, 199?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG vol (PDF of Lha sa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, 2009). Collected Works of the Lord Mkhas-grub rje dge-legs-dpal-bzaṅ-po, vol. 1, New Delhi: Guru Deva, Also: Collected Works of Mkhas-grub dge-legs dpal, vol. 1, New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also: New Delhi: n.p., English translation: José Ignacio Cabezón. A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, English translation of the chapter on the Mind-Only School: Jeffrey Hopkins. Khay-drub-ge-legpal-sang s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate : The Mind-Only School. Unpublished manuscript. Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog jigs med dbang po, ) Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland grub pa i mtha i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che i phreng ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (dkon mchog jigs med dbang po). TBRC W1KG9560.6: New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971). Tibetan: K. Mimaki. Le Grub mtha rnam bzhag rin chen phreṅ ba de dkon mchog jigs med dbaṅ po ( ), Zinbun [The Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University], 14 (1977): Also, Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 6, New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also: Xylograph in thirty-two folios from the Lessing collection of the rare book section of the University of Wisconsin Library, which is item 47 in Leonard Zwilling. Tibetan Blockprints in the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, Also: Mundgod, India: blo gsal gling Press, Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Also: Dharmsala, India: Teaching Training, n.d. Also: A blockprint edition in

186 184 Bibliography twenty-eight folios obtained in 1987 from Go-mang College in Lha-sa, printed on blocks that predate the Cultural Revolution. English translation: Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins. Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, New York: Grove, 1976; rev. ed., Cutting through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Also: H. V. Guenther. Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, Also, the chapters on the Autonomy School and the Consequence School: Shōtarō Iida. Reason and Emptiness, Tokyo: Hokuseido, Maitreya (byams pa) 4. Ornament for the Clear Realizations abhisamayālaṃkāra/ abhisamayālaṁkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrakārikā mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa Sanskrit editions: Amano, Ko ei. A study on the Abhisamaya-alam ka ra-ka rika -s a stra-vrṭti. Rev. ed. Yanai City, Japan: Rokoku Bunko, Stcherbatsky, Theodore and Eugène Obermiller, eds. Abhisamaya lan ka ra-prajn a pa ramita - Upades a-śa stra: The Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series. Reprint ed. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3786). TBRC W :3-28 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). English translations: Brunnhölzl, Karl. Gone Beyond: The Prajn a pa ramitā Su tras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyu tradition. The Tsadra Foundation series. 2 vols. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Groundless Paths: The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Nyingma Tradition. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Conze, Edward. Abhisamayālaṅkāra: Introduction and Translation from Original Text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index. Roma, Italy: Is. M.E.O., Hopkins, Jeffrey and Jongbok Yi. Maitreya s Ornament for the Clear Realizations. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2015: downloadable at uma-tibet.org.. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Explanation of the Treatise Ornament for the Clear Realizations From the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: The Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at umatibet.org.. (containing 203 of the 274 stanzas) The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Seventy Topics and Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Sparham, Gareth. A ryavimuktisena, Maitreyana tha, and Haribhadra. Abhisamaya lam ka ra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company., Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Nāgārjuna (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.) Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom madhyamakaśāstra / prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā dbu ma i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba i tshig le ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3824). TBRC W :3-39, vol. tsa (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5224, vol. 95.

187 Bibliography 185 Edited Sanskrit: J. W. de Jong. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ. Madras, India: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977; reprint, Wheaton, Ill.: Agents, Theosophical Publishing House, c1977. Also: Christian Lindtner. Nāgārjuna s Filosofiske Vaerker, Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, English translation: Frederick Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, Also: Kenneth Inada. Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, Also: David J. Kalupahana. Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York, Also: Jay L. Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. New York: Oxford University Press, Also: Stephen Batchelor. Verses from the Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime. New York: Riverhead Books, Italian translation: R. Gnoli. Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Le stanze del cammino di mezzo. Enciclopedia di autori classici 61. Turin, Italy: P. Boringhieri, Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. Nāgārjuna s Filosofiske Vaerker, Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness śūnyatāsaptatikārikā stong pa nyid bdun cu pa i tshig le ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3827). TBRC W :49-55 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5227, vol. 95. Edited Tibetan and English translation: Christian Lindtner. Master of Wisdom. Oakland: Dharma Publishing, English translation: David Ross Komito. Nāgārjuna s Seventy Stanzas : A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Precious Garland of Advice for the King rājaparikathāratnāvalī rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che i phreng ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4158). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Del-hi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93. Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese: Michael Hahn. Nāgārjuna s Ratnāvalī. vol. 1. The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese). Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins. Nāgārjuna s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, Supersedes that in: Nāgārjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama. The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint, in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. The Buddhism of Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; reprint, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, English translation: John Dunne and Sara McClintock. The Precious Garland: An Epistle to a King. Boston: Wisdom Publications, English translation of 223 stanzas (chap. 1, 1-77; chap. 2, 1-46; chap. 4, 1-100): Giuseppe Tucci. The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1934): ; (1936): , Japanese translation: Uryūzu Ryushin. Butten II, Sekai Koten Bungaku Zenshu, 7 (July, 1965): Edited by Nakamura Hajime. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Also: Uryūzu Ryushin. Daijō Butten, 14 (1974): Ryūju Ronshū. Edited by Kajiyama Yuichi and Uryūzu Ryushin. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha. Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. Nagarjuna, Juvelkaeden og andre skrifter. Copenhagen:

188 186 Bibliography Navidharma Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions piṇḍanivartananirdeśakārikā ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa i tshig le ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4293, sgra mdo, she 250b.7-254a.3. TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5782, sgra rig pa, le 245b.6-249a.6 (vol.140, p ). [N] le 230b.1-234a.4. [Kinsha] 3782, le 316b.1 (p ). Commentary on Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions piṇḍanivartananirdeśavārttika ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa i rnam grel Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4294, sgra mdo, she 254a.4-277a7. [N] le 234a.4-260b.2). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Peking 5783, sgra rig pa, le 249a.6-273b.7 (vol.140, p ). [N] le 234a.4-260b.2. [Kinsha] 3783, le 322b.1 (p ). Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje) Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Diff icult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Tibetan digital reprint edition: In TBRC W (PDF of Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964.). Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, Delhi: Guru Deva, Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). Taipei edition: Drepung Gomang Library (Taipei, Taiwan: Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 2007). Explanation of Veil Truths and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets grub mtha bzhi i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo i glu dbyangs Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.1:9-280 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). New Delhi: Guru Deva, Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vol. 1, Delhi: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, Translation of the chapter on the Great Exposition School: John B. Buescher. Echoes from an Empty Sky: The Origins of the Buddhist Doctrine of the Two Truths. Ithaca, Snow Lion Publications: Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga ston Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.3: (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). Word Commentary on the Root Verses of (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets tshig grel / grub mtha' chen mo i mchan 'grel gyi skabs skabs su mdzad pa i rtsa ba i tshig grel zur du bkod pa In Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983.

189 Bibliography 187 Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Taipei Edition (see above), includes Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Word Commentary on the Root Verses. Prajñāmokṣha (shes rab thar pa) Commentary on (Atisha s) Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way dbu ma i man ngag ces bya ba i grel ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (dpe bsdur ma). TBRC W1PD : (PDF of Pe cin: krung go i bod rig pa i dpe skrun khang, ). Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö (red mdaʼ ba gzhon nu blo gros, ) Commentary on (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Fundamental Treatise on the Middle : Illuminating the Tenable dbu ma rtsa baʼi ʼgrel pa ʼthad paʼi snang ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ʼbum (gzhon nu blo gros) TBRC W : (PDF of Kathmandu: Sa skya rgyal yongs gsung rab slob gnyer khang, 1999). Shāntideva (zhi ba lha, eighth century C.E.) Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra byang chub sems dpa i spyod pa la jug pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 3871). TBRC W : , dbu ma, vol. la (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ). Sanskrit: P. L. Vaidya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 12. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, Sanskrit and Tibetan: Vidhushekara Bhattacharya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, Sanskrit and Tibetan with Hindi translation: Rāmaśaṃkara Tripāthī, ed. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bauddha-Himālaya-Granthamālā, 8. Leh, Ladākh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, English translations: Stephen Batchelor. A Guide to the Bodhisattva s Way of Life. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Marion Matics. Entering the Path of Enlightenment. New York: Macmillan, Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton. The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Padmakara Translation Group. The Way of the Bodhisattva. Boston: Shambhala, Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace. A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Contemporary commentary: H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. Transcendent Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of the Night. Boston: Shambhala, Ta-drin-rab-tan (rta mgrin rab brtan, tre hor dge bshes, ) Annotations / Annotations for the Diff icult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa s) The Essence of Eloquence : Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence drang nges rnam byed legs bshad snying po dka gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo gsal dga ston Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG10421, 1 vol. (No publication data). Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grags, Tag-tshang Shay-rab-rin-chen (stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen, b.1405)

190 188 Bibliography Explanation of Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets : Ocean of Eloquence grub mtha kun shes nas mtha bral grub pa zhes bya ba i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho Tibetan digital edition: In grub mtha kun shes nas mtha bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba i bstan bcos: TBRC W29895: (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzangstobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data. Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets grub mtha kun shes nas mtha bral grub pa zhes bya ba i bstan bcos Tibetan digital edition: In grub mtha kun shes nas mtha bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba i bstan bcos: TBRC W29895: (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzangstobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data. Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, ) Explanation of (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle dbu ma rtsa ba i tshig le ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba i rnam bshad rigs pa i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes ṭik chen Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W :5-622 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6153, vol Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, n.d. Also: rje tsong kha pa i gsung dbu ma i lta ba i skor, vols Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, English translation: Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield. Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford: Oxford University Press, English translation (chap. 2): Jeffrey Hopkins. Ocean of Reasoning. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Illumination of the Thought dbu ma la jug pa i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W :5-582 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6143, vol Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, n.d.; Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973; Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975; Delhi: Guru Deva, English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1980; the portion of the book that is Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought (chapters 1-5) is downloadable at: English translation (chap. 6, stanzas 1-7): Jeffrey Hopkins and Anne C. Klein. Path to the Middle: Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet: The Oral Scholarship of Kensur Yeshay Tupden, by Anne C. Klein, , Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, Jam-dbyangs-bshadpa i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa i byang

191 Bibliography 189 chub lam rim chen mo i dka ba i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron Tibetan digital reprint edition: In lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma (bla brang bkra shis khyil par ma). TBRC W :3-978 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis khyil edition printed from the 1807 bla brang bkra shis 'khyil blocks in 1999?). Also: New Delhi: Chos- phel-legs-ldan, Also: Gomang Library, 2016 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa i byang chub lam gyi rim pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W :51026 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6001, vol Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, Edited Tibetan: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam Rim Chen Mo). Japanese and Tibetan Buddhist Culture Series, 6. Kyoto: Tibetan Buddhist Culture Association, English translation: Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. 3 vols. Joshua W.C. Cutler, editor-in-chief, Guy Newland, editor. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of the part on the excessively broad object of negation: Elizabeth Napper. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publications, English translation of the part on the excessively narrow object of negation: William Magee. The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of the parts on calm abiding and special insight: Alex Wayman. Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978; reprint, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers sde bdun la jug pa i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG vol (PDF of Sarnath, India: dge ldan spyi las khang, 1972). sde dge, New Zhol Par-khang edition of the collected works of Tsong-kha-pa, Vol. tsha. Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim bring / lam rim chung ngu Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W :5-474 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, 199?); Peking 6002, vol Also: Mundgod, India: dga ldan shar rtse, n.d. (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay); Bylakuppe, India: Sera Je Library, 1999 (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay); Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1968; Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979.

192 190 Bibliography English translation of the section on special insight: Jeffrey Hopkins. In Tsong-kha-pa s Final Exposition of Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Robert Thurman. The Middle Transcendent Insight. Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Edited Tibetan text and Japanese translation of the section on special insight: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito. A Study of Tsong khapa s Mādhyamika Philosophy 1: Annotated Japanese translation of the Vipaśyanā Section of Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim). Tsong kha pa chuugan tetsugaku no kenkyuu 1, Bodaidousidairon chuuhen, kan no shou: wayaku, Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito, Kyoto: Buneido, Japanese translation: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takashi Rujinaka. The Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment by rje Tsong kha pa: An Annotated Japanese Translation of Byang chub Lam rim chung ba. Kyoto: Unio Corporation, Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par phye ba i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W : (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis khyil, 199?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W (PDF of sde dge lhun grub steng: sde dge par khang, n.p.). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W : (PDF of Dharamsala: Sherig Parkhang, 1997). Peking 6142, vol English translation of the Prologue and Mind-Only section: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism. Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, English translation of the introductory section on the Middle Way School; Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness in the Middle Way School of Buddhism: Mutual Reinforcement of Understanding Dependent-Arising and Emptiness. Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 4. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. English translation of the entire text: Robert A. F. Thurman. Tsong Khapa s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Editions: see the preface to Hopkins critical edition of the Introduction and section on the Mind- Only School, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 355. Also: Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable, Mundgod, India: SOKU, Ye shes thabs mkhas. shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mdzad pa i drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po (The Eastern Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa s Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence ). Tā la i bla ma i phags bod, vol. 22. Part Two, Varanasi: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, Ye-shay-day (ye shes sde, fl. 8th century) Distinctions in the Views lta ba i khyad par Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge, 4360). TBRC W : (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, ).

193 2. OTHER WORKS Dreyfus, Georges B.J. and Sara L. McClintock, The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? (Wisdom Publications, 2003) Hopkins, Jeffrey. Absorption In No External World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism. Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 3. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom Publications, Nāgārjuna s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Rogers, Katherine Manchester. Tibetan Logic. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Yotsuya, Kodo. The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999.

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195 Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia where he taught Tibetan Buddhist Studies and Tibetan language for thirty-two years from He received a B.A. magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five years at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey), and received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in He served as His Holiness the Dalai Lama s chief interpreter into English on lecture tours for ten years, At the University of Virginia he founded programs in Buddhist Studies and Tibetan Studies and served as Director of the Center for South Asian Studies for twelve years. He has published fifty-one books, some of which have been translated into a total of twenty-two languages. He published the first translation of the foundational text of the Jo-nang school of Tibetan Buddhism in Mountain Doctrine: Tibet s Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha-Matrix, and two on the Nying-ma view, Fundamental Mind: The Nyingma View of the Great Completeness and Mi-pam-gya-tsho s Primordial Enlightenment: The Nying-ma View of Luminosity and Emptiness, Analysis of Fundamental Mind, with oral commentary by Khetsun Sangpo. He has translated and edited sixteen books from oral teachings by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the last four being How to See Yourself as You Really Are; Becoming Enlightened; How to Be Compassionate; and The Heart of Meditation: Discovering Innermost Awareness. He is the Founder and President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.

196 This is the second of four volumes presenting Tibetan views on a controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self. It stems from the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called Wisdom : Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not causelessly Do any things Ever arise anywhere. The present book provides two Tibetan explanations, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü ( /1722) of Chandrakīrti s defense against Bhāvaviveka s criticism of Buddhapālita s commentary. Included also is a complete translation of the relevant section of Chandrakīrti s Clear Words. The controversy between these commentators engendered a split in what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School within the Middle Way School. The topics involved in this series of four books are used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena falsely appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. In this volume Jamyang-shay-pa takes the reader step by step through Chandrakīrti s adverse reactions to Bhāvaviveka s often terse criticisms of Buddhapālita s refutation of production from causes in which effects already exist nonmanifestly. Chandrakīrti is considered to have the final word in the debate. This complex material is used in Ge-lugpa monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how objects appear and thereby about the nature of the reality behind appearances. uma-tibet.org