Principles for Practice: The Four Reliances

Transcription

1 Principles for Practice: The Four Reliances Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 1 William Magee In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

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3 Principles for Practice Website for UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies (Union of the Modern and the Ancient: gsar rnying zung `jug khang): umatibet.org. UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient and means Middle Way in Tibetan. UMA is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

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5 Principles for Practice: The Four Reliances Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive: 1 with Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations William Magee In collaboration with Lo-sang-gyal-tshan Edited by Jeffrey Hopkins UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies uma-tibet.org

6 Education in Compassion and Wisdom UMA Great Books Translation Project Supported by generous grants from the ING Foundation and Yeshe Khorlo Foundation and gifts from individual sponsors Hsu Shu-Hsun; Chou Mei-Dai; Chien Jin-Hong; Pu Chih-Pin; Daniel E. Perdue Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Buddhist systems. The project focuses on Great Indian Books and Tibetan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations. Publications available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies 7330 Harris Mountain Lane Dyke, VA USA Version: December, 2015 ISBN Library of Congress Control Number: Magee, William (1949-). Principles for practice: jam-yang-shay-pa on the four reliances / by William Magee. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, Drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar po i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Drang nges chen mo. 4. Wisdom Religious aspects--buddhism. I. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, II. Title.

7 Contents Introduction 7 Jam-yang-shay-pa 8 Ngag-wang-pal-dan 9 Great Exposition of Tenets 10 Explaining the four reliances 11 Unravelling the four reliances by way of persons 17 The pretentious 18 The Worldly Diverged Afar 18 Those holding their own view to be supreme 21 Those intent on hearing 21 Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive 22 The meaning of rely 23 How they were spoken 24 Jam-yang-shay-pa s 6 points in Refuting Mistakes 27 Expanding on the four reliances 28 Jam-yang-shay-pa s 16 points in Our Own System 31 Connecting the four reliances 38 Scripture and reasoning 39 Jam-yang-shay-pa s 16 points in Dispelling Objections 42 Identifying the reliable 47 Table of quotations in the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and Definitive on the four reliances 51 Provocative implications of the four reliances 60 Editions consulted 65 Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive on the Four Reliances 67 I. The reasons why differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive is needed 70 A. Decisive analysis [of the four reliances] Refuting [mistakes about the meaning of the four reliances] Presentation of our own system 80 a. Do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning 99 b. Do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning 103 c. Do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom Dispelling objections [to the presentation of our own system] 116

8 6 Contents Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets on the Four Reliances 135 From what Approaches the Interpretable and Definitive are Differentiated Positing the four reliances by way of persons Positing the four reliances by way of times Positing the four reliances by way of four validities Identifying the four to be relied on Identifying the four not to be relied on Benefits of the four reliances 161 Abbreviations 165 Bibliography Sūtras Other Sanskrit and Tibetan Works Other Works 183 Endnotes 185

9 Introduction The two translations of Jam-yang-shay-pa s a texts presented here cover the topic of the four reliances and also represent this great scholar in two very different types of texts a debate-oriented decisive analysis and an encyclopedic compendium of tenets. They are drawn from two of his seminal works: 1. Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate b (c. 1686) 2. Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets : Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings c (c. 1699). The four reliances are employed to guide the process of differentiating between interpretable and definitive teachings and interpretable and definitive phenomena. They are indispensable advice for those in search of the final view of reality. Both of Jam-yang-shay-pa s texts treat the topic of the four reliances, but from different approaches. The basic format of the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive is dialectical, whereas the style of the Great Exposition of Tenets is mostly expository. d Taken together, these two avenues reveal the four reliances as capable of steering decisions about practice by identifying deficiencies of approach and character and rearranging goals. Another way to illuminate complex material is to consult later commentaries, as represented here by Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, which provide fourteen side-comments to the material on the four a Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, /1722). b Herein called Interpretable and Definitive. c Herein called Tenets. d Cross-references to Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive and Great Exposition of Tenets are indicated in parentheses with Interpretable and the Definitive and Tenets and page reference; cross-references to other volumes are also given in footnotes.

10 8 Principles for Practice reliances in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets, inset into his text here behind a three-point border. JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA According to Derek Maher, a Jam-yang-shay-pa was born in the Am-do Province of Tibet in the year of the Earth-Mouse, At the age of five he was blessed by the Fifth Dalai Lama, from whom he later received monastic vows. Engaged in his studies by the age of thirteen, Jam-yangshay-pa excelled among his fellow students by his ability quickly to understand texts and disputations. In 1668, arriving in Lhasa, he offered a presentation scarf to an image of Mañjushrī in the Jo-khang Temple. The statue reportedly favored the young scholar with a smile, due to which he became known as Jam-yang-shay-pa, One Smiled Upon by Mañjushrī. Jam-yang-shay-pa began studying Tsong-kha-pa s b The Essence of Eloquence at Dre-pung s Go-mang Monastic College in At that time, the standard Go-mang textbook on The Essence of Eloquence was Gung-ru Chö-kyi-jung-nay s c Garland of White Lotuses, d the very text that Jam-yang-shay-pa s own textbook the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive would later supersede. Also on this topic, Jam-yang-shay-pa studied the Second Dalai Lama Gen-dün-gyatsho s Commentary on the Difficult Points of Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient [Tsong-ka-pa]: Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of his Thought. e Following the conclusion of his formal studies, Jam-yang-shay-pa entered a period of spiritual practice, meditative retreat, and scholarly a For a longer biography of Jam-yang-shay-pa see Derek F. Maher, Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2003), , which is the source for much of the material here. b tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, c gung ru chos kyi byung gnas. d Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-ka-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence : Garland of White Lotuses (drang ba dang nges pa i rnam par byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba i mtha dpyod padma dkar po i phreng ba). sku bum, Tibet: sku bum Monastery, n.d. [blockprint obtained by Jeffrey Hopkins in 1988]. e dge dun rgya mtsho, ; rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa i gsung bum las drang nges rnam byed kyi dka grel dgongs pa i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa i sgron me.

11 Introduction 9 composition. At the age of thirty-eight he authored the first of his major works, Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive. During this same period he also wrote another of his great expositions, the Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beautifying the Subduer s Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the Fortunate, commonly called Great Exposition of the Concentrative and Formless Absorptions. He wrote the Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Roar in 1689 and published the Great Exposition of Tenets its prose auto-commentary ten years later in At the age of fifty-three Jam-yang-shay-pa was named abbot of Gomang by the Sixth Dalai Lama. In 1710, aged sixty-two, he returned to Am-do Province where he founded the influential monastery at Tra-shikhyil. a Seven years later he founded a tantric college there as well. Throughout his life he continued to write volumes on the full range of topics of a Ge-lug-pa scholar-adept. He died in 1721, b having received honors from the central Tibetan government and the Chinese Emperor. NGAG-WANG-PAL-DAN Ngag-wang-pal-dan, the author of the Annotations, was a Mongolian scholar of the early nineteenth century, c born in Urga (present day Ulaanbaatar) in the Fire-Serpent year of 1797, and receiving his monastic training in Tra-shi-chö-pel Monastic College. d At the age of forty Ngagwang-pal-dan occupied the seat of Doctrine Master (chos rje) of Urga. Ngag-wang-pal-dan wrote a number of works besides the Annotations; among these are Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets e and Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four Great Secret a bkra shis khyil. b Or 1722; scholars question the date; see Maher, Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism, 164. c Lokesh Chandra, Eminent Tibetan Polymaths of Mongolia (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), 24. d bkra zhi chos phel. e grub mtha i bzhi i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo i glu dbyangs (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972).

12 10 Principles for Practice Tantra Sets. a Ngag-wang-pal-dan and other Mongolian scholars of his time were especially influenced by the works of Jam-yang-shay-pa. Ngagwang-pal-dan s Annotations provide an annotative commentary (mchan grel) for Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets; they are the type of scholarly apparatus called side annotations (zur mchan), since they are not interlinear notes but are published under separate cover, to be read alongside the text. The complete Annotations is extensive: four hundred and sixteen folios, presenting commentary on difficult points in all thirteen chapters of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets. Ngag-wangpal-dan s positions are on several occasions controversial for Go-mang scholars when he disagrees with Jam-yang-shay-pa over doctrinal points, but for the most part he applies his great scholarship to the tasks of clarification and supplementation. The portion of the Annotations that has been translated here includes fourteen alphabetically arranged notes, from wa (139) to kha (158). GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS Let us begin with Jam-yang-shay-pa s later more expository presentation of the four reliances in the chapter on the Mind-Only School of the Great Exposition of Tenets (see page 137) under the heading of From what Approaches the Interpretable and Definitive are Differentiated in the Mind-Only School. The four reliances are the first of four topics discussed in the section, the other three being the four reasonings, the four thoughts, and the four indirect intentions. b Jam-yang-shay-pa explains the four reliances not one by one but as a group by way of six approaches, citing as scriptural sources in order of appearance: 1. an unidentified sūtra 2. Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, also known as Grounds of Yogic Practice 3. Asaṅga s Grounds of Yogic Practice, also known as Actuality of the Grounds 4. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 5. Vasubandhu s Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras 6. Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras a gsang chen rgyud sde bzhi i sa lam gyi rnam bzhag rgyud gzhung gsal byed (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972). b For these see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound,

13 Introduction Asaṅga s Grounds of Yogic Practice, also known as Actuality of the Grounds 8. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 9. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 10. Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras 11. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 12. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 13. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 14. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 15. [Teachings of Akṣhayamati] Sūtra 16. Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, also known as Grounds of Yogic Practice 17. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 18. Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras In sum, in this section of the Great Exposition of Tenets there are: five citations from Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas four citations from Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, also known as Grounds of Yogic Practice four citations from Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra three citations from Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras one citation from an unidentified sūtra one citation from Vasubandhu s Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras. The prime source in both order of appearance and frequency of citation is Asaṅga; Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras is next in centrality to the exposition even though the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra is cited more frequently than it. Despite the fact that the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra is the main sūtra source for the differentiation of the interpretable and definitive in the Middle Way School, it is the only sūtrasource cited here. This is likely because the exposition of the four reliances here contains nothing specific to the Mind-Only School and thus serves as a general exposition for all Great Vehicle schools of tenets. EXPLAINING THE FOUR RELIANCES The four reliances themselves are aphoristic: Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine. With respect to the doctrine, do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning.

14 12 Principles for Practice With respect to the meaning, do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning. With respect to the definitive meaning, do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom. Embedded with their implications, Indian and Tibetan texts weave them into a complex structure informing various levels of practice. a Four times of implementation. The twelfth-century Tibetan commentary on Po-to-wa s b Blue Teat for Calves associates the four with hearing, thinking, meditating, and ascertaining: c 1. On the occasion of hearing, rather than relying on the person one should rely on the doctrine. 2. With respect to the doctrine on which one is to rely, from between the two, words and meanings, one should rely on the meaning since on the occasion of thinking one should mainly think about the meaning. 3. With respect to the meaning on which one is to rely, from between the two, the interpretable and the definitive, one should rely on the definitive since on the occasion of meditation one needs to abandon the apprehension of self upon mainly meditating on the definitive. 4. On the occasion of placing the mind on the definitive meaning, d one should not rely on sense consciousnesses but should rely on pristine wisdom. Jam-yang-shay-pa (142) similarly speaks of the four as being relevant to four periods of time so as not to waste these opportunities for practice; he says: a The explanation below follows Jam-yang-shay-pa s six approaches but in a slightly different order for the sake of easier access. b po to ba rin chen gsal, In TBRC W20519 and W1KG12954 it is listed as by dge bshes shes rab rgya mtsho; see the next footnote. c be u bum gyi ṭik ka, as paraphrased in Ta-drin-rab-tan s Annotations, 175.1; Pal-jor-lhündrub s Lamp for the Teaching (8.6), reversing the order of the third and the fourth, lists these as hearing, thinking, ascertaining (nges pa), and meditating. About the commentary, Dr. Amy Miller wrote in an to Jeffrey Hopkins, I am going to venture a guess that Be u bum ṭik ka refers to Lha bri sgang pa s commentary on the Be u bum sngon po by Potowa which Sherab Gyatsho was so instrumental to arranging that he is sometimes referred to it as the root text s author. About the title of the root text be u bum sngon po, Ngag-wang-dar-gyay s translator renders it as The Blue Cow s Nipple (Pamphlet) for Calf-like (Disciples). Based on this, Hopkins translates the title as Blue Teat for Calves. d nges don la sems jog pa i tshe; Ta-drin-rab-tan s Annotations,

15 Introduction 13 The four reliances are posited respectively in order not to lose out at four times. One would not lose out, 1. if when understanding all doctrines, one relied on doctrine, but not on persons, 2. and if when holding all doctrines, one relied on meaning, but not on persons words, 3. and if when closely investigating or contemplating meaning, one relied on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning, 4. and if when achieving doctrinal practices, one relied on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s commentary clarifies the problems associated with not following each of these dictums at the appropriate time: 1. When understanding that is, hearing all doctrines, if one takes as true all that is explained and does not analyze the meaning of words, one will not know how to distinguish the correct from the quasi. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the first reliance [rely on doctrine, but do not rely on persons] is posited. 2. When holding all doctrines without forgetting, if one is intent only on words, one will fall from holding the meaning without forgetting it. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the second reliance [rely on meaning, but do not rely on words] is posited. 3. When closely investigating meaning at the time of [states] arisen from thinking doing proper mental application if one merely takes conventionalities to mind, one will not gain ascertainment arisen from thinking with regard to the ultimate. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the third reliance [rely on definitive meaning, but do not rely on interpretable meaning] is posited. 4. When achieving doctrine the path of liberation in accordance with doctrine, if one is satisfied with mere conceptual consciousnesses arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditation, one will not gain uncontaminated pristine wisdom in which clear perception of the meaning of reality has reached completion. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the fourth reliance [rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness] is posited.

16 14 Principles for Practice Jam-yang-shay-pa s Indian source, Asaṅga s Grounds of Yogic Practice, is cryptic in its brevity: Concerning this, in brief, because of losing out and not losing out at four times when understanding all doctrines, when holding all doctrines, when closely investigating or contemplating the meaning of all doctrines, and when achieving all doctrines in accordance with doctrine four [types of] persons are presented, whereby the four reliances are presented. Four to be relied on. About what is to be relied upon, the four reliances are associated with four factors: 1. scriptures, that is, Buddha s high sayings; 2. the meaning of the thought that is not the meaning of the literal reading; 3. meaning ascertained correctly, not wrongly understood; 4. uncontaminated pristine wisdom realizing the meaning ascertained correctly. As the coming Buddha Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says: The doctrine taught [in the] scriptures, That which possesses the thought of the meaning of those, That which has the validity of definitive meaning, And that which attains its inexpressibility. Four to be stopped. Four opposite to those must be stopped, for they are not suitable to be valid since they are devoid of a corresponding correctness: 1. persons who have abandoned the doctrines of the scriptures; 2. the meaning of the literal reading when it is not confirmed by reasoning; 3. erroneously interpreted meanings due to wrong thought; 4. consciousness, except for pristine wisdom of individual selfknowledge. Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says: Abandoning, just what is set forth, Wrong understanding, and Attainment of the expressible Are indicated here as to be stopped.

17 Introduction 15 Four validities. The four to be relied upon, under slightly different names, are also called the four validities, or four nondeceptives, because they are reliable. About these Jam-yang-shay-pa (see Tenets, 144) says: 1. the meaning in rely on meaning, but not on words, 2. the reasoning in rely on reasoning [that is, doctrine], but not on persons, 3. the teacher in rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning, 4. the pristine wisdom in rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness. It is easy to understand how, in the second, reasoning substitutes for doctrine since it is by reasoning that one examines doctrine, but how, in the third, teacher comes to substitute for definitive meaning is more convoluted. This is revealed by Ngag-wang-pal-dan s citation of a variant reading of Vasubandhu s Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras which points to meanings having validation by teachers in that these meanings are ascertained and differentiated by teachers who are taken as valid. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says briefly: From these four reliances, in brief, four validities themselves are indicated: (1) the meanings of the teachings, (2) reasonings, (3) teachers, and (4) pristine wisdoms of realization arisen from meditation. The four to be relied upon are called the four validities, or valid sources, in order to emphasize that all four are needed in the process of spiritual training; as Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: Understanding that what is to be known by the knowledge of meditation cannot be known only by knowing meanings through hearing and thinking, they do not abandon and do not deprecate the supremely profound doctrines spoken by the One-Gone-Thus even when hearing them. In that way, Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances, whereby they are oriented well. How to implement the four. Ngag-wang-pal-dan gives a particularly vivid account of how to implement the four: 1. Although regarding persons in do not rely on persons there are a variety of the supreme and the low, mainly it is not reasonable to follow the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good.

18 16 Principles for Practice 2. It is not reasonable to be intent only on words of texts that solely do not separate from desire, do not bring about emergence, and never separate from misapprehension of things as inherently existent, like the texts of those called Diverged Afar a in that they have gone apart from the correct view. These are mainly common sources of knowledge and so forth unrelated with any of the four seals testifying to a doctrine as being Buddha s Word: 1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent 2. all contaminated things are miserable 3. all phenomena are selfless 4. nirvāṇa is peace. 3. It is not reasonable to hold one s view to be supreme, that is, to hold how phenomena appear to one s own sense consciousnesses to be the final reality, that is to say, to be the way things actually are. 4. It is not reasonable to be satisfied with mere wisdom arisen from hearing, like persons who are intent [only] on hearing. Ngag-wang-pal-dan says that this is the thought of Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, also known as the Grounds of Yogic Practice, b which says: If you ask, How are these presented? [These four reliances are presented] by way of the distinctions of four kinds of persons: the first, by way of the distinctions of pretentious persons; the second, by way of the distinctions of the Worldly Diverged Afar; the third, by way of abiding in holding their own view to be supreme; and the fourth, by way of being intent on hearing. Benefits. By implementing the four reliances there are benefits to be accrued; as Jam-yang-shay-pa (161) says: 1. By the first [relying on doctrine, but not relying on persons] one will not fall from the doctrine and thereby will not sever one s lineage [of spiritual development]. 2. By the second [relying on meaning, but not relying on words] one will not fall from partaking of the profound thought. 3. By the third [relying on definitive meaning, but not relying on interpretable meaning] one will not fall from hearing the meaning exactly as it is and thereby will not wrongly engage the meaning of scripture. a rgyang phan pa, ayata. b rnal byor spyod pa i sa, yogācārabhūmi.

19 Introduction By the fourth [relying on pristine wisdom, but not relying on consciousness] one will not fall from wisdom having clear appearance and thereby will not fall from supramundane pristine wisdom. For, Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says: The firm do not fall from Being intent, partaking, Hearing from others just as it is, And inexpressible pristine wisdom. UNRAVELLING THE FOUR RELIANCES BY WAY OF PERSONS The details of Jam-yang-shay-pa s presentation of the four reliances by way of persons (see Interpretable and Definitive, 137) are particularly complicated. Let us attempt to unpack them along with Ngag-wang-paldan s Annotations. As cited above, Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds/ Grounds of Yogic Practice speaks of the four reliances as required by all practitioners during four phases of practice when holding all doctrines, when closely investigating or contemplating the meaning of all doctrines, and when achieving all doctrines in accordance with doctrine, but also in another mode the same text assigns types of persons to the four reliances: If you ask, How are these presented? [These four reliances are presented] by way of the distinctions of four kinds of persons: the first, by way of the distinctions of pretentious persons; the second, by way of the distinctions of the Worldly Diverged Afar; the third, by way of abiding in holding their own view to be supreme; and the fourth, by way of being intent on hearing. Here Asaṅga presents the four reliances in terms of persons particularly in need of them due to having a faulty belief system or attitude. Jam-yangshay-pa reframes these as: 1. the pretentious should rely on doctrine, but not on persons; 2. the likes of the Diverged Afar a [Nihilists] should rely on meaning, but not on humans words; a For a discussion of types of the Diverged Afar (Nihilists) see 18 for Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations.

20 18 Principles for Practice 3. those holding their own view to be supreme should rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning; 4. those intent only on hearing should rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness. Each type of person mentioned is assigned one of the reliances as an antidote to that belief or attitude. The pretentious For instance, pretentious persons are often thought of as insincere poseurs, eager for unearned status. Jam-yang-shay-pa feels such personality types are in danger of being misled by others, for he says: the pretentious should rely on doctrine, but not on persons; In their quest for status, the pretentious are easily misled by charismatic persons; thus, they are in need of the first reliance. This explanation fits the pattern of the topic, wherein the Worldly Diverged Afar need meaning, those holding their own view to be supreme need definitive meaning, and those intent on hearing need pristine wisdom. Despite the clarity of this pattern, Ngag-wang-pal-dan posits a different explanation outside this format. He explains that the pretentious are those on whom one should not rely. Ngag-wang-paldan s Annotations a (for the entire note wa see 139) says: Although regarding persons in do not rely on persons there are a variety of supreme and lower [persons], mainly it is not reasonable to follow the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s explanation places the pretentious in the role of the person not to be relied on, breaking the pattern of the other three. According to Jam-yang-shay-pa s explanation however, the pretentious are advised to rely not on persons but on doctrine. The Worldly Diverged Afar The second reliance is presented by way of the distinctions of the Worldly Diverged Afar, that is, Nihilists. The Diverged Afar in particular should not rely on words but should rely on meaning. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s annotation wa says: a dngos wa, Taipei edition,

21 Introduction 19 It is not reasonable to be intent only on words like the Diverged Afar a [Nihilists] who are intent only on reciting the Forders secret words these being the Diverged Afar who are one of the divisions from within the threefold terminological division of the Diverged Afar. Ngag-wang-pal-dan describes this threefold division of the Diverged Afar earlier in his Annotations: b 1. Diverged Afars in terms of all coursing in conceptuality [that is, beings who are coursing in conceptuality] are taken as persons who have not realized emptiness. 2. Diverged Afars in terms of [those using] worldly secret words are taken as persons mainly using the common sources of knowledge and so forth unrelated with any of the four seals testifying [to a doctrine] as being [Buddha s] Word. c a Diverged afar = rgyang phan pa, ayata. b stod, ka, 53a.5 (Delhi edition): ཀ མ ག ལ ད པ ཐམས ཅད བ ས པའ དབང ས པའ ང ཕན པ ན ང ཉ ད མ གས པའ གང ཟག དང འཇ ག ན པའ གསང ཚ ག ག དབང ས པའ ང ཕན པ ན བཀར བ གས ག བཞ བ གང ང དང མ འ ལ བའ ན མ ང བའ ར ག གནས ས གས གཙ བ ར ད པའ གང ཟག དང ཆད པར བའ དབང ས པའ ང ཕན པ ན ལས འ ས དང བ ས གས ཅ ར གས མ ད པར བའ ང ཕན པ མཚན ཉ ད པ ལ ད ད བ དཔ ན ང བ བཟང བ ས འད ར ང ཕན པ ན མ པ ག མ ཞ ས པ ནས ད འ བ གས པ བར ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པ ག ང གང དག འད ད ཆགས དང ལ བར མ འ ར ཡ ད འ ང བར མ འ ར ཞ ང ནམ ཡང དང ས པ ར འཛ ན པ ལས མ འ ལ བ གཅ ག འ གསང ཚ ག མས ཏ ར འ དག ང གང དག འཇ ག ན ང ཕན པའ གཏམ ར ལ ན པ སངས ས ཀ ག ང ངས ནས གཞན གས ཅན ག ག ང ཚ ག བ ད དག ན འཁ ར ག ནང ད ང ནས ད དག ཆ ས ཀ ས འཁ ར དགའ བར ད ད ས ད དག དམ པ མ ཡ ན པ ད ད དག ན དག ང ལ པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས པས བཀག པས ས ཆད པར བའ དབང ས ཏ འད ར བ ད པ འད ཉ ད ད ཞ ས པ ར ར c The four seals are:

22 20 Principles for Practice 3. Diverged Afars in terms of a view of annihilation are taken as fully qualified nihilists who view any of these karma and its effects and former and future births and so forth as nonexistent. The master Bodhibhadra, in his Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva s) Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom as cited by Ngag-wang-pal-dan, gives more detail: 1 [Since they have gone apart from the correct view of the world, they are Diverged Afar. Ayoti means depart, separate, and go. Their tenets are texts.] Here, those Diverged Afar have three aspects: 1. Diverged Afar in terms of all coursing in conceptuality: As long as the mind operates, they are called those diverged afar from the world. 2. Diverged Afar in terms of [those using] worldly secret words: He said, In the future, there will be monastics who, sitting on lion thrones in the midst of a retinue, will expound the texts of the Worldly Diverged Afar and will speak praises of them. He refuted them by saying, Shāriputra, whatever monastics are intent on the discourse of the Worldly Diverged Afar secret word texts that solely do not separate from desire, do not bring about emergence, and never separate from apprehension of things who, having abandoned the Buddha s speech, propound the sayings of others, Forders, having gone amongst their circle, amuse that circle with sounds of [Forder] doctrine: such unholy beings are rotten monastics. 3. The Worldly Diverged Afar in terms of a view of annihilation: those who are discussed here [in Āryadeva s text] are just these. According to Ngag-wang-pal-dan, it is the second of these divisions that is indicated on the occasion of the second of the four reliances: those intent 1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent 2. all contaminated things are miserable 3. all phenomena are selfless 4. nirvāṇa is peace.

23 Introduction 21 on texts that do not separate from desire, do not bring about emergence, and never separate from apprehension of things should not rely on words but should rely on meaning. Meaning in this context refers to any doctrine related with the four seals testifying to a doctrine as being Buddha s Word: 1. all compounded phenomena are impermanent 2. all contaminated things are miserable 3. all phenomena are selfless 4. nirvāṇa is peace. Those holding their own view to be supreme When the four reliances are posited by way of persons, those holding their own view to be supreme are not to rely on interpretable meanings but are to rely on definitive meanings. Ngag-wang-pal-dan makes it clear that this is a warning to worldly beings that the world is not valid with respect to suchness. He does so by quoting Chandrakīrti s Supplement to Nāgārjuna s Treatise on the Middle Way (VI.30): 2 If the world is valid, Since the world sees suchness what is the need for others, Superiors? What would the path of Superiors do? It is not reasonable for the stupid to be valid. The message here is obvious: arrogant persons should renounce their incorrect views and adopt the view of the sages. In modern argot, they should stop being so stupid (blun po) as to think they were valid on the topic of suchness. This same use of Supplement stanza VI.30 is also evident in Tsong-kha-pa s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, where the stanza appears as part of an argument that worldly valid cognition establishes forms and such but not suchness. (See the Four Interwoven Annotations, 139.) Those intent on hearing The fourth reliance directs the practitioner who is intent on hearing away from consciousness and toward reliance on pristine wisdom. Ngag-wangpal-dan s note wa says: It is not reasonable to be satisfied with mere wisdom arisen from hearing like persons who are intent on hearing.

24 22 Principles for Practice Persons who are intent on hearing are content with the consciousness that is wisdom arisen from hearing. Pristine wisdom, in the other hand, is a much more subtle wisdom arisen from meditation. The fourth reliance calls on persons who are intent on hearing to culminate their own thinking processes through reliance on non-conceptual direct perception of emptiness. GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE In Jam-yang-shay-pa s earlier more complicated work, the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive (see page 67), he begins by citing Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence on the reasons why differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive is needed. This passage explains that Buddha spoke variously in relation to the thoughts of trainees and hence the correct view of reality must be settled by reasoning. Since not all of Buddha s statements are definitive on the literal level, one must seek the thought behind them, following the two great prophesied treatise authors Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, openers of the chariotways. In this passage Tsong-kha-pa lays out the foundations of his system of approaching the scriptures: 1. due to his profound understanding of the needs of trainees, the Buddhas spoke in a variety of ways about emptiness; 2. therefore we must work at a means of differentiating his interpretable statements from those of definitive meaning; 3. such differentiation cannot be done only according to pronouncements in scripture; 4. instead, it is best to rely on one of the prophesied Indian commentators: Nāgārjuna (1 st century C.E.), Chariot-way Opener of the Middle Way School or Asaṅga (4 th century C.E.), Chariot-way Opener of the Mind-Only School; 5. within relying on these commentators, one must employ reasoning to determine the final correct view. Even these philosophical guides are not the final arbiters of the view; with the assistance of these Chariot-way Openers, one must determine through one s own logical processes which of Buddha s pronouncements require interpretation and which are definitive. Immediately after quoting Tsong-kha-pa on this, Jam-yang-shay-pa launches an investigation into the four reliances, called a Decisive

25 Introduction 23 Analysis, which is divided into three subsections Refuting Mistakes, a Presenting Our System, b and Dispelling Objections. c In Refuting Mistakes (see page 73) he considers the meaning of rely and the literality of Buddha s pronouncements. THE MEANING OF RELY The first debate in Refuting Mistakes (see page 73) investigates a mistaken meaning of rely. In the Tibetan language, the spelling of rely ( ན, rton) and the spelling of teach ( ན, ston) are quite similar; the only difference being a single superscripted character. Here Jam-yang-shay-pa introduces an opponent who accepts such a misspelling as the correct text. This basic error leads the opponent to misunderstand rely as teach: Someone says: Not mainly teaching (mi ston), just as it is, the mode of subsistence to trainees of low faculties but in the definitive scriptures mainly teaching (ston) the mode of subsistence in consideration of trainees of sharp faculties is the significance of not relying (mi rton) on persons, but relying (rton) on the doctrine. (73) The opponent s mistaken thesis that not teaching and teaching the mode of subsistence is the meaning of not relying on persons but relying on the doctrine is based on misreading rely as teach. Jam-yang-shay-pa flings an absurd consequence that shows the logical incorrectness of inserting teach when rely is called for in the context of four reliances: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take the relying (rton) and not relying (mi rton) of the four reliances (rton pa bzhi) on this occasion as explaining [the mode of subsistence] and not explaining [to a person] because [according to you,] it is reasonable that (1) not relying (mi rton) on a person is taken as mainly not teaching (mi ston) the mode of subsistence to those [persons] and (2) the meaning of relying (rton) on doctrine is taken as teaching (ston) mainly the meaning of the mode of subsistence. It would be absurd to accept that rely has the meaning of teach or explain on this occasion of the four reliances, since rely and teach a khrul ba dgag pa. b rang lugs bzhag pa. c rtsod pa spang ba.

26 24 Principles for Practice have different spellings and incompatible meanings. Teach is merely a typographical error. Having refuted that rely means teach or explain, Jam-yang-shay-pa sets forth his own meanings of rely and not rely: because the rely and not rely here is asserted by scholars to be taken as: 1. assert and not assert, 2. reasonable to follow and not reasonable to follow, 3. nondeceptive and deceptive, 4. true and untrue, and because rely and not rely is not explicable in the letters or meaning as explain and not explain. The meaning here is mental reliance (yid rton) because it must be posited as reasonable to place mental trust and not reasonable to place mental trust (yid gtod). Here in the context of settling the meaning of the word rely, Jam-yangshay-pa shows how highly he values the four reliances: they are the crucial sources of valid knowledge; nondeceptive objects in which to place trust. HOW THEY WERE SPOKEN We have seen that the first debate in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Interpretable and Definitive establishes reasonable to place mental trust as the meaning of rely. This assertion serves to correct the mistaken impression (caused by a lexical error) that the meaning of rely is teach. In the process of doing so, Jam-yang-shay-pa also points out that rely denotes true, nondeceptive, suitable to follow, and to assert. He no doubt felt that it was necessary to clarify this in the beginning, and, indeed, he uses these interchangeably throughout the text. The second debate (see page 75) is equally central to the meaning of the four reliances. He turns his attention to a mistaken notion about the meaning of relying on doctrine which, if correct, would negate the need for the differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive. Here the opponent presents a thesis that includes the assertion that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken. The phrase I have italicized in accordance with how they were spoken is the incorrect part of this assertion, since in accordance with how they were spoken refers to the

27 Introduction 25 words of a scripture on the literal level. Scriptural passages are not always true on the literal level; if they were, all sūtras would be definitive. Hence, this incorrect assertion fails to inspect the validity of the words of scripture on the literal level and thus threatens the need to differentiate the interpretable and definitive: Someone says: That trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken is the significance of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 75.) It is correct that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation, since it is said that everything the Victor taught was for the sake of attaining liberation (see Interpretable and Definitive, 87). However, those scriptural collections are not all true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken, since only definitive sūtra statements are true in accordance with how they were spoken: interpretable sūtra statements are not reliable on the literal level. Jam-yang-shay-pa parries this assertion with an absurd consequence: It absurdly follows that differentiating the interpretable and the definitive among the Victor s high sayings is meaningless because [according to you] it is reasonable to assert [the high sayings of the Victor] in accordance with the measure set forth in the Victor s high sayings. If indeed one could assert the high sayings a of the Victor in accordance with the measure set forth in those high sayings (that is to say, in accordance with the literal words set down in scripture), then there would be no sense in attempting to differentiate the interpretable and the definitive: all sūtras would be definitive. But that is not the case, for not only did Buddha set forth various presentations of reality in relation to the thoughts of trainees, but also the sūtras themselves relate numerous ways of positing the interpretable and the definitive. As Tsong-kha-pa points out (see Interpretable and Definitive, 71), the differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive cannot be done merely through scriptures a This term (gsung rab, pravacana) is often translated as scriptures, but high sayings conveys its literal connotation as speech (vacana), with rab (pra-) as an intensifier.

28 26 Principles for Practice that state, This is a meaning to be interpreted; that is a meaning that is definitive. Therefore, since differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive is necessary, one cannot accept that it is reasonable to assert the high sayings of the Victor in accordance with their literal words. Jam-yang-shay-pa disproves the opponent s meaning of not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning with this demonstration of why it is not reasonable to assert the scriptures in accordance with their literal words. He now puts forth his own system, which is that: 1. the unsuitability of asserting all phenomena in accordance with explicit readings of scriptures is the meaning of not relying on the words, and 2. asserting the final meaning of [Buddha s] thought, upon its having been sought is the meaning of relying on the meaning. He says: Concerning high sayings of interpretable meaning from among the Victor s pronouncements of a variety of interpretable and definitive high sayings: the unsuitability of asserting the two truths a in accordance with the explicit reading due to the force of the [particular] context of this and that [trainee] and asserting the final meaning of [Buddha s] thought, upon its having been sought, is the significance of not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning. In this second debate, Jam-yang-shay-pa points out that it is unsuitable to rely on the explicit reading of the words because the explicit reading varies according to the needs of trainees. On the other hand, it is suitable to rely on the meaning behind the words, the final meaning of Buddha s thought, emptiness, upon its having been sought. Upon its having been sought means upon having differentiated with reasoning the interpretable and the definitive. These two debates show Jam-yang-shay-pa refuting incorrect assumptions about the four reliances: the first misrepresenting the meaning of rely and the second undermining the need for differentiating the interpretable and the definitive. The points made are summarized in the chart below. a In this context, two truths (conventional truths and ultimate truths) is a general rubric for all phenomena.

29 Introduction Jam-yang-shay-pa s 6 points in Refuting Mistakes First Debate (See Interpretable and Definitive, 73) The relying (rton) and not relying (mi rton) of the four reliances (rton pa bzhi) does not mean explaining and not explaining. Rely and not rely here are to be taken as: 1. assert and not assert, 2. reasonable to follow and not reasonable to follow, 3. nondeceptive and deceptive, 4. true and untrue. The meaning of rely here is mental reliance (yid rton) because rely and not rely must be posited as reasonable to place mental trust and not reasonable to place mental trust (yid gtod). Hence, the relying (rton) and not relying (mi rton) of the four reliances (rton pa bzhi) are not to be confused with teaching (ston) and not teaching (mi ston), for then you might wrongly hold that not relying (mi rton) on persons, but relying (rton) on the doctrine would mean not mainly teaching (mi ston) emptiness, just as it is, to trainees of low faculties but in the definitive scriptures mainly teaching (ston) emptiness in consideration of trainees of sharp faculties. Second Debate (See Interpretable and Definitive, 75) Buddha spoke in the context of the trainees; therefore, with regard to not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine, relying on doctrine does not mean that it is reasonable to assert whatsoever Buddha spoke for sentient beings in accordance with how these were spoken. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate with reasoning the interpretable and the definitive. In the context of Buddha s Word: 1. not asserting the two truths in accordance with the literal reading a of non-literal high sayings of interpretable meaning and definitive meaning is the significance of not relying on the words and a sgras zin.

30 28 Principles for Practice 2. asserting the final meaning of Buddha s thought upon its having been sought is the significance of relying on the meaning. EXPANDING ON THE FOUR RELIANCES In the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive in the subsection called Presentation of Our System (see page 80), Jam-yangshay-pa introduces the four reliances as a group and then treats each reliance one by one, citing as scriptural sources in order of appearance: THE FOUR RELIANCES AS A GROUP 1. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 2. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra DO NOT RELY ON PERSONS, BUT RELY ON DOCTRINE 3. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 4. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 5. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 6. Tsong-kha-pa s The Lesser Essence of Eloquence/ Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising 7. Vasubandhu s Principles of Explanation 8. Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣhṭapāla from the Pile of Jewels Sūtra 9. Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra 10. Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought 11. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 12. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 13. Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra 14. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra DO NOT RELY ON THE WORDS, BUT RELY ON THE MEANING 15. Kālachakra Root Tantra 16. Mañjughoṣha Narendrakīrti s Brief Explication of the Assertions of Our Own View 17. Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles 18. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 19. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra DO NOT RELY ON INTERPRETABLE MEANING, BUT RELY ON DEFINITIVE MEANING 20. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra

31 21. Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence 22. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 23. Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness 24. Maitreya s Treatise on the Sublime Continuum Introduction 29 DO NOT RELY ON CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT RELY ON PRISTINE WISDOM 25. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 26. Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles 27. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 28. Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness In sum, in the Presentation of Our System in the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive there are: eight citations of Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra six citations of Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas two citations of the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra two citations of Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness two citations of Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles one citation of the Kālachakra Root Tantra one citation of Maitreya s Treatise on the Sublime Continuum one citation of Mañjughoṣha Narendrakīrti s Brief Explication of the Assertions of Our Own View one citation of the Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣhṭapāla from the Pile of Jewels Sūtra one citation of Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence one citation of Tsong-kha-pa s The Lesser Essence of Eloquence/ Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising one citation of Vasubandhu s Principles of Explanation. a In the general section Jam-yang-shay-pa cites a long passage from Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 80) and then in the individual treatments of the four reliances makes five citations or references to parts of that same passage. He also cites a short passage from the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra that lists the four reliances, but as in the Great Exposition of Tenets Asaṅga is the central source. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas is the overarching rubric even though numerically it is not the most frequently cited text, this being the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra, which despite being the prime sūtra a See the footnote at the citation on 91.

32 30 Principles for Practice source for the differentiation of the interpretable and definitive in the Middle Way School and not the Mind-Only School, is the predominant sūtra that is cited by far, showing that Jam-yang-shay-pa intends this presentation of the four reliances to be common for the Great Vehicle schools of tenets. In the section of Our Own System he presents the significances, or meanings, of the four reliances, which function like definitions to provide memorizable statements of positions regarding them. a Each significance is fashioned in two parts separated by a but to mirror the format of the reliances. Notice that the third reliance requires two slightly different significances reflecting the twofold division of interpretable meanings and definitive meanings (1) on the level of the words that are the means of expression and (2) on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed. DO NOT RELY ON PERSONS, BUT RELY ON THE DOCTRINE Not using as a reason merely the claims of those persons or the goodness of a person, but asserting the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings set out in accordance with this [person s] assertions is the significance of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 84.) DO NOT RELY ON WORDS, BUT RELY ON THE MEANING There being no definiteness of non-deception with respect to the mode of subsistence and so forth in accordance with the explicit reading of those high sayings, but making assertions in accordance with the specific object expressed that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought having pure proofs is the significance of not relying on words, but relying on meaning. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 99.) DO NOT RELY ON INTERPRETABLE MEANING, BUT RELY ON DEFINITIVE MEANING That conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras but emptiness is asserted as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras is the significance of a Jam-yang-shay-pa provides slightly different significances in the Dispelling Objections section (see Interpretable and Definitive, 116).

33 Introduction 31 the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the words that are the means of expression and that conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with various appearances but that emptiness of truth in accordance with those appearances is asserted as the mode of subsistence is the significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 103.) DO NOT RELY ON CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT RELY ON PRISTINE WISDOM Not asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of those [conceptual] consciousnesses [realizing emptiness] and in accordance with the mode of apprehension of those that have not realized emptiness is the significance of not relying on consciousness but asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by those pristine wisdoms and mainly by pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 110.) Jam-yang-shay-pa buttresses these encapsulations of the four reliances with considerable supporting detail that bring out their meaning. These are presented below in chart form. His basic mode of procedure is to provide the significance of the two-part aphorism, as given just above, and then to provide the significance of each of the two parts with provocatively different vocabulary; these sub-significances are then supported with logical evidence and with scriptural evidence. (The scriptural evidence is presented later in a separate table, 51.) Jam-yang-shay-pa s 16 points in Our Own System

34 32 Principles for Practice 1 2 I. Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 84.) Within persons here there are the two, the ordinary and the supreme through to and including Buddhas. Within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings. Thus: Not using as a reason merely the claims of those persons or the goodness of a person, but asserting the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings set out in accordance with this person s assertions is the significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. (84) That trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not asserted, and deceptive as methods for attaining liberation is the significance of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons because since trainees in terms of their various modes of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation, they are also not asserted as methods for attaining liberation, and also are not nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, whereby it is said, do not rely on persons because not relying on persons [means] it is not suitable mentally to rely on, that is to say, mentally to trust trainees in terms of the various modes of thought of those persons as methods for attaining liberation because if it were suitable mentally to rely on, that is to say, mentally to trust trainees in terms of the various modes of thought of those persons as methods for attaining liberation it would [absurdly] follow that it would not be necessary for even any being to train in the path, and because it would [absurdly] follow that there would be unmistaken valid cognitions with respect to the contradictory, and because there also is a mode of not relying on persons but relying on doctrine relative to such persons who view self and relative to thoroughly knowing the basis in [Buddha s] thought behind explanations in accordance with their thought. (86)

35 Introduction That whatsoever scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation is the significance of relying on doctrine because since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever scriptural collections only for the sake of setting trainees in the definite goodness of liberation, those statements are true as methods for attaining liberation, are nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and are asserted as methods for attaining liberation whereby it is said, rely on doctrine, because all pronouncements of whatsoever scriptural collections of excellent doctrine taught by the Victor, although they teach a variety of topics, in the end only teach methods for setting trainees in definite goodness, they are also called treatises intent on achievement, a and therefore one should mentally rely on excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech, that is to say, it is suitable to mentally trust these excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech as methods for attaining liberation. (86, 89) Among the persons referred to in not relying on persons there are a variety of Outer [non-buddhist] and Inner [Buddhist] persons. Thus: The significance of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine is that (1) since trainees in terms of their various modes of thought are untrue as methods of attaining liberation, they are also not asserted as methods of attaining liberation and also are not nondeceptive as methods of attaining liberation, whereby it is said, do not rely on persons and (2) since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever scriptural collections only for the sake of setting [trainees] in the definite goodness of liberation, those (statements in whatsoever scriptural collections) are true as methods for attaining liberation, are nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and are asserted as methods for attaining liberation, whereby it is said, rely on doctrine ]. (92) a That is, they are intent on achieving religious practice.

36 34 Principles for Practice To overcome the modes of conception propounding the self by the Forder proponents of an existent self and thereupon to enter the three doors of liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness) is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus] because (1) non-truth in accordance with the conceptions of an existent self by Forder Proponents of self but (2) assertion and nondeceptiveness of the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus] the three doors of liberation as the mode of subsistence is the significance in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine relative to Forder proponents of self and to sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus], because there is a significance [in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ] relative to those two [that is, to Forder proponents of self and to sūtras teaching a permanent stable (matrix of a One- Gone-Thus)], (93) That the Diverged Afar [that is, Nihilists] who assert that there are no past and future lives may later enter into [an understanding of] actions and their effects and selflessness through the teaching that there exists a self substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching the existence of a self of persons because if [Buddha] had not taught a substantially existent self to the Diverged Afar who assert that past and future lives do not exist, they would not know how to posit a being who is the substratum experiencing the fruition of the effects of actions, due to which [Buddha] taught a substantially existent self because for those who assert self, from between the two, self of persons and self of phenomena, the teaching of a self of persons is supreme. (93, 95) Rather than taking as a reason [for reliance] merely an explanation by a special person, a Buddha or a Hearer and so forth, and holding whatever they set forth to be of definitive meaning mental reliance on pure reasoning is the significance in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine relative to supreme persons. (97)

37 Introduction II. With respect to the doctrine, do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 99.) Within words here there are the two, treatises and Word of Buddha, and the two, the literal and the non-literal. Within meanings there are the two, interpretable meanings and definitive meaning. Thus: There being no definiteness of non-deception with respect to the mode of subsistence and so forth in accordance with the explicit reading of those high sayings but making assertions in accordance with this and that object expressed a that is the meaning of the thought having pure proofs is the significance of not relying on words, but relying on meaning, because it being the case that even with respect to the doctrine spoken by the Teacher, there are the two: (1) words that are the means of expression (rjod byed kyi tshig) and (2) the meanings expressed (brjod bya'i don) that the literal reading of the high sayings that are means of expression lack, [when taken] literally, the certainty of non-deception about the mode of subsistence of things is the significance of not relying on words, and the establishment in fact of the objects expressed that are the meanings of [their] thought is the significance of relying on meaning, because it is necessary to understand the objects expressed that are the meanings of Buddha s thought through demonstrating the damage by valid cognition to the literality of the literal reading of sūtras whose literal reading is not literal. a Even though this is the meaning behind what is literally expressed in the run of the words, it is nevertheless an object expressed with the qualification that it is the meaning behind what is literally expressed.

38 36 Principles for Practice III. With respect to the meaning, do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 103.) Within interpretable meaning and definitive meaning here, there are (1) the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of [the passages that are] the means of expression and (2) the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are expressed. Thus: That conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras but emptiness is asserted as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras is the significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of [the texts that are] the means of expression and that conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with various appearances but that emptiness of truth in accordance with those appearances is asserted as the mode of subsistence is the significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed. Within the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed not asserting these interpretable meanings appearances as various conventionalities as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on interpretable meaning, and asserting the emptiness of true establishment in accordance with such appearances as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of relying on definitive meaning, because not only that, it is also reasonable to posit those two respectively as meaning do not rely on the conventional, but rely on the ultimate, because conventional substrata that exist variously are without the divisions of color, shape, and so forth in this way in the mode of subsistence but are the same taste as the non-affirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation.

39 Introduction IV. With respect to the definitive meaning, do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom. (See Interpretable and Definitive, 110.) Within consciousness here there are two, awarenesses that do and do not realize emptiness. Although pristine wisdom is mainly pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness, wisdom awarenesses arisen from meditation on emptiness are also posited as pristine wisdom. Thus: Not asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of emptiness to those consciousnesses realizing emptiness and also not asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of apprehension of those that have not realized emptiness is the significance of not relying on consciousness and asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by those pristine wisdoms and mainly by pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom. Within definitive meaning in not relying on interpretable meaning, but relying on definitive meaning there are the two, consciousness and pristine wisdom. Thus: Not asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of a worldly consciousness that realizes emptiness by way of a meaning-generality is the significance of not relying on consciousness, and asserting the final mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom, because although the proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of a worldly inferential consciousness realizing emptiness, they are not eliminated in the perspective of the appearance factor, whereby [emptiness] is not asserted as the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of that [worldly inferential consciousness realizing emptiness], and all proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated not only in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of a Superior s pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing the final mode of subsistence, but also in the perspective of the appearance factor.

40 38 Principles for Practice CONNECTING THE FOUR RELIANCES In the first debate of the Dispelling Objections section (see Interpretable and Definitive, 116) the opponent asserts that it is reasonable to posit doctrine in rely on doctrine as verbal doctrine most likely because Jam-yang-shay-pa himself (see below, 86) earlier explained: that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods of attaining liberation is the meaning of relying on doctrine. However, as Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates, this is the doctrine in the first reliance in the context of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons, but relying on doctrine, whereas just before this description he speaks about the general significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine in which he specifies that within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings, and thus in the general context doctrine cannot be limited to verbal doctrine since it also includes meanings, that is, the objects expressed by those words. Thus, Jam-yang-shay-pa refutes this assertion by pointing out that doctrine is divided into verbal doctrines and the meanings expressed by them. He then goes on to say that since there are these two divisions of doctrine, not asserting in accordance with the literal reading of the verbal doctrine but engaging [that is, understanding] the object expressed that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought is the significance of the second reliance not relying on words, but relying on meaning. Since doctrine is divided into words and meanings, it is suitable that the next reliance is nonreliance on words but reliance on meanings. Jamyang-shay-pa identifies this pattern again between the second and third reliances by taking the divisions of meaning and using them as the reason why not asserting appearances of various conventionalities in this way as the mode of subsistence but asserting the nonaffirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation of all the various substrata as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of the third reliance. In other words, since meaning is divided into interpretable meanings and definitive meanings, it is suitable that the next reliance is nonreliance on interpretable meanings but reliance on definitive meanings. The connection between the third reliance and the fourth reliance is established in a different way, but the pattern is recognizable. Definitive

41 Introduction 39 meaning connects to the consciousness and pristine wisdom of the fourth reliance because definitive meanings require positing by an awareness. Such an awareness in the context of the fourth reliance will either be a consciousness or a pristine wisdom because positing the definitive meaning emptiness requires either a consciousness of inferential realization or a Superior s pristine wisdom. a In other words, since definitive meanings are realized by either consciousness or pristine wisdom and positing as the final definitive meaning moreover must be a positing by a single awareness and this could not be done in accordance with its appearance to an inferential rational consciousness realizing emptiness (see Interpretable and definitive, 119), it is suitable that the next reliance is nonreliance on consciousness but reliance on pristine wisdom. Jam-yang-shay-pa s treatment of this debate brings out a pattern in the four reliances. The pattern is that the divisions of each of the reliable elements of the first two reliances doctrine and meaning form the next reliance. In the case of the third reliance, it is the positors of definitive meaning consciousness and pristine wisdom that form the elements of the fourth reliance. In this way, each of the reliances is derived from the one preceding it, gradually tightening the focus of mental trust from doctrine, to meaning, to definitive meaning, to pristine wisdom. SCRIPTURE AND REASONING From within the threefold division of phenomena into manifest, b slightly hidden, c and very hidden, d emptiness is classified as slightly hidden. For the practitioner seeking the correct view of emptiness, striving to differentiate high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive, that emptiness is slightly hidden is both good news and bad news. The bad news is that slightly hidden phenomena do not appear to the senses, and therefore one cannot find the view without appeal to an epistemological authority such as inferential reasoning or scripture. The good news is that slightly hidden phenomena (unlike very hidden phenomena) become a Ge-lug theorists assert that in dependence on a correct reasoning about emptiness, an inferential consciousness can realize emptiness through the route of a conceptual image of emptiness appearing to that consciousness. Repeated meditations on emptiness employing inferential images can evolve into direct realization of the ultimate. Such a non-conceptual ultimate consciousness is a meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness. b mngon gyur. c cung zad lkog gyur. d shin tu lkog gyur.

42 40 Principles for Practice perceivable through the route of conceptual images based on correct signs, that is, reasons. Therefore, reason is an epistemological authority with regard to emptiness. The issue raised here is that scripture and reasoning are often mentioned as means of arriving at the correct view, and since emptiness is hidden and the path of reasoning is difficult, shouldn t the predominant course simply be to rely on scripture? In the last debate in the section on Dispelling Objections Jam-yangshay-pa presents such a challenge in which the opponent claims that the predominant means is to rely on scripture (see Interpretable and Definitive, 129): It follows that, between scripture and reasoning, scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive because for common beings the mode of subsistence of phenomena is hidden. Jam-yang-shay-pa disagrees on the grounds that not all statements in scripture can be trusted: If in the high sayings [a sūtra] is said to be of interpretable meaning, it does not need to be of interpretable meaning, and if [a sūtra] is said to be of definitive meaning, it does not need to be of definitive meaning. To prove that this statement is established, Jam-yang-shay-pa points out that if it were the case that a sūtra said to be of interpretable meaning needed to be of interpretable meaning, then the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras would be sūtras of interpretable meaning because of being described that way in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought. If that were so, the opponent would also have to say that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are sūtras of definitive meaning because of being described that way in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra. The opponent is unable to disagree, since to do so would simply prove Jam-yang-shay-pa s point. Jam-yang-shay-pa, basing his argument on Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence (see Interpretable and Definitive, 132), now moves to show why reasoning must be predominant in the case of two scriptures giving conflicting differentiations of the interpretable and definitive. a He says: a Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa s The Essence of Eloquence sets forth how the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought presents the hermeneutical positions of Proponents of Mind-Only (sems tsam pa, cittamātra) and how the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra presents the hermeneutical positions of Proponents of the Middle Way (dbu ma pa, mādhyamika). The Sūtra Unravelling the Thought pronounces the first and middle wheel of doctrine to be of

43 Introduction 41 It follows [that between those two the differentiation must mainly be made by pure reasoning] because at that time [of differentiating the interpretable and definitive], since among the high sayings a variety of the discordant interpretable and definitive are set forth, that Such-and-such is true and Such-and-such is untrue must be differentiated through pure reasoning, [whereas] since scriptures are the bases of analyses concerning the interpretable and definitive, they are not suitable as proofs. This argument consists of two parts. First, the scriptures contain numerous conflicting statements that such-and-such is true or untrue. For instance, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are sūtras of interpretable meaning according to the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought but are sūtras of definitive meaning according to the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra. Second, scriptural statements themselves are the bases of analysis to be investigated with reasoning to determine whether they are interpretable or definitive. They are to be proven or disproven and hence are not themselves proofs about this. Tsong-kha-pa s Stages of Secret Mantra likewise explains why scriptures are not to be taken as proofs of the interpretable and definitive: At that time since the two scriptures are the bases of analysis concerning possession or not of the meaning of the truth, the bases of dispute are not suitable as the means of proof; hence, differentiation as to possessing the meaning of the truth or not is done by way of just reasoning. Tsong-kha-pa s argument is reminiscent of similar arguments posed in a variety of political and legal contexts showing the necessity of having a neutral third party adjudicate a dispute. In this instance, competing scriptures claim to possess the truth, and since their claims are discordant, reason must be called upon to settle the issue. Reason is the third party called in to resolve the hermeneutical dispute posed by dissonant scriptures. Just as a legal dispute is placed before a judge, hermeneutical disputes are resolved by reasoning. The five debates of the section on dispelling objections are summarized in the chart below: interpretable meaning and the third wheel to be definitive. The Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra, on the other hand, presents a system in which only the middle wheel is of definitive meaning. How to determine which is correct? Tsong-kha-pa states emphatically that reasoning must be used to differentiate which sūtra statements are interpretable and which are definitive.

44 42 Principles for Practice Jam-yang-shay-pa s 16 points in Dispelling Objections Third Debate (See Interpretable and Definitive, 116.) In the first reliance, doctrine in Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine, is taken as doctrines spoken by the Teacher which are twofold: (1) the means of expression, verbal doctrines, and (2) the meanings expressed. Hence, even if scriptural collections spoken by the Victor is identified (see below, 86) as the doctrine in the first reliance in the limited context of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons, but relying on doctrine, it is not reasonable to posit doctrine in rely on doctrine in the general context as limited to verbal doctrine. Based on the second import of doctrine in Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine, the meanings expressed, not asserting in accordance with the literal reading of the verbal doctrine but understanding the object expressed that is the meaning of Buddha s thought is the significance of the second reliance, Do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning. Based on the fact that even with respect to the object expressed that is the meaning of Buddha s thought there are two imports, interpretable conventionalites and the definitive meaning of the mode of subsistence not asserting appearances of various conventionalities in this way as the mode of subsistence but asserting the nonaffirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation of all the various substrata as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of the third reliance Do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning.

45 Introduction Positing as the final definitive meaning moreover must be a positing by a single awareness and: not only not asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with its appearance to a consciousness of a common being who has not realized emptiness but also not asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with its appearance to an inferential rational consciousness realizing emptiness but asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with appearance to a Superior s pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness, is the significance of the fourth reliance Do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom. Fourth Debate (121) In the second reliance, words in Do not rely on words include the interpretable meanings of the Word of the Teacher Buddha but also include the words of other beings, such as Bodhisattvas who set forth some of the 84,000 piles of doctrine. Therefore, words in do not rely on the words are not posited just as the words of the Teacher Buddha, since it is wider than that. In the second reliance, meaning in but rely on the meaning is not just emptiness but includes objects as numerous as the phenomena of the two truths, that is, all phenomena. Fifth Debate (127) In the third reliance, definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is of two levels: (1) the definitive on the level of the passages that are the means of expression (2) the definitive on the level of the meanings that are expressed. Although the latter is emptiness, definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning cannot be said to be emptiness because definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning has the above two levels. Ultimate in rely on the ultimate is taken to be emptiness, but that is not a reason to take definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning as emptiness since it has the above two levels.

46 44 Principles for Practice Sixth Debate (128) In the fourth reliance, the meaning of do not rely on consciousness is do not assert emptiness in accordance with the mode of appearance to an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness. Emptiness appears to inherently exist to an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness even though such an inferential consciousness accurately realizes emptiness. An inferential consciousness realizes emptiness through the mode, or medium, of a meaning-generality (a conceptual image of emptiness), but this does not mean that it realizes a meaninggenerality of emptiness; it realizes emptiness. Hence, the meaning of do not rely on consciousness is not that whatever is a consciousness in do not rely on consciousness necessarily has not realized emptiness because among those consciousnesses there are inferential consciousnesses that realize emptiness. Seventh Debate (See Interpretable and Definitive, 129) It cannot be held that between scripture and reasoning, scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive because, for instance, the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought says that the extensive, middle-length, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are sūtras of interpretable meaning whereas the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says that the extensive, middle-length, and brief Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are sūtras of definitive meaning. Hence, since among the high sayings a variety of the discordant interpretable and definitive are set forth, that Such-and-such is true and Such-and-such is untrue must be differentiated through pure reasoning. Because scriptures are the bases of analyses concerning the interpretable and definitive, they are not suitable as proofs for what is interpretable and definitive. Therefore, even though emptiness, the mode of subsistence, is not manifest like a sense object but is hidden for common beings, it can be approached by reasoning because among the hidden emptiness is only slightly hidden a and not very hidden.

47 Introduction 45 a About the classification of objects into the manifest and the hidden, Kön-chog-jig-maywang-po s Precious Garland of Tenets says: The definition of a manifest object is: a phenomenon that can be known through the power of experience, without depending on a logical sign. Obvious object (mngon sum, pratyakṣa), manifest object (mngon gyur, abhimukhī), sense object (dbang po i yul, indriyaviṣaya), and non-hidden phenomenon (lkog tu ma gyur pa i chos, aparokṣadharma) are mutually inclusive and synonymous. Illustrations are forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The definition of a hidden object is: a phenomenon that must be known through depending on a reason or sign. Hidden object (lkog gyur, parokṣa), non-obvious phenomenon (mngon sum ma yin pa i chos), and object of inferential comprehension (rjes dpag gi gzhal bya, anumānaprameya) are mutually inclusive and synonymous. Illustrations are the impermanence of a sound and a sound s selflessness of phenomena. [Sopa and Hopkins add:] These definitions are taken from the point of view of ordinary beings because there are no hidden objects for a Buddha, who realizes everything directly. Also, although an ordinary being who has a yogic direct perception that directly realizes the subtle impermanence of, for instance, a sound must depend on inference before directly cognizing it, a Superior can directly perceive the impermanence of a sound without first depending on an inference. Thus the impermanence of sound is not always a hidden object; it can be perceived directly as under the above conditions. Consequently, the synonyms given are only roughly mutually inclusive because what is an object of inference for one person could be an object of direct perception even for another ordinary being. The point here is that a hidden object is something that an ordinary being can newly cognize only through inference. It can be understood from the illustrations that the author gives the impermanence of a sound and a sound s selflessness of phenomena that hidden objects are not propositions about phenomena inaccessible to an ordinary being s experience but are such phenomena themselves. Therefore, in this system a manifest object and a hidden object are mutually exclusive [for ordinary beings]. Also, the three spheres of objects of comprehension [the manifest, the slightly hidden, and the very hidden] are asserted to be mutually exclusive. Slightly hidden objects, such as an emptiness of inherent existence, are amenable to realization by the usual type of inference. The very hidden, such as the layout of the universe, are known through such means as inference based on valid scriptures.

48 46 Principles for Practice See Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1990),

49 Introduction 47 IDENTIFYING THE RELIABLE As a summation, using the above richly provocative descriptions of each of the four reliances let us identify the element on which practitioners are not to rely and the element on which practitioners are to rely. IDENTIFYING PERSONS IN DO NOT RELY ON PERSONS 1. Ordinary persons, among whom there are a variety of Outer (Nonbuddhist) and Inner (Buddhist) persons, because trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not asserted, and deceptive as methods for attaining liberation (75, 87). 2. Supreme persons through to and including Buddhas, because the mere claims of those persons or the goodness of a person are not sufficient (84). 3. Mainly, the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good (139). 4. Doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person (85). 5. Relative to Forder (Nonbuddhist) Proponents of Self: The self as conceived by the Forder (Nonbuddhist) Proponents of Self (93). 6. Relative to the Diverged Afar Nihilists: The nonexistence of past and future lives asserted by the Diverged Afar Nihilists (93). IDENTIFYING DOCTRINE IN RELY ON DOCTRINE 1. Scriptural collections, because scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation (86) since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever scriptural collections only for the sake of setting trainees in the definite goodness of liberation, those statements in whatsoever scriptural collections are true as methods for attaining liberation, are nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and are asserted as methods for attaining liberation (87). 2. Within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings (84). 3. Asserting the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings set out in accordance with this person s assertion (84). Mental reliance on pure reasoning, rather than taking as a reason merely that something is an explanation by a special person, a Buddha or a Hearer and so forth, and holding whatever they set forth to be of definitive meaning (97). The reasoning validity, which means the same as reliance on doctrine (145). When understanding that is, hearing all doctrines, if one takes as true all that is explained and does not analyze the meaning of words, one will not know how to distinguish the correct from the quasi. (139).

50 48 Principles for Practice 4. Thorough knowledge of the composition of doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person is called doctrine (85). 5. Relative to Forder (Nonbuddhist) Proponents of Self: Assertion and nondeceptiveness of the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable matrix of a One-Gone-Thus the three doors of liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness) as the mode of subsistence (94). 6. Relative to the Diverged Afar Nihilists: Entry into an understanding of actions and their effects and of selflessness through the teaching that there exists a self substantially existent in the sense of being selfsufficient (94). IDENTIFYING WORDS IN DO NOT RELY ON THE WORDS 1. Within words here there are the two, treatises and Words of Buddha, and the two, the literal and the non-literal (99). Even within doctrines spoken by the Teacher, there are the two, (1) words that are the means of expression (rjod byed kyi tshig) and (2) the meanings expressed (brjod bya'i don) (102). 2. The explicit reading of the high sayings not definitely nondeceptive with respect to the mode of subsistence and so forth (99). 3. The terminology of treatises (academic language) when local terms convey the meaning (100). 4. Teachings of the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation through to the essence of enlightenments; teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine (101). 5. The certainty of non-deception about the mode of subsistence of things being lacking when the literal reading of the high sayings that are means of expression cannot be accepted as is (103), 6. The literality of the literal reading of sūtras when subject to damage by valid cognition (103). IDENTIFYING MEANING IN RELY ON THE MEANING 1. Within meanings there are the two, interpretable meanings and definitive meaning (99). 2. Making assertions in accordance with the specific object expressed that is the meaning of the thought having pure proofs (99). 3. Meaning conveyed by local terms (100). 4. All-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed in a single moment of mind; the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings (99).

51 Introduction Establishing in fact the objects expressed that are the meanings of the speaker s thought (103). 6. The objects expressed that are the meanings of Buddha s thought understood through demonstrating the damage by valid cognition to the literality of sūtras whose literal reading is not acceptable (103). IDENTIFYING INTERPRETABLE MEANING IN DO NOT RELY ON INTERPRETABLE MEANING 1. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: conventionalities as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher Buddha s sūtras (103). 2. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: conventionalities as the mode of subsistence in accordance with various appearances (103). 3. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: high sayings teaching conventionalites (107). 4. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: conventionalites (107). 5. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: appearances as various conventionalities as the final mode of subsistence (108) 6. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: conventional substrata existing variously (109) 7. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: teachings of the various aspects of method like the various kernels of grains dwelling in the covering of various husks (110). IDENTIFYING DEFINITIVE MEANING IN RELY ON DEFINITIVE MEANING 1. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: emptiness as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras (103). 2. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: emptiness of true existence in accordance with the appearances of conventionalites as the mode of subsistence (103). 3. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: high sayings teaching the ultimate (107). 4. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: the ultimate (107). 5. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: emptiness of true establishment in accordance with such appearances as the final mode of subsistence (108).

52 50 Principles for Practice 6. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: the same taste of the variously existing conventional substrata without the divisions of color, shape, and so forth in the mode of subsistence as the non-affirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation (109). 7. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: teachings of the mode of the subtle profundity of emptiness like the single sweet and delicious taste of honeys (110). IDENTIFYING CONSCIOUSNESS IN DO NOT RELY ON CONSCIOUSNESS 1. There are two, awarenesses that do and do not realize emptiness (110). 2. Consciousnesses realizing emptiness but not directly; these have a mode of appearance in which emptiness appears in a dualistic aspect (110). Consciousnesses of those that have not realized emptiness; these are subject to faulty modes of appearance and modes of apprehension of the nature of their objects (110). 3. In general, in terms of a common being, wisdoms of hearing and thinking analyzing suchness (112). 4. Whatever approaches and abides in forms, approaches and abides in feelings, approaches and abides in consciousness, approaches and abides in compositional factors; consciousness of the earth constituent, consciousness of the water constituent, consciousness of the fire constituent, consciousness of the wind constituent; cognition of forms which are known by the eye, cognition of sounds which are known by the ear, cognition of odors which are known by the nose, cognition of tastes which are known by the tongue, cognition of objects of touch which are known by the body, and cognition of phenomena which are known by the mind (112). 5. An inferential consciousness realizing emptiness by way of a meaning-generality; although the proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated in the perspective of its ascertainment factor, they are not eliminated in the perspective of the appearance factor (114). IDENTIFYING PRISTINE WISDOM IN RELY ON PRISTINE WISDOM 1. Mainly pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness, but also wisdom awarenesses arisen from meditation on emptiness which include conceptual realizations of emptiness (110). 2. Pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness realizes emptiness totally nondualistically, and thus there is no false appearance of inherent existence or appearance of a meaning-generality (110).

53 Introduction A wisdom arisen from analytical meditation on suchness which is mainly a Superior s pristine wisdom of direct realization (112). 4. Thorough knowledge of the aggregate of consciousness abiding in whichever of the four aggregates; regarding consciousnesses abiding in any of these four constituents, knowledge of the noumenon as undifferentiable; regarding consciousnesses abiding in any of these four constituents, knowledge of the noumenon as undifferentiable is pristine wisdom; this which is pacified internally and does not move to the external and does not conceive and conceptualize any phenomenon (112). 5. A Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing the final mode of subsistence; all proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated not only in the perspective of its ascertainment factor, but also in the perspective of its appearance factor (114). Now let us put these sections together with the scriptural sources that Jamyang-shay-pa cites. TABLE OF QUOTATIONS IN THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE INTERPRETABLE AND DEFINITIVE ON THE FOUR RELIANCES THE FOUR RELIANCES AS A GROUP 1. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a.6-136b.6) [Do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning.] Regarding that, how do Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances? Concerning this, Bodhisattvas listen to doctrines from others because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting well-crafted words. Since they listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting the words, therefore even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. [Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine.] Moreover, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know unwholesome teachings and also great teachings correctly just as they are. Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines.

54 52 Principles for Practice [Do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning.] Moreover, Bodhisattvas adhere to faith and adhere to joy in the One-Gone-Thus and take manifest joy in solely ascertaining his speech, and they rely on the One-Gone- Thus s sūtras of definitive meaning, but not on [sūtras of] interpretable meaning, for if one relies on sūtras of definitive meaning, one will not be lured from this disciplinary doctrine because it is due to not ascertaining that the divisions of sūtras of interpretable meaning are for the sake of entry through various doors that doubt is generated. If Bodhisattvas become without ascertainment concerning sūtras of definitive meaning, they will be lured from this disciplinary doctrine. [Do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom.] Furthermore, Bodhisattvas view the pristine wisdom of realization as the essence, not just consciousness of doctrines and meanings through hearing and thinking. [Four validities.] Understanding that what is to be known by the knowledge of meditation cannot be known only by knowing meanings through hearing and thinking, they do not abandon and do not deprecate the supremely profound doctrines spoken by the One-Gone-Thus even when hearing them. In that way, Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances, whereby they are oriented well. From these four reliances, in brief, four validities themselves are indicated: (1) the meanings of the teachings, (2) reasonings, (3) teachers, and (4) pristine wisdoms of realization arisen from meditation. Through all four reliances, the nonmistakenness that definitely yields entry into initiating Bodhisattvas correct training is manifestly clarified. 2. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4) The four reliances of Bodhisattvas also are an imperishable. What are the four? They are as follows: Rely on the meaning, but do not rely on the letters; rely on pristine wisdom, but do not rely on consciousness; rely on sūtra [passages] of definitive meaning, but do not rely on sūtra [passages] of interpretable meaning; rely on the doctrine itself, but do not rely on persons. DO NOT RELY ON PERSONS, BUT RELY ON DOCTRINE 3. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (84) (sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 58b.4-5)

55 Introduction 53 Moreover, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know unwholesome teachings and also great teachings correctly just as they are. Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. 4. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (85) (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 232a.5-232b.4) Regarding this, what is the doctrine itself? What is a person? [Whatsoever doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person are called person. This thorough knowledge of the composition of that view of the person is called doctrine itself. ] a Moreover, persons who are ordinary beings, persons who are virtuous common beings, [persons who follow by faith, persons who are followers of doctrine, persons on the eighth (ground, that is, Approachers to Stream-Enterer), persons who are Stream- Enterers, persons who are Once-Returners, persons who are Non- Returners, persons who are Foe Destroyers, persons who are Solitary Realizers, persons who are Bodhisattvas, and one person who when arising in the world benefits many beings, comforts many beings, empathizes with the world, who arises in the world for the sake of masses of gods and humans, for their benefit, for their comfort, the teacher of gods and humans,] the Buddha Supramundane Victor, the unique person are called persons. [All of those terms for persons are taught by the Supramundane Victor for the sake of leading sentient beings by way of conventional words; those who adhere to them are said to be without reliance ; in order for them to enter into reliance,] the Supramundane Victor also said, Rely on the doctrine itself, but not for the sake of persons. 5. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (89) (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 232a.5-6) Whatsoever doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person are called person. This thorough knowledge of the composition of that view of the person is called doctrine itself. b a See Interpretable and Definitive, 89. b chos nyid; in other contexts this term refers to the final nature of phenomena, but here it merely means doctrine (chos).

56 54 Principles for Practice 6. Tsong-kha-pa s The Lesser Essence of Eloquence/ Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising (90) All statements whatsoever by you Operate based on just dependent-arising. Since they also are for the sake of nirvāṇa, You have nothing that is not done to bring about pacification. 7. Vasubandhu s Principles of Explanation (91) (Peking 5562, vol. 113, not found; most likely a spurious attribution) a Meaningless, wrong meaning, and meaningful; Deceitful, bereft of empathy, and abandoning suffering; Intent on hearing, on debate, and on achievement; Treatises are asserted as lacking six and endowed with three. 8. Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣhṭapāla from the Pile of Jewels Sūtra (91) (lha sa 62, dkon brtsegs, vol. 38, 499b.5-499b.6) Due to being endowed with compassion, Through hundreds of skillful means and reasonings You cause transmigrating beings who wander due to not knowing The modes of emptiness, quiescence, and no production to enter [into understanding the three doors of liberation]. 9. Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra (94) (sde dge TBRC W b.2-106b.4 and snar thang TBRC W ) Mahāmati, for the sake of leading Forders who are attached to propounding a self, the Ones-Gone-Thus teach the matrix of a One-Gone-Thus through revealing the matrix of a One-Gone- Thus, [thinking,] How [fine] it would be if those having thoughts that have fallen into the view of conceptualizing a real self [that is, the Forders] come to possess thoughts dwelling in the objects of activity of the three [doors of] liberation and quickly become fully purified in unsurpassed thoroughly complete enlightenment! 10. Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought (96) It is taught that even persons substantially exist because beings tamed by this [teaching of a substantially existent self] are cared a See the footnote at the citation on 91.

57 Introduction 55 for by being taught that this exists. For, instance, it is said: Monastics, the five aggregates are the burden; the carrier of the burden is the person. a In the face of inquiry by those holding that persons substantially exist in the sense of being self-sufficient, [Buddha] did not teach that such does not exist but stated that the person that is the carrier of the burden exists, and even though in the words of this statement substantial existence is not explicitly present, the meaning is that [persons] substantially exist. 11. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (81) (sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 58b.4-5) Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. 12. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (97) (This quote is not found in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra; likely a spurious attribution.) Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed, My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars Upon analyzing it well, Not out of respect [for me]. 13. Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra (98) (reference without quote; the reference is likely to Peking 775, vol. 29, , chapter 2) Sūtras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine which is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] also pleases children but is not discourse setting out the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamored of the expression. 14. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (85) (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 232b.2-4) a See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound (221): Monastics, I will teach you about the burden. I will also teach you about the taker of the burden, the leaver of the burden, and the carrier of the burden. Regarding this, the burden is the five appropriated aggregates. The taker of the burden is attachment. The leaver of the burden is liberation. The carrier of the burden is the person

58 56 Principles for Practice All of those terms for persons are taught by the Supramundane Victor for the sake of leading sentient beings by way of conventional words; those who adhere to them are said to be without reliance ; in order for them to enter into reliance,] the Supramundane Victor also said, Rely on the doctrine itself, but not for the sake of persons. DO NOT RELY ON THE WORDS, BUT RELY ON THE MEANING 15. Kālachakra Root Tantra (100) For ultimate reality always the great ones Do not rely on words in local areas. If the meaning is known with local names, What use are the terms of treatises? 16. Mañjughoṣha Narendrakīrti s Brief Explication of the Assertions of Our Own View (100) (Peking 4610, vol. 81) The term karṇā of Karṇāṭa [or Karṇāṭaka] expresses stone and leg. For some, it expresses deaf. a Tantras teach similarly. 17. Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles (100) Through the force of different linguistic usages in diverse localities, there are usages of different names even for each meaning and various different meanings even for each name. Hence, given that the people of individual areas who use language for meaning are able to understand the meaning, what use are the delineations of Sanskrit terms renowned in treatises? That is to say, there is no purpose. 18. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (101) (sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a.6) Since they listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting the words, therefore even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. 19. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (101) (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4-230b.1) a That is, an alternate meaning of karṇā in the parlance of one locality is deaf.

59 Introduction 57 Concerning that, what are meanings? What are letters? a [ Letters teach the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation through to the essence of enlightenments. Meaning is an all-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed in a single moment of mind.] In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. This is rely on meaning, but do not rely on letters. DO NOT RELY ON INTERPRETABLE MEANING, BUT RELY ON DEFINITIVE MEANING 20. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (104) (Peking 843, 150a.2-150b.4 and lha sa 176, vol. 60, 231a.6) Which are sūtras of definitive meaning? Which are sūtras of interpretable meaning? [Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of entering the path are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of entering into the fruit are called definitive meaning. ] Whichever sūtras teach establishing conventionalities are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach establishing ultimates are called definitive meaning. [Whichever sūtras teach engaging in actions and agents are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach engaging in actions and exhausting afflictions are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of setting out the thoroughly afflicted are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of purifying the thoroughly pure are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach mental projections in cyclic existence are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach entry into the nonduality of cyclic existence and nirvana are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach (various objects by way of) various words and letters are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach the profound (emptiness) difficult to view and difficult to realize are called definitive meaning. a These two questions do not appear in lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4.

60 58 Principles for Practice Whichever sūtras teach (various objects by way of) many words and letters and in order to please the minds of sentient beings are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach (the profound emptiness) with few words and letters and cause the minds of sentient beings to become definite mind are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach what are set out with various vocabulary (such as) self, sentient being, living being, the nourished, creature, person, mind-progeny, pride-child, agent, and feeler like (teaching) an owner when there is no owner are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach the doors of liberation things emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, no composition, no production, no produced, no sentient being, no living being, no person, and no owner are called definitive meaning. ] This is called reliance on sūtras of definitive meaning and non-reliance on sūtras of interpretable meaning. 21. Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence (107) (Collected Works of Rje Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa, vol. 21 pha [Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975], ) When the interpretable and the definitive are posited in terms of the meaning of these [sūtras] needing or not needing to be interpreted otherwise, the high sayings themselves are held as illustrations of the interpretable and the definitive. However, when meanings [that is to say, objects] that need or do not need to be interpreted otherwise are posited as the interpretable and the definitive, conventionalities and ultimates are treated as the interpretable and the definitive. 22. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (108) They rely on the One-Gone-Thus s sūtras of definitive meaning, but not on [sūtras of] interpretable meaning, for if one relies on sūtras of definitive meaning, one will not be lured from this disciplinary doctrine because it is due to not ascertaining that the divisions of sūtras of interpretable meaning are for the sake of entry through various doors that doubt is generated. 23. Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness (110) (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972, )

61 Introduction 59 [Not asserting these appearances] of the varieties of conventionalities [as the mode of subsistence but asserting the ultimate the emptiness of true establishment in the manner of such appearance as the mode of subsistence] is the significance of [ not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on definitive meaning and not relying on conventionalities but] relying on ultimates[.] 24. Maitreya s Treatise on the Sublime Continuum (110) (I.148; sde dge 4024, vol. phi, 61b1-61b.2) The teaching of the mode of the subtle profundity [of emptiness] Is like the single [sweet and delicious] taste of honeys. The teaching of the mode of the various aspects of [method] Is to be known as like [the various] kernels [of grains dwelling] in the covering of various [husks]. DO NOT RELY ON CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT RELY ON PRISTINE WISDOM 25. Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (111) (sde dge 4037, vol. wi, 136b.4) Furthermore, Bodhisattvas view the pristine wisdom of realization as the essence, not just consciousness of doctrines and meanings through hearing and thinking. 26. Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles (112) In general, on the occasion of the fourth reliance the consciousness in the likes of do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom, is wisdoms of hearing and thinking analyzing suchness and is in terms of a common being, but pristine wisdom is a wisdom arisen from analytical meditation on suchness and moreover is mainly a Superior s pristine wisdom of direct realization. 27. Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (112) (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 230b.1-231a.1) What is consciousness? What is pristine wisdom? Consciousness is the four stations of consciousness. [What are the four? Regarding consciousness, whatever approaches and abides in forms, approaches and abides in feelings, approaches and abides in consciousness, approaches and abides in compositional factors is called consciousness. Regarding that, what is pristine wisdom? Thorough knowledge of the aggregate of consciousness

62 60 Principles for Practice abiding in whichever of the four aggregates is called pristine wisdom. Moreover, regarding consciousness, consciousness of the earth constituent, consciousness of the water constituent, consciousness of the fire constituent, consciousness of the wind constituent is called consciousness. Regarding consciousnesses abiding in any of these four constituents, knowledge of the noumenon as undifferentiable is pristine wisdom.] Moreover, consciousness is cognition of forms which are known by the eye, cognition of sounds which are known by the ear, cognition of odors which are known by the nose, cognition of tastes which are known by the tongue, cognition of objects of touch which are known by the body, and cognition of phenomena which are known by the mind. These are called consciousness. This which is pacified internally and does not move to the external and through relying on pristine wisdom does not conceive and conceptualize any phenomenon is called pristine wisdom. 28. Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness (115) (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972, ) In our system, even the presentation of the four reliances has fundamental importance as follows. We propound that: not asserting these appearances of the varieties of conventionalities as the mode of subsistence but asserting the ultimate the emptiness of true establishment in the manner of such appearance as the mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on definitive meaning and not relying on conventionalities but relying on ultimates; asserting that this mode of appearance to the consciousnesses of common beings is not the mode of subsistence but that very mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom is the mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on consciousness but relying on pristine wisdom. PROVOCATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOUR RELIANCES By analyzing these four aphorisms and putting them together with numerous Indian and Tibetan sources Jam-yang-shay-pa and Ngag-wang-

63 Introduction 61 pal-dan provide richly evocative readings of these pithy directives. Let us assemble this material as multiple renderings of each directive: I. Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine. The pith: When understanding that is, hearing all doctrines, if one takes as true all that is explained and does not analyze the meaning of words, one will not know how to distinguish the correct from the quasi (Ngag-wang-paldan s Annotations, 139). 1. Ordinary persons, among whom there are a variety of Outer (Nonbuddhist) and Inner (Buddhist) persons in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not to be asserted, and deceptive as methods for attaining liberation (75, 87) whereas scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation (86), since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever scriptural collections only for the sake of setting trainees in the definite goodness of liberation (87). 2. Do not use as a reason the mere claims of the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good (139), and do not take as a reason the mere claims of supreme persons through to and including Buddhas or merely that something is an explanation by a special person, a Buddha or a Hearer and so forth, or use as a reason the goodness of a person, but assert the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings (84), using mental reliance on pure reasoning (97), the reasoning validity (145). 3. Do not adhere to doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person; they are taught by the Supramundane Victor for the sake of leading sentient beings by way of conventional words, but rely on thorough knowledge of the composition of doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person (85). 4. Relative to Forder (Nonbuddhist) Proponents of Self: The self as conceived by the Forder (Nonbuddhist) Proponents of an existent self is untrue, but the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable matrix of a One-Gone-Thus the three doors of liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness) is to be asserted and is nondeceptive as the mode of subsistence (93). 5. Relative to the Diverged Afar Nihilists: The nonexistence of past and future lives asserted by the Diverged Afar Nihilists is untrue, but the meaning of Buddha s thought behind sūtras teaching them that there exists a self substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient

64 62 Principles for Practice is that they may later enter into an understanding of actions and their effects and selflessness because if Buddha had not taught a substantially existent self to the Diverged Afar who assert that past and future lives do not exist, they would not know how to posit a being who is the substratum experiencing the fruition of the effects of actions (93). II. With respect to the doctrine, do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning. The pith: When holding all doctrines without forgetting, if one is intent only on words, one will fall from holding without forgetting the meaning (Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, 139). 1. Do not assert the explicit literal reading of the high sayings as being definitely nondeceptive with respect to the mode of subsistence and so forth, but make assertions in accordance with this and that object expressed a that is the meaning of the thought having pure proofs (99). 2. Do not use the terminology of treatises (academic language), but use local terms when they convey the meaning (100). 3. For the certainty of non-deception about the mode of subsistence of things, do not rely on teachings of the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation through to the essence of enlightenments, the teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine, but rely on the establishment in fact of the objects expressed that are the meanings of the thought all-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed in a single moment of mind; the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings (101). 4. For the certainty of non-deception about the mode of subsistence of things, do not rely on the literal reading of the high sayings that are means of expression when they cannot be accepted as is due to being subject to damage by valid cognition, but establish in fact the objects expressed that are the meaning of the speaker s thought through demonstrating the damage by valid cognition to the literality of those sūtras (103). a Even though this is the meaning behind what is literally expressed in the run of the words, it is nevertheless an object expressed with the qualification that it is the meaning behind what is literally expressed.

65 Introduction 63 III. With respect to the meaning, do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning. The pith: When closely investigating meaning at the time of states arisen from thinking doing proper mental application if one merely takes conventionalities to mind, one will not gain ascertainment arisen from thinking with regard to the ultimate (Ngag-wang-paldan s Annotations, 139). 1. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: Do not take conventionalities as true for the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher Buddha s sūtras teaching conventionalites, but assert as the mode of subsistence emptiness in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras teaching the ultimate (103, 107, 108). 2. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: Do not take conventionalities as true for the mode of subsistence in accordance with their various appearances, but assert as the mode of subsistence the emptiness of the true existence that conventionalites falsely appear to have (103). 3. On the level of the texts that are the means of expression: Do not rely on teachings of conventional substrata that exist variously with divisions of color, shape, and so forth which are like the coverings of various husks as if they were teachings on the mode of subsistence, but rely teachings on their same taste as the non-affirming negative like grain that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation, the subtle profundity of emptiness, which is also like the single sweet and delicious taste of honeys (110). 4. On the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed: Do not rely on conventional substrata that exist variously with divisions of color, shape, and so forth which are like the coverings of various husks as if they were the mode of subsistence, but rely on their same taste as the non-affirming negative like grain that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation, the subtle profundity of emptiness, which is also like the single sweet and delicious taste of honeys (110).

66 64 Principles for Practice IV. With respect to the definitive meaning, do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom. The pith: When achieving doctrine the path of liberation in accordance with doctrine, if one is satisfied with mere conceptual consciousnesses arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditation, one will not gain uncontaminated pristine wisdom in which clear perception of the meaning of reality has reached completion (Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, 139). 1. Do not assert the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of emptiness to consciousnesses conceptually realizing emptiness such that emptiness appears in a dualistic aspect, but assert the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by pristine wisdom and mainly by pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness (110). 2. Do not view just consciousness of doctrines and meanings through hearing and thinking analyzing suchness in terms of a common being as the essence, but view the pristine wisdom of realization arisen from analytical meditation on suchness, which is mainly a Superior s pristine wisdom of direct realization, as the essence (111). 3. For knowledge of the mode of subsistence, do not rely on: whatever approaches and abides in forms, approaches and abides in feelings, approaches and abides in consciousness, approaches and abides in compositional factors; consciousness of the earth constituent, consciousness of the water constituent, consciousness of the fire constituent, consciousness of the wind constituent; cognition of forms which are known by the eye, cognition of sounds which are known by the ear, cognition of odors which are known by the nose, cognition of tastes which are known by the tongue, cognition of objects of touch which are known by the body, and cognition of phenomena which are known by the mind, but rely on: thorough knowledge of the aggregate of consciousness abiding in whichever of the four aggregates; regarding consciousnesses abiding in any of these four constituents, knowledge of the noumenon as undifferentiable;

67 Introduction 65 this which is pacified internally and does not move to the external and does not conceive and conceptualize any phenomenon (112). 4. Do not assert the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of a worldly consciousness that realizes emptiness by way of a meaning-generality since although the proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated in the perspective of its ascertainment factor, they are not eliminated in the perspective of the appearance factor, but assert the final mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom since all proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated not only in the perspective of its ascertainment factor but also in the perspective of its appearance factor (114). The Indian and Tibetan commentaries indeed reveal the four aphorisms as replete with provocative meaning. EDITIONS CONSULTED Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive were consulted: 1. drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar po i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong, TBRC W : 1-288, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil, bla brang brka shis khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Abbreviated reference: 2011 TBRC bla brang. 2. drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar po i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. Published at Go-mang College, date unknown. Abbreviated reference: 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, so named because of being acquired by Jeffrey Hopkins in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in Also a third edition based on the bla brang edition was used for convenience: 3. drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar po i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1995) of the

68 66 Principles for Practice 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: 2008 Taipei reprint. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive provided in this book was supplied by the Dre-pung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India, which was likely based on the 1999 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang and the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa. Two basic editions of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets were consulted: 1. grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong, TBRC W1KG9409: , which is a PDF of: Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bzhad-pa irdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). Abbreviated reference:? Also: New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the Tra-shikhyil blockprint with some corrections ]. Abbreviated reference: 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang. 2. grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong, Mundgod, India: Dre-pung Gomang Library, 1999; rpt. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, n.d. [this edition is based on the Tra-shi-khyil blockprint]. Abbreviated reference: 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets provided in this book was supplied by the Dre-pung Gomang Library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. It was likely based on the 1999 Mundgod codex. It has been edited in accordance with the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang.

69 Jam-yang-shay-pa s GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE on the Four Reliances The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements present what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jam-yang-shay-pa considers to be wrong positions. Black words are other information or function structurally. In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator when it has been filled in.

70

71 Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis- Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate ང བ དང ང ས པའ ད ན མ པར འ ད པའ མཐའ ད ད འ ལ ལ ང ར གས བ ར དཀར པ འ གན མཛ ད ལ བཟང ར བ ཀ ན ང ཞ ས བ བ གས ས Here a by way of [treating] difficult points [I] will explain this great treatise b bestowing on those endowed with intelligence analysis, not reliant on the power of others, concerning the meaning of the thought of all the [Buddha s] high sayings c from the approach of differentiating among all of the Victor s high sayings those which require interpretation and those which are definitive, the essence of all eloquence. d This has two parts: (1) the reasons why differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive is needed and (2) how the interpretable and the definitive are differentiated. ད ལ འད ར ལ གས བཤད ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང པ ལ བའ ག ང རབ ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང བ དང ང ས པའ ད ན མ པར འ ད པའ ནས ག ས དང ན པ དག ལ ག ང རབ མཐའ དག a The 2011 TBRC bla brang section on the four reliances, 3a ; the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa, 2b.3-10a.3; the 2008 Taipei reprint, b Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence. c This term (gsung rab, pravacana) is often translated as scriptures, but high sayings conveys its literal connotation as speech (vacana), with rab (pra-) as an intensifier. d Here Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates that the meaning of Tsong-kha-pa s title The Essence of Eloquence is that the essence of all of the Buddha s speech, his eloquence, is the differentiation among those scriptures which require interpretation and which are definitive. However, Jam-yang-shay-pa s follower, Gung-thang Kön-chog-tan-pay-drönme (gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa i sgron me) a late eighteenth- and early nineteenthcentury scholar of Mongolian descent whose works figure prominently in the syllabus at Go-mang College, at Tra-shi-khyil Monastery and Kum-bum Monastery in Am-do Province, and at many related monasteries, offers a particularly thorough explanation of the title of Tsong-kha-pa s text that cogently explains that emptiness is the essence of Buddha s teachings; see Jeffrey Hopkins, Absorption in No External World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2005),

72 70 Principles for Practice ག དག ངས ད ན ལ གཞན ང མ འཇ ག པའ མ ད ད ར བའ བ ན བཅ ས ཆ ན པ འད དཀའ གནས ཀ ནས འཆད པ ལ ང ང ས འ ད དག ས པའ མཚན དང ང ང ས ཇ ར འ ད ལ གཉ ས I. THE REASONS WHY DIFFERENTIATION OF THE INTERPRETABLE AND THE DEFINITIVE IS NEEDED དང པ [ ང ང ས འ ད དག ས པའ མཚན ]ན [Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence] says: a The Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣhṭapāla [contained in the Pile of Jewels Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 91) b ] says: Due to being endowed with compassion, Through hundreds of skillful means and reasonings You cause transmigrating beings who wander due to not knowing The modes of emptiness, quiescence, and no production To enter [into understanding these three doors of liberation]. 3 Thus, it is said that the Compassionate Teacher perceiving that the thusness of phenomena is very difficult to realize and that, if it is not realized, one [can] not be released from cyclic existence brings about the thorough understanding of that [suchness] through many modes of skillful means and many approaches of a Jam-yang-shay-pa quotes the beginning and end of this passage from Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence. I have supplied the rest, minus notes, from Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), The Tibetan is from drang nges legs bshad snying po, TBRC W1KG8902, 2a.3-2b.6. b Cross-references to Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive and Great Exposition of Tenets are indicated in parentheses with Interpretable and the Definitive and Tenets and page reference; references to other volumes are given in footnotes.

73 The Interpretable and the Definitive 71 reasoning. Therefore, those having discrimination must work at a technique for thoroughly understanding how suchness is. ཇ ད འཕགས པ ལ འཁ ར ང ག ས ས པ ལས ང པ ཞ བ བ མ ད པའ ལ ཞ ས པ ནས [མ ཤ ས པས ན འག བ འཁ མས ར པ ད དག གས མངའ བས ཐབས ལ དང ར གས པ བ དག ག ས ན འ ད པར མཛད ཅ ས ཆ ས མས ཀ ད བཞ ན ཉ ད ན ཤ ན གས པར དཀའ བ དང མ གས ན འཁ ར བ ལས མ ག ལ བར གཟ གས ནས གས ཅན ག ན པས ཐབས ཀ ལ དང ར གས པའ མ ཞ ག ག ས ད ཁ ང ད བ ལ འ ད པར ག ངས ས ད འ ར མ ད ད དང ན པ དག ག ས ད ཉ ད ཇ ར ཡ ན ཁ ང ད པའ ཐབས ལ འབད དག ས ལ ད ཡང ལ བའ ག ང རབ ཀ ང བ དང ང ས པའ ད ན མ པར ད པ ལ རག ལས ཤ ང Moreover, this depends upon differentiating those meanings that require interpretation and those that are definitive within the scriptures of the Victor. Furthermore, the differentiation of those two cannot be done merely through scriptures that state, This is a meaning to be interpreted; that is a meaning that is definitive. For, [Buddha spoke variously in relation to the thoughts of trainees and] (1) otherwise the composition of commentaries on [Buddha s] thought differentiating the interpretable and the definitive by the great openers of the chariot-ways [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga] would have been senseless; (2) also, scriptures [such as the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra] set forth many conflicting modes of positing the interpretable and the definitive; and (3) through scriptural passages merely saying [about a topic], This is so, such cannot be posited, and if, then, in general it is not necessarily [suitable to accept whatever is indicated on the literal level in sūtras], mere statements [in sūtra] of, This is [interpretable, and that is definitive], also cannot establish about specifics, the interpretable and the definitive, [that such is necessarily so]. ད གཉ ས མ པར འ ད པ ཡང འད ན ང བའ ད ན ན འད ན ང ས པའ ད ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ང ཙམ ག ས ས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཞན ན ཤ ང ཆ ན པ དག ག ས ང ང ས འ ད བའ དག ངས འག ལ བ མས པ ད ན མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར དང ག ང རབ ལས ང ང ས ཀ འཇ ག ལ མ མ ན པ མ ག ངས པའ ར

74 72 Principles for Practice དང འད ན འད འ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ཙམ ག ང ག ས ད ར གཞག པར ན མ ས ལ ད འ ཚ ལ ད ར མ ཁ བ པ ན ག ང ང ས ལ ཡང འད འད འ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ཙམ ག ས ཀ ང བ པར མ ས པའ ར ར Therefore, one must seek [Buddha s] thought, following the [two] great openers of the chariot-ways [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga], who were prophesied as differentiating the interpretable and the definitive in [Buddha s] scriptures and who commented on the thought of the interpretable and the definitive and, moreover, settled it well through reasoning that damages the interpretation of the meaning of definitive scriptures as anything else and establishes that, within their being unfit to be interpreted otherwise, [the final mode of subsistence explained in them] is definite as [just] that meaning. Therefore, in the end, the differentiation [between the interpretable and the definitive] must be made just by stainless reasoning, because if a proponent asserts a tenet contradicting reason, [that person] is not suitable to be a valid being [with respect to that topic] and because the suchness of things also has reasoned proofs which are establishments by way of [logical] correctness. ད འ ར ག ང རབ ཀ ང ང ས འ ད པར ང བ ན པའ ཤ ང ཆ ན པ དག ག ས ང ང ས ཀ དག ངས པ བཀ ལ ཞ ང ད ཡང ང ས ད ན ག ག ང རབ ཀ ད ན གཞན འ ན པ ལ གན ད ད དང གཞན ང མ ང བར ད ན ད ར ང ས པའ བ ད ཀ ར གས པས ལ གས པར གཏན ལ ཕབ པ ཞ ག ག ས འ ངས ནས དག ངས པ འཚ ལ དག ས པས མཐར ག གས ན མ མ ད པའ ར གས པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ད དག ས ཏ ར གས པ དང འགལ བའ བ མཐའ ཁས ལ ན ན བ པ ཚད མའ ས ར མ ང བའ ར དང དང ས པ འ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད ཀ ང འཐད བས བ པའ ར གས པའ བ ད དང ན པའ ར ར It is from perceiving the import of this meaning [that differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive cannot be made by scripture alone and that reasoning is required, that Buddha] says [in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra]: a Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed, a For other Tibetan versions and a Sanskrit version from Shāntarakṣhita s tattvasaṃgraha see Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 366, fn. a.

75 The Interpretable and the Definitive 73 My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars Upon analyzing it well, Not out of respect [for me]. ད ན ག དབང འད གཟ གས ནས དག ང དག གམ མཁས མས ཀ ས བ གས བཅད བ ར བའ གས ར བཞ ན ལ གས པར བ གས ལ ང ཡ བཀའ ] ང བར ཡ ག ས ར མ ན ཞ ས ག ངས ས ཞ ས པའ བར ང A. DECISIVE ANALYSIS [OF THE FOUR RELIANCES] This has three parts: refuting [mistakes], a presenting [our system], and dispelling [objections to our system]. འད འ བས མཐའ ད ད པ ལ དགག བཞག ང ག མ ལས 1. Refuting [mistakes about the meaning of the four reliances] དང པ [དགག པ ]ལ 1. Concerning the meaning of the four reliances mentioned in the high sayings, [the high sayings being] the bases of analysis by those endowed with intelligence, someone says: 4 Not mainly teaching (mi ston), just as it is, the mode of subsistence to trainees of low faculties but in the definitive scriptures mainly teaching (ston) the mode of subsistence in consideration of trainees of sharp faculties is the significance of not relying (mi rton) on persons, but relying (rton) on the doctrine. b ག ས དང ན པ དག ག ད ད གཞ ག ང རབ ལས ན པ བཞ ག ངས པའ ད ན ལ ཁ ཅ ག ན ར ག ལ དམན པ a Jam-yang-shay-pa divides the decisive analysis section into refuting (dgag), presenting (bzhag), and dispelling (spang). Refuting is the short form of refuting mistakes ('khrul ba dgag pa) or refuting others systems (gzhan lugs dgag pa). Presenting is the short form of presenting our system (rang lugs bzhag pa), and dispelling is the short form of dispelling objections (rtsod pa spang ba). b Jam-yang-shay-pa dismisses this statement as an incorrect misreading based on a lexical error treating rely (rton) as teach (ston).

76 74 Principles for Practice མས ལ གནས གས ཇ བ བཞ ན གཙ བ ར མ ན པར ང ས ད ན ག ག ང རབ མས ག ལ དབང ན ལ དག ངས ནས གནས གས གཙ བ ར ན པ ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ཟ ར ན Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to take the relying (rton) and not relying (mi rton) of the four reliances (rton 5 pa bzhi) on this occasion as explaining [the mode of subsistence] and not explaining [to a person] because [according to you] it is reasonable that (1) not relying (mi rton) on a person is taken as mainly not teaching (mi ston 6 ) the mode of subsistence to those [persons] and (2) the meaning of relying (rton) on doctrine is taken as teaching (ston) mainly the meaning of the mode of subsistence. You have asserted the reason [which is that it is reasonable that (1) not relying (mi rton) on a person is taken as mainly not teaching (mi ston) the mode of subsistence to those [persons] and (2) the meaning of relying (rton) on doctrine is taken as teaching (ston) mainly the meaning of the mode of subsistence]. འ ན བས འད འ ན པ བཞ འ ན མ ན ད བཤད མ བཤད ལ ད ར གས པར ཐལ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པ ད ལ གཙ བ ར གནས གས མ ན པ ལ ད ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན གཙ བ ར [3b.1] གནས གས ཀ ད ན ན པ ལ ད ར གས པའ ར [གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པ ད ལ གཙ བ ར གནས གས མ ན པ ལ ད ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན གཙ བ ར གནས གས ཀ ད ན ན པ ལ ད ར གས པ ] གས ཁས If you accept [that it is reasonable to take the relying (rton) and not relying (mi rton) of the four reliances (rton pa bzhi) on this occasion as explaining (the mode of subsistence) and not explaining (to a person)], it follows that this is not logically feasible: because the rely and not rely here is asserted by scholars to be taken as: 1. assert and not assert,

77 The Interpretable and the Definitive reasonable to follow and not reasonable to follow, 3. nondeceptive and deceptive, 4. true and untrue, and because rely and not rely here is rely (rton) with a ra superscript, [and not explain (ston) with a sa superscript as you incorrectly read it] due to which here such [that is, rely (rton)] is not explicable in the letters or meaning as explain and not explain. The meaning here [of rely (rton)] is mental reliance (yid rton) because [ rely and not rely ] must be posited as reasonable to place mental trust and not reasonable to place mental trust (yid gtod). [ བས འད འ ན པ བཞ འ ན མ ན ད བཤད མ བཤད ལ ད ར གས པ ]འད ད ན མ འཐད པར ཐལ འད འ ན མ ན ད ཁས ལ ན མ ལ ན དང ས འ ང ར གས མ ར གས དང མ བད ན མ བད ན ལ ད པར མཁས པ དག ག ས བཞ ད པའ ར དང འད ར ན མ ན ན ར ན འ ག པས ད འ འད ར བཤད མ བཤད ཡ ག ད ན ལ མ འཐ བ པའ ར ད འ ད ན ཡ ད ན པ ཡ ད གཏ ད ར གས མ ར གས ལ འཇ ག དག ས པའ ར 2. Someone says: 7 That trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation a and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken is the significance of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. ཁ ཅ ག ག ལ རང རང ག བསམ ལ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས a That trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation appears to be acceptable to Jam-yang-shay-pa.

78 76 Principles for Practice ག ངས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ཟ ར ན Our response: Well then, it [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to assert whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor in accordance with how they were spoken because [according to you] such an assertion is the meaning of relying on doctrine. You have asserted the reason [which is that it is reasonable to assert whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor in accordance with how they were spoken is the meaning of relying on doctrine ]. འ ན ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ར ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས ག ངས པ ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པར ཐལ ད ར ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར [ད ར ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ] གས ཁས It [absurdly] follows that [such an assertion that it is reasonable to assert whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor in accordance with how they were spoken is the meaning of relying on doctrine ] because [according to you scriptural collections being] true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how the Victor pronounced them that way is the meaning of relying on doctrine. [ད ར ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ལ བས ད ར བཀའ ལ བ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It [absurdly] follows that [(scriptural collections being) true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how the Victor pronounced them that way is the meaning of relying on doctrine ] because [according to you] your thesis [that trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in

79 The Interpretable and the Definitive 77 accordance with how they were spoken is the meaning of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ] is logically feasible. [ ལ བས ད ར བཀའ ལ བ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ [ག ལ རང རང ག བསམ ལ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས ག ངས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ཞ ས པའ ]དམ བཅའ འཐད པའ ར If you accept the root consequence [that it is reasonable to assert in accordance with how they were spoken whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor], it [absurdly] follows that differentiating the interpretable and the definitive among the Victor s high sayings is meaningless because [according to you] it is reasonable to assert [the high sayings of the Victor] in accordance with the measure set forth in the Victor s high sayings. [ ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ར ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས ག ངས པ ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པ ] བར འད ད ན ལ བའ ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ད ན མ ད པར ཐལ ལ བའ ག ང རབ མས བཤད ཚ ད ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པའ ར [4a.1] It [absurdly] follows that [it is reasonable to assert the high sayings of the Victor in accordance with the measure set forth in the Victor s high sayings] because [according to you] it is reasonable to assert [the high sayings of the Victor] in accordance with how they are set forth. [ ལ བའ ག ང རབ མས བཤད ཚ ད ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད དག ག ས བཤད པ ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པའ ར It [absurdly] follows that [it is reasonable to assert (the high sayings of the Victor) in accordance with how they are set forth] because [according to you] your thesis [that trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation and that whatsoever scriptural

80 78 Principles for Practice collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken, is the meaning of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ] is logically feasible. [ད དག ག ས བཤད པ ར ཁས ལ ན ར གས པ ]ད ར ཐལ [ག ལ རང རང ག བསམ ལ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས ག ངས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ཞ ས པའ ]དམ བཅའ འཐད པའ ར Furthermore, it follows that [your thesis that trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken for sentient beings by the Victor as methods for attaining liberation are true as methods for attaining liberation in accordance with how they were spoken is the meaning of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ] is not correct because even if this is taken in the context of the [Buddha s] Word, concerning high sayings of interpretable meaning from among the Victor s pronouncements of a variety of interpretable and definitive high sayings: the unsuitability of asserting the two truths a in accordance with the explicit reading due to the force of the [particular] context of this and that [trainee] and asserting the final meaning of [Buddha s] thought, upon its having been sought, is the significance of not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning. གཞན ཡང [ག ལ རང རང ག བསམ ལ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན ལ བས ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག ག ངས པ མས ག ངས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པ ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ཞ ས པའ དམ བཅའ ]ད མ འཐད པར ཐལ བཀའ དབང ས ན ཡང ལ བས ང ང ས ཀ ག ང རབ ཚ གས ཤ ག བཀའ ལ བ ལས ང ད ན ག ག ང རབ མས ཀ དང ས ཟ ན ར བད ན གཉ ས ད དང ད ར བས a In this context, two truths is a general rubric for all phenomena.

81 The Interpretable and the Definitive 79 བས ཀ ས ཁས ང མ ང ཞ ང དག ངས ད ན མཐར ག པ བཙལ ནས ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows that [even if this is taken in the context of the (Buddha s) Word, concerning high sayings of interpretable meaning from among the Victor s pronouncements of a variety of interpretable and definitive high sayings (1) the unsuitability of asserting the two truths in accordance with the explicit reading due to the force of the (particular) context of this and that (trainee) and (2) asserting the final meaning of (Buddha s) thought, upon its having been sought, is the significance of not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning ] because in the context of [Buddha s] Word: 1. not asserting as above [the two truths] in accordance with the literal reading a of non-literal high sayings of interpretable meaning and so forth is the significance of not relying on the words and 2. asserting the final meaning of [Buddha s] thought upon its having been sought is the significance of relying on the meaning because a significance of such b not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning exists. [བཀའ དབང ས ན ཡང ལ བས ང ང ས ཀ ག ང རབ ཚ གས ཤ ག བཀའ ལ བ ལས ང ད ན ག ག ང རབ མས ཀ དང ས ཟ ན ར བད ན གཉ ས ད དང ད ར བས བས ཀ ས ཁས ང མ ང ཞ ང དག ངས ད ན མཐར ག པ བཙལ ནས ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ང ད ན ག ག ང རབ ཇ བཞ ན པ མ ཡ ན པ ལ ས གས པ མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ར ར བཞ ན ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དང དག ངས ད ན མཐར ག བཙལ ནས a sgras zin. b A significance of such not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning means A significance of not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning in the context of [Buddha s] word.

82 80 Principles for Practice ཁས ལ ན པ ད བཀའ དབང ས པའ ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ད འ འ ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད པའ ར 2. Presentation of our own system གཉ ས པ རང གས ལ There are four reliances because the four: 1. do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine; a 2. do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning; 3. do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning; 4. do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom are set forth, ན པ བཞ ཡ ད ད གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པ དང ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པ དང ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པ དང མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པ ཞ ས བ བཞ ག ངས པའ ར ཏ because Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 84, 101, and 123, and Tenets, 156) says: 8 [Do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning.] Regarding that, how do Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances? Concerning this, Bodhisattvas listen to doctrines from others because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting well-crafted words. Since they listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting the words, therefore even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. a The Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra speaks of relying on doctrine itself (chos nyid) instead of simply doctrine (chos), as found elsewhere. This usage of chos nyid is not to be taken as reality (chos, dharmatā).

83 The Interpretable and the Definitive 81 ང ས ལས ད ལ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན པ བཞ པ དག ལ ཇ ར ར ཞ ན ཞ ས པ ནས འད ལ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ད ན འད ད པའ ར གཞན ལས ཆ ས ཉན པར ད ཀ ཚ ག འ ལ གས པར ར བར འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན ཏ ད ད ན འད ད པའ ར ཆ ས ཉན ག ཚ ག འ འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན པས ན ཕལ པའ ད ཀ ས ཆ ས ན ན ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ད ན ལ ན པ ན ག ས པར ས ཏ ཉན པར ད ད [Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine.] Moreover, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know unwholesome teachings and also great teachings correctly just as they are. Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ནག པ བ ན པ དང ཆ ན པ བ ན པ ཡང ཡང དག པ ཇ བ བཞ ན རབ ཤ ས ཏ རབ ཤ ས ནས ཀ ང ར གས པ ལ ན པར ད པ ཡ ན ག གནས བ ན ནམ ཤ ས པའ གང ཟག གམ ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའམ དག འ ན ག ས ཆ ས འད དག བཤད ད ཞ ས གང ཟག ལ ན པ མ ཡ ན ན ད ར ར གས པ ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ད ན ད ཁ ནའ ད ན ལས མ གཡ ཞ ང ཆ ས མས ལ གཞན ག ང མ འཇ ག པ ཡང ཡ ན ན [Do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning.] Moreover, Bodhisattvas adhere to faith and adhere to joy in the One-Gone-Thus and take manifest joy in solely ascertaining his speech, and they rely on the One-Gone- Thus s sūtras of definitive meaning, but not on [sūtras of] interpretable meaning, for if one relies on sūtras of definitive

84 82 Principles for Practice meaning, one will not be lured from this disciplinary doctrine because it is due to not ascertaining that the divisions of sūtras of interpretable meaning are for the sake of entry through various doors that doubt is generated. If Bodhisattvas become without ascertainment concerning sūtras of definitive meaning, they will be lured from this disciplinary doctrine. ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པ ལ དད པ ཞ ན ཅ ང དགའ བ ཞ ན ཏ ག ང ལ གཅ ག ང ས པར མང ན པར དགའ བ དང ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའ ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ལ མ ཡ ན ཏ ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ན ཆ ས འ ལ བ འད ལས མ འ གས པར འ ར ཏ འད ར ང བའ ད ན ག མད ན ཚ གས ནས གས པའ ད ན ག མ པར ད བ མ ང ས པས ཐ ཚ མ ད པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར གལ ཏ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ཡང ང ས པ མ ད པར ར ན ན ད ར ན ད ཆ ས འ ལ བ འད ལས འ གས པར འ ར ར [Do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom.] Furthermore, Bodhisattvas view the pristine wisdom of realization as the essence, not just consciousness of doctrines and meanings through hearing and thinking. ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལ ང པ བ ཡ ན ག ཐ ས པ དང བསམས པས ཆ ས དང ད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཙམ ལ ན མ ཡ ན ན [Four validities.] Understanding that what is to be known by the knowledge of meditation cannot be known only by knowing meanings through hearing and thinking, they do not abandon and do not deprecate the supremely profound doctrines spoken by the One-Gone-Thus even when hearing them. In that way, Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances, whereby they are oriented

85 The Interpretable and the Definitive 83 well. From these four reliances, in brief, four validities themselves are indicated: (1) the meanings of the teachings, (2) reasonings, (3) teachers, and (4) pristine wisdoms of realization arisen from meditation. Through all four reliances, the nonmistakenness that definitely yields entry into initiating Bodhisattvas correct training is manifestly clarified. ད ས བ མས པའ ཤ ས པས ཤ ས པར བ གང ཡ ན པ ད ན ཐ ས པ དང བསམས པས ད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཙམ ག ས མ པར ཤ ས པར མ ས པར ར ག ནས ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས མཆ ག ཟབ པ དག ཐ ས ན ཡང ང བར མ ད ཅ ང ར པ མ འད བས ཏ ད ར ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན པ བཞ པ དག ལ ར བར ད ད ད ར ན ལ གས པར གས པ ཡ ན ན ན པ བཞ པ ད དག ལས ན མད ར བ ན ཚད མ ཉ ད བཞ བ ན ཏ བ ན པའ ད ན དང ར གས པ དང ན པ དང བ མས པ ལས ང བའ གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ས ན པ བཞ པ ཐམས ཅད ཀ ས ན ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཡང དག པའ ར བ མ པ ལ གས པ ང ས པར འ ན པའ འ ལ བ མ ད པ མང ན པར གསལ བར ས པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས དང and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: 9 The four reliances of Bodhisattvas also are an imperishable. What are the four? They are as follows: Rely on the meaning, but do not rely on the letters; rely on pristine wisdom, but do not rely on consciousness; rely on sūtra [passages] of definitive meaning, but do not rely on sūtra [passages] of interpretable meaning; rely on the doctrine itself, but do not rely on persons. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ང བ [4b.1] ས མས དཔའ མས

86 84 Principles for Practice ཀ ན པ བཞ ཡང མ ཟད པ བཞ གང ཞ ན འད ད ན ལ ན ག ཡ ག ལ མ ན པ དང ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ག མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན པ དང ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ག མད ལ མ ན པ དང ཆ ས ཉ ད ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པའ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Do not rely on persons, but rely on doctrine There is a significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine because it being the case that within persons here there are the two, the ordinary and the supreme through to and including Buddhas, and within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings not using as a reason merely the claims of those persons or the goodness of a person, but asserting the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings set out in accordance with this [person s] assertions is this [significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ], དང པ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ག ད ན ཡ ད ད འད འ གང ཟག ལ ཕལ པ དང མཆ ག སངས ས ཀ བར གཉ ས ཡ ད ཆ ས ལ ཚ ག དང ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས གང ཟག ད དག ག འད ད ཞ ན ནམ གང ཟག ད བཟང པ ཙམ མཚན མ ད པར ད འ འད ད པ ར བཤད པའ ཚ ག དང ད ན ལ བ གས ནས འཐད ན ཁས ལ ན པ ད ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas 10 (see Interpretable and Definitive, 80, and Tenets, 156) says: Moreover, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know unwholesome teachings and also great teachings correctly just as they are. Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. ང ས ལས ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ནག པ བ ན པ

87 The Interpretable and the Definitive 85 དང ཆ ན པ བ ན པ ཡང ཡང དག པ ཇ བ བཞ ན རབ ཤ ས ཏ རབ ཤ ས པས ཀ ང ར གས པ ལ ན པར ད པ ཡ ན ག ས གནས བ ན ནམ ཤ ས པའ གང ཟག གམ ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའམ དག འ ན ག ས ཆ ས འད དག བཤད ད ཞ ས གང ཟག ལ ན པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས པ དང and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 89, and Tenets, 152) says: 11 Regarding this, what is the doctrine itself? What is a person? [Whatsoever doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person are called person. This thorough knowledge of the composition of that view of the person is called doctrine itself. ] a Moreover, persons who are ordinary beings, persons who are virtuous common beings, [persons who follow by faith, persons who are followers of doctrine, persons on the eighth (ground, that is, Approachers to Stream-Enterer), persons who are Stream- Enterers, persons who are Once-Returners, persons who are Non- Returners, persons who are Foe Destroyers, persons who are Solitary Realizers, persons who are Bodhisattvas, and one person who when arising in the world benefits many beings, comforts many beings, empathizes with the world, who arises in the world for the sake of masses of gods and humans, for their benefit, for their comfort, the teacher of gods and humans,] the Buddha Supramundane Victor, the unique person are called persons. [All of those terms for persons are taught by the Supramundane Victor for the sake of leading sentient beings by way of conventional words; those who adhere to them are said to be without reliance ; in order for them to enter into reliance,] the Supramundane Victor also said, Rely on the doctrine itself, but not for the sake of persons. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ད ལ ཆ ས ཉ ད ན གང གང ཟག ན གང ཞ ན ཞ ས པ ནས [གང གང ཟག བ ལ གནས ཏ ཆ ས ཁ ཅ ག ལ མ པ འད ན གང ཟག ཅ ས འ གང གང ཟག བ ད འ མ པ ཡ ངས a See Interpretable and Definitive, 89.

88 86 Principles for Practice ཤ ས པ འད ན ཆ ས ཉ ད ཅ ས འ ] གཞན ཡང ས ས བ འ གང ཟག དང ས ས བ འ དག བའ གང ཟག དང ཞ ས པ ནས [དད པས ས འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང ཆ ས ཀ ས འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང བ ད པའ གང ཟག དང ན གས པའ གང ཟག དང ལན གཅ ག ར འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང ར མ འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང དག བཅ མ པའ གང ཟག དང རང སངས ས ཀ གང ཟག དང ང བ ས མས དཔའ གང ཟག དང གང ཟག གཅ ག འཇ ག ན ང ན བ མང པ ལ ཕན པ དང བ མང པ ལ བད བ དང འཇ ག ན ལ ང བ བ དང དང མ འ བ ཕལ པ ཆ འ ད ན ག ར ཕན པའ ར བད བའ ར དང མ མས ཀ ན པ ]སངས ས བཅ མ ན འདས གང ཟག གཅ ག པ འཇ ག ན ང ད ན གང ཟག ཅ ས འ ཞ ས པ ནས [གང ཟག ག ད དག ཐམས ཅད ན ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའ ཀ ན བ ཀ ཚ ག ག གནས ཀ ས ས མས ཅན མས ང བའ ར བ ན པ ད ལ གང དག མང ན པར ཞ ན པ ད དག ན ན པ མ ཡ ན པ ཞ ས ད དག ན པ ལ ག ད པའ ར ]བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས ཀ ང ཆ ས [5a.1]ཉ ད ལ ན པར ག ས ཤ ག གང ཟག ག ར ན མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས ས ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hence, there is a significance of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons, but relying on doctrine because that trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not asserted, and deceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation are the significances respectively of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine, ད ས ན གང ཟག ཕལ པ ལ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ད ད ག ལ མས ཀ བསམ པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན པའམ ཁས མ ལ ན པའམ མ བ མ ཡ ན པ དང ལ བས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ བ

89 The Interpretable and the Definitive 87 མས ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པའམ ཁས ལ ན པ དང མ བ མས ན ར མ བཞ ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because (1) since trainees in terms of their various modes of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation, they are also not asserted as methods for attaining liberation, and also are not nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, whereby it is said, do not rely on persons and ག ལ མས ཀ བསམ ལ ཚ གས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན པས ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པར ཡང ཁས མ ལ ན ལ ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བའང མ ཡ ན པས ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས ག ངས པ གང ཞ ག (2) since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever scriptural collections only for the sake of setting [trainees] in the definite goodness of liberation, those [statements in whatsoever scriptural collections] are true as methods for attaining liberation, are nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and are asserted as methods for attaining liberation whereby it is said, rely on doctrine. ལ བས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ པ ཐམས ཅད མཐར ཐར པ ང ས ལ གས ལ འག ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ག ངས པས ན ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པས ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བ དང ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཁས ལ ན པས ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The first [part of the reason which is that since trainees in terms of their various modes of thought are untrue as methods for attaining liberation, they are also not asserted as methods for attaining liberation, and also are not nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, whereby it is said, do not rely on persons ] follows because not relying on persons

90 88 Principles for Practice [means] it is not suitable mentally to rely on, that is to say, mentally to trust trainees in terms of the various modes of thought of those persons as methods for attaining liberation. དང པ [ག ལ མས ཀ བསམ ལ ཚ གས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན པས ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པར ཡང ཁས མ ལ ན ལ ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བའང མ ཡ ན པས ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ]ད ར ཐལ གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ག ལ གང ཟག ད དག ག བསམ ལ ཚ གས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཡ ད མ ན པ ཡ ད བ ན མ ང བའ ར It follows that [not relying on persons (means) it is not suitable mentally to rely on, that is to say, mentally to trust trainees in terms of the various modes of thought of those persons as methods for attaining liberation]: because if it were not like that [that is, if it were suitable mentally to rely on, that is to say, mentally to trust trainees in terms of the various modes of thought of those persons as methods for attaining liberation] it would [absurdly] follow that it would not be necessary for even any being to train in the path, and because it would [absurdly] follow that there would be unmistaken valid cognitions with respect to the contradictory, and because there also is a mode of not relying on persons but relying on doctrine relative to such persons who view self and [relative] to thoroughly knowing the basis in [Buddha s] thought behind explanations in accordance with their thought. [གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ག ལ གང ཟག ད དག ག བསམ ལ ཚ གས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཡ ད མ ན པ ཡ ད བ ན མ ང བ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ར མ ཡ ན ན བ འང ལམ ལ [5b.1] བ མ དག ས པར ཐལ བའ ར དང འགལ བ ལ མ འ ལ བའ ཚད མ ཡ ད པར ཐལ བའ ར དང ད འ འ གང ཟག ལ བདག ཅན ཞ ག དང ད འ བསམ པ དང མ ན པར བཤད པའ དག ངས གཞ ཡང དག པར ཤ ས པ ལ གང ཟག ད ལ ས པའ གང ཟག

91 The Interpretable and the Definitive 89 ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན ལ ཡང ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ because the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 85) says: Whatsoever doctrines composed within abiding in a view of the person are called person. This thorough knowledge of the composition of that view of the person is called doctrine itself. a ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས གང གང ཟག བ ལ གནས ཏ གང ཆ ས ཁ ཅ ག ལ མ པ འད ན གང ཟག ཅ ས འ གང ཟག བ ད འ མ པ ཡ ངས ཤ ས པ འད ན ཆ ས ཉ ད ཅ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The second root reason [which is that since the Victor in the end spoke all statements in whatsoever sūtra collections only for the sake of setting (trainees) in the definite goodness of liberation, those (statements in whatsoever sūtra collections) are true as methods for attaining liberation, are nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and are asserted as methods for attaining liberation whereby it is said, rely on doctrine ] follows because all pronouncements of whatsoever scriptural collections of excellent doctrine taught by the Victor, although they teach a variety of topics, in the end only teach methods for setting [trainees] in definite goodness, they are also called treatises intent on achievement, b and therefore one should mentally rely on excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech, that is to say, it is suitable to mentally trust these [excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech] as methods for attaining liberation. གས གཉ ས པ [ ལ བས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ པ ཐམས ཅད མཐར ཐར པ ང ས ལ གས ལ འག ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ག ངས པས ན ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པས ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བ དང ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཁས ལ ན པས ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པ ]ད ར a chos nyid; in other contexts this term refers to the final nature of phenomena, but here it merely means doctrine (chos). b That is, they are intent on achieving religious practice.

92 90 Principles for Practice ཐལ ལ བས དམ པའ ཆ ས ཀ ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ པ ཐམས ཅད ན བ ད ར ཚ གས ཤ ག བ ན ཀ ང མཐར ང ས ལ གས ལ འག ད པའ ཐབས ན པ ཤ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ན བ པ ར ལ ན པའ བ ན བཅ ས ཞ ས ཀ ང ག ངས ལ ད ས ན ན པའ ང ག དམ ཆ ས ལ ཡ ད ན པ འད ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཡ ད བ ན ང བའ ར It follows that [since all pronouncements of whatsoever scriptural collections of excellent doctrine by the Victor, although they teach a variety of topics, in the end only teach methods for setting (trainees) in definite goodness, they are also called treatises intent on achievement, and therefore one should mentally rely on excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech, that is to say, it is suitable to mentally trust these (excellent doctrines that are the Teacher s sacred speech) as methods for attaining liberation] because Tsong-kha-pa s The Lesser Essence of Eloquence [that is, Praise of the Supramundane Victor Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound Dependent-Arising] says: a All statements whatsoever by you Operate based on just dependent-arising. Since they also are for the sake of nirvāṇa, You have nothing that is not done to bring about pacification. [ ལ བས དམ པའ ཆ ས ཀ ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ པ ཐམས ཅད ན བ ད ར ཚ གས ཤ ག བ ན ཀ ང མཐར ང ས ལ གས ལ འག ད པའ ཐབས ན པ ཤ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ན བ པ ར ལ ན པའ བ ན བཅ ས ཞ ས ཀ ང ག ངས ལ ད ས ན ན པའ ང ག དམ ཆ ས ལ ཡ ད ན པ འད ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཡ ད བ ན ང བ ]ད ར ཐལ ལ གས བཤད ང པ ང བ ལས ཁ ད ཀ ས ཇ ད བཀའ ལ པ ན འ ལ ཉ ད ལ བ མ a sangs rgyas bcom ldan das la zab mo rten cing brel bar byung ba gsung ba i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad pa i snying po. For English translations see: Geshe Wangyal, in The Door of Liberation (New York: Lotsawa, 1978), ; and Robert Thurman, in Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa (Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982),

93 The Interpretable and the Definitive 91 འ ག ད ཡང ང ངན འདའ ར ཏ ཞ འ ར མ མཛད ཁ ད ལ མ ད ཅ ས དང and Vasubandhu s Principles of Explanation says: a Meaningless, wrong meaning, and meaningful; Deceitful, bereft of empathy, and abandoning suffering; Intent on hearing, on debate, and on achievement; Treatises are asserted as lacking six and endowed with three. མ བཤད ར གས 12པ ལས ད ན མ ད ད ན ལ ག ད ན དང ན ངན གཡ བ ལ ག བ ལ ང ཐ ས ད བ པ ར ལ ན པ བ ན བཅ ས ག ལ ག མ འད ད ཅ ས པ དང and the Superior Sūtra of the Questions of Rāṣhṭapāla [contained in the Pile of Jewels Sūtra] (see Interpretable and Definitive, 70) says: 13 Due to being endowed with compassion, Through hundreds of skillful means and reasonings a rnam par bshad pa i rigs pa, vyākyhayukti; Peking 5562, vol. 113, where this passage is not found. Jam-yang-shay-pa cites the first three lines of same passage earlier in the Great Exposition of Tenets (TBRC bla brang, 18b.4) but from Asaṅga s Compendium of Ascertainments (rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba, nirṇayasaṃgraha/ viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī; Peking 5539, sde dge 4038) and makes reference to similar descriptions here and there in the Principles of Explanation. However, the passage also is not found in Asaṅga s Compendium of Ascertainments. To summarize Ngag-wang-pal-dan explanation in another context (Annotations vol. 1, mchan stod, 18a.1, nga), the first two items in each of the first three lines are the six that treatises lack, namely, no meaning, wrong meaning, being deceitful, being bereft of empathy, being intent on hearing, and being intent on debate; the third item in each of the first three lines are the three that treatises possess, namely, meaningfulness, abandoning suffering, and being intent on achievement. He gives examples of the six that treatises lack; the meaningless is the examination of the teeth of a crow; that with wrong meaning is se u bcu pa i ngag, a type of disguised multivalent speech of rishis; the deceitful are the secret words of brahmins; the bereft of empathy are offerings of animal sacrifice; the intent on hearing are the secret words of brahmins; and the intent on debate are Outsiders texts on logic. Ngag-wang-pal-dan explains that Intent on hearing, on debate, and on achievement indicate purpose (dgos pa); Meaningless, wrong meaning, and meaningful indicate the content (brjod bya), and Deceitful, bereft of empathy, and abandoning suffering indicate motivation, each of them differentiating Outer (Nonbuddhist) and Inner (Buddhist) texts.

94 92 Principles for Practice You cause transmigrating beings who wander due to not knowing The modes of emptiness, quiescence, and no production to enter [into understanding the three doors of liberation]. 14 ལ འཁ ར ང ག ས ས པའ མད ལས ང པ [6a.1] ཞ བ བ མ ད པའ ལ མ ཤ ས པས ན འག བ འཁ མས ར པ ད དག གས མངའ བས ཐབས ལ དང ར གས པ བ དག ག ས ན འ ད པར མཛད ཅ ས ག ངས པའ ར Therefore, among the persons referred to in not relying on persons there are a variety of Outer [non-buddhist] and Inner [Buddhist] persons, and the significance of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine is as above, a a The reference may be to the earlier statement (84) : There is a significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine because it being the case that within persons here there are the two, the ordinary and the supreme through to and including Buddhas, and within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings not using as a reason merely the claims of those persons or the goodness of a person, but asserting the logically correct upon having investigated the words and meanings set out in accordance with this [person s] assertions is this [significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ], དང པ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ག ད ན ཡ ད ད འད འ གང ཟག ལ ཕལ པ དང མཆ ག སངས ས ཀ བར གཉ ས ཡ ད ཆ ས ལ ཚ ག དང ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས གང ཟག ད དག ག འད ད ཞ ན ནམ གང ཟག ད བཟང པ ཙམ མཚན མ ད པར ད འ འད ད པ ར བཤད པའ ཚ ག དང ད ན ལ བ གས ནས འཐད ན ཁས ལ ན པ ད ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ or to (86) : Hence, there is a significance of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons, but relying on doctrine because that trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not asserted, and deceptive as methods for attaining liberation, and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken by the Conqueror are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods for attaining liberation are the significances respectively of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine, ད ས ན གང ཟག ཕལ པ ལ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ད

95 The Interpretable and the Definitive 93 ད ས ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ ནང ག གང ཟག ཚ གས ཤ ག ཡ ད ཅ ང གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན [ག ལ མས ཀ བསམ ལ ཚ གས པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན པས ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པར ཡང ཁས མ ལ ན ལ ད ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ འང མ ཡ ན པས ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས ག ངས པ གང ཞ ག ལ བས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ པ ཐམས ཅད མཐར ཐར པ ང ས ལ གས ལ འག ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ག ངས པས ན ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པས ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བ དང ད དག ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས ཁས ལ ན པས ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པ ] ར ར ཡ ན ཏ because (1) to overcome the modes of conception propounding the self by the Forder Proponents of Self and thereupon to enter the three doors of liberation is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus] and (2) that the Diverged Afar [that is, Nihilists] who assert that there are no past and future lives may later enter into [an understanding of] actions and their effects and selflessness through the teaching that there exists a self substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching the existence of a self of persons. གས བདག བ མས ཀ བདག འ ཞ ན ལ ད བ ག ནས མ ཐར ག མ ལ འ ད པ ག བ ན ན པའ མད འ དག ངས ད ན གང ཞ ག བ མ ད པར འད ད པའ ང འཕ ན ལ རང བ པའ ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག ཡ ད ད ད ག ལ མས ཀ བསམ པ ར ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས མ བད ན པའམ ཁས མ ལ ན པའམ མ བ མ ཡ ན པ དང ལ བས ད ཇ ད ཅ ག བཀའ ལ བ མས ཐར པ ཐ བ པའ ཐབས བད ན པའམ ཁས ལ ན པ དང མ བ མས ན ར མ བཞ ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ

96 94 Principles for Practice ཞ ས བ ན པས ས ལས འ ས དང བདག མ ད ལ འ ག པ ད གང ཟག ག བདག ཡ ད པར ན པའ མད འ དག ངས ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར The first [part of the reason which is that to overcome the modes of conception propounding the self by the Forder proponents of self and thereupon to enter the three doors of liberation is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable (matrix of a One-Gone- Thus)] follows because (1) non-truth in accordance with the conceptions of an existent self by Forder Proponents of self but (2) assertion and nondeceptiveness of the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus] the three doors of liberation (emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness) as the mode of subsistence is the significance in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine relative to Forder proponents of self and to sūtras teaching a permanent stable [matrix of a One-Gone-Thus], because there is a significance [in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine ] relative to those two [that is, to Forder proponents of self and to sūtras teaching a permanent stable (matrix of a One-Gone-Thus)], དང པ [ གས བདག བ མས ཀ བདག འ ཞ ན ལ ད བ ག ནས མ ཐར ག མ ལ འ ད པ ག བ ན ན པའ མད འ དག ངས ད ན ]ད ར ཐལ གས བདག མས ཀ ས བདག ཡ ད པར ཞ ན པ ར མ བད ན ག བ ན ན པའ མད འ དག ངས ད ན ང ཉ ད མཚན མ ད ན མ ད ཀ མ ཐར ག མ གནས གས ཁས ལ ན ཅ ང མ བ ད གས བདག དང ག བ ན ན པའ མད ལ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ ད གཉ ས ལ ས པའ ད འ ད ན ཡ ད པའ ར because the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra says: 15 Mahāmati, for the sake of leading Forders who are attached to propounding a self, the Ones-Gone-Thus teach the matrix of a One-Gone-Thus through revealing the matrix of a One-Gone-

97 The Interpretable and the Definitive 95 Thus, [thinking,] How [fine] it would be if those having thoughts that have fallen into the view of conceptualizing a real self [that is, the Forders] come to possess thoughts dwelling in the objects of activity of the three [doors of] liberation and quickly become fully purified in unsurpassed thoroughly complete enlightenment! ལང གཤ གས ལས ག ས ཆ ན པ ད ར ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པ མས ཀ ས 16 གས ད བདག བ ལ མང ན པར ཞ ན པ མས ང པའ ར ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའ ང པ བ ན པས ད བཞ ན གཤ གས [6b.1] པའ ང པ ན ཏ ཡང དག པའ བདག མ པར ག པའ བར ང བའ བསམ པ ཅན དག མ པར ཐར པ ག མ ག ད ལ ལ གནས པའ བསམ པ དང ན ཞ ང ར ན མ ད པར ཡང དག པར གས པའ ང བ མང ན པར གས པར འཚང བར ཇ ར འ ར ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The second [part of the reason which is that the Diverged Afar (that is, Nihilists) who assert that there are no past and future lives may later enter into (an understanding of) actions and their effects and selflessness through the teaching that there exists a self substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is the meaning of the thought behind sūtras teaching the existence of a self of persons] follows because if [Buddha] had not taught a substantially existent self to the Diverged Afar who assert that past and future lives do not exist, they would not know how to posit a being who is the substratum experiencing the fruition of the effects of actions, due to which [Buddha] taught a substantially existent self. གཉ ས པ [ བ མ ད པར འད ད པའ ང འཕ ན ལ རང བ པའ ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག ཡ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན པས ས ལས འ ས དང བདག མ ད ལ འ ག པ ད གང ཟག ག བདག ཡ ད པར ན པའ མད འ དག ངས ད ན ]ད ར ཐལ བ མ ད པར འད ད པའ ང འཕ ན ལ ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག མ

98 96 Principles for Practice བ ན ན ལས འ ས ཀ མ ན ང གཞ འ བ འཇ ག མ ཤ ས པས ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག བ ན པའ ར It follows that [if (Buddha) had not taught a substantially existent self to the Diverged Afar who assert that past and future lives do not exist, they would not know how to posit a being who is the substratum experiencing the fruition of the effects of actions, due to which (Buddha) taught a substantially existent self] because for those who assert self, from between the two, self of persons and self of phenomena, the teaching of a self of persons is supreme, because Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought says: It is taught that even persons substantially exist because beings tamed by this [teaching of a substantially existent self] are cared for by being taught that this exists. For, instance, it is said: Monastics, the five aggregates are the burden; the carrier of the burden is the person. a In the face of inquiry by those holding that persons substantially exist in the sense of being self-sufficient, [Buddha] did not teach that such does not exist but stated that the person that is the carrier of the burden exists, and even though in the words of this statement substantial existence is not explicitly present, the meaning is that [persons] substantially exist. [ བ མ ད པར འད ད པའ ང འཕ ན ལ ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག མ བ ན ན ལས འ ས ཀ མ ན ང གཞ འ བ འཇ ག མ ཤ ས པས ས ཡ ད ཀ བདག བ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ བདག ཁས ལ ན པ མས ལ ཆ ས བདག དང གང ཟག ག བདག གཉ ས ལས གང ཟག ག བདག ན པ མཆ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ མ བཤད དག ངས པ རབ གསལ ལས གང ཟག ཀ ང ས ཡ ད པར ན ཏ ད ས འ ལ བའ བ ལ ད ཡ ད a See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound (221): Monastics, I will teach you about the burden. I will also teach you about the taker of the burden, the leaver of the burden, and the carrier of the burden. Regarding this, the burden is the five appropriated aggregates. The taker of the burden is attachment. The leaver of the burden is liberation. The carrier of the burden is the person

99 The Interpretable and the Definitive 97 པར ས བ ན པས ས འཛ ན པའ ར ར ཇ ད དག ང དག ང པ ན ཁ ར ར ཁ ར ཁ ར བ པ ན གང ཟག ག ཞ ས ག ངས པ འ འད ན གང ཟག རང བ པའ ས ཡ ད འཛ ན པ མས ཀ ས ས པའ ང ར མ ད པར མ བ ན པར ཁ ར ཁ ར པའ གང ཟག ཡ ད པར ག ངས པའ ཚ ག ལ དང ས མ ད ཀ ང ད ན ན ས ཡ ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར There is a significance in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine relative to supreme persons because rather than taking as a reason [for reliance] merely an explanation by a special person, a Buddha or a Hearer and so forth and holding whatever they set forth to be of definitive meaning mental reliance on pure reasoning is that [significance], གང ཟག མཆ ག ལ ས པའ གང ཟག མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ད ད སངས ས སམ ཉན ཐ ས ས གས གང ཟག ཁ ད པར ཅན ད ས བཤད པ ཙམ མཚན ས ནས བཤད ཚད ང ས ད ན མ འཛ ན པར ར གས པ མ དག ལ ཡ ད ན [7a.1] པ ཞ ག ད ཡ ན པའ ར because it is explained this way in Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas a and it is explained this way also in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra: b a See above, 81, the statement: Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. b Jam-yang-shay-pa s citation of the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra merely says, monastics and and so forth (dge slong dag gam). I have supplied the full quote using Jeffrey Hopkins translation from Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 71. For other Tibetan versions and a Sanskrit version from Shāntarakṣhita s tattvasaṃgraha see

100 98 Principles for Practice Like gold [that is acquired] upon being scorched, cut, and rubbed, My word is to be adopted by monastics and scholars Upon analyzing it well, Not out of respect [for me]. 17 and also in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, a ད ར ཡ ན པར ང ས ལས བཤད པ དང ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ཀ ང ད ར དག ང དག གམ ཞ ས ས གས དང ལང གཤ གས ལས ཀ ང ད ར བཤད པའ ར དང and also because in one mode of explanation in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra it is explained as well that not adhering to true [existence] in dependence on the conventions of persons, but mental reliance on the lack of true existence is the meaning of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. b Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 366, fn. a. This quote is not found in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra; it is likely a spurious attribution. a The reference is likely to: Sūtras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine which is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] also pleases children but is not discourse setting out the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should follow the meaning and not be enamored of the expression. Peking 775, vol. 29, , chapter 2. See Jñānashrībhadra s commentary, Peking 5519, vol. 107, For Suzuki s translation see Daisetz T. Suzuki, The Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge, 1932), 68. This passage is cited later in Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence in the section on the Consequence School in a subsection titled How the Consequentialists dispel [the notion that] their uncommon mode of commenting on the thought of the Superior Nāgārjuna contradicts sūtra and within this Dispelling contradiction with the Sūtra Unraveling The Thought. It is also cited in Jam-yang-shaypa s Great Exposition of Tenets in the chapter on the Consequence School; see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 815. b See above, 85: All of those terms for persons are taught by the Supramundane Victor for the sake of leading sentient beings by way of conventional words; those who adhere to them are said to be without reliance ; in order for them to enter into reliance,] the Supramundane Victor also said, Rely on the doctrine itself, but not for the sake of persons.

101 The Interpretable and the Definitive 99 ཡང ག ས མ ཟད པའ བཤད ལ གཅ ག ལ གང ཟག ག ཐ ད ལ བ ན ནས བད ན ཞ ན མ བར བད ན མ ད ལ ཡ ད ན པ ལ གང ཟག ལ མ ན པར ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡང བཤད པའ ར ར a. Do not rely on the words, but rely on the meaning There is a significance to be understood in not relying on the words, but relying on the meaning because it being the case that within words here there are: the two, treatises and Word [of Buddha], and the two, the literal and the non-literal and within meanings there are the two, interpretable meanings and definitive meaning there being no definiteness of non-deception with respect to the mode of subsistence and so forth in accordance with the explicit reading of those high sayings but making assertions in accordance with this and that object expressed a that is the meaning of the thought having pure proofs is the significance of not relying on words, but relying on meaning, གཉ ས པ ཚ ག ལ མ ན ལ ད ན ལ ན པའ ག ད ན ཡ ད ད འད འ ཚ ག ལ བ ན བཅ ས དང བཀའ གཉ ས དང ཇ བཞ ན པ ཡ ན མ ན གཉ ས ཡ ད ད ན ལ ང ད ན ང ས ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས ག ང རབ ད དག ག དང ས 18 ཟ ན ར གནས གས ས གས ལ མ བའ ང ས པ མ ད པར བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ད དང ད ལ བ ད མ དག ཡ ད པ ར ཁས a Even though this is the meaning behind what is literally expressed in the run of the words, it is nevertheless an object expressed with the qualification that it is the meaning behind what is literally expressed.

102 100 Principles for Practice ལ ན པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན པར ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because the Kālachakra Root Tantra says: For ultimate reality always the great ones Do not rely on words in local areas. If the meaning is known with local names, What use are the terms of treatises? ས འཁ ར ད ལས ད ན དམ ད ཉ ད ལ ལ ག ན ཆ ན པ མས ན ཚ ག ལ ན པ མ ན ལ ག མ ང མས ཀ ས ན ད ན ཤ ས ན བ ན བཅ ས མས ཀ ས ན ཅ ཞ ག ཞ ས དང and Mañjughoṣha Narendrakīrti s Brief Explication of the Assertions of Our Own View says: 19 The term karṇā of Karṇāṭa [or Karṇāṭaka] expresses stone and leg. For some, it expresses deaf. a Tantras teach similarly. རང ག བའ འད ད པ མད ར བ ན པ ལས ཀར ཌ ཡ ཀར འ ས དང ང པ 20 བ ད པར ལ ལར འ ན པ 21 རབ བ ད ད ད བཞ ན ད མས བ ན པའ ཞ ས དང and Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles says: 22 Through the force of different linguistic usages in diverse localities, there are usages of different names even for each meaning and various different meanings even for each name. Hence, given that the people of individual areas who use language for meaning are able to understand the meaning, what use are the delineations of Sanskrit terms renowned in treatises? That is to say, there is no purpose. ཊ ཀ ཆ ན ད ཉ ད ང བ ལས ལ ས ས འ བ མ འ བའ a That is, an alternate meaning of karṇā in the parlance of one locality is deaf.

103 The Interpretable and the Definitive 101 དབང ག ས ད ན ར ར ལའང [7b.1] མ ང འ བ དང མ ང ར ར ལའང ད ན མ འ བ ཚ གས པ ལ འ ག པ ཡ ད པས ད ན ད ལ བ ས པའ ས ས འ ལ ག མ མས ཀ ད ན ད ཤ ས པར ད ས པ ལ ང ས པར བ ན བཅ ས ལ ག གས པའ ལ གས ར ག དག ན ང ས བ ང ཅ ཞ ག དག ས པ མ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས དང and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 80 and 123, and Tenets, 156) says: 23 Since they listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting the words, therefore even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. ང ས ལས ད ད ན འད ད པའ ར ཆ ས ཉན ག ཚ ག འ འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན པས ན ཕལ པའ 24 ད ཀ ས 25 ཆ ས ན ན ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ 26 ད ན ལ ན པ 27 ན ག ས པར ས ཏ ཉན པར ད ད ཞ ས པ 28 དང and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (see Tenets, 154; also Ngag-wangpal-dan s Annotations, 155) says: 29 Concerning that, what are meanings? What are letters? [ Letters teach the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation through to the essence of enlightenments. Meaning is an all-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed in a single moment of mind.] In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. This is rely on meaning, but do not rely on letters. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ད ལ ད ན ན གང ཡ ག ན གང ཞ

104 102 Principles for Practice ན ཞ ས པ ནས [ཡ ག ཞ ས བ ན གང ཐ ག མར ས མས བ ད པ ནས བ ང ང བ ཀ ང པ ལ ག ག བར ག ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཡ ན ཏན ག ཚ གས བ ན པའ ད ན ཞ ས བ ན གང ས མས ཀ ད ཅ ག མ གཅ ག དང ན པའ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ས ཐམས ཅད མཁ ན པའ ཡ ཤ ས མང ན པར གས པར འཚང བ ]མད ར ན གང ཆ ས ཀ ང པ ང ག བ ད བཞ བ ན པ འད ན ཡ ག ཞ ས འ གང ས མས ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད དང ཡ ག དང ང བར ད པ དང བ ད མ ད པའ ད ན ད ན ད ན འད ན ད ན ལ ན ག ཡ ག ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Therefore, the earlier explanation is so because it being the case that even with respect to the doctrine spoken by the Teacher, there are the two: (1) words that are the means of expression (rjod byed kyi tshig) and (2) the meanings expressed (brjod bya'i don) that the literal reading of the high sayings that are means of expression lack, [when taken] literally, the certainty of non-deception about the mode of subsistence of things is the significance of not relying on words, and the establishment in fact of the objects expressed that are the meanings of [their] thought is the significance of relying on meaning. ད ས ན ར བཤད པ ད ར ཡ ན ཏ ན པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས ལ ཡང ད ད ཀ ཚ ག དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས ལས ད ད ཀ ག ང རབ མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ཇ བཞ ན པ ར དང ས པ འ གནས ལ ལ མ བའ ང ས པ མ ད པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དང བསམ ད ན ག བ ད མས དང ས གནས ལ བ པ ད ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows that [ it being the case that also with respect to the doctrine spoken by the Teacher, there are the two, (1) words that are the means of

105 The Interpretable and the Definitive 103 expression (rjod byed kyi tshig) and (2) the meanings expressed (brjod bya'i don) that the literal reading of the high sayings that are means of expression lack, [when taken] literally, the certainty of nondeception about the mode of subsistence of things is the significance of not relying on words, and the establishment in fact of the objects expressed that are the meanings of [Buddha s] thought is the significance of relying on meaning ] because it is necessary to understand the objects expressed that are the meanings of [Buddha s] thought through demonstrating the damage by valid cognition to the literality of the literal reading of sūtras whose literal reading is not literal because the Sūtra says, One should follow the meaning but not be attached to the expression. [ ན པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས ལ ཡང ད ད ཀ ཚ ག དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས ལས ད ད ཀ ག ང རབ མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ཇ བཞ ན པ ར དང ས པ འ གནས ལ ལ མ བའ ང ས པ མ ད པ ད ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དང བསམ ད ན ག བ ད མས དང ས གནས ལ བ པ ད ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ས ཟ ན ཇ བཞ ན པ མ [8a.1] ཡ ན པའ མད མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ཇ བཞ ན པ ལ ཚད མས གན ད པ བ ན པས བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ལ གས དག ས པའ ར ཏ མད ལས ད ན ག ས འ ང བར ཡ བ ད པ ལ ཆགས པར མ འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར b. Do not rely on interpretable meaning, but rely on definitive meaning There is a significance in not relying on interpretable meaning, but relying on definitive meaning because it being the case that within interpretable meaning and definitive meaning here, there are (1) the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of [the passages that are] the means of expression and (2) the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are expressed a that a See Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, 70 note a, for a discussion of the two levels of differentiating the interpretable and the definitive.

106 104 Principles for Practice conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras but emptiness is asserted as the mode of subsistence in accordance with explanations in the Teacher s sūtras is the significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of [the words that are] the means of expression and that conventionalities are untrue as the mode of subsistence in accordance with various appearances but that emptiness of truth in accordance with those appearances is asserted as the mode of subsistence is the significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed ག མ པ ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ད ད ད འ ང ད ན ང ས ད ན ལ ད ད ཀ དབང ས པའ ང ང ས གཉ ས དང བ ད འ དབང ས པའ ང ང ས གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས 30 ང ད ན ཀ ན བ ན པའ མད འ བཤད ལ ར གནས གས མ བད ན 31 ང ས ད ན ང ཉ ད ན པའ མད འ བཤད ཚ ད ར གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ན ད ད ཀ དབང ས པའ ད འ ད ན དང ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ ར གནས གས མ བད ན ང བ ད ར བད ན པས ང པ ད གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ན བ ད འ དབང ས པའ ད འ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra a says: 32 Which are sūtras of definitive meaning? Which are sūtras of interpretable meaning? [Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of entering the path are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of entering into the fruit are called definitive meaning. ] a See Hopkins, Emptiness in the Middle Way School, General Exposition, unpublished digital version, 19, and Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 257.

107 The Interpretable and the Definitive 105 Whichever sūtras teach establishing conventionalities are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach establishing ultimates are called definitive meaning. [Whichever sūtras teach engaging in actions and agents are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach engaging in actions and exhausting afflictions are called definitive meaning. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ན གང ང བའ ད ན ག མད ན གང ཞ ན [མད གང དག ལམ ལ འ ག པའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག འ ས ལ འ ག པའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ ]མད གང དག ཀ ན བ བ པར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ད ན དམ པ བ པར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ ཞ ས པ ནས [མད གང དག ལས དང བ ལ འ ག པར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ལས དང ཉ ན མ ངས པ ཟད པར བའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of setting out the thoroughly afflicted are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach for the sake of purifying the thoroughly pure are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach mental projections in cyclic existence are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach entry into the nonduality of cyclic existence and nirvana are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach (various objects by way of) various words and letters are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach the profound (emptiness) difficult to view and difficult to realize are called definitive meaning. མད གང དག ཀ ན ནས ཉ ན མ ངས པ བཤད པའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག མ པར ང བ ཡ ངས དག པར བའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག འཁ ར བ ལ ཡ ད

108 106 Principles for Practice ད ང བར བ བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག འཁ ར བ དང ངན ལས འདས པ གཉ ས མ ད པ ལ འ ག པར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ཚ ག དང ཡ ག ཚ གས བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ཟབ མ མཐ ང བར དཀའ 33 བ ཁ ང ད པར དཀའ བ བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ Whichever sūtras teach (various objects by way of) many words and letters and in order to please the minds of sentient beings are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach (the profound emptiness) with few words and letters and cause the minds of sentient beings to become definite mind are called definitive meaning. Whichever sūtras teach what are set out with various vocabulary (such as) self, sentient being, living being, the nourished, creature, person, mind-progeny, pride-child, agent, and feeler like (teaching) an owner when there is no owner are called interpretable meaning. Whichever sūtras teach the doors of liberation things emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, no composition, no production, no produced, no sentient being, no living being, no person, and no owner are called definitive meaning. ] This is called reliance on sūtras of definitive meaning and non-reliance on sūtras of interpretable meaning. a a As Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, vol. 2, 6.6) says about these eight: The interpretable and the definitive are posited by way of: 1. teaching for the sake of entering into the path and teaching for the sake of entering into the fruit 2. teaching so as to establish conventionalities and teaching so as to establish the ultimate 3. teaching for the sake of entering into actions and objects and teaching for the sake of entering into extinguishing actions and afflictive emotions 4. teaching for the sake of describing thorough afflictions and teaching for the sake of describing thoroughly purifying complete purification 5. teaching renunciation from cyclic existence and teaching entry into the nonduality of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa 6. teaching in the manner of various words and letters and teaching the profound 7. teaching with many words and letters pleasing sentient beings and teaching brief quintessential instructions for meditative stabilization with few words and letters 8. teaching according to the existence of self and teaching the emptiness of things and so forth.

109 The Interpretable and the Definitive 107 མད གང དག ཚ ག དང ཡ ག མང ཞ ང ས མས ཅན ག ས མས དགའ བར བའ ར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ཚ ག དང ཡ ག ང ལ ས མས ཅན ག ས མས ང ས པར ས མས པར ད པར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག བདག དང ས མས ཅན དང ག དང གས བ དང ས དང གང ཟག དང ཤ ད ལས ས དང ཤ ད དང ད པ པ དང ཚ ར བ པ དང མ པ ཚ གས བཤད པ དང བདག པ མ ད པ ལ བདག པ དང བཅས བར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ མད གང དག ང པ ཉ ད དང མཚན མ མ ད པ དང ན པ མ ད པ དང མང ན པར འ མ ད པ དང མ ས པ དང མ ང བ དང དང ས པ མ ད པ དང བདག མ ད པ དང ས མས ཅན མ ད པ དང ག མ ད པ དང གང ཟག མ ད པ དང བདག པ མ ད པ དང མ པར ཐར པའ འ བར བ ན པ ད དག ན ང ས པའ ད ན ཅ ས ] འད ན ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ག མད ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས དང and this very text [that is, Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence] also says: 34 When the interpretable and the definitive are posited in terms of the meaning of these [sūtras] needing or not needing to be interpreted otherwise, the high sayings themselves are held as illustrations of the interpretable and the definitive. However, when meanings [that is to say, objects] that need or do not need to be interpreted otherwise are posited as the interpretable and the definitive, conventionalities and ultimates are treated as the interpretable and the definitive. འད ཉ ད ལས ཀ ང འད འ ད ན གཞན ངས དག ས མ དག ས ཀ དབང ས ནས ང ང ས འཇ ག པ ན ག ང Tsong-kha-pa, citing only the second, sixth, and eighth of these eight pairs, explains that the first pair treats the two truths (conventional and ultimate) as interpretable meanings and definitive meanings. The sixth pair explains that the teaching of conventionalities is a teaching of various meanings through various different words and the teaching of the ultimate is a teaching of the single taste that is an elimination of proliferations, that is to say, emptiness.

110 108 Principles for Practice [8b.1]རབ ཉ ད ང ང ས ཀ མཚན གཞ ར ག ང ལ གཞན ངས དག ས མ དག ས ཀ ད ན ལ ང ང ས འཇ ག པ ན ཀ ན བ དང ད ན དམ ལ ང ང ས ཞ ས དང and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 81, and Tenets, 157) says: 35 They rely on the One-Gone-Thus s sūtras of definitive meaning, but not on [sūtras of] interpretable meaning, for if one relies on sūtras of definitive meaning, one will not be lured from this disciplinary doctrine because it is due to not ascertaining that the divisions of sūtras of interpretable meaning are for the sake of entry through various doors that doubt is generated. ང ས ལས ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའ ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ལ མ ཡ ན ཏ ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ན ཆ ས འ ལ བ འད ལས མ འ ག པར འ ར ཏ འད ར ང བའ ད ན ག མད ན ཚ གས ནས གས པའ ད ན ག མ པར ད བ མ ང ས པས ཐ ཚ མ ད པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར The significance of the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed exists because within the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed not asserting these interpretable meanings appearances as various conventionalities as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on interpretable meaning, and asserting the emptiness of true establishment in accordance with such appearances as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of relying on definitive meaning. བ ད འ དབང ས པའ ད འ ད ན ཡ ད ད བ ད འ ད ན ད ལ ང ང ས གཉ ས ལས ང ད ན ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ འད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད ང

111 The Interpretable and the Definitive 109 ད ན ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དང ད ར ང བ ར བད ན པར བ པས ང པ ད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows [that within the two, the interpretable and the definitive on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed not asserting these interpretable meanings, appearances as various conventionalities, as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on interpretable meaning, and asserting the emptiness of true establishment in accordance with such appearances as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of relying on definitive meaning ] because not only that, it is also reasonable to posit those two respectively as meaning do not rely on the conventional, but rely on the ultimate. It follows that [not only that, it is also reasonable to posit those two respectively as meaning do not rely on the conventional, but rely on the ultimate ] because conventional subjects that exist variously are without the divisions of color, shape, and so forth in this way in the mode of subsistence but are the same taste as the non-affirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation, [བ ད འ ད ན ད ལ ང ང ས གཉ ས ལས ང ད ན ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ འད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད ང ད ན ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དང ད ར ང བ ར བད ན པར བ པས ང པ ད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ཡ ན པར མ ཟད ད གཉ ས ར མ པ བཞ ན ཀ ན བ ལ མ ན ད ན དམ ལ ན པའ ད ན འང འཇ ག ར གས པའ ར [ད ཡ ན པར མ ཟད ད གཉ ས ར མ པ བཞ ན ཀ ན བ ལ མ ན ད ན དམ ལ ན པའ ད ན འང འཇ ག ར གས པ ]ད ར ཐལ ཆ ས ཅན ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ཡ ད པ འད ར གནས གས ལའང ཁ ད ག ད བས ས གས ཀ ད བ མ ད པར དགག འ བདག བཅད ཙམ ག མ ད དགག ར གཅ ག པའ ར ཏ

112 110 Principles for Practice because Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness (for a longer citation see Interpretable and Definitive, 115) says: 36 [Not asserting these appearances] of the varieties of conventionalities [as the mode of subsistence but asserting the ultimate the emptiness of true establishment in the manner of such appearance as the mode of subsistence] is the significance of [ not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on [definitive meaning and not relying on conventionalities but] relying on ultimates[.] ང ན ལས འད ར ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ཞ ས པ ནས [ ང བ འད གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན ག ང བ འད ར བད ན པས ང བའ ད ན དམ གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ན ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པ དང ཀ ན བ ལ མ ན ]ད ན དམ ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ལ ཞ ས པའ [9a.1] བར དང and Maitreya s Treatise on the Sublime Continuum says: 37 The teaching of the mode of the subtle profundity [of emptiness] Is like the single [sweet and delicious] taste of honeys. The teaching of the mode of the various aspects of [method] Is to be known as like [the various] kernels [of grains dwelling] in the covering of various [husks]. ད མ ལས མ ཟབ མ འ ལ བ ན པ ང ར གཅ ག པ བཞ ན ན མ པ ཚ གས ལ བ ན ན ཚ གས བས ང བཞ ན ཞ ས ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར c. Do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom There is a significance in not relying on consciousness, but relying on pristine wisdom because it being the case that with regard to consciousness here there are two, awarenesses that do and do not realize emptiness, and although pristine wisdom is mainly pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness, wisdom awarenesses arisen from meditation on emptiness are also posited as pristine wisdom not asserting the

113 The Interpretable and the Definitive 111 mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of [emptiness to] those consciousnesses [realizing emptiness and] also not asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of apprehension of those that have not realized emptiness is the significance of not relying on consciousness and asserting the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by those pristine wisdoms and mainly by pristine wisdom directly realizing emptiness is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom, a བཞ པ 38 མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ད ད འད འ མ ཤ ས ལ ང ཉ ད གས མ གས ཀ གཉ ས ཡ ད ཅ ང ཡ ཤ ས ན གཙ བ ར ང ཉ ད མང ན མ གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཡ ན ཀ ང ང ཉ ད ལ མ ང ག ཤ ས རབ མས ཀ ང ད ར འཇ ག ཅ ང མ ཤ ས ད དག ག ང ལ ར ང པ ཉ ད མ གས པ མས ཀ བ ང ལ ར ཡང གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན པའ ད ན དང ཡ ཤ ས ད དག དང གཙ བ ར ང ཉ ད མང ན མ གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཀ ས གཟ གས པ ར གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 82) says: 39 Furthermore, Bodhisattvas view the pristine wisdom of realization as the essence, not just consciousness of doctrines and meanings through hearing and thinking. ང ས ལས ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལ ང པ ར བ ཡ ན ག ཐ ས པ དང བསམ པས ཆ ས དང ད ན a Here Jam-yang-shay-pa breaks the previous pattern of giving a single significance for the aphorism and, instead of that, gives a significance for each of the two parts, and then below does the same with different significances.

114 112 Principles for Practice མ པར ཤ ས པ ཙམ ལ ན མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས གས དང and Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles says: In general, on the occasion of the fourth reliance the consciousness in the likes of do not rely on consciousness, but rely on pristine wisdom, is wisdoms of hearing and thinking analyzing suchness and is in terms of a common being, but pristine wisdom is a wisdom arisen from analytical meditation on suchness and moreover is mainly a Superior s pristine wisdom of direct realization. ཊ ཀ ཆ ན ད ཉ ད ང བ ལས ར ན པ བཞ པའ བས མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པ འ མ ཤ ས ན ད ཁ ན ཉ ད འ ད པའ ཐ ས བསམ ག ཤ ས རབ དང ད ཡང གཙ ཆ ར ས འ དབང ས ལ ཡ ཤ ས ན ད ཁ ན ཉ ད འ ད པའ མ ང ག ཤ ས རབ དང ད ཡང གཙ ཆ ར [9b.1]མང ན མ གས པའ འཕགས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཡ ན ཞ ང ཞ ས དང and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: 40 What is consciousness? What is pristine wisdom? Consciousness is the four stations of consciousness. [What are the four? Regarding consciousness, whatever approaches and abides in forms, approaches and abides in feelings, approaches and abides in consciousness, approaches and abides in compositional factors is called consciousness. Regarding that, what is pristine wisdom? Thorough knowledge of the aggregate of consciousness abiding in whichever of the four aggregates is called pristine wisdom. Moreover, regarding consciousness, consciousness of the earth constituent, consciousness of the water constituent, consciousness of the fire constituent, consciousness of the wind constituent is called consciousness. Regarding consciousnesses abiding in any of these four constituents, knowledge of the noumenon as undifferentiable is pristine wisdom.]

115 The Interpretable and the Definitive 113 Moreover, consciousness is cognition of forms which are known by the eye, cognition of sounds which are known by the ear, cognition of odors which are known by the nose, cognition of tastes which are known by the tongue, cognition of objects of touch which are known by the body, and cognition of phenomena which are known by the mind. These are called consciousness. This which is pacified internally and does not move to the external and through relying on pristine wisdom does not conceive and conceptualize any phenomenon is called pristine wisdom. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ད ལ མ པར ཤ ས པ ན གང ཡ ཤ ས ན གང ཞ ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཞ ས བ ན མ པར ཤ ས པ གནས པ བཞ ཞ ས པ ནས [བཞ གང ཞ ན འད མ པར ཤ ས པ ན ག གས ལ ཉ བར འག བ དང ཚ ར བ ལ ཉ བར འག བ དང འ ཤ ས ལ ཉ བར འག བ དང འ ད ལ ཉ བར འག ཞ ང གནས པ འད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཞ ས འ ད ལ ཡ ཤ ས གང ཞ ན གང ང པ བཞ ལ གནས པའ མ པར ཤ ས པའ ང པ ཡ ངས ཤ ས པ འད ན ཡ ཤ ས ཞ ས འ གཞན ཡང མ པར ཤ ས པ ན སའ ཁམས མ པར ཤ ས པ དང འ ཁམས དང མ འ ཁམས དང ང ག ཁམས མ པར ཤ ས པ འད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཞ ས འ གང ཁམས མ པ བཞ པ འད དག ལ གནས པའ མ པར ཤ ས པ ལ ཆ ས ཀ ད ངས ད ར མ ད པར ཤ ས པ འད ན ཡ ཤ ས ཞ ས འ ] གཞན ཡང མ པར ཤ ས པ ན གང མ ག ག ས ཤ ས པར བའ ག གས ལ མ པར ར ག པ 41 དང ད བཞ ན བས ཤ ས པར བའ མས དང ས ཤ ས པར བའ མས དང ས ཤ ས པར བའ ར མས དང ས ཀ ས ཤ ས པར བའ ར ག མས དང 42 ཡ ད ཀ ས ཤ ས པར བའ ཆ ས ལ མ པར ར ག པ འད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཞ ས འ གང ཡང ནང ཉ བར ཞ ཞ ང ར ལ བ མ ད པ དང ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པས ཆ ས གང ཡང མ ག ཅ ང མ པར མ ག པ འད ན ཡ ཤ ས ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས

116 114 Principles for Practice པའ ར It is moreover so because it being the case that within definitive meaning in one part of the explanation of not relying on interpretable meaning, but relying on definitive meaning there are the two, consciousness and pristine wisdom not asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of a worldly consciousness that realizes emptiness by way of a meaning-generality is the significance of not relying on consciousness, and asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom. ད ར ཡང ཡ ན ཏ ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པའ བཤད ལ ག ཆ གཅ ག ལ ང ས ད ན ལ མ ཤ ས ཡ ཤ ས གཉ ས ལས ང ཉ ད ད ན འ ལ ག ས གས པའ འཇ ག ན པའ ཤ ས པའ ང ལ ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན པའ ད ན དང འཕགས པའ མ ག ཡ ཤ ས ཀ གཟ གས ལ ར གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows [that it being the case that within definitive meaning in one part of the explanation of not relying on interpretable meaning, but relying on definitive meaning there are the two, consciousness and pristine wisdom not asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of a worldly consciousness that realizes emptiness by way of a meaning-generality is the significance of not relying on consciousness, and asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom is the significance of relying on pristine wisdom ] because although the proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of a worldly inferential consciousness realizing emptiness, they are not eliminated in the perspective of the appearance factor, whereby [emptiness] is not asserted as the mode of subsistence in accordance with the mode of appearance of that [worldly inferential consciousness

117 The Interpretable and the Definitive 115 realizing emptiness], and all proliferations of dualistic appearance are eliminated not only in the perspective of the ascertainment factor of a Superior's pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing the final mode of subsistence, but also in the perspective of the appearance factor, [ ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པའ བཤད ལ ག ཆ གཅ ག ལ ང ས ད ན ལ མ ཤ ས ཡ ཤ ས གཉ ས ལས ང ཉ ད ད ན འ ལ ག ས གས པའ འཇ ག ན པའ ཤ ས པའ ང ལ ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན པའ ད ན དང འཕགས པའ མ ག ཡ ཤ ས ཀ གཟ གས ལ ར གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ང ཉ ད གས པའ འཇ ག ན པའ ས དཔག ག ང ས ང ར གཉ ས ང ག ས པ བཅད ཀ ང ང ང ར མ བཅད [10a.1] པས ད འ ང ལ ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན ཞ ང གནས གས མཐར ག མང ན མ གས པའ འཕགས པའ མཉམ བཞག ཡ ཤ ས ཀ ང ས ང ར མ ཟད ང ང ར ཡང གཉ ས ང ག ས པ མཐའ དག བཅད པའ ར ཏ because Khay-drub s Compilation on Emptiness says: 43 In our system, even the presentation of the four reliances has fundamental importance as follows. We propound that: not asserting these appearances of the varieties of conventionalities as the mode of subsistence but asserting the ultimate the emptiness of true establishment in the manner of such appearance as the mode of subsistence is the significance of not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on definitive meaning and not relying on conventionalities but relying on ultimates; asserting that this mode of appearance to the consciousnesses of common beings is not the mode of subsistence but that very mode of perception by a Superior s non-conceptual pristine wisdom is the mode of

118 116 Principles for Practice subsistence is the significance of not relying on consciousness but relying on pristine wisdom. ང ན ལས ཁ བ ཅག ག གས ལ ན ན པ བཞ འ མ པར བཞག པ ཡང ཆ ས གནས པ ཉ ད འ ར ཏ འད ར ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ འད གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན ག ང བ འད ར བད ན པས ང བའ ད ན དམ གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ན ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པ དང ཀ ན བ ལ མ ན ད ན དམ ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ལ ས ས བ འ ཤ ས པའ ང ལ འད གནས གས མ ཡ ན ག འཕགས པའ མ ག ཡ ཤ ས ཀ གཟ གས ལ ད ཉ ད གནས གས ཁས ལ ན པ ན མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ད ན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བར ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར 3. Dispelling objections [to the presentation of our own system] ག མ པ ད པ ང བ ལ 3. Someone says: 44 It follows that it is reasonable to posit doctrine in rely on doctrine as verbal doctrine because the significance to be understood in the first reliance a is logically feasible. a The reference may be to the earlier statement (see above, 86) where the scriptural collections spoken by the Victor is identified as the doctrine in the first reliance and thus is limited to verbal doctrine: That trainees in terms of their own mode of thought are untrue, not asserted, and deceptive as methods of attaining liberation, and that whatsoever scriptural collections spoken by the Victor are true, asserted, and nondeceptive as methods of attaining liberation are the significances respectively of not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine. However, as Jam-yang-shay-pa indicates, this is the doctrine in the first reliance in the context of not relying on persons in terms of ordinary persons, but relying on doctrine,

119 The Interpretable and the Definitive 117 ཁ ན ར ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ང ག ཆ ས ལ འཇ ག ར གས པར ཐལ ན པ དང པ འ ག ད ན འཐད པའ ར ན Our response: [That the significance to be understood in the first reliance is logically feasible] does not entail [that it is reasonable to posit doctrine in rely on doctrine as verbal doctrine]. [ ན པ དང པ འ ག ད ན འཐད ན ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ང ག ཆ ས ལ འཇ ག ར གས པས ]མ ཁ བ You cannot accept [that it is reasonable to posit doctrine in rely on doctrine as verbal doctrine] because upon having taken that [doctrine in rely on doctrine ] as doctrines spoken by the Teacher, among them there are two: (1) the means of expression, verbal doctrines, and (2) the meanings expressed. [ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ང ག ཆ ས ལ འཇ ག ར གས པར ]འད ད མ ས ཏ [ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ]ད ན པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས ལ ས ནས ད ལ ད ད ང ག ཆ ས དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པའ ར It follows that [upon having taken doctrine in rely on doctrine as doctrines spoken by the Teacher, among them there are two: (1) the means of expression, verbal doctrines, and (2) the meanings expressed] because it being the case that there are such [that is, that there are two: (1) the means of expression, verbal doctrines, and (2) the meanings expressed] not asserting in accordance with the literal reading of the verbal doctrine but understanding the object expressed that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought is the significance of the second reliance [not relying on words, but relying on meaning]. [ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ན པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས ལ ས ནས ད ལ ད whereas just before this description he speaks about the general significance to be understood in not relying on persons, but relying on doctrine in which he specifies that within doctrine there are the two, words and meanings, and thus in the general context doctrine cannot be limited to verbal doctrine since it also includes meanings, that is, the objects expressed by those words.

120 118 Principles for Practice ད ང ག ཆ ས དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ [ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ལ ད ད ང ག ཆ ས དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས ]ད ར ཡ ད པ ལས ང ག ཆ ས མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ར ཁས མ ལ ན པར བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ལ འ ག པ ད ན པ གཉ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows [that it being the case that there are such (that is, that there are two: (1) the means of expression, verbal doctrines, and (2) the meanings expressed among the doctrines spoken by the Teacher in rely on doctrine ) not asserting in accordance with the literal reading of the verbal doctrine but understanding the object expressed that is the meaning of (Buddha s) thought is the significance of the second reliance (not relying on words, but relying on meaning)] because it being the case that even with respect to the object expressed that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought there are two meanings, interpretable conventionalites and the definitive meaning of the mode of subsistence not asserting appearances of various conventionalities in this way as the mode of subsistence but asserting the nonaffirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation of all the various substrata as the final mode of subsistence is the significance of the third reliance [not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on definitive meaning]. [(ཆ ས ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས ད ན པས ག ངས པའ ཆ ས ལ ས ནས ད ལ ད ད ང ག ཆ ས དང བ ད འ ད ན གཉ ས )ད ར ཡ ད པ ལས ང ག ཆ ས མས ཀ ས ཟ ན ར ཁས མ ལ ན པར བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ལ འ ག པ ད ན པ གཉ ས [10b.1] པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ད ལ ཡང ང ད ན ཀ ན བ དང ང ས ད ན གནས གས ཀ ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ འད ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པར ཆ ས ཅན ཚ གས པ ཐམས ཅད ཀ དགག འ བདག བཅད ཙམ ག མ ད དགག གནས

121 The Interpretable and the Definitive 119 གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ན པ ག མ པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར It follows that [ it being the case that even with respect to the object expressed that is the meaning of (Buddha s) thought there are two meanings interpretable conventionalites and the definitive meaning of the mode of subsistence not asserting appearances of various conventionalities in this way as the mode of subsistence but asserting the nonaffirming negative that is the mere elimination of the self that is the object of negation of all the various substrata as the final mode of subsistence is the meaning of the third reliance (not relying on interpretable meaning but relying on definitive meaning)] because positing as the final definitive meaning moreover must be a positing by a single awareness and: not only not asserting as the mode of subsistence in accordance with its appearance to a consciousness of a common being who has not realized emptiness but also not asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with its appearance to an inferential rational consciousness realizing emptiness but asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with appearance to a Superior s pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness, is the significance of the fourth reliance [ not relying on consciousness, but relying on pristine wisdom ], [བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ད ལ ཡང ང ད ན ཀ ན བ དང ང ས ད ན གནས གས ཀ ད ན གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ལས ཀ ན བ ཚ གས ང བ འད ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པར ཆ ས ཅན ཚ གས པ ཐམས ཅད ཀ དགག འ བདག བཅད ཙམ ག མ ད དགག གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ན པ ག མ པའ ད ན ཡ ན པ ]ད ར ཐལ ང ས ད ན མཐར ག འཇ ག པ ད ཡང གཅ ག ག ས བཞག དག ས ལ ང ཉ ད མ གས པའ ས འ མ ཤ ས ལ ང བ ར གནས གས ཁས མ ལ ན པར མ ཟད ང ཉ ད གས པའ ར གས ཤ ས ས དཔག ལ ང བ ར

122 120 Principles for Practice འང གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས མ ལ ན པར ང ཉ ད མང ན མ གས པའ འཕགས པའ མཉམ བཞག ཡ ཤ ས ལ ང བ ར གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན པ ད ན པ བཞ པའ ད ན ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ because Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence says: a Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, b for instance, says that: with respect to the doctrine in rely on the doctrine but do not rely on the person there are two, words and meanings with respect to meanings there are two, the interpretable and the definitive and with respect to definitive meanings one should not rely on consciousness but should rely on pristine wisdom. ད ད འད ཉ ད ལས ས ཡ དང ས གཞ ལས གང ཟག ལ མ ན པར ཆ ས ལ ན པའ ཆ ས ལ ཚ ག ད ན གཉ ས དང ད ན ལ ང ང ས གཉ ས དང ང ས ད ན ལ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ a Hopkins, Emptiness in the Middle School General Exposition, unpublished digital manuscript, 25 b sa i dngos gzhi, bhūmivastu; sde dge 4035, sems tsam, tshi, 130b.1; Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds is also known as Grounds of Yogic Practice (yogācārabhūmi). Tsong-khapa gives a paraphrase, not a quotation. Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho (Port of Entry, vol. 2, ) cites this lengthy passage from the Ground of Equipoise (mnyam par bzhag pa i sa) in Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds that is Tsong-kha-pa s source: Rely only on doctrine, not on persons because explanations by country-folk are not to be adhered to. The doctrine also is twofold, words and meanings. Concerning those, rely on the meaning, not on the words: do not be devoted to hearing; rather, think about the meaning, comprehend it, analyze it. About this, in sūtras the Supramundane Victor set forth definitive meanings and also set forth interpretable meanings, but one who considers the meaning should rely on sūtras of definitive meaning and not on interpretable meaning. About this, the Supramundane Victor set forth meritorious consciousness and immovable consciousness for the sake of proceeding to happy transmigrations, and set forth consciousness of the four noble truths for the sake of passing beyond sorrow, concerning which one who practices doctrine concordant with the doctrine should rely on pristine wisdom and not on consciousness.

123 The Interpretable and the Definitive 121 ཤ ས ལ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པ འ ཞ ས པ དང and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 83) says: 45 From these four reliances, in brief, four validities themselves are indicated: (1) the meanings of the teachings, (2) reasonings, (3) teachers, and (4) pristine wisdoms of realization arisen from meditation. ང ས ལས ན པ བཞ པ ད དག ལས ན མད ར བ ས ན ཚད མ ཉ ད བཞ བ ན ཏ བ ན པའ ད ན དང ར གས པ དང ན 46 པ དང མ པ ལས ང བའ གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ས ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར [11a.1] 4. Someone says: 47 It follows that words in the phrase do not rely on the words are not posited as the words of the Teacher because meaning in the phrase rely on the meaning is not the mode of subsistence, emptiness. ]ཡང ཁ ན ར ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག ད ན པའ བཀར མ འཇ ག པར ཐལ ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ད ན ད གནས གས ང པ ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པའ ར The reason [which is that meaning in the phrase rely on meaning is not the mode of subsistence, emptiness] is established because among those [meanings in the phrase rely on meaning ] there are those as numerous as the phenomena of the two truths [that is, all phenomena] because a meaning of the second reliance [not relying on words, but relying on meaning] exists because this very text [Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence] says [when paraphrasing Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds, as cited above in debate 3]: with respect to the doctrine [in rely on the doctrine but do not rely on the person ] there are two, words and meanings with respect to meanings there are two, the interpretable and the definitive.

124 122 Principles for Practice [ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ད ན ད གནས གས ང པ ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པ ] གས བ [ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ད ན ]ད ལ བད ན པ གཉ ས ཀའ ཆ ས ཇ ད ཅ ག ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ ན པ གཉ ས པའ ད ན ཡ ད པའ ར འད ཉ ད ལས ཆ ས ལ ཚ ག ད ན གཉ ས དང ད ན ལ ང ང ས གཉ ས དང ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར You cannot accept [that words in the phrase do not rely on the words are not posited as the Words of the Teacher] because whatever is [ word in do not rely on the words ] is necessarily the Word [of Buddha]. It follows that [whatever is word in do not rely on the words is necessarily the Word of Buddha] because whatever is [ word in do not rely on the words ] must be a Word [of Buddha] that, within nonassertion of it in accordance with the literal reading, requires understanding the object of expression that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought because a meaning of do not rely on the words exists. [ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག ད ན པའ བཀར མ འཇ ག པར ]འད ད མ ས ཏ [ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག ]ད ཡ ན ན བཀའ ཡ ན དག ས པའ ར [ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག ད ཡ ན ན བཀའ ཡ ན དག ས པ ]ད ར ཐལ [ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག ]ད ཡ ན ན ས ཟ ན ར ཁས མ ལ ན པར བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ལ འ ག དག ས པའ བཀའ ཡ ན དག ས པའ ར ཏ ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད པའ ར ཟ ར ན Our response: [That a meaning of do not rely on words exists] does not entail [that whatever is word in do not rely on the words must be a Word (of Buddha) that, within nonassertion of it in accordance with the literal reading, requires understanding the object of expression that is the meaning of [Buddha s] thought]: 1. because although it is like that when done in terms of the interpretable meanings of the Word of the Teacher, in general among words in

125 The Interpretable and the Definitive 123 do not rely on words, but rely on meaning there are also the words of other beings [ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད ན (ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག )ད ཡ ན ན ས ཟ ན ར ཁས མ ལ ན པར བསམ ད ན ག བ ད ལ འ ག དག ས པའ བཀའ ཡ ན དག ས པས ]མ ཁ བ ང ད ན ག ན པའ བཀའ དབང ས ན ད ར ཡ ན ཀ ང ར ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ཚ ག ལ བ གཞན ག ཚ ག ཀ ང ཡ ད པའ ར དང 2. and because if the meaning is profound, it is respected even though it is explained with ordinary words, due to which Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas calls this even a not relying on words, but relying on meaning ད ན ཟབ ན ཚ ག ཕལ བས བཤད ཀ ང ག ས པར ད པས ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པ ཞ ག ཀ ང ང ས ལས བཤད པའ ར དང 3. and because since even though words are literal, they are not logically feasible as the mode of subsistence as such, asserting the mode of subsistence that is the meaning of their thought upon having sought it is described in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra even with the convention of not relying on words or letters but relying on meaning, བཀའ ད ཇ བཞ ན པ ཡ ན ཀ ང ད ར གནས གས མ འཐད པས ད འ དག ངས ད ན ག གནས གས བཙལ ནས ཁས ལ ན པ ཡང ཚ ག གམ ཡ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ཐ ད ཅ ག ཀ ང ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས བཤད པའ ར ཏ because to cite these in order: Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 80 and 101 and Tenets, 156) says: 48

126 124 Principles for Practice Concerning this, Bodhisattvas listen to doctrines from others because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting well-crafted words. Since they listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning, but not because of wanting the words, therefore even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. ར མ པ བཞ ན ངས པ ལ ང ས ལས འད ལ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ད ན འད ད པའ ར གཞན ལས [11b.1] ཆ ས ཉན པར ད ཀ ཚ ག འ ལ གས པར ར བ འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན ཏ ད ད ན འད ད པའ ར ཉན ཆ ས ག ཚ ག འ འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན པས ན ཕལ བའ ད ཀ ས ཆ ས ན ན ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ ད ན ལ ན པ ན ག ས པར ས ཏ ཉན པར ད ད ཞ ས དང and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: 49 Letters teach the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation a through to the essence of enlightenments. Meaning is an all-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed with a single moment of mind. In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. This is rely on meaning, but do not rely on letters. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ཡ ག ཞ ས བ ན གང ཐ ག མ ས མས བ ད པ ནས བ ང ང བ ཀ ང པ ལ འ ག ག བར ག ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཡ ན ཏན ག ཚ གས བ ན a Generating the altruistic intention to become enlightened.

127 The Interpretable and the Definitive 125 པའ ད ན ཞ ས བ ན གང ས མས ཀ ད ཅ ག མ གཅ ག དང ན པའ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ས ཐམས ཅད མཁ ན པའ ཡ ཤ ས མང ན པར གས པར འཚང བ མད ར ན གང ཆ ས ཀ ང པ ང ག བ ད བཞ བ ན པ འད ན ཡ ག ཞ ས འ གང ས མས ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད དང ཡ ག དང ང བར ད པ དང བ ད མ ད པའ ད ན ད ན ད ན ཏ འད ན ད ན ལ ན ག ཡ ག ལ མ ན པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར [that these say such] entails [the three points] because: 1. that Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: 50 They listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning, but not because of wanting the words. Therefore, even if doctrine is taught with common language, and so forth, and that the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: ranging from initial mind-generation (see Tenets, 146) and so forth explain that words of common beings exist among words in do not rely on words. 2. that Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: 51 They listen to the doctrine because of wanting the meaning, but not because of wanting the words. Therefore, even if doctrine is taught with common language, Bodhisattvas who rely on the meaning listen to it respectfully. describes a not relying on words, but relying on meanings in which if the meaning is profound, it is respected even though it is taught in common language; 3. that the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: 52

128 126 Principles for Practice In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. This is rely on meaning, but do not rely on letters. describes those piles of doctrine as the words and letters which are part of the phrase do not rely on words or letters, and thereupon with of all sentient beings and so forth describes a mode of not relying on words or letters within taking as the element of attributes the meaning that is inexpressible to others by expressive terms in accordance with how it is directly experienced, ཁ བ ང ས ལས ད ད ན འད ད པའ ར ཆ ས ཉན ག ཚ ག འ འད ད པའ ར མ ཡ ན པས ན ཕལ བའ ད ཀ ས ཞ ས ས གས དང ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས གང ཐ ག མ ས མས བ ད པ ནས བ ང ཞ ས ས གས ཀ ས ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ལ ས འ ཚ ག ཡ ད པར བཤད ང ས ལས ད ད ན འད ད པའ ཞ ས ས གས ཀ ས ད ན ཟབ ན ཕལ པའ ད དང ཕལ བས ན ཀ ང ག ས པར ད པའ ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པ ཞ ག བཤད ག ས [12a.1] མ ཟད པའ མད ལས མད ར ན གང ཆ ས ཀ ང པ ང ག བ ད བཞ ཞ ས ས གས ཀ ས ཆ ས ང ད མས ཚ ག གམ ཡ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ཚ ག ར ག ཚ ག གམ ཡ ག ར བཤད ནས མད ལས གང ས མས ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཀ ཞ ས ས གས ཀ ས ད ད ཀ ས མང ན མ ང བ ཇ བ བཞ ན གཞན ལ བ ད མ ད པའ ད ན ཆ ས ད ངས ལ ད ན ས ནས ཚ ག གམ ཡ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ལ ཞ ག བཤད པའ ར ཏ

129 The Interpretable and the Definitive 127 because modes of explaining the meaning of those exist and because there are Bodhisattvas who set forth [some of] the 84,000 piles of doctrine [and thus some of these words are words in do not rely on words and are not the Words of a Buddha]. a ད དག ག ད ན བཤད ལ ཡ ད པའ ར དང ཆ ས ང བ ད ཁ བཞ ང ག ང མཁན ག ང ས མས ཡ ད པའ ར ར 5. Someone says: 53 It follows that it is not reasonable to assert that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is the final mode of subsistence b because of this with respect to rely on meaning [that is to say, because it is not reasonable to assert that the meaning in rely on meaning is the final mode of subsistence]. You cannot accept [that it is not reasonable to assert that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is the final mode of subsistence] because that [ definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning ] is taken to be emptiness. It follows [that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is taken to be emptiness] because ultimate in rely on the ultimate is taken to be emptiness. ཡང ཁ ཅ ག ན ར ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན ད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པར ཐལ ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པ ལ [གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པ ]ད འ ར [ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན ད གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པ ]འད ད མ ས ཏ [ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན ]ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད པའ ར [ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད ན དམ ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དམ ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད པའ ར ན a Lo-sang-gyal-tshan [005-8:50]. b It is only on the level of the meanings that are the objects expressed that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is the final mode of subsistence (see above, 108); for, in terms of the means of expression the high sayings themselves are taken as illustrations of the definitive; hence, a general statement that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is emptiness, or the final mode of subsistence, is unsuitable.

130 128 Principles for Practice Our response: [That ultimate in rely on the ultimate is taken to be emptiness] does not entail [that the definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning is taken to be emptiness]. The reason [which is that ultimate in rely on the ultimate is taken to be emptiness] is established because meanings of those two [that is, ultimate in rely on the ultimate and definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning ] a exist. [ད ན དམ ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དམ ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད པས ]མ ཁ བ [ད ན དམ ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན དམ ད ང ཉ ད ལ ད པ ] གས བ [ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ང ས ད ན དང ང ཉ ད ]ད གཉ ས ཀ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད པའ ར 6. Someone says: 54 It follows that whatever is a consciousness in do not rely on consciousness necessarily has not realized emptiness because with respect to whatever is that [consciousness in do not rely on consciousness ] it is necessarily not reasonable to assert the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by it because a meaning of do not rely on consciousness exists. ད ལ ཁ ཅ ག མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས ད ཡ ན ན ང ཉ ད མ གས པས ཁ བ པར ཐལ [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས ]ད ཡ ན ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས གཟ གས པ ར གནས གས ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པས ཁ བ པའ ར ཏ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད པའ ར ན Our response: [That a meaning of do not rely on consciousness exists] does not entail [that with respect to whatever is a consciousness in do not rely on consciousness, it is necessarily not reasonable to assert the mode of subsistence in accordance with perception by it] because not asserting as the final mode of subsistence in accordance with the appearance to an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness is the meaning [of do not rely on consciousness ] because if it were otherwise, there would be a Or perhaps: ultimate in rely on the ultimate and definitive meaning in rely on definitive meaning.

131 The Interpretable and the Definitive 129 no proliferations of dualistic appearance in the perspective of the perception by an inference realizing emptiness. [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ཞ ག ཡ ད ན ( མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས )ད ཡ ན ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས གཟ གས པ ར གནས གས ཁས ལ ན མ ར གས པས ཁ བ པས ]མ ཁ བ ང ཉ ད གས པའ ས དཔག ལ ང བ ར གནས གས མཐར ག ཁས མ ལ ན པ ད [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པ ]ད འ ད ན ཡ ན པའ [12b.1] ར ཏ གཞན ན ང ཉ ད གས པའ ས དཔག ག གཟ གས ང ར གཉ ས ང ག ས པ མ ད པའ ར You cannot accept the root [statement that whatever is a consciousness in do not rely on consciousness necessarily has not realized emptiness] because among them there are inferences realizing emptiness because an inference realizing emptiness through the mode of a meaning-generality exists because Khay-drub s Great Commentary Illuminating the Principles says: Consciousness is a wisdom of hearing and thinking differentiating suchness. [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས ད ཡ ན ན ང ཉ ད མ གས པས ཁ བ པ ] བར འད ད མ ས ཏ [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས ]ད ལ ང ཉ ད གས པའ ས དཔག ཅ ག ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ [ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ཤ ས ]ད ལ ང ཉ ད ད ན འ ལ ག ས གས པའ ས དཔག གཅ ག ཡ ད པའ ར ཊ ཀ ཆ ན ད ཉ ད ང བ ལས མ ཤ ས ན ད ཁ ན ཉ ད འ ད པའ ཐ ས བསམ ག ཤ ས རབ དང ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར 7. Someone says: 55 It follows that, between scripture and reasoning, scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive because for common beings the mode of

132 130 Principles for Practice subsistence of phenomena is hidden. ཁ ན ར ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ལ ང ར གས གཉ ས ཀ ནང ནས ང གཙ ཆ བར ཐལ ཆ ས མས ཀ གནས གས ས ས བ ལ ག ར བའ ར ན Our response: [That for common beings the mode of subsistence of phenomena is hidden] does not entail [that between scripture and reasoning scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive]. You cannot accept [that, between scripture and reasoning, scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive] because if in the high sayings [a sūtra] is said to be of interpretable meaning, it does not need to be of interpretable meaning, and if [a sūtra] is said to be of definitive meaning, it does not need to be of definitive meaning. [ཆ ས མས ཀ གནས གས ས ས བ ལ ག ར ན ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ལ ང ར གས གཉ ས ཀ ནང ནས ང གཙ ཆ བས ]མ ཁ བ [ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ལ ང ར གས གཉ ས ཀ ནང ནས ང གཙ ཆ བ ]འད ད མ ས ཏ ག ང རབ ལས ང ད ན ག ངས ན ང ད ན ཡ ན མ དག ས ང ས ད ན ག ངས ན ང ས ད ན ཡ ན མ དག ས པའ ར ཏ If [you say] the reason [which is that if in the high sayings a sūtra is said to be of interpretable meaning, it does not need to be of interpretable meaning, and if a sūtra is said to be of definitive meaning, it does not need to be of definitive meaning] is not established, it [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the three the extensive, middle-length, and brief [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras ]are sūtras of interpretable meaning because of being described that way [as of interpretable meaning] in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought. You have asserted the entailment [that being described as sūtras of interpretable meaning in the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought entails being sūtras of interpretable meaning]. You cannot accept [that the three the extensive, middle-length, and brief [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are sūtras of interpretable meaning] because of being sūtras of definitive meaning, because of being described that way [as of definitive

133 The Interpretable and the Definitive 131 meaning] in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra. You have asserted the entailment [that being described as sūtras of definitive meaning in the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra entails being sūtras of definitive meaning]. a [ག ང རབ ལས ང ད ན ག ངས ན ང ད ན ཡ ན མ དག ས ང ས ད ན ག ངས ན ང ས ད ན ཡ ན མ དག ས པ ]མ བ ན ས འ ང བ ས ག མ ཆ ས ཅན ང ད ན ག མད ར ཐལ དག ངས འག ལ ག ས b [ ང ད ན ]ད ར བཤད པའ ར [དག ངས འག ལ ག ས ང ད ན བཤད ན ང ད ན ཡ ན དག ས པས ]ཁ བ པ ཁས [ ས འ ང བ ས ག མ ང ད ན ག མད ར ]འད ད མ ས ཏ ང ས ད ན ག མད ཡ ན པའ ར ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས [ང ས ད ན ]ད ར བཤད པའ ར [ ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས ང ས ད ན བཤད ན ང ས ད ན ཡ ན དག ས པས ]ཁ བ པ ཁས Moreover, it follows that [that between scripture and reasoning, scripture is predominant for differentiating high sayings into the interpretable and the definitive] is not logically feasible because when the interpretable and definitive are differentiated among the high sayings, between those two [that is, scripture and reasoning,] the differentiation must mainly be made by pure reasoning. It follows [that between those two the differentiation must mainly be made by pure reasoning] because at that time [of differentiating the interpretable and definitive], since among the high sayings a variety of the discordant interpretable and definitive are set forth, that Such-and-such is true and Such-and-such is untrue must be differentiated through pure reasoning, [whereas] since scriptures are the bases of analyses concerning the interpretable and definitive, they are not suitable as proofs, a These final three blue colorizations merely indicate that from the viewpoint of the Consequence School these are acceptable. The point being made, however, is that statements in sūtras are not sufficient to determine which sūtras are interpretable and which are definitive. b Correcting gyi in the digital Tibetan to gyis in accordance with both 2011 TBRC bla brang (12b.4) and 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (9b.5).

134 132 Principles for Practice གཞན ཡང [ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ལ ང ར གས གཉ ས ཀ ནང ནས ང གཙ ཆ བ ]ད མ འཐད པར ཐལ ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ན [ ང ར གས ]ད གཉ ས ལས གཙ བ ར ར གས པ མ དག ཅ ག ག ས འ ད དག ས པའ ར [ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ན ( ང ར གས )ད གཉ ས ལས གཙ བ ར ར གས པ མ དག ཅ ག ག ས འ ད དག ས པ ]ད ར ཐལ [ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པ ]ད འ ཚ ག ང རབ ན ང ང ས མ མ ན པ ཚ གས ཤ ག ག ངས པས ད དག ལས འད ར བད ན འད ར མ བད ན ཞ ས ར གས པ མ དག ཅ ག ག ས འ ད དག ས ང མས ན ང ང ས ད ད པའ གཞ ཡ ན པས བ ད [13a.1] མ ང བའ ར ཏ because this very text [Tsong-kha-pa s The Essence of Eloquence] says: 56 In the end, the differentiation [between the interpretable and the definitive] must be made just by stainless reasoning. and: 57 because many discordant modes of positing the interpretable and the definitive are set forth in the high sayings and because through scriptural passages merely saying [about a topic], This is so, such cannot be posited, and if, then, in general it is not necessarily [suitable to accept whatever is indicated on the literal level in sūtras], mere statements [in sūtra] of, This is [interpretable, and that is definitive], also cannot establish about specifics, the interpretable and the definitive, [that such is necessarily so]. འད ཉ ད ལས མཐར ག གས ན མ མ ད པའ ར གས པ ཉ ད ཀ ས འ ད དག ས ཏ ཞ ས པ དང ག ང རབ ལས ང ང ས ཀ འཇ ག ལ མ མ ན པ མ ག ངས པའ ར དང འད ན འད འ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ཙམ ག ང ག ས ན ད ན ད ར བཞག

135 The Interpretable and the Definitive 133 པར མ ས ལ ད འ ཚ ལ ད ར མ ཁ བ པ ན ག ང ང ས ལ ཡང འད ན འད འ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ཙམ ག ས ཀ ང བ པར མ ས པའ ར ར ཞ ས པ དང and also because Tsong-kha-pa s Stages of Secret Mantra says: At that time since the two scriptures are the bases of analysis concerning possession or not of the meaning of the truth, the bases of dispute are not suitable as the means of proof; hence, differentiation as to possessing the meaning of the truth or not is done by way of just reasoning. གས ར མ ལས ཀ ང ད འ ཚ ང གཉ ས ན བད ན པའ ད ན ཅན ཡ ན མ ན ད ད པའ གཞ ཡ ན པས ད གཞ བ ད མ ང བའ ར ར གས པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བད ན པའ ད ན ཅན ཡ ན མ ན ད བར འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར This approach is extensively explained in Dharmakīrti s Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition. a འད འ ལ མ འག ལ ལས ས པར བཤད ད a The reference is likely to the explanation of extremely hidden phenomena near the end of the first chapter.

136

137 Jam-yang-shay-pa s GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS on the Four Reliances In the Tibetan, turquoise highlight indicates material added in place of ellipses, and magenta highlight sets off the ellipsis indicator. a a For Tibetan editions consulted see 65.

138 FROM WHAT APPROACHES THE INTERPRETABLE AND DEFINITIVE ARE DIFFERENTIATED གཉ ས པ [གང ག ས ང ང ས འ ད པ ]ན འ ན ང ང ས ད ལ གང འ ཅ ག ག ས འ ད མ ན The interpretable and definitive are divided by way of four reliances, four reasonings, four thoughts, and four indirect intentions. ང ང ས ན ར གས དག ངས མ བཞ བཞ ས འ ད ཅ ས བ ན Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Word Commentary on Root Text: By what are the interpretable and the definitive differentiated? The interpretable and the definitive are differentiated by the four reliances and the four reasonings with respect to the two, words and meanings, and the interpretable and the definitive are differentiated with respect to the high sayings by the four thoughts and the four indirect intentions. ང ད ན དང ང ས ད ན གང ག ས ད མ ན ན པ བཞ དང ར གས པ བཞ ས ཚ ག ད ན གཉ ས དང དག ངས པ ཅན བཞ དང མ དག ངས བཞ ས ག ང རབ ལ ང ང ས འ ད ད Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets: The great chariots of the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School differentiated the interpretable and the definitive with respect to both words and meanings by way of the four reliances and four reasonings and differentiated the interpretable and the definitive with respect to the Subduer s Word by way of the four thoughts and four indirect intentions. Hence, if these are understood, it has the great purpose of penetratingly realizing the high sayings, and so forth; therefore, [I] will briefly clarify the essence. Regarding this, the four reliances are indicated in sūtra; sūtra says: a a The Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4) is significantly different in vocabulary and order: བ ན པ ར ཏ འ གཞན ཡང ང བ ས མས དཔའ མས ཀ ན པ

139 Great Exposition of Tenets 137 Rely on doctrine, but do not rely on persons; rely on meaning, but do not rely on words; rely on sūtras of definitive meaning, but do not rely on [sūtras of] interpretable meaning; rely on pristine wisdom, but do not rely on consciousness. ད ས མས ཀ ཤ ང ཆ ན པ དག ག ས ན པ དང ར གས པ བཞ ས ཚ ག ད ན གཉ ས ཀ ལ ང ང ས འ ད དག ངས ཅན བཞ དང མ དག ངས བཞ ས བ པའ བཀའ ལ ང ང ས འ ད པས འད དག ག ན ག ང རབ ལ ནང ན ད པ ས གས ཤ ན དག ས པ ཆ བས མད ར བ ས ང པ གསལ བ ར ད ལ ན པ བཞ ན མད ར བ ན པ ན མད ལས ཆ ས ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན ག ཚ ག འ ལ མ ན ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ག མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཞ ས ས Concerning this, there are six topics positing the four reliances by way of persons, by way of times, by way of four validities, identifying the four to be relied upon, identifying the four not to be relied upon, and benefits of the four reliances. ད ལ གང ཟག ག ས དང ས ཀ ས དང ཚད མ བཞ འ ས དང གང ལ ན པ བཞ ང ས འཛ ན དང གང ལ མ ན པ བཞ ང ས འཛ ན དང ན པ བཞ འ ཕན ཡ ན ག བཞ འང མ ཟད པ བཞ གང ཞ ན འད ད ན ལ ན ག ཚ ག འ ལ མ ན པ དང ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ག མ པར ཤ ས པ ལ མ ན པ དང ང ས པའ ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང བའ ད ན ག མད ལ མ ན པ དང ཆ ས ཉ ད ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པའ

140 138 Principles for Practice 1. POSITING THE FOUR RELIANCES BY WAY OF PERSONS དང པ [གང ཟག ག ས ན པ བཞ བཞག པ ]ན The four reliances are posited respectively by way of distinctions of four persons who are pretentious, diverged afar, holding their own view to be supreme, and intent only on hearing because: 1. the pretentious should rely on doctrine, but not on persons; a 2. the likes of the Diverged Afar b [Nihilists] should rely on meaning, but not on humans words; 3. those holding their own view to be supreme should rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning; 4. those intent only on hearing should rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness. ལ འཆ ས དང ང ཕན དང རང མཆ ག འཛ ན དང ཐ ས པ ཙམ ར ལ ན པའ གང ཟག བཞ འ ག ག ས ན པ བཞ ར མ བཞ ན བཞག ལ འཆ ས པ ན ཆ ས ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ དང ང ཕན ད ན ལ ན ག མ འ ང ས ཚ ག ལ མ ན པ དང རང མཆ ག འཛ ན ག ས ང ས ད ན ག མད ལ ན ག ང ད ན ག མད ལ མ ན པ དང ཐ ས པ ར ལ ན པའ གང ཟག ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ག མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན དག ས པའ ར ཏ a Jam-yang-shay-pa seems to be saying that of all types of persons, it is especially the pretentious who should rely on doctrines, not persons. However, Ngag-wang-pal-dan explains that the pretentious are those on whom one should not rely. Ngag-wang-paldan s Annotations (dngos wa, Taipei edition, ): Although regarding persons in do not rely on persons there are a variety of supreme and lower [persons], mainly it is not reasonable to follow the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good. For the entire note wa see below, 139. b Ngag-wang-pal-dan discusses the Diverged Afar in his Annotations (stod, ka, 53a.5 [Delhi edition]). See Introduction, 21.

141 Great Exposition of Tenets 139 Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds says: 58 If you ask, How are these presented? [These four reliances are presented] by way of the distinctions of four kinds of persons: the first, by way of the distinctions of pretentious persons; the second, by way of the distinctions of the Worldly Diverged Afar; the third, by way of abiding in holding their own view to be supreme; and the fourth, by way of being intent on hearing. སའ དང ས གཞ ལས ད དག ཇ ར མ པར བཞག པ ཡ ན ཞ ན གང ཟག མ པ བཞ འ ག ག ས ཏ དང པ ན ལ འཆ ས པའ གང ཟག ག ག ག ས ས གཉ ས པ ན འཇ ག ན ང ཕན པའ ག ག ས ས ག མ པ ན རང ག བ མཆ ག འཛ ན པ ལ གནས པའ ག ག ས ས བཞ པ ན ཐ ས པ ར ལ ན པའ ག ག ས ས ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, wa: 59 It is explained that: 1. Although regarding persons in do not rely on persons there are a variety of supreme and lower [persons], mainly it is not reasonable to follow the pretentious who dissimulate so that the bad looks as if good. 2. It is not reasonable to be intent only on words like the Diverged Afar [that is, Nihilists] who are intent only on reciting the Forders secret words these being the Diverged Afar who are one of the divisions from within the threefold terminological division of the Diverged Afar. a 3. In accordance with the statement [in Chandrakīrti s Supplement to Nāgārjuna s Treatise on the Middle Way, VI.30]: 60 If the world is valid, Since the world sees suchness what is the need for others, Superiors? a Ngag-wang-pal-dan describes this threefold division of the Diverged Afar in his Annotations (stod, ka, 53a.5 [Delhi edition]). See Introduction, 21.

142 140 Principles for Practice What would the path of Superiors do? It is not reasonable for the stupid to be valid. a a Tsong-kha-pa s commentary on this stanza together with the Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Choskyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, Jam-dbyangs-bshadpa i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub (lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa i byang chub lam rim chen mo i dka ba i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron), (New Delhi: Chos- phel-legs-ldan, 1972, ) is: The second, that the mode of refutation [that worldly consciousnesses such as an eye-consciousness] are valid with respect to suchness, is clear also in the root text: If even worldly perceptions, eye-consciousnesses and so forth, were asserted as valid on the occasion of analyzing suchness in dependence on accepting that valid cognitions renowned in the world express discredit upon the refutation of reasoning analyzing the ultimate, such as reasonings analyzing production from other and so forth, then the world would be valid on the occasion of analyzing suchness but this is not asserted. If perceptions by the world were valid with respect to suchness, Then, since the world [that is,] all ordinary beings, would directly see that is to say, realize suchness, given that they would be seeing suchness directly, what need would there be to posit for direct realization of suchness, those others, Superiors who directly realize suchness, separately from the world? And if there is no need to posit those Superiors, what would be the use of making great striving for the sake of seeking the path of Superiors? There is no need, because it would be senseless for an ordinary worldly being [to do so]. Moreover since the ordinary world does not analyze meanings, it is also not reasonable and not fitting that the stupid are valid on the occasion of analyzing the profound mode of subsistence of phenomena. གཉ ས པ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད ལ ཚད མར བཀག ལ བར ཡང གསལ བ ན ཅ གཞན ས གས ད ན དམ ད ད པའ ར གས པས བཀག པ འཇ ག ན ག ག གས པའ ཚད མས གན ད པ བ ད པར འད ད པ ལ བ ན ནས ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མ པར ད ད པའ བས ལ འཇ ག ན ག མཐ ང བ མ ག ཤ ས ལ ས གས པའང ཚད མར ཁས ལ ན པ ཡ ན ན འཇ ག ན ད ཉ ད ད ད པའ བས ལ ཚད མ ཡ ན པ ད ཡ ན དང ད ར ཡ ན ན ཡང ཁས ལ ན པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གལ ཏ འཇ ག ན ག ས མཐ ང བ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད ལ ཚད མ ཡ ན ན ན ད ར ན འཇ ག ན རང ག བས ཐ མལ བ ཐམས ཅད

143 Great Exposition of Tenets 141 it is not reasonable to hold one s view to be supreme, that is, to hold how [phenomena] appear to one s own sense consciousnesses to be the final mode of subsistence. 4. It is not reasonable to be satisfied with mere wisdom arisen from hearing like persons who are intent on hearing. ཝ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ མཆ ག དམན ཚ གས ཡ ད ཀ ང གཙ ཆ ར ལ འཆ ས ཅན ངན པ བཟང ར བ ས པའ ས འ ང མ ར གས པ དང ང ཕན ལ ས བ ད ར གས ཀ ནས ག མ བའ ནང ཚན འཇ ག ན པའ གསང ཚ ག ག དབང ས པའ ང ཕན གས པའ གསང ཚ ག འད ན པ ཁ ན ར ལ ན པ ར ཚ ག ཁ ན ར ལ ན པར མ ར གས པ དང གལ ཏ འཇ ག ན ཚད མ ཡ ན ན ན འཇ ག ན ད ཉ ད མཐ ང བས འཕགས གཞན ག ས ཅ དག ས འཕགས པའ ལམ ག ས ཅ ཞ ག ན པ ཚད མར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས པ ར རང མཆ ག འཛ ན ཏ རང ག དབང མང ན ལ ཇ ར ང བ ར གནས གས མཐར ག འཛ ན པར མ ར གས པ དང ཐ ས པ ར ལ ན པའ གང ཟག ར ཐ ས ཀ ས ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མང ན མ མཐ ང བར འ ར བ གས པས ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མང ན མ གས པ ལ འཇ ག ན ལས ལ གས ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མང ན མ གས པའ འཕགས པ ཞ ས བ གཞན ཞ ག བཞག པ ད ཉ ད ག ས དག ས པ མ ད པས ད བཞག ཅ ཞ ག དག ས མ དག ས ལ འཕགས པ ད བཞག མ དག ས ན འཕགས པའ ལམ འཚ ལ བའ འབད ལ ག ད ན འབད པ ཆ ན པ ད པ འད ས ཀ ང ཅ ཞ ག དག ས པ མ ད ད འཇ ག ན རང ག པའ ད ན མ ད པའ ར ར གཞན ཡང འཇ ག ན ཐ མལ པ ན ད ན ལ ད ད པ མ ད པས ན པ ན ད ཁ ན ཉ ད ལ ཡ ན ལ ན པ ད ཆ ས ཀ གནས གས ཟབ མ ལ ད ད པའ བས ཚད མར ར གས ཤ ང འ ས པའང མ ཡ ནན

144 142 Principles for Practice ང ག ཤ ས རབ ཙམ ག ས ཆ ག པར འཛ ན པ མ ར གས པར བཤད ད 2. POSITING THE FOUR RELIANCES BY WAY OF TIMES གཉ ས པ [ ས ཀ ས ན པ བཞ བཞག པ ]ན The four reliances are posited respectively in order not to lose out at four times. One would not lose out, 1. if, when understanding all doctrines, one relied on doctrine, but not on persons, 2. and if, when holding all doctrines, one relied on meaning, but not on persons words, 3. and if, when closely investigating or contemplating meaning, one relied on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning, 4. and if, when achieving doctrinal practices, one relied on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness; ས བཞ ར ད མ ཟ བའ ར ན པ བཞ ར མ བཞ ན བཞག ཆ ས ཀ ན བ པར ད ས ན པ དང པ འཛ ན ས ན པ གཉ ས པ ད ན ལ ཉ བར ག པའམ ས མས ས ན པ ག མ པ དང ཆ ས བ བ པའ ས ན པ བཞ པ ལ བ ན ན ཉམས པར མ འ ར ཏ Asaṅga s Grounds of Yogic Practice says: 61 Concerning that, in brief, because of losing out and not losing out at four times when understanding all doctrines, when holding all doctrines, when closely investigating or contemplating the meaning of all doctrines, and when achieving all doctrines in accordance with doctrine four [types of] persons are presented, whereby the four reliances are presented. ལ འ ར ད པའ ས ལས ད ལ མད ར བ ན ས བཞ ར

145 Great Exposition of Tenets 143 ད ཟར འ ར བ དང ད ཟ བར མ འ ར བའ ར གང ཟག བཞ ར མ པར བཞག ཆ ས ཀ ན བ པར ད པའ ས དང འཛ ན པའ ས དང ད ན ལ ཉ བར ག པའ ས དང ཆ ས ཀ ས མ ན པའ བ བ པའ ས ལས ན པ བཞ མ པར བཞག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, zha: When understanding that is, hearing all doctrines, if one takes as true all that is explained and does not analyze the meaning of words, one will not know how to distinguish the correct from the quasi. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the first reliance [rely on doctrine, but do not rely on persons] is posited. 2. When holding all doctrines without forgetting, if one is intent only on words, one will fall from holding without forgetting the meaning. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the second reliance [rely on meaning, but do not rely on words] is posited. 3. When closely investigating meaning at the time of [states] arisen from thinking doing proper mental application if one merely takes conventionalities to mind, one will not gain ascertainment arisen from thinking with regard to the ultimate. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the third reliance [rely on definitive meaning, but do not rely on interpretable meaning] is posited. 4. When achieving doctrine the path of liberation in accordance with doctrine, if one is satisfied with mere conceptual consciousnesses arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditation, one will not gain uncontaminated pristine wisdom in which clear perception of the meaning of reality has reached completion. Therefore, in order not to lose out at that time, the fourth reliance [rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness] is posited. ཞ ཆ ས ཀ ན བ པར ད པ ཐ ས པ ད པའ ས གང བཤད པ ཐམས ཅད བད ན པར བ ང ནས ཚ ག ད ན

146 144 Principles for Practice ལ བ ག ད ད མ ས ན ཡང དག ར ང ག མ ད མ ཤ ས པས ན ད ར ས ད མ ཟ བར བའ ར ན པ དང པ དང ད མ བ ད པར འཛ ན པའ ས ཚ ག འབའ ཞ ག ར ལ ན ན ད ན མ བ ད པར འཛ ན པ ལས ཉམས པར ར བས ན ད ར ས ད མ ཟ བར བའ ར ན པ གཉ ས པ དང ད ན ལ ཉ བར ག པ ལ བཞ ན ཡ ད ལ ད པའ བསམ ང ག ཚ ཀ ན བ ཙམ ཡ ད ལ ད ན ད ན དམ ལ བསམ ང ག ང ས པ མ ད པས ན ད ར ས ཆད མ ཟ བར བའ ར ན པ ག མ པ དང ཆ ས ཀ ས མ ན པའ ཆ ས ཏ ཐར ལམ བ བ པའ བས ཐ ས བསམ དང བ མ ང ག ག པ ཙམ ག ས ཆ ག པར འཛ ན ན ཡང དག པའ ད ན ལ གསལ ང མཐར ན པའ ཟག མ ད ཀ ཡ ཤ ས ད པར མ འ ར བས ན ད ར ས ད མ ཟ བར བའ ར ན པ བཞ པ མ པར བཞག པ ཡ ན ན 3. POSITING THE FOUR RELIANCES BY WAY OF FOUR VALIDITIES ག མ པ [ཚད མ བཞ འ ས ན པ བཞ བཞག པ ]ན The four reliances indicate four validities, or four nondeceptives, because: 1. the meaning in rely on meaning, but not on words, is indicated to be endowed with validity; similarly, 2. the reasoning in rely on reasoning [that is, doctrine], but not on persons, is indicated to be endowed with validity; 3. the teacher in rely on definitive meaning, but not on interpretable meaning, is indicated to be endowed with validity;

147 Great Exposition of Tenets the pristine wisdom in rely on pristine wisdom, but not on consciousness, is indicated to be endowed with validity ན པ བཞ ཚད མ ཉ ད བཞ འམ མ བ བ ཉ ད བཞ བ ན ཏ ཚ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན པའ ད ན ཚད མ ཉ ད དང ན པ ད བཞ ན གང ཟག ལ མ ན ར གས པ ལ ན པའ ར གས པ ཚད མ ཉ ད དང ང ད ན ལ མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པའ ན པ ཚད མ ཉ ད དང མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པའ ཡ ཤ ས མ བ བ ཉ ད དང ན པ བཞ བ ན པའ ར ཏ because Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: 63 From these four reliances, in brief, four validities themselves are indicated: (1) the meanings of the teachings, (2) reasonings, (3) teachers, and (4) pristine wisdoms of realization arisen from meditation. ང ས ལས ན པ བཞ པ ད དག ལས ན མད ར བ ས ན ཚད མ ཉ ད བཞ བ ན ཏ བ ན པའ ད ན དང ར གས པ དང ན པ དང མ པ ལས ང བའ གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ས ཞ ས དང Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, za: 64 The reasoning validity has the same significance as reliance on doctrine; the meaning validity has the same significance as reliance on the meaning; the teacher validity has the same significance as reliance on the definitive meaning; the pristinewisdom validity has the same significance as reliance on pristine wisdom, because validity means nondeceptive. Nondeceptive, moreover, must be understood individually in context; it is not to be taken only as concordance between mode of appearance and mode of abiding. a a For instance, in the context of taking truth (bden pa, satya) in the two truths as meaning nondeceptive (mi slu ba), nondeceptive is explained as meaning concordance between mode of appearance and mode of abiding (snang tshul dang gnas tshul mthun pa); however, nondeceptive in the context of the four reliances is glossed here as reliance (rton pa),

148 146 Principles for Practice ཟ ར གས པ ཚད མ ན ཆ ས ལ ན པ དང ད ན ཚད མ ན ད ན ལ ན པ དང ན པ ཚད མ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན པ དང ཡ ཤ ས ཚད མ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པ དང ག ད ན གཅ ག ཡ ན ཏ ཚད མ ཞ ས པ ན མ བ བའ ད ན ཡ ན པས ས མ བ ཞ ས པ ཡང བས བས ཀ ས ས ས ར ཤ ས དག ས ཀ ང ལ དང གནས ལ མ ན པ ཁ ན ལ མ འ and also Vasubandhu s Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras [says]: 65 This is the character of teachers; the meaning of their having validity is that they have become valid teachers, or it is what is ascertained and differentiated to be taken as valid by them. མད ན ག འག ལ པ ལས ཀ ང འད ན ན aཔ མས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད ད ད ལ ཚད མ དང ན པའ ད ན ན ན པ ཚད མར ར པའམ ད ས ཚད མར མཛད པའ ང ས པར ས ཤ ང མ པར བ གང ཡ ན པའ ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, a: 66 [The passage from Vasubandhu s commentary] in the Narthang edition differs slightly from what is quoted here [in Jam-yangshay-pa s text]: 67 This describes the character of teachers; meanings having validation by them are those ascertained and differentiated by teachers who are taken as valid. which in the Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive is explained to mean mental reliance (yid rton) or to place mental trust (yid gtod). a Correcting rton in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (410.5) to ston in accordance with Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras (sde dge 4020, sems tsam, vol. phi, 223b.6).

149 Great Exposition of Tenets 147 འ ར ཐང པར མ ལས འད ན ན པ མས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད བཤད ད ད ས ཚད མ དང ན པའ ད ན ན ན པ ཚད མར མཛད པས ང ས པར ས ཤ ང མ པར བ གང ཡ ན པའ ཞ ས འད ར ངས པ དང ང མ འ བར ང ང 4. IDENTIFYING THE FOUR TO BE RELIED ON བཞ པ [གང ལ ན པ བཞ ང ས འཛ ན ]ན On what should one have mental reliance? Four are described as to be relied upon: 1. rely on doctrine; 2. rely on the meaning; 3. rely on definitive meaning; 4. rely on pristine wisdom; because it is considered that it is because they have nondeceptive validity; for, Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras associates [the four reliances] with four lines respectively: 68 The doctrine taught [in the] scriptures, That which possesses the thought of the meaning of those, That which has the validity of definitive meaning, And that which attains its inexpressibility. གང ལ ཡ ད ན ན ཆ ས ལ ན ད ན ལ ན ང ས ད ན ལ ན ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ཅ ག ཅ ས གང ལ ཡ ད ན པ བཞ བཤད ད ད མས ལ མ བ བའ ཚད མ ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས དག ངས པའ ར མད ན ལས 69 ག ག ལག བ ན པའ ཆ ས དང ན ད ད ན དག ངས པ ཅན དང ན ང ས ད ན ཚད མ a ན པ a Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020 (29b.4) reads: ང ས ད ན ཚད མར ན པ དང.

150 148 Principles for Practice དང ད ཡ བ ད མ ད ཐ བ པའ ཞ ས ང པ བཞ དང ར མ བཞ ན ར Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, ya: 70 Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras explains that the four to be relied on are: scriptures, that is, high sayings; 2. the meaning of the thought that is not the meaning of the literal reading; 3. meaning ascertained correctly, not wrongly understood; 4. uncontaminated pristine wisdom realizing the meaning ascertained correctly; and that the four not to be relied on are: 1. persons who have abandoned the doctrines of the scriptures; 2. the meaning of the literal reading; 3. erroneously interpreted meanings due to wrong thought; 4. consciousness, except for pristine wisdom of individual selfknowledge. ཡ གང ལ ན པ བཞ ན ག ག ལག ག ང རབ དང ས ཟ ན ག ད ན མ ན པའ དག ངས ད ན དང ལ ག པར ཤ ས པ མ ཡ ན པར ཡང དག པར ང ས པའ ད ན དང ད གས པའ ཟག མ ད ཀ ཡ ཤ ས ཏ བཞ དང གང ལ མ ན པ བཞ ན ག ག ལག ག ཆ ས ང བའ གང ཟག དང ཇ བཞ ན པའ ད ན དང ལ ག པར བསམས པས ད ན ན ཅ ལ ག ངས པ དང ས ས རང ར ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས མ གཏ གས པའ ཤ ས པ བཞ ལ མད ན ལས བཤད ད In accordance with the statement by Asaṅga, 72 Also this doctrine has two aspects: word and meaning, doctrine is twofold, word and meaning; and word is twofold, interpretable and definitive sūtras [as well as] treatises; and meaning is twofold, doctrine itself and reasonings because the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra says: 73

151 Great Exposition of Tenets 149 Concerning this, rely on doctrine itself but do not rely on persons. and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: 74 In that way, one who relies on reasoning but does not rely on persons does not fall from suchness. Therefore, reasonings also are divided into the four reasonings. Also, the divisions of meanings are included in those. ཐ གས མ ད ཀ ས ཆ ས ད ཡང མ པ གཉ ས ཏ ཚ ག འ དང ད ན ཏ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ར ཆ ས ལ ཚ ག ད ན གཉ ས དང ཚ ག ལ ང ང ས ཀ མད བ ན བཅ ས གཉ ས དང ད ན ལ ཆ ས ཉ ད དང ར གས པ གཉ ས ཏ ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས འད ན ཆ ས ཉ ད ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པའ ཞ ས དང ང ས ལས ད ར ར གས པ ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ད ན ད ཁ ན ལས མ ཉམས ས ཞ ས ས ད ས ན ར གས པ ལའང ར གས པ བཞ ར ད བའ ད ན ག ད བའང ད ར འ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, ra: 75 Also, the divisions of meanings in rely on the meaning are included in the four reasonings. ར ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན ག ད བའང ར གས པ བཞ པ ད ར འ ས ས Definitive meanings are [found in] both [Buddha s] Word and treatises, and in just a this context [of the Mind-Only School] the literal are definitive a In accordance with Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotation la immediately below, in just this context ( di ba i skabs nyid du) should read in this context ( di ba i skabs nyid du); his point is that Proponents of the Great Exposition, for instance, treat the literal as definitive. As Jam-yang-shay-pa himself says earlier in the same text:

152 150 Principles for Practice meanings, whereas in the context of the Middle Way School there is the distinctive feature that the definitive has to mainly teach ultimate truth. Pristine wisdom is to be taken as the pristine wisdom of non-conceptual meditative equipoise of the three Superiors [that is, Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicle Superiors]. ང ས ད ན ལ བཀའ བ ན བཅ ས གཉ ས དང འད བའ བས ཉ ད ཇ བཞ ན མས ང ས ད ན དང ད མ པའ བས ད ན དམ བད ན པ གཙ བ ར བ ན པ ཞ ག དག ས པ ཁ ད པར ར ཡ ཤ ས ན འཕགས པ ག མ ག མཉམ བཞག མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལ འ Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, la: 76 Since the particle nyid [ just in the phrase just in this context of འད བའ བས ཉ ད ] is a lexical error, it should read འད བའ བས ཇ བཞ ན པ མས ང ས ད ན དང. Certain Proponents of the Great Exposition assert, in accordance with the description in Bhāvaviveka s Blaze of Reasoning, that all of [Buddha s] word is just of definitive meaning [that is, literal] and do not assert that there are interpretable meanings. In addition, there are also [some Proponents of the Great Exposition] who assert that there are both definitive meanings and meanings requiring interpretation. Not only that, but also all later Proponents of the Great Exposition and even the Vatsīputrīyas assert that even Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras require interpretation, saying that: The statements of the absence of true existence and non-production refer to the type of truth and production imputed by Forders such as the Sāṃkhyas and so forth, Likewise, the statements of the non-existence of nature, the non-existence of attainment, abandonment, and so forth and the non-existence of things also are in consideration that the nature and so forth and permanent effective things as imputed by Forders do not exist. See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 235. In all of these cases the definitive is the literal.

153 Great Exposition of Tenets 151 ལ ཉ ད དང ཞ ས པ ཡ ག ན ར བ ཡ ན པས འད བའ བས ཇ བཞ ན པ མས ང ས ད ན དང ཞ ས འད ན དག ས ས 5. IDENTIFYING THE FOUR NOT TO BE RELIED ON པ [གང ལ མ ན པ བཞ ང ས འཛ ན ]ན On what should one not rely? 1. Do not rely on persons exemplified by those who abandon the doctrine. 2. Do not rely on words, that is, just what is set forth. 3. Do not rely on interpretable meanings. 4. Do not rely on consciousness. These must be stopped because they are not suitable to be valid since they are devoid of a relevant sort of logical correctness. Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says: 77 Abandoning, just what is set forth, Wrong understanding, and Attainment of the expressible Are indicated here as to be stopped. གང ལ མ ན ན ཆ ས ང བའ གང ཟག ག ས མཚ ན པའ གང ཟག ལ མ ན ཇ ད བཤད ཙམ ག ས ཚ ག ལ མ ན ང ད ན ལ མ ན མ ཤ ས ལ མ ན པར ད དགག པ ཞ ག དག ས ཏ ད མས ལ ཅ ར གས ཀ འཐད ལ ཡ ན པས 78 ཚད མར མ ང བའ ར ཏ མད ན ལས ང དང ཇ ད བཤད པ དང ལ ག པར ཡང དག ཤ ས པ དང བ ད དང བཅས པ ཐ བ པ དག འད ར ན དགག པར བ ན པ ཡ ན ཞ ས ས

154 152 Principles for Practice With respect to persons here [that is to say, persons who are not to be relied on] there are many; the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra 79 (see Interpretable and Definitive, 85 and 89) says: Moreover, persons who are ordinary beings, persons who are virtuous common beings, [persons who follow by faith, persons who are followers of doctrine, persons on the eighth (ground, that is, Approachers to Stream-Enterer), persons who are Stream- Enterers, persons who are Once-Returners, persons who are Non- Returners,] persons who are Foe Destroyers, persons who are Solitary Realizers, persons who are Bodhisattvas, and [one person who when arising in the world benefits many beings, comforts many beings, empathizes with the world, who arises in the world for the sake of masses of gods and humans, for their benefit, for their comfort,] the teacher of gods and humans, the Buddha Supramundane Victor, the unique person are called persons. and so forth, ད འ གང ཟག ལ མ ཡ ད ད ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས གཞན ཡང ས ས བ འ གང ཟག དང ས ས བ འ དག བའ གང ཟག དང ཞ ས པ ནས [དད པས ས འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང ཆ ས ཀ ས འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང བ ད པའ གང ཟག དང ན གས པའ གང ཟག དང ལན གཅ ག ར འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང ར མ འ ང བའ གང ཟག དང ] དག བཅ མ པའ གང ཟག དང རང སངས ས ཀ གང ཟག དང ང བ ས མས དཔའ གང ཟག དང ཞ ས པ ནས [གང ཟག གཅ ག འཇ ག ན ང ན བ མང པ ལ ཕན པ དང བ མང པ ལ བད བ དང འཇ ག ན ལ ང བ བ དང དང མ འ བ ཕལ པ ཆ འ ད ན ག ར ཕན པའ ར བད བའ ར ] དང མ མས ཀ ན པ སངས ས བཅ མ ན འདས གང ཟག གཅ ག པ འཇ ག ན ང ད ན གང ཟག ཅ ས འ ཞ ས ས གས དང

155 Great Exposition of Tenets 153 Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, sha: 80 [I] wonder if persons who are virtuous ordinary beings refers to Bodhisattvas who are common beings, since in [Buddha s] Life Stories and so forth there are many usages of the term virtuous for Bodhisattva. ཤ ས ས བ འ དག བའ གང ཟག ཅ ས པ ན ང ས མས ས ལ ད དམ མ ས རབས ས གས ང ས མས ལ དག བའ ས བཤད པ མང བའ ར ར and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 84) says: 81 Moreover, Bodhisattvas thoroughly know unwholesome teachings and also great teachings correctly just as they are. Thorough knowledge also relies on reasonings, but does not rely on persons as in saying, The elder or knowledgeable person or One-Gone-Thus or monastic has set forth these doctrines. ང ས ལས ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ནག པ བ ན པ དང ཆ ན པ བ ན པ ཡང དག པ ཇ བཞ ན རབ ཤ ས ཏ རབ ཤ ས ནས ཀ ང ར གས པ ལ ན པར ད པ ཡ ན ག གནས བ ན ནམ ཤ ས པའ གང ཟག གམ ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའམ དག འ ན ག ས ཆ ས ད དག བཤད ད ཞ ས གང ཟག ལ ན པ མ ན ན ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, sa: 82 [I] wonder if knowledgeable person refers to knowledgeable person within the five fully-qualified persons described in the Discipline? ས ཤ ས པའ གང ཟག ན འ ལ བ ནས བཤད པའ གང ཟག ཁ ད པར ཅན འ ནང ཚན ཀ ན ག ས ཤ ས པའ གང ཟག ལ ད དམ མ མ

156 154 Principles for Practice Hence, there are many modes of non-reliance among these [four]: with respect to the words there are two the factual and the nonfactual and even with respect to the factual, they are to associated with hearing, thinking, and meditating, whereupon nonapprehension of just merely that as supreme, and so forth, are needed because not relying on the letters but relying on the meaning is set out on some occasions. ད ས ན འད འ མ ན ལ མ ཡ ད ད འད འ ཚ ག ལ ད ན ཡ ད མ ད གཉ ས དང ད ན ཡ ད པ ལའང ཐ ས བསམ མ པ ལ ར ནས ཧ ཅང ད ཙམ ལས མཆ ག མ འཛ ན པ ཞ ག ས གས དག ས ཏ ལ ལར ཡ ག ལ མ ན ད ན ལ ན ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར དང Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, ha: 83 Since [the particle] las [in de tsam las mchog tu mi dzin] is a lexical error, it should read nonapprehension of just merely that as supreme (de tsam la mchog tu mi dzin). ཧ ལས ཞ ས པ ཡ ག ན ར ཡ ན པས ཧ ཅང ད ཙམ ལ མཆ ག མ འཛ ན ཞ ས འད ན དག ས ས and the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 101) says: 84 In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. This is rely on meaning, but do not rely on letters. ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ལས མད ར ན ཆ ས ཀ ང པ ང ག བ ད བཞ བ ན པ འད ན ཡ ག ཞ ས འ གང ས མས ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད དང ཡ ག དང ང བ ད པ དང བ ད མ ད པའ ད ན ཏ འད ན ད ན ལ ན ག ཡ ག ལ མ

157 Great Exposition of Tenets 155 ན པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས དང Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, a: 85 [I] wonder according to the citation of the Teachings of Akṣhayamati Sūtra in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Decisive Analysis of Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive (see Interpretable and Definitive, 101), which states: Letters teach the collections of Bodhisattva qualities ranging from initial mind-generation through to the essence of enlightenments. Meaning is an all-knowing pristine wisdom manifestly completely purified by wisdom endowed with a single moment of mind. In brief, these teachings of whatsoever 84,000 piles of doctrine are called letters. That meaning which is the unlanguaged, unlettered, nonilluminable, and inexpressible of all sentient beings is called meaning. whether (1) the teaching, in the high sayings, of the collections of Bodhisattva qualities are to be taken as letters, and (2) the qualities of the Buddha ground are to be taken as meanings; or whether (1) Words spoken in accordance with trainees dispositions, thoughts, and dormancies are to be taken as letters, and (2) whether phenomena that are unlanguaged, unlettered, and inexpressible just as perceived by a knower-ofall-aspects are to be taken as meanings. ཨ ང ང ས མ འ ད ཀ མཐའ ད ད ག ས མ ཟད པའ མད ངས པ ལས ཡ ག ཞ ས བ ན གང ཐ ག མར ས མས བ ད པ ནས བ ང ང བ ཀ ང པ ལ ག ག བར ག ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཡ ན ཏན ག ཚ གས བ ན པའ ད ན ཞ ས བ ན གང ས མས ཀ ད ཅ ག མ གཅ ག དང ན པའ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ས ཐམས ཅད མཁ ན པའ ཡ ཤ ས མང ན པར གས པར འཚང བ མད ར ན གང ཆ ས ཀ ང པ བ ད ཁ བཞ ང བ ན པ འད ན ཚ ག

158 156 Principles for Practice འ ཞ ས འ གང ས མས ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད དང ཡ ག དང ཚ ག འ ས ཞ ས པ ནས བ ད མ ད པའ ད ན ད ན ད ན ཏ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ར ན ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཡ ན ཏན ག ཚ གས བ ན པའ ག ང རབ ལ ཡ ག དང མཐར ག སངས ས ཀ སའ ཡ ན ཏན ལ ད ན ས པའམ ག ལ འ ཁམས བསམ པ བག ལ ཉལ དང མ ན པར ག ངས པའ བཀའ ལ ཡ ག དང མ མཁ ན ག ས གཟ གས པ ཇ བ བཞ ན མ ང ཚ ག ཡ ག ས བ ད མ ད པའ ཆ ས ལ ད ན ས པ ཡ ན ནམ མ མ and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 80 and 123) says: 86 Regarding that, how do Bodhisattvas train in the four reliances? Concerning this, Bodhisattvas listen to doctrines from others because of wanting the meaning but not because of wanting wellcrafted words. and so forth. ང ས ལས ད ལ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན པ བཞ པ a དག ལ ཇ ར ར ཞ ན འད ལ ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན ད ན འད ད པའ ར གཞན ལས ཆ ས ཉན པར ད ཀ ཚ ག འ ལ གས པར ར བ འད ད པའ ར མ ན ཏ ཞ ས ས གས ས Here, regarding the interpretable and the definitive, divisions are very numerous as the [Teachings of Akṣhayamati] Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 104) says: 87 a Here Jam-yang-shay-pa s citation of Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas reads rton pa which accords with the snar thang edition (152b.7). The sde dge version of the Grounds of Bodhisattvas misreads the text as ston pa at this point (136a.5) and on three other occasions in this passage when referring to the four reliances as a group.

159 Great Exposition of Tenets 157 Those teachings of various words and letters in whatsoever sūtras are called interpretable meanings. and also as Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas (see Interpretable and Definitive, 108) says: 88 because it is due to not ascertaining that the divisions of sūtras of interpretable meaning are for the sake of entry through various doors that doubt is generated. འད འ ང ད ན ན མད ལས མད གང ལས ཚ ག དང ཡ ག ཚ གས བ ན པ ད དག ན ང བའ ད ན ཅ ས འ ཞ ས དང ང ས ལས ཀ ང འད ར ང བའ ད ན ག མད ན ཚ གས ནས གས པའ ད ན ག མ པར ད བ མ ང ས པས ཐ ཚ མ ད པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས ག ངས པ ར ད བ ཤ ན མང ལ (1) The way non-reliance on words or letters and on interpretable meanings in these [four reliances] are not redundant and (2) that contexts and so forth differ; and also (3) how in general they are non-contradictory should be known; I have explained only a portion. ཚ ག གམ ཡ ག དང འད འ ང ད ན ལ མ ན པ གཉ ས མ ས ལ དང བས ས གས མ འ ལ ར མ འགལ ལ ཡང ཤ ས དག ས ཏ གས ཙམ བདག ག ས བཤད ཟ ན ཏ Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, ka: 89 With regard to the mode of nonredundancy of the two, nonreliance on words and non-reliance on interpretable meanings, on this occasion [of the Mind-Only School] nonredundancy must be explained in this way: 1. non-reliance on words mainly refers to non-satisfaction with merely reciting words, these being occasions of holding [the mind] without forgetting

160 158 Principles for Practice 2. non-reliance on interpretable meanings refers to nonsatisfaction with merely literal meanings, these being occasions of proper mental application. However, this is formulated in terms the system of the Proponents of Mind-Only, since in this system it is predominantly said that whatever is an established base is necessarily a definitive meaning because there are no interpretable meanings. However, in some other monastic colleges textbooks it is explained that, even in the context of the Mind-Only School, interpretable meanings are conventionalities and definitive meanings are ultimates as with the Proponents of Naturelessness, in accordance with which there is no qualm [of redundancy]. ཀ ཚ ག ལ མ ན པ དང ང ད ན ལ མ ན པ གཉ ས མ ས ལ ན བས འད ར ཚ ག ལ མ ན ཞ ས པ གཙ ཆ ར ཚ ག འད ན པ ཙམ ག ས ཆ ག པར མ འཛ ན པ ལ ད ལ ང ད ན ལ མ ན ཞ ས པ ཇ བཞ ན པའ ད ན ཙམ ག ས ཆ ག པར མ འཛ ན པ ལ ད པ དང མ ན མ བ ད པར འཛ ན པའ གནས བས དང མ ན ལ བཞ ན ཡ ད ལ ད པའ གནས བས ཡ ན པས མ ས ཞ ས བཤད དག ས ས འ ན ཀ ང ས མས ཙམ པའ གས ལ གཞ བ ན ང ས ད ན ག ས ཁ བ ང ད ན མ ད ཟ ར བ ཤས ཆ བས ད འ དབང ས པ ཡ ན ག ཚང གཞན ག ཡ ག ཆ འགའ ཞ ག ལས ས མས ཙམ པའ བས ཡང ང བ ཉ ད མ ད པར བ ར ང ད ན ཀ ན བ དང ང ས ད ན ད ན དམ བཤད པ ར ན ད གས པ མ ད ད [Let me add a little more about context and noncontradiction.] For, here [in the context of the four reliances] consciousness has even six: the [five] sense consciousnesses of the eye and so forth, and a conventionally aspected mental consciousness, but it is explained that when examining

161 Great Exposition of Tenets 159 the ultimate, without relying on these consciousnesses, rely on profound non-conceptual pristine wisdom; the [Teachings of Akṣhayamati] Sūtra (see Interpretable and Definitive, 113) says: Moreover, consciousness is (1) cognition of forms which are known by the eye, (2) cognition of sounds which are known by the ear, (3) cognition of odors which are known by the nose, (4) cognition of tastes which are known by the tongue, (5) cognition of objects of touch which are known by the body, and (6) cognition of phenomena which are known by the mind. These are called consciousness. [This which is pacified internally and does not move to the external and through relying on pristine wisdom does not conceive and conceptualize any phenomenon is called pristine wisdom. ] and so forth. འད འ མ ཤ ས ལ མ ག ས གས དབང ཤ ས དང ཀ ན བ མ ཅན ག ཡ ད ཤ ས དང ག ཀ ང ཡ ད ད ད ན དམ འཚ ལ ཚ མ ཤ ས ད དག ལ མ ན པར མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཟབ མ ལ ན པར བཤད པའ ར ཏ མད ལས གཞན ཡང མ པར ཤ ས པ ན གང མ ག ག མ པར ཤ ས པས ག གས ལ མ པར ར ག པ དང ད བཞ ན བས ཤ ས པར བའ མས དང ས ཤ ས པར བའ མས དང ས ཤ ས པར བའ ར མས དང ས ཀ ས ཤ ས པར བའ ར ག མས དང ཡ ད ཀ ས ཤ ས པར བའ ཆ ས ལ མ པར ར ག པ འད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ས གས ས Also, in terms of temporary and final aims, what need is there to mention hearing and thinking! Even consciousnesses arisen from meditation included within cyclic existence are posited as consciousness here [in the four reliances as not to be relied upon] because it is explained that no matter what dependent-arisings of consciousness form, formless, and below in taking rebirth in the three realms that one attains, they are

162 160 Principles for Practice not to be mentally relied on; rather, one should rely on uncontaminated pristine wisdom knowing the four truths and so forth. ཡང གནས བས དང མཐར ག ག ད ན ག དབང ས ནས ཐ ས བསམ ག མ ཤ ས ཅ ས འཁ ར བས བ ས པའ མ ང ག མ ཤ ས ཀ ང འད འ མ ཤ ས ལ འཇ ག ཁམས ག མ བ ལ ན པའ མ ཤ ས ག གས ག གས མ ད མན ཆད ཀ མ ཤ ས ཀ ན འ ལ ཅ ཙམ ཐ བ ཀ ང ཡ ད མ ན ལ བད ན བཞ ས གས ཤ ས པའ ཟག མ ད ཀ ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན པར བཤད པའ ར Asaṅga s Actuality of the Grounds says: 90 Regarding that, the One-Gone-Thus spoke of merit and unwavering consciousness for the sake of progressing to the happy migrations, and regarding statements that knowledge of the four truths for Superiors is for the sake of attaining nirvāṇa, rely on the pristine wisdom of the accomplishment of doctrine in accordance with reality, but not on consciousness. སའ དང ས གཞ ལས ད ལ བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས aབས ད ནམས དང མ གཡ བར འག བའ མ པར ཤ ས པ ཡང བད འག ར འག བའ ར ག ངས ལ འཕགས པའ བད ན པ བཞ ཤ ས པ ཡང ངན ལས འདས པར འ ར བའ ར ག ངས པ ད ལ ཆ ས ཀ ས མ ན པའ ཆ ས བ བ པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལ ན ག མ པར ཤ ས པ ལ མ ན ན ཞ ས དང Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, kha: 91 I wonder whether these refer to causal consciousness of the same round [of the twelve links of dependent-arising] as meritorious a Correcting kyi in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (414.3) to kyis in accordance with the Actuality of the Grounds (sde dge 4035, sems tsam vol., 130b.3).

163 Great Exposition of Tenets 161 impelling action and unmoving impelling action because consciousness at the time of the effect is neutral, due to which there are none arisen from meditation. ཁ འད ན འཕ ན ད བས ད ནམས ཀ ལས དང འཕ ན ད མ གཡ བའ ལས དང ཚར གཅ ག པའ ས ཀ མ ཤ ས ལ ད ད འ ས ས ཀ མ ཤ ས ན ང མ བ ན ཡ ན པས ད ལ མ ང མ ད པའ ར མ མ and Asaṅga s Grounds of Bodhisattvas says: 92 Bodhisattvas view the pristine wisdom of realization as the essence, not just consciousness of the meanings of hearing and thinking. ང ས ལས ང བ ས མས དཔའ ན གས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལ ང པ ར བ ཡ ན ག ཐ ས པ དང བསམ པའ ད ན མ པར ཤ ས པ ཙམ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས 6. BENEFITS OF THE FOUR RELIANCES ག པ [ ན པ བཞ འ ཕན ཡ ན ] The four reliances have benefits because: 1. By the first [relying on doctrine, but not relying on persons] one will not fall from the doctrine and thereby will not sever one s lineage [of spiritual development]. 2. By the second [relying on meaning, but not relying on words] one will not fall from partaking of the profound thought. 3. By the third [relying on definitive meaning, but not relying on interpretable meaning] one will not fall from hearing the meaning exactly as it is and thereby will not wrongly engage the meaning of scripture. 4. By the fourth [relying on pristine wisdom, but not relying on consciousness] one will not fall from wisdom having clear appearance and thereby will not fall from supramundane pristine wisdom. For, Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras says: 93

164 162 Principles for Practice The firm do not fall from Being intent, partaking, Hearing from others just as it is, And inexpressible pristine wisdom. ཕན ཡ ན ཡ ད ད ན པ དང པ ས ཆ ས ལས མ ཉམས པས ར གས ཆད པར མ འ ར བ དང གཉ ས པས དག ངས པ ཟབ མ ད པ ལས མ ཉམས པ དང ག མ པས ད ན ཇ བ བཞ ན ཐ ས པ ལས མ ཉམས པས ང ད ན ལ ལ ག པར མ འ ག པ དང བཞ པས གསལ ང ག ཤ ས རབ ལས མ ཉམས པས འཇ ག ན ལས འདས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལས ཉམས པར མ འ ར བའ ར ཏ མད ན ལས མ ས དང མ པར ད པ དང གཞན ལས ཇ བཞ ན ཐ ས པ དང བ ད པ མ ད པའ ཡ ཤ ས ལས བ ན མས ཉམས པར མ འ ར ར ཞ ས ས Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations, ga: 94 It explains that the firm, that is, Bodhisattvas, do not deteriorate from the four: being intent on scriptural doctrines, analysis of the meaning of the Subduer s thought, hearing nonerroneous meanings from others, and supramundane pristine wisdom. Partake (spyod pa) is a lexical error; hence it should read not fall from analyzing the profound thought (དག ངས པ ཟབ མ ད ད པ ལས མ ཉམས པ ) and Being intent, analysis (མ ས དང མ པར ད ད པ ). ག ཕན ཡ ན ན ང ག ཆ ས ལ མ ས པ དང བ པའ དག ངས ད ན ད ད པ དང གཞན ལས ད ན ན ཅ མ ལ ག པར ཐ ས པ དང འཇ ག ན ལས འདས པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཏ བཞ ལས བ ན པ ང ས མས མས ཉམས པར མ འ ར བར བཤད ད ད པ ཞ ས པ ཡ ག ན ར བས

165 Great Exposition of Tenets 163 དག ངས པ ཟབ མ ད ད པ ལས མ ཉམས པ དང ཞ ས དང མ ས དང མ པར ད ད པ དང ཞ ས འད ན དག ས ས

166

167 Abbreviations 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang = Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅsbzhad-pa i-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Go-mang Lhasa = drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa'i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. Named 1987 because of being acquired in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987; published at Go-mang College, date unknown. (Complete edition, available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org.) 2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod = grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong, Mundgod, India: Dre-pung Gomang Library, 1999; rpt. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, n.d. [this edition is based on the Tra-shi-khyil blockprint] Taipei reprint = drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa i gan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong. Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973) TBRC bla brang = drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par byed pa i mtha dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong, TBRC W : 1-288, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil, bla brang brka shis khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. lha sa = lha sa bka gyur. TBRC W26071, which is a PDF of: Zhol bka gyur par khang, Lhasa, Tibet, Interpretable and Definitive = Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-khapa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par byed pa'i mtha' dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong).

168 166 Abbreviations Peking = Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, sde dge = sde dge bstan gyur. sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bstan ḥgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, The cataglogue numbers are from Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, And A Catalogue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism. Edited by Yensho Kanakura. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, TBRC W23703, which is a PDF of: Delhi: Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, TBRC = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center ( Tenets = Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets : Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong).

169 Bibliography Sūtras are listed alphabetically by English title in the first section; the terms glorious and supreme at the beginning of titles are often dropped in the Bibliography. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section. Works mentioned in the first or second sections are not repeated in the third section. 1. SŪTRAS Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa P735, vol. 21; Toh. 13, vol. ka (shes rab sna tshogs) Sanskrit and Tibetan: Akira Yuyama. Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā (Sanskrit Recension A): Edited with an Introduction, Bibliographical Notes and a Tibetan Version from Tunhuang. London: Cambridge University Press, Sanskrit: E. E. Obermiller. Prajñāpāramitā-ratnaguṇa-sañcayagāthā. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, Also: P. L. Vaidya. Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṃgraha. Part I. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 17. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, English translation: Edward Conze. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary. Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa P734, vol. 21; TBRC W22084 Sanskrit: P. L. Vaidya. Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā, with Haribhadra s Commentary called Ālokā. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, English translation: Edward Conze. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary. Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra āryapañcaśatikāprajñāpāramitā phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga brgya pa P0738, vol. 21. English translation: Edward Conze. The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts. London: Luzac, One Hundred Fifty Modes of the Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitānayaśatapañcāśatikāsūtra shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i tshul brgya lnga bcu pa i mdo P121, vol. 5 English translation: Edward Conze. The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts, London: Luzac, One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa P730, vols.12-18; Toh. 8, vols. ka-a ( bum); TBRC W22084 Condensed English translation: Edward Conze. The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom. Berkeley: University of California Press, One Letter Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra ekākṣarīmātānāmasarvatathāgataprajñāpāramitāsūtra

170 168 Bibliography de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge gcig ma i mdo P741, vol. 21; D23, Dharma vol. 12 Perfection of Wisdom in Few Letters svalpākṣaraprajñāpāramitāsūtra shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge nyung ngu P159, vol. 6 English translation: Edward Conze. The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts, London: Luzac, Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa P731, vol. 19; TBRC W22084 English translation (abridged): Edward Conze. The Large Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom. Berkeley: University of California Press, Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitāsañcayagāthā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa P735, vol. 21; Toh. 13, vol. ka (shes rab sna tshogs); TBRC W : 3-40 Sanskrit and Tibetan: Akira Yuyama. Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā (Sanskrit Recension A): Edited with an Introduction, Bibliographical Notes and a Tibetan Version from Tunhuang. London: Cambridge University Press, Sanskrit: E. E. Obermiller. Prajñāpāramitā-ratnaguṇa-sañcayagāthā. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, Also: P. L. Vaidya. Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṃgraha. Part I. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 17. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, English translation: Edward Conze. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary. Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, OTHER SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS Abhayākaragupta ( jigs med byung gnas sbas pa) Commentary on the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra : Moonlight of Essential Points aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvṛttimarmakaumudī shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i grel pa gnad kyi zla od P5202, vol. 92; D3805, vol. da Ornament to the Subduer s Thought munimatālaṃkāra thub pa i dgongs rgyan P5294, vol.101; D3894, vol. ha Āryavimuktasena ('phags pa rnam grol sde, ca. 6 th century C.E.) Commentary on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra : Ornament for the Clear Realizations pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa; abbr. nyi khri snang ba P5185, vol. 88 Sanskrit edition: L'Abhisamayālamkāravrtti di Ārya-Vimuktisena: primo Abhisamaya / testo e note critiche [a cura di] Corrado Pensa. Roma, Italy: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Tibetan edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : , which is a PDF of: Delhi, India: Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang,

171 Bibliography 169 Asaṅga (thogs med, fourth century) Five Treatises on the Grounds 1. Grounds of Yogic Practice yogācārabhūmi rnal byor spyod pa i sa P , vols Grounds of Bodhisattvas bodhisattvabhūmi byang chub sems pa i sa P5538, vol. 110 Sanskrit: Unrai Wogihara. Bodhisattvabhūmi: A Statement of the Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being the Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi). Leipzig: 1908; Tokyo: Seigo Kenyūkai, Also: Nalinaksha Dutt. Bodhisattvabhumi (Being the XVth Section of Asangapada s Yogacarabhumi). Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 7. Patna, India: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, English translation of the Chapter on Suchness, the fourth chapter of Part I which is the f ifteenth volume of the Grounds of Yogic Practice: Janice D. Willis. On Knowing Reality. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Compendium of Ascertainments nirṇayasaṃgraha / viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī rnam par gtan la dbab pa bsdu ba P5539, vols Compendium of Bases vastusaṃgraha gzhi bsdu ba P5540, vol Compendium of Enumerations paryāyasaṃgraha rnam grang bsdu ba P5543, vol Compendium of Explanations vivaraṇasaṃgraha rnam par bshad pa bsdu ba P5543, vol. 111 Grounds of Hearers nyan sa śrāvakabhūmi P5537, vol. 110 Sanskrit: Karunesha Shukla. Śrāvakabhūmi. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 14. Patna, India: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Two Summaries 1. Summary of Manifest Knowledge abhidharmasamuccaya chos mngon pa kun btus P5550, vol. 112 Sanskrit: Pralhad Pradhan. Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga. Visva-Bharati Series 12. Santiniketan, India: Visva-Bharati (Santiniketan Press), French translation: Walpola Rahula. La compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d Asaṅga. Paris: École Française d Extrême-Orient, Summary of the Great Vehicle mahāyānasaṃgraha theg pa chen po bsdus pa

172 170 Bibliography P5549, vol. 112 French translation and Chinese and Tibetan texts: Étienne Lamotte. La somme du grand véhicule d Asaṅga, 2 vols. Publications de l Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 8. Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1938; reprint, Atisha (dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, mar me mdzad ye shes, ) Lamp Summary of (Maitreya s) Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthapradīpa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don bsdus sgron ma P5201, vol. 92; D3804, vol. tha Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment bodhipathapradīpa byang chub lam gyi sgron ma P5343, vol. 103; D3947, vol. khi English translation with Atisha s autocommentary: Richard Sherbourne, S.J. A Lamp for the Path and Commentary. London: George Allen and Unwin, English translation: Atisha s Lamp for the Path: An Oral Teaching by Geshe Sonam Rinchen. Trans. and ed. Ruth Sonam. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Bhadanta Vimuktasena (btsun pa grol sde) [Sub]commentary on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra : Ornament for the Clear Realizations āryapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkārakārikāvārttika nyi khrid nam grel / phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan gyi tshig le ur byas pa i rnam par grel pa P5186, vol. 88 Bodhibhadra (byang chub bzang po) Connected Explanation of (Āryadeva s) Compilation of the Essence of Wisdom ye shes snying po kun las btus pa shes bya ba i bshad sbyar, jñānasārasamuccayanāmanibandhana P5252, vol. 95 Buddhashrījñāna Commentary on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Supramundane Victorious Mother Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Wisdom Lamp Garland abhisamayālaṃkārabhagavatīprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛttiprajñāpradīpāvali bcom ldan das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan gyi grel pa shes rab sgron ma i phreng ba P5198, vol. 91; D3800, vol. ta Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Verse Summary sañcayagāthāpañjikā bsdus pa tshig su bcad pa'i dka' grel P5196, vol. 91; D3798, vol. nya Chandrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, seventh century) Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle madhaymakāvatārabhāṣya dbu ma la jug pa i bshad pa / dbu ma la jug pa i rang grel P5263, vol. 98; Toh. 3862, vol. a. Also: Dharmsala, India: Council of Religious and Cultural Affairs, Tibetan: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, French translation (up to chap. 6, stanza 165): Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Muséon 8 (1907): ; Muséon 11 (1910): ; Muséon 12 (1911):

173 Bibliography 171 German translation (chap. 6, stanzas ): Helmut Tauscher. Candrakīrti- Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 5. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle madhyamakāvatāra dbu ma la jug pa P5261, P5262, vol. 98; Toh. 3861, Toh. 3862, vol. a Tibetan: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, English translation: C. W. Huntington, Jr. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (chap. 6): Stephen Batchelor. Echoes of Voidness by Geshé Rabten, London: Wisdom Publications, See also references under Chandrakīrti s Autocommentary on the Supplement. Chim Jam-pay-yang (mchims jam pa i dbyangs or mchims nam mkha grags, died 1289 / 1290) Commentary on [ Vasubandhu s] Treasury of Manifest Knowledge : Ornament of Manifest Knowledge chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le ur byas pa i grel pa mngon pa i rgyan Buxaduor, India: Nang bstan shes rig dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, n.d. Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century) Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition pramāṇavārttikakārikā tshad ma rnam grel gyi tshig le ur byas pa P5709, vol. 130; Toh. 4210, vol. ce. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Sanskrit: Dwarikadas Shastri. Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrtti. Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, Sanskrit and Tibetan: Yūsho Miyasaka. Pramāṇavarttika-kārikā: Sanskrit and Tibetan. Indo Koten Kenkyu (Acta Indologica) 2 ( ): English translation (chap. 2): Masatoshi Nagatomi. A Study of Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavarttika, Book I. Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, English translation (chap. 4): Tom J.F. Tillemans. Dharmakīrti s Pramāṇavārttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna), vol. 1 (k ). Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Dharmakīrtishrī (chos kyi grags pa dpal / gser gling pa) Explanation of (Haribhadra s) Commentary on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Illumination of the Difficult to Realize prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttidurbodhālokānāmaṭīkā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa rtogs par dka' ba'i snang ba zhes bya ba'i grel bshad P5192, vol. 91; D3794, vol. ja Dharmamitra (chos kyi bshes gnyen) Explanation of (Haribhadra s) Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Very Clear Words abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkāprasphuṭapadā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan gyi tshig le ur byas pa i grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba

174 172 Bibliography P5194, vol. 91; D 3796, vol. nya Dharmashrī Explanation of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra śatasāhasrikāvivaraṇa stong phrag brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa P5203, vol. 92; D3802, vol. da Key to the Treasury of the Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrābhisamayālaṃkāravṛttidurbodhālokānāmaṭīkā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i mdzod kyi lde mig P5204, vol. 92; D3806, vol. da Gen-dün-drub, First Dalai Lama (dge dun grub, ) Commentary on (Guṇaprabha s) Aphorisms on Discipline / Essence of the Entire Discipline, Eloquent Holy Doctrine legs par gsungs pa i dam chos dul ba mtha dag gi snying po Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dge- dun-grub-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Lama Sangye, Explanation of [ Vasubandhu s] Treasury of Manifest Knowledge : Illuminating the Path to Liberation dam pa i chos mngon pa i mdzod kyi rnam par bshad pa thar lam gsal byed Tibetan editions: Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dge- dun-grub-pa, vol. 3. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Lama, Buxaduor, India: n.p., Also: Sarnath, India: wa na mtho slob dge ldan spyi las khang, English translation (chapters 1-5): David Patt. Elucidating the Path to Liberation. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microf ilms, English translation (chap. 6): Harvey B. Aronson, The Buddhist Path: A Translation of the Sixth Chapter of the First Dalai Lama s Path of Liberation. Tibet Journal 5, no. 3 (1980): 29-51; 5, no. 4 (1980): 28-47; 12, no. 2 (1987): 25-40; 12, no. 3 (1987): Gen-dün-gya-tsho, Second Dalai Lama (dge dun rgya mtsho, ) Lamp Illuminating the Meaning / Commentary on the Difficult Points of Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive from the Collected Works of the Foremost Holy Omniscient [Tsong-ka-pa]: Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Meaning of his Thought rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa i gsung bum las drang nges rnam byed kyi dka grel dgongs pa i don rab tu gsal bar byed pa i sgron me n.d. [blockprint borrowed from the library of H.H. the Dalai Lama and photocopied] volume a Guṇaprabha (yon tan od ) Aphorisms on Discipline vinayasūtra dul ba i mdo P5619, vol. 123 Gung-ru Chö-kyi-jung-nay (c. sixteenth century, gung ru chos gyi byung gnas). Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-ka-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive, The Essence of Eloquence : Garland of White Lotuses. (drang ba dang nges pa i rnam par byed pa legs bshad snying po zhes bya ba i mtha dpyod padma dkar po i phreng ba). sku bum, Tibet: sku bum Monastery, n.d. [blockprint obtained by Jeffrey Hopkins in 1988]. Gung-thang Kön-chok-tan-pay-drön-me (gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa i sgron me, ) Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing Liberation: Festival for the Wise bden bzhi i rnam gzhag thar dod jug ngogs mkhas pa i dga ston Collected Works of Gun-thaṅ dkon-mchog bstan-pa i sgron-me, vol. 2. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972.

175 Bibliography 173 Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho (gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho, /1930) Annotations to (Haribhadra s) Small Clear Meaning Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Clearing Away the Darkness for Those Wanting Liberation mngon rtogs rgyan gyi grel chung don gsal ba'i mchan grel kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma thar dod mun sel Tibetan editions: Lhasa (?): dge ldan legs bshad gsung rab grem spel khang, TBRC W00EGS , which is a PDF of: Lhasa (?): dge ldan legs bshad gsung rab grem spel khang, Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, ) Explanation [of (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations and its Commentaries]: Ornament for the Essence/ Explanation Illuminating the Meaning of the Commentaries on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Ornament for the Essence rnam bshad snying po rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa don gsal ba'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan Tibetan editions: Sarnath: Gelugpa Student's Welfare Committee, mngon rtogs brgyad don bdun cu dang bcas pa'i grel pa nyams su len tshul. In gsung bum/ rgyal tshab rje (sku bum par ma). TBRC W : , which is a PDF of: sku bum monastery, Tibet: sku bum byams pa gling par khang, [19?]. Explanation of (Shāntideva s) Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds : Entrance for Victor Children byang chub sems dpa i spyod pa la jug pa i rnam bshad rgyal sras jug ngog Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973 Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Explanation of (Dharmakīrti s) Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition : Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation thar lam gsal byed / tshad ma rnam grel gyi tshig le ur byas pa i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa Tibetan editions: Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Guru Deva, Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po, late eighth century) Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations spuṭhārtha / abhisamayālaṃkāranāmaprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛtti grel pa don gsal / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan ces bya ba i grel pa Sanskrit editions: Amano, Ko ei. A study on the Abhisamaya-alam ka ra-ka rika -s a stra-vrṭti. Rev. ed. Yanai City, Japan: Rokoku Bunko, Tripathi, Ram Shankar. Slob-dpon Seṅ-ge-bzaṅ-pos mdzad pa'i Mṅon-par-rtogs-pa'i-rgyan gyi grel pa Don-gsal (Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstre Ācāryaharibhadraviracitā Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛttiḥ Sphuṭārtha), nd ed. Sarnath, India: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies Wogihara, Unrai. Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā, The Work of Haribhadra. 7 vols. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, ; reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, Wogihara, Unrai, ed. Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā: Commentary on aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā by Haribhadra, Together with the Text Commented on. Tokyo, Japan: The Toyo Bunko, 1973.

176 174 Bibliography Tibetan edition: In bstan gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : , which is a PDF of: Delhi, India: Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, English translation: Sparham, Gareth. A ryavimuktisena, Maitreyana tha, and Haribhadra. Abhisamaya lam ka ra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Verse Summary of the Precious Qualities of the Supramundane Victorious [Mother] bhagavatīratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthāpañjikāsubodhinīnāma bcom ldan das yon tan rin po che sdus pa'i tshig su bcad pa'i dka' grel P5190; D3792 [Commentary on the] Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa P5188; D3790 Explanation of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra : Illumination of (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāvyākhyānābhisamayālaṃkārālokā shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i bshad pa mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi snang ba In bstan gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : 4-683, which is a PDF of: Delhi, India: Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü ( jam dbyangs bzhad pa i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, /1722) Eloquent Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics: Sacred Word of Guru Ajita dngos po brgyad don bdun cu i rnam bzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung Tibetan editions: 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang: Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa i-rdo-rje, vol. 15. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Go-mang Lhasa (first printing): don bdun cu'i mtha' spyod mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung gsal ba'i legs bshad blo gsal mgul rgyan. 1a-20a. Go-mang College: Lha-sa, Tibet: n.d. (PDF of complete printing available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, Go-mang Lhasa (second printing): don bdun cu'i mtha' spyod mi pham bla ma'i zhal lung gsal ba'i legs bshad blo gsal mgul rgyan. 3a-20a. Go-mang College: Lha-sa, Tibet: n.d. (PDF of incomplete printing available at UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, Mundgod revision of Ngawang Gelek bla brang: Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźadpa i-rdo-rje, vol. 16. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Mundgod: dngos po brgyad don bdun cu i rnam gzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma i zhal lung. In don bdun cu dang sa lam sogs nyer mkho'i skor phyogs bsgrigs: Mundgod, India: Dre-pung Gomang Library, Tōyō Bunko CD-ROM: Tibetan texts of don bdun bcu of jam dbyangs bzhad pa and rigs lam phrul gyi lde mig of dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me. In the Toyo Bunko Database CD Release II. Tokyo, Japan: Tōyō Bunko, CD-ROM. (This edition is based on the 1999 Mundgod.) 2001 Kan su u: dngos po brgyad don bdun cu i rnam gzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma i zhal lung. In don bdun cu dang sa lam sogs nyer mkho'i skor phyogs bsgrigs: Kan su'u, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, Mundgod: dngos po brgyad don bdun cu i rnam gzhag legs par bshad pa mi pham bla ma i zhal lung. In don bdun cu dang sa lam sogs nyer mkho'i skor phyogs bsgrigs: Mundgod, India: Dre-pung Gomang Library, 2005.

177 Bibliography TBRC bla brang: In kun mkhyen jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje mchog gi gsung bum, vol. 14. TBRC W : , which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil: bla brang brka shis khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins and Jongbok Yi. The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Seventy Topics and Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par byed pa'i mtha' dpyod khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong Edition cited: TBRC W : 1-288, which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil, bla brang brka shis khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets : Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulf illing All Hopes of All Beings grub mtha chen mo / grub mtha i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu i re ba kun skong Edition cited: Musoorie, India: Dalama, Also: Collected Works of Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa irdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also: Mundgod, India: Dre-pung Gomang Library, English translation (entire root text and edited portions of the autocommentary and Ngag-wangpal-dan s Annotations): Jeffrey Hopkins. Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (beginning of the chapter on the Consequence School): Jeffrey Hopkins. Meditation on Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom Publications, English translation of root text with Lo-sang-kön-chog s commentary: Daniel Cozort and Craig Preston. Buddhist Philosophy: Losang Gonchok's Short Commentary to Jamyang Shayba's Root Text on Tenets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Translation of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Daniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998). Jay-tsun Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (se ra rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, ) Excellent Means Definitely Revealing the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics, the Topics of (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations, the Stainless Oral Transmission of Jay-tsun-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan gyi brjod bya dngos brgyad don bdun cu nges par byed pa i thabs dam pa rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan gyi gsung rgyun dri ma med pa Indian block-print, n.d. dngos po brgyad don bdun cu i rnam gzhag. In don bdun cu dang sa lam sogs nyer mkho'i skor phyogs bsgrigs bzhugs so: kan su'u, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, Rje btsun pa i Don bdun cu: An Introduction to the Abhisamayālaṅkāra Edited with Introduction by Shunzō Onoda Kyoto, Japan: The Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Nagoya University, Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, ) Extensive Explanation of (Dharmakīrti s) Commentary on (Dignāga s) Compilation of Prime Cognition : Ocean of Reasoning tshad ma rnam grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho TBRC W1KG10279, vol. 10 (tha), , which is a pdf of bla brang bkra shis khyil par khang edition, 199?

178 176 Bibliography Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po (dkon mchog jigs med dbang po, ) Condensed Presentation of the Eight Categories and Seventy Topics dngos brgyad don bdun cu i rnam bzhag bsdus pa Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbang-po, vol. 6. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Precious Garland of Tenets / Presentation of Tenets: A Precious Garland grub pa i mtha i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che i phreng ba Tibetan: K. Mimaki. Le Grub mtha rnam bzhag rin chen phreṅ ba de dkon mchog jigs med dbaṅ po ( ), Zinbun [The Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University], 14 (1977): Also, Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 6, New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, Also: Xylograph in thirty-two folios from the Lessing collection of the rare book section of the University of Wisconsin Library, which is item 47 in Leonard Zwilling. Tibetan Blockprints in the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, Also: Mundgod, India: blo gsal gling Press, Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Also: Dharmsala, India: Teaching Training, n.d. Also: A blockprint edition in twenty-eight folios obtained in 1987 from Go-mang College in Lha-sa, printed on blocks that predate the Cultural Revolution. English translation: Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins. Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, New York: Grove, 1976; rev. ed., Cutting through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Also: H. V. Guenther. Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, Also, the chapters on the Autonomy School and the Consequence School: Shōtarō Iida. Reason and Emptiness, Tokyo: Hokuseido, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, vol. 7. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, English translation: Elizabeth Napper. Traversing the Spiritual Path: Kön-chog-jig-may-wangpo s Presentation of the Grounds and Paths: Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles, with Dan-ma-lo-chö s Oral Commentary. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2013: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Thorough Expression of the Natures of the One Hundred Seventy-Three Aspects of the Three Exalted Knowers: White Lotus Vine of Eloquence mkhyen gsum gyi rnam pa brgya dang don gsum gyi rang bzhin yang dag par brjod pa legs bshad padma dkar po i khri shing Tibetan editions: Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbang-po, vol. 6. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, In gsung bum/ dkon mchog jigs med dbang po (bla brang par ma). TBRC W2122.6: , which is a PDF of: bla brang bkra shis khyil, Tibet: bla brang dgon pa, English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins and Jongbok Yi. The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Seventy Topics and Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Kumārashrībhadra Summary of (Maitreya s) Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don bsdus pa P5195, vol. 91; D3797, vol. nya Long-döl Ngag-wang-lo-sang (klong rdol ngag dbang blo bzang, ) Vocabulary Occurring in the Perfection of Wisdom phar phyin las byung ba i ming gi rnam grangs

179 Bibliography 177 Tibetan editions: Collected Works, Śata-Piṭaka Series, vol New Delhi, India: International Academy of Indian Culture, TBRC W87: , which is a PDF of: khreng tu'u, China: [s.n.], [199-]. Lo-sang-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, ) Explanation of the First Category in the Ocean of Good Explanation Illuminating the Essence of the Essence of (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi snying po'i snying po gsal bar legs par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho las skabs dang po'i rnam par bshad pa Tibetan editions: Collected Works, vol. 4. New Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, TBRC W : , which is a PDF of: New Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, Maitreya (byams pa) Ornament for the Clear Realizations abhisamayālaṃkāra/ abhisamayālaṁkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrakārikā mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa Sanskrit editions: Amano, Ko ei. A study on the Abhisamaya-alam ka ra-ka rika -s a stra-vrṭti. Rev. ed. Yanai City, Japan: Rokoku Bunko, Stcherbatsky, Theodore and Eugène Obermiller, eds. Abhisamaya lan ka ra-prajn a pa ramita - Upades a-śa stra: The Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series. Reprint ed. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, Tibetan editions: Asian Classics Input Project, co ne: TBRC W1GS : 5-30, which is a PDF of: Co ne dgon chen: co ne, dpe bsdur ma: vol. 49: Beijing, China: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang, Peking: P5184, vol. 88 (śer-phyin, I): 1-15a.8. Tokyo; Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, snar thang: TBRC W : 5-30, which is a PDF of: Narthang: s. n., 1800?. sde dge: TBRC W :3-28, which is a PDF of: Delhi: Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, English translations: Brunnhölzl, Karl. Gone Beyond: The Prajn a pa ramitā Su tras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyu tradition. The Tsadra Foundation series. 2 vols. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Groundless Paths: The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Nyingma Tradition. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Conze, Edward. Abhisamayālaṅkāra: Introduction and Translation from Original Text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index. Roma, Italy: Is. M.E.O., Hopkins, Jeffrey and Jongbok Yi. Maitreya s Ornament for the Clear Realizations. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2015: downloadable at uma-tibet.org.. Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Explanation of the Treatise Ornament for the Clear Realizations From the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: The Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org.

180 178 Bibliography. (containing 203 of the 274 stanzas) The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa s Seventy Topics and Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Sparham, Gareth. A ryavimuktisena, Maitreyana tha, and Haribhadra. Abhisamaya lam ka ra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company., Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Sparham, Gareth. A ryavimuktisena, Maitreyana tha, and Haribhadra. Abhisamaya lam ka ra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company., Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra theg pa chen po i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le ur byas pa P5521, vol. 108; Dharma vol. 77 Tibetan edition: sde dge: TBRC W : 3-80, which is a PDF of: Delhi: Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, Sanskrit edition: Sitansusekhar Bagchi. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāraḥ of Asaṅga [with Vasubandhu s commentary]. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, Sanskrit text and translation into French: Sylvain Lévi. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. 2 vols. Paris: Bibliothèque de l École des Hautes Études, 1907, Nāgārjuna (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.) Precious Garland of Advice for the King rājaparikathāratnāvalī rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che i phreng ba P5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93 Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese: Michael Hahn. Nāgārjuna s Ratnāvalī. vol. 1. The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese). Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, English translations: Jeffrey Hopkins. Nāgārjuna s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, Supersedes that in: Nāgārjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama. The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint, in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. The Buddhism of Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; reprint, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, John Dunne and Sara McClintock. The Precious Garland: An Epistle to a King. Boston: Wisdom Publications, Of 223 stanzas (chap. 1, 1-77; chap. 2, 1-46; chap. 4, 1-100): Giuseppe Tucci. The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1934): ; (1936): , Japanese translation: Uryūzu Ryushin. Butten II, Sekai Koten Bungaku Zenshu, 7 (July, 1965): Edited by Nakamura Hajime. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Also: Uryūzu Ryushin. Daijō Butten, 14 (1974): Ryūju Ronshū. Edited by Kajiyama Yuichi and Uryūzu Ryushin. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha. Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. Nagarjuna, Juvelkaeden og andre skrifter. Copenhagen: Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b.1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje)

181 Bibliography 179 Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa s) Great Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought grub mtha chen mo i mchan grel dka gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅagdbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, Delhi: Guru Deva, Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets grub mtha bzhi i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo i glu dbyangs New Delhi: Guru Deva, Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vol. 1, Delhi, Explanation of (Maitreya s) Treatise Ornament for the Clear Realizations from the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: Sacred Word of Maitreyanātha bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan tshig don gyi sgo nas bshad pa byams mgon zhal lung TBRC W5926-3: , which is a PDF of: Delhi: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, Ngag-wang-lo-sang-gya-tsho (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, Fifth Dalai Lama, ) Instructions on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Sacred Word of Mañjushrī byang chub lam gyi rim pa i khrid yig jam pa i dbyangs kyi zhal lung Thimphu, Bhutan: kun bzang stobs rgyal, English translation of the Perfection of Wisdom Chapter : Jeffrey Hopkins. Practice of Emptiness. Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Pa-bong-ka-pa Jam-pa-tan-dzin-trin-lay-gya-tsho (pha bong kha pa byams pa bstan dzin phrin las rgya mtsho, ) Presentation of the Interpretable and the Definitive, Brief Notes on the Occasion of Receiving Profound [Instruction from Jo-ne Paṇḍita Lo-sang-gya-tsho in 1927] on (Tsong-kha-pa s) The Essence of Eloquence drang ba dang nges pa i don rnam par bzhag pa legs par bshad pa i snying po i zab nos skabs kyi zin bris mdo tsam du bkod pa Collected Works of Pha-boṅ-kha-pa-bstan- dzin- phrin-las-rgya-mtsho, vol. 4, New Delhi: Chophel Legdan, Paṇ-chen Sö-nam-drag-pa (paṇ chen bsod nams grags pa, ) General-Meaning Commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom/ Good Explanation of the Meaning of (Gyal-tshab s) Explanation Illuminating the Meaning of the Commentaries on (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for the Clear Realizations : Ornament for the Essence : Lamp Illuminating the Meaning of the Mother phar phyin spyi don/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan grel pa dang bcas pa i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba i sgron me Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, Prajñākaramati (shes rab byung gnas blo gros, ) Summary of (Haribhadra s) Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations abhisamayālaṃkāravṛittipiṇḍārtha mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa'i bsdus don P5193, vol. 91; D3795, vol. ja Ratnākarashānti (rin chen byung gnas zhi ba) Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra : The Supreme Essence ārya-aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāpañjikāsārottamā phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i dka' grel snying po mchog P5200, vol. 92; D3803, vol. tha Pure Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāvṛittiśuddhamatīnāma mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i grel pa dag ldan

182 180 Bibliography P5199, vol. 91; D3801, vol. ta Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom prajñāpāramitopadeśa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag P5579, vol. 114; D4079, vol. hi Ratnakīrti Commentary on (Maitreya s) Ornament for the Clear Realizations : A Portion of Glory abhisamayālaṃkāravṛittikīrtikalānāma mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi grel pa grags pa'i cha P5197, vol. 91; D3799, vol. nya Shāntideva (zhi ba lha, eighth century) Compendium of Instructions śikṣāsamuccaya bslab pa kun las btus pa P5272, vol. 102; Toh. 3940, vol. khi English Translation: C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse. Śikṣā Samuccaya. Delhi: Motilal, Edited Sanskrit: Cecil Bendall. Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching. Bibliotheca Buddhica 1. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra byang chub sems dpa i spyod pa la jug pa Toh. 3871, dbu ma, vol. la Sanskrit: P. L. Vaidya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 12. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, Sanskrit and Tibetan: Vidhushekara Bhattacharya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, Sanskrit and Tibetan with Hindi translation: Rāmaśaṃkara Tripāthī, ed. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bauddha-Himālaya-Granthamālā, 8. Leh, Ladākh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, English translations: Stephen Batchelor. A Guide to the Bodhisattva s Way of Life. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Marion Matics. Entering the Path of Enlightenment. New York: Macmillan, Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton. The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Padmakara Translation Group. The Way of the Bodhisattva. Boston: Shambhala, Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace. A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Contemporary commentary: H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. Transcendent Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of the Night. Boston: Shambhala, Smṛtijñānakīrti Indicating Through Eight Concordant Meanings the Mother Perfection of Wisdom Taught Extensively in One Hundred Thousand, Taught in Medium Length in Twenty-five Thousand, and Taught in Brief in Eight Thousand [Stanzas] prajñāpāramitāmātṛikāśatasāhasrikābṛhacchāsanapañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāmadhyaśāsanāṣṭādaśasā hasrikālaghuśāsanāṣṭasamānārthaśāsana yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyas par bstan pa bum dang bring du bstan pa nyi khri lnga stong dang bsdus te bstan pa khri brgyad stong pa rnams mthun par don brgyad kyis bstan pa

183 Bibliography 181 P5187, vol. 88; D3789, vol. kha Tshe-chog-ling Ye-shay-gyal-tshan (tshe mchog gling ye shes rgyal mtshan, ) Quintessential Instructions Clearly Teaching the Essentials of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, Correlating the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra with (Maitreya s) Ornament for Clear Realization : Lamp Illuminating the Perfection of Wisdom sher phyin stong phrag brgyad pa dang mngon rtogs rgyan sbyar te byang chub lam gyi rim pa i gnad rnams gsal bar ston pa i man ngag sher phyin gsal ba i sgron me Tibetan editions: Collected Works, vol. 7. New Delhi, India: Tibet House, TBRC W1022.7: 8-174, which is a PDF of: New Delhi, India: Tibet House, Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, ) Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle : Illumination of the Thought dbu ma la jug pa i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal P6143, vol Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, n.d. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1980; the portion of the book that is Tsong-kha-pa s Illumination of the Thought (chapters 1-5) is downloadable at: English translation (chap. 6, stanzas 1-7): Jeffrey Hopkins and Anne C. Klein. Path to the Middle: Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet: The Oral Scholarship of Kensur Yeshay Tupden, by Anne C. Klein, , Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, Golden Garland of Eloquence / Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya s) Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations as Well as Its Commentaries: Golden Garland of Eloquence legs bshad gser phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa i rgyan grel pa dang bcas pa i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba Tibetan editions: In gsung bum/ tsong kha pa (bkra shis lhun po par rnying). New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, TBRC W , which is a PDF of: gedan sungrab minyam gyunphel series (Ngawang Gelek Demo), English translation: Sparham, Gareth. Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Great Exposition of Secret Mantra / The Stages of the Path to a Conqueror and Pervasive Master, a Great Vajradhara: Revealing All Secret Topics sngags rim chen mo / rgyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje chang chen po i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phye ba P6210, vol Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, English translation (chap. 1): H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins. Tantra in Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (chaps. 2-3): H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins. The Yoga of Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981; reprinted as Deity Yoga. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation (chap. 4): H.H. the Dalai Lama, Dzong-ka-ba, and Jeffrey Hopkins. Yoga Tantra: Paths to Magical Feats. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings

184 182 Bibliography lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa i byang chub lam gyi rim pa P6001, vol Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, Edited Tibetan: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam Rim Chen Mo). Japanese and Tibetan Buddhist Culture Series, 6. Kyoto: Tibetan Buddhist Culture Association, English translation: Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. 3 vols. Joshua W.C. Cutler, editor-in-chief, Guy Newland, editor. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of the part on the excessively broad object of negation: Elizabeth Napper. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publications, English translation of the part on the excessively narrow object of negation: William Magee. The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, English translation of the parts on calm abiding and special insight: Alex Wayman. Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, New York: Columbia University Press, 1978; reprint, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim bring / lam rim chung ngu Tibetan editions: Mundgod, India: dga ldan shar rtse, n.d. (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay). Bylakuppe, India: Sera Je Library, 1999 (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay). P6002, vol Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, English translation of the section on special insight: Jeffrey Hopkins. In Tsong-kha-pa s Final Exposition of Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Robert Thurman. The Middle Transcendent Insight. Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Edited Tibetan text and Japanese translation of the section on special insight: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito. A Study of Tsong khapa s Mādhyamika Philosophy 1: Annotated Japanese translation of the Vipaśyanā Section of Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim). Tsong kha pa chuugan tetsugaku no kenkyuu 1, Bodaidousidairon chuuhen, kan no shou: wayaku, Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito, Kyoto: Buneido, Japanese translation: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takashi Rujinaka. The Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment by rje Tsong kha pa: An Annotated Japanese Translation of Byang chub Lam rim chung ba. Kyoto: Unio Corporation, Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, fl. 360) Treasury of Manifest Knowledge abhidharmakośa chos mngon pa i mdzod P5590, vol. 115 Sanskrit: Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra. Bauddha Bharati Series, 5. Banaras: Bauddha

185 Bibliography 183 Bharati, Also: P. Pradhan. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Patna, India: Jayaswal Research Institute, French translation: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. L Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, English translation of the French: Leo M. Pruden. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. 4 vols. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, OTHER WORKS Amano, Ko ei. A study on the Abhisamaya-alam ka ra-ka rika -s a stra-vrṭti. Rev. ed. Yanai City, Japan: Rokoku Bunko, Bastian, Edward Winslow. Mahāyāna Buddhist Religious Practice and the Perfection of Wisdom: According to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā: (The Interpretation of the First Two Topics by Haribhadra, Rgyal-Tshab Dar-Ma-Rin-Chen, and Rje- Btsun Chos-Kyi Rgyal-Mtshan. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, Brunnhölzl, Karl. Gone Beyond: The Prajn a pa ramitā Su tras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyu Tradition. The Tsadra Foundation series. 2 vols. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Groundless Paths: The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Nyingma Tradition. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Conze, Edward. Abhisamayālaṅkāra: Introduction and Translation from Original Text with Sanskrit- Tibetan Index. Roma, Italy: Is. M.E.O., The Gilgit manuscript of the Asṭạ das asa hasrika prajn a pa ramitā: Chapters 55 to 70 corresponding to the 5th Abhisamaya. Roma, Italy: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, with the Divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary. Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, Dhargey, Geshe Ngawang. A Short Biography in Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, ed. Robert A. F. Thurman. Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins. Tantra in Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Hopkins, Jeffrey. Absorption In No External World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism, Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 3. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Extracts from (Si-tu Paṇ-chen Chö-kyi-jung-nay s) Explanation of (Tön-mi Sambhoṭa s) The Thirty. Unpublished.. Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom Publications, Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Nāgārjuna s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Hopkins, Jeffrey, and Elizabeth Napper. Grammar Summaries for Tibetan. Unpublished. Maher, Derek F. Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context. Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, Napper, Elizabeth. Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po s Presentation of the Grounds and Paths with Denma Locho s Commentary. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, forthcoming 2014; downloadable free online at:

186 184 Bibliography Obermiller, Eugène. Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Fasc. 1). Calcutta Oriental Series No. 27. London: Luzac & Co., Reprint ed. Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities Press, Sopa, Geshe Lhundup, and Jeffrey Hopkins. Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, Sparham, Gareth. Maitreyana tha, A ryavimuktisena, and Haribhadra. Abhisamaya lam ka ra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company., Detailed Explanation of the Ornament and Brief Called Golden Garland of Eloquence by Tsong kha pa, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, Stcherbatsky, Theodore and Eugène Obermiller, eds. Abhisamaya lan ka ra-prajn a pa ramita -Upades a- śa stra: The Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya. Bibliotheca Buddhica 23. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, Reprint ed. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, Available free online at Zahler, Leah. Study and Practice of Meditation: Tibetan Interpretations of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2009.

187 Endnotes 1 sde dge 3852, 40a.1. 2 Chandrakīrti s Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle (madhaymakāvatārabhāṣya, dbu ma la jug pa i bshad pa / dbu ma la jug pa i rang grel). Peking 5263, vol. 98; sde dge 3862, VI.30, 256a.7-256b.1. 3 Brackets from Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho s Port of Entry, TBRC bla brang, 3a.4; 1987 Go-mang, 2b.6; 2008 Taipei reprint, Correcting skabs di i ston pa bzhi in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (3a.6) to skabs di i rton pa bzhi in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (3a.1). Here the 2011 TBRC bla brang appears to be incorrect. 6 Correcting gnas lugs mi rton pa la byed in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (3a.6) to gnas lugs mi ston pa la byed in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (3a.2). Here the TBRC Mundgod appears to be incorrect TBRC bla brang, 3b.3; 1987 Go-mang, 3a.4; 2008 Taipei reprint, sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a.6-136b.6. 9 lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 58b I have supplied in brackets material omitted from the citation by Jam-yang-shay-pa from: lha sa 176, vol. 60, 232a.5-232b Correcting rig to rigs in accordance with the Peking title, rnam par bshad pa i rigs pa. 13 phags pa yul khor skyong gis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po i mdo, āryarāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchānāmamahāyānasūtra; lha sa 62, dkon brtsegs, vol. 38, 499b.5-499b Brackets from Jig-may-dam-chö-gya-tsho s Port of Entry, Jam-yang-shay-pa s citation of the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra is in accordance with the sde dge (TBRC W b.2-106b.4) and the snar thang (TBRC W ) editions of the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra: de ltar de'i phyir blo gros chen po de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying por bstan pas mu stegs byed kyi bdag tu smra ba'i bstan pa dang mi 'dra'o blo gros chen po de ltar de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi mu stegs byed bdag tu smra ba la mngon par zhen pa rnams drang ba'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po ston te yang dag pa ma yin pa'i bdag tu rnam par rtog pa'i lta bar lhung ba'i bsam pa can dag rnam par thar pa gsum gyi spyod yul la gnas pa'i bsam pa dang ldan zhing myur du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub tu mngon par 'tshang rgya bar ji ltar 'gyur zhe na Tsong-kha-pa s citation in The Essence of Eloquence of the same passage (TBRC W1KG a.2-93a.4.) is:

188 186 Endnotes sangs rgyas rnams kyis ni byis pa bdag med pa skrag pa spang ba dang mu stegs byed bdag tu smra ba la zhen pa rnams drang ba'i phyir stong nyid mtshan med smon med la sogs pa'i tshig gi don chos kyi bdag med snang med kyi spyod yul la de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes ston pas mu stegs kyi bdag smra ba dang mi 'dra ste 'di la da ltar dang ma 'ongs pa'i byang sems kyi bdag tu zhen par mi bya'o// bdag tu lta bar lhung ba'i bsam pa can rnams rnam thar gsum gyi spyod yul la gnas pa'i bsam pa dang ldan zhing myur du 'tshang rgya bar gyur na snyam nas de'i don du snying po ston pas// 16 Correcting mi in the 2008 Taipei reprint (7.12) to mu in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang edition (6a.6). 17 See Jeffrey Hopkins Reflections on Reality, chap Correcting ngos zin in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7a.4) to dngos zin in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (5b.4). 19 Mañjughoṣha Narendrakīrti ( jam pa i dbyangs mi i dbang po grags pa) (also known as Mañjushrīkīrti ( jam dpal grags pa) and Kālachakrapāda), rang gi lta ba i dod pa mdor bstan pa yongs su brtag pa, pradarśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣā, Peking 4610, vol Correcting ba in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7a.6) to pa in accordance with the 1987 Gomang Lhasa (5b.6). 21 Correcting par in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7a.6) to pa in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (5b.7). 22 Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, ) Extensive Explanation of (Kalkī Puṇḍarīka s) Great Commentary on the Glorious Kālachakra Tantra, The Stainless Light : Illumination of the Principles (dpal dus kyi khor lo i grel chen dri ma med pa i od kyi rgya cher bshad pa de kho na nyid snang bar byed pa). 23 sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a Correcting ba i in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7b.2) to pa i in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (6a.2). 25 The 1987 Go-mang Lhasa reads kyi (6a.2) rather than the more likely kyis in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7b.2). 26 Correcting dpa i in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7b.3) to dpa in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (6a.2). 27 Correcting ston in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7a.3) to rton in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (6a.2). 28 Correcting zhes in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (7b.3) to zhes pa in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa zhes pa (6a.2). 29 lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4-230b Correcting yod pa i in the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (6a.7) to yod pa las in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang (8a.3). This is an emendation for the sake of consistency by the 2011 TBRC bla brang. See the use of yod pa las in the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (7b.4). 31 Correcting mi bden in the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (6a.7) to mi bden par in accordance with the 2011 TBRC bla brang (8a.3).

189 Endnotes Peking 843, 150a.2-150b.4 and lha sa 176, vol. 60, 231a.6. Jam-yang-shay-pa s citation has been filled out. 33 Correcting dga (lha sa 176, vol. 60, 231b.6) twice in this line of text to dka in accordance with Peking 843, 150a Collected Works of Rje Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa, vol. 21 pha (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975), ; translation by Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Middle School: General Exposition, unpublished digital manuscript, sde dge 4037, vol. wi, 136b mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, stong thun chen mo (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972), I.148; sde dge 4024, vol. phi, 61b1-61b Correcting ba in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (9a.2) to pa in accordance with the 1987 Gomang Lhasa (7a.2). 39 sde dge 4037, vol. wi, 136b lha sa 176, vol. 60, 230b.1-231a Correcting rigs in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (9b.2) to rig in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (7a.7). 42 The 2008 Taipei reprint (13.1) misreads rig; both 2011 TBRC bla brang (9b.3) and 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (7b.1) correctly read reg. 43 mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, stong thun chen mo (Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 1, 1972), TBRC bla brang, 10a.5; 1987 Go-mang, 7a.1; 2008 Taipei reprint, sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136b Correcting rton in the 2011 TBRC bla brang (10b.6) to ston in accordance with the 1987 Go-mang Lhasa (8a.7) TBRC bla brang, 11a.1; 1987 Go-mang, 8a.7; 2008 Taipei reprint, sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a.6-136a lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4-230b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a Jam-yang-shay-pa cites only the beginning and and so forth, which has been filled out. 52 Jam-yang-shay-pa cites only the beginning and and so forth, which has been filled out TBRC bla brang, 12a.3; 1987 Go-mang, 9a.6; 2008 Taipei reprint, TBRC bla brang, 12a.5; 1987 Go-mang, 9a.7; 2008 Taipei reprint, TBRC bla brang, 12b.2; 1987 Go-mang, 9b.3; 2008 Taipei reprint, Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, Adapted from Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School, sde dge 4035, sems tsam, vol. tshi, 130a Annotations, dgnos, wa, 97a.5.

190 188 Endnotes 60 Chandrakīrti s Autocommentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna s) Treatise on the Middle (madhaymakāvatārabhāṣya, dbu ma la jug pa i bshad pa / dbu ma la jug pa i rang grel). Peking 5263, vol. 98; sde dge 3862, VI.30, 256a.7-256b sde dge 4035, b Annotations, dgnos, zha, 97b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136b Annotations, dgnos, za, 98a Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020, sems tsam, vol. phi, 223b Annotations, dgnos, a, 98a snar thang edition of Asvabhāva s text, TBRC W Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020 sems tsam vol. phi,. 29b Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020, sems tsam, vol. phi, 29b Annotations, dgnos, ya, 98a Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020; 29b Asaṅga s Grounds of Yogic Practice; sde dge 4035, 130b lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136b.1. ACIP text reads: ད ར ར གས པ ལ ན ག གང ཟག ལ མ ན པ ད ན ད ཁ ནའ ད ན ལས མ གཡ ཞ ང. 75 Annotations, dgnos, ra, 98a Annotations, dgnos, la, 98a Maitreya s Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras, sde dge 4020; 29b Correcting yin pa i in the Labrang edition (190a.6) to yin pas in accordance with the sense of the passage. 79 I have supplied in brackets material omitted from the citation: sde dge 89, 232a.5-232b Annotations, dgnos, sha, 98b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 58b Annotations, dgnos, sa, 98b Annotations, dgnos, ha, 98b lha sa 176, vol. 60, 228b.4-230b Annotations, dgnos, a, 98b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136a lha sa 176, vol. 60, 231b sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136b Annotations, dgnos, ka, 99a sde dge, 4035; 130b.3-4.

191 Endnotes Annotations, dgnos, kha, 99a sde dge 4037, sems tsam, vol. wi, 136b sde dge 4020; 29b Annotations, dgnos, ga, 99a.6.

192 Principles for Practice Drawn from the syllabus of the renowned Tibetan Go-mang College, this book contains: the first translation of the Four Reliances section in Jam-yangshay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-dru s ( ) Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa s) Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lapis-Lazuli of Scripture and Reasoning Free from Error, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate the first complete translation of the Four Reliances section in Jam-yang-shay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets the first translation of Ngag-wang-pal-dan s Annotations of fourteen annotations on the Four Reliances section in Jam-yangshay-pa s Great Exposition of Tenets the first translation of Four Interwoven Commentaries on Chandrakīrti s Supplement to the Middle, VI.30 the Tibetan of these texts interspersed with the translations Tables of the Four Reliances WILLIAM MAGEE, PH.D., Vice President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies and Associate Professor, taught for eight years at the Dharma Drum Buddhist College in Jinshan, Taiwan. Author of Paths to Omniscience: the Geluk Hermeneutics of Nga-wang-belden and The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World and co-author of Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency-Oriented Learning System, he also published a novel about Tibet She Still Lives and a detective novel Colombo and the Samurai Sword.