Buddhapālita s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata s Commentary

Transcription

1 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self, Bhāvvivek s Criticism, nd Avlokitvrt s Commentry Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 Jeffrey Hopkins Dul lnguge edition by Crig Preston UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

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3 Buddhpālit s Refuttion, Bhāvvivek s Criticism, nd Avlokitvrt s Commentry Website for UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies (Union of the Modern nd the Ancient: gsr rnying zung `jug khng): umtibet.org. UMA stnds for "Union of the Modern nd the Ancient" nd mens "Middle Wy" in Tibetn. UMA is non-profit 501(c)3 orgniztion.

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5 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self, Bhāvvivek s Criticism, nd Avlokitvrt s Commentry Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 Jeffrey Hopkins Dul lnguge edition by Crig Preston UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies um-tibet.org

6 Eduction in Compssion nd Wisdom UMA Gret Books Trnsltion Project Supported by generous grnts from the Yeshe Khorlo Foundtion the Pierre nd Pmel Omidyr Fund the Silicon Vlley Community Foundtion nd bequest from Dniel E. Perdue Trnslting texts from the heritge of Tibetn nd Inner Asin Buddhist systems, the project focuses on Gret Indin Books nd Tibetn commentries from the Go-mng College syllbus s well s relted theme on the fundmentl innte mind of cler light in Tntric trditions. A feture of the Project is the usge of consistent vocbulry nd formt throughout the trnsltions. Publictions re vilble online without cost under Cretive Commons License with the understnding tht downloded mteril must be distributed for free: UMA stnds for Union of the Modern nd the Ancient (gsr rnying zung jug khng). The UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies is non-profit 501(c)3 orgniztion. UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies 7330 Hrris Mountin Lne Dyke, VA USA Version: October, 2017 ISBN: Librry of Congress Control Number: Hopkins, Jeffrey (1940- ). Buddhpālit s refuttion of production from self, bhāvvivek s criticism, nd vlokitvrt s commentry: jm-yng-shy-p s gret exposition of the middle: chpter six, opposite of the consequences, 1/ by Jeffrey Hopkins. Includes bibliogrphicl references. ISBN: 'Jm dbyngs bzhd p ngg dbng brtson grus, Dbu m 'jug p'i mth' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng 'jug ngogs. 2. Dge-lugs-p (Sect)--Doctrines. 3. Dbu m chen mo. 4. Wisdom Religious spects--buddhism. I. II. Title.

7 Contents Technicl Notes... 7 Prefce... 9 Jm-yng-shy-p The Gret Exposition of Tenets The Gret Exposition of the Middle Ngg-wng-pl-dn Editions consulted Prt One: Bckground of the Controversy Two Schools? The Issue Sāmkhy Tenets Prt Two: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of Tenets: Wht is the right wy to refute production? Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Debte bout opposite of the consequences within the Middle Wy School I. Refuttion of production from self through the resoning in (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom A. The generl mening [of the refuttion of production from self through the resoning in (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom ] How Buddhpālit refutes production from self How Bhāvvivek criticizes this [refuttion by Buddhpālit of production from self] [. Discussion of terminology] 125 Prt Three: The Source Texts Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self, Other, Both, nd Neither Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Abbrevitions...279

8 6 Contents Bibliogrphy Snskrit nd Tibetn Works Other Works...295

9 Technicl Notes Plese notice tht: Full bibliogrphicl references re given in the footnotes t first cittion. For trnsltions nd editions of texts, see the Bibliogrphy. The nmes of Indin Buddhist schools re trnslted into English in n effort to increse ccessibility for non-specilists. For the nmes of Indin scholrs nd systems cited in the body of the text, ch, sh, nd ṣh re used insted of the more usul c, ś, nd ṣ for the ske of esy pronuncition by non-specilists; however, cch is used for cch, not chchh. In prentheses the usul trnslitertion system for Snskrit is used. Trnslitertion of Tibetn is done in ccordnce with system devised by Turrell Wylie; see A Stndrd System of Tibetn Trnscription, Hrvrd Journl of Asitic Studies 22 (1959): The nmes of Tibetn uthors nd orders re given in essy phonetics for the ske of esy pronuncition nd internet ccessibility.

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11 Prefce This is the first of four volumes presenting Tibetn views on the controversy tht rose in Buddhist Indi over how to refute production from self: 1. Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self, Bhāvvivek s Criticism, nd Avlokitvrt s Commentry: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 1 2. Chndrkīrti Defends Buddhpālit ginst Bhāvvivek: Jm-yngshy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 3. Chndrkīrti Undermines Bhāvvivek s Assertion of Autonomy: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Comptibly Appering Subjects, 3 4. Wht does it Men to be Consequentilist? Tsong-kh-p s Gret Exposition of Specil Insight nd the Four Annottions: Comptibly Appering Subjects, 4. The controversy revolves round the opening phrse of the first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom : Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Do ny things Ever rise nywhere. Unchrcteristiclly, Nāgārjun sys nothing more bout the first leg of this resoning tht things re not produced from self. He immeditely proceeds to the resoning proving tht things re not produced from other by exmining the four types of conditions. His principl Indin commenttors, however, explin the refuttion of production from self in vrying detil, the differences engendering the split between wht cme to be clled the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School. Buddhpālit s (c ?) commentry on the refuttion of production from self provoked Bhāvvivek (c ?) into extensive criticism nd hence into demonstrtion of his own preferred style of commentry. The present book provides two Tibetn explntions of the controversy, shorter nd longer, by the Tibetn scholr Jm-yng-shy-p Ngg-wng-tsön-drü ( /1722). Included lso re trnsltions of Buddhpālit s nd Bhāvvivek s commentries s well s the first trnsltion into English of Avlokitvrt s (flourishing mid-seventh century)

12 10 Prefce extensive commentry on Bhāvvivek s presenttion, his minute exmintion llowing Bhāvvivek s terse text to be seen in high relief (though, of course, subject to creful scrutiny). This complex topic is used in Tibetn monstic colleges to drw students into fscinting reflections bout how phenomen pper nd thereby to explore the nture of the relity behind ppernces. These issues hve received world-wide ttention s hs been brillintly documented in Anne McDonld s mgnificent In Cler Words: The Prsnnpdā, Chpter One. JAM-YANG-SHAY-PA Jm-yng-shy-p Ngg-wng-tsön-drü b ws born in the northestern Am-do Province of Tibet in the Erth-Mouse yer of 1648 est of the Blue Lke. At the ge of five he ws blessed by the Fifth Dli Lm, from whom he lter received monstic vows. Hving studied the lphbet t ge seven with his uncle, who ws monk, he mstered reding nd writing nd six yers lter becme novice monk, excelling mong his fellow students by his bility quickly to understnd texts nd disputtions. He went to Lhs t ge twenty-one to further his studies t the Gomng College of Dre-pung Monstic University. Arriving in Lhs in1668, he offered presenttion scrf to n imge of Mñjushrī in the Jo-khng Temple, where the sttue reportedly fvored the young scholr with smile, due to which he becme known s Jm-yng-shy-p, Smiled Upon by Mñjushrī. Six yers lter he received full ordintion nd t twenty-nine entered Gyumy Tntric College. From ge thirty-three he spent two yers in medittive retret in cve ner Dre-pung. At the ge of thirty-eight he uthored the first of his mjor works, Decisive Anlysis of (Tsong-kh-p s) Differentiting the Interpretble nd the Definitive : Storehouse of White Lpis-Lzuli of Scripture nd Resoning Free from Mistke, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunte, commonly clled Gret Exposition of the Interpretble nd the Definitive. During this sme period he lso wrote nother of his gret expositions, the Tretise on the Presenttions of the Concentrtive nd Formless Absorptions: Adornment Beutifying the Subduer s Teching, Ocen of Scripture Vienn: Verlg der Österreichishen Akdemie der Vissenschften, b jm dbyngs bzhd p ngg dbng brtson grus, For longer biogrphy of Jm-yng-shy-p see Derek F. Mher, Knowledge nd Authority in Tibetn Middle Wy Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukb (dge lugs p) Epistemology of Jmyng Shyb ( jm dbyngs bzhd p) In Its Historicl Context (Ph.D. diss., University of Virgini, 2003),

13 11 Prefce nd Resoning, Delighting the Fortunte, commonly clled Gret Exposition of the Concentrtive nd Formless Absorptions. He wrote the Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Ror in 1689, which is the outline of the present book, nd published the Gret Exposition of Tenets its prose uto-commentry ten yers lter in At ge fifty-three he becme bbot of Go-mng College nd in 1710 t sixty-two returned to Am-do Province where he founded highly influentil monstery t Tr-shi-khyil. Seven yers lter he founded tntric college t the sme plce. He wrote prolificlly on the full rnge of topics of typicl Tibetn polymth nd, hving received honors from the centrl Tibetn government nd from the Chinese Emperor, died t the ge of seventy-three or -four in 1721/2. b Prtly becuse of the close connection between Go-mng College nd the Mongolin people s stretching from the Cspin Se through Siberi, who were predominntly Ge-lug-p by this time, Jm-yng-shy-p s influence on the Ge-lug-p order hs been considerble. His life mnifests pttern typicl of mny influentil Tibetn religious figures child prodigy, lerned scholr, dissemintor of the religion, politicin, priest to politicl personges, monstery leder, yogi, mgicin, populr techer, nd prolific writer. THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS Jm-yng-shy-p s Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Ror, c published in 1689, is written in unusully terse, sometimes opque nine-syllble lines, lrgely devoid of customry grmmticl endings nd prticles. d An orl trdition reports tht the stylistic oddness of his root text is due to Jm-yng-shyp s composing it in n inspired stte hering the sounds of lute-like bkr shis khyil. b See Mher, Knowledge nd Authority in Tibetn Middle Wy Schools of Buddhism, 164. c There re two editions of the Root Text in Jm-yng-shy-p s Collected Works, the second lso contining interliner nnottions; on few occsions it contins mteril contrry to his commentry in the Gret Exposition of Tenets nd, therefore, my indicte n erly commentry or my hve been uthored by student. d Tg-tshng s root text, on the other hnd, contins sufficient grmmticl endings nd prticles to be redily understood. His utocommentry, however, is sometimes difficult to follow becuse he uses the root text within explntory sentences but cites it only by syllble or two nd nd so forth (sogs); the difficulty is tht the words of the root text re integrl prts of the commentry, which, therefore, cn be understood only by the reder s supplying the remining words of tht phrse, line, or lines of the root text. In trnsltion, I hve supplied the missing words so s to mke it ccessible.

14 12 Prefce instrument plyed by the goddess Svrsvtī. His prose utocommentry clled Explntion of Tenets: Sun of the Lnd of Smntbhdr Brillintly Illuminting All of Our Own nd Others Tenets nd the Mening of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocen of Scripture nd Resoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, published ten yers lter in 1699, cites the entire root text section by section, nd includes most but not ll of the words of the root text within the commentry. Monumentl in length, the Gret Exposition of Tenets expnds gretly on the root text through citing sources, unrveling issues, nd suggesting other issues. THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE The second text trnslted here is portion of Jm-yng-shy-p Nggwng-tson-drü s Decisive Anlysis of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle, Tresury of Scripture nd Resoning, Thoroughly Illuminting the Profound Mening [of Emptiness], Entrnce for the Fortunte, b lso clled Gret Exposition of the Middle, published in 1695, commentry on Tsong-kh-p Lo-sng-drg-p s c Illumintion of the Thought, Extensive Explntion of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle. d It belongs to the debte-oriented decisive nlysis (mth dpyod) genre nd is the textbook (yig ch) for the study of Tsong-kh-p s The Illumintion of the Thought t Go-mng Monstic College. In most Ge-lug-p colleges there re seprte generl-mening commentry nd seprte decisive nlysis commentry for seminl texts such s Chndrkīrti s Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle, but in the Go-mng Monstic College Tsong-kh-p s Illumintion of the Thought is tken s the generl-mening commentry on Chndrkīrti s Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle, nd Jm-yng-shy-p composed very lengthy decisive nlysis. Our topic, nevertheless, is bsed only prtilly in Chndrkīrti s Supplement but minly in Chndrkīrti s Cler Words which is brought into the Gret Exposition of the Middle becuse of its crucil role in highlighting the difference between Buddhpālit s nd Chndrkīrti s system from Bhāvvivek s system. jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje ngg dbng brtson grus, /1722. b dbu m jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs/ dbu m chen mo. c Tsong-kh-p blo bzng grgs p, d dbu m l jug p i rgy cher bshd p dgongs p rb gsl.

15 13 Prefce NGAG-WANG-PAL-DAN The Khlkh Mongolin scholr Ngg-wng-pl-dn ws born in Urg present dy Ulnbtr, the cpitol of Mongoli in the Fire-Serpent yer of He received his monstic trining in the Ge-lug-p monstic college of Dr-shi-chö-pel nd t the ge of forty in 1836 ws ppointed to the set of Doctrine Mster b of Urg, nd thus he is more commonly known s Pl-dn-chö-jy. c He went to Tibet in 1843 in connection with the funerl service of the Fifth Je-tsun-dm-p, the reincrntion of Tārnāth, the second most importnt figure of the Jo-nng-p sect, nd in 1847 relinquished the post of Doctrine Mster of Urg. It seems tht he remined in Tibet t the Go-mng d College of Dre-pung e Monstery, west of nd t tht time outside of the city of Lhs. He lso vidly studied nd sometimes wrote bout the textbook literture of the Lo-sel-ling f College of Dre-pung. He composed seven volumes of mny works on wide rnge of topics. Ngg-wng-pl-dn s extrordinry depth is exemplified in his extensive commentry g titled Annottions for (Jm-yng-shy-p s) Gret Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Cler Awreness, h lmost s long Jm-yng-shy-p s text itself. i The Gret Exposition of Tenets, j despite being monumentl in length, is often cryptic in its references nd mening (typicl for Jm-yng-shy These first two sentences re drwn from Lokesh Chndr, Eminent Tibetn Polymths of Mongoli (New Delhi: Interntionl Acdemy of Indin Culture, 1961), 24. b chos rje. c dpl ldn chos rje. d sgo mng. e brs spungs. f I hve vgue memory of being told tht Ngg-wng-pl-dn ws removed from the comforts of the community of the Go-mng College fourteen times, which I speculte ws due to his occsionl preference for the positions of the Lo-sel-ling College. g 505 folios, Guru Dev edition. h grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor, Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅg-dbṅ Dpl-ldn of Urg, vols. 4-5, (Delhi: Guru Dev, 1983). i 545 folios, bl brng edition. j Gret Exposition of Tenets / Explntion of Tenets : Sun of the Lnd of Smntbhdr Brillintly Illuminting All of Our Own nd Others Tenets nd the Mening of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocen of Scripture nd Resoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (grub mth chen mo / grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho skye dgu i re b kun skong), Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdo-rje, vol. 14 entire (New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973).

16 14 Prefce p whose style is usully reltively cler); it is lso lden with copy-editing problems. Seeing the tremendous vlue of the Gret Exposition of Tenets, Ngg-wng-pl-dn sought to mke it more ccessible through lengthening, explining, nd identifying source mterils nd through expnding on issues. He lso rises qulms bout the relevnce of certin source quotes nd frequently corrects misprints, fulty cittions, nd other copyediting problems in the Old Go-mng edition, though he forswers trying to mke list of wht requires copy-editing. b His ttention to detil mnifests the gret vlue he put on the text, bringing tremendous clrity to wht otherwise is n unusully bstruse work. His nnottions re necessry key for the Gret Exposition of Tenets through providing rigorous contextuliztion nd non-prtisn critique. The Annottions re invluble s they revel the systemtic bckground of Jm-yng-shy-p s cittions which, without this contextuliztion, sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of wht the uthor intends. Until one understnds tht Jm-yng-shy-p intends his text to in some wys function s lecture notes for techer competent in Tsongkh-p s system, mny of his cittions re bffling. Undoubtedly, Nggwng-pl-dn sw this need nd provided contextuliztion. His nnottions do indeed untie the knots of gret mny difficult points especilly by elborting the mening of quottions, nd thus I used it extensively for both understnding the mening nd dding brcketed mteril in my Medittion on Emptiness nd Mps of the Profound. c EDITIONS CONSULTED Two min editions of Jm-yng-shy-p s Explntion of Tenets: Sun of Some of his corrections indicte tht he did not hve the Tr-shi-khyil edition. b He sys (stod, h, 179.2): Since, in generl, I hve not tried to write down the very mny mistkes in wording (yig nor) here in Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of Tenets, I hve mostly neglected them. nd (dngos, th, 215.5): Although in generl there re very mny tiny mistkes in wording in ll of the omniscient Jm-yng-shy-p s textbook literture on philosophy nd in prticulr in the Gret Exposition of Tenets, such s the genitive cse where the instrumentl cse should be nd the instrumentl cse where the genitive cse should be, I hve not tried here to write [ll of ] them down, nd hence hve mostly neglected them. c See the Bibliogrphy.

17 15 Prefce the Lnd of Smntbhdr Brillintly Illuminting All of Our Own nd Others Tenets nd the Mening of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocen of Scripture nd Resoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings, lso clled Gret Exposition of Tenets were consulted: 1. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. Published t Go-mng College, Lhs, Tibet, dte unknown. Abbrevited reference: 2016 Old Go-mng Lhs, so nmed becuse of being scnned in Mundgod, Krntk, Indi, t Go-mng College in December 2016 by Jongbok Yi for the UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies. This version ws likely originlly printed t Go-mng College, Lhs, Tibet, while Jm-yng-shy-p ws bbot of Go-mng College. (To be mde vilble t UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, um-tibet.org.) 2. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. TBRC W : (PDF of bl brng bkr shis khyil: bl brng bkr shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbrevited reference: 2011 TBRC bl brng. This edition, which is revision of the bove edition, ws printed in L-brng-tr-shi-khyil monstery founded by Jmyng-shy-p fter his return to Am-do. In generl, it is the preferred edition, though not lwys. These two editions re the sources of five other vilble editions:. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. In the Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdorje: Reproduced from prints from L-brng-tr-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedn Sungrb Minym Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, Indi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje) TBRC W1KG : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbrevited reference: 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng. b. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng College, 1996). Abbrevited reference: 1996 Mundgod revision. The erlier Lhs Go-mng edition is yet to be cquired.

18 16 Prefce c. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. Codex bsed on the 1996 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng Librry, 1999). Abbrevited reference: 1999 Mundgod. d. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. Tipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Tiwn: The Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, 2000). Abbrevited reference: 2000 Tipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod. e. grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho. Musoorie, Indi: Dlm, Abbrevited reference: 1962 Dlm. Two min editions of Jm-yng-shy-p s Decisive Anlysis of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Tresury of Scripture nd Resoning, Thoroughly Illuminting the Profound Mening [of Emptiness], Entrnce for the Fortunte, lso clled Decisive Anlysis of the Middle nd Gret Exposition of the Middle were consulted: 1. dbu m l jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs. Published t Go-mng College, Lhs, Tibet, dte unknown. Abbrevited reference: 2015 Old Go-mng Lhs, so nmed becuse of being cquired in Lhs, Tibet, t Gomng College in 2015 by Jongbok Yi nd then scnned for the UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies. (To be mde vilble t UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, um-tibet.org.) 2. dbu m l jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs. TBRC W22186-I1KG10676: , which is PDF of: bl brng bkr shis khyil, mdo. Abbrevited reference: 2011 TBRC bl brng. This edition, which is revision of the bove edition, ws printed in L-brng-tr-shi-khyil monstery founded by Jm-yng-shy-p fter his return to Am-do. In generl, it is the preferred edition, though not lwys. These two editions re the sources of four other vilble editions:. dbu m l jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun This edition ws provided to the UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies by the lte E. Gene Smith ( ) in 2010.

19 17 Prefce gsl skl bzng jug ngogs. In the Collected Works of Jmdbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Bkrshis-'khyil Blocks, 15 vols., vol. 9, Gedn Sungrb Minym Gyunphel Series. New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Abbrevited reference: 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng. b. dbu m l jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs. TBRC W : , PDF of: Mundgod, South Indi: Gomng College, 1997 (revision of the 1973 Ngwng Gelek Demo edition). Abbrevited reference: 1997 revision of Ngwng Gelek bl brng. c. dbu m l jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs. Tipei reprint (published by the Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, Tipei, Tiwn, 2007) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng Librry, 1999) bsed on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, Indi: Gomng College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng edition (New Delhi, Indi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbrevited reference: 2007 Tipei codex reprint. d. The digitl Tibetn text of Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle provided in this book ws supplied by the Drepung Gomng Librry of Go-mng College in Mundgod, Krntk Stte, Indi. It is likely slightly revised version of the 1999 codex mentioned in item #c. It hs been edited in ccordnce with the 2011 TBRC bl brng nd other sources. In the body of the book nd occsionlly in notes Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Annottions for (Jm-yng-shy-p s) Gret Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Cler Awreness from ny of three editions re cited in indenttions with borders on the top, bottom, nd right side to demrcte it clerly from Jm-yng-shyp s text: 1. grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor. Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, Tibetn digitl reprint edition of typeset edition: In TBRC W Abbrevited reference: Annottions Srnth Edition. 2. grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor. In Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅg-dbṅ Dpl-ldn of Urg, vols Delhi: Guru Dev, Tibetn digitl reprint edition of printing of the Urg blocks: In gsung bum (ng dbng dpl ldn). TBRC W Prt One nd W Prt Two. Abbrevited reference: Annottions Urg Edition.

20 18 Prefce 3. grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor, Mundgod, Indi: Drepung Gomng Librry, 2007; rpt. Tipei, Tiwn: The Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, n.d. Abbrevited reference: Annottions Tipei Edition.

21 PART ONE: BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY

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23 1. Two Schools? Mny Buddhist scholrs throughout the world spek of two principl subschools of the Middle Wy School in Indi the Consequence School b founded by Buddhpālit nd Chndrkīrti nd the Autonomy School c founded by Bhāvvivek. However, the nmes for the subschools were not used in Indi but were coined in Tibet bsed on Chndrkīrti s rgument ginst Bhāvvivek tht it is not suitble to use utonomous inferences d nd tht consequences e re sufficient. f Since even the nmes of the subschools were coined in Tibet, one might think tht the doctrinl differences dbu m p, mādhymik / mdhymk. b thl gyur p, prāsṅgik. c rng rgyud p, svātntrik. d rng rgyud kyi rjes dpg, svtntr-numān. e thl gyur, prsṅg. f In both his Gret Exposition of the Stges of the Pth nd Middle-Length Exposition of the Stges of the Pth, Tsong-kh-p sys: The terminology of Autonomist nd Consequentilist is used with respect to Proponents of the Middle by scholrs of the lter dissemintion [of Buddhism] in the Lnd of Snowy Mountins [Tibet]; this ccords with Chndrkīrti s Cler Words. In the Gret Exposition he dds, Hence you should not think tht it is their own fbriction. See lso Tsong-kh-p, The Gret Tretise on the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment, vol. 3, trns. nd ed. Joshu W. C. Cutler nd Guy Newlnd (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, ), 116; Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kh-p s Finl Exposition of Wisdom (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, 2007), 34, nd Elizbeth Npper, Dependent-Arising nd Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publictions, 1989), 166 nd Tsong-kh-p is sying not tht Chndrkīrti used the terms Prāsṅgik nd Svātntrik, but tht the coining of these terms in Tibet is bsed on Chndrkīrti s refuttion of utonomous inferences (rng rgyud kyi rjes dpg, svtntr-numān) nd stted preference for consequences (thl gyur, prsṅg) in the first chpter of his Cler Words (tshig gsl, prsnnpdā) nd hence is not bseless fbriction. For discussion of the Tibetn origins of the nmes of the sub-divisions of the Middle Wy School, see: Ktsumi Mimki, Blo gsl grub mth' (Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982). Ktsumi Mimki, The Blo gsl grub mth', nd the Proponent of the Middle Clssifiction in Tibetn grub mth' Literture, in Contributions on Tibetn nd Buddhist Religion nd Philosophy, ed. Ernst Steinkellner nd Helmut Tuscher (Vienn: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983), Jeffrey Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, M.: Wisdom, 1996), Peter dell Sntin, Mdhymk Schools in Indi (Delhi: Motill Bnrsidss, 1986).

24 22 Bckground of the Controversy dduced between these two subschools would be worded in tenttive wy; however, in certin scholstic literture within the Ge-lug-p order of Tibetn Buddhism, especilly their tenets literture, b there re hrd nd fst sttements bout the respective tenets of these subschools such tht one cn be left with the impression tht these positions were clerly stted s such in Indin works. As the min difference between these two versions of the Middle Wy School, it is often sid tht: 1. The Autonomy School sserts tht ll phenomen re estblished by wy of their own chrcter conventionlly, but not so ultimtely. 2. The Consequence School sserts tht no phenomenon is estblished by wy of its own chrcter, either conventionlly or ultimtely. For instnce, in his Presenttion of Tenets: A Precious Grlnd the eighteenth century Ge-lug-p scholr, Kön-chog-jig-my-wng-po, c sys bout the Autonomy School: d They mintin tht ny estblished bse [tht is, object] is necessrily estblished by wy of its own chrcter becuse they ssert tht, regrding ny phenomenon, if the imputed object is sought, it is findble. Therefore, they ssert tht inherently estblished, e Jeffrey Hopkins, A Tibetn Delinetion of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indin Middle Wy School: Tsong-kh-p s Two Interprettions of the Locus Clssicus in Chndrkīrti s Cler Words Showing Bhāvvivek s Assertion of Comptible Subjects nd Inherent Existence, Tibet Journl 14, no. 1 (1989):10-43; the printing contins egregious typogrphicl errors. Tom J.F. Tillemns, Tsong kh p et l. on the Bhāvvivek-Cndrkīrti Debte in Tibetn Studies: Proceedings of the 5 th Seminr of the Interntionl Assocition for Tibetn Studies. Monogrph Series of Nritsn Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occsionl Ppers 2. Nrit: Nrit-sn Shinshō-ji, Kodo Yotsuy, The Critique of Svtntr Resoning by Cndrkīrti nd Tsong-khp: A Study of Philosophicl Proof According to Two Prāsṅgik Mdhymk Trditions of Indi nd Tibet, Tibetn nd Indo-Tibetn Studies 8 (Stuttgrt: Frnz Steiner Verlg, 1999). Georges B.J. Dreyfus nd Sr L. McClintock, eds., The Svātntrik-Prāsṅgik Distinction (Boston: Wisdom Publictions, 2003). dge lugs p. b grub mth, siddhānt. c dkon mchog jigs med dbng po, d Geshe Lhundup Sop nd Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting through Appernces: Prctice nd Theory of Tibetn Buddhism, (Ithc, New York: Snow Lion Publictions, 1989), ; see lso H. V. Guenther. Buddhist Philosophy in Theory nd Prctice (Bltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1972),. e rng bzhin gyis grub p, svbhāvsiddh.

25 Two Schools? 23 estblished by wy of its own chrcter, estblished by wy of its own mode of biding, b nd estblished in its own right c re mutully inclusive. nd bout the Consequence School he sys: d They ssert tht whtever is n estblished bse [tht is, whtever exists] necessrily is not estblished by wy of its own chrcter becuse they ssert tht ll objects e re only imputed by conceptulity nd tht the word only in the term only imputed by conceptulity elimintes the estblishment of objects by wy of their own chrcter. One might think tht Bhāvvivek, considered to be the founder of the Autonomy School, mde such unequivocl sttements or tht Chndrkīrti, considered by most to be the founder of the Consequence School, mde explicit delinetions using such n unequivocl style. However, neither Bhāvvivek nor Chndrkīrti nor ny of their Indin followers did so. Rther, s Tsong-kh-p Lo-sng-drg-p, f founder of the Ge-lug-p order of Tibetn Buddhism, sttes in his The Essence of Eloquence, g none of the mjor Indin Autonomists noted tht Chndrkīrti, in defending Buddhpālit ginst Bhāvvivek s ttcks, hd disgreed with Bhāvvivek over their respective views of emptiness. Given Ge-lug-p scholrs emphsis on Chndrkīrti s supposed delinetion of difference between himself nd Bhāvvivek with regrd to emptiness nd thus between the two subdivisions of the Middle Wy School, one would expect rng gi mtshn nyid kyis grub p, svlkṣṇsiddh. b rng gi sdod lugs kyi ngos ns grub p. c rng ngos ns grub p, svrūpsiddh. d Sop nd Hopkins, Cutting through Appernces, 303. e Literlly, whtsoever estblished bses (gzhi grub tshd). The term tshd here does not refer to vlid cognition (tshd m) but to mesure s in whtsoever mesure or whtsoever extent. f tsong kh p blo bzng grgs p, g drng b dng nges p i don rnm pr phye b i bstn bcos legs bshd snying po; P6142, vol For n English trnsltion of the Prologue nd Mind-Only section, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of Cliforni Press, 1999). For n English trnsltion of the complete text, see Robert A. F. Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). A Chinese trnsltion ws completed in Lhs on the dy commemorting Buddh s enlightenment in 1916 by Venerble F Zun, Bin Lio Yi Bu Lio Yi Shuo Cng Lun, in Xi Zng Fo Jio Jio Yi Lun Ji (Tipei: D Sheng Wen Hu Chu Bn She, 1979), vol. 2,

26 24 Bckground of the Controversy tht t lest one Indin Autonomist would hve spoken of just such difference, but even ccording to Tsong-kh-p none did (lthough, s will be explined below, fn. p.27, one of his students found just such pssge in Kmlshīl s Illumintion of the Middle). Furthermore, Tsong-kh-p sttes tht Bhāvvivek himself not only did not frme his disgreement with Buddhpālit round divergence of opinion over wht the doctrine of emptiness negtes but lso did not even perceive ny such difference. However, Tsong-kh-p noticed tht Chndrkīrti frmes his response to Bhāvvivek s criticism of Buddhpālit round perceived disgreement over emptiness, specificlly tht of which phenomen re empty. Still, since Chndrkīrti did not explicitly sy such in those words, even gret Indin scholrs who followed Bhāvvivek s school nd red Chndrkīrti s criticism did not perceive tht Chndrkīrti sw his own view of emptiness s being distinct from tht of Bhāvvivek. In his The Essence of Eloquence Tsong-kh-p by no mens hides the inventiveness of his explntion: Although Bhāvvivek pprehended mny fults in the mster Buddhpālit s Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom b he did not express fult by wy of the existence of disgreement with respect to the two This pssge occurs t the beginning of the section on the Consequence School in Tsong-kh-p s The Essence of Eloquence; see lso Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold, 288. All trnsltions provided here re my own. The Tibetn: བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བ ཤ ས རབ ཀ འག ལ པ མཛད པ ལ ལ གས ན ག ས ན མང པ བ ང ཡང བདག མ ད གཉ ས ལ མ མ ན པ ཡ ད པའ ནས ན མ བ ད ལ ན རས གཟ གས བ ལ གས ཀ ས ཀ ང ཐ ད ནང ག ན འ ལ མ ཙམ བ ད ས ཡ ད ཅང ད ན དམ པར ང བ ཉ ང མ ད པར ཤ ས པ ན འཕགས པ ཡབ ས དང ལ གས ན འ ད དང སངས ས བ ངས ལ ས གས པ ད མའ ལམ བ མས ཀ ས ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པའ ལ བ ན པའ ཞ ས འཆད ད ཐ ད མ ཙམ ཡ ད པ དང ད ན དམ པར ང བ ཉ ད མ ད ལ ལ བ དཔ ན གཉ ས འ བར བཤད ད ཡ ཤ ས ང པ དང ཞ བ འཚ དང ཀ མ ལ ལ ལ ས གས པ མས ཀ ས ཀ ང སངས ས བ ངས དང བ ག གས པའ གས དང རང ག གས གཉ ས ལ བདག མ ད ཀ ཁ ད པར ཡ ད པའ ལ མ བཤད ད b dbu m rts b i grel p buddh pā li t, buddhpālitmūlmdhymkvṛtti, P5254, vol. 95.

27 Two Schools? 25 selflessnesses; [Bhāvvivek s commenttor] Avlokitvrt lso explins [tht the thought of ll these msters is similr]: The knowledge tht conventionlly externl nd internl dependent-risings exist s ble to perform functions nd s only [like] illusions nd without n inherent nture ultimtely is the mode of the perfection of wisdom tught by the proponents of the pth of the Middle Wy the fther, the Superior [Nāgārjun], nd his spiritul son [Ārydev], s well s Bhāvvivek, Buddhpālit, nd so forth. Avlokitvrt describes the two msters [Bhāvvivek nd Buddhpālit] b s similr with respect to the mode of existing conventionlly s only [like] illusions nd s ntureless ultimtely. Even Jñāngrbh, Shāntrkṣhit, Kmlshīl, nd so forth do not describe mode of difference concerning selflessness between the two, the system of Buddhpālit nd Chndrkīrti nd their own systems. Tsong-kh-p repets these points lter in The Essence of Eloquence when specificlly refuting utonomous syllogisms: c Brckets re from T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions, Avlokitvrt is commenting on Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom, Commentry on the Tretise on the Middle (dbu m rts b i grel p shes rb sgron m, prjñāprdīpmūlmdhymkvṛtti, P5253, vol. 95), which is commenting on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle (dbu m i bstn bcos, mdhymkśāstr, P5224, vol. 95), XXIV.14. b T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions, c The Tibetn is: ལ གས ན ལ ཡང སངས ས བ ངས དང རང ཉ ད རང ད ཁས ལ ན མ ལ ན མ མ ན མ པ མ འ ག ག རང ད ཁས ལ ན པ འ ས མ ད ས པའ གས ང ང ད འ གནད ཀ ས ཀ ང རང ཉ ད དང སངས ས བ ངས གཉ ས ལ ཆ ས དང གང ཟག ལ རང བཞ ན འག ག པའ དགག ལ ཡང ཁ ད པར ཡ ད པར མ བཞ ད ད ལ གས ན ག ས འ ང ན རས གཟ གས བ ལ གས ལ འག ལ པ ཚ ག གསལ ག ས འ ག པས ཤ ས རབ ན མར སངས ས བ ངས བཀག པའ འག ལ བཤད ཀ བས བས ལ གས ན ལ ན བ ད པ མས འ ག མ འ ག ག བཤད པ འ ང ར ང ཞ ང ཞ བ འཚ དཔ ན བ ལ ས གས པས ཀ ང བས རང ད བཀག པའ ན ང མཛད ར ང ཡང མ མཛད ད

28 26 Bckground of the Controversy Even Bhāvvivek did not think tht he differed from Buddhpālit with respect to sserting or not sserting utonomy; his ppers to be system in which it is indispensble to ssert utonomy. Due to this essentil, he lso did not ssert tht he nd Buddhpālit differed even with respect to the object of negtion in the refuttion of n inherent nture with respect to phenomen nd persons. Since Bhāvvivek s follower, Avlokitvrt, hd cquintnce with Chndrkīrti s Cler Words: Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle, it ppers tht it would hve been pproprite for him, t those points in his explntory commentry on the refuttion of Buddhpālit in Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom, to explin whether the fults tht Chndrkīrti scribed to Bhāvvivek pplied or did not pply, nd it lso would pper tht the mster Shāntrkṣhit nd his student [Kmlshīl] nd so forth should hve dispelled the See lso the trnsltion in Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold, 323. Some hve contended tht in the usul Tibetn debting formt there re no syllogisms, most likely becuse the entilment is not mnifestly stted; Dniel Perdue (Debte in Tibetn Buddhist Eduction, 837) points out tht this kind of logicl sttement contining one or more suppressed premises is clled n enthymeme. Dhrmkīrti sttes tht syllogism is composed of n entilment, or pervsion (khyb p), nd the property of the subject (phyogs chos), tht is, minor premise, nd indeed in the more forml Tibetn vriety both of these re required in proof sttement (sgrub ngg) long with n exmple, but the conclusion is not explicitly stted. For n Aristotelin syllogism, however, ll three members of syllogism re explicitly stted these being the mjor premise, the minor premise, nd the conclusion. For Dhrmkīrti the mjor nd minor premises must be explicitly stted, but the conclusion is not. In the Tibetn informl version widely used in debting courtyrds, the first prt, the pervsion, is suppressed, wheres in the forml version the third prt, the conclusion, is suppressed. However, since both the pervsion nd the conclusion re implicitly present in both the informl nd the forml versions, it is suitble to cll them syllogisms s long s it is understood tht prt is suppressed, tht is to sy, not explicitly stted. Indeed, it is common knowledge mong Tibetn scholrs tht the entilment is implicit or tht the conclusion is implicit. For Dhrmkīrti, the conclusion is not stted becuse it is so obvious tht it would be redundnt to stte it. Chndrkīrti, on the other hnd, hs five-membered syllogism in which even more members re explicitly stted; see Jeffrey Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness,. Avlokitvrt (P5259, vol. 96, dbu m, vol. w, 85.8) lists Cndrkīrti s one of the eight commenttors on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle, the others being Nāgārjun (for Ge-lug-p scholrs views on the ctul uthor of this commentry s scholr by the nme of Akutobhyā see 51), Buddhpālit, Devshrmn, Guṇshrī, Guṇmti, Sthirmti, nd Bhāvvivek. Of these, only five tht ttributed to Nāgārjun nd those by Buddhpālit, Bhāvvivek, Chndrkīrti, nd Sthirmti re presently vilble.

29 Two Schools? 27 fllcies [dduced] by Chndrkīrti in his refuttion of utonomy, but these were not done. Ngg-wng-pl-dn s (Annottions, dbu m p, ph, 101.4) (1) cites pssge in Khy-drub Ge-leg-pl-sng s Gret Compiltion: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunte in which Kmlshīl defends Bhāvvivek ginst refuttion of him by Chndrkīrti nd (2) then juxtposes this to Tsong-kh-p s clim tht Shāntrkṣhit nd his student [Kmlshīl] never did such: On this occsion little detil is needed s to how these two re not contrdictory: (1) the sttement in Khy-drub Ge-leg-pl-sng s Gret Compiltion: Kmlshīl s Illumintion of the Middle sys: Moreover, to certin mster s [tht is, Bhāvvivek s] sying, Ultimtely the internl sense-spheres [eye sense, er sense, nd so forth] re not produced from other becuse of being other nd so forth someone s [tht is, Chndrkīrti s] expressing tht [the reson] is indefinite nd nonestblished is senseless [literlly, unrelted]. With respect to the [non-buddhist] Forders clling conventionl cuses tht re other cuses nd so forth only ctulities tht re ctully only othernesses nd so forth, the mster [Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle I.2] sets out repudition: The inherent existence of things Does not exist in conditions nd so forth. nd so forth. Therefore, the otherness of their textul system is not estblished, whereby it is demonstrted tht [things] re not produced from other [in tht sense]. This clerly explins tht production from other conventionlly exists [for Kmlshīl] nd tht since production from other in ccordnce with how it is imputed in the textul systems of the Forders nd so forth does not exist, production from other does not exist [in tht sense]. It is evident tht [Kmlshīl] ws thinking tht certin mster is Bhāvvivek, nd tht someone s expressing tht [the reson] is indefinite nd nonestblished is Chndrkīrti s expressing in the Cler Words fllcies in Bhāvvivek s syllogism. nd (2) Tsong-kh-p s The Essence of Eloquence: it lso would pper tht the mster Shāntrkṣhit nd his student [Kmlshīl] nd so forth should hve dispelled the fllcies [dduced] by Chndrkīrti in his refuttion of utonomy, but these were not done. བས འད ར ང ན ལས ཡང ང བ ལས ད འ ར བ དཔ ན ཁ ཅ ག ག ས ད ན དམ པར ནང ག མཆ ད གཞན ལས མ གཞན ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ཞ ས པ ནས ཁ ཅ ག འད ལ མ ང ས པ དང མ བ པ ཉ ད ད པར ད པ གང ཡ ན པ ད འ ལ བ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན གས ཅན མས གཞན ལ

30 28 Bckground of the Controversy More bluntly, one might sy tht the evidence for difference in the view of emptiness between Chndrkīrti nd Bhāvvivek is so thin tht even these gret Indin scholrs did not notice it. Their lck of response to Chndrkīrti s nmed ttcks on Bhāvvivek s exposition mkes one wonder how seriously these scholrs (who in Tibet cme to be clled Autonomists) took Chndrkīrti s works, though it my be tht they delibertely sought to diminish his influence by ignoring him since he cme to be in distinct minority of Proponents of the Middle who chllenged the minstrem movement tht mrried Nāgārjun s Middle Wy philosophy with Dignāg s nd Dhrmkīrti s epistemology nd logic. Nevertheless, it seems cler tht during his own time Chndrkīrti ws prominent figure t Nālnd Monstic University where he mintined debte with Chndrgomin, Proponent of Mind-Only, for seven yers, but there is gp of three centuries fter his deth in the seventh century when (1) the only follower listed in his linege is the still untrceble Rig- ས གས པའ ཐ ད ཀ དང ས གཞན ཉ ད ལ ས གས པའ དང ས པ ད ཡ ན པ ཁ ནར བ ད པ ད དག ལ བ དཔ ན ག ས དང ས པ མས ཀ རང བཞ ན ན ན ལ ས གས པ ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ན ད ང བ བཤད ད ད འ ར ད འ ག ང གས ཀ ས གཞན ཉ ད མ བ པས གཞན ལས མ འ ཞ ས བ ན པར འ ར ར ཞ ས ཐ ད གཞན ཡ ད པ དང གས ལ ས གས པའ ག ང གས ཀ ས བཏགས པ ར ག གཞན མ ད པས གཞན ལས མ བར བཤད པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས གསལ བར བཤད ཅ ང བ དཔ ན ཁ ཅ ག ག ས ཞ ས པ ན ལ གས ན འ ད དང ད འ ར ཁ ཅ ག འད ལ མ ང ས པ དང མ བ པ ཉ ད ད པར ད པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ན ཞ ས པ བས ལ གས ན ག གས ར ད ལ ཚ ག གསལ ན བ ད པ ལ བསམས པར མང ན ན ཞ ས དང ལ གས བཤད ང པ ལས ཞ བ འཚ དཔ ན བ ལ ས གས པས ཀ ང བས རང ད བཀག པའ ན ང མཛད ར ང ཡང མ མཛད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པ གཉ ས མ འགལ ལ ལ ཞ བ ཆ ང ཞ ག དག ས ས My guess is tht since Khy-drub wrote his Compiltion with Tsong-kh-p s The Essence of Eloquence before him, he merely wnted this contrdiction to slip by without emphsis. Of more interest to me is tht given Chndrkīrti s intense concentrtion on Bhāvvivek s ttck ginst Buddhpālit s refuttion of production from self, Kmlshīl did not respond to tht. Also, in my trnsltion of Avlokitvrt s commentry on tht section in Bhāvvivek s Lmp included in this book, I point out severl plces where Avlokitvrt s usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti s well two instnces of demonstrting comptible ppernce where he ppers to be responding to Chndrkīrti.

31 Two Schools? 29 py-khu-chug The Greter, (2) Chndrkīrti is merely mentioned by only Avlokitvrt mong the Proponents of the Middle who cme to be clled Autonomists, nd (3) Chndrkīrti s works re not trnslted into Tibetn (this occurring not until the eleventh century). Still, the obvious similrity of view between the eighth-century Shāntidev s Engging in the Bodhisttv Deeds nd Chndrkīrti s works, s is clerly indicted in Tgtshng Shy-rb-rin-chen s b Explntion of Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets : Ocen of Eloquence, indictes Chndrkīrti s influence; c nd indeed Chndrkīrti is liberlly cited by Prjñākrmti d ( ) in his Commentry on the Difficult Points of (Shāntidev s) Engging in the Bodhisttv Deeds. e Also, Atish ( ) nmes Chndrkīrti s the most prominent follower of Nāgārjun in his Introduction to the Two Truths]: f Who relized emptiness? Nāgārjun, who ws prophesied by the One-Gone-Thus And sw the noumenl truth; The student [of Nāgārjun who relized his thought exctly s it is] is Chndrkīrti. Through quintessentil instructions trnsmitted From him the noumenl truth will be relized. I conclude tht the trnsmission from Chndrkīrti of which Atish speks (though pprently untrceble tody) nd the prominence of Shāntidev s Engging in the Bodhisttv Deeds s well s the fct tht Chndrkīrti s Rig-py-khu-chug The Greter (rig p i khu phyug che b) is listed s one of the previous incrntions of Tsong-kh-p s student Khy-drub-ge-leg-pl-sng (mkhs grub dge legs dpl bzng, ) in the ltter s Secret Biogrphy by Jy-tsün Chö-kyi-gyltshn; see H.H. the Dli Lm, Tenzin Gytso, nd Jeffrey Hopkins, The Kālchkr Tntr: Rite of Initition for the Stge of Genertion (London: Wisdom Publictions, 1985; 2d rev. ed., 1989), , n b stg tshng lo tsā b shes rb rin chen, born c grub mth kun shes ns mth brl grub p zhes by b i bstn bcos rnm pr bshd p legs bshd kyi rgy mtsho. For n excerpt from tht text see Jeffrey Hopkins, Mps of the Profound: Jm-yng-shy-b s Gret Exposition of Buddhist nd Non-Buddhist Views on the Nture of Relity (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, 2003), d shes rb 'byung gns blo gros. e byng chub kyi spyod p l jug p i dk grel, bodhicryāvtārpñjikā; P5139, vol. 91. f bden gnyis l jug p, stydvyāvtār, stnz 14; P5380, 7b.2-7b.3; Toh. 3902, dbu m, vol., 72b.4-72b.5; Tibetn nd English in Richrd Sherburne, The Complete Works of Atīś (New Delhi: Adity Prkshn, 2000), Brckets re from Four Interwoven Annottions, vol. 2, See lso Gret Tretise, vol. 3, 353.

32 30 Bckground of the Controversy works survived over these centuries in the moist het of Indi suggests the routes by which his thought survived tht period of reltive quiet eventully to enter into the religious culture of Tibet during the second dissemintion of Buddhism from Indi in the eleventh century. In Tibet, Chndrkīrti s views on the Middle Wy School becme of prime importnce in dependence upon recommendtions from Indin scholrs such s Atish ( ) nd Jyānnd (c. 1100) s well s Tibetn scholr-trnsltors such s P-tshb Nyi-m-drg (b. 1055). Bck to the topic t hnd: Since Tsong-kh-p nd his followers hold tht Bhāvvivek did not differentite between existence nd inherent existence, it is no wonder tht Bhāvvivek did not clerly declre tht phenomen inherently exist conventionlly. According to Tsong-kh-p s school, for Bhāvvivek the mere existence of n object mens tht conventionlly the object is estblished from its own side, estblished by wy of its own chrcter, nd inherently exists. Hence, there cn only be hints nd suggestions in Bhāvvivek s works tht phenomen re estblished by wy of their own chrcter conventionlly nd re not empty of such estblishment. According to Tsong-kh-p, there re persusive resons in Bhāvvivek s nd Chndrkīrti s writings for coming to the conclusion tht they differ with respect to defining emptiness, specificlly with respect to identifying the misconceived sttus of phenomen of which they re empty. In order to pprecite the subtlety of Tsong-kh-p s exegesis, it is helpful first to notice how thin, subtle, or perhps even flimsy the evidence is; only then cn we see Tsong-kh-p s skills t work. In The Essence of Eloquence, Tsong-kh-p proceeds with gret cre to ly out evidence for differing views of emptiness in the Autonomy nd Consequence Schools. First he notes tht Chndrkīrti himself sees his explntion to be distinctive, not shred with others who clim to be of the Middle Wy School. Immeditely following the erlier cittion bove, Tsong-kh-p sys: b sp/p tshb nyi m grgs. See Kren Lng, Sp-tshb Nyi m grgs nd the Introduction of Prāsṅgik Proponent of the Middle into Tibet, in Reflections on Tibetn Culture: Essys in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie, ed. Lwrence Epstein & Richrd F. Sherburne (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). b See lso Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold, The Tibetn: བ ག གས པས ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས འཕགས པའ དག ངས པ ཇ བ བཞ ན བཀ ལ པས ད དང རང ག ད ན དམ པ དང ཀ ན བ པའ འཇ ག ལ ཁ ད པར མ ད པར བཞ ད ལ རང ག གས ན ད མ པ གཞན ག ས བཀ ལ པ དང ན མ ང མ

33 Two Schools? 31 [However] Chndrkīrti sserts tht since Buddhpālit commented on the thought of the Superior [Nāgārjun] just s it is, there is no difference between tht [commentry by Buddhpālit] nd his own mode of positing the ultimte nd veilings, nd [Chndrkīrti] describes his own system s not shred with the commentries [on Nāgārjun s thought] by the other Proponents of the Middle. His Autocommentry on the Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle sys: b ཡ ན པར བཤད ད འ ག འག ལ ལས ཇ ར ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས མ གཏ གས པར བ ན བཅ ས གཞན ལས ང པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བའ ཆ ས འད ན ཅ མ ལ ག པར མ བ ད པ ད བཞ ན ཁ བ ཅག ག ས འད ར གས གང ཞ ག བ ལ ལན དང བཅས པར བ ད པའ གས འད ནས འ ང བ ད ཡང ན པ ཉ ད ཀ ཆ ས ར བ ན བཅ ས གཞན ན མ ད ད ཞ ས མཁས པ མས ཀ ས ང ས པར མཛད གས ལ ལ ད འ ར ཁ ཅ ག ག ས མད པ མས ཀ གས ད ན དམ པར ས པ ད ཉ ད ད མ པ མས ཀ ས ཀ ན བ འད ད ད ཞ ས ས པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ན ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས ཀ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མང ན པར མ ཤ ས པ ཁ ནས ས པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཤ ས པར འ ཞ ས ག ངས ཤ ང ག བའ གས ལ ཡང ད ར ག ངས པའ མཐར འད ར འཇ ག ན ལས འདས པའ ཆ ས ན འཇ ག ན པའ ཆ ས དང མ ངས པར མ ར གས བའ ར ཏ གས འད ན ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཞ ས མཁས པ མས ཀ ས ང ས པར འ ཞ ས ག ངས ས T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions, b dbu m l jug p, mdhymkāvtār; Toh 3862, sde dge, dbu m, vol., ; Louis de l Vllée Poussin, Mdhymkāvtār pr Cndrkīrti, Bibliothec Buddhic, 9 (Osnbrück, Germny: Biblio Verlg, 1970), , commenting on stnzs XIII.1-2. Since Chndrkīrti often refers to Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle (dbu m i bstn bcos, mdhymkśāstr) merely by the ppelltion mdhymk, the mdhymk of mdhymkāvtār is held to refer to text propounding the middle, specificlly Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle. My trnsltion of vtār ( jug p) s supplement is controversil; others use introduction or entrnce, both of which re ttested common trnsltions in such context. My rendering is bsed on the explntion by Tsongkh-p tht Chndrkīrti ws filling in holes in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle; see Tsong-kh-p, Kensur Lekden, nd Jeffrey Hopkins, Compssion in Tibetn Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), Among the mny menings of the Tibetn term for vtār, jug p cn men to ffix or to dd on. To summrize the orl techings of the lte Ngg-wng-leg-dn: Avtār mens ddition in the sense tht Chndrkīrti s text is supplement historiclly necessry so s to clrify the mening of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the

34 32 Bckground of the Controversy My scholrs scertin tht just s except for Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle this doctrine clled emptiness is not expressed nonerroneously in other tretises, so the system ppering in this [tretise] b by me set out together with objections nd nswers to ny [other] c system does not exist, in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, in other tretises. Therefore, it should be understood tht certin [scholr s, tht is, Jñāngrbh s] d propounding tht just wht re propounded ultimtely in the system of Middle. He wnted to mke cler tht the Tretise should not be explined ccording to the Mind-Only system or ccording to the Middle Wy Autonomy School (dbu m rng rgyud p, svtntrikmādhymik), the founding of which is ttributed to Bhāvvivek. During Nāgārjun s lifetime, Bhāvvivek hd not written his commentry on the Tretise, nor hd he founded his system; therefore, it ws necessry lter to supplement Nāgārjun s text to show why it should not be explined in such wy. Moreover, it is sid tht Chndrkīrti sought to show tht follower of Nāgārjun should scend the ten grounds by prcticing the vst pths necessry to do so. This is becuse some tke the Middle Wy perspective to be nihilistic. They see it s mens of refuting the generl existence of phenomen rther thn just their inherent existence nd conclude tht it is not necessry to engge in prctices such s the cultivtion of compssion. Therefore, in order to show tht it is importnt to engge in three centrl prctices compssion, non-dul understnding, nd the ltruistic mind of enlightenment nd to scend the ten Bodhisttv grounds, Chndrkīrti wrote this supplementry text in relince on Nāgārjun s Precious Grlnd. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Buddhist Advice for Living nd Libertion: Nāgārjun s Precious Grlnd (Ithc, New York: Snow Lion, 1998). This Tibetnized reding of jug p s supplement ccords with the Tibetn term rtgs jug (liṅgāvṃtār [Srt Chndr Ds, A Tibetn-English Dictionry (Clcutt: 1902; reprint, Delhi: Motill Bnrsidss, 1969, 1970; compct reprint, Kyoto, Jpn: Rinsen Book Compny, 1981), 535) the ffixing of gender, referring to the usge of letters identified by gender in Tibetn grmmr in vrious positions in syllble. The rendering s supplement lso perhps ccords with the fifth mening given in Vmn Shivrm Apte, Snskrit-English Dictionry (Poon, Indi: Prsd Prkshn, 1957), 163, Any new ppernce, growth, rise, though it seems tht not much of cse cn be mde from the Snskrit. Of course, such supplement lso serves s n introduction, or mens of entry, to Nāgārjun s Tretise. Tretise on the Middle nd Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom re different nmes for the sme book. b T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions, c d Ibid. Tsong-kh-p cites Jñāngrbh in The Essence of Eloquence below.

35 Two Schools? 33 the Sūtr School re sserted conventionlly by the Proponents of the Middle is proposition only by one who does not know the suchness of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle. At the end of lso sying such with respect to the system of Gret Exposition School, b [Chndrkīrti] sys: This is becuse suprmundne doctrine is not fit to be similr to mundne doctrine; scholrs should scertin This system is uncommon. Tsong-kh-p s cittion of these pssges indictes tht he tkes seriously Chndrkīrti s clim of uniqueness in terms of both the ultimte nd the conventionl. As the fundmentl point of divergence between Chndrkīrti nd Buddhpālit on the one hnd nd other Middle Wy School msters such s Bhāvvivek on the other, Tsong-kh-p posits Chndrkīrti s not sserting tht phenomen re conventionlly estblished by wy of their own chrcter. He continues: c The driving rtionle behind [Chndrkīrti] positing by reson of his own system s not being shred with other Proponents of the Middle tht one who sserts tht wht re propounded ultimtely by the two Proponents of [Truly Existent Externl] Objects [tht is, the Gret Exposition School nd the Sūtr School] re propounded conventionlly by the Proponents of the Middle does not know the Middle Wy suchness, is tht in his own system even conventionlly phenomen tht re estblished by wy of their own chrcter re not sserted, wheres those [Proponents of (Truly Estblished) Things] d solely posit [ll phenomen] in its b mdo sde p, sutrāntik. bye brg smr b, vibhāṣik. For the pssge, see L Vllée Poussin, Mdhymkāvtār, 407.1; Toh 3862, sde dge, dbu m, vol., c See lso Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold, 289. The Tibetn: རང ག གས ད མ པ གཞན དང ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ས ད ན གཉ ས ཀ ས ད ན དམ པར ས པ མས ད མ པའ ཀ ན བ འད ད པས ད མའ ད ཁ ན ཉ ད མ ཤས པར འཇ ག པའ མཚན ན རང ག གས ལ ཐ ད ཡང རང ག མཚན ཉ ད ཀ ས བ པའ ཆ ས མ འད ད ལ ད དག ན ད འ ང ནས འཇ ག པ ཤ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ར d This nd the next two brcketed dditions re from T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions,

36 34 Bckground of the Controversy context [tht is to sy, estblishment of objects by wy of their own chrcter]. It is now necessry for Tsong-kh-p to prove tht Bhāvvivek nd so forth do indeed ssert tht phenomen conventionlly re estblished by wy of their own chrcter. He recognizes tht this is not n esy tsk since, s he himself points out, Chndrkīrti nd Bhāvvivek use similr terminology with respect to both wht is negted in emptiness nd wht remins to exist conventionlly. Thus, the differentition of their views of emptiness cnnot be mde merely by wy of the vocbulry they use when they spek of the conventionl existence of phenomen or nme the object of negtion in the view of emptiness. In this vein, in the section on the Autonomy School in The Essence of Eloquence Tsong-kh-p sys: b In Consequentilist texts, even existing conventionlly is frequently described s nture (ngo bo nyid, svbhāvtā) of tht [object], inherent nture (rng bzhin, svbhāv), its own chrcter (rng gi mtshn nyid, svlkṣṇ), nd so forth, nd lso in the texts of this mster [Bhāvvivek] c there re mny cses of [his speking of n object s being] not estblished by wy of its own nture (rng gi ngo bo nyid kyis m grub p), not produced by wy of [its own] nture (ngo bo nyid kyis m skyes p), not being substntilly estblished (rdzs su m grub p), nd so forth; therefore, it ppers to be difficult to differentite them. Tsong-kh-p himself holds tht it is difficult, even from the viewpoint of how they use terminology, to determine tht one system sserts inherent existence conventionlly nd tht the other one does not. Given tht there is no cler-cut difference in the terminology of wht is negted nd of the sttus of wht exists, the determintion of difference between Bhāvvivek (nd importnt followers such s Jñāngrbh, rng gi mtshn nyid kyis grub p, svlkṣṇsiddh. b See lso Thurmn, Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold, 267. The Tibetn: ཐ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ཡང ད འ ང བ ཉ ད དང རང བཞ ན དང ད འ རང ག ས མཚན ཉ ད ས གས ཐལ འ ར བའ ག ང ནས བཤད པ ཡང མང ལ རང ག ང ཉ ད ཀ ས མ བ པ དང ང བ ཉ ད ཀ ས མ ས པ དང ས མ བ པ ལ ས གས པ བ དཔ ན འད ཡ ག ང ནའང མང བས ད དཀའ བར c T-drin-rb-tn s Annottions,

37 Two Schools? 35 Shāntrkṣhit, nd Kmlshīl), nd Chndrkīrti on these topics will hve to be mde by detiled contextul nlysis. The hrdening of the terminology such tht in Ge-lug-p texts s in tht by Kön-chog-jig-mywng-po cited t the beginning of this book it is sid tht the Autonomy School sserts inherent existence conventionlly wheres the Consequence School does not is built, therefore, not on finding explicit exclusive use of such terminology in those wys in Indin texts but on textul, philosophicl nlysis of the menings nd implictions of sttements, which were communicted in Tibet through stndrd sets of terminology tht never were used tht wy in Indi. Among the evidence tht Tsong-kh-p uses to ferret out Bhāvvivek s position on wht is refuted in the view of emptiness re: 1. Bhāvvivek s clling for self-powered, or utonomous, inference (rng dbng du rjes su dpg p, svtntr-numān) in his Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom when commenting on the beginning of chpter thirteen of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle nd minly Chndrkīrti s refuttion in the first chpter of his Cler Words b of Bhāvvivek s position on comptibly ppering subjects nd hence utonomous inferences s evinced in the first chpter of the Lmp when Bhāvvivek ttcks Buddhpālit s commentry on Nāgārjun s refuttion of production from self. Autonomous inferences re tken s mening syllogisms in which the subject, predicte, reson, exmple, nd so forth re estblished by wy of their own chrcter. Consequentilists do not ccept tht the subject, reson, exmple, nd so forth, of syllogism pper similrly to Proponent of the Middle nd non-proponent of the Middle becuse, for Consequentilists, vlid cognition tht seems to n opponent to estblish the subject nd so forth is nonexistent in the wy tht the opponent sserts it becuse non-proponent of the Middle views vlid cognition s certifying tht the phenomenon is inherently existent, but for Consequentilist nothing inherently exists. In this wy, there cn be no comptible estblishment. 2. Bhāvvivek s refuttion in the twenty-fifth chpter of his Lmp for dbu m rts b i grel p shes rb sgron m, prjñāprdīpmūlmdhymkvṛtti, P5253, vol. 95. For n English trnsltion of chpters 18, 24, nd 25, see Dvid Eckel, A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvvivek s Response to the Fundmentl Problems of Proponent of the Middle Philosophy, unpublished disserttion (Hrvrd University, 1980). b dbu m rts b i grel p tshig gsl b, mūlmdhymkvṛttiprsnnpdā, P5260, vol. 98.

38 36 Bckground of the Controversy (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom, Commentry on the Tretise on the Middle of the Mind Only School s presenttion of chrcter-non-nture with regrd to imputtionl ntures, in which he sttes tht if imputtionl ntures re sid to be chrcter-non-ntures, this would involve deprection of imputtionl ntures. Here, chrcter-nture is tken s mening estblishment by wy of their own chrcter; thus Bhāvvivek seems to be indicting tht, for him, ll phenomen even existent imputtionl ntures re estblished by wy of their own chrcter. 3. Bhāvvivek s sttement in his Blze of Resoning b tht it need not be proven to him tht consciousness (tken s mening the mentl consciousness) is the self, since such is lredy estblished for him. c His stnce suggests tht something nmely, consciousness tht is the person cn be found when sought mong the bses of designtion of the person, contrry to Chndrkīrti s position tht when nlyzed, nothing tht is tht phenomenon cn be found either mong or seprte from its bses of designtion. 4. Chndrkīrti s refuttion in the sixth chpter of his Autocommentry on the Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle of Bhāvvivek s supposed ssertion of production from other, in which he indictes tht when in Bhāvvivek s system production is sought in the four wys, it must be found s one of those four conventionlly, tht is, conventionlly estblished production from other. 5. Chndrkīrti s refuttion in the first chpter of his Cler Words of Bhāvvivek s mode of positing conventionlities, the topics here being substrtum nd its ttributes nd definiendum nd its definition. In Ge-lug-p scholstic literture the first topic, the controversy bout comptibly ppering subjects, d is treted in gret detil fscinting to find how thin the evidence is but more so to be drwn more deeply into the topics in which it is embedded, the mening of emptiness nd thus the middle tht is the proper determintion of the sttus of phenomen. In two kun btgs, priklpit. b Blze of Resoning, Commentry on the Hert of the Middle (dbu m i snying po i grel p rtog ge br b, mdhymkhṛdyvṛttitrkjāvlā, P5255, vol. 96). For n English trnsltion of chpter III , see Shōtrō Iid, Reson nd Emptiness (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980). c This is evidence cited by Jm-yng-shy-p; see Jeffrey Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, M.: Wisdom, 1996), , nd Hopkins, Mps of the Profound, d chos cn mthun snng b.

39 Two Schools? 37 books I tret this issue extensively. The present volume trets Buddhpālit s commentry nd Bhāvvivek s criticism of it long with Avlokitvrt s extensive commentry detiling every move in it; the second volume trets Chndrkīrti s defense of Buddhpālit s commentry. The next bckground chpter introduces Nāgārjun s stnz, followed by short chpter on the Sāṃkhy system tht sserts production from self. These re followed by n nnotted trnsltion of Jm-yng-shyp s textbook probing Buddhpālit s commentry nd Bhāvvivek s response to it nd improvement on it. At the end re trnsltions of Buddhpālit s, Bhāvvivek s, nd Avlokitvrt s texts.

40

41 2. The Issue Nāgārjun t the beginning of his renowned Fundmentl Stnzs on the Middle Clled Wisdom mkes n expression of worship to the Buddh who tught dependent-rising s qulified by eight negtions: b Homge to the perfect Buddh, The best of propounders, Who tught tht wht dependently rises Hs no cesstion, no production, No nnihiltion, no permnence, No coming, no going, No difference, no smeness, Is free from prolifertions, nd t pece. Cesstion, production, nnihiltion, permnence, coming, going, difference, nd smeness do not exist in the fce of medittive equipoise relizing emptiness. (In Chinese Buddhism these eight negtions re clled b bu the Eight No s.) Using Middle Wy resonings to serch for objects, they re not found; thus in medittive equipoise, ll dependent-risings re seen s without production nd so forth, nd this shows tht in generl they lck inherently existent production nd so forth. After the expression of worship, Nāgārjun presents the first of twenty-seven chpters titled Anlysis of Conditions. c Although it ppers right fter the expression of worship, which first mentioned no cesstion, Nāgārjun rther thn immeditely speking bout no cesstion, chooses to show tht there is no production becuse s Avlokitvrt (below, 175) explins: Erlier [when discussing the order of the eight terms in Nāgārjun s expression of worship, Bhāvvivek] explined tht there is no fult in [Nāgārjun s] teching no cesstion, no production becuse cyclic existence hs no beginning nd becuse cesstion does not depend on the stge of production nd becuse the topics re being exmined, d but here in teching the mening of those the mūlmdhymkkārikāḥ. b Introductory stnzs; Toh 3824, sde dge, dbu m, vol. ts, 1b.2-1b.3; Snskrit in L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 11.13: nirodhmnutpādmnucchedmśāśvtṃ / nekārthmnānārthmnāgmmnirgmṃ // yḥ prtītysmutpādṃ prpñcopśmṃ śivṃ / deśyāmās sṃbuddhstṃ vnde vdtāṃ vrṃ //. c rkyen btg p, prtyyprikṣā. d don brtg p yin p i phyir, which literlly is menings re being exmined but

42 40 Bckground of the Controversy cuse of ll of them tht is to sy, the cuse of cesstion nd so forth is production since: if something hs been produced, it will cese, but if it is not produced, it will not cese; the definition of the cutting of the continuum of something tht hs been produced is nnihiltion, but if it is not produced, it will not be nnihilted; due to the nondestruction of something tht hs been produced, it is permnent, but if it is not produced, it will not become permnent; due to the coming of something produced from nother plce, it comes, but if it is not produced, it does not come; due to the going of something produced to nother plce, it goes, but if it is not produced, it does not go; something produced is different chrcter, but if it is not produced, it does not become different object; becuse something produced hs the sme chrcter, it is the sme object, but if it is not produced, it will not become the sme object; nd hence: becuse when the cuse is stopped, its effects lso do not rise, nd becuse it being the cse tht the world is intensely ttched mostly to production nd mnifestly dheres to production, this tretise is imed t bndoning intense ttchment nd mnifest dherence, nd becuse when intense ttchment nd mnifest dherence hve been bndoned, nirvāṇ is ttined, here the mster [Nāgārjun] took up the tsk of initilly teching no production. Nāgārjun begins the first chpter with : Not from self, not from others, likely mens the topics re being listed or the topics re being exmined in contrst to teching the mening of those just below. These ltter two resons quote Bhāvvivek (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.4). In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) red yin for m yin in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (60b.2).

43 The Issue 41 Not from both, not cuselessly Do ny things Ever rise nywhere. n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ/ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn// bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min/ gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min/ dngos po gng dg gng n yng/ skye b nm yng yod m yin// Unchrcteristiclly, Nāgārjun sys nothing more bout the first leg of this resoning, tht things re not produced from self. Insted of explining why things re not produced from self, he immeditely proceeds to n offshoot of the resoning proving tht things re not produced from other by exmining the four types of conditions. His commenttors, however, explin the refuttion of production from self in vrying detil, nd the principl controversy engendering the split between the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School revolves round how they frme nd explin this refuttion. The stnz contins the fmous vjr nodes, in Tibetn dor-je-seg-m (rdo rje gzegs m). Seg-m mens node, piece, frgment, or fcet. Dor-je is the Tibetn for vjr nd lso mens dimond nd thus unbrekble. I m trnslting it here not s dimond pieces, chunks, frgments, slivers, or fcets s I hve elsewhere, but s vjr nodes, vjr mening scepter specificlly referring to myth bout Indr s striking down mountins with dimond scepter. A former bbot of the Tntric College of Lower Lhs, Ngg-wngleg-dn, sid tht they re clled dimond nodes becuse piece of dimond hs the strength of n entire dimond; thus the four resonings refute inherent existence both together nd individully. However, if one of them lone is sufficient, why hve ll four? Also, is the first resoning sufficient? It is not becuse to refute inherent existence it does not suffice merely to refute production from self; otherwise, proponents of Buddhist schools other thn the Consequence School bsurdly would relize the bsence of inherent existence since the lower Buddhist schools re cpble of refuting production from self. In ny cse, the nme tken this wy mens tht these resonings re powerful nd cn cut through the net of conceptions believing in inherent existence. The four resonings re tht things re produced not from self, not ngg dbng legs ldn, mkhn zur;

44 42 Bckground of the Controversy from other, not from both, nd not without cuse. If things re produced, they re produced either from cuses or not from cuses; thus, the first three nodes re in the ctegory of from cuses, nd the fourth is the ctegory of not from cuses. Tsong-kh-p explins in his Explntion of (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Ocen of Resoning b tht these four theses re four resons proving n implicit thesis tht things re not inherently produced. Formulted this wy, the resoning reds: Things re not inherently produced becuse they re not ever produced nywhere from self, not ever produced nywhere from other, not ever produced nywhere from both, nd re not ever produced nywhere cuselessly. c When Nāgārjun sys tht things re never produced nywhere from self, other, nd both, or cuselessly, ever (nm yng, jātu) mens t ny time, nd nywhere (gng n yng, kvcn) mens t ny plce. These two qulifictions eliminte the qulm tht things might simply not be produced in some seson but re in nother seson or not be produced in some plce but re produced in nother plce. The qulifictions drmticlly eliminte ll possibilities. It is sid tht in medittion one needs consciousness tht will eliminte inherently existent production in bsolutely ll circumstnces. My I mke personl comment: Despite the fct tht this prticulr medittion is prevlent in Indin literture, I must dmit tht for long time it did not work well for me. The sevenfold resoning worked better, for in tht resoning one is serching for the ctul entity of the object nd not finding it, wheres serching for thing s cuses nd not finding them did not seem to ffect the thing itself (dmittedly my own shortcoming). In time, the sevenfold resoning wekened for me, nd so I tried reflecting on this resoning. Within whtever understnding I hd from the viewpoint of the sevenfold resoning s bckground, I concentrted on this one not produced from self, other, both, or neither with its sub-resons nd it s if cpped it off nd mde the sevenfold resoning stronger; tsong kh p blo bzng grgs p; b dbu m rts b i tshig le ur bys p shes rb ces by b i rnm bshd rigs p i rgy mtsho / rts shes ṭik chen; Gomng Tipei reprint, c The Tibetn for this syllogism is: dngos po chos cn (rng bzhin gyis) skye b med de/ bdg ls gng n yng skye b nm yng yod p m yin p dng/ gzhn ls gng n yng skye b nm yng yod p m yin p dng/ gnyis ls gng n yng skye b nm yng yod p m yin p dng/ rgyu med gng n yng skye b nm yng yod p m yin p i phyir.

45 The Issue 43 it brought out nother potency becuse the resoning suddenly hd relevnce to the sttus of the entity of the object. For me, never nd nywhere enhnced the resoning becuse they mde sure tht it is extended to ll possibilities. Through the sevenfold resoning, I ws mking some progress on the ctul entity of the object but not mking so much progress on the production of compounded phenomenon, but I hd mde enough progress with respect to its entity tht, when looking for its production, I discovered tht this is further reson why the object itself cnnot be found under nlysis. Wht these four dimond nodes re proving, in the end, is tht the object cnnot be found; it is n exmintion of compounded phenomen s effects, thereby requiring inquiry into their production, nd if their production cnnot be found under nlysis, compounded phenomen do not inherently exist. Bck to the topic: When Nāgārjun sttes tht things re never produced nywhere from self, other, nd so forth, nywhere lso mens through the force of ny system of tenets. Tsong-kh-p points out tht Nāgārjun is not sying, for exmple, tht things re not produced in the system of the Proponents-of-True-Existence, becuse in the system of the Proponents-of-True-Existence things re produced from other. The Snskrit, s bove, is trnslted s: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn These negtives tht precede the four possibilities not from self, not from other, not from both, not cuselessly connect to the verb of existence vidynte, which is trnslted s the verb re bove; the entire stnz is one unit. The Tibetn, however, hs n dditionl, fifth negtive: fter not from self, not from other, not from both, nd not cuselessly there is negtive with the verb of existence (yod m yin) nd thus should be trnslted s: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Whtsoever things re Never produced nywhere. Gomng Tipei reprint, 34.4.

46 44 Bckground of the Controversy bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min dngos po gng dg gng n yng skye b nm yng yod m yin Becuse the Tibetn hs this fifth negtive, some hve felt tht the first two lines, not from self nd so forth, re the reson cluse nd the thesis is things re not ever produced nywhere. Tken this wy, the stnz reds: Whtsoever things re not ever produced nywhere becuse of not [being produced] from self, not [being produced] from other, not [being produced] from both, nd not [being produced] cuselessly. This reding is shown to be wrong bsed on Chndrkīrti s commentry, where the entire stnz is tken s single unit, lbeit using only one negtive. He illustrtes this through putting together the first of the four theses s: Not from self re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere. b niv svt utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn Chndrkīrti dds tht the other three theses should be put together this wy. However, Tsong-kh-p c cites nd rejects Tibetn trnsltion tht puts the lst two lines first nd does not employ fifth negtive: dngos po gng dg gng n yng skye b nm yng yod p lt d bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min He prefers the dditionl finl negtive in relince on Bhāvvivek s Lmp Tipei reprint, b The syntx of the Tibetn trnsltion of this sentence (bdg ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng skye b nm yng yod m yin) puts the negtive clerly with the verb nd should be trnslted s, Whtsoever things re not ever produced nywhere from self. c Gomng Tipei reprint, d I cn only guess tht the stnz rendered this wy should be trnslted s: Consider whether ny things re Ever produced nywhere: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly.

47 The Issue 45 for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom which, in commenting on not from self, holds tht fter declring, Not from self, the second prt nswers the question, Wht is it tht is not from self? The reply is: Whtsoever things re Never produced nywhere. In nswering the question, the dditionl negtive is required. Bhāvvivek dds tht the other three theses should be put together this wy. Tsong-kh-p vers tht the erlier nd lter negtives re cler lso in the Snskrit edition, b but, s cited bove, fifth negtive does not pper in the Poussin edition of the Snskrit. In ny cse, Chndrkīrti nd Bhāvvivek gree tht these four theses re nonffirming negtives (med dgg, prsjy-prtiṣedh); they do not ffirm nything positive in plce of wht they negte, not even negtive tht suggests something positive such s the corpulent Devdtt s not eting during the dy, which suggests tht he ets t night. The controversy between Buddhpālit, Bhāvvivek, nd Chndrkīrti on how production from self is refuted is the locus clssicus for the Middle Wy School discussion bout nonffirming negtives nd ffirming negtives (m yin dgg, pryudās-prtiṣedh), nd the locus clssicus for our knowing tht in the Middle Wy School these theses re just nonffirming negtives. This does not men tht ny nd ll Middle Wy resonings, such s becuse of being dependent-rising re nonffirming negtives, but these four (not from self nd so forth) nd the sevenfold resoning s well s the other negtive resonings re ll nonffirming negtives. Tsong-k-p s The Essence of Eloquence provides description of the types of negtive phenomen: c b c Golden reprint, vol. 107, rgy dpe. The Tibetn: ད ལ དགག པ ན ས བ ད པ ན ཚ ག ག ས ཟ ན པར དགག བཅད པའམ ད འ མ པ ལ འཆར བ ན དགག བཀག པའ མ པ ཅན དང ས ཤར ནས གས པར བ ཞ ག དང པ ན བདག མ ད འ གཉ ས པ ན ཆ ས ཉ ད འད ལ ཚ ག ག ས ཟ ན པར དགག བཅད པ མ ད ཀ ང ད འ ད ན འཆར བ ན ས པ བཅད པའ མ པ ཅན འཆར བ ཡ ད ད ད ར དགག དང ས བཅད པས གས པར བའ ད ན ད ལ གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན དགག ན དགག དང ས བཅད ནས ཆ ས གཞན འཕ ན པ ག ག འབར བ ལས མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ན

48 46 Bckground of the Controversy དང ས པ འ ང བ ཉ ད དགག པས ད དང འ བ ད ལས གཞན པའ དང ས པ འ ང བ ཉ ད བ པར ད པ དཔ ར ན འད མ ཟ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས དགག པས མ ཟ འ བ ད ལས གཞན པ མ ཟ མ ཡ ན པ དཀའ བ དང ཐ ས པ ལ ས གས པས དམན པའ དམངས ར གས ཡ ན པར བ པ འ ཞ ས ས མ ད དགག ན དགག དང ས བཅད ནས ཆ ས གཞན མ འཕ ན པ ག ག འབར བ ལས མ ད པར དགག པ ན དང ས པ འ ང བ ཉ ད ཙམ ཞ ག འག ག པར ཟད ཀ ད དང འ བ ད མ ཡ ན པ གཞན ག དང ས པ བ པར མ ད པ དཔ ར ན མ ཟ ས ཆང བ ང བར མ འ ཞ ས བ ད ཙམ ཞ ག འག ག པར ཟད ཀ ད ལས གཞན པའ བ ང བ བ ང ང ཞ འམ མ བ ང ང ཞ ས མ བ ད པ འ ཞ ས ས ད ལ བ མ བ ན འཕ ན མ འཕ ན དང ད ན གཅ ག ལ ད ལས གཞན པ ན དགག བཀག ཙམ མ ན པའ མ ཡ ན ཞ ས པ དང མ ད ཅ ས པའ ཚ ག ག ས བཀག པ ན ད གཉ ས ཀ ཁ ད པར མ ན ཏ བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བཀག པ མ ད དགག ལ གས ན དང བ གཉ ས ཀས བཤད པའ ར དང ཚ དཔག མ ད ཅ ས པ མ ཡ ན དགག དག ས པའ ར ར ད ས ན དགག པ ལ ཆ ས ཀ ན ཀ ང རང མ ཡ ན བཀག པས དང ས པ ལ དགག བཅད པས མ ཆ ག ག རང བ ད པའ ས བཅད པ དང རང གས པའ ལ དང ས དགག བཅད པའ མ པ ཅན འཆར བ གང ང དག ས ས ཁ ཅ ག བདག མ ད མ ད དགག ཡ ན ག གང ཟག ལ བདག མ ད ཅ ས པ གཞ བ པ དང ཚ གས ན མ ད དགག མ ན ཞ ས འད ད ལ གཞན དགག གཞ དང ཚ གས ན ཆ ས གཞན འཕངས པས མ ད དགག མ ན ཞ ས བ ན མ ར གས ཏ དགག པ གཉ ས ཀ ཁ ད པར ན ར བཤད པ ཁ ན བཞ ན ག ང གཞན ལས ཀ ང འ ང ལ ད འ ཚ མ ཟ ས ཆང མ བ ང ང ཞ ས པ ལ གཞ བ པ དང ཚ གས ཀ ང མ ད དགག ག མཚན ཉ ད གནས པའ ར དང མ ཟ ད དགག བཅད ནས ཆ ས གཞན འཕ ན མ འཕ ན བའ གཞ ཡ ན ག འཕངས པའ ཆ ས གཞན མ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ད ས ན ཆ ས གཞན འཕངས ལ ལ གས དང དང ས དང ད གཉ ས ཀ དང བས ཀ ས འཕངས པ ཡ ད ད ཤ ས རབ ན མའ འག ལ བཤད ངས པ ལས དགག པ ད ན ག ས བ ན པ དང ཚ ག གཅ ག བ པར ད པ དང ད ན རང ཚ ག མ ན པ མ ཡ ན གཞན པ གཞན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ས ད ལ ད ན ག ས བ ན པ ན མཆ ད ན ཚ ན པ ཉ ན པར མ ཟ བ ཞ ས པ འ ཚ ག གཅ ག ག ས

49 The Issue 47 Concerning tht, negtive is n object of reliztion (1) tht when it is expressed by term, n object of negtion is eliminted in its verbl reding or (2) tht explicitly dwns in mnner hving the spect of negting n object of negtion when its spect dwns to n wreness. The first is, for instnce, selflessness (bdg med, nātmn). The second is, for instnce, the noumenon (chos nyid, dhrmtā); regrding this there is no elimintion of n object of negtion in the verbl reding, but when its mening ppers, there is n ppernce in mnner hving the spect of n elimintion of the prolifertions [of inherent existence]. Objects tht re relized through n explicit elimintion of n object of negtion in this wy re twofold [ffirming negtives nd non-ffirming negtives]. An ffirming negtive (m yin dgg, pryudāsprtiṣedh), upon explicitly eliminting n object of negtion, projects nother phenomenon; Bhāvvivek s Blze of Resoning sys: b An ffirming negtive negtes the entity of thing, through which the entity of thing like this nd other thn this is ffirmed; for exmple, through the negtion, This དང ས པ བ པ ན བདག ལས མ ས པ ཡ ད ཅ ས པ དགག གཅ ད པ དང ཆ ས གཞན དང ས འཕ ན པ གཉ ས ཀ ཚ ག གཅ ག ག ས ཟ ན པའ ད ན ན དང ས གས ལ ཆ ས གཞན འཕངས པ ད གཉ ས ཀ ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག མཆ ད ན ཚ ན པ ཉ ན པར མ ཟ བ ར ད པ མ ན པ ཡ ད ཅ ས པ འ རང ག ཚ ག ག ས མ ན པ ན ས གཅ ག ལ ར གས དང མ ཟ གང ང གཅ ག ང ས ཤ ང ཁ ད པར མ ང ས པའ བས འད མ ཟ མ ཡ ན ཞ ས པ འ འཕ ན ལ བཞ པ ད གང ང ཡང མ ཡ ན དགག ཡ ན ལ ད ལས གཞན པ ད བཞ གང ཡང མ འཕངས པ ན མ ཡ ན དགག ལས གཞན མ ད དགག ག See lso drng nges legs bshd snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive nd Interpretble (Mundgod, Indi: SOKU, 1991), ed. by Geshe Plden Drkp nd Dmdul Nmgyl, dgg p, prtiṣedh. b Bhāvvivek, dbu m i snying po i grel p rtog ge br b (mdhymkhṛdyvṛttitrkjvālā), in bstn gyur (sde dge 3856), TBRC W : (Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe chodhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Commenting on Bhāvvivek s Hert of the Middle stnz III.26; dbu m, vol. dz, 59b.4-59b.5; Iid, Reson nd Emptiness, 84.

50 48 Bckground of the Controversy is not brhmin, it is ffirmed tht [the person] is nonbrhmin, like brhmin but other thn this, [such s] menil who is lower in terms of sceticism, hering, b nd so forth. A non-ffirming negtive (med dgg, prsjyprtiṣedh), upon explicitly eliminting n object of negtion, does not project nother phenomenon; Bhāvvivek s Blze of Resoning sys: c A nonffirming negtive simply refutes the mere entity of thing nd does not ffirm nother thing like this nd other thn this; for exmple, the sttement Brhmins do not drink beer simply refutes [or forbids] only this nd does not express tht [brhmins] drink or do not drink beverge other thn this. In those [sttements] ffirming (sgrub) nd not ffirming (mi sgrub) hve the sme mening s projecting ( phen) nd not projecting (mi phen); other thn this [refers to] wht re not just negtions of objects of negtions. Negtions through the words is not (m yin) nd does not exist d (med) do not constitute the difference between those two [tht is, ffirming negtions nd nonffirming negtions] becuse both Bhāvvivek nd Chndrkīrti explin tht the negtion is not from itself (bdg ls m yin, n svtḥ) is nonffirming negtive nd becuse Mesureless Life (tshe dpg med, mitāyus) must be tken s n ffirming negtive. Therefore, with respect to negtive phenomen, since ll phenomen negte wht is not themselves [in the sense tht they re not wht is not themselves], it is not sufficient tht n object of negtion be eliminted with respect to the thing; rther, either the term expressing it must eliminte [n object of negtion], or [the phenomenon] must dwn to n wreness relizing it s hving the spect of explicitly eliminting n object of negtion. One [scholr] sserts tht selflessness, for instnce, is nonffirming negtive, but when there is composite with bsis dmngs rigs, śūdr. b Tht is, lerning. c Commenting on Bhāvvivek s Hert of the Middle stnz III.26; sde dge 3856, sde dge dbu m, vol. dz, 59b.5-59b.6; Iid, Reson nd Emptiness, 84. d Or less s in mesureless.

51 The Issue 49 tht is positive s in the cse of selflessness with respect to persons, sserts tht this is not nonffirming negtive. Others propound tht when there is composite with bsis, then since nother phenomenon is projected, it is not nonffirming negtive. These re not resonble becuse the difference between the two negtives occurs lso in other texts only s explined erlier, nd in tht cse lthough there is composite with bsis tht is positive in Brhmins do not drink beer for instnce, the defining chrcteristic of nonffirming negtive remins nd becuse brhmins in this cse re the bsis with respect to which it is being determined whether nother phenomenon is projected or not upon the elimintion of the object of negtion [nmely, drinking beer] nd re not nother phenomenon projected [in plce of drinking beer]. Therefore, with respect to how nother phenomenon is projected there re four: those of implicit projection, explicit projection, projection both [implicitly nd explicitly], nd projection by wy of context; Avlokitvrt s Commentril Explntion of (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (see lso below, 198) quotes: b Negtions tht indicte [nother, positive phenomenon] through their import, Negtions tht estblish through phrse, [Negtions] tht possess those, nd [negtions] tht do not indicte through their own words Are ffirming [negtives]; others re other [tht is, nonffirming negtives]. In this: Tht which indictes through its import is, for instnce, Ft Yjñdtt s not eting in the dy. gng zg l bdg med. b 198.1: dgg p don gyis bstn p dng / tshig gcig sgrub pr byed p dng // de ldn rng tshig mi ston p// m yin gzhn p gzhn yin no//. Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of Tenets (Tipei, 216.3) identifies the pssge s from ldog p bsdus p, which is Nvidhrm s Stnzs Demonstrting Condenstion of Exclusions (ldog p bsdus p bstn p'i tshig le'ur bys p, piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśkārikā; P5782). The sde dge edition (Toh. 4293; TBRC W23703, ) reds: don gyis go br byed p dng //tshig gcig sgrub pr byed p dng // de dng ldn p i dgg p dng //rng gi tshig gis mi ston p o//. There is commentry by Nvidhrm, ldog p bsdus p bstn p'i rnm 'grel, piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśvārttik; P5783; Toh

52 50 Bckground of the Controversy Tht which estblishes thing through one phrse is cse of one phrse s contining both the elimintion of n object of negtion nd n explicit projection of nother phenomenon for instnce, Nonproduction from self exists. Tht which possesses those is phrse tht hs both explicit nd implicit projection of other phenomen for instnce, The non-emcited ft Yjñdtt who does not et during the dy exists. Tht which does not indicte through its own words is, for instnce, This is not brhmin, in context when it hs been scertined tht person is either of the royl cste or is brhmin nd the specific hs not been scertined. Whenever ny of those four modes of projection occur, [the phenomenon] is n ffirming negtive, wheres negtives other thn those tht do not project ny of those four re other thn ffirming negtives, tht is to sy, nonffirming negtives. The thesis is not explicitly indicted here in the first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle, but implicitly it is; so these nonffirming negtives do ffirm something. They ffirm nother nonffirming negtive, the bsence of inherently existent production. It is permissible for nonffirming negtive to imply nother nonffirming negtive of the sme vriety. This resoning could not prove uncompounded spce, for exmple, but it proves the lck of inherently existent production, which in ddition proves tht things do not inherently exist. Why is it importnt tht these four theses re nonffirming negtives? In medittive equipoise wht one is perceiving is just emptiness. If these were proving something else, like, for exmple, tht production exists conventionlly, then becuse you use these to relize emptiness nd enter medittive equipoise, you would hve to be relizing conventionlly existent production within medittive equipoise. In one wy, since the proof is of nonffirming negtive, medittive equipoise is just perceiving n bsence; in nother wy, the epistemologicl fct tht nothing except emptiness ppers in medittive equipoise requires tht the resoning be oriented round tht fct. The resoning leds one to conclude tht medittive equipoise must hve s its object mere negtive, nd on the other hnd depts report tht medittive equipoise is without perception of ny other object except emptiness. The point is tht the resons in this stnz re This could lso be trnslted s the existence of the non-emcited ft Yjñdtt who does not et during the dy.

53 The Issue 51 nonffirming negtives nd wht they prove is nonffirming negtive. Sometimes, especilly in other orders of Tibetn Buddhism, the negtive is put together with positive phenomenon, such s the mind of cler light. The mind of cler light is positive (sgrub p, vidhi) nd so the combintion of the two the cler light nture of the mind nd the bsence of inherent existence is n ffirming negtive. The present Dli Lm sys tht if you relize the nonffirming negtive tht is the bsence of inherent existence nd your understnding qulifies your perception of the luminous nture of the mind, then this is fully qulified wy of meditting on emptiness nd of overcoming fflictive emotions. Some scholrs, however, sy tht the object of medittion hs to be just nonffirming negtive for it to be effective in overcoming fflictive emotions. Their criticism seems to be tht without stressing elimintion of the object of negtion, one could just end up with the luminous nture of the mind, which might be like performing clm biding medittion on the luminous nture of the mind. However, ccording to the Dli Lm, if other orders medittions re done well, the two emptiness nd the luminous nture of the mind go together. For exmple, in the Nyingm order, you nlyze your mind to find from where it rises ( byung), where it bides (gns), nd tht into which it goes ( gro), nd through Middle Wy type of resoning inherent existence is eliminted. Thus when such prctitioner gets hold of the luminous nture of the mind, it is qulified with, tht is to sy, endowed with, understnding the bsence of inherent existence. Prtly from this stnz nd commentry on it, gret division in Tibetn Buddhism involving prtisn polemics rose between Ge-lug nd the other systems. Some find this nonffirming negtive to be n extreme of nihilism, wheres some Ge-lugs re unble to understnd how the nonffirming negtive cn go together with reflecting on the luminous light nture of the mind, wheres some others py no ttention to the nonffirming negtive nd hold only to the luminous light nture of the mind. This first stnz in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle nd the commentries on it re source for glimpsing crucilly different pproches in Indin nd other Asin Buddhisms. The first extnt commentry on Nāgārjun s text is Buddhpālit s, titled Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl [Stnzs on the] Middle, but it is generlly clled the Buddhpālit Commentry the nme of the uthor being used for the nme of the text. In the sme mnner, the lte Go-mng scholr Ge-dün-lo-drö opined tht the commentry on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle clled Akutobhyā (g ls jigs med; mūlmdhymkvṛtti. To dte, the Snskrit version of the text hs not been found.

54 52 Bckground of the Controversy no fer from nywhere ), generlly regrded s being by n unknown uthor, might be by person nmed Akutobhyā. Some ttribute it to Nāgārjun, but it quotes Nāgārjun s student Ārydev, wheres the custom is not to cite one s own student. Also, the other gret Indin commenttors do not cite it. A commentry is required to explin why the chpter ws written, why prticulr stnz ws written, nd how the stnz fits into greter context. Buddhpālit s commentry provoked Bhāvvivek, who objected to mny points. Chndrkīrti cme to Buddhpālit s defense. This put Buddhpālit nd Chndrkīrti on one side, nd Bhāvvivek on the other. Chndrkīrti s commentry ws not written while Bhāvvivek ws still live; thus Bhāvvivek never hd chnce to respond. In the first chpter of Cler Words, Chndrkīrti presents n elborte rgument defending Buddhpālit ginst Bhāvvivek s chrge of his misconstruing the refuttion of production in Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom. Chndrkīrti s defense of Buddhpālit culmintes in n ttck on Bhāvvivek s own formultion of Nāgārjun s refuttion of production. During it, Chndrkīrti indictes tht, ccording to the tenets of the Middle Wy School, the subject of Bhāvvivek s syllogism refuting production from self s presented in the Sāṃkhy system (tht is, production, or mnifesttion, of n effect tht is of the sme entity s its cuse) is not estblished comptibly for both prties of the debte. From this, Chndrkīrti concludes tht the mode of procedure of Bhāvvivek s resoning is fulty despite the ltter s own supposed presenttion of such comptible estblishment. In the syllbus of the Ge-lug-p monstic universities, the topic of Bhāvvivek s ssertion of comptibly ppering subjects nd Chndrkīrti s refuttion of this surfces in the Middle Wy clss during discussion of the refuttion of production from self in Chndrkīrti s Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle. b Since Chndrkīrti trets the topic in his Cler Words, the mteril from it is brought over to this clss lthough the clss is structured round his Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle. The first phse is clled Opposite of the Consequences c ; this leds to the second phse clled Comptibly ppering subjects. d Then, the clss returns to the refuttion of production from other, which leds to b c d See Jeffrey Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness, dbu m l jug p, mdhymkāvtār; P5261, P5262, vol. 98. thl bzlog. chos cn mthun snng b.

55 The Issue 53 third phse clled Two Truths, nd so forth. Pertinent here re the first two phses, centrlly importnt in the Ge-lug-p eductionl system for understnding the Middle Wy Consequence School, b since they re used for cquiring working knowledge of the differences between the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School. The trining progrm provides highly developed commentries on this very difficult controversy. c The controversy over this stnz is one of the wys tht Ge-lug-p scholrs pproch the doctrine of emptiness, provoking reflection becuse, hving lerned mny of the principles of the Middle Wy School, you hve to use them to figure out wht is t issue mong these three scholrs you hve to toss round nd ruminte over the principles of Proponent of the Middle to get hndle on the topics. This period of study does not so much tech you directly bout the resonings; rther, it forces you to use Middle Wy principles in trying to figure out wht is hppening in this controversy such tht your continuum becomes imbued with those notions. Buddhpālit first sets forth the Eight No s no cesstion, nd so bden p gnyis. b dbu m thl gyur p, prāsṅgikmādhymik. c My exposition of this topic is drwn lmost entirely from Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle / Anlysis of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Tresury of Scripture nd Resoning, Thoroughly Illuminting the Profound Mening [of Emptiness], Entrnce for the Fortunte (dbu m chen mo / dbu m jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs) (Buxduor: Gomng, 1967), 224b , which is Jm-yng-shy-p s explntion of the controversy between Buddhpālit, Bhāvvivek, nd Chndrkīrti in their respective commentries on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle nd especilly s recounted by Chndrkīrti in his Cler Words. I hve lso mde extensive use of textbook on the topic from the Jy College of Se-r Monstery by Gom-dy Nm-kh-gyl-tshn, his Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chndrkīrti s) Cler Words, Written by Jm-py-yng Gom-dy Nm-kh-gyl-tshn (thl bzlog gi dk b i gns gtn l bebs p jm p i dbyng sgom sde nm mkh rgyl mtshn gyis mdzd p i tshig gsl gyi lde mig ) in The Obligtory Texts (Yig-ch) for the Study of Mdhymik of Byes Grw-tshn of Se-r Monstery, Mdhymik Text Series, vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lh-mkhr yoṅs-dzin bstn-p-rgyl-mtshn, 1973). Throughout this explntion, my work t the Buddhist School of Dilectics in Dhrmsl during April, My, nd June of 1982 figures prominently. During tht period I ttended dily lectures by the Principl, the lte Lobsng Gytso of Lo-sel-ling College which uses the textbooks of Pṇ-chen Sö-nm-drg-p, nd debted with members of the clss on n lmost dily bsis. The experience lifted this importnt topic out of the textbooks into living dilemm of expliction, requiring fr greter grsp of the movement of the controversy thn I hd previously. Also, throughout the explntion, the techings of lte Ken-sur Ngg-wng-leg-dn, bbot emeritus of the Tntric College of Lower Lhs nd ge-shy in the Go-mng College of Dre-pung Monstic University, who first introduced me to the topic, re crucil.

56 54 Bckground of the Controversy forth. After Nāgārjun s expression of worship, he constructs the scene by hving the person in the street sy, Show how this clled production is only convention! This is how Buddhpālit sets the scene for Nāgārjun s first chpter, the import being, If you Nāgārjun wnt to sy tht in the fce of ultimte nlysis there is no production, no cesstion, nd so forth, then show me how production is just convention. It is provoctive tht Buddhpālit hs the objector sy, Show how it is convention! He does not hve the objector sy Show how production does not exist in the fce of medittive equipoise! He does not hve the questioner sy, Show how production is not found when pursued by resoning! He does not hve person sy, Show how it does not exist! (to which Ge-lug scholrs would dd inherently exist ). Buddhpālit hs the frming question red, Show how production is only convention! Does Nāgārjun s stnz show how production is convention? It does not. Since the four resons re nonffirming negtives, the four resons do not prove tht production exists conventionlly. This is how Buddhpālit s frme is the source of the controversy. The Tibetn scholr who brought this understnding of the root of the controversy to the fore is Jm-yng-shy-p. b Tsong-kh-p does not mention this point, lthough Jm-yng-shy-p tkes it to be the hinge for understnding how Bhāvvivek s objection rose. Bhāvvivek s refuttion of Buddhpālit is brief; he gives three resons why Buddhpālit s presenttion is wrong (to be cited below). I feel tht, in exploring those three resons nd looking t Buddhpālit s explntion, we must sy tht Bhāvvivek ws upset by Buddhpālit s sttement bout conventionlly existent production the forementioned hinge even though Bhāvvivek himself does not mention it. Agin, this hinge sttement by Buddhpālit, which Ge-lug-p scholrs refer to s the introduction (gleng gzhi ) is: Respectively, [someone] sys, At this point show how this clled production is only convention! The term respectively implies tht our chllenger, the person-in-thestreet, is now sking bout production nd will continue lter to sk bout the rest of the Eight No s cesstion, nnihiltion, permnence, difference, smeness, coming, nd going. Buddhpālit s Commentry ws lost in the Snskrit nd only preserved in the Tibetn. The Tibetn for the bove is: re zhig ji ltr skye br brjod p th snyd tsm yin p de ltr rb tu ston cig. b jm dbyngs bzhd p; He is the principl textbook uthor for the Go-mng (sgo mng) College of Dre-pung Monstic University ( brs spungs).

57 The Issue 55 To nswer this question by discussing the refuttion of production, Buddhpālit cites the first stnz in Nāgārjun s Tretise: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. Ge-lug scholrs cll the next pssge in Buddhpālit s Commentry the brief indiction (mdor bstn) in which he ddresses the first resoning in Nāgārjun s stnz. This pssge lso begins with respectively which gin indictes tht there is series of refuttions tht is to sy, he will now consider the first, production from self nd lter, production from other nd so on: About tht, respectively, things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ/ tdutpdviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc/ dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/ From their own entities could be rendered s from their own essences. It mens from cuses tht re of the sme essence s them. To illustrte, tble is produced, nd it is either produced from cuses or cuselessly. If it is produced from cuses, mong ll the things tht exist in the multiverse there re itself nd others; so, self nd other include everything. Either it is produced from itself or from nother. Not mny would consider tht it is produced from itself just purely itself, I do not men cuses tht re of the sme entity s it but I think it is rther interesting to lso consider whether it is produced from itself. Doing so llows getting hndle on this phse of the resoning. If it is produced from itself, then tht self, which lredy exists, will hve to be produced endlessly; for, if it is there nd it hs some need to be produced from itself, then it hs to be produced nd produced nd produced. Production would lso be senseless becuse if it is lredy there, wht is the need or purpose for it to be produced gin? We re tlking not The Snskrit is from Chndrkīrti s cittion of it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.1).

58 56 Bckground of the Controversy bout its next moment its next moment is produced from this moment but bout its being produced from itself. If it is produced from itself, nd itself is lredy there, wht is the use or purpose for duplicte production? I wnt to reiterte tht I m not tlking bout its giving rise to nother one like itself; I m tlking bout its just being produced from itself. This would be completely bsurd. Putting these two consequences together (tht self-production would be senseless nd endless): If there were some need for it to be produced, then given tht it hs been produced, it would need tht production endlessly. In other words, first of ll it is senseless for it to be produced from itself, but if you mintin tht there is sense, purpose, or need for its being produced from itself, then it would be produced endlessly becuse it would lwys need to be produced from itself. It is helpful to think this wy for the ske of eliminting bsolutely ll possibilities even if this is thoroughly bsurd possibility. The other benefit is tht it drws you into the resoning, llowing you to confront the fllcies, for these sme fllcies re extended to those who sy it is produced from cuses tht re of the sme entity s the effect. Of course, the Sāṃkhys who re the min Indin proponents of self-production re not sying tht this pot is produced from this pot, but hving investigted pot-from-pot production, you lern how Buddhists refute the Sāṃkhy position of production from self, tht is to sy, from cuses tht re the sme entity s the effect. A good del will be sid below bout why these fllcies pply to the Sāṃkhys, despite the fct tht they re not sying tht this pot is produced from this pot. Let us return to Buddhpālit s brief indiction: About tht, respectively, things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. We see tht it looks like syllogism (sbyor b, pryog) rther thn consequence (thl gyur, prsṅg) becuse he does not sy, It [bsurdly] follows tht (yin pr thl, prsjyte). He gives two resons: becuse their production [gin] would be just senseless nd production would be endless. Wht this hs to men is: becuse if they were produced from themselves, their production [gin] would be senseless Since they lredy exist, their existence would be their first production,

59 The Issue 57 nd ny subsequent production would be re-production, or productiongin. Let me briefly explin why the sttement must include the word gin, which hs been dded in brckets in the trnsltion. Immeditely following this brief indiction is wht Ge-lug-p scholrs term the extensive explntion (rgys bshd ) in which Buddhpālit elbortes on this initil brief sttement. In the extensive explntion Buddhpālit sys: It is thus: the production-gin of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. n hi svātmnā vidymānānāṃ pdārthānāṃ punrutpāde pryojnmsti/ th snnpi jāyet/ n kdā cinn jāyet// dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid yod p rnms l ni yng skye b l dgos p med do// ci ste yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur ro// Here Buddhpālit specificlly qulifies production s being productiongin, wheres bove in the brief indiction he did not. Thus, the word gin needs to be crried from the extensive explntion bck to the brief indiction. Suppose you re Sāṃkhy, nd I sy to you, Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production would be just senseless. (Notice tht I did not sy, becuse their production-gin would be senseless. ) Wht would you sy to the reson? You would sy tht the reson is not estblished; in other words, It is not estblished tht the production of things would be senseless becuse, in generl, the production of things is sensible. Even Buddhpālit would sy tht the reson, without the qulifiction gin, is not estblished, becuse the production of things is sensible. So, when the brief indiction is tken s it is worded in isoltion without ffixing the word gin to it, it looks s if you hve to reverse the reson in order to understnd wht Buddhpālit ws getting t, thereby turning it into becuse their production is sensible. Tht is how Bhāvvivek understood wht Buddhpālit ws sying with good enough cuse, given Buddhpālit s wording in the brief indiction. Now, why did Bhāvvivek not red the reson s, if they re produced from their own entities, their production-gin would be just senseless? The specultion is tht he did not red the reson cluse this wy becuse otherwise when you relize the reson, you lredy hve relized the thesis tht there is no production from self. If you relize tht If

60 58 Bckground of the Controversy things re produced from self, their production is senseless, you would be relizing tht things re not produced from self. Becuse ccording to the rules of logic, the mind tht relizes the reson cnnot be the mind tht relizes the thesis, Ge-lug scholrs speculte tht Bhāvvivek thought tht Buddhpālit could not men this. (Their curiosity bout wht Bhāvvivek ws thinking beyond wht he ctully sid is indeed stimulting!) A Middle Wy Consequentilist, like Chndrkīrti, reds Buddhpālit s sttements differently. To him, Buddhpālit is just stting thesis things re not produced from their own entities nd s his reson he gives two consequences. It is s if Buddhpālit is sying, I m going to show you tht there is no production of things from self, so I will stte two full consequences of tht position to prove it. A consequence must hve subject, predicte, nd reson; so, we will hve to find these three in Buddhpālit s sttement of wht only looks like reson. A Middle Wy Consequentilist notices tht Buddhpālit uses the words would be when he sys, their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless, nd thus Consequentilist sees tht Buddhpālit is flinging two consequences t the Sāṃkhy. In the extensive explntion, Buddhpālit mkes the first reson into just sttement: It is thus: the production-gin of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. Then, s the second reson he sys: If, though existent, they re produced [in other words, if their production-gin is purposeful], they would never not be produced. Buddhpālit concludes the sttement with: Hence, tht lso is not ccepted. Therefore, respectively, things re not produced from self. In the first reson, production-gin is the mnifesttion of n object s the Sāṃkhys posit it. The first production is the coming into nonmnifest existence of the pot in the cly; the second production is its coming into mnifest existence. When the potter gets the cly redy, the pot exists in the cly nonmnifestly t tht time. (I m led into wondering whether nonmnifest pot exists before someone gthers the cly out in the countryside? Does nonmnifest pot exist before the cly forms geologiclly, or before the world system forms? I ssume tht Sāṃkhys sy tht pot In Snskrit this is conveyed by the opttive jāyet; in Tibetn gyur b.

61 The Issue 59 exists nonmnifestly only when some of its min cuses come together, mybe s lte s when the cly is in the potter s hnds?) Its coming into nonmnifest existence is one production, nd so re-production is sensible, but just once from nonmnifest to mnifest. Since the controversy centers round production from self, we cn skip over production from other, both, nd neither nd look t wht Gelug scholrs cll Buddhpālit s conclusion (mjug sdu b): Since the production of things is thus in ll wys not logiclly fesible, there is no production; therefore, this clled production is only convention. Tht he sys tht production is only convention lends credence to the notion provoked by his introductory frming tht he holds tht Nāgārjun is demonstrting the existence of conventionlly existent production through refuting the four possibilities. It looks s if he tkes the existence of production for grnted, nd thus once it does not inherently exist, it must conventionlly exist. The im of looking t both the introductory pssge nd the concluding pssge is tht if these mentions of conventionlly existent production re, s Jm-yng-shy-p cogently sys, the stimulus driving Bhāvvivek s objection to Buddhpālit s presenttion, we need to keep them in mind to understood Bhāvvivek s response. The fct tht Buddhpālit twice brings up conventionlly existent production s if Nāgārjun s refuttion of production is proving tht production conventionlly exists is Bhāvvivek s strting point even if he does not mention it. This controversy revolves round how one uses this stnz s wy to meditte on the bsence of inherently existent production. It is pivotl to Middle Wy scholrship tht through meditting on the import of this stnz one relizes negtive, n bsence, the lck of inherently existent production. Since this reliztion is initilly inferentil, the controversy is concerned with how one genertes n inferentil consciousness relizing emptiness. Tht inferentil consciousness relizing emptiness will then be cultivted such tht it turns into wisdom directly relizing emptiness, which t tht point is cpble of removing fflictive emotions the obstructions to libertion from cyclic existence nd finlly is cpble of removing the obstructions to omniscience when enhnced by the ltruistic intention to become enlightened nd its ttendnt deeds. Among the resonings proving emptiness, there re mny different ctegories: nlyses of effects, nlyses of cuses, nlyses of both cuses nd effects, nlyses of entities, nd so forth. Here we re nlyzing compounded phenomen by wy of exmining their production from cuses

62 60 Bckground of the Controversy produced from self, other, both, neither; therefore, this is n nlysis of cuses. Though we re nlyzing the things tht re the effects, we re doing so by wy of custion we re nlyzing the cuses of those effects. When nlysis is done by wy of effects, it is exmined whether n inherently existent effect is produced, whether n utterly nonexistent effect is produced, n effect tht is both existent nd nonexistent is produced, or n effect tht is neither existent nor nonexistent is produced. As Nāgārjun s Seventy Stnzs on Emptiness sys: Becuse the existent exists, it is not produced. Becuse the nonexistent does not exist, it is not [produced]. Becuse the qulities re incomptible, the existent nd nonexistent is not [produced]. Becuse there is no production, there is no biding nd no cesing. When nlysis is done by wy of both cuse nd effect, it is exmined whether one cuse produces one effect, one cuse produces mny effects, mny cuses produce one effect, or mny cuses produce mny effects. As Jñāngrbh s Differentition of the Two Truths sys: b Mny do not crete one thing, Mny do not crete mny, One does not crete mny things, One lso does not crete one. In ll of these, we re nlyzing effects but sking different questions bout them; they ll prove the thesis tht compounded phenomen re not inherently produced. The prticulr nlysis tht is our focus in this controversy is clled the vjr nodes or the refuttion of production from the four extremes. Is n pple, s n effect nd it hs to be n effect becuse it is functioning thing (dngos po, bhāv) produced from self, other, both, or neither? Let me mention gin tht this single stnz: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly P5227, vol. 95, b The Stydvyvibhṅg is not included in the Peking Tripiṭk, but is included in the sde dge edition. This is stnz 14; for the Tibetn, see Mlcolm Dvid Eckel, Jñāngrbh on the Two Truths (Albny, N.Y.: Stte University of New York Press, 1987), 165. Brckets re from Annottions, dbu m p, 73b.3ff.

63 The Issue 61 Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. is the bsic explntion Nāgārjun gives for this method of nlysis, followed only by n nlysis of production from other by nlyzing conditions. In this work, the Fundmentl Stnzs on the Middle, Nāgārjun presents mny different nlyses for ech topic from different points of view often by multiple stnzs. Ech one is complete unto itself in the sense tht you do not need the others to relize emptiness. Tht he offers mny different types of resonings is not becuse one type is not sufficient to get t emptiness, but becuse Bodhisttvs in their trining wnt to open the mind s vstly s possible to emptiness. As Tsong-kh-p sys: To estblish tht even single phenomenon does not truly exist, those of the Gret Vehicle use limitless, different resonings s set forth in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle. Hence their minds become gretly brodened with respect to suchness. Those of the Lesser Vehicle use only brief resoning to estblish suchness by vlid cognition, nd since they do not estblish emptiness the wy those of the Gret Vehicle do, they do not hve mind brodened with respect to suchness. Therefore, Nāgārjun speks of difference of vstness or bbrevition nd difference of fully or not fully meditting on selflessness. This difference rises becuse: Herers nd Solitry Relizers strive to bndon only the fflictive emotions [tht is, the obstructions to libertion], nd relizing mere bbrevition of the mening of suchness is sufficient for tht; Mhāyānists re intent on bndoning the obstructions to omniscience, nd for this it is necessry to hve very brodened mind of wisdom opened to suchness. Using vst number of resoning expnds the mind relizing emptiness, even though the emptiness relized is the sme. Thus the Gret Vehicle mode of procedure for pproching emptiness is to use mny different nlyses. See my trnsltion of Tsong-kh-p s Extensive Explntion of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Illumintion of the Thought (dbu m l jug p i rgy cher bshd p dgongs p rb gsl) in Tsong-kh-p, Kensur Lekden, nd Jeffrey Hopkins, Compssion in Tibetn Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980),

64 62 Bckground of the Controversy The gret S-ky scholr Ren-d-w, Tsong-kh-p s techer, tkes the opposite viewpoint, sying tht Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle is text common to both the Lesser Vehicle pth nd the Gret Vehicle pth becuse both prctitioners of the Lesser Vehicle nd prctitioners of the Gret Vehicle need to relize emptiness. Tsong-kh-p refutes his own techer, sying tht it is Gret Vehicle text becuse vst number of resonings re presented. Both scholrs hve point, but Tsong-kh-p s strikes me s more cogent. Becuse of the pucity of Nāgārjun s explntion of this prticulr resoning, we see the importnce of the commentries on his first stnz. How could you meditte on the first stnz without reding commentry on how to contemplte the vjr nodes? Why re things not produced from self? Why re they not produced from other? Why re they not produced from both? Why re they not produced from neither? Despite the fct tht Nāgārjun expounds t length on other resonings, he obviously did not feel tht it ws necessry to sy nything more. Mny texts re known for their brevity, but frnkly I could not mke use of this one stnz without commentry. Thus, our concern in considering this controversy between Buddhpālit, Bhāvvivek, nd Chndrkīrti is fundmentlly with the mens for meditting on the mening of this stnz. Buddhpālit s Commentry tells how to do it: [Brief indiction:] About tht, respectively, things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. [Extensive explntion:] It is thus: the production-gin of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, tht lso is not ccepted. Therefore, respectively, things re not produced from self. This is how to medittively reflect on the lck of inherently existent production from self. You think, for exmple: The subject, my body, is not inherently produced becuse of not being produced from itself, not being produced from other, not being produced from both, nd not being produced cuselessly. Then, you proceed to investigte production from self in order to strt the process of estblishing ech of the four resons so tht you cn relize the initil thesis: My body is not inherently produced. red md b,

65 The Issue 63 The problem is tht given wht Buddhpālit sys in the brief indiction, we would be misled to proceed like this: The subject, my body, is not produced from its own entity becuse my body s production is senseless. However, this is problemtic becuse it is obvious tht for Buddhpālit production is not senseless! This illustrtes the problems in Buddhpālit s presenttion the wy he structures it runs into trouble. One might reword it s follows, but it is still problemtic: The subject, my body, is not produced from its own entity becuse, if produced from its own entity, its production-gin would be senseless. In this cse, there is the fult tht when you relize the reson, you would lredy hve relized the thesis. Therefore, let us reword it s consequence ccording to the text of the extensive explntion: With respect to the subject, my body, it follows tht its productiongin is purposeless becuse of being lredy existent in its own entity. Now it mkes supreme sense.

66

67 3. Sāmkhy Tenets Before going into the controversy mong these Buddhist scholrs in more detil, let us consider the Sāṃkhy school s tenets, which uphold production from self. The Snskrit word Sāṃkhy is trnslted into Tibetn s those who possess enumertion (grngs cn p). They re clled Enumertors becuse they set forth definite number of ctegories of phenomen, through the knowledge of which one cn be liberted. Bsiclly, there re twenty-five ctegories. Within the twenty-five, there re two ctegories, puruṣ ( person, self, pure consciousness ) nd prkṛti ( nture, fundmentl nture ). Prkṛti is further divided in stges into the remining twenty-three. First there is buddhi (intellect) nd then hṃkār ( I-mker, I-principle ). Ahṃkār is ctully mde up of three I-mkers, which re ech dominted by one of the three guṇs ( qulities ). The three guṇs, or qulities of nture, re sttv (snying stobs) which is the qulity of lightness, rjs (rdul ) which is the qulity of motility, nd tms (mun p) which is the qulity of drkness. Out of the interction of the three guṇs come ll phenomen. Prkṛti is mtter, which mens tht ll twenty-three ctegories tht evolve from it re mtter. Even buddhi, intellect, is mtter. Anything tht is n evolute of prkṛti is mtter. According to Sāṃkhy, we confuse the pure consciousness of puruṣ with ll our other consciousnesses which re in fct mtter. Similrly, in Buddhism Highest Yog Tntr ims t getting hold of the mind of cler light which is somewht equivlent to puruṣ in the midst of ny sort of consciousness nd t concentrting on tht to the point where ll conceptul consciousnesses (rtog p, klpnā) dispper; in this context, conceptul consciousnesses include ll dulistic consciousnesses ll levels of dulity, including even the directly perceiving sense consciousnesses. According to certin S-ky techings, for instnce, the six opertive consciousnesses do not exist in Buddh. In chrt form, the twenty-five ctegories re: b The six opertive consciousnesses re the eye, er, nose, tongue, body, nd mentl consciousnesses. In this type of system, it is solely through the opertive consciousnesses of trinees tht Buddhs pper. b The chrt is dpted from Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness,

68 66 Bckground of the Controversy TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES CONSCIOUSNESS 1. person (skyes bu, puruṣ), or self (bdg, ātmn), consciousness (shes p), knower (rig p), the sentient (sems p cn), knower of the field (zhing shes p, kṣetrjñ) MATTER 2. fundmentl nture (rts b i rng bzhin, mūlprkṛti ), or nture (rng bzhin, prkṛti), principl (gtso bo, prdhān), generlity (spyi, sāmāny), generl principl (spyi i gtso bo, sāmānyprdhān) 3. wreness (blo, buddhi), or gret one (chen po, mht) 4. I-principle (ng rgyl, hṃkār) () I-principle dominted by motility (rdul, rjs) (b) I-principle dominted by drkness (mun p, tms) (c) I-principle dominted by lightness (snying stobs, sttv) Five subtle objects, or potencies of objects, which evolve from the I-principle dominted by motility: 5. sounds (sgr, śbd) 6. tngible objects (reg by, sprṣṭvy) 7. odors (dri, gndh) 8. visible forms (gzugs, rūp) 9. tstes (ro, rs) Eleven fculties which evolve from the I-principle dominted by lightness: Five physicl fculties, or ction fculties 10. speech (ngg, vāc) 11. rms (lg p, pāṇi) 12. legs (rkng p, pād) 13. nus (rkub, pāyu) 14. genitli ( doms, upsth) Five mentl fculties 15. er (rn b, śrot) 16. body or skin (pgs p, sprśn) 17. tongue (lce, rsn) 18. eye (mig, ckṣu) 19. nose (sn, ghrāṇ) One intellectul fculty 20. Intellectul fculty (yid, mns), the nture of which is both mentl nd physicl Five elements: 21. erth (s, pṛthivī), which evolves from the odor potency 22. wter (chu, āp), which evolves from the tste potency 23. fire (me, tejs), which evolves from the visible form potency 24. wind (rlung, vāyu), which evolves from the tngible object potency 25. spce (nm mkh, ākāś), which evolves from the sound potency

69 Sāmkhy Tenets 67 In Sāṃkhy there is nonmteril person pure consciousness nd then ll other phenomen, including the sense powers, sense consciousnesses, ll of our thoughts, tbles, chirs, nd so forth in the ctegory of mtter. In the Buddhist system of Highest Yog Tntr, ll these nonpuruṣ consciousnesses tht the Sāṃkhys put in the ctegory of mtter re put in the ctegory of corse (rgs p) consciousness or their objects; the mind of cler light is subtle (phr b), nd ll other consciousnesses re corse nd hve to be stopped. A difference from Sāṃkhy is tht t Buddhhood, within the mind of cler light, one is still ble to operte the other consciousnesses nd pper in form; this is not shred with Sāṃkhy, which holds tht upon libertion one is either in stte of withdrwn, pure consciousness, or ppering to others within lower stte. According to Sāṃkhy, we re brought into cyclic existence due to confusing pure consciousness with other phenomen. The process of relese from cyclic existence is, therefore, to understnd fully the enumertion of mind nd mtter. Through understnding well tht reckoning, one develops the divine eye understnding the source of confusion, whereupon mtter disppers. In the Buddhist system of Highest Yog Tntr, the grosser levels of consciousness cese through specil concentrtive techniques within reflection on emptiness. Buddhists use the vocbulry of dissolving (thim p) which is Sāṃkhy terminology, but Ge-lug-p scholrs dd tht the mening of dissolving is not tht the essence of one phenomenon psses into the essence of nother phenomenon, lthough tht is wht dissolving usully mens; rther, the corser levels cese. In the Sāṃkhy system, prkṛti is lso clled prdhān ( principl ) nd sāmāny ( generlity ). Prkṛti is perhps like Mother Nture; it is the three guṇs in blnce. The three guṇs sttv, rjs, nd tms re ssocited with the colors white, red, nd blck, respectively. In Buddhist Highest Yog Tntr, the three minds tht mnifest before the mind of cler light the mind of vivid white ppernce, the mind of vivid red increse, nd the mind of vivid blck ner-ttinment re lso sometimes clled sttv, rjs, nd tms. In Buddhism, the gol is to remin only in the fourth nd most subtle mind, the mind of cler light, nd pper in form within tht stte through using the very subtle wind tht is the mount of the fundmentl innte mind of cler light s the bsis of emntion. One ppers in form by using this very subtle wind s the substntil cuse (nyer len, upādān) of physicl ppernce. One stys t the level of cler light nd ppers in form. In Sāṃkhy, to be liberted one hs to seprte from prkṛti, the bsic fctors of which re these white, red, nd blck See Tsong-kh-p s Gret Exposition of Secret Mntr.

70 68 Bckground of the Controversy ctors, s it were. These guṇs re mteril, from which one hs to seprte, whereupon one is in stte of libertion. It seems tht Sāṃkhys do not posit the bility to pper within the stte of pure consciousness; wht is left is just the puruṣ (skyes bu) which is their equivlent of the mind of cler light. They do not seem to posit the bility to pper within it; when liberted being dies, tht being is incpble of ppernce nd is just in spiritul stte of withdrwl. Thus, there re extrordinry similrities nd n importnt difference between Sāṃkhys nd Buddhists, the differentiting fctor being the prctice of compssion nd so forth in the Gret Vehicle tht drws out potencies for ppernce within the most profound stte. The prctice of compssion is coupled with deity yog in Tntr nd utiliztion of subtle minds in Highest Yog Tntr in order to use the wind tht is the mount of the fundmentl innte mind of cler light s the substntil cuse for ppernce, tht is, s the substnce from which to emnte ppernce. This is profound difference between Sāṃkhy nd Buddhism, nd yet I cll it just difference beyond the similrities. Prkṛti is clled the generlity (spyi, sāmāny) becuse it pervdes ll secondry phenomen. It seems tht the whole of prkṛti is present in ll of its mnifesttions, t lest ccording to Buddhist presenttions of it. In the Prmenides, when Zeno questions Socrtes, who here is the fool, he sks bout the Ides whether the Ide of (let us sy) pple is entirely present in this pple nd entirely present in tht pple over there, or whether only prt of the Ide of pple is present in this nd prt in tht pple. He goes on to sy tht if only prt of the Ide of gretness is present in something tht is gret, then something less thn full gretness would mke something gret. When he cites bsurdities this wy, Socrtes hs nothing to sy nd is quite bothered, dmitting tht his mind hops to nother topic when fced with these questions. With this bckground let us turn to two presenttions of the controversy mong the erly Indin Proponents of the Middle by the lte seventeenth-century nd erly eighteenth-century Tibetn scholr Jm-yngshy-p. The first is concise overview, nd the second, chllenging look into the detils. This book minly trets Buddhpālit s commentry on Nāgārjun s refuttion of self-production nd Bhāvvivek s criticl rection to it; the second volume ddresses Chndrkīrti s defense of Buddhpālit.

71 PART TWO: Jm-yng-shy-p s GREAT EXPOSITION OF TENETS: Wht is the right wy to refute production?

72

73 Presenttion of Tenets: Lion s Ror Erdicting Error, Precious Lmp Illuminting the Genuine Pth to Omniscience བ པའ མཐའ མ པར བཞག པ འ ལ ང གད ང འ ད ངས ཀ ན མཁ ན ལམ བཟང གསལ བའ ར ན ཆ ན ན མ ཞ ས བ བ གས ས with Jm-yng-shy-p s own commentry on the root text: Explntion of Tenets: Sun of the Lnd of Smntbhdr Brillintly Illuminting All of Our Own nd Others Tenets nd the Mening of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocen of Scripture nd Resoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings བ མཐའ མ བཤད རང གཞན བ མཐའ ཀ ན དང ཟབ ད ན མཆ ག གསལ བ ཀ ན བཟང ཞ ང ག ཉ མ ང ར གས མཚ དག འ ར བ ཀ ན ང ཞ ས བ བ གས ས nd with Ngg-wng-pl-dn s word-commentry nd nnottions from his: Annottions for (Jm-yng-shy-p s) Gret Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Cler Awreness བ མཐའ ཆ ན མ འ མཆན འག ལ དཀའ གནད མ ད ག ལ གསལ གཅ ས ན ར ཞ ས བ བ གས ས Buddhpālit commented on the Fundmentl by wy of consequences Old Go-mng Lhs, 8b.5; 2011 TBRC bl brng, ph, 11.1; 2000 Tipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod,

74 72 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets བ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཐལ འ ར བཀ ལ Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Word Commentry on Root Text: The mster Buddhpālit commented on the thought of Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom in the mnner of the Consequence School. བ ཤ ས རབ ཀ དག ངས པ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཐལ འ ར བའ གས བཀ ལ Around just fter the mster Asṅg opened the wy of the Mind-Only School upon hving come to this world, the mster Buddhpālit wrote commentry on Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom nd thereby opened the wy of the Consequence School. For: in generl there re eight commentries on Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom nd lthough the other six commentries b mostly use syllogistic sttements, this mster flings mny consequences. བ དཔ ན ཐ གས མ ད ག ང འད ར ན ནས ས མས ཙམ ག ལ བའ ས ཙམ ལ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ད མ བ ཤ ས རབ ལ འག ལ པ མཛད ནས ཐལ འ ར ག ལ བ ཡ ན ཏ ར ཤ ལ འག ལ བ བ ད ཡ ད ཅ ང འག ལ བ གཞན ག ག ས ཕལ ཆ ར ར ངག མཛད ཀ ང བ དཔ ན འད ས ཐལ འ ར མང པ འཕ ན པར མཛད པ ཡ ན པའ ར Most of the explntions in the commentries by msters [who wrote texts] other thn the Akutobhyā Commentry nd the Cler Words tht re mentioned in Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom re seen to be in the clss of syllogisms. Also, Chndrkīrti s Cler Words sys, Objection: However, the extensive expression of syllogistic sttements is the system of commenttors. This [presents n opponent s position tht] Tipei edition, note tsh, b Chndrkīrti s Cler Words, like Buddhpālit s commentry, minly uses consequences.

75 Overview of Buddhpālit s Refuttion of the Four Extremes 73 Although syllogistic sttements re mnifest in Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom, this is due to its being root text, but the extensive sttement of syllogisms is done by its commentries, nd why did Buddhpālit not lso do this? The mster Buddhpālit refutes ech of the four extreme types of production through consequences nd similrly does commentry within using mny consequences. The Buddhpālit Commentry contins mny [sttements of consequences] such s, for instnce: b About tht, respectively, things re not produced from their own entities becuse [if they were,] c their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. It is thus: the production gin of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. [Also] if, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced; hence, tht lso is not sserted. Therefore, respectively, things re not produced from self. They lso re not produced from other. Why? For it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything would be produced from everything. They lso re not produced from both self nd other becuse the fllcies of both [production from self nd production from other] would [bsurdly] follow. They lso re not produced cuselessly becuse it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything lwys would be produced from everything nd becuse there would be the fllcy tht ll endevor would be just senseless. འག ལ པ ག ལ ས འཇ གས མ ད དང ཚ ག གསལ གཉ ས མ ན པའ བ དཔ ན གཞན ག འག ལ པ ཕལ ཆ ར ག བཤད པ ཤ ས [G9]རབ ན མ ར བཀ ད པ དག ཀ ང ར ངག ག གས ང ཞ ང ཚ ག གསལ ལས ཀ ང འ ན ཏ ར བའ ངག ས པར བ ད པར ད པ འད ན འག ལ པ མཁན པ མས ཀ གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ན ཞ ས ས འད ས ཤ ར ངག མ གསལ ཡང The commentry is clled by the nme of its uthor. b P5242, vol. 95, ff, commenting on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle, I.1. c This nd the next brckets re from Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle, 225.6ff.

76 74 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets བའ དབང ག ས ཡ ན ལ ར ངག ས པར འག ད པ འད འ འག ལ པ དག ག ས མཛད ལ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཀ ང ཅ འ ར མ མཛད ཅ ས པའ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ བ ར ར ནས ཐལ པས བཀག ཅ ང ད བཞ ན ཐལ འ ར མང པ མཛད ནས བཀ ལ བ ཡ ན ཏ དྷ ལ ཏ ལས ད ལ ར ཞ ག དང ས པ བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང [L11b] བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར འད ར དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ མས ལ ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད གལ ཏ ཡ ད ཀ ང ན མ བར མ འ ར བས ད ཡང མ འད ད ད ད འ ར ར ཞ ག དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད གཞན ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ཅ འ ར ཞ ན ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར བདག དང གཞན དང གཉ ས ཀ ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད གཉ ས ཀའ ན ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར མ ད ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ག ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར དང མ པ ཐམས ཅད ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ན འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས པ མང ང This mster Buddhpālit [yogiclly] chieved [meeting with] the foremost venerble Mñjughoṣh, composed explntions of mny tretises, nd proceeded to n re of knowledge-berers. Tsong-kh-p s Explntion of (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Ocen of Resoning sys: The one clled Buddhpālit who chieved the word of the foremost venerble Mñjughoṣh nd proceeded to plce of dept

77 Overview of Buddhpālit s Refuttion of the Four Extremes 75 knowledge-berers. nd the colophon to the trnsltion of the Buddhpālit Commentry sys: Written by one who chieved the word of the youthful Mñjushrī, composed explntions of mny tretises, properly entered the Gret Vehicle, nd proceeded to specil plce of those who hve chieved the holding of knowledge-mntr. བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས འད ན བ ན འཇམ ད ངས བ པ བ ན བཅ ས མའ མ བཤད མཛད ཅ ང ར ག འཛ ན ག སར གཤ གས པ ཡ ན ཏ མ བཤད ལས བ ན འཇམ དཔལ ད ངས ཀ བཀའ བ ཅ ང བ པའ ར ག འཛ ན གནས གཤ གས ར པ སངས ས བ ངས ཞ ས དང འག ལ པའ འ ར ང ལས འཇམ དཔལ གཞ ན འ བཀའ བ པ བ ན བཅ ས མའ མ བཤད མཛད པ ཐ ག པ ཆ ན པ ཡང དག [G9b] པར གས པ ར ག གས འཆང བ པའ གནས ཁ ད པར ཅན གཤ གས པས མཛད པ ཞ ས ས

78 Bhvy, pprehending fllcies, opened the wy of the Middle Wy Autonomy School. བྷ ས ན བ ང ད མ རང ད Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Word Commentry on Root Text: The mster Bhvykr (legs ldn byed), pprehending fllcies in those [consequences presented by Buddhpālit], opened the chriotwy of commenting on the thought of Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom in the mnner of the system of the Middle Wy Autonomy School. ད ལ བ དཔ ན བྷ ཀ ར ལ གས ན འ ད ཀ ས ན བ ང ནས དགག པ མཛད ད ཤ འ དག ངས པ ད མ རང ད པའ གས བཀ ལ བའ ཤ ང འ ལ འ The mster b Bhvykr tht is, legs ldn byed nd in some trnsltions lso skl ldn nd lso the mster snng brl ccording to Khy-drub s Gret Exposition of the Generl Tntr Sets c vowed to chieve the vjr set [Buddhhood] in tht lifetime but in his next lifetime becme the mster Vjrghṇṭpād nd ttined the supreme fet [Buddhhood]. In generl, he wrote mny tretises, nd in prticulr he composed: the Hert of the Middle, which is like condenstion of Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom, nd its utocommentry, the Blze of Resoning, setting forth t length our own nd others ssertions nd minly teching both the profound nd the vst of the bsis, pth, nd fruit the mind of enlightenment, clm biding, specil insight, nd so forth nd the Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom, commentry on Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom. Tht is, Bhāvvivek. b Tipei, c See Ferdinnd D. Lessing nd Alex Wymn, Mkhs Grub Rje s Fundmentls of the Buddhist Tntrs (The Hgue: Mouton, 1968), rpt., (Delhi: Motill Bnrsidss, 1978), 89.

79 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 77 ད ནས བ དཔ ན བྷ ཀ ར ལ གས ན འ ད དང འ ར ལ ལར ལ ན འང བ ར བ དཔ ན ང ལ ཡང ཟ ར བ ད མ [L12] ཆ ན མ ར ན ཚ ད ལ གདན བ པར དམ བཅས ཀ ང ཚ མ ལ ལ བར ར ནས མཆ ག ག དང ས བ བ ས པ ད ས ར བ ན བཅ ས མང པ དང ཁ ད པར ད མ བ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ང པ བ ས པ རང གཞན ག འད ད ལ ས པར ན ཅ ང གཙ བ ར ང ས མས དང ཞ ག ས གས གཞ ལམ འ ས ག མ ག ཟབ ས གཉ ས ཆར ན པ ད མ ང པ དང ད འ རང འག ལ ག ག འབར བ དང བ ཤ ས རབ ཀ འག ལ པ ཤ ས རབ ན མ མཛད Apprehending fllcies in the ssertions of mny msters nd in the [sttement of ] consequences by the mster Buddhpālit when refuting production from the four extremes, he refutes them one by one extensively. Refuting the ssertions by the Proponents of Mind-Only tht imputtionl ntures re not inherently estblished, nd so forth, he newly opened the gret wy of Proponents of the Middle in which lthough phenomen do not ultimtely exist, they conventionlly exist inherently nd by wy of their own chrcter. Though it is explined tht this mster followed Devshrm s commentry clled Shining White, the opener of the chriot-wy of the Middle Wy Autonomy School is only Bhāvvivek becuse he is the first mster who, subsequent to the Superior [Nāgārjun] nd his spiritul son [Ārydev], extensively opened the wy [of the system in which it is demonstrted tht] the Mind-Only School is not logiclly fesible nd the Middle Wy School is logiclly fesible. This is lso known from the sttement by the mster Ye-shy-dy: b After them, the mster Bhāvvivek repudited the system of Cognition-Only nd presented system in which externl objects b dkr po rnm pr chr b. ye shes sde; fl. c. 800.

80 78 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets exist conventionlly. And moreover becuse the mster Shāntrkṣhit mde [the formt of] nonexistence ultimtely nd inherent existence in conventionl terms in ccordnce with the system of this mster [Bhāvvivek] nd lso citing it s sources. བ དཔ ན མང པ འ འད ད ལ དང བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ འག ག ག བས ལ ས གས པའ ཐལ བ མས ལ ར ར ནས ན བ ང ནས དགག པ ས པར བ ད པར མཛད ད ས མས ཙམ པས ཀ ན བཏགས རང བཞ ན ག ས མ བ པར འད ད པ ས གས བཀག ནས ད ན དམ པར མ ད ཀ ང ཐ ད རང བཞ ན དང རང མཚན ག ས བ པའ ད མའ ལ ཆ ན པ གསར བཏ ད ད བ དཔ ན འད ད བ ཤར མའ འག ལ བ དཀར པ མ པར འཆར བའ ས འ ང བར བཤད ཀ ང ད མ རང ད པའ ཤ ང འ ལ འ ད འད ཁ ན ཡ ན ཏ བ དཔ ན འཕགས པ ཡབ ས ཀ ས ས མས ཙམ པ མ འཐད ལ ད མའ ལ འཐད ལ ས པར ལ འ ད པ བ དཔ ན འད བའ ར ཏ བ དཔ ན ཡ ཤ ས ས ཀ ང ད འ འ ག བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན འ ད ཀ ས མ པར ར ག པ ཙམ ག གས ན ང ཐ ད འ ད ན ཡ ད པའ གས མ པར [L12b] བཞག པ མཛད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པས ཀ ང ཤ ས ས བ དཔ ན ཞ འཚ ཡང ད ན དམ པར མ ད པ ཐ ད རང བཞ ན ག ས བ པ བ དཔ ན [G10] འད འ གས ར ས ཤ ང ཤ ས ད ཀ ང ངས པས ས

81 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 79 [Refuting Production from Self] With respect to the wy [Bhāvvivek] pprehends fllcies in [Buddhpālit s] individul consequences, Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys bout [Buddhpālit s] consequences estblishing the nonexistence of production from self: Tht is not resonble: 1. becuse [Buddhpālit] does not express reson [cpble of proving tht there is no production from self ] s well s n exmple, nd 2. becuse [the resoning s Buddhpālit sttes it] does not void the fllcies dduced by nother [tht is, the fllcies tht Sāṃkhy would be expected to dduce]. 3. Since these re phrses of consequences, they [must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the resons, b due to which it would be tht things re produced The Snskrit, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 15.1), rther thn presenting this s three points s the Tibetn in Bhāvvivek s text does (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, s well s in Avlokitvrt s commentry, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 148,3), refrmes Buddhpālit s syllogism in its opposite form: prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti (Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end.) The Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s text, nevertheless, s bove presents this s three points: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetn Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Snskrit into Tibetn, however, s: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/ Becuse of the unnimity of the Tibetn versions on this point (except for mine) nd becuse Tsong-kh-p nd Jm-yng-shy-p spek to these versions, I use their csting of the mening s three points but cite the Snskrit version throughout. b de i chos. Avlokitvrt sys: the property of tht (de i chos, tddhrm): the property of tht thesis, tht is to sy, [the reson which is] the property of the subject of tht thesis (bsgrub pr by b de i phyogs kyi chos), Things re not

82 80 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets from other, production hs effects, nd production hs n end, whereby [Buddhpālit] would contrdict tenets [of the Middle Wy School]. ཐལ འ ར ས ས ལ ན བ ང ལ ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པའ ཐལ བ ལ ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས བ བ པར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས ས These re widely renowned. Their mening is: produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ), nmely, becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, tdutpdviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc). wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of tht (de bzlog p i don mngon ps, viprītrth vyktu): wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of becuse their production would be just senseless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir, tdutpdviyrthyāt), nmely, becuse production hs effects (skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b i phyir, jnmsāphlyāt) nd the opposite of becuse production would be endless (skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, tiprsṅgdo- ṣācc) nmely, becuse production hs n end (skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir, jnmnirodhāt). As mentioned two notes bove, t the end of the second reson Jm-yng-shy-p s cittion (374.12) reds ro the equivlent of period which might seem to terminte the list of resons, mking it look s if there re only two resons. In other versions, there is n nd clerly denoting tht there is third, dditionl reson.

83 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit It does not express reson nd n exmple cpble of proving tht there is no production from self. 2. It does not void fllcies [dduced by Sāṃkhys] questioning whether this is conventionl or ultimte [in the Sāṃkhys own system]. 3. Since the thesis the nonexistence of production from self is not nonffirming negtive, it contrdicts the tenet, or system, of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtrs nd Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom. འད ག གས ཆ ལ ད ན བདག མ ད པར བ ས ཀ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད ཅ ང གཞན ག ཀ ན བ དང ད ན དམ གང ཡ ན འ བའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བ དང བ བ བདག མ ད པ མ ད དགག འ ར པས ཤ ར མད དང ཤ ས ཀ བ མཐའ འམ གས དང འགལ བའ ད ན ན Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Annottions: b With respect to the three fllcies: 1. Since [Buddhpālit s commentry] does not express reson nd n exmple cpble of proving tht there is no production from self, it is reduced to mere thesis. 2. [Buddhpālit s commentry] does not void criticism by Sāṃkhys upon exmining the thesis: About the mening of your from their own entities, if you re sying from the entities of mnifest effects, [you] re proving wht is lredy estblished [for us] becuse we lso do not ssert tht [things] re produced from the entities of lredy mnifest effects. If you re sying from potentil entities tht re non-mnifest cuses, the entilment is opposite becuse ll tht hve production re only produced from those [non-mnifest cuses]. According to Tsong-kh-p nd his followers, the tenet being contrdicted is tht the resonings prove nonffirming negtive. b dbu m p, ph, 6.3.

84 82 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets 3. These re phrses ffording n opportunity for censure by nother prty. The syllogism of the verbl reding (tshig zin gyi sbyor b) of the first commentry [by Buddhpālit] is: The subjects, things, re not produced from self becuse production is senseless nd endless. The syllogism constructed by Bhāvvivek s being wht Buddhpālit ws intending (dgongs tshod blngs p i sbyor b) is: With respect to the subjects, things, production from self is not just eliminted becuse production is sensible nd hs n end. [Bhāvvivek] expresses the first two fllcies with respect to the syllogism of the verbl reding nd expresses the fllcy of ffording n opportunity for censure minly with respect to the syllogism constructed s wht [Buddhpālit] ws intending. ཕ ད འ ན ག མ ན བདག མ ད པར བ ས པའ གས དང དཔ གང ཡང མ བ ད པས དམ བཅའ ཙམ ཟད པ དང ག ངས ཅན ག ས བདག ལས ཞ ས པའ ད ན འ ས གསལ བའ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན བ ཟ ན བ པ དང མ གསལ བ ས པའ བདག The trnsltion of Chndrkīrti s Cler Words in which Chndrkīrti cites Bhāvvivek s criticisms of Buddhpālit, by Mhāsumti nd P-tshb-nyi-m-drg (p tshb nyi m grgs), tht Jm-yng-shy-p uses just bove reds becuse these re phrses of consequences (thl br gyur b i tshig yin p i phyir, prsṅgvākytvāc c), wheres the trnsltion of Bhāvvivek s Lmp for Wisdom, by Jñāngrbh nd Lui-gyl-tshn (glu i rgyl mtshn), tht Ngg-wng-pl-dn uses reds becuse there re phrses ffording n opportunity for censure (glgs yod p i tshig yin p i phyir te, sāvkāśvcntvāc c). The first version seems to be merely pointing out tht Buddhpālit s refuttion uses consequences, wheres the second version indictes the Buddhpālit s explntion is subject to nother s censure. The first version could lso men tht Buddhpālit s explntion is subject to nother s drwing out consequences s is suggested by Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek tht clerly supports the second trnsltion. Nevertheless, the second trnsltion does not pper to be the mening of the sme phrses, cited below, from Chndrkīrti s renditions of Bhāvvivek s objections to Buddhpālit s refuttions of production from other nd of cuseless production.

85 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 83 ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན ན ཐམས ཅད ད ལས བ ཁ ན ཡ ན པས ཁ བ པ འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས དམ བཅའ ལ བ གས ནས ན བ ད པ མ བསལ བ དང ལ བ གཞན ག ཀ ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པ དང ག མ མ འག ལ ངག དང པ འ ཚ ག ཟ ན ག ར བ ན དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ལས བ མ ད ད བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས པའ ལ གས ན ག ས སངས ས བ ངས ཀ དག ངས ཚ ད ངས པའ ར བ ན དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག མ པར བཅད པ ཙམ མ ན ཏ བ ད ན བཅས དང ག བཅས ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས པའ ད ལ ན དང པ གཉ ས ན དང ས ཟ ན ག ས ར བ ལ བ ད ཅ ང ག གས ཡ ད པའ ན ན གཙ ཆ ར དག ངས ཚ ད ངས པའ ར བ ལ བ ད ད The wy in which these become n opportunity for censure [by nother prty] is s Tsong-kh-p s Gret Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom sys: How does it become n opportunity for censure? It becomes so becuse it [must] be reversed from the syllogism put forwrd. Tht [production] is senseless nd endless is not the reson, nd tht if produced from self, [their production] would be senseless nd endless, is lso not suitble s the reson becuse when [the reson] is estblished upon the subject, the proposition would be estblished. Therefore, the two reverse menings re the sign [or reson]. If the sign of the explicit rendering must be reversed, then the thesis of the ex-

86 84 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets nd: plicit rendering lso must be reversed becuse of being prllel. About this, since [the reversl of the thesis of the explicit rendering] is not doble in ccordnce with how the signs re reversed, tht production from self is not just eliminted is the reverse mening [of the originl thesis Things re not produced from their own entities. ] Then, it is being sid, Becuse production is sensible nd hs n end, tht things re produced from self is not just eliminted, whereby it becomes tht they re produced from other. In tht cse, the mening of is not from self contrdicts the tenet of being mere elimintion of production from self. ག གས ཡ ད པར འ ར ལ ན ཤ འ ཀ ཆ ན ལས ག གས ཡ ད པར ཇ ར འ ར ན བས ཀ ད ན ར བ ད ལས བ ག པས འ ར ར ཞ ས པ ནས ད ན དང ག མ ད ཀ ང གས མ ན ལ བདག ཡ ད ན ད ན དང ག མ ད ཀ ང གས མ ང ད ད གཞ འ ང བ ན བ བ བ དག ས པའ ར ར ད ས ན བ ག ད ན གཉ ས གས ས དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ ག དག ས ན དང ས ཟ ན ག དམ བཅའ ཡང བ ག དག ས ཏ མ ངས པའ ར ར ད ལ གས བ ག པ ར ར མ ད པས བདག མ པར བཅད ཙམ མ ན པ བ ག པའ ད ན ན ཞ ས དང ད ཡ ཚ བ ད ན དང ག བཅས ཡ ན པའ ར དང ས པ མས བདག མ པར བཅད པ ཙམ མ ན ན ཞ ས པས གཞན ལས བར འ ར ར ད ན བདག ལས མ ན ཞ ས པའ ད ན བདག

87 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 85 མ པར བཅད ཙམ ཡ ན པའ བ མཐའ དང འགལ ལ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ར ར [REFUTING PRODUCTION FROM OTHER] [Bhāvvivek] lso speks of fllcies in [Buddhpālit s] refuttion of production from other; Chndrkīrti s Cler Words sys: b About this the mster Buddhpālit explins: They lso re not produced from other. Why? For it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything would be produced from everything. The mster Bhāvvivek repudites this, sying: Therefore, becuse this is speech of consequences, when the thesis nd the mens of proof re reversed, things would be produced from self, both, or cuselessly nd some would be produced from some, whereby the erlier position is contrdicted. Also, in nother wy, it is becuse [things] would be produced from everything. Hence, since in tht [commentry by Buddhpālit] there re no proof nd refuttion, it is senseless. གཞན འག ག པའ ཐལ བའང ན བ ད ད ཚ ག གསལ ལས འད ལ བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན འ ད ན ད ས ན ད ལ ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ངག ཡ ན པའ ར བ བ པར བ དང བ པར ད པ བ ག པར ས ན དང ས པ མས བདག གམ གཉ ས སམ མ ད པ ལས བར འ ར བ དང འགའ ཞ ག ལས འགའ ཞ ག བར འ ར བའ ར གས ག ང མ དང [L13]འགལ བར འ ར ར གཞན ནའང ཐམས ཅད ལས Tipei, b I hve lengthened Jm-yng-shy-p s cittion of Chndrkīrti s Cler Words to include his quottion of Buddhpālit s refuttion.

88 86 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets བར འ ར བའ ར ར ད བས ན ད ལ བ བ པ དང ན འ ན པ ཉ ད མ ད པའ ར ད ན ད ན འ ལ མ ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས ན འ ན འ ཞ ས ས The mening is: If the thesis nd mens of proof of the explicit rendering re not reversed, then since tht ll re produced from ll is not suitble s the reson, one s own position is not proven, nd since [Buddhpālit] does not demonstrte ny dmge by direct perception nd so forth to the ssertion of production from other, the other s position is lso not repudited, whereby [his commentry] is senseless. If the explicit thesis nd mens of proof re reversed, the opposite of the reson is: some re produced from some; nd the opposite of the nonexistence of production from other is: production from other exists. However, these re not suitble becuse this is n occsion of demonstrting tht ultimtely those do not exist. Therefore, it must be tht, hving turned wy from mere negtion of production from other, [Buddhpālit] is proving tht [things] re produced from self, both, or cuselessly, whereby this contrdicts the erlier position, tht is, tht the ssertion tht [things] re not produced from other in [Nāgārjun s] root text is nonffirming negtive. ད ན ན དང ས ཟ ན ག བ བ བ ད མ བ ག ན ཐམས ཅད ཐམས ཅད ལས བར འ ར བ གས མ ང བས རང གས བ པ མ ད ལ གཞན ཁས ངས པ ལ མང ན མ ལ ས གས པའ གན ད པ གང ཡང [G10b] མ བ ན པས གཞན གས ན འ ན པའང མ ད པས འ ལ མ ད ལ བ ག ན ན གས ཀ བ ག ད ན འགའ ཞ ག ལས འགའ ཞ ག བ ཡ ན ལ གཞན མ ད པའ བ ག ད ན གཞན ཡ ད པ ལ མ ང ད ན དམ པར ད མ ད པར ན པའ བས ཡ ན པས ས ད ས ན འགའ ཞ ག ལས འགའ ཞ ག བའ གས ཀ ས གཞན

89 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 87 བཀག ཙམ ལ ག ནས བདག གམ གཉ ས སམ མ ད ལས བ བ དག ས པས གས ག ང མ བའ གཞན ལས བ མ ན ཞ ས པའ མ ད དགག འད ད པ དང འགལ ཞ ས པའ [Refuting Cuseless Production] [Bhāvvivek] lso speks of fllcies in [Buddhpālit s] refuttion of cuseless production. Chndrkīrti s Cler Words sys: The mster Buddhpālit explins: They lso re not produced cuselessly becuse it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything lwys would be produced from everything [nd becuse there would be the fllcy tht ll endevor would be just senseless]. The mster Bhāvvivek repudites this, sying: If this is sserted s speech mnifesting thesis nd proof, then it comes to indicte tht things re produced from cuses becuse t some times some re produced from some nd endevor just hs effects. However, tht is not resonble due to incurring the bove-mentioned fllcy. མ ད པས བ འག ག པའ ཐལ བ ཡང ན བ ད ད ཚ ག གསལ ལས འད ལ ཡང བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན འ ད ད ལ ཡང ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ངག ཡ ན པའ ར གལ ཏ བ བ པར བ དང བ པར ད པ གསལ བ ངག ག ད ན མང ན པར འད ད ན ད འ ཚ འད ད དང ས པ མས ལས བར འ ར བ དང ལན འགའ ཁ ཅ ག ལས ཁ ཅ ག བར འ ར བ དང [L13b] མ པ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ན པར འ ར ན བཤད པ ད ན Ibid.

90 88 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets མ ར གས ཏ ར ས པའ ན འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས ན འ ན པ འ ཞ ས ས The mening is: It is not suitble to reverse the literl reding, nd thus production from cuses is implicitly indicted s the opposite mening of the thesis of tht consequence [the thesis being] the nonffirming negtive tht [things] re not produced cuselessly. The opposite mening of the two signs tht re the proofs must be stted s becuse t some times some re produced from some nd endevor hs effects. Hence, this hs the fllcies of contrdicting the ssertion tht the nonexistence of production from the four extremes is nonffirming negtive. ད ན ན དང ས ཟ ན ལ བ ག པ མ ང ལ ཐལ བ ད འ བ བ མ ད ལས བ མ ད པའ མ ད དགག ག བ ག ད ན ལས བ གས ལ ན ཅ ང བ ད གས གཉ ས ཀ བ ག ད ན ར མ བཞ ན ལན འགའ ཞ ག ཁ ཅ ག ལས ཁ ཅ ག བ དང མ པ འ ས དང བཅས པར འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས འག ད དག ས པའ མཐའ བཞ འ བ མ ད པ མ ད དགག འད ད པ དང འགལ བའ ན ཡ ད ཅ ས པའ BHĀVAVIVEKA S OWN AUTONOMOUS SYLLOGISMS [REFUTING THE FOUR TYPES OF PRODUCTION] 1. The subjects, eyes nd so forth, re not ultimtely produced from self becuse of existing s is the cse, for exmple, with n existent consciousness. 2. The subjects, cuses nd effects such s semen nd blood, which re cuses of n eye, nd the eye, which is their effect, respectively The literl reding of Buddhpālit s thesis is Things re not produced cuselessly. The opposite of tht is, Things re produced cuselessly. Bhāvvivek s point is tht this is obviously not wht Buddhpālit is proving.

91 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 89 empty, inherently re not ultimtely produced from other becuse of being other s is the cse, for exmple, with woolen cloth from cly. 3. Those subjects lso re not ultimtely produced from both [self nd other] becuse of incurring the fllcies described for both. 4. The subject, eyes, re not cuselessly produced dventitiously becuse of possessing generl chrcteristics nd specific chrcteristic s is the cse, for exmple, with pot. Through such pproches Bhāvvivek extensively refutes [production from the four extremes]. Below, these will be explined little, together with sources. ལ གས ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ས རང ད ཀ ར བ མ ག ཆ ས ཅན ད ན དམ པར བདག ལས མ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན མ ག ག ཁ ཁ ག དང འ ས མ ག ས གས འ ས གང དང གང ག ས ང པ ད དག ཆ ས [G11] ཅན ང བ ཉ ད ཀ ས ད ན དམ པར གཞན ལས མ གཞན ཡ ན པའ ར དཔ ར ན འཇ མ པ ལས མ བཞ ན ད ཆ ས ཅན ད ན དམ པར གཉ ས ཀ ལས ཀ ང མ གཉ ས ཀ ལ ན བཤད པ ད འ ང བའ ར མ ག ཆ ས ཅན མ ད པར ག ར བ མ ན ཏ འ མཚན ཉ ད དང ཁ ད པར ག མཚན ཉ ད དག དང ན པའ ར དཔ ར ན མ པ བཞ ན ཞ ས པ འ ས ཆ ར འག ག ཤ ས ད དང བཅས ང ཟད འ ག འཆད ད Bhāvvivek s opening the wy in this mnner occurred fter Asṅg nd his [hlf-]brother [Vsubndhu] widely spred the system of the Mind- Only School; the fifth chpter of his Hert of the Middle sys: Due to pride in their own system Others who bosted of being wise Propounded tht entry into the mbrosi of suchness Is tught well by the Yogic Prctitioners. gng dng gng gis stong p de dg, trnsltion doubtful.

92 90 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Tenets nd his utocommentry [the Blze of Resoning] sys: Other msters of the Gret Vehicle itself Asṅg, Vsubndhu, nd so forth interpreted otherwise the systemtic menings thoroughly relized by Superiors who were prophesied by the One- Gone-Thus nd who gined [Bodhisttv] grounds. Without shme nd embrrssment, tking pride in knowing the mening while they did not know it nd tking pride in being wise, they propounded the following. ལ གས ན ག ས འད ར ལ བ འད ཐ གས མ ད མཆ ད ཀ ས ས མས ཙམ པའ གས ཆ ར དར བའ [L14] བས ཡ ན ཏ ད མ ང པ འ ལ པ ལས རང ག གས ཀ ང ལ ག ས མཁས པར མ གཞན འད ད ད ཉ ད བ ད ར འ ག པ ཡང ལ འ ར ད པས ལ གས པར བ ན ཞ ས དང ད འ རང འག ལ ལས ཐ ག པ ཆ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ བ དཔ ན ཐ གས མ ད དང ད ག གཉ ན ལ ས གས པ གཞན དག ན ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པས ང བ ན ཞ ང ས རབ བ ས པའ འཕགས པ མས ཀ ས ཡང དག པར གས པའ ད ན ག གས གཞན འ ན པར ད ཅ ང ང ཚ དང ཁ ལ མ ད པ ད ན མ པར མ ཤ ས བཞ ན མ པར ཤ ས ཤ ང མཁས པར ང ལ ད པ དག འད ད ས ཏ ཞ ས ས Hence, it is evident tht the mster [Nāgārjun] composed the Essy on the Mind of Enlightenment nd so forth fter Proponents of Mind-Only hd ppered, whereby: the two the mster Bhāvvivek nd the mster Chndrkīrti re fesibly [Nāgārjun s] lter-phse students Gung-tng (Explntion, 6.5) sys, This book is clled Essy on the Mind of Enlightenment becuse it explins the mening of stnz on the mind of enlightenment spoken by Virochn in the second chpter of the Guhysmāj Tntr.

93 Overview of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit 91 nd [Nāgārjun s] living for six hundred yers is lso well estblished. ད ས ན ང བ ས མས འག ལ ས གས བ དཔ ན ག ས ས མས ཙམ པ ང ནས བ མ པར མང ན པས བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན དང བ དཔ ན བ གཉ ས ཆར ག བ མར འཐད ཅ ང ལ ག བ ར བ གས པའང ལ གས པར བ བ

94

95 Jm-yng-shy-p s GREAT EXPOSITION OF THE MIDDLE: Debte bout opposite of the consequences within the Middle Wy School Decisive Anlysis of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Tresury of Scripture nd Resoning, Thoroughly Illuminting the Profound Mening [of Emptiness], Entrnce for the Fortunte / Gret Exposition of the Middle ད མ འ ག པའ མཐའ ད ད ང ར གས གཏ ར མཛ ད ཟབ ད ན ཀ ན གསལ ལ བཟང འ ག ང གས ཞ ས བ བ གས ས Key to the coloriztion: The Tibetn text nd the trnsltion re highlighted in three colors: blck, blue, nd red. Blue colored sttements represent wht Jm-yng-shy-p considers to be right positions, while red colored sttements represent wht Jm-yng-shy-p considers to be wrong positions. Blck words mostly re merely neutrl informtion or function structurlly. In the Tibetn, turquoise highlight indictes mteril dded in plce of ellipses, nd mgent highlight sets off the ellipsis indictor when it hs been filled in. In discussing the controversy between Buddhpālit nd Bhāvvivek, Jm-yng-shy-p first explins the Sāṃkhy position of production from self nd then gives n ccount of Buddhpālit s refuttion of tht position. Jm-yng-shy-p s text is t the mrgin; comments by others re indented in three-sided box nd nmed to clerly distinguish them from Jm-yngshy-p s text.

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97 I. REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM SELF THROUGH THE REASONING IN (NĀGĀRJUNA S) FUNDAMENTAL TREATISE ON THE MIDDLE CALLED WISDOM གཉ ས པ ཤ ས ཀ ར གས པས བདག དགག པ ན One stnz occurs in Chndrkīrti s root text [Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle ] ( VI. 13) nd commentry: If it is sserted tht [effects] re produced from self, then if the produced nd the producer And the object nd the gent lso become just one, then since those Those re not just one, it is not to be sserted tht those re produced from self Becuse of the consequence of fllcies extensively explined. བར བདག ལས བར འད ད ན བ ད པར དང ད ད དང [ལས དང ད པ པ ཡང གཅ ག ཉ ད འ ར ན ད དག ན གཅ ག ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པས ན བདག ལས བར ཁས ང བར མ ན ཆ ར བཤད པའ Tsong-kh-p s commentry in the Illumintion of the Thought sys: If it is sserted tht effects re produced from self, then if the produced effects nd the producer cuses And the objects cted upon nd the gents tht re the mens of cting lso become just one, then since those Those re not just one, it is not to be sserted tht those [effects] re produced from self Becuse of the consequence of fllcies extensively explined in this tretise nd in Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom. འ ས བདག ལས བར འད ད ན བ ད བར བ འ ས དང ད བར ད པ དང གང ཞ ག བའ ལས དང གང ག ས ད པའ ད པ པ ཡང གཅ ག ཉ ད འ ར ན ད དག ན གཅ ག ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པས ན བདག ལས བར ཁས ང བར བ མ ན ཏ བ ན བཅ ས འད དང ཤ ལས ཆ ར བཤད པའ ཉ ས པར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར

98 96 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle ཉ ས པར ཐལ བར འ ར ར ར ]ཞ ས ས གས ཚ གས བཅད གཅ ག འག ལ ང [G150b/L204b] This hs two prts: the generl mening nd decisive nlysis. འད ལ ད ན དང མཐའ ད ད པ གཉ ས A. THE GENERAL MEANING [OF THE REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION FROM SELF THROUGH THE REA- SONING IN (NĀGĀRJUNA S) FUNDAMENTAL TREATISE ON THE MIDDLE CALLED WISDOM ] This hs three prts: how Buddhpālit refutes production from self, how Bhāvvivek criticizes tht [refuttion by Buddhpālit of production from self], nd how Chndrkīrti explins tht Buddhpālit does not hve those fllcies. དང པ [ ད ན ]ལ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བདག བཀག ལ ད ལ ལ གས ན ག ས ན བ ད ལ སངས ས བ ངས ལ ན མ ད པར བས བཤད ལ ག མ ལས 1. How Buddhpālit refutes production from self དང པ [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བདག བཀག ལ ]ལ A Sāṃkhy sys: It follows tht seed tht is the cuse of one effect, for instnce, brley stlk, nd the wter nd mnure tht re conditions [for the stlk s production] hve single prtless generlity (spyi, sāmāny) or principl (gtso bo, prdhān) or nture (rng bzhin, prkṛti) hving the concomitnce of mutully being [the nture of the cuse nd of the conditions] becuse common effect is observed with respect to the cuse nd conditions. All tht The first two prts re presented in this book; the third begins in the next volume.

99 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self 97 hve production exist from the time of their cuses becuse t the time of their cuses they dwell in the nture of the cuses, just s, for exmple, cly pot exists in the nture of the cly t the time of the cly. ག ངས ཅན པ ན ར ནས ག འ འ ས གཅ ག ག ས བ ན དང ན ད མས ལ འམ གཙ བ འམ རང བཞ ན ཆ མ ད གཅ ག ཕར ཡ ན ར ཡ ན ག ཁ བ པའ ས ས འག བ ཡ ད པར ཐལ ན ད དག ལ འ ས ན མ ང བ དམ གས པའ ར ན ཐམས ཅད རང འ ས ནས ཡ ད ད ད དག རང འ ས འ རང བཞ ན གནས པའ ར དཔ ར ན མ འཇ མ པའ ས འཇ མ པའ རང བཞ ན ཡ ད པ བཞ ན Hopkins: The Sāṃkhys ide is this: The brley stlk is the effect, the brley seed is the cuse, nd wter nd mnure re conditions. The cuses nd conditions hve one prtless nture such tht the nture of the cuses is the nture of the conditions, nd the nture of the conditions is the nture of the cuses. Why is the nture of the cuses the nture of the conditions nd vice vers? Becuse they both give rise to one effect. If they did not hve something molding them together some nture binding them to mnifest brley stlk then they could not produce it. Something hs to pull them ll together so tht they work in unison. Here is question bout their ssertion: Wht does the nture (prkṛti, rng bzhin) involved in prticulr custion hve to do with the generl or big nture (prkṛti) tht contins ll mtter? Are the big nture (prkṛti) contining ll mtter nd smll nture (prkṛti), such s nture shred mong the cuse nd conditions in prticulr cusl sequence, the sme or different? Mybe it is to void such problem tht they sy nture (prkṛti) is prtless. With respect to the Sāṃkhy position tht the effect exists t the time of its cuses, the lte Go-mng scholr Ge-dün-lo-drö sid tht Buddhists hold the nunce tht At the time of the seed

100 98 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle the stlk exists s the entity of the seed, but t the time of the seed the stlk does not exist. This illustrtes tht often the differences between Sāṃkhy nd Buddhism re subtle. In response to Gedün-lo-drö s sttement, Sāṃkhy might set forth the following: It follows tht the subject, stlk, exists t the time of its cuses becuse t the time of its cuses it exists s the entity of the seed. To this Buddhist could sy: The fct tht stlk exists s the entity of seed t the time of its cuse, the seed, does not entil tht it exists t the time of its cuse, the seed. In this lck of entilment lies the difference between Buddhism nd Sāṃkhy on custion. The difference is not merely tht for the Buddhist the stlk does not exist t the time of the seed; the ctul difference lies in the Buddhist nunce, or refinement tht the stlk exists s the entity of the seed t the time of the seed but does not exist t the time of the seed. We need to explore why the stlk hs to exist s the entity of the seed t the time of the seed since it might seem tht this would be unnecessry. It my be tht the consequence of not holding this position is tht otherwise the stlk could not be produced from the seed. To Sāṃkhy if it exists in the entity of the seed, then it would hve to exist; nd we might think tht if it exists s the entity of the seed, then it still hs to exist, but the Buddhists sy not necessrily! Another question for Sāṃkhy is: When does the effect exist in the cuse? When does the pot exist in the cly? For instnce, if you tke cly from mny different plces, does the pot exist in tht cly only when you hve brought it ll together? Or does it exist before the portions re brought together? Or, by extension, even pre-geologiclly before this world system? Does it exist in the cosmic soup? Does it exist in the former world system? If so, re Sāṃkhys sying tht everything exists t ll times in every plce? No, they sy tht n effect exists only when the conditions come together t some point; but t wht point? I herd debter in s bon gyi dus su myug gu s bon gyi ngo bor yod kyng s bon gyi dus su myug gu med.

101 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self 99 Dhrmsl nswer this by sying tht the cly hs to exist mnifestly before the pot cn exist there nonmnifestly. In this vein, Dhrmkīrti sttes n bsurd consequence to Sāṃkhy: It follows tht the plce on blde of grss where worm is, there re hundred elephnts becuse this prticulr worm will tke rebirth s n elephnt in the next one hundred lifetimes. Also, is there pot wherever there is cly, or does pot exist there only if someone strts mking it? Seems hrd to nswer. Therefore, [the Sāṃkhys] ssert tht the nture of the cuse nd the conditions nd the nture of the effect re lso prtless unity nd hence re mutully inclusive; for, Tsong-kh-p s Illumintion of the Thought sys: About this, the Sāṃkhys sy tht: mutully individul nd different cuses nd conditions hve single common effect, nd since it would not be suitble if tht lso did not hve single concomitnt principl of the sme nture with the cuses nd conditions, tht which is the nture of the cuse, the brley [seed], lso is the nture of the conditions, the wter, mnure, nd so forth; similrly the nture of the stlk nd the ntures of its cuses nd conditions re mutully ech other. Therefore, since they ssert tht seed nd stlk re only mutully different, they do not ssert tht stlk is produced from stlk, but they propound tht stlk is produced from the nture of the seed nd tht [sprout], whereupon since the two ntures re one, production from its own nture nd production of nonmnifest stlk existent t the time of its cuses is the mode of ssertion of self-production [or production from self]. ད ས ན ན ག རང བཞ ན དང འ ས འ རང བཞ ན ཡང ཆ མ ད གཅ ག ཡ ན པས ཕན ན ཡ ན ཁ བ མཉམ འད ད ད མ བཤད ལས འད ལ ག ངས ཅན མས [ ན ཕན ན ས ས ཐ དད པ མས ལ འ ས ན མ ང བ གཅ ག ན ཡ ད ལ ད ཡང ན མས ལ རང བཞ ན གཅ ག པའ གཙ བ གཅ ག ས འག བ མ ད ན མ ང བས ནས ཀ

102 100 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle རང བཞ ན གང ཡ ན པ ཡང ན ད ས གས ཀ རང བཞ ན ཡ ན ལ ད བཞ ན ག འ རང བཞ ན དང ད འ ན ག རང བཞ ན མས ཕར ཡ ན ར ཡ ན འད ད ད མ འ ར ཐམས ཅད ཀ རང བཞ ན མས ད ར འད ད ད ད འ ར ས ག ཕན ན ཐ དད པ ཁ ནར འད ད པས ག ག ལས བར མ འད ད ཀ ང ག ན ས བ ན དང ད འ རང བཞ ན ལས བར བ ན རང བཞ ན གཉ ས གཅ ག ཡ ན པས རང ག རང བཞ ན ལས ཀ ང བ དང ག མ གསལ བ ས ན ཡ ད པ བ ན བདག འ ]ཞ ས པ ནས འད ད ལ ཞ ས ས Moreover, some Sāṃkhys do not ssert production (skye b, utpād) of [ stlk] from the generlity [tht is, the nture] but ssert mnifesttion (gsl b) becuse these Sāṃkhys ssert mode of oneness of entity of the two, generlity nd mnifesttion, nd mode of estblishment of the two, generlity nd mnifesttion, s explined bove. ཡང ག ངས ཅན ཁ ཅ ག ལས ད བར མ འད ད ལ གསལ བར འད ད ད འད ས ཀ ང གསལ གཉ ས ང བ གཅ ག ལ དང བ ལ མ ར འད ད པའ ར ར Hopkins: Some Sāṃkhys do not use the vocbulry of production; they use the vocbulry of mnifesttion. Buddhists reply tht the sme fults hold becuse whtever Buddhists chllenge bout production will pply to mnifesttion; thus the chnge in vocbulry does not mitigte the ttck. How generlity nd mnifesttion re one entity is esy to understnd, but wht does mode of estblishment men? The generlity, lso clled the nture, is the nonmnifest, nd the mnifesttion is the mnifest, but re these cuse nd effect? In other words, just s in the ssertion s explined erlier the Sāṃkhys sid tht ll tht hve production exist from the time of their cuses, so do these other Sāṃkhys sy tht ll mnifesttions exist from the time of their cuses. Do Sāṃkhys in fct ssert tht ll mnifesttions re present t the time of their cuses? Let us look t it formlly: The subject, mnifesttion, exists t the time of its nonmnifest stte. If the Sāṃkhy sys, No, Buddhist could sy:

103 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self 101 Then it is not the cse tht the subject, produced things, exist t the time of their cuses tht is to sy, t the time of their nonmnifest stte. Buddhists clim tht t this point Sāṃkhys re forced to ccept contrdiction with their own tenets. However, to mintin the Sāṃkhy position here it would hve to be held tht the vocbulry of existence hs no pplicbility to mnifesttion, for, if it did, then everything would hve to be mnifest. Only if somehow mnifesttion is not included in produced things could it be outside the context of the discussion, but how could mnifesttion be outside produced things? For it is by certin cuses nd conditions the min topics of production tht things become mnifest. There is wy tht the mster Buddhpālit flings consequences t such n ssertion becuse upon Buddhpālit s setting the thesis, Things re not produced from their own entities, someone wonders, Wht fult is there if [things] re produced from self? nd he briefly indictes, in nominl wy, dmge by two [unwnted] consequences: Becuse there come to be the fllcies tht their production [gin] would be just senseless nd, not only tht, would lso be endless. ད ར འད ད པ ལ བ དཔ ན སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས ཐལ འ ར འཕངས ལ ཡ ད ད སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ཅ ས དམ བཆའ བཞག པ ལ ཁ ན ར བདག ལས [L205] ན ཅ ཉ ས མ པ ལ Jm-yng-shy-p s phrse would lso be endless (thug med du yng gyur b) renders the Snskrit tiprsṅgdoṣ s found in Chndrkīrti s Cler Words, which is trnslted into Tibetn there s shin tu thl br gyur b i skyon, which literlly mens the fllcy of gret bsurdity but hs secondry mening of endlessness. Jm-yng-shy-p renders tiprsṅgdoṣ s thug p med p gyur b to convey this ltter mening nd to ccord with the Tibetn trnsltion of Buddhpālit s text (P5242, vol. 95, ) s well s the Tibetn trnsltion of Bhāvvivek s rendition (P5253, vol. 95, ) of Buddhpālit s sttement nd Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek (P5259, vol. 96, ) s well s Tsong-kh-p s commentry on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle (Vrnāsī, 1973, 52.4). Thus, I use it throughout. Also, we know tht this Tibetn rendition is n ccurte reflection of the Snskrit becuse lter in Chndrkīrti s text he cites tiprsṅg s the opposite of utpādnirodh which mens limit to production.

104 102 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle ད དག ག བ ད ད ན མ ད འ ར བ དང ད ར མ ཟད ག མ ད ཡང འ ར བའ ན འ ང པའ ར ཞ ས ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས ཀ ས གན ད ད མ ང ག ནས མད ར བ ན པའ ར Hopkins: Jm-yng-shy-p hs crefully structured Buddhpālit s brief indiction so tht it is generl thesis (dm bc, prtijñā), Things re not produced from their own entities, seprte from n expression of fults tht come if things re produced from self: Their production [gin] would be just senseless nd, not only tht, would lso be endless. Buddhpālit himself did not spell it out quite so clerly. Buddhpālit s Commentry sys: Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production [gin] would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. (n svt utpdynte bhāvāḥ/ tdutpdviyrthyāt tiprsṅgdoṣācc; b dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med de de dg gi skye b don med pr gyur b i phyir dng/ shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir) ལ ཏ ལས དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང ཤ ན ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས ས There is wy tht Buddhpālit flings the consequence tht production would be senseless becuse he flings this: It follows with respect to the subject, stlk, tht its productiongin is senseless becuse of lredy existing in its own entity. Hopkins: Becuse of lredy existing in its own entity (bdg gi bdg nyid du yod p i phyir) is replced in Jm-yng-shy-p s text s becuse of existing t the time of its cuses (rng gi rgyu dus ns yod p i phyir) which is like Tsong-kh-p s rendition quoted ner the end of this section, Also, if the mnifesttion See Hopkins, Medittion on Emptiness, 818 note 374. b The Snskrit is s cited by Chndrkīrti (L Vllée Poussin, Mūlmdhymkkārikās vec l Prsnnpdā, 14.1).

105 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self 103 does not exist previously, [the Sāṃkhy] hs fllen from the position tht only wht previously exists in [its] cuses is produced. Jm-yng-shy-p lter rejects reding very similr to this on the grounds tht in his extensive explntion Buddhpālit sys things tht lredy exist in their own entities nd not existing t the time of their cuses. བ ད ན མ ད ཐལ བ འཕངས ལ ཡ ད ད ག ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད ཐལ རང ག ས ནས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས འཕངས པའ ར To this, the Sāṃkhy sys tht something s lredy existing in its own entity does not entil tht its production-gin is senseless. There is wy tht [Buddhpālit] flings t tht the second consequence of endlessness becuse he flings this: It follows with respect to the subject, stlk, tht its production is endless becuse though it lredy exists in its own entity, there is sense in, or need for, its production-gin. ད ལ ག ངས ཅན ག ས [རང ག ས ནས ཡ ད ན ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད པས ]མ ཁ བ ཟ ར བ ལ [G151] ཐལ འ ར གཉ ས པ ག མ ད ཐལ བ འཕངས ལ ཡ ད ད ག ཆ ས ཅན ཁ ད ཀ བ ལ ག པ མ ད པར ཐལ རང ག ས ནས བ ཟ ན ཀ ང ར ཡང བ ལ དག ས པའམ ད ན ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས འཕངས པའ ར For, Buddhpālit s Commentry sys: There is no need for production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) of things tht lredy exist in their own entities. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. (n hi svātmnā vidmānāṃ pdārthānāṃ pnrutpāde pryognmsti/ th snnpi jāyyet/ n kdā cinn jāyet, dngos po bdg gi bdg nyid du yod p rnms l ni yng skye b l dgos p med do// ci ste yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur ro)

106 104 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle ལ ཏ ལས དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ མས ལ ན ཡང བ ལ དག ས པ མ ད ད ཅ ཡ ད ཀ ང ན ནམ ཡང མ བར མ འ ར ར ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར To this lso, [the Sāṃkhy] sys tht the fct tht though something lredy exists in its own entity, there is sense in its re-production does not necessitte tht production of tht thing is endless becuse [the Sāṃkhy] thinks tht wht is existent but nonmnifest requires production into mnifest [stte] nd thus [holds] tht there is no entilment in the erlier consequence, nd [lso] thinks tht this consequence is not entiled by the reson, since wht hs lredy mnifested does not require production. For Tsong-kh-p s Ocen of Resoning sys: The other prty propounds tht the two consequences, former nd ltter, hve no logicl entilment, since wht exists nonmnifestly in potentil entity requires production nd wht is lredy mnifest does not require production. However, they cnnot dispel the fults [dduced by Buddhpālit]. Hopkins: The Sāṃkhy, mintining tht there is sense in re-production, sttes, Wht is existent but nonmnifest does indeed require production in mnifest form. འད ལའང [རང ག ས ནས བ ཟ ན ཀ ང ར ཡང བ ལ དག ས པའམ ད ན ཡ ད ན ཁ ད ཀ བ ལ ག པ མ ད པས ]མ ཁ བ ཟ ར བ ཡ ན ཏ ཡ ད ཀ ང མ གསལ བ གསལ བར དག ས པས འ ར མར མ ཁ བ ལ གསལ ཟ ན ནས མ དག ས པས ཐལ འ ར འད ལ མ ཁ བ མ པའ ར ཏ ར གས པའ མཚ ལས ད ལ ཕ ར ལ པ ས ས པའ ང བ ར མ གསལ བར [L205b] ཡ ད པ གསལ བར དག ས པ དང གསལ ཟ ན ནས མ དག ས པས ཐལ བ གཉ ས ལ ཁ བ པ མ ད ཅ ས མ ད ཀ ང ན ང མ ས ཏ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར

107 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self 105 It follows tht lthough [Sāṃkhys] plnt the response, No entilment, to those two consequences, they hve not plnted correct response [becuse of the following bsurd consequences:] It [bsurdly] follows tht the subject, mnifesttion, is not produced gin becuse of existing from the time of its cuses [or becuse of existing in its own entity]. If [Sāṃkhys nswer tht] it is not estblished tht mnifesttion exists from the time of its cuses [or in its own entity], then it follows tht it is not the cse tht ll things hving production re things tht, existing previously, re produced into the mnifest [entities] by conditions becuse this is not the cse with respect to mnifesttion. If erlier [Sāṃkhys] sy tht something s existing from the time of its cuses [or in its own entity] does not necessitte tht it is not produced gin, then it [bsurdly] follows bout the subject, mnifesttion, tht its production is endless becuse though it exists from time of unmnifest stte, it hs need for production-gin. Tsong-kh-p s Ocen of Resoning sys: However, they cnnot dispel the fults [dduced by Buddhpālit], for if mnifesttion exists from before, it does not need to be produced into tht [mnifest stte], but if though existent from before it is produced, [its production] would be endless. [Hence, the fllcies] remin s before. Also, if the mnifesttion does not exist previously, [the Sāṃkhy] hs fllen from the position tht only wht previously exists in [its] cuses is produced. ཐལ འ ར ད གཉ ས ལ མ ཁ བ ཀ ལན བཏབ ཀ ང ལན མ དག མ ཐ བ པར ཐལ ད ལ གསལ བ ཆ ས ཅན ར ཡང མ བར ཐལ ས ནས ཡ ད པའ ར [ ས ནས ཡ ད པ ]མ བ ན འ ན ན ཐམས ཅད ར ཡ ད ཡ ན ག ས གསལ བར བ མ ཡ ན པར ཐལ གསལ བ ལ ད འ ར ག ང [ ས ནས ཡ ད ན ར ཡང མ བས ]མ ཁ བ ན གསལ བ ཆ ས ཅན ཁ ད ཀ བ ག མ ད ཡ ན པར ཐལ ཁ ད རང འ ས ནས ཡ ད ཀ ང ར བ དག ས པ དང བཅས པའ ར ར གས པའ མཚ ལས མ ད ཀ ང ན ང མ ས ཏ གསལ བ ནས ཡ ད ན ད ར མ དག ས ལ ནས ཡ ད ཀ ང ན ག མ ད ས ན

108 106 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle གནས ཤ ང གསལ བ ར མ ད ན ལ ར ཡ ད ཁ ན བའ གས ཉམས ས ཞ ས ས Hopkins: Let us summrize by going bck to Buddhpālit s first consequence nd re-encting the debte. Buddhist: With respect to the subject, stlk, its re-production is senseless becuse of existing from the time of its cuses. Sāṃkhy: Something s existing from the time of its cuses does not entil tht its re-production is senseless. (m khyb) Now, insted of proceeding to the second consequence of endlessness, let us introduce the topic of mnifesttion s it comes to ber on this first consequence of senselessness: Buddhist: Show me tht there is no entilment. (m khyb te) Sāṃkhy: There is purpose in wht is nonmnifest being produced into mnifest [form]. Buddhist: It follows with respect to the subject, mnifest stlk, tht its re-production does not exist becuse of existing from the time of its cuses. Sāṃkhy: It is not estblished tht mnifest stlk exists from the time of its cuses. Buddhist: You hve contrdicted your root thesis (rts b i dm bc gl ) tht ll things hving production re previously existent nd produced into mnifest form by conditions. Wherever the Buddhist s responses re put fter the Sāṃkhy s response to the first consequence or the second one the conclusion is the sme.

109 2. How Bhāvvivek criticizes this [refuttion by Buddhpālit of production from self] There is wy tht Bhāvvivek criticizes this [refuttion of production of self by Buddhpālit] becuse the bsis of his criticism is tht [Bhāvvivek] did not consider the brief indiction [of refuttion of production from self given in the first sentence] of Buddhpālit s commentry to be s the [more] extensive explntion is [in the next two sentences], nd therefore he did not think tht Buddhpālit ws flinging [the consequences] tht production-gin would be senseless nd endless, nd thus he criticized only the text of the brief indiction, གཉ ས པ [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བདག བཀག ལ ]ད ལ ལ གས ན ག ས ན བ ད ལ ཡ ད ད ན བ ད ཀ གཞ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ འག ལ པའ མད ར བ ན ས བཤད ད ར ཡ ན པར མ དག ངས ཤ ང ད ས ན མད ར བ ན ག ས ར ཡང བ ད ན མ ད དང [G151b] ག མ ད འཕངས པར མ དག ངས ནས མད ར བ ན ག ག ང ཁ ན ལ ན བ ད མཛད པའ ར ཏ Hopkins: Buddhpālit s brief indiction is, Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. However, his extensive explntion is: There is no need for production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) of things tht lredy exist in their own entities. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. Jm-yng-shy-p mintins tht even Buddhpālit s brief indiction flings the two consequences of senselessness nd endlessness becuse one must see the brief indiction in the context of the extensive explntion. The Tibetn mkes it clerer thn the Snskrit tht these sttements in the brief indiction could be consequences. Tibetn: de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng/ skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro; Snskrit: tdutpādviyrthyāt tiprsṅgdoṣācc. The presence of gyur b in the Tibetn fcilittes reding these sttements s consequences rther thn s syllogisms, wheres the Snskrit is mbiguous in tht

110 108 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle becuse Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys: About this, nother [nmely, Buddhpālit] mkes the explntion, Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. Tht is not resonble b (1) becuse [Buddhpālit] does not express reson [cpble of proving tht there is no production from self] s well s n exmple; (2) becuse [the resoning s Buddhpālit sttes it] does not void the fllcies dduced by nother [tht is, the fllcies tht Sāṃkhy would be expected to dduce]; nd (3) becuse [Buddhpālit s] words fford n opporregrd. The difference in English is between becuse their production would be senseless which contins the consequence-style reding s opposed to becuse their production is senseless for the syllogistic reding. The term tiprsṅg in the Snskrit of the second fllcy indictes endless, not consequence. Tht is, other thn Bhāvvivek himself. b The Snskrit of this prgrph, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.4), is: tdyuktṃ/ hetudṛṣtāntānbhidhānāt/ proktdoṣāprihārācc/ prsṅgvākytvācc prkṛtārthvipryyeṇ viprītrthsādhytddhrmvyktu prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt/ jnmnirodhāceti kṛtāntvirodhḥ syāt// The Tibetn s it ppers in Bhāvvivek s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4) is: de ni rigs p m yin te/gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir dng / gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b i phyir ro// glgs yod p i tshig yin p i phyir te/ skbs kyi don ls bzlog ps sgrub pr by b dng /de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro// A slightly different Tibetn trnsltion is found in Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek (P5259, vol. 96, ): de ni rigs p m yin te/gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir dng / gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b dng // glgs yod p i tshig yng yin p i phyir te/ skbs kyi don ls bzlog ps sgrub pr by b dng /de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro// See lso the next two footnotes.

111 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 109 tunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system]. ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས འད ལ གཞན ག ས དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད [L206] འ ར བའ ར དང ག པ མ ད པར The third fult prsṅgvkytvcc is trnslted in the Peking edition of Bhāvvivek s text (vol , trns. by Jñāngrbh nd Lui-gyl-tshn [glu i rgyl mtshn]) s glgs yod p i tshig yin p i phyir te but in the Peking edition of the Cler Words (vol , nd in the Shes rig pr khng edition, 10.17, trns. by Mhāsumti nd P-tshb Nyi-m-drg [p tshb nyi m grgs]) s thl br gyur b i tshig yin p i phyir, nd in Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek (P5259, vol ) s glgs yod p i tshig yin p i yng phyir te. Only in the lst is the finl c of the Snskrit represented by yng, llowing it to be red s third reson for the unsuitbility of Buddhpālit s refuttion. In his commentry on the Tretise Tsong-kh-p (1973 Vrnsi edition, 52.12) points out the discrepncy in trnsltion, indicting tht he fvors glgs yod p i tshig yin p i yng phyir te s it is in the edition of Bhāvvivek he hd before him nd in Avlokitvrt, in the sense of mening, [Buddhpālit s exposition] is lso unsuitble becuse of hving words tht fford n opportunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system]. Tsong-kh-p identifies tht this is Avlokitvrt s explntion, nd it indeed is s cn be seen in his text. The Tibetn of tht, in vol is: གནས བ ན ལ ཏས མ པར བཤད པ ད ན ལ བ གཞན ག ཀ ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཡང ཞ ས བའ ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པ འབའ ཞ ག མ ཟད ཀ ད ན ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བར ར ར In this explntion prsṅgvkytvcc hs the sense of becuse of being sttement tht is susceptible to [bsurd] consequences in the sense of ffording n opportunity to n opponent to find holes in one s rgument, rther thn just mening becuse of being sttement of [bsurd] consequences. Thus, this is not description of Buddhpālit s commentry s contining consequences but n indiction tht it is susceptible to the bsurd consequence of contrdicting bsic Mdhymik tenet. The reminder of the pssge then spells out wht tht inner contrdiction is. In this reding, the phrse is tken s third reson, not s reson beginning the next sentence. This is lso Jm-yng-shy-b s opinion (Gret Exposition of the Middle, 264b.2-6), bsed on Avlokitvrt. Thus lthough the Tibetn of this prgrph here should red: de ni rigs p m yin te, gtn tshigs dng bpe m brjod p i phyir dng/ gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m gsl b i phyir dng/ glgs yod p i tshig yin p i phyir, Jm-yng-shy-p here hs ro insted dng though he lter mkes the correction. This discrepncy in his own versions is incomprehensible.

112 110 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར འཆད པར ད ད ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར Hopkins: With regrd to the first reson why Buddhpālit s sttement is not cceptble [Buddhpālit] does not express reson s well s n exmple we should note tht, even from Bhāvvivek s perspective, Buddhpālit tried to give reson. Things re not produced from their own entities is the thesis, nd becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless is the reson. Hence, even from Bhāvvivek s perspective, Buddhpālit did try to express reson; thus, wht Bhāvvivek mens is tht Buddhpālit did not express proper reson cpble of refuting production from self. Bhāvvivek probbly thought tht Buddhpālit tried to stte reson but only gve bogus one, which then mens he did not stte reson. Still, he most likely thought tht Buddhpālit did not offer n exmple of ny sort. The third fult mens tht Buddhpālit s sttement is unsuitble becuse it is susceptible to somebody else pointing out tht he is contrdicting his own tenets it provides n opportunity for refuttion. Bhāvvivek continues his indictment of Buddhpālit: [His explntion ffords such n opportunity] becuse since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] things re produced from other nd production hs effects nd production hs n end due to which [Buddhpālit] The Snskrit, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 15.1), rther thn presenting this s three points s the Tibetn in Bhāvvivek s text does (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, s well s in Avlokitvrt s commentry, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 148,3), refrmes Buddhpālit s syllogism in its opposite form:

113 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 111 would contrdict tenets [of the Middle Wy School]. བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པར འ ར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: Tht is ll tht Bhāvvivek sys; he does not elborte further. Tht is left for his successors right up to the present dy to determine, s Jm-yng-shy-p now does. The mening. The mster Bhāvvivek is sying: The words of Buddhpālit s commentry refuting production from self re not resonble becuse they incur three fults: 1. The fult tht the syllogism indicted by tht [brief commentry] does not express reson nd n exmple cpble of proving tht there is no production from self. 2. The fult tht it does not void criticism by Sāṃkhys tht either it is proving wht is lredy estblished [for them] or it lcks entilment, [proving] the opposite. 3. The fult tht it ffords n opportunity for censure by nother prty. prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti (Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end.) The Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s text, nevertheless, is s bove: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetn Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Snskrit into Tibetn, however, s: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/ Becuse of the unnimity of the Tibetn versions on this point (except for mine) nd becuse Tsong-kh-p nd Jm-yng-shy-p spek to these versions, I use their csting of the mening s three points but cite the Snskrit version throughout.

114 112 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle འད འ ད ན ན བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན ག ས སངས ས བ ངས ཀ བདག འག ག པའ འག ལ པའ ཚ གས ད ན མ ར གས ཏ ད ས བ ན པའ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པ བ ས ཀ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ན དང ག ངས ཅན ག ས བ ཟ ན བ པའམ ཁ བ པ འགལ བའ ན བ ད ཡ ད པ མ བསལ བའ ན དང ལ བ གཞན ག ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པའ ན ག མ འ ང བའ ར Hopkins: Why does Bhāvvivek feel tht Buddhpālit s brief indiction cnnot prove tht there is no production from self? He does not explin this; however, Avlokitvrt, Chndrkīrti, nd so forth, probe wht Bhāvvivek thought bout this s will be detiled lter. Here Jm-yng-shy-p continues spelling out wht Bhāvvivek ws thinking: The first [prt of the reson which is tht the syllogism indicted by tht (brief commentry) does not express reson nd n exmple cpble of proving tht there is no production from self] is estblished becuse lthough Buddhpālit s commentry in its verbl reding (thig zin l) sttes: The subjects, things, re not produced from their own entities becuse production would be senseless nd endless, wht Buddhpālit ctully intended (bsm tshod l) to stte ws becuse production is sensible nd hs n end. The reson [tht is, lthough end ] is esy [to estblish]. དང པ [ད ས བ ན པའ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པ བ ས ཀ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པར ] བ ཁ ད ཀ འག ལ པས ར བ དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས ཚ ག ཟ ན ལ བཀ ད ཀ ང Avlokitvrt ws in Bhāvvivek s linege but not his student.

115 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 113 བསམ ཚ ད ལ ད ན བཅས དང ག བཅས ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད པ ད འ ར [ཁ ད ཀ འག ལ པས ར བ དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས ཚ ག ཟ ན ལ བཀ ད ཀ ང བསམ ཚ ད ལ ད ན བཅས དང ག བཅས ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད པ ད འ ] གས [Tht Buddhpālit sttes such] necessittes [his being subject to the first fult] becuse in tht cse [his commentry] is reduced to mere thesis nd this syllogism cnnot prove tht there is no production from self. It follows [tht in tht cse (his commentry) is reduced to mere thesis nd tht this syllogism cnnot prove tht there is no production from self] becuse it does not express reson nd n exmple tht cn refute production from self s in [my own tht is, Bhāvvivek s own commentry]: The subjects, the inner sense-spheres such s n eye, re not ultimtely produced from self becuse of existing like, for exmple, intelligence. [ཁ ད ཀ འག ལ པས ར བ དང ས པ མས ཆ ས ཅན བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད བ ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས ཚ ག ཟ ན ལ བཀ ད ཀ ང བསམ ཚ ད ལ ད ན བཅས དང ག བཅས ཡ ན པའ ར ཞ ས བཀ ད ན ད ས བ ན པའ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པ བ ས ཀ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པས ]ཁ བ ད ར ན དམ བཅའ [L206b] ཙམ ཟད ཀ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པར བ མ བ པའ ར [ད ར ན དམ བཅའ ཙམ ཟད ཀ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པར བ མ བ པ ]ད ར ཐལ མ ག ས གས ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཆ ས ཅན ད ན དམ པར བདག ལས མ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ཞ ས པ འ བདག འག ག ས ཀ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར Hopkins: The crux of Bhāvvivek s complint is: You did not

116 114 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle put forth good resoning like mine. Since Bhāvvivek sys so little, it is left to the debting courtyrd to figure out wht there is bout Bhāvvivek s resoning tht is different from Buddhpālit s resoning; this mens tht complete tretment of this first fult is not to be found in Bhāvvivek or Jm-yng-shy-p, even though Jm-yng-shy-p s is the most extensive tretment mong the mjor Ge-lug-p textbook uthors. Bhāvvivek lived round the sixth century, nd Jm-yng-shy-p lived in the lteseventeenth nd erly-eighteenth centuries; so eleven hundred yers lter, someone in Tibet is figuring out wht Bhāvvivek hd in mind. Nerly three hundred yers lter we re still working on it. It is lively mtter. Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys: becuse [Buddhpālit] does not express reson [cpble of proving tht there is no production from self] s well s n exmple nd Tsong-kh-p s Ocen of Resoning sys: Bhāvvivek is sying, Tht is not resonble becuse this syllogism does not express reson proving there is no production from self or ny exmple nd hence is reduced to mere setting of thesis. ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས [G152] དང ར གས པའ མཚ ལས ལ གས ན ག ས ད ན མ ར གས ཏ ར བ ད ས བདག མ ད པར བ པའ གས དང དཔ གང ཡང མ བ ད པས དམ བཅས པ ཙམ ཟད པའ ར དང ཞ ས ས Hopkins: If you do not hve good reson nd exmple, you re left with just thesis. Now Jm-yng-shy-p continues with his explntion of Bhāvvivek s criticism: The second [prt of the reson which is tht (the resoning refuting production from self s Buddhpālit sttes it) does not void criticism by Sāṃkhys tht either it is proving wht is lredy estblished (for them) or it lcks entilment, (proving) the opposite] is estblished becuse it does

117 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 115 not void the fllcies of Sāṃkhy s sying: About the mening of your from their own entities, re you sying from the entities of mnifest effects or from the entity of the cusl nonmnifest principl (gtso bo, prdhān)? If it is the first, [you] re proving wht is lredy estblished [for us] becuse we lso do not ssert tht [things] re produced from the entities of lredy mnifest effects. གཉ ས པ [ག ངས ཅན ག ས བ ཟ ན བ པའམ ཁ བ པ འགལ བའ ན བ ད ཡ ད པ མ བསལ བར ] བ ག ངས ཅན ག ས ཁ ད ཀ ས བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས པའ ད ན འ ས མང ན གསལ ག བདག ཉ ད ལས ཟ ར རམ མ གསལ བ གཙ བ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས འད ད དང པ [ག ངས ཅན ག ས ཁ ད ཀ ས བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས པའ ད ན འ ས མང ན གསལ ག བདག ཉ ད ལས ] ར ན བ ཟ ན བ པ ཡ ན ཏ ཁ བ ཡང འ ས མང ན པར གསལ ཟ ན པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བར མ འད ད པའ ར Hopkins: We must keep the Sāṃkhys position in mind: custion mens tht thing psses from nonmnifest to mnifest stte. They hold the view of existent effects (stkārydṛṣṭi), mening tht effects exist in their cuses. When they sy bove tht they do not ssert tht [things] re produced from the entities of lredy existent effects, they men tht pot is not produced from the entity of n lredy mnifest pot. The cly is, of course, n lredy mnifest effect, but they re not sying tht the pot is not produced from the entity of lredy mnifest cly. If it is the second, the entilment is opposite becuse ll tht hve production re produced from tht [nonmnifest principl]. གཉ ས པ [ མ གསལ བ གཙ བ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ] ར ན ཁ བ པ འགལ བར འ ར ཏ ན ཐམས ཅད ད ལས བའ ར ཞ ས བའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར

118 116 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle Hopkins: For the Sāṃkhys, becuse production is sensible nd hs n end, things re necessrily produced from the unmnifest principl ll production works this wy. Kmlshīl explins tht by mens of five resons [Sāṃkhys] prove tht the effect exists t the time of the cuse before its production. Those five resons re: 1. The nonexistent cnnot be cted upon. Tht is: If the effect does not exist in the nture of the cuse through potentil entity, the effect cnnot be cted upon by mens of ny cuse, becuse it is entityless, like sky-lotus. Existing through potentil entity mens existing nonmnifestly. 2. Beings tke up cuses individully. Tht is: If śālistmb rice ws eqully nonexistent [in ll seeds], why do those who seek śālistmb rice tke up śālistmb seeds but do not tke up others, such s millet b seeds? If just s millet seeds re devoid of śālistmb rice, so śālistmb seeds re lso empty of śālistmb rice; thus, by reson of the presence of wht fetures re individully distinct seeds chosen, given tht they do not differ? Tht those who wnt yogurt get hold of milk, nd not wter, is due to the fct tht yogurt exists in milk nd does not exist in wter. 3. Nothing would be produced. Tht is: Becuse ll existents would not differ in lcking the nture [of the effect], ll tht re subject to production would be produced from ll things [but since this is not ssertble, nothing would be produced t ll]. 4. Potencies crete the potentilized. Tht is: Buddhists sy: Becuse the potencies of the cuses re individully distinct, (1) though the effect does not preexist, it is produced (2) cuses with potencies re used (3) nd ll is not produced from everything, whereby the bove-mentioned fllcies re not incurred. To this, the Sāṃkhys sy: Tht is not suitble s response becuse potentilized b Prphrsing Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Annottions, stod, tsh, ko tr p.

119 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 117 cuses crete only potentilized effects. Tht potentilized cuses crete only potentilized effects entils tht the response is not suitble becuse if the nonpre-existent is creted, only the nonpotentilized would be mde, becuse the nonexistent is not creted into nything different s is the cse with the horns of rbbit since the nonexistent is entityless nd does not chnge, nd since if it did chnge, tht it hs nture of nonexistence would be dropped. Thus, how could those cuses crete previously nonexistent effects? They do not. 5. Cuses exist. Tht is: The bove four resons hve proven tht the cretion of formerly nonexistent effect is not suitble; therefore, if [cuses] do not crete n effect, by doing wht re seeds nd so forth clled cuses? Hence, seeds nd so forth would not be cuses becuse [ccording to you] effects do not exist [in cuses], like sky-lotus. Since [tht effects do not preexist in cuses] cn be refuted, [the ctul fct is tht] preexistent effects re produced. Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys: becuse [the resoning s Buddhpālit sttes it] does not void the fllcies dduced by nother [tht is, the fllcies tht Sāṃkhy would be expected to dduce] nd Tsong-kh-p s Ocen of Resoning sys: becuse it does not void Sāṃkhy s criticism upon exmining the thesis [tht things re not produced from self]: If the mening of from self is from the entities of mnifest effects, then [you] re proving wht is lredy estblished [for us] nd if it is from entities of cusl unmnifest potency, then since ll tht hve production re only produced from tht, the entilment is opposite. ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར དང ཞ ས དང ར གས པའ མཚ ལས ག ངས ཅན ག ས བདག ལས ཞ ས པའ ད ན འ ས གསལ བའ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན བ ཟ ན བ པ དང མ གསལ བ ས

120 118 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle [L207]པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཡ ན ན ན ན ཐམས ཅད ད ལས བ ཁ ན ཡ ན པས ན ཁ བ པ འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས དམ བཅའ ལ བ གས ནས ན བ ད པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར ཞ ས ས Hopkins: The phrse the entilment is opposite ( gl khyb) mens tht for Sāṃkhys, Buddhpālit s sttement proves just the opposite for them. If, s Bhāvvivek clims, Buddhpālit sttement mens: Things re not produced from self the cusl nonmnifest principl becuse their production is sensible nd finite. then the reson proves just the opposite for Sāṃkhys becuse, for them, whtever hs sensible nd finite production is necessrily produced from the cusl nonmnifest principl. The third root reson [which is tht it ffords n opportunity for censure by nother prty] is estblished becuse since the syllogism on this occsion, in which wht is explicitly stted s the reson is tht [production] is senseless nd endless, is not logiclly fesible [since production is in fct sensible nd finite], the syllogism of the commentry s explicit rendering (dngos zin) must be reversed, whereby there is the fult of being lible to censure by nother prty. [ ལ བ གཞན ག ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པ ] གས ག མ པ བ བས ཀ ད ན དང ས བ ན ད ན མ ད ག མ ད གས བཀ ད པའ ར བ མ འཐད པས འག ལ པའ དང ས ཟ ན ག ར བ ད ལས བ ག དག ས བ ག པས གཞན ག ཀ ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པའ ན ཡ ད པའ ར Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys: becuse [Buddhpālit s] words fford n opportunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system] since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from the mening put for-

121 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 119 wrd, nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] nd Tsong-kh-p s Ocen of Resoning sys, it is lso not resonble becuse of being sttement tht llows n opportunity of censure by nother prty, nd How does it come to llow n opportunity? The syllogism is to be reversed from wht is explicitly stted. ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པར འ ར བ དང ཞ ས དང ར གས པའ མཚ ལས ལ བ གཞན ག ཀ ན ཀའ ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང མ ར གས ས ཞ ས དང ག གས ཡ ད པར ཇ ར འ ར ན བས ཀ ད ན ར བ ད ལས བ ག པས འ ར ར ཞ ས ས There is wy tht [Buddhpālit s remrks] come to be sttement tht ffords n opportunity [of censure] through reversing the explicitly indicted syllogism becuse through reversing the explicit thesis things re not produced from their own entities it becomes [things] re produced from other nd through reversing the phenomenon proving such, tht is to sy, the reson the two, [production] is senseless nd endless he is stting tht [production] is sensible nd finite, whereby he comes to contrdict the Proponent of the Middle s own tenet tht nonproduction of the four extreme types is nonffirming negtive. བས ཀ ད ན དང ས བ ན ག ར བ ལས བ ག པས ག གས ཡ ད ཀ ཚ ག འ ར ལ ཡ ད ད དང ས [G152b] ཟ ན ག དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས པའ བ བ བ ག པས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང ད ར བ བ པའ ཆ ས ཏ གས ད ན མ ད ག མ ད གཉ ས བ ག པས ད ན བཅས ག བཅས བཀ ད པས ད མ རང ག བ མཐའ མཐའ བཞ འ

122 120 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle མ ད མ ད དགག ད པའ བ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར བའ ར Hopkins: Why does Bhāvvivek determine tht the thesis s well s the reson hve to be reversed? Jm-yng-shy-p explins this point clerly; he tells us lter in his text tht the reson why in this prticulr instnce Bhāvvivek feels tht the thesis must be reversed is Buddhpālit s introductory sttement: Respectively, [someone] sys: At this point show how this clled production is only convention! Answer: Tht is shown first [in the first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle]: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. And tht the thesis must be reversed is lso shown by Buddhpālit s concluding sttement: b Since the production of things is thus in ll wys not logiclly fesible, there is no production; therefore, this clled production is only convention. In these pssges, you cn see the sense behind Bhāvvivek s ssumption tht Buddhpālit thinks tht Nāgārjun s refuttion of the four extreme types of production proves tht production is merely conventionlly existent. Once these resonings prove tht production is merely conventionlly existent, the resoning tht things re not produced from self is not just n elimintion of production from self nd therefore not nonffirming negtive. Also, since this resoning is n ffirming negtive nd not just n elimintion of production from self, it must imply some other type of production; therefore, if things re not produced from self, then they must be produced from other. (Things could not be produced from both self nd other, since the fults of self-production would b See below, 155. See below, 157.

123 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 121 still be incurred; nd cuseless production incurs the fult of production of everything from everything.) This is why Bhāvvivek thinks tht Buddhpālit s thesis must be reversed in this instnce. Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom sys: since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] things re produced from other nd production hs effects nd production hs n end due to which [Buddhpālit] would contrdict tenets [of the Middle Wy School]. ཤ ར ན ལས [ བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས ]བ བ པར བ དང [L207b]ནས [ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ]འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས དང The Snskrit, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 15.1), rther thn presenting this s three points s the Tibetn in Bhāvvivek s text does (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, s well s in Avlokitvrt s commentry, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 148,3), refrmes Buddhpālit s syllogism in its opposite form: prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti (Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end.) The Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s text, nevertheless, is s bove: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Tibetn Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Snskrit into Tibetn, however, s: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/ Becuse of the unnimity of the Tibetn versions on this point (except for mine) nd becuse Tsong-kh-p nd Jm-yng-shy-p spek to these versions, I use their csting of the mening s three points but cite the Snskrit version throughout.

124 122 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle Hopkins: From looking t wht Bhāvvivek sys, you might think tht wht contrdicts tenets of the Middle Wy School would be these three fctors: 1) things re produced from other becuse 2) production hs effects nd becuse 3) production hs n end. You would think tht Bhāvvivek is sying tht since Buddhpālit sserts these three, he would be contrdicting tenets of the Middle Wy School. You might think, Yes! Proponents of the Middle hve no tenets! Wht Ge-lug-p scholrs sy is tht these three re not the tenet tht Buddhpālit is contrdicting; rther, these show tht he is contrdicting some other tenet, nmely, tht the resonings must be nonffirming negtives. And indeed, Bhāvvivek hs long section on nonffirming negtives before this in chpter one of the Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom. Tsong-kh-p s Explntion of (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Ocen of Resoning sys: With respect to how [Buddhpālit s refuttion] becomes words ffording n opportunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system] since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, the proposition Things re not produced from their own entities evinces the opposite mening, whereby Things re produced from other nd the opposite menings of the signs tht re the phenomen of proof tht production is meningful nd hs n end become evident, whereby it hs the fllcy of contrdicting his own tenets. ཀ ཆ ན ལས བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས ཞ ས ས གས ནས [ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག འ ར ལ ན དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས པའ བ བ པར བ བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས བ ད ན བཅས དང གས བཅས འ ར བས རང ག བ མཐའ དད འགལ བར འ ར བའ ན ཡ ད ཅ ས ]ཟ ར ར ཞ ས དང Hopkins: This topic is clled Opposite of the Consequences (thl bzlog). To explin: Bhāvvivek sw syllogism in Buddhpālit s sttements. Is it Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production is sensible nd hs n end?

125 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 123 Or, Things re produced from other becuse production is sensible nd hs n end? The second would be big jump, nd thus Things re produced from other is clled the implicit thesis. The explicit thesis tht Bhāvvivek sw in Buddhpālit s sttement, ccording to Jm-yng-shy-p, is, Tht things re produced from their own entities is not just eliminted. Clling this the explicit thesis indictes tht something else is being implied, nmely, Things re produced from other. I speculte tht Bhāvvivek is sying tht Buddhpālit hs to ccept the opposite of the consequences; since the consequences re Their production would be senseless nd endless becuse of being produced from its own entity, the opposite tht Bhāvvivek feels Buddhpālit hs to ccept is Things re produced from other becuse their production is sensible nd hs n end. Chndrkīrti sys tht the opposite of the consequence is sserted by the opponent, the Sāṃkhy, nd he sys tht the Proponent of the Middle does not ccept it. This is where the topic, Opposite of the Consequences, gets its nme. Of course, when Chndrkīrti sys tht the opposite of the consequence is sserted by the Sāṃkhy, he is referring to the consequences s he sees them (s Jm-yng-shy-p will explin in the second volume), not s Bhāvvivek sees them. Khy-drub s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunte sys: How [ccording to Bhāvvivek] does [Buddhpālit s refuttion of self-production] come to fford n opportunity [for censure]? It is thus: It comes to fford n opportunity since the verbl rendering of the syllogism must be reversed. If, ccording to the verbl rendering of the syllogism, tht things re not produced from self is the thesis nd tht production is senseless nd endless is the reson, the reson would not be estblished s property of the subject [since it is not the cse tht the production of things is senseless nd endless]. Even if the reson is tht if [things] re produced from self, [their production] would be senseless nd endless, when [the reson] is estblished s property of the subject, the thesis would [lso] be estblished [nd one would not hve to proceed to relizing the thesis, nd hence the syllogistic sttement is fulty]. Therefore, [the syllogism] in its explicit rendering is not logiclly fesible, nd Bhāvvivek sying tht it is evident tht Buddhpālit himself sserts the opposite mening

126 124 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle of these two constructs Buddhpālit s ssertion. ལ བཟང མ ག འ ད ལས ག གས ཇ ར ཡ ད ན འད ར ར བའ ཚ ག ཟ ན ལས བ ག དག ས པས ག གས ཡ ད པར འ ར ཏ ར བའ ཚ ག ཟ ན ར ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ བ བ དང བ ད ན མ ད ག མ ད གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན ན གས གས ཆ ས མ བ པར འ ར ཞ ང བདག ལས ན ད ན མ ད དང ག མ ད འ ར པ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན ན ཡང གས ཆ ས བ ན བ བ བ པར འ ར བའ ར དང ས ཟ ན ར མ འཐད ཅ ང འད འ བ ག ད ན གཉ ས སངས ས བ ངས རང ཉ ད ཀ ས འད ད པར མང ན ཞ ས ལ གས ན ག ས སངས ས བ ངས ཀ འད ད ངས ས ཞ ས ས Hopkins: Buddhpālit s refuttion of self-production indeed seems to be poorly stted: Things re not produced from their own entities becuse if produced from self, their production would be senseless nd endless. If you understnd the reson ( if produced from self, their production would be senseless nd endless ), the thesis Things re not produced from their own entity hs lredy understood. Chndrkīrti does not defend Buddhpālit by sying tht this is wht he ment; he hs to reform the sttement. About the tenet tht is being contrdicted Jm-yng-shy-p holds tht the three points themselves re not the tenet tht is contrdicted; rther, the three points show tht, ccording to Bhāvvivek, Buddhpālit hs contrdicted the tenet of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of production from self is nonffirming negtive. However, Bhāvvivek s commenttor Avlokitvrt, however, merely repets the three points s wht Buddhpālit is contrdicting: It would contrdict the tenets in the mster [Nāgārjun s]

127 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 125 scriptures tht it is not sserted tht things re produced from other, it is not sserted tht production hs effects, nd it is not sserted tht production hs n end. Since Avlokitvrt follows Bhāvvivek s cler sttements tht Nāgārjun refutes production ultimtely, perhps he mens tht Buddhpālit sserts these three ultimtely nd tht this is the tenet tht Buddhpālit contrdicts. Whtever the cse whether he is referring to just these three or these three ultimtely Tsong-khp nd his followers do not gree tht the tenet tht Bhāvvivek thinks Buddhpālit contrdicts is these three; they sy tht the tenet tht Bhāvvivek thinks Buddhpālit contrdicts is tht the refuttion of production is mere nonffirming negtive. [. Discussion of terminology] At this point, it is necessry to know the mny conventions [tht is, terms or vocbulry] tht occur for reson, predicte of the proposition, nd so forth, for, if these re known, it helps with mny points to be explined below, nd you will become skilled in differentiting the terminology of the Proponents of the Middle nd the Epistemologists (tshd m p, *prāmāṇk). Let us explin these in connection with [Bhāvvivek s] syllogism proving tht stlk is not ultimtely produced through the reson of [its] existing. བས འད ར གས ཆ ས ས གས ར ར ལ ཡང ཐ ད མ ང བ ཤ ས དག ས ཏ ད ཤ ས ན འ ག ག འཆད འ ར མ ལ ཕན པ དང ད ཚད ཀ ད མ འ བའ མ ད ལ མཁས པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཡ ད པའ གས ཀ ས ག ད ན དམ པར མ བར བ པའ ར བ དང ར ནས བཤད ན Hopkins: Epistemologists include the Proponents of Sūtr nd Proponents of Mind-Only; b here they do not include the Autonomists becuse Avlokitvrt is n Autonomist nd he is being Correcting skye bs in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) to skye b in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b Proponents of Sūtr re Lesser Vehicle School; Proponents of Mind-Only re

128 126 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle contrsted to the Epistemologists. Position in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi phyogs), proposition in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi sgrub by), nd thesis in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi dm bc ) re equivlent becuse the Proponents of the Middle nd the Epistemologists gree tht the composite of the subject nd the predicte in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi chos cn dng chos) re the position (phyogs), nd so forth. Position (phyogs, pkṣ) is tht used for the two [tht is, the combintion of subject nd predicte]. ད བ ཀ གས དང བ བ དང དམ བཅའ མས ད ན གཅ ག ད བ ཀ ཆ ས ཅན དང ཆ ས ཀ ཚ གས ད ན གས ས གས ཡ ན པར ད ཚད མ ན པའ ར གས ཞ ས པ ན པཀྵ ཞ ས པ གཉ ས ལ འ ག པ ད ཡ ན ན Hopkins: Both groups gree tht position, proposition, nd thesis eqully men the combintion of the subject nd the predicte. The word chos, which here mens predicte in the predicte in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi chos), hs mny menings. Generlly it mens property ; the reson is sometimes clled tht which is property (chos) of the subject (phyogs chos), with phyogs ( position ) referring only to the subject, which is prt of the position tht is combintion of the subject nd the predicte the subject. They gree tht predicte in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi chos) nd predicte of the proposition in the proof of tht (de sgrub kyi bsgrub by i chos) re equivlent becuse it is the predicte being proven with respect to whtsoever bsis [tht is, subject]. They lso gree tht bsis of inference (rjes su dpg pr by b i gzhi), position in property of the position (phyogs chos zhes p i phyogs), bsis of debte (rtsod gzhi), nd bsl subject (gzhi i chos cn) re equivlent becuse, hving tken [the term] ttributes in possessor of the ttributes [chos cn, usully trnslted Gret Vehicle school; Autonomists re subdivision of Proponents of the Middle who re contrsted with Consequentilists, the other subdivision of Proponents of the Middle. These re listed ccording to the generl Tibetn schem of the scending subtlety of the understnding of selflessness, emptiness Old Go-mng Lhs misreds yng.

129 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 127 s subject ] s the two, the sign nd the predicte, they explin [ possessor of the ttributes ] s the subject possessing those two ttributes [tht is, possessing the predicte of the proposition nd the reson], ད བ ཀ ཆ ས དང བ བ འ ཆ ས མས [L208] ད ན གཅ ག པར མ ན ཏ གཞ གང ག ང བ བ པར བའ ཁ ད པར ག ཆ ས ཡ ན པའ ར ས དཔག པར བའ གཞ དང གས [G153] ཆ ས ཞ ས པའ གས དང ད གཞ དང གཞ འ ཆ ས ཅན མས ད ན གཅ ག པར མ ན ཏ ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས པའ ཆ ས གས ཆ ས གཉ ས ལ ས ནས ད གཉ ས དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར ཏ Hopkins: In other words, the subject possesses both the predicte tht is being proven nd the reson proving it. becuse Avlokitvrt s Commentry on (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (below, 223) sys: [Just tht (substrtum) is clled the subject (chos cn, dhrmin; literlly, ttribute-possessor );] with respect to the term subject, the substrtum of inference tht possesses the two, (1) the ttribute [tht is, the predicte] tht is being proven nd (2) the ttribute [or reson] tht is the mens of proof is the subject. Hopkins: The Snskrit for chos, ttribute, is dhrm, nd common mening of these two terms is phenomenon ; the predicte nd the reson re phenomen of the subject. So ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos) could be considered somewht literlly s the proof-phenomenon, the reson. འག ལ བཤད བ ལ གས ལས ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས བ ན ས དཔག པར བའ གཞ གང ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ད ན ཆ ས ཅན ཏ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Therefore, they gree tht the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos), property of the position (phyogs chos) [usully trnslted s

130 128 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle property of the subject ], reson (gtn tshigs, hetu), sign (rtgs, liṅg), nd evidence (rgyu mtshn) re equivlent. Avlokitvrt s Commentry on (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (below, 192) sys: Attribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos) is the ttribute proving not produced, the reson. nd (below, 226): becuse of existing is the ttribute [or property] tht is the reson of tht position comprising predicte nd subject, nd hence is clled property of the position (phyogs kyi chos). Hopkins: For Dhrmkīrti (see chpter one of his Commentry on (Dignāg s) Compiltion of Prime Cognition ), position in property of the position refers only to the subject, it being prt of the whole position, wheres for Avlokitvrt the term seems to men combintion of both the subject nd the predicte. ད ས ན བ པའ ཆ ས དང གས ཆ ས དང གཏན ཚ གས དང གས དང མཚན མས ད ན གཅ ག པར མ ན ཏ འག ལ བཤད ད ཉ ད ལས བ པའ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན བ མ ད པའ བ པའ ཆ ས ཏ གཏན ཚ གས ས ཞ ས དང ད འ ར ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས དང ཆ ས ཅན བ ས པའ གས ད འ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ན པས གས ཀ ཆ ས ཞ ས འ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Autonomous reson (rng rgyud kyi gtn tshigs, *svtntrhetu), utonomous sign (rng rgyud kyi rtgs, *svtntrliṅg), nd utonomous inference (rng rgyud kyi rjes su dpg p, *svtntrānumān) re equivlent becuse these re sserted s tht which produces n inference in the other prty by wy of the three modes [of the reson] being estblished through their own power in comptible ppernce for both disputnts. It follows [tht these re sserted s tht which produces n inference in the other prty by wy of the three modes (of the reson) being estblished gtn tshigs kyi chos.

131 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 129 through their own power in comptible ppernce for both disputnts] becuse the mening of utonomy must be tken s estblishment under its own power, རང ད ཀ གཏན ཚ གས དང རང ད ཀ གས དང རང ད ཀ ས དཔག པ ད ན གཅ ག ལ ལ ལ ལ ག མ མ ན ང རང དབང ག ས བ པའ ནས ལ ལ ས དཔག ད པ གཅ ག ལ འད ད པའ ར [རང ད ཀ གཏན ཚ གས དང རང ད ཀ གས དང རང ད ཀ ས དཔག པ ད ན གཅ ག ལ ལ ལ ལ ག མ མ ན ང རང དབང ག ས བ པའ ནས ལ ལ ས དཔག ད པ གཅ ག ལ འད ད པ ]ད ར ཐལ རང ད ཀ ད ན རང དབང བ པ ལ ད དག ས པའ ར Hopkins: The three modes (tshul gsum) re the presence of the reson in the subject, the pervsion, nd the counter-pervsion. The Autonomists re sid to ssert type of resoning in which the three modes re estblished by wy of their own power; the key phrse here is under their own power. If two Consequentilists re debting together, they cn hve the three modes estblished in comptible ppernce; the distinguishing fctor in the Autonomy School nd below is tht the three modes re estblished by wy of their own power in comptible ppernce. According to Ge-lug-p scholrs, this is wht mkes reson utonomous. Autonomous, literlly own-continuum, (rng rgyud, svtntr) might seem to men tht something exists in your own continuum (rng own ; rgyud continuum ) or tht you ccept from your own viewpoint, but Ge-lug-p scholrs hold tht it mens tht the three modes re estblished by wy of their own power in the reson. Whtever the cse, the term utonomous is seldom used by Autonomists. Bhāvvivek seems to cll for selfpowered, or utonomous, inferences (rng dbng du rjes su dpg p, *svtntr-numān) in his Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom when commenting on the beginning of chpter thirteen of

132 130 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle: Now [Nāgārjun] composed the thirteenth chpter in order to tech the nturelessness of compositionl phenomen through the force of setting forth (1) nswers to refuttions nd (2) own-powered [or utonomous] inferences (rng dbng du rje su dpg p). Here, the word inferences does not refer to consciousness relizing hidden or obscure object of knowledge in dependence on correct reson but to syllogistic sttements themselves. Bhāvvivek s sttement my not men nything more thn tht Nāgārjun will give some of his own inferences under his own power (rng dbng du rje su dpg p). Since Ge-lug-p scholrs hold tht Nāgārjun does indeed hve his own inferences, Bhāvvivek s sttement, when tken this wy, would not indicte tht he, Bhāvvivek, ccepts utonomous inferences. Also, when Chndrkīrti uses the term utonomous inference (rng rgyud kyi rjes dpg), he does not in so mny words sy wht it mens he does not sy tht it mens n inference induced by wy of the three modes tht re estblished by wy of their own power in comptible ppernce for both disputnts. You hve to notice by context tht he himself uses proof sttements nd hence uses inference, nd thus utonomous inference cnnot just men n rgument tht the presenter believes in. However, mny Indins nd Tibetns hve thought tht Chndrkīrti s declrtion tht he himself does not hve utonomous inferences just mens tht he does not hve nything from his own side to offer, tht is, he does not believe in stting syllogisms. Estblished by wy of their own power mens estblished from its own side (rng ngos ns grub p), estblished by wy of their own chrcter (rng gi mtshn nyid gyis grub p), estblished inherently (rng bzhin gyis grub p), nd so forth. It is complicted to explin the mening of estblished by wy of their own chrcter in the four schools of Buddhist tenets, but when Ge-lug-p scholrs sy tht Autonomists hold tht there is Cited in Jng-ky Rol-py-dor-jy (lcng sky rol p i rdo rje, born 1717), Presenttion of Tenets (grub mth i rnm bzhg), (Srnth: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, 1970), , nd Jm-yng-shy-p, Gret Exposition of Tenets, (Musoorie: Dlm, 1962), c 61.7: d ni sun byin p i ln btb p dn rng dbng du rjes su dpg p i mthus du byed rnms rnm p ls ngo b nyid bstn p i don gyi dbng gis rb tu byed p bcu gsum p btsms so.

133 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 131 estblishment by wy of their own chrcter, it mens tht there is something to be found upon serching for the object imputed (btgs don btsl ns brnyed rgyu yod p). Correspondingly, when Consequentilists sy there is no estblishment by wy of their own power, it mens tht there is nothing to be found upon serching for the object imputed. However, when Proponents of Mind-Only sy tht other-powered ntures re estblished by wy of their own chrcter, this cnnot men there is something to be found upon serching for the object imputed becuse Proponents of Mind-Only sy tht imputtionl ntures re not estblished by wy of their own chrcter, nd thus estblished by wy of its own chrcter cnnot men tht the object is not found upon serching for the object imputed, since then Proponents of Mind-Only would understnd emptiness s described by the Consequence school with respect to one object, imputtionl ntures, nd hence would understnd emptiness with respect to ll objects. For, Ārydev sys tht the viewing consciousness of one object knows, or is cpble of knowing, the sttus of ll objects: Tht which is the viewer of one thing Is explined to be the viewer of ll. Tht which is the emptiness of one Is the emptiness of ll. Thus, the mening of estblished by wy of its own chrcter in the Mind-Only School is topic of tremendous debte. Given tht estblished by wy of its own chrcter cnnot men estblished from its own side in the Mind-Only School, wht does it men? It is conundrum with mny nunces multiple spects of which I hve treted in chpters 5-8 in Absorption in No Externl World. b ) becuse Avlokitvrt s Commentry on (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (below, 223) sys: On this occsion, the internl sense-spheres [tht is, the internl Stnz 191 (VIII.16); see lso Kren Lng, Ārydev s Ctuḥśtk: On the Bodhisttv s Cultivtion of Merit nd Knowledge, Indiste Studier, 7 (Copenhgen: Akdemisk Forlg, 1986), 83; nd Yogic Deeds of Bodhisttvs: Gyl-tsb on Ārydev s Four Hundred, commentry by Geshe Sonm Rinchen, trnslted nd edited by Ruth Sonm (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1994), 194. b Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, 2005.

134 132 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle sense orgns] which re the substrt possessing the two: the ttribute [or predicte] of the proposition, re not produced from self, which is pproved by both disputnts, nd the ttribute proving nonproduction from self, tht is, just existing, which is pproved by both disputnts re clled the subject (chos cn, dhrmin) [literlly, tht which possesses the ttributes, tht is to sy, tht which is endowed with the predicte nd the reson ]. འག ལ བཤད ད ཉ ད ལས བས འད ར ན ནང ག མཆ ད མས [L208b] ཞ ས བ གཞ གང ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ས ཀ ལ ག གས པ དང བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ད བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ས ཀ ལ ག གས པ ད གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ད ན ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས འ ཞ ས དང Hopkins: When Avlokitvrt speks of the predicte being pproved by both disputnts, this mens tht it is pproved by oneself nd pproved by the other prty. Does this indicte tht Avlokitvrt ccepts estblishment from its own side? It might. Once he sys tht re not produced from self is something the other person knows bout nd something the Proponent of the Middle knows tht it is something both cn recognize then for both of them these re estblished by vlid cognition, nd if in the systems of both disputnts the mode of being estblished by vlid cognition is the sme, tht is to sy, if their knowledge of re not produced from self ffirms not just this but lso its being inherently existent, then Avlokitvrt s sttement indictes tht he ccepts estblishment from its own side. Also, the insistence on the sttement of syllogisms without llowing the mere sttement of consequences suggests tht he holds tht things pper in common wy to both prties, tht in the systems of the two prties the mode of estblishment of the sub-

135 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 133 ject, predicte, reson, nd exmple re similrly set forth. Avlokitvrt s dding in this pproved by both disputnts is potent. The difficulty in investigting this development in the Middle Wy School is tht the evidence is thin; such points re window into other ssertions, just s csul remrk cn be window into someone s ides. nd Amrsinh s Tresury sys, b Autonomous (rng rgyud, svtntr), own-powered (rng dbng), nd self-powered (bdg dbng). འཆ མ ད མཛ ད ལས རང ད རང དབང བདག དབང དང ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: Turning to renowned Snskrit dictionry, the Amrkosh, Jm-yng-shy-p estblishes lexigrphiclly tht there is connection between utonomous (rng rgyud) nd ownpower (rng dbng). You see how pressed he is; he does not hve source from ny of these Indin Buddhist scholrs explicitly sying this; he hs to turn to dictionry to sy tht somebody mde connection between utonomous (which might just men own-continuum, tht is, n inference in one s own continuum) nd own-powered. Still, it is interesting tht the Snskrit word tntr, which usully comes into Tibetn s rgyud, does occsionlly come out s dbng, for exmple in the word gzhn dbng, other-powered, which is the Tibetn for pr-tntr. Self-renowned (or self-pproved) sign (rng grgs kyi rtgs, svsiddhliṅg); self-renowned (or self-pproved) inference (rng grgs kyi rjes dpg, svsiddhānumān); other-renowned (or other-pproved) sign (gzhn grgs kyi rtgs, prsiddhliṅg); nd other-renowned (or otherpproved) inference (gzhn grgs kyi rjes dpg, prsiddhānumān) re equivlent, but those [stted] by non-consequentilists re not sserted to be correct. [These re equivlent] becuse, when Proponent of the Middle, the former prty, proves tht things re without true existence for n chi med seng ge. b chi med mdzod, mrkoś; Amrkoś : svtntro pāvṛtḥ svirī svcchndo nirvgrhḥ. Among these five, svtntr is rng rgyud ; svirī is rng dbng; svcchnd is rng dod. In his Gret Exposition of Tenets (Gomng 1999, ) Jmyng-shy-p sys tht svirī is lso bdg dbng. The other two words, pāvṛt nd nirvgrh both men self-willed nd the like.

136 134 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle opponent who is Proponent of [Truly Estblished] Things, since [the sign] is pproved by the ltter prty himself/herself, it is clled self-pproved, nd since it pproved by the ltter prty who is other thn the former prty, it is [lso] clled other-pproved. རང ག གས ཀ གས དང ད འ ས དཔག དང གཞན ག གས ཀ གས དང ད འ ས དཔག པ མས ད ན གཅ ག ལ ཐལ འ ར བ མ ཡ ན པའ ཡང དག མ འད ད ད ལ ད མ པས ལ དང ས ལ དང ས པ བད ན མ ད བ ཚ ལ རང ཉ ད ལ ག གས པས ན རང ག གས དང ལ ལས [G153b]གཞན པའ ལ ལ ག གས པས ན གཞན ག གས ཞ ས བཤད པའ ར Hopkins: The opponent from his or her own viewpoint is self nd from the viewpoint of the Proponent of the Middle is other ; hence, self-pproved sign nd other-pproved sign men the sme thing the opponent being both self nd other from different points of view. Such sign is lso self-pproved inference nd n other-pproved inference becuse in this cse inference refers, not to consciousness, but to reson. Clling sign n inference is cse of giving the nme of the effect to the cuse becuse the sign genertes the inferentil consciousness. It follows [tht when Proponent of the Middle, the former prty, proves tht things re without true existence for Proponent of (Truly Estblished) Things, the ltter prty, since (the sign) is pproved by the ltter prty himself/herself, it is clled self-pproved, nd since it pproved by the ltter prty who is other thn the former prty, it is (lso) clled otherpproved ] becuse until the view of the middle is found, [logicl] signs nd so forth s they re pproved by Proponents of the Middle cnnot be shown to, or cnnot be pproved by the wreness of, the ltter prty, by reson of which it is sserted tht it is impossible for there to be the three modes [of logicl sign] commonly ppering to both prties. [ ལ ད མ པས ལ དང ས ལ དང ས པ བད ན མ ད བ ཚ ལ རང ཉ ད ལ ག གས པས ན རང ག གས དང ལ ལས གཞན པའ ལ ལ ག གས པས

137 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 135 ན གཞན ག གས ཞ ས བཤད པ ]ད ར ཐལ ད མའ བ མ ད བར ད མ པ ལ ག གས པ ར ག གས ས གས ལ ལ བ ན པའམ ལ ག གས མ བ པའ མཚན ག ས ལ བ གཉ ས ཀར མ ན ང ག ལ ག མ མ ཡ ང བར འད ད པའ ར ར Hopkins: A sign nd so forth s they re renowned to, or pproved by, Consequentilist cnnot be shown to the opponent until tht person genertes the Consequentilist view becuse the two sides hve different opinion bout wht the consciousness certifying the reson ffirms. Opponents cnnot seprte existing nd existing from its own side, wheres once they hve the Consequentilist view nd thus hve relized emptiness, they cn. Jm-yng-shy-p now returns to explicting Bhāvvivek s ides in criticizing Buddhpālit. There is wy tht [from Bhāvvivek s viewpoint, Buddhpālit s explntion of the refuttion of production from self] contrdicts the tenet of the Middle Wy School tht they re proving nonffirming negtive (med dgg, prsjyprtiṣedh) becuse: 1. When, upon reversing the sign of the explicit rendering, one sttes [s the reson of the implied syllogism tht the production of things] is sensible nd is finite, the explicit thesis lso is reversed, whereupon one must be proving tht things re produced from other, due to which one contrdicts the tenet [of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of the four extreme types of production proves only nonffirming negtive]. 2. The distinction must be mde tht lthough in generl ll whtsoever consequences nd signs re not prllel in hving to be reversed in this wy, on this occsion of Buddhpālit s refuting production from the four extremes such is necessry. མ ད དགག བ བ ར ད པའ ད མའ བ མཐའ དང འགལ ལ ཡ ད ད དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ གས ནས ད ན བཅས ག བཅས འག ད ན དང ས ཀ དམ བཅའ ཡང བ གས ནས དང ས པ གཞན ལས བ བ བ པར ད དག ས པས བ

138 136 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle མཐའ དང འགལ བ གང ཞ ག ར ཐལ འ ར དང གས གང བཀ ད ཀ ད ར བ ག དག ས [L209] པ མ ངས པ མ ཡ ན ཡང སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ བ འག ག པའ བས འད ར ད ར དག ས ཞ ས ཞ བ ཆ འ ད དག ས པའ ར Hopkins: When such reversl is done to the reson, you do not necessrily hve to reverse the thesis. The reson why in this instnce it hs to be reversed is to be found Buddhpālit s introductory nd concluding remrks, where he indictes tht Nāgārjun is proving tht production is just convention. The first [prt of the reson which is tht when, upon reversing the sign of the explicit rendering, one sttes (s the reson of the implied syllogism tht the production of things) is sensible nd is finite, the explicit thesis lso is reversed, whereupon one must be proving tht things re produced from other, due to which one contrdicts the tenet (of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of the four extreme types of production proves only nonffirming negtive)] is estblished becuse: 1. Just s the sign of the explicit rendering is reversed, so the proposition of the literl rendering lso is reversed, whereupon lthough it is not suitble to stte Things re produced from other, s the [explicitly indicted] proposition, such becomes the implicitly indicted proposition. 2. In tht cse, n ffirming negtive comes to be the explicit proposition, whereby there is the fult of contrdicting the tenet [of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of the four extreme types of production proves only nonffirming negtive]. དང པ [དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ གས ནས ད ན བཅས ག བཅས འག ད ན དང ས ཀ དམ བཅའ ཡང བ གས ནས དང ས པ གཞན ལས བ བ བ པར ད དག ས པས བ མཐའ དང འགལ བར ] བ དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ གས པ ར དང ས ཟ ན ག བ བ ཡང བ གས ནས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས ཞ ས བ བ ར འག ད པ མ ང ཡང གས བ ན ག བ བ ར འ ར བ གང ཞ ག ད ར ས ན མ

139 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 137 ཡ ན དགག དང ས ཀ བ བ ར ས ང བས བ མཐའ དང འགལ བའ ན ཡ ད པའ ར Hopkins: If the reversed, explicit thesis were tht things re produced from other, then it would not be nonffirming negtive, but s Jm-yng-shy-p indictes bove, the reversed explicit thesis is Tht things re produced from their own entities is not just eliminted. In fct, Bhāvvivek knows tht Buddhpālit does not wnt to prove tht there is production from other becuse right in the next section Buddhpālit proves tht phenomen re not produced from other, but, from Bhāvvivek s perspective, Buddhpālit hs put himself into this spot. Wouldn t it hve been more strightforwrd if Bhāvvivek nd Avlokitvrt hd sid tht Buddhpālit ws just proving conventionlly existent production rther thn production from other? Their point perhps is tht if in the context of ultimte nlysis conventionlly existent production is being proving, then it would hve to be conventionlly existent production from other. The first [prt of the reson which is tht just s the sign of the explicit rendering is reversed, so the proposition of the literl rendering lso is reversed, whereupon lthough it is not suitble to stte Things re produced from other, s the (explicitly indicted) proposition, such becomes the implicitly indicted proposition] is estblished becuse Tsong-kh-p s Explntion of (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Ocen of Resoning sys: Therefore, the two reverse menings re the sign. If the sign of the explicit rendering must be reversed, the thesis of the explicit rendering lso must be reversed becuse of being prllel. About this, [the reversl of the thesis of the explicit rendering] is not doble in ccordnce with how the signs re reversed, tht production from self is not just eliminted is the reverse mening [of the originl thesis Things re not produced from their own entities. ] དང པ [དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ གས པ ར དང ས ཟ ན ག བ བ ཡང བ གས ནས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས ཞ ས བ བ ར འག ད པ མ ང ཡང གས བ ན ག བ བ ར འ ར བར ] བ ར གས པའ མཚ ལས

140 138 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle ད ས ན བ ག ད ན གཉ ས གས ས དང ས ཟ ན ག གས བ ག དག ས ན དང ས ཟ ན ག དམ བཅའ ཡང བ ག དག ས ཏ མ ངས པའ ར ད ལ གས བ ག པ ར ར མ ད པས བདག མ པར བཅས ཙམ མ ཡ ན པ བ ག པའ ད ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: Jm-yng-shy-p, just bove, points out tht lthough in generl ll whtsoever consequences nd signs re not prllel (mtshung p m yin) in hving to be reversed in this wy, in this cse they both need to be chnged. Bhāvvivek s point is tht from context one cn see tht Buddhpālit wnts to prove tht production is merely convention. By sying production from self is not just eliminted Tsongkh-p improves on Bhāvvivek s sttement tht Buddhpālit is proving tht things re produced from other. The second [prt of the reson which is tht in tht cse, n ffirming negtive comes to be the explicit proposition, whereby there is the fult of contrdicting the tenet (of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of the four extreme types of production proves only nonffirming negtive)] is estblished becuse since Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle is for the ske of eliminting ll prolifertion (spros p, prpñc), on this occsion nonffirming negtive is needed, but if n ffirming negtive is used, one contrdicts the tenet of the Suprmundne Victor s sying not to course in signs. གཉ ས པ [ད ར ས ན མ ཡ ན དགག དང ས ཀ བ བ ར ས ང བས བ མཐའ དང འགལ བའ ན ཡ ད པར ] བ ད མའ བ ན བཅ མ ཀ ས ས པ ཐམས ཅད གཅ ད པའ ཆ ད ཡ ན པས བས འད ར མ ད དགག གཅ ག དག ས ཀ མ ཡ ན དགག ས ན བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས མཚན མ ལ མ ད པར ག ངས པའ བ མཐའ དང འགལ བའ ར ཏ

141 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 139 Hopkins: To solve the problem of to just wht Bhāvvivek is objecting, we re pulled into thinking bout ffirming negtives, nonffirming negtives, emptiness, nd so forth; by using these principles to tckle this problem, we thereby become fmilir with fundmentl principles. This is the genius of this system of eduction. Even if you get into totl mess Did Bhāvvivek relly men tht? Is there relly ny difference between the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School? it comes tht you re studying the principles of Tsong-kh-p s system; you re getting used to structure. Here Jm-yng-shy-p just sys tretise on the middle which is nother nme for Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Stnzs on the Middle b but could be tken to men Middle Wy tretises in generl. Chndrkīrti refers to this text with the phrse from Mdhymk, which some people mistke s mening ny of Nāgārjun s Six Collections of Resoning, c but in Chndrkīrti s sme text when he refers to others mong the Six Collections of Resonings, he gives their specific nmes; thus it cn be seen tht the term Mdhymk in from Mdhymk refers to the specific text Mdhymkshāstr (Tretise on the Middle) which is nother nme for the Fundmentl Stnzs on the Middle. Similrly, some confusion rises with regrd to Chndrkīrti s Supplement to Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle (dbu m l jug p, mdhymkāvtār). The title is literlly be trnslted s Supplement to the Middle or Introduction to the Middle ; the question rises bout wht exctly is the Middle tht is to be supplemented or introduced? Wht does Middle / Mdhymk men here in Chndrkīrti s title? It is just Nāgārjun s Mdhymkshāstr (Tretise on the Middle). When Chndrkīrti uses the word Mdhymk in this context, it refers to this prticulr work by Nāgārjun. Returning to Jm-yng-shy-p s pssge, it sys tht the Tretise on the Middle is for the ske of eliminting ll prolifertion. There re two different kinds of prolifertion: the prolifertion of true existence (bden dzin kyi spros p) nd the prolifer dbu m i bstn bcos, mdhymkśāstr. b dbu m rts b i tshig le ur bys p shes rb ces by b, mūlmdhymkkārikāprjñānām. c See the Bibliogrphy under Nāgārjun for list of the six.

142 140 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle tion of dulistic ppernce (gnyis snng gi spros p). Prolifertions of dulistic ppernce re 1) the ppernce of conventionlities, 2) the ppernce of subject nd object, 3) the ppernce of difference, 4) the ppernce of inherent existence, nd 5) the ppernce of mening-generlities, tht is, conceptul imges. Though Ge-lug-p scholrs cll ll these prolifertions of dulistic ppernce, they re not ll wht you would cll dul; the ppernce of subject nd object is dul, but tke, for exmple, the ppernce of tble s inherently existent in sense there is no dulity, for it is just single tble. It is interesting to ponder why this ppernce is clled dul. The ppernce of conventionlity is not dul there is no two; it does not openly spek of dulism. It is the sme with the ppernce of mening-generlity. It cn be seen tht the word dulistic does not necessrily refer to wht we tend to immeditely think of when we her the term: good nd evil, subject nd object, nd so forth nd then suggest nondulistic stte beyond them. Given its multiple menings, the word prolifertion is often hrd to pin down s to wht it mens. Some people trnslte it s verbl elbortion, the phenomenl world (Mūrti), constructions of thought (Dell Sntin), phenomenl extension (Streng), multiplictions, nd so forth Here, Jm-yng-shy-p sys tht Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle is for the ske of eliminting ll prolifertions (spros p, prpñc), due to which on this occsion nonffirming negtive is needed. Wht evidence is in the Tretise on the Middle itself tht Nāgārjun is proving nonffirming negtive? The word nonffirming negtive is not in the Tretise, but is in Bhāvvivek s commentry, Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom nd Chndrkīrti s commentry, the Cler Words. Jm-yng shy-p then sys, If n ffirming negtive is used, one contrdicts the tenet of Buddh s sying not to course in signs. In the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtrs, Buddh sys tht nyone who courses in signs is not prcticing the proper pth, nd wht one needs is signlessness. Wht does signs men? Apprehending signs seems to men mistkenly pprehending inherent existence. Ge-dün-lo-drö identified tht it mens pprehending mistken relity or nture. Now Jm-yng-shy-p mkes cittion bout ffirming negtives tht is difficult to understnd.

143 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 141 Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (below, 162) sys: When n ffirming negtion is employed, due to its principlly being n ffirmtion, it is being ffirmed tht phenomen re not produced, whereby nonproduction is indicted, nd hence one seprtes from tenet becuse scripture sys, If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. Though vrious things re propounded [bout this by others,] not understnding it this wy, they re mistken. ཤ ས རབ ན མ ལས མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ཡ ངས ས བ ང ན ན ད བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ པས བ མ ད པ ན པའ [G154] ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བར འ ར ཏ ང ལས ག གས བ མ ད པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ [L209b] ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར ཞ ས ས འད ར མ ག བར ཚ གས ས ཀ ང འ ལ ལ Hopkins: An ffirming negtive is predominntly positive becuse it implies positive phenomenon in plce of its object of negtion. On the other hnd, in the phrse Brhmins do not drink beer, the object of negtion is beer ; negting beer does not imply nything in its plce even if brhmins is positive. Here Bhāvvivek sys tht since wht one is proving is predominntly positive, one is proving, Phenomen re not produced. As Jm-yng-shy-p is bout to sy, n ffirming negtive hs to involve the intent of the speker to imply something in its plce. Mybe Bhāvvivek is thinking of the existence of the bsence of truly existent production, s when Tsong-kh-p sys, Therefore, [Jñāngrbh s] explntion tht negtive of ultimtely existent production nd so forth is conventionl mens tht it exists conventionlly; it does not indicte tht such is conventionlity. Hopkins, Tsong-kh-p s Finl Exposition of Wisdom, Medium Exposition of Specil Insight, 146.

144 142 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle The second [prt of the reson which is tht the distinction must be mde tht lthough in generl ll whtsoever consequences nd signs re not prllel in hving to be reversed in this wy, on this occsion of Buddhpālit s refuting production from the four extremes such is necessry] becuse (1) Buddhpālit, on the occsion of refuting production from the four extremes, wishes to prove, not just the bsence of production, but tht production exists conventionlly, like n illusion, (2) nd in tht cse, since production is meningful nd finite, his sying not produced from self implicitly suggests production from other. གཉ ས པ [ ར ཐལ འ ར དང གས གང བཀ ད ཀ ད ར བ ག དག ས པ མ ངས པ མ ཡ ན ཡང སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ བ འག ག པའ བས འད ར ད ར དག ས ཞ ས ཞ བ ཆ འ ད དག ས པར ] བ སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ བ འག ག བས མ ད ཙམ མ ཡ ན པར བ ཐ ད ཡ ད པ མ ར ར བ འད ད ལ ད ར ན བ ན ད ན བཅས ག བཅས ཡ ན པས བདག ལས མ ས པས གས ལ གཞན འཕ ན པའ ར Hopkins: Bhāvvivek knows tht Buddhpālit does not hold tht the refuttion of production from self does not imply production from other, but Buddhpālit hs ended up in this mess becuse of his fulty introductory nd concluding sttements tht the refuttion of production from self estblishes conventionlly existent production. This is Jm-yng-shy-p s key to explining the controversy! The first corner of the reson [which is tht Buddhpālit, on the occsion of refuting production from the four extremes, wishes to prove, not just the bsence of production, but tht production exists conventionlly, like n illusion] is estblished becuse it is evident tht this is wht Bhāvvivek ws thinking since Buddhpālit s Commentry sys: Respectively, [someone] sys: At this point show how this clled production is only convention! Answer: Tht is shown first [in the first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle]: Not from self, not from others,

145 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 143 Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. Concerning this, if something is produced, consider whether the production of tht thing is from self, from other, from both self nd other, or cuselessly. Upon exmintion, it is not logiclly fesible in ll wys. How? From self (bdg ls, svtḥ) is the equivlent of sying from [its own] entity (bdg nyid ls). About tht, respectively, things re not produced from self becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. This nd the next two sentences re cited in Chndrkīrti s Cler Words (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.1): n svt utpdynte bhāvāḥ/ tdutpādviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc/ n hi svātmnā vidymānānāṃ pdārthānāṃ punrutpāde pryojnmsti/ th snnpi jāyet/ n kdā cinn jāyet// The Tibetn trnsltion of Chndrkīrti s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) is: dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med de de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng / shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir ro // dngos po bdg gi bdg nyid yod p rnms l ni yng skye b l dgos p med do// ci ste yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur ro/ The Tibetn trnsltion of Buddhpālit s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.5) reds: dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls* skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/ di ltr dngos po bdg gi bdg nyid yod p rnms l yng skye b l dgos p med do// gl te yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur bs// In the ltter edition, svtḥ is trnslted into Tibetn s bdg gi bdg nyid ls insted of bdg ls (s would be expected) most likely becuse Buddhpālit in the previous sentence glosses bdg ls (svtḥ) s bdg nyid ls nd in the next sentence uses bdg gi bdg nyid (svātmnā). The Snskrit of the second fllcy, tiprsṅgdoṣācc ( nd becuse of the fult of gret bsurdity ) is rendered in the Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s Cler Words (P5260, vol. 98, 4.4.3; Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) s dng shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir ( nd becuse it would be very bsurd ). The Tibetn of Buddhpālit s text (P5242, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.6; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. ), however, differs due, most likely, to providing mening trnsltion spelling out the ctul bsurdity, dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ( nd becuse production would be endless ). Since the ltter is more to the point nd is lso the reding in the Tibetn of Bhāvvivek s text (P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.6) nd Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek

146 144 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle It is thus: the production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, tht lso is not ccepted. Therefore, respectively, things re not produced from self. They lso re not produced from other. Why? For it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything would be produced from everything. They lso re not produced from both self nd other becuse [such] would [bsurdly] entil the fllcies of both [production from self nd production from other]. They lso re not produced cuselessly becuse it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything lwys would be produced from everything nd becuse there would be the fllcy tht ll endevor would be just senseless. Becuse the production of things is thus in ll wys indmissible, there is no [inherently existent] production; therefore, this clled production is only convention. [སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས མཐའ བཞ འ བ འག ག བས མ ད ཙམ མ ཡ ན པར བ ཐ ད ཡ ད པ མ ར ར བ འད ད པའ ] གས ར དང པ བ ལ ཏ ལས འད ར ས པ ར ཞ ག བར བ ད པ ཐ ད ཙམ ཡ ན པ ད ར རབ ན ཅ ག བཤད པ ད དང པ ར བ ན པར འ བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན ཞ ས པ ནས [གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན འད ལ གལ ཏ དང ས པ འགའ ཞ ག བར ར ན དང ས པ ད འ བ ད བདག ལས སམ གཞན ལས སམ བདག དང གཞན གཉ ས ལས སམ མ ད པ ལས འ ར ག ང ན བ གས ནས མ པ ཐམས ཅད ལས མ འཐད ད ཇ ར ཞ ན བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ (P5259, vol. 96, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 229.2, which for thug reds thugs; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 145.3) I hve trnslted it this wy throughout. It is unsuitble to trnslte this fllcy s infinite regress since the reference is not to the pst but to the future, tht is to sy, n object would be produced over nd over gin. Also, ech cuse hs cuse, thereby requiring n infinite regress, which is not fllcy since there is infinite time for string of infinite cuses.

147 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 145 ཚ ག ག ད ལ ར ཞ ག དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར འད ར དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ མས ལ ཡང བ དག ས པ མ ད ད གལ ཏ ཡ ད ཀ ང ཡང ན ནམ ཡང མ བར མ འ ར བས ད ཡང མ འད ད ད ད འ ར ར ཞ ག དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ]གཞན ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ཅ འ ར ཞ ན ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར བདག དང གཞན གཉ ས ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད གཉ ས ཀའ ན ད ཐལ འ ར བའ ར ར མ ད པ ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ག ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར དང མ པ ཐམས ཅད ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར ད ར གང ག ར དང ས པ བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད མ འཐད པ ད འ ར བ མ ད པས བར བ ད པ ན ཐ ད ཙམ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར མ ལ གས ན ག ས དག ངས པར མང ན པའ ར Hopkins: The reson is becuse the production of things is thus in ll wys indmissible ; then the thesis is there is no [inherently existent] production. This somehow further implies tht this clled production is only convention. Such sequence certinly seems to be Buddhpālit s intention, nd so his resonings come to prove positive nd re hence ffirming-negtions. This is how Jm-yng-shy-p s cler presenttion of why Bhāvvivek criticism of Buddhpālit is bsed on Buddhpālit s own words. Though [wht Bhāvvivek sid] is gret bsis of nlysis [tht is, provides serious points of chllenge to Buddhpālit s presenttion], there is no fult [in Buddhpālit s presenttion] becuse [Buddhpālit s] brief indiction of the explntion in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle tht nothing exists ultimtely nd tht everything is fesible within the context of only nme nd terminology must [be tken s] explining tht:

148 146 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle Here lso, lthough the bsence of production from the four extremes is nonffirming negtive, [Nāgārjun] treted production s existing nme-only, due to which [his explntion] is very good. ད ད གཞ ཆ མ ད ཀ ང ན མ ད ད ཤ ས ཀ ས ད ན དམ པར མ ད པ དང མ ང བ ཙམ ལ ཐམས [L210] ཅད ང བར བཤད པའ མད ར བ ན ལ འད ར ཡང མཐའ བཞ ལས མ བ མ ད དགག ཡ ན ཡང བ མ ང ཙམ ཡ ད པར མཛད པས ཤ ན ལ གས ས ཞ ས བཤད དག ས པའ ར ཏ Hopkins: Jm-yng-shy-p s sttement bove tht tht Bhāvvivek s criticism indictes tht Buddhpālit s refuttion of production from self is gret bsis for nlysis mens tht it clls for exmintion. Jm-yng-shy-p is not sying tht the refuttion of inherently existent production estblishes tht production is only conventionlly existent, but it is indeed the cse tht production is conventionlly existent nd tht this is the point tht Buddhpālit is trying to convey. Does Nāgārjun s Tretise nywhere spek of merely conventionl existence? It does, for it sys (XXIV.18) tht dependent imputtion nd middle pth re comptible, nd in chpter twenty-four it clerly sets forth how everything is possible within n bsence of inherent existence nd impossible without it. Khy-drub s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunte sys: It is not tht [Bhāvvivek] propounds such in generl with respect to ll whtsoever consequences nd signs, but here when Buddhpālit sttes tht production is meningful nd hs n end s the sign proving tht there is no production from self, this is equl lso to hving to ssert s the proposition the opposite of the nonffirming negtive tht production from self is not just eliminted. For, the wy it is equl to hving to hving to ssert this does not men tht it is equl to hving to stte production from other ; rther, the mening is: The mening of the reverse of tking s the proposition the nonffirming negtive tht production from self

149 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 147 is not just eliminted is tht n ffirming negtive becomes the proposition becuse when tht production is meningful nd hs n end is stted s the sign, the words of the thesis There is no production from self implicitly project the proposition tht things re produced from other; moreover, by explicitly propounding tht the production of things is meningful nd hs n end, it is propounded tht things re produced, nd by stting tht there is no production from self production from self is refuted; since within tking production s the bsic context, it is limited to the two, production from self nd production from other, by just sying tht things re produced nd re not produced from self it is projected tht [things] re produced from other. [Bhāvvivek] ws thinking tht this is like the fct tht through the force of speking of the ft Devdtt nd tht he does not et during the dy, eting t night is implied. ང ན ལས ཐལ འ ར དང གས གང ཡ ན ཐམས ཅད ལ ར ད ར བ མ ཡ ན ག ཞ ས པ ནས [འད ར སངས ས བ ངས ཀ ས བདག མ ད པར བ བ པའ གས བ ད ན བཅས ག བཅས འག ད ན བདག མ པར བཅད ཙམ ག མ ད དགག ལས བ ག པའ བ ག ད ན བ བ ར ཁས ལ ན དག ས པར ཡང མ ངས ཞ ས པ ད ཁས ལ ན དག ས པར མ ངས ལ ན གཞན ལས ཞ ས འག ད དག ས པར མ ངས ཅ ས པའ ད ན མ ན ག བདག མ པར བཅད ཙམ ག མ ད དགག བ བ ར ད པ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན མ ཡ ན དགག བ བ ར འ ར ཏ བ ད ན བཅས དང གས བཅས གས བཀ ད ན དང ས བ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས པའ དམ བཅའ ཚ ག ག ས བ བ ཆ ས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བ གས ལ འཕ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས བའ ད ན ཏ ད ཡང དང ས པ མས བ ད ན བཅས ག བཅས དང ས ས པས དང ས པ མས བར ས ཤ ང བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཅ ས པས བདག ལས བ བཀག ལ ] བ གཞ ར ས ལ བདག གཞན གཉ ས ཁ ཚ ན ཆ ད [G154b]པས དང ས པ མས བ ཡ ན ཞ ང བདག ལས མ ཞ ས ས པ ཉ ད ཀ ས གཞན ལས བ འཕ ན པའ ར ས ན

150 148 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle ཚ ན པ དང ཉ ན པར མ ཟ བར ས པའ གས ཀ ས མཚན མ ཟ བར འཕ ན པ བཞ ན ན མ བསམ ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར Hopkins: Does Bhāvvivek himself ssert production from other? He clerly does not ccept ultimtely existent production from other. In the Consequentilist system s Tsong-kh-p lys it out, conventionlly existent production is not one of the four extremes; it is neither production from self nor production from other. If it is not one of those four, then the refuttion of the four extremes of production does not refute ll possibilities of production becuse there is this possibility conventionlly existent production tht is outside of those four. Mny wonder how this resoning refute inherently existent production if it does not refute ll possibilities of production? Tsong-kh-p responds tht it refutes ll possibilities of inherently existent production. If ultimte vlid cognition found production to be nonexistent, then to sy tht production is conventionlly existent would be contrdictory; nd thus the two types cognition ultimte nd conventionl would contrdict ech other. However, in Tsongkh-p s system, it is sid tht lthough ultimte vlid cognition does not find production, it does not find production to be nonexistent; its not finding production mens tht it finds inherently existent production to be nonexistent. It is by mking this sort of distinction tht it is possible to posit conventionl existence within the rubric of vlid cognition nd yet not denude the rtionl consciousness relizing the ultimte of its force. If you look for something nd come bck reporting tht you did not find it nd clim tht therefore it does not exist, tht depends on whether your serch ws competent whether your mode of serch ws competent for tht prticulr object. If you bring in n incompetent extermintor nd he/she tells you tht he/she did not find cockroches, it does not men tht cockroches do not exist there. It is like contemporry science not finding certin ctegories of things; you cnnot conclude tht it finds them to be nonexistent. Similrly, ultimte vlid cognition is competent with regrd to inherent existence but not with regrd to mere existence. Furthermore, if speker hs no desire to project [tht is, suggest] such, it

151 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 149 is not projected becuse no one sserts tht (1) when [the Questions of Anvtpt, the King of Nāgs,] Sūtr sys, Those which re produced from conditions re not produced, nd (2) when even Bhāvvivek himself sys, The subject, form, does not ultimtely exist becuse of existing, like mgicl illusion, these implicitly project in conventionl terms production nd existence. འད ཡང པ པ ལ འཕ ན འད ད མ ད ན མ འཕ ན ཏ མད ལས གང ཞ ག ན ལས བ ད མ ས ཞ ས དང ལ གས ན རང ཉ ད ཀ ང ག གས ཆ ས ཅན ད ན དམ པར མ ད ད ཡ ད པའ ར མ བཞ ན ཞ ས པ དག ག ས ཐ ད བ དང ཡ ད པར གས ལ འཕ ན པར ཡང མ འད ད པའ ར ར Hopkins: This is the key to Chndrkīrti s ttempt to defend Buddhpālit from the pprent impct of his own words introducing nd concluding his presenttion of Nāgārjun s stnz refuting production from the four extremes: If the speker does not desire to suggest such, it is not suggested. It is not mere words tht provide the mening; thus, s will be discussed in the next book in this series, it will be crucil for Chndrkīrti to contextulize Buddhpālit s remrks if the clim tht he did not intend to indicte tht this resoning proves conventionlly existent production. For, Buddhpālit puts Nāgārjun s stnz itself in the context of demonstrting conventionlly existent production twice, nd it indeed seems he is sying tht Nāgārjun is trying to show this by mens of ultimte resoning, but Chndrkīrti clims tht Buddhpālit ctully did not intend such. This is Chndrkīrti s dmission tht Buddhpālit s words re fulty. The Questions of Anvtpt, the King of Nāgs, Sūtr sys: b Those which re produced from conditions re not produced. klu i rgyl po m dros ps zhus p i mdo, nvtptnāgrājpripṛcchāsūtr; P823, vol. 33; D156, vol. ph. b klu i rgyl po m dros ps zhus p i mdo, nvtptnāgrājpripṛcchāsūtr; P823, vol. 33; D156, vol. ph.

152 150 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle They do not hve n inherent nture of production. Those tht depend on conditions re sid to be empty. Those who know emptiness re wre. The sūtr pssge itself estblishes tht phenomen re not produced, but remember tht Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom mde the cse (bove, 140, nd lso below, 162) tht such would be proving n ffirming negtive : When n ffirming negtion is employed, due to its principlly being n ffirmtion, it is being ffirmed tht phenomen re not produced, whereby nonproduction is indicted, nd hence one seprtes from tenet becuse scripture sys, If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. However, this cittion from the Questions of Anvtpt, the King of Nāgs, Sūtr indictes tht proving Phenomen re not produced, since Buddh himself sys in the bove-cited sūtr pssge, Those which re produced from conditions re not produced. Also, in the next line of tht sūtr Buddh sys, They do not hve n inherent nture of production the sūtr itself specifies the object of negtion with inherent nture of production. It seems tht Bhāvvivek s objection here is tht one would be implicitly proving something positive; hence it would hve to be Phenomen exist s not produced, mening by extension tht they re conventionlly produced. My explntion is bsed on Tsong-kh-p s explntion in his Medium Exposition of Specil Insight of similr sttement by Jñāngrbh: In connection with the explntion of the negtive of production nd so forth s concordnt ultimte, Jñāngrbh s Commentry on the Differentition of the Two Truths sys: Others [Proponents of Mind-Only] hold [tht emptiness is] only rel; thus, lso [in the root text] hs the mening of conjunction. [However] when nlyzed with resoning it is only conventionl. Why? Since the object of negtion [ self of phenomen] does not exist, it is cler tht the negtive does not exist in relity. Thus, he sys tht others Proponents of Mind-Only ssert tht n emptiness which is negtive of the self of phenomen in bse of negtion is estblished in [tht is, s its own] relity, wheres his own system [sserts] tht since the self of phenomen which is the object of negtion does not exist, the negtion which is the negtive of tht is not estblished in [tht is, s its own] relity. Therefore, the explntion tht negtive of ultimtely existent production nd so forth is

153 Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion 151 In the second exmple, Bhāvvivek himself sys tht things do not ultimtely exist becuse of existing. Even though once something is existent nd is not ultimtely existent, then, perforce, it must be conventionlly existent, but Bhāvvivek does not hold tht he is proving conventionl existence. Also, Ge-lug-p scholrs emphsize tht lthough emptiness nd dependent-rising re comptible in tht the understnding of the one helps the understnding of the other, yet if you estblish tht something lcks inherent existence, you re not estblishing tht it conventionlly exists, even though it does conventionlly exist. The fct tht they so strongly stress tht the proof does not imply tht things conventionlly exist shows wht powerful plce medittive equipoise tht is, just perceiving emptiness hs in the system becuse if the proof were implying something such s conventionl existence in plce of negting inherent existence, the medittor would hve to move on to pying ttention to conventionl existence nd could not just sty in medittive equipoise perceiving mere bsence. You immeditely would hve to pss beyond this experience of emptiness, mere negtive of true existence, which might not lst more thn moment. You would hve moment of perceiving the bsence of inherent existence nd then would be reflecting on conventionlly existent phenomenon. Hence, the philosophicl presenttion is structured round the epistemologicl nd medittionl fct tht the content of medittive equipoise does not imply nything. It seems to me tht it is not the resoning tht is the ground in the sense of totlly driving the rgument bout the content of medittive equipoise, but n experience of medittive equipoise itself. If things did exist inherently, medittive equipoise would hve to find them, but since it is known tht it does not find them, then we know tht things do not inherently exist. This pproch puts the perceptul sitution, the medittive sitution, in front of or prllel to the resoning. When reding this type of Tibetn literture on wisdom, one keeps coming up ginst the fct tht medittive equipoise is stte in which nothing ppers except emptiness. Since this is n experience confirmed over the ges, this position is held conventionl mens tht it exists conventionlly; it does not indicte tht such is conventionlity.

154 152 Buddhpālit s Refuttion & Bhāvvivek s Criticism: Gret Exposition of Middle t ll costs, just s those who hve experienced medittive equipoise s fused in cler light qulified by emptiness hold tht position t ll costs. Wht is being investigted here is certin Indin evidence for the former position. It needs to be remembered tht it lso suffuses the ltter position.

155 PART THREE: THE SOURCE TEXTS Trnsltions of those portions of three texts in chronologicl order relevnt to the controversy round the refuttion of production from self in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle: 1. Buddhpālit s commentry, lso including his refuttions of production from other, both, nd neither to provide the context of his concluding sttement 2. Bhāvvivek s commentry 3. Avlokitvrt s explntion of Bhāvvivek s commentry.

156

157 1. Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self, Other, Both, nd Neither Buddhpālit Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle ད མ བའ འག ལ པ ལ ཏ Here [someone] sys: At this point show how this clled production is only convention! Answer: Tht is shown first [in the first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle]: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ/ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn// bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min// gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min// dngos po gng dg gng n yng // skye b nm yng yod m yin// འད ར ས པ ར ཞ ག ཇ ར བར བ ད པ ཐ ད ཙམ ཡ ན པ ད ར རབ ན ཅ ག བཤད པ ད དང པ ར བ ན པར འ བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན Three editions were used: Golden Reprint, vol. 106, ; P5242, vol. 95, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol.. See lso the nnotted trnsltion nd edited Tibetn text in the Ph.D. thesis by Akir Sito, A Study of the Buddhpālitmūlmdhymk-vṛtti, Austrlin Ntionl University, 1984.

158 156 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of the Four Extremes Concerning this, if something is produced, consider whether the production of tht thing is from self, from other, from both self nd other, or cuselessly. Upon exmintion, it is not logiclly fesible in ll wys. འད ལ གལ ཏ དང ས པ འགའ ཞ ག བར ར ན དང ས པ ད འ བ ད བདག ལས སམ གཞན ལས སམ བདག དང གཞན གཉ ས ལས སམ མ ད པ ལས འ ར ག ང ན བ གས ནས མ པ ཐམས ཅད ལས མ འཐད ད How? From self (bdg ls, svtḥ) is the equivlent of sying from [its own] entity (bdg nyid ls). About tht, respectively, things re not produced from self becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. It is thus: the production-gin This nd the next two sentences re cited in Chndrkīrti s Cler Words (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.1): n svt utpdynte bhāvāḥ/ tdutpādviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc/ n hi svātmnā vidymānānāṃ pdārthānāṃ punrutpāde pryojnmsti/ th snnpi jāyet/ n kdā cinn jāyet// The Tibetn trnsltion of Chndrkīrti s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) is: dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med de de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng / shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir ro // dngos po bdg gi bdg nyid yod p rnms l ni yng skye b l dgos p med do// ci ste yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur ro/ The Tibetn trnsltion of Buddhpālit s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.5) reds: dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls* skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/ di ltr dngos po bdg gi bdg nyid yod p rnms l yng skye b l dgos p med do// gl te yod kyng skye n nm yng mi skye br mi gyur bs// In the ltter edition, svtḥ is trnslted into Tibetn s bdg gi bdg nyid ls insted of bdg ls (s would be expected) most likely becuse Buddhpālit in the previous sentence glosses bdg ls (svtḥ) s bdg nyid ls nd in the next sentence uses bdg gi bdg nyid (svātmnā). The Snskrit of the second fllcy, tiprsṅgdoṣācc ( nd becuse of the fult of gret bsurdity ) is rendered in the Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s Cler Words (P5260, vol. 98, 4.4.3; Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.2) s dng shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir ( nd becuse it would be very bsurd ). The Tibetn of Buddhpālit s text (P5242, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 106, 493.6; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96), however, differs due, most likely, to providing mening trnsltion spelling out the ctul bsurdity, dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ( nd becuse production would be

159 Buddhpālit s Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle 157 (yng skye b, punrutpād) of things lredy existing in their own entities is purposeless. If, though existent, they re produced, they would never not be produced. Hence, tht lso is not ccepted. Therefore, respectively, things re not produced from self. ཇ ར ཞ ན བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ད ལ ར ཞ ག དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར འད ར དང ས པ བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ མས ལ ཡང བ དག ས པ མ ད ད གལ ཏ ཡ ད ཀ ང ཡང ན ནམ ཡང མ བར མ འ ར བས ད ཡང མ འད ད ད ད འ ར ར ཞ ག དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད They lso re not produced from other. Why? For it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything would be produced from everything. They lso re not produced from both self nd other becuse [such] would entil the fllcies of both [production from self nd production from other]. They lso re not produced cuselessly becuse it would [bsurdly] follow tht everything lwys would be produced from everything nd becuse there would be the fllcy tht ll endevor would be just senseless. Becuse the production of things is thus in ll wys not logiclly fesible, there is no production; therefore, this clled production is only convention. endless ). Since the ltter is more to the point nd is lso the reding in the Tibetn of Bhāvvivek s text (P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.6) nd Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek (P5259, vol. 96, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 229.2, which for thug reds thugs; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 145.3) I hve trnslted it this wy throughout. It is unsuitble to trnslte this fllcy s infinite regress since the reference is not to the pst but to the future, tht is to sy, n object would be produced over nd over gin. Also, ech cuse hs cuse, thereby requiring n infinite regress, which is not fllcy since there is infinite time for string of infinite cuses.

160 158 Buddhpālit s Refuttion of the Four Extremes གཞན ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ཅ འ ར ཞ ན ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར བདག དང གཞན གཉ ས ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད གཉ གའ ན ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར ར མ ད པ ལས ཀ ང བ མ ད ད ག ཐམས ཅད ལས ཐམས ཅད བར ཐལ བར འ ར བའ ར དང མ པ ཐམས ཅད ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ན འ ར བའ ར ར ད ར གང ག ར དང ས པ བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད མ འཐད པས ད འ ར བ མ ད པས བར བ ད པ ན ཐ ད ཙམ ཡ ན ན

161 2. Bhāvvivek s Criticism of Buddhpālit s Refuttion of Production from Self Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom ཤ ས རབ ན མ ད ཆ ར འག ལ པ The mster [Nāgārjun], hving mnifestly prised the Suprmundne Victor due to teching just tht dependent-rising hving the unique ttributes of no production nd so forth, thought tht fter teching no production, the ttributes of no cesstion nd so forth would esily be tught; thereupon he took up the tsk of initilly teching no production, bringing to the fore conceptions bout production imputed by others. When the sttements from proponents of production: some sying, Things re produced from self, others sying, Things re produced from other, some sying, Things re produced from both, nd others sying, Things re produced cuselessly, re nlyzed with resoning nd scripture, production does not withstnd logicl fesibility in ny wy. Hving scertined this in himself, through the force of this [Nāgārjun] sid: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ/ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn// bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min/ gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min/ dngos po gng dg gng n yng/ skye b nm yng yod m yin// This is generl [sttement of] theses. Four editions were used: Golden reprint, vol. 107, 64b.1-65b.6/ ; sde dge, vol. 97, 48b.1-49b.1; P5253, vol. 95, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96,

162 160 Bhāvvivek s Criticism བ དཔ ན ག ས ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང བ བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཁ ད པར དང ན པ ད ཁ ན ན པར མཛད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ མང ན པར བ ད ནས བ མ ད པ བ ན ནས འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཁ ད པར བ ན བར དག ངས པ ན བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ད ནས གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བ མ པར ག པ མང ན མ མཛད ད འད ར བར བ དག ལས ཁ ཅ ག ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས འ ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན གཞན ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར ཁ ཅ ག ན གཉ ས ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན མ ད པ ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དག ར གས པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ན བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར རང ལ ང ས པའ དབང ག ས བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས བ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ག ངས ཏ འད ན དམ བཅས པའ བཀ ད པ ཡ ན ན Concerning tht, respectively, wht is not from self? Production never exists nd so forth, which is to be pplied to ech. From self (bdg ls) is synonymous with from [its own] entity (bdg nyid ls).

163 Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom 161 The intended mening of the words is not estblished merely by hving mde thesis. b Hence, the property of the position c is held to be just existence (yod p nyid, vidymān) s follows: becuse from self is designted d to n existent entity. An exmple is by virtue of the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof [tht is to sy, the probns] e becuse it is n exmple of subject tht is endowed with renowned predicte of the proposition nd ttribute tht is the mens of proof. ད ལ ར ཞ ག བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ཅ ཞ ག ཅ ན ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ར ར དང ར བར འ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག དམ བཅས པ ཙམ ག ས བསམས པའ ཚ ག ག ད ན མ འ བ པས འད ར གས ཀ ཆ ས ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པར ག ང འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ད གདགས པའ ར ར དཔ ན བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཀ དབང ག ས ཏ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ག དཔ ཡ ན པའ ར ར This negtion, not from self (bdg ls m yin, n svtḥ), is to be viewed s mening nonffirming negtion becuse of principlly being In the Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 130.6) red mi grub ps/ de i phyir for mi grub p/ dir phyr in ccordnce with the Peking of Avlokitvrt (vol. 96, ). b Nāgārjun hs provided only thesis tht things re not produced from self; so Bhāvvivek now begins to describe the syllogism through which the thesis of no production from self will be proven. Thus, he speks bout the reson, the exmple. nd the sttus of the thesis, fter which he presents his syllogism. c phyogs kyi chos, pkṣdhrm; this is the reson (property or sign) tht is present in the subject of syllogism. d snyd gdgs p or th snyd gdgs p. e bsgrub pr by b dng sgrub p i chos; Avlokitvrt (see below, 191), seeing chos s distributed to both, tkes this s predicte of the proposition nd ttribute tht is the mens of proof.

164 162 Bhāvvivek s Criticism negtion nd becuse of intending to estblish nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions. When n ffirming negtion is employed, due to its principlly being n ffirmtion, it is being ffirmed tht phenomen re not produced, whereby nonproduction is indicted, nd hence one would seprte from tenet becuse scripture sys, If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. Here it is to be delimited tht Things re only not produced from self. If it is delimited otherwise, then it would be determined s, [Things] re not produced from only self. Well, wht then? They re produced from other, nd likewise it would be determined s, [Things] re not produced from only self. Well, wht then? They re produced from self nd other. Hence, those lso re not sserted becuse of seprting from tenet. བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བའ དགག པ འད ན མ ད པར དགག པའ ད ན བར དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར དང འད ར གས པ མ ས པའ བ དགག པས མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས འ ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ འ བ པར དག ངས པའ ར ར མ ཡ ན པ དགག པ ཡ ངས བ ང ན ན ད བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ པས བ མ ད པ ན པའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བར འ ར ཏ ང ལས ག གས ཀ བ མ ད པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འ ང བའ ར ར འད ར དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང བར འ གཞན ང ས པར ག ང ན བདག ཁ ན ལས བ མ ད ད འ ན ཅ ཞ ན བདག དང གཞན ལས འ ཞ ས བར ང ས པར འ ར བས ད ཡང མ བཞ ད ད མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བའ ར ར dgongs p.

165 Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom 163 Here those serving s the words of syllogism re: Ultimtely the internl sense-spheres [eye sense, er sense, nd so forth] re not produced from self becuse of existing, like intelligence. b n prmārtht ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt citnyvd// c don dm pr nng gi skye mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir shes p yod p nyid bzhin no// འད ར ར བའ ཚ ག འ ར བ ན ད ན དམ པར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན If it is objected: The reson, existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv) hs not been shown to be bsent from the dissimilr clss; hence, this is not veritble reson. གལ ཏ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ མ བ ན པས གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ན Answer: Becuse [the dissimilr clss] is just nonexistent, bsence from tht does not exist, due to which there is no fllcy in this or nything else. The Tibetn reds re delimited s not being produced from self (bdg ls skye b med pr nges te), but delimited is not represented in the Snskrit. It perhps hs been dded in the Tibetn in ccordnce with Bhāvvivek s erlier (bove, 162) usge of the term nd Avlokitvrt s discussion of it (below, 209). Also, the reson could be trnslted s becuse of presently existing since vidymān is the present middle prticle; however, lter Chndrkīrti (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 33.4) cites the reson s sttvād, suggesting tht the prticulr form mkes little difference, this perhps being why it is trnslted into Tibetn merely s yod p i phyir insted of d lt br yod p i phyir. b The Tibetn of the exmple shes p yod p nyid bzhin is trnsltion of the Snskrit citny nd is not n extension of the exmple to include the reson ( existing ). The reference of intelligence is, for Sāṃkhy, to the puruṣ the person, tht is to sy, pure consciousness, the spirit. According to Avlokitvrt (230), for Bhāvvivek it is conventionlly consciousness (rnm pr shes p nyid). c The Snskrit is from L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā,

166 164 Bhāvvivek s Criticism མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ད ལ ག པ མ ད པས འད དང ཐམས ཅད ལ ཉ ས པ མ ད ད Here from mong the Sāṃkhys certin ones object: Wht is the mening of this thesis? Does from self [men] from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cuse? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you hve the fllcy of] proving wht is lredy estblished. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cuse, then [your resoning] is n object of contrdiction becuse [ccording to us Sāṃkhys] ll tht hve production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] cuses. འད ར ག ངས ཅན དག ལས ཁ ཅ ག ར ག པར ད ད དམ བཅས པ འད འ ད ན གང ཡ ན ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ད ས ཅ ར འ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན བ པ བ བ བ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན ད ན འགལ བ ཉ ད ད བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བའ ར ར ཞ ན Answer: Those re not good becuse mere production from self is refuted. b For, even if it is from the entity of cuse, production even from wht is self nd wht is other is eliminted. Becuse intelligence is held to be endowed with chrcter of potentil, there lso is no fllcy. The Snskrit of this objection, s Chndrkīrti repets it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.4), is: ko ym prtijñārthḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmkāt svt ut kārṇātmkāditi/ kiṃ cātḥ/ kāryātmkāccet siddhsādhnṃ/ kārṇātmkācced viruddhārthtā/ kārṇātmnā vidymānsyiv srvsyotpttimt utpādāditi// b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 132.2) for rgyu i bdg nyid ls n yng bdg nyid ls n yng dg dng gzhn red rgyu i bdg nyid ls n yng bdg dng gzhn in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 95, ) nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.4.

167 Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom 165 ད ན བཟང པ མ ཡ ན ཏ བདག ལས བ ཙམ དགག པའ ར ར འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ཡང བདག དང གཞན ར པ ལས ཀ ང བས ལ བའ ར ར ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ཡ ངས ག ང བའ ར ཡང ཉ ས པ མ ད ད About tht, nother [nmely, Buddhpālit] mkes the explntion, Things re not produced from self becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. འད ལས གཞན ན དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར བཤད པར ད ད Tht is not resonble b (1) becuse [Buddhpālit] does not express The Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 65b.3), the Peking (P5253, vol. 95, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 96, 97.5) hve di ls gzhn ( One other thn this ) wheres Avlokitvrt (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 228.6, Peking, vol. 96, , nd Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 145.3) hs di l gzhn ( About this, nother ), s does Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle (262.6). I prefer the reding in Avlokitvrt since he comments on di l nd gzhn s individul items; see 263. b The Snskrit of this prgrph, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.4), is: tdyuktṃ/ hetudṛṣtāntānbhidhānāt/ proktdoṣāprihārācc/ prsṅgvākytvācc prkṛtārthvipryyeṇ viprītrthsādhytddhrmvyktu prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt/ jnmnirodhāceti kṛtāntvirodhḥ syāt// The Tibetn s it ppers in Bhāvvivek s text (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.4) is: de ni rigs p m yin te/gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir dng / gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b i phyir ro// glgs yod p i tshig yin p i phyir te/ skbs kyi don ls bzlog ps sgrub pr by b dng /de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro//

168 166 Bhāvvivek s Criticism reson [cpble of proving tht there is no production from self] s well s n exmple, nd (2) becuse [the resoning s Buddhpālit sttes it] does not void the fllcies dduced by nother [tht is, the fllcies tht Sāṃkhy would be expected to dduce], nd (3) becuse [Buddhpālit s] words fford n opportunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system] since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] things re produced from other nd production hs effects nd production hs n end due to which [Buddhpālit] would contrdict tenets [of the Middle Wy School]. A slightly different Tibetn trnsltion is found in Avlokitvrt s commentry on Bhāvvivek (P5259, vol. 96, ): de ni rigs p m yin te/gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir dng / gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b dng // glgs yod p i tshig yng yin p i phyir te/ skbs kyi don ls bzlog ps sgrub pr by b dng /de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro// See lso the next two footnotes. The Snskrit, s Chndrkīrti cites it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 15.1), rther thn presenting this s three points s the Tibetn in Bhāvvivek s text does (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir: P5253, vol. 95, ; Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 132.5; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 96, 97.7, s well s in Avlokitvrt s commentry, Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 234.2; Peking P5259, ; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 148,3), refrmes Buddhpālit s syllogism in its opposite form: prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti (Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end.) The Tibetn of Chndrkīrti s text, nevertheless, is s bove: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng /skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir (Golden Reprint, vol. 112, 13.4; Peking ; nd Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, ; Tibetn Publishing House 1968 edition, 10.19). I would render the Snskrit into Tibetn, however, s: dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/ Becuse of the unnimity of the Tibetn versions on this point (except for mine) nd becuse Tsong-kh-p nd Jm-yng-shy-p spek to these versions, I use their csting of the mening s three points but cite the Snskrit version throughout.

169 Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom 167 ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ པའ ར དང ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཏ བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས བ བ པར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར

170

171 3. Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Explntory Commentry on (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom ཤ ས རབ ན མ ད ཆ ར འག ལ པ [Bhāvvivek] utters: The mster [Nāgārjun], hving mnifestly prised the Suprmundne Victor due to teching just tht dependent-rising hving the unique ttributes of no production nd so forth, b thought tht fter teching no production, the ttributes of no cesstion nd so forth would esily be tught; thereupon he took up the tsk of initilly teching no production, bringing to the fore conceptions bout production imputed by others. When the sttements from proponents of production: some sying, Things re produced from self, others sying, Things re produced from other, some sying, Things re produced from both, nd others sying, Things re produced cuselessly, re nlyzed with resoning nd scripture, production does not withstnd logicl fesibility in ny wy. Hving scertined this in himself, through the force of this [Nāgārjun] sid: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. བ དཔ ན ག ས ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང བ བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཁ ད པར དང ན པ ད ཁ ན Three editions were used: Golden reprint, vol. 109, 92b / ; sde dge, / 59b ; P5259, vol. 96, b Avlokitvrt (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 92b.2/184.2) merely dds nother nd so forth; I hve filled in the reminder of the sttement.

172 170 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ན པར མཛད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ མང ན པར བ ད ནས བ མ ད པ བ ན པས འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཁ ད པར བ ན པ བར དག ངས ནས བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ས ནས གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ མང ན མ མཛད ད འད ར བར བ དག ལས ཁ ཅ ག ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས འ ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན གཞན ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར ཁ ཅ ག ན གཉ ག ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན མ ད པ ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དག ར ག b པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ན བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར རང ལ ང ས པ ད འ དབང ག ས བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ c ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན d ཞ ས བ ག ངས ཏ e The Peking edition of Bhāvvivek s text (vol. 95, ) nd the Golden Reprint of Bhāvvivek s text (vol. 107, 130.2) red dgongs p n. b Or rigs. c The Peking edition of Bhāvvivek s text (vol. 95, ) nd the Golden Reprint of Bhāvvivek s text (vol. 107, 130.4) red skyes p, which reflects the Snskrit utpnnā bhāvāḥ. The stnz, therefore, could lso be rendered s: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny produced things Ever existent nywhere. d The Snskrit, s cited erlier: n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ/ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn//. e The Tibetn is presented in ccordnce with Avlokitvrt s cittion (strting t vol. 109, 184.1) except where noted.

173 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 171 [ད འ ར ] བ དཔ ན ག ས ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང བ བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཁ ད པར དང ན པ ད ཁ ན ན པར མཛད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ མང ན པར བ ད ནས [ བ མ ད པ བ ན པས འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཁ ད པར བ ན པ བར དག ངས ནས བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ས ནས གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ མང ན མ མཛད ད འད ར བར བ དག ལས ཁ ཅ ག ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས འ ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན གཞན ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར ཁ ཅ ག ན གཉ ག ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན མ ད པ ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དག ར ག པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ན བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར རང ལ ང ས པ ད འ དབང ག ས བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང བ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ]ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ས ཏ This indictes the beginning of the explntion of the text itself of [Nāgārjun s] Tretise. Moreover, it is to be put together this wy: Hving in tht wy mnifestly prised the Suprmundne Victor, the mster [Nāgārjun], thinking to tech others the suchness of ll phenomen in ccordnce with how he comprehended it, tkes up the tsk of initilly teching no production, nd he, bringing to the fore conceptions bout production imputed by others, composes the first chpter Anlyzing Conditions from the viewpoint of teching tht production does not exist through the force of his scertinment tht when the sttements tht things re produced from self, other, both, nd cuselessly re nlyzed with resoning nd scripture, production does not withstnd logicl fesibility in ll wys. འད དག ག ས ན བ ན བཅ ས ཀ ག ང ཉ ད བཤད པར མ པའ མག འ ན པ ན ཏ ད ཡང བ དཔ ན ག ས ད ར བཅ མ ན འདས ལ མང ན པར བ ད ནས ཉ ད ཀ ས ཆ ས

174 172 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད ཁ ན ཇ ར གས ད པ ད བཞ ན གཞན ལ བ ན པར དག ངས པ ན བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ད ནས གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ མང ན མ མཛད ད དང ས པ མས བདག དང གཞན དང གཉ ས ཀ དང མ ད པ ལས འ ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དག ར གས པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ན བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར རང ལ ང ས པའ དབང ག ས བ མ ད པར བ ན པའ ནས ན བ ག པའ རབ ད པ དང པ འ བས བ མ པ མཛད ད ཞ ས བར ར ར In [Bhāvvivek s sttement]: the mster (slob dpon gyis): the Superior Nāgārjun. ད ལ བ དཔ ན ག ས ཞ ས བ ན འཕགས པ བ ཀ ས ས hving mnifestly prised the Suprmundne Victor due to teching just tht dependent-rising hving the unique ttributes of no production nd so forth (rten cing brel pr byung b skye b med p l sogs p thun mong m yin p i khyd pr dng ldn p de kho n ston pr mdzd p nyid kyis bcom ldn ds l mngon pr bstod ns): hving mnifestly prised the Suprmundne Victor due to teching in the Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtrs] just the bove-indicted terms nd menings of the substrtum, dependent-rising, which hs the unique ttributes of no production, no cesstion, nd so forth, sying: Homge to the perfect Buddh, The best of propounders, Who tught tht wht dependently rises Tht is to sy, erlier in connection with the commentry on Nāgārjun s expression of worship but not included here.

175 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 173 Hs no cesstion, no production, No nnihiltion, no permnence, No coming, no going, No difference, no smeness, Is free from prolifertions, nd t pece. ན ཅ ང འ ལ བར འ ང བའ བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པའ ཁ ད པར དང ན པ ད ཁ ན ན པར མཛད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ མང ན པར བ ད ནས ཞ ས བ ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལས འ ང བ ཁ ད པར ག གཞ ན ཅ ང འ ལ བར འ ང བ ཁ ད པར བ མ ད པ དང འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ན མ ང མ ཡ ན པ དང ན པ ར ཇ ད བ ན པའ དང ད ན ད ཁ ན ན པར མཛད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ གང ག ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང འགག པ མ ད པ མ ད པ ཆད པ མ ད པ ག མ ད པ འ ང བ མ ད པ འག མ ད པ ཐ དད ད ན མ ན ད ན གཅ ག མ ན ས པ ཉ ར ཞ ཞ བ ན པ གས པའ སངས ས མས ཀ དམ པ ད ལ ག འཚལ ལ ཞ ས མང ན པར བ ད ནས ས thought tht fter teching no production, the ttributes of no cesstion nd so forth would esily be tught; (skye b med p bstn ps gg p med p l sogs p khyd pr bstn p sl br dgongs ns): The mster, pondering, I will lso tech to sentient beings the suchness of ll phenomen in ccordnce with how I comprehended it, thought tht through initilly teching here no production from the body of the tretise, which is presented by wy of eight menings of In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 185.5) red brgyd po dg gis for brgyd po dg gi in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (60.3).

176 174 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism terms: no cesstion, no production, no nnihiltion, no permnence, no coming, no going, no difference, nd no smeness the other ttributes of no cesstion nd so forth would esily be tught. བ མ ད པ བ ན པས འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཁ ད པར བ ན བར དག ངས པ ན ཞ ས བ ན བ དཔ ན ག ས ངས ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད ཁ ན ཇ ར གས པ ད ཁ ན བཞ ན ས མས ཅན མས ལ ཡང བ ན པར འ མ ནས འགག པ མ ད པ མ ད པ ཆད པ མ ད པ ག མ ད པ འ ང བ མ ད པ འག མ ད པ ཐ དད ད ན མ ན ད ན གཅ ག མ ན ཞ ས བ ཚ ག ག ད ན བ ད པ དག ག ས བ ན བཅ ས ཀ ས མ པར གཞག པར མཛད པ ད ལས འད ར བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པས འགག པ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཁ བ པར གཞན བ ན བར དག ངས ནས ས thereupon he took up the tsk of initilly teching no production (skye b med p dng por bstn pr bzhes ns): Indeed, erlier on the occsion of teching the body of the tretise he plced the mening of the term no cesstion first, but if here on the occsion of teching those, he tught no production first, it would be esier to tech no cesstion, no nnihiltion, no permnence, no coming, no going, no difference, nd no smeness; therefore, he took up the tsk of initilly teching no production. བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ད ནས ཞ ས བ ན འད ད ཅ ས བ ན ཏ འད ར བ ན བཅ ས ཀ ས མ པར གཞག པ ར བ ན པའ བས འགག པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བའ ཚ ག ག ད ན དང པ ར མ པར གཞག མ ད ཀ འད ར ད

177 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 175 དག བ ན པའ བས བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན ན འགག པ མ ད པ དང ཆད པ མ ད པ དང ག པ མ ད པ དང འ ང བ མ ད པ དང འག བ མ ད པ དང ད ན ཐ དད པ མ ཡ ན པ དང ད ན གཅ ག པ མ ཡ ན པ དག བ ན བས ད འ ར བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ད ནས ས About this others object: Erlier when [you, Bhāvvivek,] nswered sttement [chllenging the order of the eight no s in the expression of worship in which cesstion is first, followed by production]: It would hve been resonble [for Nāgārjun] to refute cesstion fter production becuse [production] is erlier [thn cesstion], just s [he refutes] nnihiltion [fter production], you [Bhāvvivek] sid, b Becuse cyclic existence hs no beginning, production nd cesstion do not hve definite order; hence, there is no fllcy in [Nāgārjun s] teching these [with the order of] no cesstion, no production. If in tht cse it ws resonble ccording to tht order [for Nāgārjun] to tech no cesstion first, why does he wnt [here] to tech no production first? འད ར གཞན དག ན ར ར ཡང བའ འ ག འགག པ དགག པར ར གས ཏ ད ན འག བ ཅན ཡ ན པའ ར ཆད པ བཞ ན ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ཚ ཁ ད ན ར Answer: Erlier [when discussing the order of the eight terms in Nāgārjun s expression of worship, Bhāvvivek] explined tht there is no fult in [Nāgārjun s] teching no cesstion, no production becuse cyclic existence hs no beginning nd becuse cesstion does not depend on the stge of production nd becuse the topics This is quoted from Bhāvvivek s Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.2). b This prphrses Bhāvvivek s response (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.3).

178 176 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism re being exmined, but here in teching the mening of those the cuse of ll of them tht is to sy, the cuse of cesstion nd so forth is production since: if something hs been produced, it will cese, but if it is not produced, it will not cese; the definition of the cutting of the continuum of something tht hs been produced is nnihiltion, but if it is not produced, it will not be nnihilted; due to the nondestruction of something tht hs been produced, it is permnent, but if it is not produced, it will not become permnent; due to the coming of something produced from nother plce, it comes, b but if it is not produced, it does not come; due to the going of something produced to nother plce, it goes, but if it is not produced, it does not go; something produced is different chrcter, but if it is not produced, it does not become different object; becuse something produced hs the sme chrcter, it is the sme object, but if it is not produced, it will not become the sme object; nd hence: becuse when the cuse is stopped, its effects lso do not rise, nd becuse it being the cse tht the world is intensely ttched mostly to production nd mnifestly dheres to production, this tretise is imed t bndoning intense ttchment nd mnifest dherence, nd becuse when intense ttchment nd mnifest dherence hve been bndoned, nirvāṇ is ttined, here the mster [Nāgārjun] took up the tsk of initilly teching no production. don brtg p yin p i phyir, which literlly is menings re being exmined but likely mens the topics re being listed or the topics re being exmined in contrst to teching the mening of those just below. These ltter two resons quote Bhāvvivek (Golden Reprint, vol. 107, 128.4). b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) red yin for m yin in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (60b.2).

179 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 177 འཁ ར བ ལ ཐ གས མ མ ད པའ ར བ དང འགག པ ལ ག ར མས ང ས པ མ ད པའ ར འགག པ མ ད པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ན པ ལ ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས ཟ ར ན འད ར ཡང ད འ ག ར མས བཞ ན འགག པ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པའ ར གས ན ཅ འ ར བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར འད ད ཅ ན ད འ ལན འད ད ཅ ས བ ད པར ར འགག པ མ ད པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ན པ ལ ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བཤད པ ན འཁ ར བ ལ ཐ ག མ མ ད པའ ར དང འགག པ ན བའ ར མ པ ལ མ ས པའ ར དང ད ན བ ག པ ཡ ན པའ ར ད ད བཤད པ ཡ ན ག འད ར ད དག ག ད ན བ ན པ ལ ན ས ན འགག པར འ ར ག མ ས ན འགག པར མ འ ར བ དང བ ན ཆད པའ མཚན ཉ ད ན ཆད པ ཡ ན ག མ ས ན ཆད པར མ འ ར བ དང ས པ མ ཞ ག པས ག པ ཡ ན ག མ ས ན ག པར མ འ ར བ དང ས པ ལ གཞན ནས འ ང བས འ ང བ ཡ ན ག མ ས པ ན འ ང བར མ འ ར བ དང ས པ ལ གཞན འག བས འག བ ཡ ན ག མ ས ན འག བར མ འ ར བ དང ས པ མཚན ཉ ད ཐ དད པས ད ན ཐ དད པ ཡ ན ག མ ས ན ད ན ཐ དད པར མ འ ར བ དང ས པ མཚན ཉ ད གཅ ག པས ད ན གཅ ག པ ཡ ན ག མ ས ན ད ན གཅ ག པར མ འ ར བས ད འ ར འགག པ ལ ས གས པ ཐམས ཅད ཀ ན བ ཡ ན པའ ར བཀག ན ད འ འ ས མས ཀ ང མ འ ང བའ ར དང འཇ ག ན

180 178 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཡང ཕལ ཆ ར བ ལ ཤ ན ག པར ཆགས པ དང བ ལ མང ན པར ཞ ན པ ཡ ན ན བ ན བཅ ས འད ན ག པར ཆགས པ དང མང ན པར ཞ ན པ ང བའ ར གས པ ཡ ན པའ ར དང ག པར ཆགས པ དང མང ན པར ཞ ན པ ངས ན ངན ལས འདས པ ཐ བ པར འ ར བའ ར འད ར བ དཔ ན བ མ ད པ དང པ ར བ ན པར བཞ ད ད bringing to the fore conceptions bout production imputed by others. (gzhn gyis yongs su brtgs p i skye br rnm pr rtog p mngon sum du mdzd de): In tht: imputed by others (gzhn gyis yongs su brtgs p i): Since thoughts of ultimte production do not exist in his mind, he brings to the fore those conceptions bout production in which others impute nd conceive tht production ultimtely exists. ད འ ར གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ མང ན མ མཛད ད ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ད ལ གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ ཞ ས བ ན ད ན དམ པར ན ཉ ད ཀ ལ བ མ པར ག པའ དག ངས པ ཉ ད མ མངའ བས འད ར གཞན དག ག ས ད ན དམ པར བ ཡ ད པར ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ གང དག ཡ ན པ ད དག མང ན མ མཛད ད ཞ ས བར ར ར conceptions bout production (skye br rnm pr rtog p): those conceptions tht impute nd conceive of production re clled conceptions bout production, which is synonymous with spects of production (skye b i rnm p).

181 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 179 བར མ པར ག པར ཞ ས བ ན མ པར ག པ གང དག ག ས བར མ པར བ གས ཤ ང ག ང བ གང དག ཡ ན པ ད དག ན བར མ པར ག པ ཞ ས བའ མ པ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག bringing to the fore (mngon sum du mdzd de): plcing in front of the mind, this being synonymous with observes (dmigs pr mdzd). Wht re those conceptions bout production? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: མང ན མ མཛད ད ཞ ས བ ན ས མས ཀ མ ན བཞག པ མཛད པ དམ གས པར མཛད ད ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག བར མ པར ག པ ད དག ཀ ང གང ཞ ན ད འ ར འད ར བར བ དག ལས When the sttements from proponents of production: some sying, Things re produced from self, others sying, Things re produced from other, some sying, Things re produced from both, nd others sying, Things re produced cuselessly, ( di ltr skye br smr b dg ls/ kh cig ni dngos po rnms bdg ls skye o zhes zer/ gzhn dg ni gzhn ls so zhes zer/ kh cig ni gnyi g ls so zhes zer/ gzhn dg ni rgyu med p ls so zhes zer b dg) [Nāgārjun] brings to the fore those conceptions bout production. ཁ ཅ ག ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས འ ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན གཞན ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར ཁ ཅ ག ན གཉ ག ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར གཞན དག ན མ ད པ ལས ས ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དག ཅ ས བ ས ས བར མ པར ག པ ད དག མང ན མ མཛད ད འ

182 180 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism re nlyzed with resoning nd scripture (rig [or rigs] p dng lung dg gis brtgs p n): Hving brought to the fore those conceptions bout production, he nlyzes them with resoning nd scripture. resoning (rig [or rigs] p): resons nd exmple tht re renowned in the world nd in scripture. scripture (lung): ll sūtrs such s the Perfection of Wisdom nd so forth, those in which the Suprmundne Victor sys: Subhūti, this form is imputed s phenomenon; tht imputed s phenomenon hs no production, lso no cesstion; it is exhusted s only conventionlly verblized by nme nd terminology. nd so forth. Those scriptures re stted s being the One- Gone-Thus s becuse others do not hve the chrcter of scripture, s it is sid for instnce: Scriptures re believble words; Those in which defects re extinct re to be known s scriptures. Those who hve extinguished defects do not utter Flse words becuse of being without the cuse. Hence, he nlyzes with those resonings nd scriptures. ར གས པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ན ཞ ས བ ན བར མ པར ག པ ད དག མང ན མ མཛད ད ར གས པ དང ང དག ག ས བ གས པ ནའ ད ལ ར གས པ ཞ ས བ ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ འཇ ག ན དང ང ལ ག གས པ དག ག ང ཞ ས བ ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ས གས པའ མད མཐའ དག ད ལས ཀ ང བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས རབ འ ར ག གས ཞ ས བ ད ན ཆ ས བཏགས པ ཙམ ཆ ས བཏགས པ ད ལ བ ཡང མ ད འགག པ ཡང མ ད ད āgm.

183 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 181 མ ང དང བ ཙམ ག ཐ ད བ ད པ འབའ ཞ ག ཟད ད ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ཇ ད ག ངས པ དག ཡ ན ན ང ད ཡང ད བཞ ན གཤ གས པའ ཡ ན པར བ ད པར འ གཞན དག ལ ན ང ག མཚན ཉ ད མ ད ད ཇ ད ང ན ཡ ད ཆ ས ཚ ག ཡ ན ཏ ཉ ས ཟད ང ཤ ས པར ཉ ས པ ཟད པས བ ན ག ཚ ག བར མ འ ར མ ད ར ཞ ས བཤད པ ད ད འ ར ར གས པ དང ང ད དག ག ས བ གས པ ནའ production does not withstnd logicl fesibility in ny wy. (skye b rnm p thms cd du thd p mi bzod pr): production (skye b): this is limited to conceptions of production imputed by others. in ny wy (rnm p thms cd du): in ll the spects of the four poles from self, from other, from both, nd cuselessly. does not withstnd logicl fesibility ( thd p mi bzod pr): the resons for the logicl fesibility of production do not stnd s existing. བ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར ཞ ས བ ལ བ ཞ ས བ ན གཞན ག ས ཡ ངས བ གས པའ བར མ པར ག པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ས ས མ པ ཐམས ཅད ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས དང གཞན ལས དང གཉ ག ལས དང མ ད པ ལས ཞ ས བ བཞ འ མ པ ཐམས ཅད འ འཐད པ མ བཟ ད པར ཞ ས བ ན བ འཐད པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པར མ བཟ ད པར ར Hving scertined this in himself, (rng l nges p): When the mster [Nāgārjun] relized tht the production of things

184 182 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism is illogicl nd unresonble in those spects, scertinment understnding the very fct tht ultimtely ll phenomen re not produced ws generted in the mster himself. through the force of tht (de i dbng gis): through the force of tht genertion of scertinment in the mster himself. Thinking, through the force of tht, I will lso tech other sentient beings in ccordnce with how I relized the suchness of ll phenomen, [Nāgārjun] sid: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. (bdg ls m yin gzhn ls min/ gnyis ls m yin rgyu med min/ dngos po gng dg gng n yng/ skye b nm yng yod m yin // zhes by b gsungs te) རང ལ ང ས པ ཞ ས བ ན བ དཔ ན ག ས གང ག ཚ དང ས པ མས ཀ བ མ པ ད དག ག ས མ འཐད མ ར གས པར གས པ ད འ ཚ ན བ དཔ ན ཉ ད ལ ད ན དམ པར ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད བ མ ད ད ཞ ས ད ཁ ན གས ད པའ ང ས པ ས པར ར པའ ད འ དབང ག ས ཞ ས བ ན བ དཔ ན རང ལ ངས པ ས པ ད འ དབང ག ས ཏ ད འ དབང ག ས ཇ ར བདག ག ས ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད ཀ ད ཁ ན གས པ ད ར ས མས ཅན གཞན དག ལ ཡང བ ན པར འ མ དག ངས ནས བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང The Snskrit, s cited erlier: n svto nāpi prto n dvābhyāṃ nāpyhetutḥ/ utpnnā jātu vidynte bhāvāḥ kvcn kecn//.

185 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 183 ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ག ངས ཏ ཞ ས བར ར ར Tht is how [Bhāvvivek s sttement] is to be put together. It indictes this: Just s when I [Nāgārjun] exmined with resoning nd scripture, I did not see the production of things s rel nd relized suchness, so sentient beings lso will comprehend suchness through these very spects of medittion, nd hence I will set out this Tretise on the Middle teching the spects of medittion. ས མས ཅན མས ཀ ས ཀ ང བ མ པའ མ པ འད ཉ ད ཀ ས ད ཁ ན ཁ ང ད པར ས ད འ ར བ མ པའ མ པ བ ན པ ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས འད བ ན པར འ ཞ ས ག ངས པ ཡ ན ན This is generl [sttement of] theses. ( di ni dm bcs p i spyi yin no): In tht: This ( di ni): This stnz in which [Nāgārjun] sys: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Are ny things Ever produced nywhere. theses (dm bcs p): Things re not produced from self is one thesis. Things re not produced from other is second thesis. Things re not produced from both is third thesis. Things re not produced cuselessly is fourth thesis. འད ན དམ བཅས པའ བཀ ད པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ འད ན ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས མ ཡ ན གཞན ལས མ ན གཉ ས ལས མ ཡ ན མ ད མ ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ཚ ག ལ ར ས པ འད ན འ དམ བཅས པ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས

186 184 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན དམ བཅས པ གཅ ག ག གཞན ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན དམ བཅས པ གཉ ས པའ གཉ ས ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན དམ བཅས པ ག མ པའ མ ད པ ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ འད ན དམ བཅས པ བཞ པའ generl [sttement] of those theses (dm bcs p de dg gi spyi): they re put together or shown. Question: Why re only four thesis-spects treted nd not more? Answer: It is s follows: When the 964 mzing [views] re divided [into groups], they re [included] in the 363 disputnts, nd ll of those re included mong these four positions, nd there is no fifth spect other thn these; hence, only four theses re treted. དམ བཅས པ ད དག ག ཞ ས བ ན ཉ བར ར བའམ བ ན པའ ད ལ ཅ འ ར དམ བཅས པ མ པ བཞ ཁ ན ས ཤ ང མང མ ས ཤ ན འད ར ཡ མཚན ཅན དག བ ག པ དག ག ས པ ན ལ མ བ ག ག མ ར པ ད དག ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང གས བཞ པ འད འ ཁ ངས འ ས ཤ ང འད ལས གཞན པའ མ པ པ མ ད པས ད འ ར དམ བཅས པ མ པ བཞ པ ཁ ན མཛད ད Concerning tht, respectively, wht is not from self? (de l re zhig bdg ls m yin zhes by b ci zhig ce n b ): This is question by In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 187.2) red dm bcs p de dg gi spyi zhes by b ni nye br sbyr b m bstn p o for dm bcs p de dg gi ci zhes by b ni nye br sbyr b m bstn p o in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (61b.5). b In the Golden Reprint edition of Bhāvvivek s text (vol. 107, 130.5) red de l re

187 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 185 the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] himself: Wht is not from self? ད ལ ར ཞ ག བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ཅ ཞ ག ཅ ན ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས ཅ ཞ ག མ ཡ ན ཞ ན ཞ ས འག ལ བར ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས བའ ཚ ག ཡ ན ན Production never exists nd so forth (skyes p nm yng yod m yin zhes by b l sogs p ste): This is wht the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] himself sys in nswer to tht question. It is to be put together s: Wht is not from self? Production from self never exists. nd so forth (sogs p ste): The phrse includes whtsoever things nywhere (dngos po gng dg gng n yng); therefore, it indictes Wht is not from self? Not from self re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere (bdg ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng /skyes p nm yng yod m yin). ད འ ལན འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བདག ལས ཇ ཞ ག མ ཡ ན ཞ ན བདག ལས ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བར ར ར ས གས པ ཞ ས བའ ས ན དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ཞ ས བ བ ད ས ན བདག ལས ཅ ཞ ག མ ཡ ན ཞ ན བདག ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ན ཏ which is to be pplied to ech. (re re dng sbyr br by o): Wht does this indicte? These [terms] re to be pplied to ech [thesis] in this wy: Not from self re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere. (bdg ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng skyes p nm yng yod m yin) zhig bdg ls m yin zhes by b ci for de l re zhig bdg ls m yin zhes by b ci zhes by b c zhig ce n.

188 186 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Not from others re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere. (gzhn ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng skyes p nm yng yod m yin) Not from both re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere. (gnyis ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng skyes p nm yng yod m yin) Not cuselessly re whtsoever things ever produced nywhere. (rgyu med ls dngos po gng dg gng n yng skyes p nm yng yod m yin) ར ར དང ར བར འ ཞ ས བས ཇ ད བ ན ཞ ན བདག ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ དང གཞན ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ དང གཉ ས ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ དང མ ད པ ལས དང ས པ གང དག གང ན ཡང ས པ ནམ ཡང ཡ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བ དང ད ར ར ར དང ར བར འ From self is synonymous with from [its own] entity. (bdg ls zhes by b ni bdg nyid ls zhes by b i th tshig go): Why does qulm rise such tht here [Bhāvvivek] explins, From self (bdg ls) is synonymous with from [its own] entity (bdg nyid ls)? It is s follows: Self is used for five types of menings: entity (bdg nyid), ownership (bdg gi), consciousness (shes p), lord (dbng phyug), nd kinfolk (nye du); hence, in order to eliminte ownership, consciousness, lord, nd kinfolk he explins, From self (bdg ls) is synonymous with from [its own] entity (bdg nyid ls). It is the equivlent of sying, Things re not produced from [their own] entity. The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 192.6), the Peking (vol. 96, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (123.4) red bdg gis here but red bdg gi bove; I m following the bove reding.

189 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 187 བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ཞ ས བ ལ གལ ཏ གང ལས ད གས པ ན འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ཞ ས བཤད ཅ ན འད ར བདག ཅ ས བའ ད ན མ པ ལ ར ཏ བདག ཉ ད དང བདག ག དང ཤ ས པ དང དབང ག དང ཉ དག ལ ར བས ད འ ར བདག ག ས དང ཤ ས པ དང དབང ག དང ཉ དག མ པར གཅད པའ ར འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ཞ ས བཤད ད དང ས པ མས བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག The intended mening of the words is not estblished merely by hving mde thesis. (dm bcs p tsm gyis bsm p i tshig gi don mi grub ps): If the mster s [tht is, Nāgārjun s] intended mening of the words tht production does not exist were estblished by the mere words, then even others intended mening of the words tht production [exists] would be estblished. However, since it is not estblished, the intended mening of words is not estblished merely by hving mde thesis. This is s the holy presence Ārydev sttes: If by the mere word exists Things would exist, Then by the mere words not exists Why is it not tht things would not exist? Hence menings tht re well expressed With scripture nd resoning And re without internl contrdiction Are thoroughly upheld by the excellent. Reding don grub ps for don mi grub ps in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 193.2), the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (123.7), nd the Peking, vol. 95,

190 188 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism དམ བཅས པ ཙམ ག ས བསམས པའ ཚ ག ག ས ད ན མ འ བ པས ཞ ས བས ན འད ད བ ན ཏ གལ ཏ ཚ ག ཙམ ག ས བ དཔ ན ག ས བ མ ད པར བསམས པའ ཚ ག ག ས ད ན མ འ བ ན ན གཞན དག ག ས ཀ ང བར བསམས པའ ཚ ག ག ས ད ན འ བ པར འ ར བ ཞ ག ན མ འ བ པས ད འ ར དམ བཅས པ ཙམ ག ས བསམས པའ ཚ ག ག ས ད ན མ འ བ བ དཔ ན འཕགས པ འ ཞལ ནས ཀ ས གལ ཏ ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཙམ ག ས དང ས པ ཡ ད པར འ ར ན ན མ ད ཅ ས བའ ཚ ག ཙམ ག ས ཅ ར མ ད པར འ ར བ མ ན ད འ ར ད ན གང ང དང ར གས པ ཡ ས ལ གས པར མང ན པར བ ད པ དང འགལ བ མ ད པ ད དམ པ མས ཀ ས ཡ ངས བ ང ཞ ས ཇ ད ག ངས པ འ མད ར བ ན པ ཇ བ བཞ ན ས པར བཤད དག ས པས ར བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པ ད འ ར འད ར ད ཉ ད དང པ ར བ བ པར Hence, the property of the position is held to be existence (de i phyir phyogs kyi chos ni yod p nyid gzung ste): Wht ws briefly indicted must be extensively explined; therefore, becuse it ws stted erlier tht production from self does not exist, here just tht is initilly proven; [hence, Bhāvvivek] utters this. It is the equivlent of sying: Since the vlidity itself tht is sserted s vlidtion is resoning, here in the position [or thesis] Things re not produced from self, tht which is held s the property of the phyogs kyi chos, pkṣdhrm; this is the reson, or sign, tht is present in the subject of the syllogism.

191 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 189 position, tht is to sy, the reson, is existent entity (bdg nyid yod p nyid). ད འ ར འད ར གས ཀ ཆ ས ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པར ག ང ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ཚད མ ད པར འད ད པའ ཚད མ ཉ ད ན ར གས པ ཡ ན པས འད ར དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ང ཞ ས བའ གས ཀ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས བ ང བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག In nswer to the question, How is existent entity (bdg nyid yod p nyid) the property of the position? [Bhāvvivek] utters: s follows: becuse from self is designted to n existent entity. ( di ltr bdg ls zhes by b ni bdg nyid yod p l th snyd gdgs p i phyir ro): [In tht:] s follows: ( di ltr): This phrse mens becuse (gng gi phyir). It indictes: Becuse it is fitting to designte the convention from self (bdg ls, svts) to whtsoever thing whose own self-entity exists (bdg nyid kyi rng gi ngo bo yod p), [existent entity (bdg nyid yod p nyid)] is reson tht is the property of the position tht production-gin b (yng skye b, punrutpād) does not exist. གལ ཏ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཇ ར གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ན ཞ ན ད འ ལན འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ད གདགས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ར ཞ ས བའ ན གང ག ར ཞ ས བའ ད ན ཏ གང ག ར དང ས པ གང ལ བདག ཉ ད ཀ རང ག ང བ ཡ ད པ ད ལ This is the first prt of the correltives gng gi phyir de i phyir, which often is yts tts in Snskrit. b The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti.

192 190 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism བདག ལས ཞ ས ད གདགས ང བའ ར ཡ ད པ ལ ན ཡང བ མ ད པའ ར ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན བ མ ད པའ གས ཀ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བར ན ཏ becuse from self is designted to n existent entity. (bdg ls zhes by b ni bdg nyid yod p l th snyd gdgs p i phyir ro): becuse whtsoever thing in which selfness exists is n existent entity (bdg nyid yod p) nd it is suitble to designte from self (bdg ls, svts) to tht. Like for exmple, the sttement by spekers even in the world from Devdtt himself (lhs byin bdg ls) to Devdtt whose selfness exists, here lso if things re just existent entities, it is suitble to designte from self, nd if things re existent entities suitble to be designted from self, then since the existent (yod p nyid, vidymān) re without productiongin b (yng skye b, punrutpād), existing (yod p nyid, vidymān) is tken s reson tht is the property of the position tht production-gin does not exist. བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ད གདགས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ གང ལ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ལ བདག ལས ཞ ས ད གདགས ང བའ ར ར དཔ ར ན འཇ ག ན དག ན ཡང བ པ དག ན ར ས ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ས ན བདག ལས ཞ ས ཟ ར བ དང འ བར འད ར ཡང དང ས པ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན བདག ལས ཞ ས ད གདགས ང ལ བདག ལས ཞ ས ད གདགས ང བའ དང ས པ བདག Reding yod p l th snyd gdgs for yod p ls snyd gdgs in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 194.3), for yod p l snyd gdgs in the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (124.3), nd the Peking, vol. 95, , in ccordnce with the sttement just bove. b The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) here nd t the end of the sentence ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti.

193 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 191 ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ན ཡང བ མ ད པས ད འ ར ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན བ མ ད པའ གས ཀ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན པར ག ང ང An exmple is by virtue of the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof [tht is to sy, the probns] (dpe ni bsgrub pr by b dng sgrub p i chos kyi dbng gis): Tht is the equivlent of sying: An exmple must be demonstrted by virtue of the existence of (1) the predicte of the proposition ( re not produced from self ) nd (2) the ttribute tht is the mens of proof ( existing ) in the subject ( internl sense-spheres nd so forth ). དཔ ར ན བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཀ དབང ག ས ཏ ཞ ས བས ན འད ད བ ན ཏ ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ གང ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད དག ཡ ད པ ད འ དབང ག ས དཔ བ ན དག ས ས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག In tht: exmple (dpe ni): this is the exmple occurring below in [the syllogism tht Bhāvvivek will stte]: Ultimtely the internl sense-spheres [eye sense, er sense, nd so forth] re not produced from self b becuse of existing, like intelligence. c (don dm pr nng gi skye sgrub p i chos; tht is to sy, the proof, or probns. b The Tibetn reds re certin s not being produced from self (bdg ls skye b med pr nges te), but certin is not represented in the Snskrit. The reson could lso be trnslted s becuse of presently existing since vidymān is the present middle prticle; however, lter Chndrkīrti (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 33.4) cites the reson s sttvād, suggesting tht the prticulr form mkes little difference, this perhps being why the reson ws trnslted into Tibetn merely s yod p i phyir insted of d lt br yod p i phyir. c It seems to me tht the Tibetn of the exmple shes p yod p nyid bzhin must be

194 192 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir shes p yod p nyid bzhin no; n prmārtht ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt citnyvd) ད ལ དཔ ན ཞ ས བ ན འ ག ནས ད ན དམ པར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས འ ང བའ དཔ ད འ the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos): Since the proposition itself (bsgrub pr by b nyid) is n ttribute (chos), it is the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos). Or, it both is the proposition nd lso is n ttribute, whereby it is the predicte of the proposition b (bsgrub pr by b chos). Thus, it is not to be elided (?). c Also, wht is the predicte of the proposition? On this occsion, it is to be tken s not produced (skye b med p, n utpnn). བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན བ བ པར བ ཉ ད ཆ ས ཡ ན པས བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ས ཡང ན ད ན བ བ པར བ ཡང ཡ ན ལ ཆ ས ཀ ང ཡ ན པས བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ བར འ the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos): This is the reson the ttribute proving not produced [in] not produced from self. Wht is the ttribute tht is the mere trnsltion of the Snskrit citny nd is not n extension of it to include the reson ( existing ). In ny cse, for Sāṃkhy the reference of intelligence is to the puruṣ the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness. I hve trnslted it s intelligence to llow for Buddhist mening lso, s Avlokitvrt indictes below () when he indictes tht the exmple is estblished comptibly for both prties in the debte. Perhps proposition tht is the ttribute/predicte. b Perhps ttribute/predicte tht is to be proven. c bsdu br mi by o; mening uncler.

195 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 193 mens of proof? On this occsion it is to be tken s existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv). བ བ པར བའ ཆ ས ཞ ས ན བ བར མ འ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ད ཡང གང ཞ ན བས འད ར ན བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ཡ ན པར ར ར བ པའ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པ བ མ ད པ བ པའ ཆ ས ཏ གཏན ཚ གས ས བ པའ ཆ ས ད གང ཞ ན བས འད ར ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ཡ ན པར ར ར by virtue of (dbng gis): Exmples ( intelligence nd so forth ) of the subject must be demonstrted by virtue of the existence of (1) the predicte of the proposition ( re not produced from self ) nd (2) the ttribute tht is the mens of proof ( existing ) in the subject ( internl sense-spheres nd so forth ). To indicte this, [Bhāvvivek] utters: དབང ག ས ཏ ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ གང ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཡ ད པའ དབང དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ དབང ག ས ཆ ས ཅན ད འ དཔ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ས གས པ བ ན དག ས པའ becuse it is n exmple of subject tht is endowed with renowned predicte of the proposition nd ttribute tht is the mens of proof (bsgrub pr by b dng sgrub p i chos grgs p dng ldn p i chos cn gyi dpe yin p i phyir): A subject ( internl sense-spheres nd so forth ) in which exist (1) predicte of the proposition ( re not produced from self ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt b nd (2) n ttribute tht is the mens of proof ( existing ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt is clled subject tht is endowed with renowned predicte b sgrub p i chos; tht is to sy, the proof, or probns. phyir rgol b; literlly, ltter disputnt.

196 194 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism of the proposition nd ttribute tht is the mens of proof. This is to be put together s: Becuse of being n exmple of tht subject, the exmple must be demonstrted by virtue of the predicte of the proposition nd (2) the ttribute tht is the mens of proof. In tht: ད བ ན པའ ར བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ག དཔ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ གང ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ཡ ད པ ད ན བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས འ ཆ ས ཅན ད འ དཔ ཡ ན པའ ར དཔ ན བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཀ དབང ག ས བ ན དག ས ས ཞ ས བར ར ར renowned predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos grgs p): re not produced from self tht is renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt. Kodo Yotsuy mkes reference to Dignāg s Compiltion of Prime Cognition (PSK P.ce.7.3) (my trnsltion): Since the convention [of proof sttement] is used By wy of the property [tht is, the logicl sign] (chos) being estblished for both, The property is not cceptble if by both or one [of the prties] It is refused or doubted or the substrtum [tht is, the subject] is not estblished. See Kodo Yotsuy, The Critique of Svtntr Resoning by Chndrkīrti nd Tsong-khp: A Study of Philosophicl Proof According to Two Prāsṅgik Mdhymk Trditions of Indi nd Tibet, Tibetn nd Indo-Tibetn Studies 8 (Stuttgrt: Frnz Steiner Verlg, 1999), 73 n. 1.

197 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 195 ད ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ག གས པ ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པའ renowned ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos grgs p): existing (yod p, vidymān), the ttribute tht is the mens of proof tht is renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt. བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ ཞ ས བ ན བ མ ད པ བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པའ subject tht is endowed with those two (de gnyis dng ldn p i chos cn): internl sense-spheres nd so forth tht is endowed with the two, renowned predicte of the proposition nd renowned ttribute tht is the mens of proof. ད གཉ ས དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས བ ན བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ག གས པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ ད གཉ ས དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པའ n exmple of tht subject (chos cn de i dpe): intelligence nd so forth. [Bhāvvivek] is indicting tht just s the predicte of the proposition ( re not produced from self ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof ( existing ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt exist in tht subject [ internl sense-spheres nd so forth ], so the predicte of the proposition ( re not produced from self ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof ( existing ) renowned to both the disputnt nd opposing disputnt exist lso here in for exmple, intelligence nd so forth; therefore, he sys, becuse it is n exmple of subject tht is endowed with renowned predicte of the proposition nd ttribute tht is the mens of proof. It is like the explntion, An exmple in which pervsion by

198 196 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism the concomitnce of the [predicte of] the proposition nd the reson exists is similr exmple. ཆ ས ཅན ད འ དཔ ཞ ས བ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ས གས པ དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ཆ ས ཅན ད ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ཡ ད པ ད བཞ ན འད ར ཡང ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ཡ ད པར ན པས ད འ ར དཔ ན བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག གས པ དང ན པའ ཆ ས ཅན ག དཔ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས ས ཏ ཇ ད དཔ གང ལ བ བ པར བ དང གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ས འག བས ཁ བ པར ད པ ད ན ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བཤད པ འ This negtion, not from self (bdg ls m yin, n svtḥ), is to be viewed s mening nonffirming negtion (bdg ls m yin zhes by b i dgg p di ni med pr dgg p i don du blt br by ste): In whom is qulm generted such tht [Bhāvvivek] explins tht This negtion, is not from self (bdg ls m yin, n svtḥ), is to be viewed s mening nonffirming negtion? It is s follows: it occurs mong the Grmmrins b tht negtions re twofold, nonffirming negtions nd ffirming negtions; hence, in order to eliminte chos mthun p i dpe. b brd sprod p, viyākrṇ. These two types of negtions, nonffirming negtions nd ffirming negtions, re used by Mīmāṃsks for two types of injunctions when something is just forbidden nd when something positive is implied in plce of wht is

199 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 197 tht this is n ffirming negtion, here he explins tht This negtion, is not from self, is to be viewed s mening nonffirming negtion, which is the equivlent of sying: This is to be viewed s mening the nonffirming negtion Things re not produced from self, but is not to be viewed s mening the ffirming negtion, Nonproduction from self exists. བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བའ དགག པ འད ན དཔ མ ད པར དགག པའ ད ན བ བར ཞ ས བ ལ གལ ཏ གང ལས ད གས པ ན འད ར བདག ལས ཡ ན ཞ ས བའ དགག པ འད ན མ ད པར དགག པའ ད ན བ བར ཞ ས བཤད ཅ ན འད ར བ ད པ ལས དགག པ ན མ པ གཉ ས ཏ མ ད པར དགག པ དང མ ཡ ན པར དགག ག ཞ ས འ ང བའ ད འ ར མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ མ པར གཅད པའ ར འད ར བདག ལས མ ཡ ན ཞ ས བའ དགག པ འད ན མ ད པར དགག པའ ད ན བ བར ཞ ས བཤད ད དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར དགག པའ ད ན བ བར འ བདག ལས མ ས པ ཡ ད ད ཞ ས མ ཡ ན པར དགག པའ ད ན ན བ བར མ འ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག Concerning this the definitions of these two negtions re described s: b forbidden. See J.F. Stl, Negtion nd the Lw of Contrdiction in Indin Thought, Bulletin of the School of Orientl nd Africn Studies XXV, Prt 1 (1962): especilly In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 197.6) for dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med do zhes med pr dgg p i don du ni blt br mi by o zhes by b i th tshig go red dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med do zhes med pr dgg p i don du blt br by yi/ bdg ls m skyes p yod do zhes m yin pr dgg p i don du ni blt br mi by o zhes by b i th tshig go in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). b 198.1: dgg p don gyis bstn p dng / tshig gcig sgrub pr byed p dng // de ldn

200 198 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Negtions tht indicte through import, Tht estblish through phrse, Tht possess those, nd tht do not indicte through their own words Are ffirming [negtions]; others re other [tht is, nonffirming negtions]. Wht this indictes is the equivlent of sying: Negtions tht: 1. indicte understnding through import 2. estblish n ctulity through phrse 3. possess those understnding through import nd estblishing n ctulity 4. nd do not indicte through their own words for exmple, concerning person of the royl linege not indicting this through the phrse royl linege but indicting it through the phrse, [He] is not brhmin re to be viewed s ffirming negtions; others re other [tht is, non-ffirming negtions]. b rng tshig mi ston p// m yin gzhn p gzhn yin no//. Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of Tenets (Tipei, 216.3) identifies the pssge s from ldog p bsdus p, which is Nvidhrm s Stnzs Demonstrting Condenstion of Exclusions (ldog p bsdus p bstn p'i tshig le'ur bys p, piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśkārikā; P5782). The sde dge edition (Toh. 4293; TBRC W23703, ) reds: don gyis go br byed p dng //tshig gcig sgrub pr byed p dng // de dng ldn p i dgg p dng //rng gi tshig gis mi ston p o//. There is commentry by Nvidhrm, ldog p bsdus p bstn p'i rnm 'grel, piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśvārttik; P5783; Toh In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 198.3) for rgyl rigs zhes l red rgyl rigs l in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). b In the section of Consequence School in The Essence of Eloquence (Drkp nd Dmdul Nmgyl, 220.4) Tsong-kh-p explins: In this: Tht which indictes through its import is, for instnce, The corpulent Devdtt does not et during dy-time. Tht which estblishes thing through one phrse is cse of one phrse s contining both the elimintion of n object of negtion nd n explicit suggestion of nother phenomenon for instnce, Non-production from self exists. Tht which possesses those is phrse tht hs both explicit nd implicit suggestion of other phenomen for instnce, The non-emcited ft Devdtt who does not et during the dy exists Tht which does not indicte through its own words is, for instnce, This

201 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 199 ད ལས དགག པ འད གཉ ས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད ན ཇ ད དགག པ ད ན ག ས བ ན པ དང ཚ ག གཅ ག བ པར ད པ དང ད ན རང ཚ ག མ ན པ མ ཡ ན གཞན པ གཞན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བཤད པ ཡ ན ན འད ད བ ན ཏ དགག པ གང ད ན ག ས ག བ ན པ དང ཚ ག གཅ ག ག ས དང ས པ བ པར ད པ དང ད ན ག ས ག བ དང དང ས པ བ པ ད དང ན པ དང རང ག ཚ ག ག ས མ ན པ དཔ ར ན ལ ར གས ལ ལ ར གས ཞ ས བའ ཚ ག ག ས མ ན པར མ ཟ མ ཡ ན པ ཞ ས བའ ཚ ག ག ས ན པ ད ན མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ཡ ན པར བ བར འ The sttement Others re other is the equivlent of sying, Whtever negtions re other thn those re nonffirming negtions. Others b re whtever re: other thn indicting understnding through import other thn estblishing n ctulity through phrse other thn possessing those understnding through import nd estblishing n ctulity other thn not indicting through their own words. one is not Brhmin, t time when it hs been scertined tht person is either of the royl linege or Brhmin nd hs not scertined the specific. Whenever ny of those four modes of suggestion occur, [the phenomenon] is n ffirming negtive, wheres those negtives tht re other thn those tht do not suggest [in] ny of those four [wys] re non-ffirming negtives, which re other thn ffirming negtives. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 198.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for gzhn bzhin no red gzhn p gzhn yin no in ccordnce with their respective cittions of the stnz nd explntions just below. b gzhn p.

202 200 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism གཞན པ གཞན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ན ད ལས གཞན པའ དགག པ གང ཡ ན པར དགག པ ལས གཞན པ མ ད པར དགག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག གཞན པ ཞ ས བ ན ད ན ག ས ག བ བ ན པ ལས གཞན པ དང ཚ ག གཅ ག ག ས དང ས པ བ པར ད པ ལས གཞན པ དང ད ན ག ས ག བ དང དང ས པ བ པ ད དང ན པ ལས གཞན པ དང རང ག ཚ ག ག ས མ ན པ ལས གཞན པ གང ཡ ན པའ Are other is the equivlent of sying, Those re nonffirming negtions, which re other thn ffirming negtions : not indicting chrcter understood through its import being intent on negtion, tht is to sy, hving the purpose only of negtion nd mking only negtion of wht the other [prty] sserts not ffirming b the suchness of effective things or the suchness of noneffective things not possessing understnding through import nd lso not possessing effective things but possessing negtion nd indicting through its own words, for exmple, regrding nonbrhmin to mke limited c mere negtion, [He] just is not brhmin. གཞན ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ན ད ན མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ལས གཞན པ མ ད པར དགག པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ད ན ད ན ག ས ག བའ མཚན ཉ ད ན པ མ ཡ ན པ དང དགག པ ར ལ ན ཏ དགག པ ཁ ན ད འ དག ས པ ཡ ན ཞ ང གཞན ག ས ཁས ངས པ གང ཡ ན པ ད དགག པ ཙམ ད ལ དང ས gzhn yin no. b sgrub pr mi byed p. c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.3) for nyi m tshe red nyi tshe in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ).

203 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 201 པ འ ད ཁ འམ དང ས པ མ ད པའ ད ཁ ན བ པར མ ད པ དང ད ན ག ས ག བ དང ན པ ཡང མ ཡ ན དང ས པ དང ན པ ཡང མ ཡ ན ཞ ང དགག པ དང ན པ དང རང ག ཚ ག ག ས ན ཏ དཔ ར ན མ ཟ མ ཡ ན པ ཉ ད ཅ ས དགག པ ཙམ ཉ ད ཚ ད པ ཡ ན ན becuse of principlly being negtion (dgg p gtso che b i phyir dng): Why is nonffirming negtion bndoned nd n ffirming negtion employed? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters becuse of principlly being negtion. This is to be put together s, Becuse nonffirming negtion is principlly negtion, here it is employed, but becuse n ffirming negtion is principlly n ffirmtion, here it is not b employed. ཅ འ ར མ ཡ ན པར དགག པར ངས ཏ མ ད པར དགག པ ག ང ཞ ན ད འ ར དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར དང ཞ ས བ ས ཏ མ ད པར དགག པ ད ན དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར འད ར ག ང ག མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ན བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར འད ར མ ག ང ང ཞ ས བར ར ར principlly being negtion (dgg p gtso che b): Tht nonffirming negtion which is minly negtion nd hs cpcity without ffirmtion through thought nd ssertion is principlly negtion. c sgrub p. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for ming gzung red mi gzung in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, c The trnsltion here follows Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 199.4) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) which red: med pr dgg p gng ls dgg p gtso che b dng / bsm p dng dod ps sgrub pr med pr nus p yod p de ni dgg p gtso che b o//. The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 127.6) reds differently but eqully cogently: med pr dgg p gng ls dgg p gtso che b dng / bsm p dng dod ps sgrub pr nus p yod p de ni dgg p gtso che b o//, which trnsltes s: Tht nonffirming negtion which

204 202 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism དགག པ གཙ ཆ བ ཞ ས བ ན མ ད པར དགག པ གང ལས དགག པ གཙ ཆ བ དང བསམ པ དང འད ད པས བ པར ས པ ཡ ད པ ད ན དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ becuse of principlly being negtion (dgg p gtso che b i phyir dng): This is the equivlent of sying, Due to the cuse of principlly being negtion, here [I] will rely on nonffirming negtion. Or: Becuse [Nāgārjun s] Tretise on the Middle is principlly negtions, here nonffirming negtions will be employed, nd ffirming negtions will not be employed. Why re only mere negtions employed in [Nāgārjun s] Tretise on the Middle nd things not ffirmed? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར ཞ ས བ ན དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ད འ ར འད ར མ ད པར དགག པ ལ བ ན པར འ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ཡང ན དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར དང ཞ ས བ ན ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས ན དགག པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར འད ར མ ད པར དགག པ ག ང བར འ མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ག ང བར མ འ ཅ འ ར ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས ལ དགག པ ཙམ ཁ ན ད ཅ ང དང ས པ བ པར མ ད ཅ ན nd becuse of intending to estblish nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions. ( di ltr rtog p m lus p i dr b dgg ps rnm pr mi rtog p i ye shes shes by b yul m lus p dng ldn pr grub pr b dgongs p i phyir ro): The term di ltr is minly negtion nd hs the cpcity of proof through thought nd ssertion is principlly negtion. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.1) for dr bs red dr b in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 128.1) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for grub dgongs red grub pr dgongs in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn

205 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 203 mens gng gi phyir. This is to be put together s, Becuse of intending through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions to estblish nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects known, only mere negtions re employed in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle, nd things re not ffirmed. b ད འ ར འད ར གས པ མ ས པའ བ དགག པས མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པར འ བ པར དག ངས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ར ར ཞ ས བའ ན གང ག ར ཞ ས བའ ད ན ཏ གང ག ར ག པའ བ མ ས པ དང ན པ འ བ པར དག ངས པ ད འ ར ད མའ བ ན བཅ ས ལ དགག པ ཙམ ཁ ན ད ཅ ང དང ས པ བ པར མ ད ད ཞ ས བར ར ར entirety of conceptions (rtog p m lus p[ i]): Those conceptions tht effective things re produced from self, other, both, nd cuselessly re clled entirety of conceptions. ག པ མ ས པ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག དང གཞན དང གཉ ས དང མ ད པ ལས བར ག པ ད དག ན ག པ མ ས པ ཞ ས འ the net (dr b): Those very conceptions without reminder re net, for when covered by this net of the entirety of conceptions, one cnnot proceed to the libertion in which ll phenomen re unpprehendble, c nd hence the entirety of gyur (vol. 98, 128.1) nd Avlokitvrt s own commentry below. The first member of reson correltive such s ysmāt tsmāt or yts tts. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for dgg p tsm khong n byed p i dngos pos sgrub pr mi byed do red dgg p tsm kho n byed cing dngos po sgrub pr mi byed do in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 128.2) nd the mteril just preceding. c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 200.5) for dmigs med p i red dmigs su med p i in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 128.3).

206 204 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism those very conceptions, being like net, is net. བ ཞ ས བ ན ག པ མ ས པ ད དག ཉ ད བ འད ར ག པ མ ས པའ བ འད ས གཡ གས ན ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད དམ གས མ ད པའ ཐར པ ཞ ས བར འག བར མ ས པས ད འ ར ག པ མ ས པ ད དག ཉ ད བ དང འ བས བའ refuting (dgg p[s]): refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions is to refute the entirety of the net of conceptions, [nd thus Bhāvvivek sys] through refuting the entirety of the net of conceptions. དགག པས ཞ ས བ ན ག པ མ ས པའ བ ད དགག པ ན ག པ མ ས པའ བ དགག པ ག པ མ ས པའ བ དགག པ ད ས ས nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects (rnm pr mi rtog p i ye shes shes by b yul m lus p dng ldn p[r]): Tht nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects, tht is to sy, wht is known, wht is relized, nd wht is thoroughly distinguished ( objects being the entirety of objects of ctivity, objects pprehended, nd objects observed) is clled [by Bhāvvivek] nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects. མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ ཞ ས བ ན མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས གང ལ ཞ ས བ ཤ ས པར བ དང གས པར བ དང ཡ ངས གཅད པར བ མ ས པ དང ལ ཞ ས བ ད ལ དང The Snskrit likely uses synonym for this refute (dgg p) where the Tibetn uses the sme term.

207 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 205 ག ང བ དང དམ གས པ མ ས པ ཡ ད པ ད ན མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ ཞ ས འ to estblish it (de grub pr): to estblish this nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects. ད འ བ པར ཞ ས བ ན མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ ད འ བ པར ར becuse of intending (dgongs p i phyir ro): This is the equivlent of sying, becuse of sserting. Or, it is the equivlent of sying, Becuse of intending, tht is to sy, hving ffinity b for, estblishing nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects through refuting the entirety of conceptions by mens of this nonffirming negtion. Here, estblishing nonconceptul pristine wisdom endowed with the entirety of objects is positing of it in the spect of suprmundne conventionlity, but is not sserted s ultimtely estblishing pristine wisdom in chrcter of trnsformtion; for instnce, the Suprmundne Victorious Mother, the Perfection of Wisdom sys, If one courses in the production of pristine wisdom, this is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. དག ངས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ན བཞ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ཡང ན མ ད པར དགག པ འད ས འད ར ག པ མ ས པའ བ དགག པས མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ ད འ བ པར དག ངས པའ ར ཏ ས མ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག འད ར མ པར མ ག པའ ཡ ཤ ས ཤ ས ལ མ ས པ དང ན པ འ བ པ ཞ ས བ ན འཇ ག ན ལས འདས པའ ཀ ན བ b bzhed p i phyir. rjes su mthun p.

208 206 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཀ མ པར གཞག པ ཡ ན ག གནས ར པའ མཚན ཉ ད ལ ན ད ན དམ པར ཡ ཤ ས འ བ པར མ བཞ ད ད བཅ མ ན འདས མ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལས ཡ ཤ ས ཀ བ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཇ ད ག ངས པ འ When n ffirming negtion is employed, due to its principlly being n ffirmtion, it is being ffirmed tht phenomen re not produced, whereby nonproduction is indicted, nd hence one would seprte from tenet (m yin pr dgg p yongs su gzung n ni de sgrub p gtso che b i phyir chos rnm m skyes so zhes sgrub ps skye b med p ston p i phyir mdzd p i mth dng brl br gyur te): This indictes tht: When n ffirming negtion is solely employed nd nonffirming negtion is not employed, then becuse n ffirming negtion is principlly n ffirmtion, just mere negtion would not be estblished, since n ffirming negtion, Phenomen re not produced, would be ffirmed, whereby tht nonproduction exists would be indicted. However, tht lso is not sserted since one would seprte from tenet. མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ཡ ངས ག ང ན ན ད བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ བས པས བ མ ད པ ན པའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བར འ ར ཏ ཞ ས བས ན འད ད བ ན ཏ གལ ཏ མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ཡ ངས ག ང བ ཁ ན ད ཅ ང མ ད པར དགག པ ཡ ངས ག ང བ མ ད ན ན ད ས ན མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ད བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར དགག པ ཁ ན ཙམ འ བ པར མ འ ར ཏ འད ར The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 129.2) reds bsgrubs.

209 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 207 མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ན ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ བས པས ད ས ན བ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ད པར ན པའ ར ད ཡང མ བཞ ད ད འད ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བའ ར ར ཞ ས བར ན ཏ due to its principlly being n ffirmtion (de sgrub p gtso che b i phyir): becuse n ffirming negtion is principlly n ffirmtion, since Nonproduction exists would be ffirmed by wy of refuting tht Things re not produced. To indicte just this, [Bhāvvivek] utters: it is being ffirmed tht phenomen re not produced, whereby nonproduction is indicted (chos rnm m skyes so zhes sgrub ps skye b med p ston p i phyir): Tht nonffirming negtion is principlly n ffirmtion becuse by wy of ffirming tht phenomen re not produced, it is indicted tht nonproduction exists. Why is tht not sserted here? ད བ པ གཙ ཆ བའ ར ཞ ས བ ན མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ད ན བ པ གཙ མ ད པའ ར ཏ འད ར དང ས པ མས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས དགག པའ ནས མ ས པ ཡ ད ད ཞ ས བ པའ ར ར ད ཉ ད བ ན པའ ར ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ བས པས བ མ ད པ ན པའ ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ད ན ཆ ས མས མ ས ས ཞ ས བ བ པའ ད ནས བ མ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ད པར ན པའ ར བ པ གཙ ཆ བ ཡ ན ན ད ན འད ར མ བཞ ད ད ཅ འ ར ཞ ན [nd hence] one would seprte from tenet (mdzd p i mth dng brl br gyur te): In this: tenet (mdzd p i mth ) b : n estblished conclusion b The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 129.4) reds bsgrubs. kṛtānt; literlly, mde conclusion.

210 208 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism (grub p i mth ), becuse of being definite conclusion of mening mde by gret beings. one would seprte from tenet (de dng brl br gyur te): this is the equivlent of sying, one would contrdict tenet. To indicte how one would seprte from mde conclusion [Bhāvvivek] sys: འད ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བར འ ར ཏ ཞ ས བ ས ས ད ལ མཛད པའ མཐའ ཞ ས བ ན བ པའ མཐའ བདག ཉ ད ཆ ན པ མས ཀ ས མཛད པའ ད ན ག མཐའ ང ས པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ད དང ལ བར འ ར ཏ ཞ ས བ ན ད དང འགལ བར འ ར ཏ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ཇ ར ལ བར འ ར བ ད ཉ ད བ ན པའ ར becuse scripture sys, If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. (lung ls/ gzugs kyi skye b med p l spyod n shes rb kyi ph rol tu phyin p l spyod p m yin no// zhes byung b i phyir ro): becuse the Suprmundne Victorious Mother, the Perfection of Wisdom sys: Others sked the Suprmundne Victor, How is it tht when Bodhisttvs course in the perfection of wisdom, they re not coursing in the perfection of wisdom? nd the Suprmundne Victor pronounced, If one courses in the nonproduction of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. If one courses in the production of form, one is not coursing in the perfection of wisdom. nd so forth. Wht does this indicte? It indictes tht since the perfection of wisdom is devoid of the entirety of conceptions of production, nonproduction, nd so forth, then when bodhisttvs do not course even in conceptions of nonproduction, they re coursing in the For Jm-yng-shy-p s discussion of the etymology of grub p i mth nd relted terms, see Hopkins, Mps of the Profound, 65ff.

211 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 209 perfection of wisdom. Consequently, if n ffirming negtion is thoroughly employed, such contrdicts scripture, nd hence here one is to rely only on nonffirming negtion. ང ལས ག གས ཀ བ མ ད པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འ ང བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བཅ མ ན འདས མ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལས བཅ མ ན འདས ལ གཞན དག ག ས ང བ ས མས དཔའ ཇ ར ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ལགས ཞ ས ས པ དང བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས བཀའ ལ པ ག གས ཀ བ མ ད པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ག གས ཀ པ ལ ད ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ག ངས པའ ར ར ཇ ད བ ན ཞ ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ན བ དང བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པའ ག པ མ ས པ དང ལ བ ཡ ན པས གང ག ཚ ང བ ས མས དཔའ བ མ ད པའ མ པར ག པ ལ ཡང མ ད པ ད འ ཚ ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པ ལ ད པ ཡ ན པར བ ན ཏ ད བས ན མ ཡ ན པར དགག པ ཡ ངས ག ང ན ང དང འགལ བས འད ར ན མ ད པར དགག པ ཁ ན ལ བ ན པར འ Here it is to be delimited tht Things re only not produced from self. ( dir dngos po rnms bdg ls skye b med p kho n o zhes nges pr gzung br by o): delimited (nges pr gzung b): this term involves the mening of just tht (de kho n). Here the delimittion lso is of

212 210 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism three spects: tht Things re only not produced from self (bdg ls skye b med p kho n o) is the first delimittion; tht Things re not produced from only self (bdg kho n ls skye b med de) is the second delimittion; tht Things re not produced from only self (bdg kho n ls skye b med de) is the third delimittion. With respect to those, this sttement [by Bhāvvivek] Here it is to be delimited tht Things re only not produced from self is the first delimittion: the mening here is to be delimited s Things re only not produced from self. འད ར དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང བར འ ཞ ས བ ལ ང ས པར ག ང བ ཞ ས བའ ན ད ཁ ན ཞ ས བའ ད ན ལ གས ས འད ར ང ས པར ག ང བ ད ཡང མ པ ག མ བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ཞ ས བ ན ང ས པར ག ང བ དང པ འ བདག ཁ ན ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པའ བདག ཁ ན ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ང ས པར ག ང བ ག མ པའ ད ལ འད ར དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང བར འ ཞ ས བ འད ན ང ས པར ག ང བ དང པ ད ན འད ར ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང བར བ ཡ ན ན If it is delimited otherwise, (gzhn du nges pr gzung n): This indictes tht if it delimited in ccordnce with the second nd the third delimittions, s ppers below, even both re fllcious nd hence unsuitble. To indicte the second delimittion, [Bhāvvivek] utters: The second delimittion is missing in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 204.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) but ppers in the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 130.4). The difference between the second nd third is clrified below.

213 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 211 then it would be determined s, [Things] re not produced from only self. Well, wht then? They re produced from other, (bdg kho n ls skye b med de/ o n ci zhe n/ gzhn ls skye o zhes by br nges pr gyur b dng): This is the second delimittion: If it delimited tht Things re not produced from only self, then [in nswer to] Well, wht then? there would be the fllcy tht They re produced from other, nd hence this is not suitble. To indicte the third delimittion, [Bhāvvivek] utters: nd likewise it would be determined s, b [Things] re not produced from only self. Well, wht then? They re produced from self nd other. (de bzhin du bdg kho n ls ni skye b med de/ o n ci zhe n/ bdg gzhn ls skye o zhes by br nges pr gyur bs): This is the third delimittion: If it delimited tht Things re not produced from only self, then [in nswer to] Well, wht then? there would be the fllcy tht They re produced from self nd other, nd hence this lso is not suitble. Why re those two, the second nd third delimittions, unsuitble? གཞན ང ས པར ག ང ན ཞ ས བས ན ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པ དང ག མ པ འ ག ནས འ ང བ དག ར ག ང ན གཉ ག ཡང ན འ ར པས མ ང ང ཞ ས བ ན ཏ ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པ བ ན པའ ར བདག ཁ ན ལས བ མ ད ད འ ན ཅ ཞ ན གཞན ལས འ ཞ ས བར ང ས པར འ ར བ དང ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ན ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པ དང ས པ མས བདག ཁ ན ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང ན འ ན ཅ ཞ ན གཞན ལས འ ཞ ས བར ང ས པར འ ར བའ ན འ ར བས འད ན མ ང ང ང ས པར ག ང བ ག མ པ བ ན པའ ར ད བཞ ན བདག ཁ ན ལས ན བ མ ད ད འ ན ཅ ཞ ན བདག དང གཞན b Avlokitvrt omits this initil phrse. Avlokitvrt omits this initil phrse.

214 212 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ལས འ ཞ ས བར ང ས པར འ ར བས ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ན ང ས པར ག ང བ ག མ པ དང ས པ མས བདག ཁ ན ལས ན བ མ ད ད ཞ ས ང ས པར ག ང ན འ ན ཅ ཞ ན བདག དང གཞན ལས འ ཞ ས བར ང ས པར འ ར བའ ན འ ར བས འད ཡང མ ང ང ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པ དང ག མ པ ད གཉ ས ཅ འ ར མ ང ཞ ན Hence, those lso re not sserted (de yng mi bzhed de): The mster [Bhāvvivek] furthermore does not ssert the second nd third delimittions becuse even both of those ccrue the fllcy of sserting production. Why re they not sserted? Hence, he utters: becuse of seprting from tenet. (mdzd p i mth dng brl b i phyir ro): How does one seprte from tenet? It is becuse erlier on the occsion of stting the generl thesis it ws sserted tht things re not produced from self, not produced from other, not produced from both, nd not produced cuselessly, but here these two the indiction of production from other by the second delimittion nd the indiction of production from self nd other by the third delimittion contrdict the erlier thesis. ད འ ར ད ཡང མ བཞ ད ད ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པ དང ག མ པ ད ཡང བ དཔ ན མ བཞ ད ད གཉ ག ད ཡང བར ཁས ལ ན པའ ན ཆགས པའ ར ར ཅ འ ར མ བཞ ད ཅ ན ད འ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ཇ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང ལ ཞ ན ར དམ བཅས པའ བཀ ད པའ བས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ དང གཞན ལས བ མ ད པ In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 205.6) for sngr dm p dng red sngr dm bcs p dng in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 130.4) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ).

215 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 213 དང གཉ ས ལས བ མ ད པ དང མ ད པ ལས བ མ ད པར ཁས ངས ལ འད ར ང ས པར ག ང བ གཉ ས པས གཞན ལས བར བ ན པ དང ང ས པར ག ང བ ག མ པ དང བདག དང གཞན ལས བར བ ན པ འད གཉ ས ར དམ བཅས པ དང འགལ བའ ར ར Here those serving s the words of syllogism re ( dir sbyor b i tshig tu gyur b): This is to be put together s On this occsion of indicting tht things re not produced from self, those serving s words contining syllogism re the below ppliction of subject, predicte of the proposition, mens of proof, nd exmple. In tht: words of syllogism (sbyor b i tshig): words contining syllogism. This is the equivlent of sying, n inference endowed with reson nd n exmple. འད ར ར བའ ཚ ག འ ར བ ན ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ ན པའ བས འད ར ར བ དང ར བ དང བཅས པའ ཚ ག འ ར བ ན འ ག ནས ཆ ས ཅན དང བ བ པར བ ཆ ས དང བ པའ ཆ ས དང དཔ ཉ བར ར བ མས ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བར ར ར ད ལ ར བའ ཚ ག ཅ ས བ ན ར བ དང བཅས པའ ཚ ག ས དཔག པ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ དང ན པ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག Ultimtely the internl sense-spheres [eye sense, er sense, nd so forth] re not produced from self becuse of existing like, for exmple, intelligence. (don dm pr nng gi skye mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, n prmārtht ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt citnyvd): In tht:

216 214 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Ultimtely (don dm pr, prmārtht): Erlier [on the occsion of discussing the mode of negtion in the expression of worship in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle, Bhāvvivek] uttered: b Golden Reprint (vol. 107, 129.5; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 96, 93.6) nd Peking (P5259, vol. 95, ). b This is Bhāvvivek s response to n unnmed opponent; Bhāvvivek first lys out the opponent s position: Concerning those, someone sys: The refuttions of cesstion, production, difference, nd oneness re ultimtely. The refuttions of nnihiltion nd permnence re in conventionl terms. The refuttions of going nd coming re both. (de l kh cig n re/ gg p dng / skye b dng / th dd p nyid dng / gcig p nyid bkg p ni don dm pr ro// chd p dng rtg p bkg p ni th snyd du o// ong b dng gro b bkg p ni gnyi gr ro zhe o) ད ལ ཁ ཅ ག ན ར འགག པ དང བ དང ཐ དད པ ཉ ད དང གཅ ག པ ཉ ད བཀག པ ན ད ན དམ པར ར ཆད པ དང ག པ བཀག པ ན ཐ ད འ འ ང བ དང འག བ བཀག པ ན གཉ གར ར ཞ འ Avlokitvrt s commentry on the opponent s position (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 128.3; Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 84.1; Peking, P5259, vol. 96, ) is: Concerning those, (de l): Concerning those negtions s indicted [in the expression of worship in Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle] the negtion of cesstion through no cesstion, the negtion of production through no production, the negtion of nnihiltion through no nnihiltion, the negtion of permnence through no permnence, the negtion of coming through no coming, the negtion of going through no going, the negtion of difference through no difference, the negtion of smeness through no smeness. ད ལ ཞ ས བ ན འགག པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས འགག པ བཀག པ དང བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས བ བཀག པ དང ཆད པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས ཆད པ བཀག པ དང ག པ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས ག པ བཀག པ དང འ ང བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས འ ང བ བཀག པ དང འག བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བས འག བ བཀག པ དང ཐ དད ད ན མ ན ཞ ས བས ཐ དད པ ཉ ད བཀག པ དང ད ན གཅ ག མ ན ཞ ས བས ད ན གཅ ག པ ཉ ད བཀག པ ཇ ད བ ན པ ད ལའ someone (kh cig n re) [sys]: certin proponent of Middle Wy tenets [sys]. ཁ ཅ ག ན ར ཞ ས བ ན ད མ པའ བ པའ མཐའ བ ཁ ཅ ག ན ར འ The refuttions of cesstion, production, difference, nd oneness re ultimtely. ( gg p dng / skye b dng / th dd p nyid dng / gcig p nyid bkg

217 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 215 p ni don dm pr ro//): With respect to the refuttions of the cesstion, the production, the difference, nd the oneness of things, these re refuted ultimtely, but re not refuted conventionlly becuse conventionlly ll things hve cesstion nd lso hve production in the conventionl terms of the world nd becuse pots, cloths, nd so forth hve difference, nd Devdtt is described s smeness [or singulrity] (gcig p nyid) due to not hving the otherness of Yjñdtt nd so forth. འགག པ དང བ དང ཐ དད པ ཉ ད དང གཅ ག པ ཉ ད བཀག པ ན ད ན དམ པར ར ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས ཀ འགག པ དང བ དང ཐ དད པ ཉ ད དང མཚན ཉ ད གཅ ག པ ཉ ད ན ད ན དམ པར བཀག ག ཀ ན བ ན མ བཀག འད ར ཀ ན བ ན འཇ ག ན ག ཐ ད དང ས པ ཐམས ཅད ལ འགག པ ཡང ཡ ད བ ཡང ཡ ད པའ ར དང མ པ དང མ ལ ས གས པ ཐ དད པ ཉ ད ཀ ང ཡ ད པའ ར དང ས ན ན མཆ ད ན ལ ས གས པ གཞན མ ད པས གཅ ག པ ཉ ད ད ཞ ས བ ད པའ ར ར The refuttions of nnihiltion nd permnence re in conventionl terms. (chd p dng rtg p bkg p ni th snyd du o//): With respect to the refuttions of nnihiltion nd permnence, these re not reduced to only being refuttions ultimtely; rther, they re lso refuted in conventionl terms (kun rdzob kyi th snyd du), for even conventionlly things do not hve nnihiltion nd permnence becuse from the first eon onwrd those tht hve the reltion of continuum, such s grss nd so forth, still do not hve n nnihiltion of continuum nd becuse in the world ll things due to being impermnent 1 do not pper to be permnent. ཆད པ དང ག པ བཀག པ ན ཐ ད འ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས ཀ ཆད པ དང ག པ བཀག པ ན ད ན དམ པར བཀག པ འབའ ཞ ག མ ཟད ཀ ཀ ན བ ཀ ཐ ད ཡང བཀག པ འད ར ཀ ན བ ཡང དང ས པ མས ལ ཆད པ དང ག པ མ ད ད བ ལ པའ དང པ ན ཆད ནས ལ ས གས པའ ན འ ལ པ དག ད ང ཡང ན ཆད པ མ ད པའ ར དང འཇ ག ན ན དང ས པ ཐམས ཅད མ ག པས ག པ འགའ ཡང མ ང བའ ར ར The refuttions of going nd coming re both. ( ong b dng gro b bkg p ni gnyi gr ro): With respect to the refuttions of the going nd the coming of things, these re refuted both conventionlly nd ultimtely becuse it is sid in the estblished conclusions [tht is, tenets] tht since conventionlly ll compounded phenomen hve nture of disintegrting even instntneously, they do not hve coming nd going nd becuse lso the mster himself 2 [Nāgārjun] ultimtely refuted coming nd going on the occsion of [the second chpter of the Tretise on the Middle in the] Anlysis of Coming nd Going. In tht wy

218 216 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism One who is not other [nmely, Bhāvvivek myself,] sys: Here ll re refuted ultimtely becuse of being determintive. It is lso not contrdictory in other wys becuse there is no contrdiction with the forementioned indiction of the ttributes of the substrtum nd becuse of being the supreme intention by the teching by the gent. (gzhn m yin p ni dir thms cd don dm pr bkg ste nges pr gzung b i phyir ro// gzhn du yng mi gl te/ khyd pr gyi gzhi i khyd pr ji skd bstn p l gl b med p i phyir dng / mdzd p pos bstn p nyid kyis bzhed p mchog yin p i phyir ro//) this explntion tht some things re refuted ultimtely, some re refuted conventionlly, nd some re refuted both wys is given [by the opponent] for the ske of voiding contrdiction with the world nd for the ske of voiding contrdiction with scripture, since with regrd to certin [of the eight things] the ssertion tht things re conventionlly refuted contrdicts the world, nd with regrd to certin [other of the eight things] it contrdicts scripture tht sserts tht things re ultimtely refuted. འ ང བ དང འག བ བཀག པ ན གཉ གར ར ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས ཀ འ ང བ དང འག བ བཀག པ ན ཀ ན བ དང ད ན དམ པ གཉ གར བཀག འད ར ཀ ན བ ཡང འ ས ས ཐམས ཅད ད ཅ ག གཅ ག ལ འཇ ག པའ ངང ཅན ཡ ན པས འ ང བ དང འག བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ པའ མཐའ ལས ག ངས པའ ར དང ད ན དམ པར ཡང བ དཔ ན ཉ ད ཀ ས འ ང བ དང འག བ བ ག པའ བས ནས འ ང བ དང འག བ དགག པ མཛད པའ ར ར 1 In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 129.5) for mi rtg p g yng mi snng red mi rtg ps rtg p g yng mi snng in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 84.7). 2 In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 129.6) for slob dpon nyid kyi red slob dpon nyid kyi in ccordnce with the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 85.1). Avlokitvrt s commentry on this (continuing from the bove footnote) is: One who is not other (gzhn m yin p ni): Due to not being other, it is he himself, the commenttor [Bhāvvivek]. Therefore, this is to be put together s, The commenttor sys tht here the refuttions of ll cesstion, production, nd so forth re done ultimtely. གཞན མ ཡ ན པ ན ཞ ས བ ན གཞན མ ཡ ན པས རང ཉ ད ཡ ན ཏ འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ད འ ར འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ན འད ར འགག པ དང བ ལ

219 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 217 ས གས པ དགག པ ན ཐམས ཅད ད ན དམ པར བཀག པ པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ཟ ར བར ར ར Here ( dir): Here on the occsion of refuting cesstion, production, nd so forth. ll (thms cd): ll, nmely, cesstion, production, nd so forth. འད ར ཞ ས བ ན འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ དགག པའ བས འད ར ར ཐམས ཅད ཅ ས བ ན འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ ཐམས ཅད ད re refuted ultimtely (don dm pr bkg ste): ultimtely cesstion, production, nd so forth do not exist. Why? It is becuse when the mster [Nāgārjun] cuses reliztion of the chrcter of the ultimte, in this teching of the mode of the perfection of wisdom he tkes up the tsk of refuting things cesstion, production, nnihiltion, permnence, coming, going, difference, nd smeness. Why re ll those refuted ultimtely? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: ད ན དམ པར བཀག ཞ ས བ ན ད ན དམ པར འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ མ ད པ ཡ ན ཏ ཅ འ ར ཞ ན གང ག ཚ བ དཔ ན ད ན དམ པའ མཚན ཉ ད གས པར མཛད པ ད འ ཚ ན ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པའ ལ བ ན པ འད ར དང ས པ མས ཀ འགག པ དང བ དང ཆད པ དང ག པ དང འ ང བ དང འག བ དང ད ན ཐ དད པ དང ད ན གཅ ག པ ཞ ས བ དག དགག པར བཞ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས ཟ ར ར ཅ འ ར ད དག ཐམས ཅད ད ན དམ པར དགག ཅ ན becuse of being determintive. (nges pr gzung b i phyir ro//): becuse ll the phrses (tshig) re unquestionbly determintive, nd tht determintiveness lso is only in the sphere of the ultimte (don dm p i yul kho n) but not in the sphere of the conventionl (kun rdzob kyi yul). ད འ ར ང ས པར ག ང བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ར ཚ ག ཐམས ཅད ན གད ན མ ཟ བར ང ས པར ག ང བར བ ཡ ན ལ ང ས པར ག ང བར བ ད ཡང ད ན དམ པའ ལ ཁ ན ལ ཡ ན ག ཀ ན བ ཀ ལ ལ ན མ ཡ ན པའ ར ར It is lso not contrdictory in other wys (gzhn du yng mi gl te/): Things cesstion, production, nd so forth re determintively not only refuted ultimtely, for in other wys this is lso not contrdictory with the world nd lso not contrdictory with scripture, nd lso ll those cesstion, production, nd so forth re refuted ultimtely. Wht re those other wys? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: གཞན ཡང མ འགལ ཏ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས ཀ འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ ད དག ང ས པར ག ང བ ལས ད ན དམ པར དགག པ འབའ ཞ ག ཡང

220 218 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism མ ཟད ད འད ར མ པ གཞན ཡང འཇ ག ན དང ཡང མ འགལ ཞ ང ང དང ཡང མ འགལ ལ འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ ད དག ཐམས ཅད ད ན དམ པར བཀག པ ཡང ཡ ན ན མ པ གཞན ཡང གང ཞ ན becuse there is no contrdiction with the forementioned indiction of the ttributes of the substrtum nd (khyd pr gyi gzhi i khyd pr ji skd bstn p l gl b med p i phyir dng /): Wht hs no contrdiction with the world nd no contrdiction with scripture? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: with the ttributes of the substrtum s indicted (khyd pr gyi gzhi i khyd pr ji skd bstn p l): with those ttributes of no cesstion, no production, nd so forth tht exist in the substrtum, dependent-rising, the mode of the perfection of wisdom, s indicted erlier, which re the ttributes of the substrtum s indicted. becuse there is no contrdiction with them (de l gl b med p i phyir): becuse there is no contrdiction with the world nd no contrdiction with scripture; since there re no fllcies of mening regrding those, others cnnot object, There is contrdiction with the world nd contrdiction with scripture. Or: ད འ ར ཁ ད པར ག གཞ ཁ ད པར ཇ ད བ ན པ ལ འགལ བ མ ད པའ ར དང ཞ ས བ ས ས གང ལ འཇ ག ན དང འགལ བ དང ང དང འགལ བ མ ད ཅ ན ད འ ར ཁ ད པར ག གཞ འ ཁ ད པར ཇ ད བ ན པ ལ ཞ ས བ ས ཏ ཁ ད པར ག གཞ ཤ ས རབ ཀ ཕ ར ལ ན པའ ལ ན ཅ ང འ ལ པར འ ང བ གང ལ ཁ ད པར འགག པ མ ད པ དང བ མ ད པ ལ ས གས པ ཡ ད པ ར ཇ ད བ ན པ ད ན ཁ ད པར ག གཞ འ ཁ ད པར ཇ ད བ ན པ ད ལའ It is lso not contrdictory in other wys (gzhn du yng ni gl te/): It is not only tht this is not contrdictory due to being determintive nd not contrdictory due to being fllcies of mening, for it is lso not contrdictory, becuse of being the supreme ssertion by the teching by the gent. (mdzd p pos bstn p nyid kyis bzhed p mchog yin p i phyir ro//): ll those cesstion, production, nd so forth re refuted ultimtely. ད ལ འགལ བ མ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན ད ལ འཇ ག ན དང འགལ བ དང ང དང འགལ བ མ ད པའ ར ཏ གང ག ར ད ལ ད ན ག ས ཉ ས པ མ ད པ ད འ ར གཞན ག འཇ ག ན དང འགལ བ དང ང དང འགལ བ ཡ ད ད ཞ ས ལ བར མ ས ས by the teching by the gent. (mdzd p pos bstn p nyid kyis): Since in the definitions of grmmr tretises it is sid, An gent s supreme intention is ction, here lso the gent encting disply in exlted ctivities of tech-

221 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 219 ད ན དམ པར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ད ན དམ པར ཞ ས བ ན ར གཞན མ ཡ ན པ ན འད ར ཐམས ཅད ད ན དམ པར བཀག ང ས པར ག ང བའ ར ར གཞན ཡང མ འགལ ཏ ཁ ད པར ག གཞ འ ཁ ད པར ཇ ད བ ན པ ལ འགལ བ མ ད པའ ར དང ing dependent-risings s the two truths is the Suprmundne Victor [Buddh], nd [thus it] is by wy of the teching by 1 the Suprmundne Victor of both obscurtionl truths nd ultimte truths. becuse of being the supreme intention (bzhed p mchog yin p i phyir ro//): from between the intentions by the gent, the Suprmundne Victor, to tech obscurtionl truths nd lso to tech ultimte truths, here the Suprmundne Victor s supreme intention is ultimte truths, nd hence it is to be known tht since the exlted ctivity tht is the gent s supreme intention is the ultimte, ll these cesstion, production, nnihiltion, permnence, coming, going, difference, nd smeness re only refuted ultimtely. This is becuse in tht wy the Suprmundne Victor sys in the Victorious Mother, Perfection of Wisdom Sūtr, Subhūti, ll these re tught in conventionl terms, but not ultimtely. ཡང ན གཞན ཡང མ འགལ ཏ ཞ ས བ ན ང ས པར ག ང བའ ར མ འགལ བ དང ད ན ག ས ཉ ས པ མ ད པའ ར མ འགལ བ འབའ ཞ ག ཡང མ ཟད ད འད ར མཛད པ པ ས བ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ བཞ ད པ མཆ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང མ འགལ ཏ འགག པ དང བ ལ ས གས པ ད དག ཐམས ཅད ད ན དམ པར བཀག པ ཡ ན ན མཛད པ པ ས བ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ཞ ས བ ན འ བ ན བཅ ས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད ལས ད པ པ འ འད ད པ མཆ ག ན ལས ཡ ན ན ཞ ས འ ང བས འད ར ཡང ན ཅ ང འ ལ བར འ ང བ བད ན པ གཉ ས བ ན པའ ན ལས ལ ན པར མཛད པའ མཛད པ པ ན བཅ མ ན འདས ཡ ན ལ བཅ མ ན འདས ཀ ས ཀ ན བ ཀ བད ན པ དང ད ན དམ པའ བད ན པ གཉ ག བ ན པའ ཉ ད ཀ ས ས 1 The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 132.5) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) red bcom ldn ds kyi wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 86.7) reds bcom ldn ds kyis.

222 220 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism མཛད པ པ ས བ ན པ ཉ ད ཀ བཞ ད པ མཆ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས ཟ ར ར ཞ ས ས པས Hence, here it is to be put together tht the refuttion tht is, tht production does not exist is lso refuttion ultimtely. In this, ultimtely [mens tht] production is refuted ultimtely by wy of substnce (rdzs), thing (dngos po), nd bsis (gzhi); moreover, within biding in obscurtionl truths it is to be refuted s n ultimte object; ultimtely even the convention of refuttion does not exist, since [ultimtely] there is no verbliztion. In tht: the internl sense-spheres [eye sense, er sense, nd so forth] (nng gi skye mched rnms, ādhyātmikānyāytnāni): this is the object-inferred-position (rjes su dpg pr by b phyogs), tht is to sy, the subject (chos cn, dhrmin). re not produced from self (bdg ls skye b med pr nges te, n svt utpnnāni): this is the being-inferred-position b (rjes su dpg p phyogs), tht is to sy, the predicte of the proposition. becuse of existing (yod p i phyir, vidymāntvāt): this is the ttribute tht is the mens of proof, the reson, tht is to sy, the property of the position (phyogs kyi chos). like, for exmple, intelligence. (dper n shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, citnyvd): This is the exmple, tht is, qulittively similr exmple (chos mthun p i dpe). ད ལ ད ན དམ པར ཞ ས བ ན ད ན དམ པར བ ས དང དང ས པ དང གཞ འ ནས དགག པ ད ཡང ཀ ན བ ཀ བད ན པ ལ གནས ནས ད ན དམ པའ ལ ལ དགག པར བ ཡ ན ག ད ན དམ པ ཉ ད ན བ ད པ མ ད པའ ར དགག པའ ཐ ད ཀ ང མ ད ད ད ལ ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས Or, position in the sense of the object bout which something is being inferred. The position comprises subject nd predicte, nd thus the object-inferred-position is tht prt of the position which is the subject, bout which the predicte is being inferred. b Or, position in the sense of wht is being inferred.

223 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 221 བ འད ན ས དཔག པར བ གས ཏ ཆ ས ཅན ཡ ན ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཞ ས བ འད ན ས དཔག པ གས ཏ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཡ ན ན ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ འད ན བ པའ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཏ གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ན ན དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ འད ན དཔ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཡ ན ན In tht [syllogism]: internl (nng gi, ādhyātmikāni): tht which is under the influence of nd tken s n bode by the self (bdg gi byin gyis brlbs shing gns su bys p). Self is tht which, t certin points, b tkes [things] s mine (bdg gir bys p); since it tkes rticles rnging from the excellent nd the vst to the bd nd the diminutive to be mine, it is clled self. Tht which is under the influence of nd tken s n bode by tht mentting self c is clled internl. ད ལ ནང ག ཞ ས བ ན བདག ག ས ན ག ས བ བས ཤ ང གནས ས པའ བདག ཅ ས བ ན མཚམས ལ བདག ག ར ད པ ཡ ད ག ན མ པ དང ཆ ན པ དག དང པ ར ས ནས ཡ ད ངན པ དང ཁ ན ང འ བར དག ལ བདག ག ར ད པས བདག ཅ ས འ བདག ད ས ན ག ས བ བས ཤ ང གནས ས པ ན ནང ག ཞ ས འ sense-spheres (skye mched rnms, āytnāni): They re sense-spheres [or, literlly, producer-incresers] becuse they produce, give rise to, increse, nd further minds nd mentl The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 132.3) reds gis, wheres the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) reds gi. b mtshms l; trnsltion conjectured. c bdg sems p des; the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 132.4) merely reds bdg des.

224 222 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism fctors those [sense-spheres] clled eye, er, nose, tongue, body, nd mentlity. མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ ན ས མས དང ས མས ལས འ ང བ མས ཞ ང འ ང བ དང མཆ ད ཅ ང ས པར ད པས མཆ ད མས ཏ འད མ ག དང བ དང དང དང ས དང ཡ ད ཅ ས བ མས ས the internl sense-spheres (nng gi skye mched rnms, ādhyātmikānyāytnāni): this is the object-inferred-position (rjes su dpg pr by b phyogs), tht is to sy, the subject (chos cn, dhrmin). In tht, [in generl] object-inferred (rjes su dpg pr by b) is the substrtum with respect to which nonexistence (dngos po med p) is inferred from not being observed, or n impermnent thing is inferred from nture, or cuse is inferred from n effect; on this occsion it is the substrtum (the internl sense-spheres) with respect to which no production from self is being inferred. It itself is clled the position. ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ འད ན ས དཔག པར བ གས ཏ ཆ ས ཅན ཡ ན ན ད ལ ས དཔག པར བ ཞ ས བ ན གང ལ མ དམ གས པ ལས དང ས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པ In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 207.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for gng l m dmigs p zhes by ste phyogs ls red gng l mi dmigs p ls ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, This is the first of three types of resons, or signs: nonobservtion signs (s in With respect to the subject, here in this plce in front, there does not exist fctully concordnt subsequent cognition tht scertins flesh-eter in the continuum of person for whom flesh-eter is supersensory object becuse there does not exist prime cognition tht observes flesh-eter in the continuum of person for whom flesh-eter is supersensory object ); nture signs (s in The subject, the sound of conch, is impermnent becuse of being risen from exertion ); nd effect signs (s in With respect to the subject, on smoky pss, fire exists becuse smoke exists.) For extensive discussion of these, see Ktherine Mnchester Rogers, Tibetn Logic (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, 2009).

225 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 223 དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པའ གཞ བས འད ར ན གང ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ད ས དཔག པར བའ གཞ ནང ག མཆ ད མས ས ད ཉ ད གས ཞ ས [In generl] the position is the position [or thesis] comprising the ttribute [tht is, the predicte] nd the subject; on this occsion the position comprising the two the predicte of the proposition ( not produced from self ) nd the subject ( the internl sense-spheres ) tht is the substrtum with respect to which this is being proven is clled the position. Just tht [substrtum] is clled the subject (chos cn, dhrmin; literlly, ttribute-possessor ); with respect to the term subject, the substrtum of inference tht possesses the two, (1) the ttribute [tht is, the predicte] tht is being proven nd (2) the ttribute [or reson] tht is the mens of proof is the subject. On this occsion, the internl sense-spheres, which re the substrt possessing the two: the ttribute [or predicte]of the proposition, re not produced from self, renowned to both disputnts, nd the ttribute proving nonproduction from self ( existing ), renowned to both disputnts re clled the subject (chos cn, dhrmin) [literlly, tht which possesses the ttributes, tht is to sy, tht which is endowed with the predicte nd the reson ]. གས ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས དང ཆ ས ཅན བ ས པའ གས ཏ བས འད ར ན བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ དང གང ལ ད བ བ པར བའ གཞ འ ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ ད གཉ ས བ ས པའ གས ལ གས ཞ ས འ ད ཉ ད ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས བ ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས བ ན ས དཔག པར བའ གཞ གང ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ད ན ཆ ས ཅན ཏ

226 224 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism བས འད ར ན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ གཞ གང ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ད བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ས ཀ ལ ག གས པ ད གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ད ན ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས འ from self (bdg ls, svt): from [their own] existent entity (bdg nyid yod p nyid ls). བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལས ས re not produced from self (skye b med pr nges te, n svt utpnnāni): things re not produced from [their own] existent entity (bdg nyid yod p nyid ls skye b med pr nges p). This re not produced from self is the being-inferred-position (rjes su dpg p phyogs), tht is to sy, the predicte of the proposition. Concerning tht, [in generl] the being-inferred (rjes su dpg p) is (1) inference s nonexistent (dngos po med p) from not being observed, or (2) inference s impermnent from nture, or (3) inference of cuse from n effect; nd on this occsion it is the inference tht the substrtum tht is the object inferred, b tht is to sy, the internl sense-spheres, is without production from self. c It itself is clled the position. [In generl] the position is the position [or thesis] comprising the ttribute [or predicte] nd the subject; on this occsion the position comprising the two the predicte of the proposition ( not produced from self ) nd the subject ( the internl sense-spheres ) tht is the substrtum with respect to which this is being proven is Usully trnslted s inference. b Rjes su dpg pr by b i gzhi. c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 209.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for bdg l red bdg ls in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

227 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 225 clled the position. Just tht [predicte] is clled the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos, sādhydhrm); [in generl] the predicte of the proposition is (1) nonexistence (dngos po med p), or (2) impermnence, or (3) cuse; on this occsion the nonexistence of production from self, the predicte of the proposition, in the internl sense-spheres, the subject, is the proposition. བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཞ ས བ འད ན ས དཔག པ གས ཏ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཡ ན ན ད ལ ས དཔག པ ཞ ས བ ན མ དམ གས པ ལས དང ས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པ དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པ བས འད ར ན ས དཔག པར བའ གཞ ནང ག མཆ ད མས ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ས དཔག པའ ད ཉ ད གས ཞ ས བ གས ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས དང ཆ ས ཅན བ ས པའ གས ཏ བས འད ར ན བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ དང གང ལ ད བ བ པར བའ གཞ ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ ད གཉ ས བ ས པའ གས ལ གས ཞ ས འ ད ཉ ད བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མ ད པ དང མ ག པ དང བས འད ར ན ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ད བ བ པར བའ

228 226 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism becuse of existing (yod p i phyir, vidymāntvāt): becuse of the existence of [their] entity, s follows: becuse from self is designted to n existent entity. This becuse of existing is the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos), the reson; it is the property of the position (phyogs kyi chos). Concerning tht, ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos) is [in generl] the ttribute proving (1) nonexistence, or (2) impermnence, or (3) cuse nmely, nonobservtion, nture, or effect [respectively]. On this occsion the ttribute proving the predicte of the proposition ( no production from self ) is becuse of existing. ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ར ཏ འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ད གདགས པའ ར ར ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ འད ན བ བ པའ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཏ གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ན ན ད ལ བ བ པའ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མ ད པ དང མ ག པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས མ དམ གས པ དང ང བ ཉ ད དང འ ས བས འད ར ན བ བ པར བ ཆ ས པ དག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ད བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ It is thus: If from self is suitble to be designted to n existent entity nd the internl sense-spheres re suitble to be designted s from self, then the existent does not hve production-gin b (yng skye b, punrutpād), nd, therefore, becuse of existing is n ttribute [or property] proving no production from self. Just tht is clled reson (gtn tshigs); with respect to reson [in generl] the resons proving (1) nonexistence, (2) impermnence, nd (3) cuse re nonobservtion, nture, nd effect [respectively]; on this occsion the reson proving the predicte of the proposition ( no This finl phrse repets wht Bhāvvivek sid erlier but is not mrked here s quottion. b The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti.

229 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 227 production from self ) is becuse of existing. འད ར བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ ད གདགས ང བ དང བདག ལས ཞ ས ད གདགས ང བའ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ན ཡང བ མ ད པས ད འ ར ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པ བ བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ན ན ད ཉ ད གཏན ཚ གས ཞ ས བ གཏན ཚ གས ཞ ས བ ཡང དང ས པ མ ད པ དང མ ག པ དང བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས མ དམ གས པ དང ང བ ཉ ད དང འ ས བས འད ར མ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ད བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ Why re the internl sense-spheres not produced from self? Becuse of existing. If the internl sense-spheres re existent entities, then since the existent does not hve production-gin, becuse of existing is reson proving no production from self. Just tht is clled the property of the position (phyogs kyi chos). Furthermore, the property of the position is the property of the position tht comprises the predicte nd the subject, b [the property] which [in generl] is (1) nonobservtion, (2) nture, nd (3) effect; on this occsion the property of the position tht comprises the predicte of the proposition ( no production from self ) nd the subject ( the internl sense-spheres ) is becuse of existing. ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཅ འ ར བདག ལས བ མ ད ཅ ན ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 210.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for yng chos cn red yng chos dng chos cn in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

230 228 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ན ཡང བ མ ད པས ད འ ར ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ན ན ད ཉ ད གཏན ཚ གས ཞ ས བ གཏན ཚ གས ཞ ས བ ཡང དང ས པ མ ད པ དང མ ག པ དང བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས མ དམ གས པ དང ང བ ཉ ད དང འ ས བས འད ར མ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ད བ པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཅ འ ར བདག ལས བ མ ད ཅ ན ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ Why re the internl sense-spheres not produced from self? Becuse of existing. If the internl sense-spheres re existent entities, then since the existent does not hve production-gin, becuse of existing is the ttribute [or property] tht is the reson b of tht position comprising predicte nd subject, nd hence is clled property of the position (phyogs kyi chos). ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཅ འ ར བདག ལ བ མ ད ཅ ན ཡ ད པའ ར ཏ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ན ཡང བ མ ད པས ད འ ར ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས དང ཆ ས ཅན བ ས པའ གས ད འ གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ན པས གས ཀ ཆ ས ཞ ས འ like, for exmple, intelligence. (dper n shes p yod p nyid The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti. b gtn tshigs kyi chos.

231 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 229 bzhin no, citnyvd): With respect to intelligence (shes p yod p, citny), the nture of the person (skyes bu, puruṣ) is clled intelligence in the texts of the Sāṃkhys nd so forth; it is vrint of the proposition of self. With respect to nyid [in shes p yod p nyid] the thingness of intelligence (shes p yod p i dngos po) is intelligence (shes p yod p nyid). This phrse like, for exmple, intelligence is n exmple, nmely, qulittively similr exmple (chos mthun p i dpe). In tht, exmple is n exmple of the existence in the subject b of the ttribute [or predicte] of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof. Here the exmple is to be put together s being the object-inferredposition, tht is to sy, the subject (rjes su dpg pr by b phyogs chos cn) intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny), in which exist the two: 1. the being-inferred-position, tht is to sy, the predicte of the proposition (rjes su dpg p phyogs bsgrub pr by b chos) not produced from self (skye b med p, n utpnn) which is renowned to both disputnts, nd 2. the ttribute tht is the mens of proof, the reson, tht is to sy, the property of the position (sgrub p i chos gtn tshigs phyogs kyi chos) existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv) which is renowned to both disputnts. Just tht is qulittively similr exmple. དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཞ ས བ ན ག ངས ཅན ལ ས གས པའ ག ང ལ ས འ རང བཞ ན ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པའ ཞ ས ཟ ར བ བདག བའ མ ག ངས ཡ ན ན ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པའ དང ས པ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ད དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ འད ན དཔ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ rnm grngs. b chos cn, dhrmin; literlly, the possessor of the ttributes, nmely, the predicte of the proposition nd the reson.

232 230 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཡ ན ད ལ དཔ ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས ཅན གང ལ བ བ པར བ དག བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ པའ དཔ འད ར དཔ ན ས དཔག པར བ གས ཆ ས ཅན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ གང ལ ས དཔག པ གས བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བ ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གཏན ཚ གས གས ཀ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ད གཉ ས ཡ ད པ ཡ ན པར ར ར With respect to qulittively similr exmple (chos mthun p i dpe), [in generl] qulittively similr exmple in the inference of nonexistence (dngos po med p) from not being observed is in this re [ pot] does not exist becuse pot tht would be n object of observnt knowing is not observed; b qulittively similr exmple in the inference of n impermnent thing from nture is This is tree becuse of being shimshpā tree; c nd qulittively similr exmple in the inference of cuse from n effect is Here in the kitchen there is fire becuse smoke is billowing. d On this occsion with respect to for exmple, the subject, intelligence, e intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny) is renowned to the opposing prty s just existent (yod p nyid, vidymān), nd conventionlly consciousness (rnm pr shes p nyid) is renowned to the ltter prty f s just existent In the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 135.2) for ni dmigs p ls red ni mi dmigs p ls in ccordnce with the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.1) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). b phyogs di n dngos po med de dmigs p i rig byr gyur p i bum p mi dmigs p i phyir ro. c di ni shing yin te shing sh p yin p i phyir ro. A shimshpā (śimśpā) is kind of tree. d e f tshng mng di n me yod de du b thul b i phyir ro. dper n chos cn shes p yod p nyid. phyir rgol b, the Proponent of the Middle.

233 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 231 (yod p nyid, vidymān), nd in this subject exist the two: 1. the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos) not produced from self (skye b med p, n utpnn), which is renowned to both disputnts, nd 2. the ttribute tht is the mens of proving no production from self (sgrub p i chos), existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv), which is renowned to both disputnts, nd hence it is clled the subject. b Just s in the subject, intelligence, there is no production from self becuse of existing, so here lso these internl sense-spheres re renowned to the opposing prty s just existent s empowered nd sustined by the self c nd renowned to the ltter prty [nmely, the Proponent of the Middle] d s just existent s conventionlly ble to pprehend n object, e like, for exmple, sound is renowned s just existent, tht is, just rising immeditely upon exertion, nd in this f subject exist the two: 1. the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos) not produced from self (skye b med p, n utpnn), which is renowned to both disputnts, nd 2. the ttribute tht is the mens of proving no production from self (sgrub p i chos), existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv), which is renowned to both disputnts, nd hence it is clled the subject. It is to be put together s In the subject, the internl sense-spheres, lso there is no production from self g becuse of existing like, for exmple, intelligence. Therefore, [the syllogism is]: Whtever exists is without production like, for exmple, intelligence. Becuse the internl sense I tke the sentence until here to be stted in response to Chndrkīrti. b chos cn, dhrmin; literlly, the possessor of the ttributes, which re the ttribute (predicte) of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (the reson). c bdg gis byin gyis brlbs shing gns su bys p nyid. d Agin, I tke it tht Avlokitvrt is responding to Chndrkīrti. e kun rdzob tu yul dzin nus p nyid. f In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for de ls red de l in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, g In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 213.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for bdg l red bdg ls in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

234 232 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism spheres lso re just existent, they lso re without production. ད ཉ ད ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཞ ས ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཞ ས བ ན དམ གས པ ལས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ གས འད ན དང ས པ མ ད ད དམ གས པའ ར གས ར ར པའ མ པ མ དམ གས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ འད ན ཤ ང ཡ ན ཏ ཤ ང ཤ པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཚང མང འད ན མ ཡ ད ད བ འ ལ བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ བས འད ར ན དཔ ར ན ཆ ས ཅན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ད ལ བའ གས ལ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ག གས ལ ར ལ བའ གས ལ ན ཀ ན བ མ པར ཤ ས པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བར ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ག གས པ ད ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ད བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ད གཉ ས ཡ ད པས ད ན ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས ཆ ས ཅན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ད ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཡ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ད བཞ ན འད ར ཡང ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཞ ས བ འད ཡང ལ བའ གས ལ ན བདག ག ས ན ག ས བ བས ཤ ང གནས ས པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བར ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ག གས ལ ར

235 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 233 ལ བའ གས ལ ན ཀ ན བ ལ འཛ ན ས པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བར ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ག གས པ དཔ ར ན ལ བ ལ མ ཐག འ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ག གས པ དང འ བ ད ལ བ བ པར བ ཆ ས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ དང བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ད བ པའ ཆ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ ག ལ ག གས པ ད གཉ ས ཡ ད པས ད ཡང ཆ ས ཅན ཞ ས ཆ ས ཅན ནང ག མཆ ད མས ལ ཡང བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བར ར ར ད འ ར གང དང གང ཡ ད པ ད ལ བ མ ད ད དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ནང ག མཆ ད ཉ ད མས ཀ ང ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན པས ད འ ར ད དག ལ ཡང བ མ ད ད If despite being similr in being just existent, you ssert tht the internl sense-spheres hve production but ssert tht intelligence does not hve production, then you must express the resons for the distinction for sserting tht due to suchnd-such reson you ssert tht the internl sense-spheres hve production but due to such-nd-such reson you ssert tht intelligence does not hve production. Becuse those who propound production from self do not ssert tht intelligence is produced in its stte of existing, it is estblished tht the internl sense-spheres lso do not hve production due to the existence of their entity. གལ ཏ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད འ བ ལས ནང ག མཆ ད མས ལ ན བ ཡ ད པར འད ད ལ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ ན བ མ ད པར འད ད ན ན ད འ ཚ འད ས ནང ག མཆ ད མས ལ

236 234 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism བ ཡ ད པར འད ད ལ འད ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ བ མ ད པར འད ད ད ཞ ས ཁ ད པར ཉ ད བའ ཁ ད པར ག གཏན ཚ གས བ ད པར དག ས ས གང ག ར བདག ལས བར བ དག ལ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ གནས བས ལ བར མ འད ད པ ད འ ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཀ ང བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལས བ མ ད པར འ ར པ Moreover, why is the production of things sserted? If it is tht production is sserted in order to ttin n unttined entity of selfhood, then if the internl sense-spheres hve n entity of selfhood prior to production, wht is the use of imputing production from those! For, it is sid tht the produced do not hve production-gin. b གཞན ཡང དང ས པ མས ཀ བ ཅ འ ར འད ད ཅ ན བདག ཉ ད ཀ ང བ ཉ ད མ ཐ བ པ ཐ བ པར བའ ར བར འད ད པ ཡ ན ན གལ ཏ ནང ག མཆ ད ད དག ལ བའ ར ལ ན བདག ཉ ད ཀ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པར ར ན ད དག ལས བར བ གས པས ཅ ཞ ག ས པ ལ ཡང བ མ ད ད ཞ ས ག ངས པའ ར ར Furthermore, cesstion would lso be discordnt; if it exists, it would not be produced, wheres if it is produced, it does not exist. Moreover, production of the existent is contrdictory in the world becuse in the world pot tht mnifestly exists with the cpcity to perform the functions of holding honey, wter, nd milk nd so forth is not seen to be produced bdg nyid kyi ngo bo nyid. b The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti.

237 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 235 gin. གཞན ཡང དགག པ མ མ ན པར ཡང འ ར ཏ གལ ཏ ཡ ད ན ན བར མ འ ར ལ ཅ ན ན ཡ ད པ མ ཡ ན ན གཞན ཡང འཇ ག ན ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བ ན འགལ ཏ འད ར འཇ ག ན ན མ པ ང དང དང འ མ འཛ ན པ ལ ས གས པའ བ ད ས པ གསལ བར ཡ ད པ ན ཡང བར མ མཐ ང བའ ར ར If ultimtely ll externl nd internl things re refuted s not produced from self, b why here re the internl sensespheres posited s limited subject? About this, through the resoning [in Ārydev s Four Hundred]: Wht is seen with regrd to one thing Is lso sserted s seen in ll. Just wht is the emptiness of one Is the emptiness of ll. when it is estblished tht the internl sense-spheres re not produced from self, c ll phenomen, such s the externl sense-spheres, re lso estblished s just not produced from self, nd when the internl sense-spheres re posited s the subjects, others such s the externl sense-spheres nd so forth re fit for the positing of resons nd exmples. Hence, the internl sense-spheres re posited s limited subjects. ད ན དམ པར ནང ག དང ས པ ཐམས ཅད བདག ལས བ མ ད པར འགག པ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར འད ར ནང ག མཆ ད The usge of production-gin (yng skye b, punrutpād) ppers to be in response to Chndrkīrti. b bdg ls skye b med pr gg p yin n; it seems to me tht the pssge would red more esily s bdg ls skye b yod pr gg p yin n, but ll three editions hve the first reding; in ny cse, the point is cler by now. c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 214.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for bdg l red bdg ls in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

238 236 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism མས ཉ ཚ ཆ ས ཅན གཞག ཅ ན ད ན དང ས པ གཅ ག ལ གང མཐ ང བ ད ན ཀ ན ལའང མཐ ང བར འད ད གཅ ག ག ང ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ ད ཉ ད ཀ ན ག ང པ ཉ ད ཅ ས ག ངས པའ ར གས པས ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ ན ར ལ ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ ཆ ས ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཉ ད འ བ པའ ར དང ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཆ ས ཅན བཞག ན ར ལ ག མཆ ད ལ ས གས པ གཞན དག གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ ར གཞག ང བས ད འ ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས ཉ ཚ ཆ ས ཅན གཞག ག If it is objected: The reson, existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv), hs not been shown to be bsent from the dissimilr clss; hence, this is not veritble reson. (gl te gtn tshigs yod p nyid ni mi mthun p i phyogs ls ldog p m bstn b ps gtn tshigs nyid m yin no zhe n): This is drwing forth of qulm in which logicins object to the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] with the fllcy of indefiniteness. In tht: If it is objected (gl te): This is term [indicting] tht the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] himself is [hypotheticlly] drwing forth qulm of logicins. the reson, existing, (gtn tshigs yod p nyid ni): This is the erlier sttement by the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] of becuse of existing (yod p i phyir, vidymāntvāt) s reson for the nonexistence of production from self. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for m stn ps red m bstn ps in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for stn red bstn in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

239 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 237 གལ ཏ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ མ བ ན པས གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ན ཞ ས བ ན ག ག པ དག འག ལ པ ད པ ལ གཏན ཚ གས མ ང ས པའ ན ག ས ལ བའ ད གས པ བ བ ཡ ན ན ད ལ གལ ཏ ཞ ས བའ ན འག ལ བ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས ག ག པ དག ག ད གས བ བ བའ ཚ ག ཡ ན ན གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ན ཞ ས བ ན འག ལ པ ད པས ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བཤད པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ཉ ད ད hs not been shown to be bsent from the dissimilr clss; hence, this is not veritble reson. (mi mthun p i phyogs ls ldog p m bstn ps gtn tshigs nyid m yin no): In tht: hs not been shown to be bsent from the dissimilr clss; hence, (mi mthun p i phyogs ls ldog p m bstn ps): The mening of the words of the clss contrry b to the ttributes nd the subject is the dissimilr clss (mi mthun p i phyogs, vipkṣ). to be bsent from the dissimilr clss (mi mthun p i phyogs ls ldog p): The nonexistence of the two ttributes the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos) nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos) in the dissimilr clss is clled to be bsent from the dissimilr clss (mi mthun p i phyogs ls ldog p). hs not been shown hence, (m bstn ps): this bsence from the dissimilr clss hs not been shown, tht is to sy, hs not been explined; hence. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 215.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for stn red bstn in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b mi dr b i phyogs.

240 238 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ མ བ ན པས གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ལ མ མ ན པའ གས ཞ ས བ ན ཆ ས དང ཆ ས ཅན ག མ འ བའ གས ཀ ཚ ག ག ད ན མ མ ན པའ གས ས མ མ ན པའ གས ད ལས ག པ ཞ ས བ ན མ མ ན པའ གས ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གཉ ས མ ད པ ན མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ ཞ ས བའ ད མ བ ན པས ཞ ས བ ན མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ ད མ བ ན མ བཤད པས ས this is not veritble reson (gtn tshigs nyid m yin no): the reson for the internl sense-spheres nonexistence of production from self becuse of existing (yod p i phyir, vidymāntvāt) tht the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] erlier set forth is not veritble reson. Why? It is s follows: since bsence from the dissimilr clss hs not been shown, the reson becuse of existing is indefinite nd hence is not veritble reson. This is the equivlent of sying, Becuse it is not veritble reson, it lso does not prove the predicte of the proposition. གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བ ན འག ལ པ ད པས ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བཤད པ གང ཡ ན པ ད གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ཏ ཅ འ ར ཞ ན འད ར མ མ ན པའ གས ལས ག པ མ བ ན པས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བའ གཏན ཚ གས ད མ ང ས པའ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ད གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པས ད བ བ པར བ ཆ ས ཀ ང མ འ བ པ ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག

241 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 239 Moreover, the definition of reson is this: tht which evinces sign endowed with the three modes (tshul gsum dng ldn p i rtgs bstn p). For it is sid [in Dignāg s Compiltion of Prime Cognition/Dhrmkīrti s Commentry on Dignāg s Compiltion of Prime Cognition]: Tht which evinces sign endowed with the three modes Abides s the property of the position. The reminder, those imputed with two modes, b Are reveled by the exmple. ད ཡང འད ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད ན འད ཡ ན ཏ ལ ག མ ན པའ གས བ ན པ གས ཀ ཆ ས ལ གནས པ ཡ ན ག མ ལ གཉ ས བཏགས པ ན དཔ ཡ ས རབ བ ན པ ཡ ན ཞ ས བས ལ ག མ དང ན པའ གས བ ན པ ཡ ན ན About this, the three modes re definiteness s existing in the object of inference, c existing in the similr clss, nd just not existing in the dissimilr clss. Also, with respect to those hving the three modes, signs re threefold nonobservtion, nture, nd effect. Concerning them, d the three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness s just existing in the object of inference [tht is, in the subject] re: Inferring the nonexistence of thing e from nonobservtion: Here thing does not exist becuse of not being phyogs kyi chos, pkṣdhrm; this is the reson, or sign, tht is present in the subject of the syllogism. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 216.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for tshul gnyis rtgs p red tshul gnyis btgs p in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, c rjes su dpg pr by b; tht is to sy, the subject. d The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 138.1, reds des, nd the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 216.6) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). e In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, ) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for mi dmigs p ls dngos po med ps red mi dmigs p ls dngos po med pr in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

242 240 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism observed. Inferring n impermnent thing from nture: Sound is impermnent becuse of being product. Inferring cuse from n effect: With respect to this cuse exists becuse n effect is observed. ད ལ ལ ག མ ན ས དཔག པར བ ལ ཡ ད པ དང མ ན པའ གས ལ ཡ ད པ དང མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག མ པ དག ལ གས ཀ ང ག མ མ དམ གས པ དང ང བ ཉ ད དང འ ས འ ད ས ས དཔག པར བ ལ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག གས ག མ ན མ དམ གས པ ལས དང ས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པར བ ལ ན འད ན དང ས པ མ ད ད མ དམ གས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པར བ ལ ན མ ག པ ས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པར བ ལ ན འད ལ ཡ ད ད འ ས དམ གས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ཡ ན ན The three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness s just existing in the similr clss re: Qulittively similr exmple for inferring the nonexistence of thing from nonobservtion: In this qurter thing does not exist becuse pot tht would be n object of observnt knowing is not observed. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.1), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, for dmigs p i reg byr gyur red dmigs p i rig byr gyur in ccordnce the erlier occurrence in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.2), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, The originl reding lso seems dmissible dmigs p i reg byr gyur, in which cse it would red becuse pot tht would be n object of observnt touch is not observed. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for brs bu dmigs su med p i phyir red brs bu dmigs p i phyir in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

243 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 241 Qulittively similr exmple for inferring n impermnent thing from nture: This is tree becuse of being shimshpā tree. Qulittively similr exmple for inferring cuse from n effect: Here in the kitchen there is fire becuse smoke is billowing. མ ན པའ གས ལ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག གས ག མ ན མ དམ གས པ ལས དང ས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ གས འད ན དང ས པ མ ད ད དམ གས པའ ར ག ར ར པའ མ པ མ དམ གས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ འད ན ཤ ང ཡ ན ཏ ཤ ང ཤ པ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ ན པའ དཔ ཚད མང འད ན མ ཡ ད ད བ འ ལ བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ འད ཡ ན ན The three signs in terms of the mode of definiteness s just not existing in the dissimilr clss re: Qulittively dissimilr exmple for inferring the nonexistence of thing from nonobservtion: In this qurter thing exists becuse pot tht would be n object of observnt knowing is observed. Qulittively dissimilr exmple for inferring n impermnent thing from nture: Spce is permnent becuse of not being product. Qulittively dissimilr exmple for inferring cuse from n effect: b Here in this well fire does not exist becuse frost exists. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 217.6), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, for dmigs p i reg byr gyur red dmigs p i rig byr gyur in ccordnce the erlier occurrence in the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 212.2), the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ), nd the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 218.1) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, )

244 242 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག གས ག མ ན མ དམ གས པ ལས དང ས པ མ ད པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ མ ན པའ དཔ གས འད ན དང ས པ ཡ ད ད དམ གས པའ ར ག ར ར པའ མ པ དམ གས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང ང བ ཉ ད ལས མ ག པར ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ མ ན པའ དཔ ནམ མཁའ ག མ ས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ དང འ ས ལས ས དཔག པའ ཆ ས མ མ ན པའ དཔ ཁ ན པ འད ན མ མ ད ད བ མ ཡ ད པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ཡ ན ན Thus the objection is: When in tht wy sign endowed with the three modes must evince the defining chrcteristics of reson, here: 1. since Bhāvvivek indictes The internl sense-spheres re not produced from self becuse of existing (nng gi skye mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir, n ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt), there exists sign in the mode of definiteness s just existing in the object of inference [tht is, in the subject], nd 2. since Bhāvvivek indictes like, for exmple, intelligence (shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, citnyvd) there exists sign in the mode of definiteness s just existing in the similr clss, but 3. [Bhāvvivek] does not indicte sign in the mode of definiteness s just not existing in the dissimilr clss. Therefore, the defining chrcteristics of reson re not for brs bu l red brs bu ls in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 218.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for gtn tshigs kyi mtshn red gtn tshigs kyi mtshn nyid in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

245 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 243 complete; hence, becuse the reson, existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv), is indefinite, it is not [veritble] reson. ད ར ལ ག མ དང ན པའ གས ཀ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད བ ན དག ས ན འད ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ ན པས ས དཔག པར བ ལ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས ཀ ང ཡ ད དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ ན པས མ ན པའ གས ལ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས ཀ ང ཡ ད ན འད ར མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས མ བ ན པས ད འ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད མ ཚང ནས གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ད མ ང ས པའ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས ན In response to this, here the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] utters: Answer: Becuse [the dissimilr clss] is just nonexistent, bsence from tht does not exist, due to which there is no fllcy in this or nything else. (med p kho n i phyir de l ldog p med ps/ di dng thms cd l nyes p med do): In tht: Becuse it is just nonexistent, (med p kho n i phyir): Becuse the dissimilr clss is just nonexistent; tht is to sy, becuse for us Proponents of the Middle the dissimilr clss of the internl sense-spheres not being produced from self production from other is just nonexistent. ད འ ལན འད ར འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ད ལ ག པ མ ད པས འད དང ཐམས ཅད ལ ཉ ས པ མ ད

246 244 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ད ཞ ས བ ས ས ད ལ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ཞ ས བ ན མ མ ན པའ གས མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ཏ འད ར ཁ བ ཅག ད མ པ ལ ན ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ མ མ ན པའ གས གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བ མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ར bsence from tht does not exist, (de l ldog p med ps): bsence of the two the predicte of the proposition (bsgrub pr by b chos) nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof (sgrub p i chos) from tht nonexistent dissimilr clss does not exist. This is the equivlent of sying: If the dissimilr clss of nonproduction from self production from other existed, the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof would be bsent from nd nonexistent in it, b nd hence it would lso be suitble to demonstrte the sign c in the mode of definiteness s just not existing in the dissimilr clss, but becuse for us the dissimilr clss of nonproduction from self production from other is just nonexistent, bsence from it of the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof does not exist, whereby it is not necessry to demonstrte the sign in the mode of definiteness s just not existing in the dissimilr clss. ད ལ ག པ མ ད པས ཞ ས བ ན མ མ ན པའ གས མ ད པ ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས གཉ ས ག པ མ ད In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.1) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for gzhn l skye b red gzhn ls skye b in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.2) for yod n ni l red yod n ni de l in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 139.4, nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ). c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for rtg kyng red rtgs kyng in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

247 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 245 པས ཏ གལ ཏ བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ མ མ ན པའ གས གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བ ཡ ད ན ན ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ད གཉ ས ག ཅ ང མ ད པར འ ར བས མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས ཀ ང བ ན ང བ ཞ ག ན ཁ བ ཅག ལ བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ མ ན པའ གས གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བ ད མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག པ མ ད པས འད ར མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས བ ན མ དག ས ས ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག due to which there is no fllcy in this or nything else. ( di dng thms cd l nyes p med do): in these syllogistic words there is no fllcy tht is the fultiness of n indefinite reson, nd not only tht but lso this fllcy does not exist in ny of the other proofs tht occur below in this tretise. This indictes tht if the dissimilr clss existed, bsence from it of the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof should be shown; for exmple, when the dissimilr clss of Sound is impermnent becuse of being product exists s in the likes of Spce is permnent becuse of not being product, the two, the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof in [is] impermnent becuse of being product, re bsent from nd nonexistent in tht dissimilr clss, but it is being sid tht bsence of the predicte of the proposition nd the ttribute tht is the mens of proof does not exist in nonexistent dissimilr clss. Therefore, when the dissimilr clss of our position, no production from self, is delineted s production from other, then since we ssert nonproduction in ny nd ll spects, for us the dissimilr clss is just nonexistent, nd hence since bsence from it does not exist, there is no fllcy in the reson. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 219.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for rkyen red skyon in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

248 246 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Furthermore, the chrcteristics of reson re not incomplete becuse since for us the dissimilr clss is just nonexistent, the nonopertion of reson in its full nture is lso bsent, whereby there exists even sign b in the mode of definiteness s just not existing in the dissimilr clss. འད དང ཐམས ཅད ལ ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ར བའ ཚ ག འད ལ ཡང གཏན ཚ གས མ ང ས པའ ན ག ཉ ས པ མ ད ལ འད འབའ ཞ ག ཡང མ ཟད ད འད ར བ ན བཅ ས འད ལ འ ག ནས འ ང བའ བ པ གཞན ཐམས ཅད ལ ཡང ཉ ས པ འད མ ད ད འད ད བ ན ཏ མ མ ན པའ གས ཡ ད ན ན ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག པ ཡང བ ན པར དཔ ར ན མ ག ས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བའ མ མ ན པའ གས ནམ མཁའ ན ག མ ས པའ གས ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས མ ག ས པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ད གཉ ས ན ག ཅ ང མ ད པར འ ར བ ཞ ག ན ས པ གང ལ མ མ ན པའ གས ཉ ད མ ད པ ད ལ བ བ པར བ དང བ པའ ཆ ས ག པ མ ད ད ད འ ར ཁ བ འ གས བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ འད འ མ མ ན པའ གས ན གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བར བ ག ག ང ན ཁ བ ས ན མ པ ཐམས ཅད ཁ ན བ མ ད པར ཁས ངས པས ད འ ར ཁ བ ལ མ མ ན པའ གས མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ད ལ ག པ མ ད པས གཏན ཚ གས ཀ gtn tshigs rng bzhin gyis mi jug p. b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for rtg red rtgs in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

249 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 247 ན མ ད ད གཏན ཚ གས ཀ མཚན ཉ ད མ ཚང བར ཡང མ འ ར ཏ འད ར ཁ བ ལ མ མ ན པའ གས མ ད པ ཁ ནའ ར ད ལ གཏན ཚ གས རང བཞ ན ག ས མ འ ག པ ཉ ད ག པ ཡང ཡ ན པས མ མ ན པའ གས ལ མ ད པ ཉ ད ང ས པའ ལ ག ས གས ཀ ང ཡ ད པ ཡ ན ན Here from mong the Sāṃkhys certin ones object: Wht is the mening of this thesis? Does from self [men] from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cuse? Which of those is it? If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you hve the fllcy of] proving wht is lredy estblished. Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cuse, then [your resoning] is n object of contrdiction becuse [ccording to us Sāṃkhys] ll tht hve production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] cuses. ( dir grngs cn dg ls kh cig phyir bzlog pr byed de / dm bcs p di i don gng yin/ ci bdg ls zhes by b brs bu bdg nyid ls sm/ on te rgyu i bdg nyid ls/ des cir gyur/ gl te brs bu bdg nyid ls n ni grub p l b sgrub bo// on te rgyu i bdg nyid ls n ni gl b i don nyid de/ skye b cn thms cd c ni rgyu i bdg nyid du yod p kho n ls skye b i phyir ro zhe n): d Here in order to cler wy such fllcies of resoning, certin ones from mong the Sāṃkhys who propound ntures of effects, cuses, nd both plce themselves for the ske of proving the production of The Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 140.3, reds byed do. b Throughout this section the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.5, nd so forth) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, , nd so forth) vriously red grub p ls sgrub nd grub p l sgrub wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 140.4, nd so forth) consistently reds grub p l sgrub, which I prefer. c In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 220.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for thms cd tu red thms cd in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, d The Snskrit of this objection, s Chndrkīrti repets it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.4), is: ko ym prtijñārthḥ/ kiṃ kāryātmkāt svt ut kārṇātmkāditi/ kiṃ cātḥ/ kāryātmkāccet siddhsādhnṃ/ kārṇātmkācced viruddhārthtā/ kārṇātmnā vidymānsyiv srvsyotpttimt utpādāditi//

250 248 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism things s opponents through [dopting] the spect of expressing fllcies in the mster [Bhāvvivek s] proving tht things re not produced from self. འད ར ག ངས ཅན དག ལས ཁ ཅ ག ར ག པར ད ད དམ བཅས པ འད འ ད ན གང ཡ ན ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ད ས ཅ ར འ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད ད བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བའ ར ར ཞ ན ཞ ས བ ན འད ར ད ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ན བསལ བ ལ ག ངས ཅན དག ལས འ ས དང དང གཉ གའ ང བ ཉ ད བ ཁ ཅ ག དང ས པ མས ཀ བ བ པའ ར བ དཔ ན ག དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པ ལ དམ བཅས པའ ན བ ད པའ མ པས ར ལ བ ཉ ད གནས པར ད པ ཡ ན ན In tht: Here ( dir): On this occsion of clering wy the fllcies of resoning in tht wy. from mong the Sāṃkhys (grngs cn dg ls): from mong those renowned in the sttement There re twenty-five fctions mong the Sāṃkhys. certin ones (kh cig): certin ones from mong them who propound effects, cuses, nd both. object: (phyir bzlog pr byed de): In order to prove the production of things those [Sāṃkhys] plce themselves s opponents through [dopting] the spect of expressing fllcies In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 221.3) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for grng cn dg ls so red grgs p de dg ls so in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

251 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 249 in the thesis in the mster [Bhāvvivek s] proof tht things re not produced from self. Wht is the mening of this thesis? (dm bcs p di i don gng yin): These re words seeking n rgument, sying, Wht is the mening of from self in the thesis by the Proponent of the Middle, Things re not produced from self. ད ལ འད ར ཞ ས བ ན ད ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ན བསལ བའ བས འད ར ར ག ངས ཅན དག ལས ཞ ས བ ན ག ངས ཅན དག ལས ག ས པ ཉ ཡ ད ད ཞ ས ག གས པ ད དག ལས ས ཁ ཅ ག ཅ ས བ ན ད དག ལས དང འ ས དང གཉ ག བ གང དག དག ཡ ན པ ཁ ཅ ག ག ར ག པར ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ད དག དང ས པ མས ཀ བ བ པའ ར བ དཔ ན ག ས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པ ལ དམ བཅས པའ ན བ ད པའ མ པས ར ལ བ ཉ ད གནས པར ད པའ དམ བཅས པ འད འ ད ན གང ཡ ན ཞ ས བ ན ད མ པས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས དམ བཅས པ ད ལ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ འད འ ད ན གང ཡ ན ཞ ས ཀ ན ཀ ཚ ལ བའ ཚ ག ཡ ན ན Does from self (ci bdg ls zhes by b): This indictes: Concerning this, the ntures of ll things re twofold the nture of the effect nd the nture of the cuse. With respect to them, the nture of n effect is existence in the mnner of mnifest effect. The nture of cuse is tht it is seen tht [effects] re produced only from the existent entity of cuse endowed with the cpcity of the effect. If [effects] were In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 221.4) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for slob dpon gyi red slob dpon gyis in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

252 250 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism produced from cuses not hving the cpcity of the effect, then it would be resonble for stlk of brley even to be produced from rice seed, but it is not, due to which [n effect] is produced from cuse in which the nture of tht effect exists. Hence, our sttement tht things re produced from self is tht there is production due to [the effect s] existing in the entity of the cuse, self. This being the cse, wht is this from self in your thesis, The internl sensespheres re not produced from self? ཅ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ཞ ས བས ན འད ད བ ན ཏ འད ལ དང ས པ ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང བ ཉ ད ཀ མ པ གཉ ས ཏ འ ས འ ང བ ཉ ད དང འ ང བ ཉ ད ད ད ལ འ ས འ ང བ ཉ ད ན འ ས གསལ བའ ལ ག ས ཡ ད པའ འ ང བ ཉ ད ན འ ས འ ས པ དང ན པའ འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བར མཐ ང བ གལ ཏ འ ས འ ས པ མ ད པའ ལས ན ན འ ས ཀ ས བ ན ལས ཀ ང ནས ཀ ག བའ ར གས ན མ བས ད འ ར གང ལས འ ས གང ག ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ད ལས ས པས ཁ བ ས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས འ ཞ ས བ ད པ གང ཡ ན པ ད ན བདག འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པས ས པ ཡ ན ན ཁ ད ཀ ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས དམ བཅས པའ བདག ལས ཞ ས བ ད གང ཡ ན ཞ ས ག ང བ ཡ ན ན This is wht they re sying. [men] from the entity of the effect ( brs bu bdg nyid

253 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 251 ls sm): This sks, Are you sying, There is no production from n entity in which the effect exists s mnifest nture? or from the entity of the cuse? ( on te rgyu i bdg nyid ls): Are you holding the contrry, b There is no production from wht exists s n entity of cuse endowed with the cpcity of the effect? འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ ཞ ས བ ན འ ས གསལ བའ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པ ཡ ན ནམ ཞ ས འ བ ཡ ན ན འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བ ན འ ས འ ས པ དང ན པའ འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལས བ མ ད པ ཡ ན ཞ ས གལ ག ང བ ཡ ན ན Which of those is it? (des cir gyur): This is the equivlent of sying, Even both those positions re fllcious. To indicte just this [Bhāvvivek] utters: If it is from the entity of the effect, then [you hve the fult of] proving wht is lredy estblished [for us]. (gl te brs bu bdg nyid ls n ni grub p ls sgrub bo//). [In tht:] If it is from the entity of the effect, (gl te brs bu bdg nyid ls n ni). If you re proving, There no production [of n effect] from n entity in which the effect exists in mnifest nture, then [you hve the fllcy of] proving wht is lredy estblished. (grub p l sgrub bo//). In tht wy you incur the fllcy tht the resoning proves wht is lredy estblished. It is s follows: here since it is lredy estblished for ll the world tht there is no production of sense-spheres such s eyes nd so forth tht exist in the nture of mnifest sense-spheres ble to pprehend objects, if you re proving tht there is no The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 222.4) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) red yin nm zhes by b yin no wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 141.4) reds yin nm zhes dri b yin no, which I prefer. b The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 222.5) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) red gl gzung b wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 141.4) reds gl gzung b.

254 252 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism production from tht, you re proving wht is lredy estblished. In tht cse, those words in which you re proving tht there is no production of internl sense-spheres from n entity in which internl sense-spheres exists s entities of mnifest effects ble to pprehend objects incur the fllcy of proving [tht is to sy, estblishing] wht is lredy estblished like the words of the insne or those ffected by demons sying, [I] will mke n lredy mde pot. ད ས ཅ ར འ ར ཞ ས བ ན གས ད གཉ ག ཡང ན ཆགས པ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ག ད ཉ ད བ ན པའ ར གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ ཞ ས བ ས ས གལ ཏ འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན ཞ ས བ ན འ ས གསལ བའ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ བ ན ན འ བ པ ལ བ པ ཞ ས བ ན ད ར ན ཁ ད ཀ གཏན ཚ གས ད བ པ ལ བ པའ ན འ ར ཏ འད ར འད ན མ ག ལ ས གས པ མཆ ད ལ འཛ ན ན ས པ གསལ བའ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པ དག ལ ཡང བ མ ད པ ན འཇ ག ན ཐམས ཅད ལ བ ཟ ན པ ཡ ན པས ད ལས བ མ ད པར བ བ ན ན བ པ ལ བ པ ཡ ན ན ད ར ན ཁ ད ནང ག མཆ ད ལ འཛ ན ས པ འ ས གསལ བའ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པར བ བ པའ ཚ ག ད ན དཔ ར ན ན པའམ གད ན ག ས ཟ ན པ དག མ པ ས ཟ ན པ ཡང འ ཞ ས ཟ ར བའ ཚ ག བཞ ན བ པ ལ བ པའ ན འ ར ར Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cuse, then [your resoning] is n object of contrdiction ( on te rgyu i bdg nyid ls n ni gl b i don nyid de/). [In tht:]

255 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 253 Otherwise, if it is from the entity of the cuse, ( on te rgyu i bdg nyid ls n ni): If you re proving There is no production from n existent entity of the cuses endowed with cpcity of the effect, then it is n object of contrdiction ( gl b i don nyid de/): In tht cse, your reson incurs the fllcy of being contrdicted, s follows. If wheres it is renowned in the world tht internl sense-spheres, effects, re produced into mnifest ntures from cuses endowed with the cpcity of the effects, existent entities of the ovl embryo nd so forth, you re proving tht effects re not produced [this wy], then [your resoning] becomes n object of contrdiction with renown in the world. འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན འགལ བའ ད ན ད ཉ ད ད ཞ ས བ ལ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ན ཞ ས བ ན འ ས འ ས པ དང ན པའ འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ བ ན ན འ འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ད ར ན ཁ ད ཀ གཏན ཚ གས ད འགལ བའ ན འ ར ཏ འད ར འཇ ག ན ན འ ས འ ས པ དང ན པའ མ ར མ ར པ ལ ས གས པ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལས འ ས ནང ག མཆ ད མས གསལ བའ ང བ ཉ ད བར ག གས པ ལས འ ས བ མ ད པར བ ན ན འཇ ག ན ལ ག གས པ དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད འ ར ར To indicte this, [Bhāvvivek] utters: becuse [ccording to us Sāṃkhys] ll tht hve production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] cuses. (skye b cn thms cd ni rgyu i bdg nyid du yod p kho n ls skye b i phyir ro): [In tht:] becuse ll tht hve production (skye b cn thms cd): those things in which production exists re those

256 254 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism hving production ll internl nd externl sensespheres. ད ཉ ད བ ན པའ ར བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད ཅ ས བ ན དང ས པ གང ལ བ ཡ ད པ ད ན བ ཅན ཏ ནང དང ར ལ ག མཆ ད ཐམས ཅད ད re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] cuses. (rgyu i bdg nyid du yod p kho n ls skye b i phyir ro): becuse it is renowned in the world tht ll those hving production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of cuses hving the cpcity of [those] effects, since in the world it is seen tht ll internl sense-spheres re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of cuses such s the ovl embryo nd so forth, nd it is seen tht stlks lso re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of seeds tht pots too re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of cly. Hence, if you re proving effects re not produced from entities existing s cusl ntures, this is contrdictory with the renown in the world tht ll things hving production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of cuses.` འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ན བ ཅན ད དག ཐམས ཅད ན འ ས འ ས པའ འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བར འཇ ག ན ན ག གས པའ ར ཏ འད ར འཇ ག ན ནང ག མཆ ད ཐམས ཅད ཀ ང མ ར མ ར པ ལ ས གས པ འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བར མཐ ང ལ ག ཡང ས བ ན ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བ དང མ པ ཡང འཇ མ པའ བདག ཉ ད The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 224.1) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) red skye b yng cn wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 142.3) reds skye b cn; the former ppers to be berrnt.

257 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 255 ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བར མཐ ང བའ ར ར ད བས ན གལ ཏ འ ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ད པའ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པར བ ན ན འཇ ག ན ན དང ས པ བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བར ག གས པ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར [ ] (zhe n): Here if in order to cler wy such fllcies of resoning, certin ones from mong the Sāṃkhys who propound ntures of effects, cuses, nd both plcing themselves, for the ske of proving the production of things, s opponents through [dopting] the spect of expressing fllcies in the mster [Bhāvvivek s] proving tht things re not produced from self sy In response to tht sttement, here the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] himself utters: ཞ ན ཞ ས བ ན འད ར ད ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ན བསལ བ ལ ག ངས ཅན དག ལས འ ས དང དང གཉ གའ ང བ ཉ ད བ ཁ ཅ ག དང ས པ མས ཀ བ བ པའ ར བ དཔ ན ག ས དང ས པ མས ཀ བ བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ བ པ ལ དམ བཅས པའ ན བ ད པའ མ པས ར ལ བ ཉ ད གནས པ དག ད ད ཅ ས ཟ ར ནའ ད ད ཟ ར བ ད འ ལན འད ར འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས Those re not good becuse mere production from self is refuted. For, even if it is from the entity of cuse, production even from wht is self nd wht is other is eliminted. Becuse intelligence is held to be endowed with chrcter of potentil, there lso is no fllcy. (de ni bzng po m yin te bdg ls skye b tsm dgg p i phyir ro// rgyu i bdg nyid ls n yng bdg dng gzhn du gyur p ls kyng skye br sel b i phyir ro// shes p yod p nyid ni nus p i mtshn nyid dng ldn p yongs su gzung b i phyir yng nyes p med do): In tht:

258 256 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism Those re not good (de ni bzng po m yin te): Since even both those spects of disproof re qusi-disproofs, they re not good, becuse of not proving wht is lredy estblished nd becuse of not being n object of contrdiction. How is it not proving wht is lredy estblished? Therefore, [Bhāvvivek utters]: ད ན བཟང པ མ ཡ ན ཏ བདག ལས བ ཙམ དགག པའ ར ར འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ཡང བདག དང གཞན ར པ ལས ཀ ང བ ས ལ བའ ར ར ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ཡ ངས ག ང བའ ར ཡང ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ས ས ད ལ ད ན བཟང པ མ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས བ ན ན ད ང བའ མ པ གཉ ག ཡང ན ད ང བ ར ང བ ཡ ན པས བཟང པ མ ཡ ན ཏ འད ར བ པ ལ བ པ མ ཡ ན པའ ར དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད མ ཡ ན པའ ར ར ཇ ར ན བ པ ལ བ པ མ ཡ ན ཞ ན becuse mere production from self is refuted. (bdg ls skye b tsm dgg p i phyir ro//): Here it being the cse tht proving wht is lredy estblished is to prove b with nother resoning even mening greeble in mind for both the opponent nd the other prty, [Bhāvvivek] did not utter, There is no production from c wht exists s n entity of the effect. [Rther] it is s follows: only within not specifying from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cuse, he refuted mere production mere production from self, wheres you specify from the entity of the effect or from the entity of the cuse, nd hence we re not greeble in mind, sung dbyung ltr snng. b The Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 225.4) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) red bsgrubs wheres the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 143.3) reds sgrub. c In the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur (vol. 98, 143.3) red yod p ls for yod p l in ccordnce with the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 225.4) nd the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ).

259 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 257 nd, therefore, this refuttion by us, nmely, tht things re not produced from self, is not proving wht is lredy estblished. How is it not n object of contrdiction? Therefore, [Bhāvvivek] utters: ད འ ར བདག ལས བ ཙམ འགག པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ལ བ པ ལ བ པ ཞ ས བ ན ལ བ དང ར ལ བ གཉ གའ མ ན པའ ད ན ལ ཡང གཏན ཚ གས གཞན ག ས བ པ ཡ ན ན ཁ བ ས ན འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ལ བ མ ད ད ཞ ས མ ས ཏ འད ར འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས ག བ ད པ མ ས པ ཁ ནར བདག ལས ས པ ཙམ ཁ ནར འག ག པར ད ལ ཁ ད ཀ ས ན འ ས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས སམ འ ན ཏ འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས ག བ ད པ ས པས ད ས ན ཅག མ ན པ མ ཡ ན པའ ར ཁ བ ས དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བཀག པ འད བ པ ལ བ པ མ ཡ ན ན ཇ ར ན འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད མ ཡ ན ཞ ན For, even if it is from the entity of cuse, production even from wht is self nd wht is other is eliminted. (rgyu i bdg nyid ls n yng bdg dng gzhn du gyur p ls kyng skye br sel b i phyir ro//): Even if it is being proven tht things re not produced from the entity of cuse, it does not become n object of contrdiction with wht is renowned in the world. It is s follows: Your sttement tht All tht hve production re produced only within the context of existing in the entities of [their] cuses is being exmined here, so listen! I hve filled in Avlokitvrt s bridged cittion rgyu i bdg nyid ls n yng zhes by l sogs p (Golden Reprint, vol. 109, 226.1).

260 258 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism If it is considered whether this clled the seed tht is the cuse of stlk is the entity of the stlk itself or is nother entity, this does not become n object of contrdiction becuse production even from wht is self nd wht is other is eliminted. This indictes tht if it is the cse tht the seed tht is the cuse of stlk is the entity of [the stlk] itself, then if whtever the seed is itself is the stlk, it hs lredy been stted well tht there consequently is no production from self. If it is the cse tht the seed is nother entity from the entity of the stlk, this, therefore, will be exmined only below on the occsion of demonstrting tht things re not produced from other. Wit little! ད འ ར འ བདག ཉ ད ལས ན ཡང ཞ ས བ ལ ས གས པ ས ཏ དང ས པ མས འ བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད པར བ བ ན ཡང འཇ ག ན ལས ག གས པ དང འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད མ འ ར ཏ འད ར ཁ ད ན ར བ ཅན ཐམས ཅད ན འ བདག ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ཁ ན ལས བའ ར ར ཞ ས ཟ ར བ གང ཡ ན པ ད འད ར བ ག ག ཉ ན ཅ ག ཅ ག འ འ ས བ ན ཞ ས བ ད ག འ རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ན ནམ འ ན ཏ བདག ཉ ད གཞན ཡ ན གང ཡང ང བ ཞ ག བ ག ག ང ན ད ལ ཁ བ ན བདག དང གཞན ར པ ལས ཀ ང བ ས ལ བའ ར འགལ བའ ད ན ཉ ད མ འ ར ར འད ད བ ན ཏ གལ ཏ ག འ འ ས བ ན ད རང ག བདག ཉ ད ཡ ན ཏ ས བ ན གང ཡ ན པ ད ཉ ད ག ཡ ན ན ན ད འ ར བདག ལས བ མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ད ལ གས པར ག ངས པ ཡ ན ན ཅ ག འ ང བ ཉ ད ལས ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད གཞན ཡ ན ན ན ད འ

261 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 259 ར འ ག ཁ ན ནས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བ མ ད པར ན པའ བས བ ག ག ང ཟད ད ཅ ག Thus, to void fllcious reson/the fllcies of reson, here from mong the Sāṃkhys themselves nother proponent one propounding potentilities imputes fllcy with regrd to the exmple: On the occsion of your erlier propounding the words of syllogism, The internl sense-spheres re not produced from self, becuse of existing like, for exmple, intelligence (nng gi skye mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, n ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt citnyvd), it is not suitble to hve used intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny) s n exmple; intelligence is the very self-entity of the person like, for exmple, the fct tht wrmth is the self-entity of fire. Tht, moreover, does not exist t ll times, for it is sid: [When] wreness b hs mde n object dwell, The person is mde sentient. When wreness (blo, buddhi) mkes objects such s sounds nd so forth dwell in the continuum nd offers them to the person, intelligence is generted, but s long s wreness does not mke objects such s sounds nd so forth dwell in the continuum nd does not offer them to the person, intelligence is not generted; hence, lthough intelligence lwys exists with chrcter of potentility, it does not lwys exist The Tibetn reds re delimited s not being produced from self (bdg ls skye b med pr nges te), but delimited is not represented in the Snskrit. Also, the reson could be trnslted s becuse of presently existing since vidymān is the present middle prticle; however, lter Chndrkīrti (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 33.4) cites the reson s sttvād, suggesting tht the prticulr form mkes little difference, this perhps being why it is trnslted into Tibetn merely s yod p i phyir insted of d lt br yod p i phyir. b blo, buddhi, lso clled the gret one (chen po, mht) in the Sāṃkhy s list of twentyfive ctegories of objects of knowledge.

262 260 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism with chrcter of mnifesttion. Therefore, the chrcteristics of the exmple intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny) tht [you] hve used for the reson, existing (yod p, vidymān) re not complete. Consequently, there comes to be fllcy in the proof. ད ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ ན བསལ བ འད ར ག ངས ཅན དག ཁ ན ལས ས པ བ གཞན ཁ ཅ ག དཔ ལ ན འད གས པར ད པ དག ན ར ཁ ད ཀ ས ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས ར བའ ཚ ག ས པའ བས ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལ དཔ ངས པ ད ན མ ང ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ས འ རང ག ང བ ཉ ད ད དཔ ར ན བ ན མ འ རང ག ང བ ཉ ད ཡ ན པ དང འ འ ད ཡང ས ཐམས ཅད མ ད ད འད ར ཡ ས ད ན ན གནས ས པ ས ས ས མས པར ད པ ཡ ན ཞ ས འ ང བས གང ག ཚ ས ལ ས གས པའ ད ན ད ལ གནས པར ས ཤ ང ས ལ འ ལ བར ད པ ད འ ཚ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད འ ཇ ད ས ལ ས གས པ ད ན ད ལ གནས པར མ ས ཤ ང ས ལ འ ལ བར མ ད པ ད ད ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད མ བས ད འ ར ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད ཀ ས ག ཡ ད ཀ ང གསལ བའ མཚན ཉ ད ཀ ས ག མ ད པས གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ དཔ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ལས

263 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 261 ངས པ ད འ མཚན ཉ ད མ ཚང བས བ པའ ན འ ར ར [ ] To nswer this opposing point tht hs been [hypotheticlly] drwn, [Bhāvvivek] utters: Becuse intelligence is held to be endowed with chrcter of potentil, there lso is no fllcy. (shes p yod p nyid ni nus p i mtshn nyid dng ldn p yongs su gzung b i phyir yng nyes p med do): This indictes, We [tht is, Bhāvvivek] s n exmple intelligence during the stte hving the chrcter of potentil when intelligence hs not been generted by the exertion of wreness (blo, buddhi); hence, there is no defect with regrd to the exmple. In tht: intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny): the intelligence tht erlier ws indicted s n exmple for the reson existing (yod p, vidymān) in The internl sense-spheres re not produced from self, becuse of existing like, for exmple, intelligence (nng gi skye mched rnms bdg ls skye b med pr nges te yod p i phyir shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, n ādhyātmikānyāytnāni svt utpnnāni vidymāntvāt citnyvd). ཞ ས ཟ ར བའ གས མ ཁ ང ནས ད ང བ ད འ ལན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ཡ ངས ག ང བའ ར ཡང ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ས ས འད ད བ ན ཏ གང ག ཚ འ ལ བས མ ས པའ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད ཀ གནས བས ན ཡ ད པ ཉ ད གང ཡ ན པ ད ཁ བ ས དཔ ཉ ད བ ན པར ས པས ད འ ར དཔ འ ན མ ད ད ད ལ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ན ཞ ས བ ན ར ནང ག མཆ ད མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར ང ས ཏ ཡ ད པའ ར དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན

264 262 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ཞ ས གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ དཔ ར བ ན པའ ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ད endowed with chrcter of potentil, (nus p i mtshn nyid dng ldn p): the intelligence which hs the chrcter of potentil is tht which is endowed with chrcter of potentil; moreover, since it is sserted s existing t ll times, it is existent (yod p nyid, vidymān). ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ཞ ས བ ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད གང ལ ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད ཡ ད པ ད ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ད ཡང ག ངས ཅན ག ས ལ ས ཐམས ཅད ཡ ད པར ཁས ངས པས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན Becuse [intelligence] is held to be (yongs su gzung b i phyir): Becuse we hold this possessing the chrcter of potentil s n exmple of existing (yod p nyid, vidymān), there is not fllcy in the exmple of the reson. ཡ ངས ག ང བའ ར ཞ ས བ ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ད ཁ བ ས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ དཔ ར ཡ ངས ག ང བའ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ དཔ ལ ན མ ད ད lso (yng): this term mens Not only is there no defect with regrd to the exmple of the reson becuse just tht possessing the chrcter of potentil is used, but there is not defect with regrd to the exmple of the reson lso becuse tht possessing the chrcter of mnifesttion is used. ཡང ཞ ས བའ ན ས པའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ འབའ ཞ ག ཡ ངས བ ང བའ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཀ དཔ ལ ན མ ད པར མ ཟད ཀ གསལ བའ མཚན ཉ ད དང ན པ ཡ ངས

265 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 263 ག ང བའ ར ཡང གཏན ཚ གས ཀ དཔ ལ ན མ ད ད ཞ ས བའ ད ན ཏ there is no fllcy. (nyes p med do): Hence, in the indiction of intelligence (shes p yod p nyid, citny) s n exmple of the reson existing (yod p nyid, vidymāntv) there is no such fllcy. ཉ ས པ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ད འ ར གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ དཔ ར ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བ ན པ ལ དཔ འ ན ག ས ཉ ས པ མ ད པའ About tht, nother mkes the explntion, Things re not produced from their own entities becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. ( di l gzhn ni dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/ zhes rnm pr bzhd pr byed do): This indictes, Also on this occsion of proving tht things re not produced from self the commenttor, the mster Buddhpālit, mkes such nd such n explntion. In tht: འད ལ གཞན ན དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར བཤད པར ད ད ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པའ བས འད ལ འག ལ བ ད པ བ དཔ ན ལ ཏ ན འད ད མ པར བཤད པར ད ད ཞ ས བ ན པ ཡ ན ན About tht, ( di l): On this occsion of proving tht things re not produced from self.

266 264 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ད ལ འད ལ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ པའ བས འད ལའ nother (gzhn ni): Among the mny commenttors on this Tretise [on the Middle] rnging from the holy mster [Nāgārjun], the Elder Buddhpālit, b Chndrkīrti, Devshrm, Guṇshrī, Guṇmti, nd Sthirmti through to the mster Bhāvvivek this term refers to the Elder Buddhpālit who is other thn most of the mny commenttors on this Tretise [on the Middle]. The Elder Buddhpālit mkes the explntion: གཞན ན ཞ ས བའ ན བ ན བཅ ས འད འ འག ལ པ ད པ མང འད བ དཔ ན ག ཞལ ནས དང གནས བ ན ལ ཏ དང ཙ ཀ དང ད བ ཤ དང ག ཎ དང ག ཎ མ ཏ དང ར མ ཏ དང བ དཔ ན ལ གས ན འ ད ཉ ད ལ ག པའ བར དག ཡ ད པ ལས ད དག ཕལ ལས གཞན པས ཏ གནས བ ན ལ ཏ དང ར ར གནས བ ན ལ ཏ ན Things re not produced from self becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless. (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/, n svt Avlokitvrt is referring to the commentry on Nāgārjun s Tretise on the Middle clled Akutobhyā (g ls jigs med; no fer from nywhere ) which he clerly ccepts s uthored by Nāgārjun. Tsong-kh-p nd his followers disgree, pointing to the fcts tht this commentry quotes Nāgārjun s student Ārydev, wheres the custom is not to cite one s own student nd tht none of the other gret Indin commenttors cite. The lte Go-mng scholr Ge-dün-lo-drö opined tht this commentry might be by person nmed Akutobhyā nd thus the text is clled the Akutobhyā, much s the commentry by Buddhpālit is clled the Buddhpālit Commentry. b sthvīr, gns rtn.

267 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 265 utpdynti bhāvāḥ/ tdutpdviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdo- ṣācc/ ): In tht: དང ས པ མས བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར བཤད པར ད ད Things (dngos po rnms, bhāvāḥ): The externl nd internl sense-spheres (skye mched, āytn). from self (bdg gi bdg nyid ls, b svtḥ): This is the sme s from [their own] entities (bdg nyid ls); from them. re not produced (skye b med, n utpdynti): [re not produced] ultimtely (don dm pr). Why re things not produced from their own entities? becuse their production would be just senseless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir, tdutpdviyrthyāt): c [In tht:] ད ལ དང ས པ མས ཞ ས བ ན དང ནང ག མཆ ད མས ས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས ཞ ས བ ན བདག ཉ ད ལས བའ ཐ ཚ ག ད ལས ས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན ད ན དམ པར ར ཅ འ ར དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ཅ ན ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཏ ད དག ག བ ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ ད དག ག བའ ད ན མ ད པ ཞ ས བ ན ད ན དང ལ བ ན ད ན མ ད པ འ ས མ ད པའ ཉ ད ཅ ས བ ན ད དག The Snskrit for Buddhpālit s sttement is tken from Chndrkīrti s cittion of it (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.1). b This is rendered into English bove s from their own entities fter the Tibetn which is following this very gloss by Avlokitvrt; here the trnsltion s from self follows the Snskrit svtḥ, which in Tibetn would be bdg ls, so tht Avlokitvrt s gloss is not redundnt. c Literlly, becuse of the senselessness of their production.

268 266 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism ག བ ད ན མ ད པའ དང ས པ ན ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད ད their production (de dg gi skye b, tdutpād): the production of those things. senseless (don med p, viyrthy): devoid of sense (don dng brl b) is to be senseless, fruitless ( brs bu med p). ness (nyid, y[?]): the fct of their production being without sense, the senselessness of their production. By sying becuse their production would be just senseless [Buddhpālit] is indicting tht if things were produced from n existent [stte], their production would be just senseless becuse there would nothing different from wht hd lredy been produced, nothing tht hd not risen erlier. Also:` ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བས ན འད ད བ ན ཏ གལ ཏ དང ས པ མས ཡ ད པ ལས ན ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར ཏ འད ར ས ཟ ན པ ལས ཁ ད པར ན མ ང བ འགའ ཡང མ ད པའ ར ར [nd] becuse their production would be endless (skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir, b tiprsṅgdoṣāt): If, though existent, something were produced, then it would be produced in tht spect without cesstion; therefore, [its repeted] production would just not finish. mkes the explntion (zhes rnm pr bzhd pr byed do): the Elder Buddhpālit mkes tht explntion on this occsion of proving tht things re not produced from self. b de dg gi skye b don med p i dngos po. This is lso rendered into Tibetn s shin tu thl br gyur b i phyir; see.

269 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 267 གཞན ཡང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ཏ གལ ཏ ཡ ད ཀ ང བར འ ར ན ཡང བར འ ར བས མ པ ད ས མ ཤ བའ བར བར འ ར ཏ ད ས ན བ ཡ ངས གས པ མ ད པ ཁ ནར འ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར བཤད པ ད ད ཞ ས བ ན གནས བ ན ལ ཏ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད པར བ བ པའ བས འད ར ད ད ཅ ས མ པར བཤད པར ད ད Tht is not resonble (1) becuse of not expressing reson nd n exmple, nd (2) becuse of not voiding the fllcies dduced by nother, [nd] (3) lso becuse the words fford n opportunity since it [must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the reson] things re produced from other nd production hs effects nd production hs n end due to which it would contrdict tenets. b (de ni rigs p m yin te/gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir dng / gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b i phyir ro// glgs yod p i tshig yin p i yng phyir te/ skbs kyi don ls bzlog ps bsgrub pr by b dng de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b Or, following the Snskrit: Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end. (prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti, which in Tibetn would be dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/) b Fleshed out little, this reds: Tht is not resonble (1) becuse [Buddhpālit] does not express reson [cpble of proving tht there is no production from self] s well s n exmple, nd (2) becuse [the resoning s Buddhpālit sttes it] does not void the fllcies dduced by nother [tht is, the fllcies tht Sāṃkhy would be expected to dduce], nd (3) becuse [Buddhpālit s] words lso fford n opportunity [to n opponent to expose contrdiction within his own system] since [the thesis nd the reson must] be reversed from wht is explicitly stted nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the reson Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end due to which [Buddhpālit] would contrdict tenets [of the Middle Wy School].

270 268 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism gyur b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro//, tdyuktṃ/ hetudṛṣtāntānbhidhānāt/ proktdoṣāprihārācc/ prsṅgvākytvācc prkṛtārthvipryyeṇ viprītrthsādhytddhrmvyktu prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt/ jnmnirodhāceti kṛtāntvirodhḥ syāt// b ): In this pssge the commenttor [Bhāvvivek] himself proves tht the explntion by the Elder Buddhpālit is not resonble. In tht: ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ཡང ར ཏ བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས བ བ པར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར མཛད པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས བ ན འག ལ པ ད པ ཉ ད ཀ ས གནས བ ན ལ ཏས མས པར བཤད པ ད ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པར བ པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན ན Tht is not resonble (rigs p m yin te, tdyuktṃ): This is [Bhāvvivek s] thesis tht the explntion by the Elder Buddhpālit is not resonble. Why is it not resonble? ད ལ ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཏ ཞ ས བ ན གནས བ ན ལ ཏས མས པར བཤད པ ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས དམ བཅས པ ཡ ན ན ཅ འ ར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཞ ན The Tibetn follows Avlokitvrt s text; for other versions nd comments see the notes in the preceding three chpters. b The Snskrit is from Chndrkīrti s cittion in his Cler Words (L Vllée Poussin, Prsnnpdā, 14.4).

271 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 269 (1) becuse of not expressing reson nd n exmple, (gtn tshigs dng dpe m brjod p i phyir, hetudṛṣtāntānbhidhānāt): This indictes tht in [Buddhpālit s] explntion he is reduced to hving only proclimed mere thesis, Things re not produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ) but hs not expressed reson why they re not produced from self such s [Bhāvvivek did in his syllogism when he gve s the reson] becuse of existing (yod p i phyir, vidymāntvāt) nd hs not expressed n exmple of the nonproduction of the existent from self such s [Bhāvvivek did when he sid] like, for exmple, intelligence (dper n shes p yod p nyid bzhin no, citnyvd), nd therefore [Buddhpālit s explntion] is not resonble. Furthermore, [it is not resonble]: གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར ཏ འད ད བ ན ཏ མ པར བཤད པ ད ལ དང ས པ མས བདག ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས དམ བཅས པ ད ཙམ ཁ ན ཞ ག ག གས པར ཟད ཀ ཇ ར བདག ལས བ མ ད པའ གཏན ཚ གས ཡ ད པའ ར ཞ ས བ དང ཡ ད པ བདག ལ བ མ ད པའ དཔ དཔ ར ན ཤ ས པ ཡ ད པ ཉ ད བཞ ན ན ཞ ས བ མ བ ད པའ ར ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན (2) becuse of not voiding the fllcies dduced by nother, (gzhn gyis smrs p i nyes p m bsl b i phyir, proktdoṣāprihārācc): Even if he hd fully expressed the expression nd proof of reson nd n exmple, it would, without question, hve the fllcies dduced by nother who propounds production, but you [Buddhpālit] did not void them; hence, becuse of not voiding the fllcies dduced by nother, [your explntion] is not resonble. For wht further [reson] is it not resonble? In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 231.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for khyod kyi red khyod kyis in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

272 270 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism གཞན ཡང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ཏ གལ ཏ ད ལ གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ དག བ ད ཅ ང བ པ གས པར བ ད ཟ ན ཀ ང ད ལ བར བ གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ གད ན མ ཟ བར འ ང བར འ ར ན ད ཡང ཁ ད ཀ ས མ བསལ པས ད འ ར གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ད ན ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན གཞན ཡང ད ཇ ར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ཞ ན (3) lso becuse the words fford n opportunity (glgs yod p i tshig yin p i yng phyir te/, prsṅgvākytvācc). The explntion by the Elder Buddhpālit is lso unresonble becuse of being words ffording n opportunity for censure by nother prty. lso (yng, c): This term is to be tken s [indicting] Not only is [his explntion] unresonble becuse of not expressing reson nd n exmple nd becuse of not voiding the fllcies dduced by nother, but lso it is unresonble becuse of ffording n opportunity [for censure]. To indicte just tht [Bhāvvivek] utters: it [must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd, (skbs kyi don ls bzlog p, prkṛtārthvipryy): Wht is the mening put forwrd? It is tht very explntion by Buddhpālit himself, Things re not produced from self becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de/ de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ/ tdutpdviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc). ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ཡང ར ཏ གནས བ ན ལ ཏས མ པར བཤད པ ད ན ལ བ གཞན ག ཀ ན ཀའ The Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) mistkenly repets the lst two sentences.

273 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 271 ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཡང ཞ ས བའ ན གཏན ཚ གས དང དཔ མ བ ད པའ ར དང གཞན ག ས ས པའ ཉ ས པ མ བསལ བའ ར ར གས པ མ ཡ ན པ འབའ ཞ ག མ ཟད ཀ ད ན ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན ཞ ས བར ར ར ད ཉ ད བ ན པའ ར བས ཀ ད ན ལ ག པ ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བས ཀ ད ན གང ཞ ན གནས བ ན ལ ཏ ཉ ད ཀ ས དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས མ པར བཤད པ ཉ ད ཡ ན ན since it [must] be reversed from tht, (de ls bzlog ps, prkṛtārthvipryyeṇ): since it [must] be reversed from the mening put forwrd. The opposite of Things re not produced from their own entities (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ) is Things re produced from other (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b, prsmādutpnnā bhāvā); the opposite of becuse their production would be just senseless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir, tdutpdviyrthyāt) is becuse their production hs effects (skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b, jnmsāphlyāt), nd the opposite of In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 232.5) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for de ls bzlog ps zhes by b ni skbs kyi don de ls zlog p zhes by b smrs te/ skbs kyi don gng zhes n/ gns brtn bu ddh pā li t nyid kyi dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro/ zhes rnm pr bshd p nyid yin no// de ls bzlog ps zhes by b ni skbs kyi don de ls zlog ps te red de ls bzlog ps zhes by b ni skbs kyi don de ls zlog ps te in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, 147.5, with the exception tht finl two syllbles in the ltter red p ste.

274 272 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism becuse production would be endless (skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir, tiprsṅgdoṣāt) is becuse production hs n end (skye b thug p yod p yod pr gyur b i phyir, jnmnirodhāt). Hence, lso becuse of being words ffording n opportunity [for censure] it is lso unresonble. How [does Buddhpālit s explntion] come to be words ffording n opportunity [for censure] through reversing the mening put forwrd? Therefore, [Bhāvvivek] utters: ད ལས བ ག པས ཞ ས བས ན བས ཀ ད ན ད ལས བ ག པ དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ལས བ ག པ དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བ ལས བ ག པ བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ ལས བ ག པ བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བས ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པའ ར ཡང ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན བས ཀ ད ན ལས བ ག པས ཇ ར ག གས ཡ ད པའ ཚ ག ཡ ན པར འ ར ཞ ན nd hence wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of the thesis nd the property of tht [tht is, the reson] (bsgrub pr by b dng /de i chos bzlog p i don mngon ps, viprītrthsādhytddhrmvyktu): [In tht:] the thesis (bsgrub pr by b, sādhy): the thesis, Things re not produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ). ད འ ར བ བ པར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བ བ པར བ ཞ ས བ ན

275 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 273 དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ བ པར འ wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of tht (de bzlog p i don mngon ps, viprītrth vyktu): wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of Things re not produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ), tht is, Things re produced from other (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b, prsmādutpnnā bhāvā). ད བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ཞ ས བ ན དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ ལས བ ག པའ ད ན དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བ མང ན པས ས the property of tht (de i chos, tddhrm): the property of tht thesis, tht is to sy, [the reson which is] the property of the subject of tht thesis, Things re not produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ), nmely, becuse their production would be just senseless nd becuse production would be endless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir dng skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, tdutpdviyrthyāt/ tiprsṅgdoṣācc). ད འ ཆ ས ཞ ས བ ན བ བ པར བ ད འ ཆ ས ཏ དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ བ པར བ ད འ གས ཀ ཆ ས ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས བའ bsgrub pr by b de i phyogs kyi chos.

276 274 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of tht (de bzlog p i don mngon ps, viprītrth vyktu): wht becomes evident is the mening of the opposite of becuse their production would be just senseless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir, tdutpdviyrthyāt), nmely, becuse production hs effects (skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b i phyir, jnmsāphlyāt) nd the opposite of becuse production would be endless (skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, tiprsṅgdoṣācc) nmely, becuse production hs n end (skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir, jnmnirodhāt). How does [Buddhpālit s explntion] come to fford n opportunity [for censure] due to the mnifesting of the opposite of those? Hence, [Bhāvvivek] utters: ད བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ཞ ས བ ན ད དག ག བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བ བ ག པའ ད ན བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ ཞ ས བ དང བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ བ ག པའ ད ན བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར པའ ར ར ཞ ས བ མང ན པས ས ད དག བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ག གས ཇ ཡ ད པར འ ར ཞ ན things re produced from other nd production hs effects nd production hs n end, due to which (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b dng / skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b dng / skye b thug p yod pr gyur b i phyir, b Or, following the Snskrit: Things re produced from other becuse production hs effects nd becuse production hs n end. (prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti, which in Tibetn would be dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye b yin te/ skye b don yod p nyid yin p i phyir dng skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir ro/) b See the previous footnote.

277 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 275 prsmādutpnnā bhāvā jnmsāphlyāt jnmnirodhācceti): becuse: (1) since the mening of the opposite of the thesis Things re not produced from self (dngos po rnms bdg gi bdg nyid ls skye b med de, n svt utpdynti bhāvāḥ) becomes evident, [his explntion] ffords n opportunity for the censure [tht wht he mens is] Things re produced from other (dngos po rnms gzhn ls skye br gyur b, prsmādutpnnā bhāvā), (2) nd since the mening of the opposite of the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] becuse their production would be just senseless (de dg gi skye b don med p nyid du gyur b i phyir, tdutpdviyrthyāt) becomes evident, [his explntion] ffords n opportunity for the censure [tht wht he mens is] becuse production hs effects (skye b brs bu dng bcs p nyid du gyur b i phyir, jnmsāphlyāt), (3) nd since the mening of the opposite of the property of tht [tht is, the opposite of the reson] becuse production would be endless (skye b thug p med pr gyur b i phyir ro, tiprsṅgdoṣācc) becomes evident, [his explntion] ffords n opportunity for the censure [tht wht he mens is] becuse production hs n end (skye b thug p yod p yin p i phyir, jnmnirodhāt). As response to hypotheticl other prty who sks, Wht fllcy is there when it turns into such? [Bhāvvivek] utters: it would contrdict tenets. (mdzd p i mth dng gl br gyur ro, kṛtāntvirodhḥ syāt): it would contrdict the tenets in the mster [Nāgārjun s] scriptures tht it is not sserted tht things re produced from other, it is not sserted tht production b hs effects, nd it is not sserted tht production hs n end. c Therefore, this explntion In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for dri i phyogs red dri b i phyogs in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, b In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 234.6) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for skye bs red skye b in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98, c Jm-yng-shy-p (see bove, ; Gret Exposition of the Middle, b.4) holds

278 276 Avlokitvrt s Explntion of Bhāvvivek s Criticism by the Elder Buddhpālit is not resonble since it contrdicts resoning nd scripture. ད འ ར དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར འ ར བ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད འ ར བ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ བ བ པར བ དང ས པ མས བདག ག བདག ཉ ད ལས བ མ ད ད ཞ ས བ བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ན དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བ ཞ ས བའ ག གས ཡ ད པར འ ར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས ད དག ག ས བ ད ན མ ད པ ཉ ད འ ར པའ ར ཞ ས བ བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ན བ འ ས དང བཅས པ ཉ ད ཅ ས བའ ག གས ཡ ད པར འ ར བ དང ད འ ཆ ས བ ག པ མ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ཞ ས བ བ ག པའ ད ན མང ན པས ན བ ག པ ཡ ད པ ཞ ས བའ ག གས ཡ ད པར འ ར བའ ར ར ད ར ར ན ཉ ས པ ཅ ཡ ད ཅ ས འ བའ གས མ ཁ ང ནས ད ང བ ད འ ལན མཛད པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ཞ ས བ ས ཏ འད ར བ དཔ ན ག ང ལས དང ས པ མས གཞན ལས བར མ བཞ ད པ དང བ འ ས དང བཅས པར མ བཞ ད པ དང བ ག པ ཡ ད པར མ བཞ ད པའ བ པའ མཐའ དང འགལ བར འ ར ར ད བས ན གནས བ ན tht the three points themselves re not the tenet tht is contrdicted; rther, the three points show tht, ccording to Bhāvvivek, Buddhpālit hs contrdicted the tenet of the Middle Wy School tht the refuttion of production from self is nonffirming negtive. In the Golden Reprint (vol. 109, 235.2) nd in the Peking (P5259, vol. 96, ) for rig p red rigs p in ccordnce with the Krmp sde dge bstn gyur, vol. 98,

279 Avlokitvrt s Commentry on Bhāvvivek s Lmp 277 ལ ཏས མས པར བཤད པ ད ན བ པ དང ང དང འགལ བས ར གས པ མ ཡ ན ན

280

281 Abbrevitions co ne = co ne bstn gyur. TBRC W1GS co ne dgon chen: co ne, Dhrm = the sde dge edition of the Tibetn cnon published by Dhrm Press: the Nying-m Edition of the sde-dge bk'-'gyur nd bstn- 'gyur. Oklnd, Clif.: Dhrm Press, Golden Reprint = gser bris bstn gyur (Sichun, Chin: krung go i mtho rim nng bstn slob gling gi bod brgyud nng bstn zhib jug khng, 1989). Grgs p & rnm rgyl = Plden Drkp nd Dmdul Nmgyl. drng nges legs bshd snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive nd Interpretble, Mundgod, Indi: SOKU, Krmp sde dge refers to the sde dge mtshl pr bk gyur: A Fcsimile Edition of the 18th Century Redction of Si tu chos kyi byung gns Prepred under the Direction of H.H. the 16th rgyl dbng krm p (Delhi: Delhi Krmpe Chodhey Gylwe Sungrb Prtun Khng, 1977). Peking = Tibetn Tripiṭk: Peking Edition kept in the Librry of the Otni University, Kyoto. Edited by Disetz Teitrō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Jpn: Tibetn Tripiṭk Reserch Foundtion, sde dge = sde dge Tibetn Tripiṭk bstn ḥgyur preserved t the Fculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Edited by Z. Ymguchi, et l. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, The ctlogue numbers re from Complete Ctlogue of the Tibetn Buddhist Cnons. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendi, Jpn: Tohoku University, And A Ctlogue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetn Works on Buddhism. Edited by Yensho Knkur. Sendi, Jpn: Tohoku University, TBRC W23703 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Krmpe Chodhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, 1977). stog Plce refers to the Tog Plce Mnuscript of the Tibetn Knjur (Leh, Ldkh: Smnrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979). TBRC = Tibetn Buddhist Resource Center (

282

283 Bibliogrphy 1. SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN WORKS Avlokitvrt (spyn rs gzigs brtul zhugs) Explntory Commentry on (Bhāvvivek s) Lmp for (Nāgārjun s) Wisdom prjñāprdīpṭīkā shes rb sgron m i rgy cher grel p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3859). TBRC W :4-575 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5259, vol Bhāvvivek (legs ldn byed, c ?) Blze of Resoning / Commentry on the Hert of the Middle Wy : Blze of Resoning mdhymkhṛdyvṛttitrkjvālā dbu m i snying po i grel p rtog ge br b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3856). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5256, vol. 96. Prtil English trnsltion (chp. 3, 1-136): Shōtrō Iid. Reson nd Emptiness. Tokyo: Hokuseido, Hert of the Middle Wy mdhymkhṛdykārikā dbu m i snying po i tshig le ur bys p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3855). TBRC W :4-82 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5255, vol. 96. Prtil English trnsltion (chp ): Shōtrō Iid. Reson nd Emptiness. Tokyo: Hokuseido, Prtil Snskrit nd Tibetn edition (chps. 1-3): Annette L. Heitmnn. Textkritischer Beitrg zu Bhvys Mdhymkhṛdykārikā Kpitel 1-3. Copenhgen: Videnskbsbutikkens Forlg, Kobenhvns Universitet, Lmp for Nāgārjun s Wisdom, Commentry on the Tretise on the Middle prjñāprdīp shes rb sgron m Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3856). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). P5253, vol. 95 Toh. 3853, dbu m, vol. tsh English trnsltion nd Tibetn text (chpters 3-5, 17, 23, 26): Willim Ames. Bhāvvivek s Prjñāprdīp: Six Chpters. PhD diss., University of Wshington, Buddhpālit (sngs rgys bskyngs, c ?) Buddhpālit Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle buddhpālitmūlmdhymkvṛtti dbu m rts b i grel p buddh pā li t Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3842). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5254, vol. 95; Toh. 3842, vol. tsh; Tokyo sde dge vol. 1; Golden Reprint, vol Edited Tibetn (Ch.1-12): Mx Wlleser. Bibliothec Buddhic 16. Osnbrück: Biblio Verlg, English trnsltion of Ch.1: Judit Fehér. Buddhpālit s Mūlmdhymkvṛtti Arrivl nd

284 282 Bibliogrphy Spred of Prāsṇgik-Mādhymik Literture in Tibet. In Tibetn nd Buddhist Studies Commemorting the 200th Anniversry of the Birth of Alexnder Csom de Kūros, vol. 1, edited by Louis Ligeti, Budpest: Akdmii Kido, Tibetn edition nd English trnsltion of Ch.18: Christin Lindtner. Buddhpālit on Emptiness. Indo-Irnin Journl 23 (1981): Annotted trnsltion nd edited Tibetn text: Akir Sito, A Study of the Buddhpālitmūlmdhymk-vṛtti. Ph.D. thesis. Austrlin Ntionl University, Chndrkīrti (zl b grgs p, seventh century) Autocommentry on the Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle mdhymkāvtārbhāṣy dbu m l jug p i bshd p / dbu m l jug p i rng grel Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3862). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5263, vol. 98. Also: Dhrmsl, Indi: Council of Religious nd Culturl Affirs, Tibetn: Louis de L Vllée Poussin. Mdhymkāvtār pr Cndrkīrti. Bibliothec Buddhic 9. Osnbrück, Germny: Biblio Verlg, French trnsltion (up to chp. 6, stnz 165): Louis de L Vllée Poussin. Muséon 8 (1907): ; Muséon 11 (1910): ; Muséon 12 (1911): Germn trnsltion (chp. 6, stnzs ): Helmut Tuscher. Cndrkīrti-Mdhymkāvtārḥ und Mdhymkāvtārbhāṣym. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 5. Vienn: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Cler Words, Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle mūlmdhymkvṛttiprsnnpdā dbu m rts b i grel p tshig gsl b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3860). TBRC W :4-401, vol. (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5260, vol. 98. Also: Dhrmsl, Indi: Tibetn Culturl Printing Press, Snskrit: Louis de L Vllée Poussin. Mūlmdhymkkārikās de Nāgārjun vec l Prsnnpdā commentire de Cndrkīrti. Bibliothec Buddhic 4. Osnbrück, Germny: Biblio Verlg, Also, J.W. de Jong. Text-criticl Notes on the Prsnnpdā. Indo-Irnin Journl 20, nos. 1/2 (1978): nd nos. 3/4 (1978): Also, Snskrit, Tibetn, nd French trnsltion of the Mdhymkśāstrstuti tht concludes Cler Words: J.W. de Jong. L Mdhymkśāstrstuti de Cndrkīrti. Oriens Extremus 9 (1962): English trnsltion (chp. 1): McDonld, Anne. In Cler Words: The Prsnnpdā, Chpter One. Vienn: Verlg der Österreichishen Akdemie der Vissenschften, English trnsltion (chps. 1 nd 25): T. Stcherbtsky. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇ, Leningrd: Office of the Acdemy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927; rev. reprint, Delhi: Motill Bnrsidss, English trnsltion (chp. 2): Jeffrey Hopkins. Anlysis of Coming nd Going. Dhrmsl, Indi: Librry of Tibetn Works nd Archives, Prtil English trnsltion: Mervyn Sprung. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Wy: The Essentil Chpters from the Prsnnpdā of Cndrkīrti trnslted from the Snskrit. London: Routledge, 1979; Boulder: Prjñā Press, French trnsltion (chps. 2-4, 6-9, 11, 23, 24, 26, 28): Jcques My. Prsnnpdā Mdhymk-vṛtti, douze chpitres trduits du snscrit et du tibétin. Pris: Adrien-Misonneuve, French trnsltion (chps ): J. W. de Jong. Cinq chpitres de l Prsnnpdā. Pris: Geuthner, 1949.

285 Bibliogrphy 283 French trnsltion (chp. 17): É. Lmotte. Le Trité de l cte de Vsubndhu, Krmsiddhiprkrṇ. Mélnges chinois et bouddhiques 4 (1936): Germn trnsltion (chps. 5, 12-26): Stnislw Schyer. Ausgewählte Kpitel us der Prsnnpdā. Krkow: Nktdem Polskiej Akdemji Umiejetnosci, Germn trnsltion (chp. 10): Stnislw Schyer. Feuer und Brennstoff. Rocznik Orjentlistyczny 7 (1931): Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle mdhymkāvtār dbu m l jug p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3861). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Tibetn: Louis de L Vllée Poussin. Mdhymkāvtār pr Cndrkīrti. Bibliothec Buddhic 9. Osnbrück, Germny: Biblio Verlg, English trnsltion: C. W. Huntington, Jr. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Erly Indin Mādhymik, Honolulu, Hwii: University of Hwii Press, English trnsltion (chps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compssion in Tibetn Buddhism. London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion (chp. 6): Stephen Btchelor. Echoes of Voidness by Geshé Rbten, London: Wisdom Publictions, See lso references under Chndrkīrti s [Auto]commentry on the Supplement. Dhrmkīrti (chos kyi grgs p, seventh century) Commentry on (Dignāg s) Compiltion of Prime Cognition prmāṇvārttikkārikā tshd m rnm grel gyi tshig le ur bys p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4210). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5709, vol Also: Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, Snskrit: Dwrikds Shstri. Prmāṇvārttik of Āchāry Dhrmkīrtti. Vrnsi, Indi: Buddh Bhrti, Also, Yūsho Miysk. Prmāṇvrttik-Kārikā (Snskrit nd Tibetn), Act Indologic 2 ( ): Also, (chp. 1 nd utocommentry) Rniero Gnoli. The Prmāṇvārttikm of Dhrmkīrti: The First Chpter with the Autocommentry. Rome: Istituto Itlino per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, English trnsltion (chp. 2): Mstoshi Ngtomi. A Study of Dhrmkīrti s Prmāṇvrttik: An English Trnsltion nd Annottion of the Prmāṇvrttik, Book I. Ph.D. diss., Hrvrd University, English trnsltion (chp. 4, stnzs 1-148): Tom J.F. Tillemns. Dhrmkīrti s Prmāṇvārttik: An Annotted Trnsltion of the Fourth Chpter (prārthānumān), vol. 1. Vienn: Verlg der Osterreichischen Akdemie der Wissenschften, Dignāg (phyogs kyi glngs po, sixth century) Compiltion of Prime Cognition prmāṇsmuccy tshd m kun ls btus p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4203). TBRC W :3-29 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5700, vol English trnsltion (prtil): M. Httori. Dignāg, On Perception. Cmbridge, Mss.: Hrvrd University Press, Gom-dy Nm-kh-gyl-tshn (sgom sde nm mkh rgyl mtshn) ) Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chndrkīrti s) Cler

286 284 Bibliogrphy Words, Written by Jm-py-yng Gom-dy Nm-kh-gyl-tshn thl bzlog gi dk b i gns gtn l bebs p jm p i dbyng sgom sde nm mkh rgyl mtshn gyis mdzd p i tshig gsl gyi lde mig in The Obligtory Texts (Yig-ch) for the Study of Mdhymik of Byes Grw-tshn of Se-r Monstery, Mdhymik Text Series, vol. 4 New Delhi: Lh-mkhr yoṅs-dzin bstn-p-rgyl-mtshn, Gyl-tshb-dr-m-rin-chen (rgyl tshb dr m rin chen, ) Explntion of (Dhrmkīrti s) Commentry on (Dignāg s) Compiltion of Prime Cognition : Unerring Illumintion of the Pth to Libertion / Illumintion of the Pth to Libertion tshd m rnm ʼgrel gyi tshig leʼur bys pʼi rnm bshd thr lm phyin ci m log pr gsl br byed p / rnm ʼgrel thr lm gsl byed Tibetn editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyl tshb rje, bl brng pr m) TBRC W4CZ2710.5: (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, 1999). Tibetn editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyl tshb rje) TBRC W : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, ). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In tshd m rnm grel gyi rnm bshd. TBRC W665: (PDF of zhng kng: zhng kng then m dpe skrun kung zi, 2000). Collected Works of Rgyl-tshb Dr-m-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Guru Dev, Also: Collected Works of Rgyl-tshb Dr-m-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Also: Vrnsi, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, Jm-yng-shy-p Ngg-wng-tson-drü ('jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje ngg dbng brtson grus, /1722) Gret Exposition of the Interpretble nd the Definitive / Decisive Anlysis of (Tsong-kh-p s) Differentiting the Interpretble nd the Definitive : Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture nd Resoning Free from Mistke, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunte drng b dng nges p'i don rnm pr byed p'i mth' dpyod khrul brl lung rigs bi dūr dkr p'i ngn mdzod skl bzng re b kun skong Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W :1-288 (PDF of bl brng bkr shis khyil, bl brng brk shis khyil dgon, publishing dte unknown). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W1KG (PDF of sbg s: nng bstn shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khng, [1968]). Tibetn edition: Published t Lhs, Tibet: Go-mng College, dte unknown. Acquired by Jeffrey Hopkins in Lhs, Tibet, t Go-mng College in Tipei reprint (published by the Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, Tipei, Tiwn, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng Librry, 1999) bsed on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng edition (New Delhi, Indi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973). English trnsltion of section one: Willim Mgee. Principles for Prctice: Jm-yng-shy-p on the Four Relinces with Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Annottions. UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, um-tibet.org. English trnsltion of section two: Willim Mgee. Questioning the Buddh About Contrdictions in His Techings. UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, um-tibet.org. English trnsltion of section three: Willim Mgee. Buddh s Answer Dispelling Contrdiction in the Sūtrs. UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, um-tibet.org. Gret Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Anlysis of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Tresury of Scripture nd Resoning, Thoroughly Illuminting the Profound Mening [of Emptiness], Entrnce for the Fortunte dbu m chen mo / dbu m jug p i mth dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zb don kun gsl skl bzng jug ngogs Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje). TBRC W : (PDF of South Indi?: Gomng College?, 1997?). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje). bl brng bkr shis 'khyil: bl brng brk shis 'khyil dgon, publishing dte unknown. Also vilble t: TBRC

287 Bibliogrphy 285 W Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdo-rje, vol. 9 (entire). New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Also vilble t: TBRC W1KG Buxduor, Indi: Gomng, Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdo-rje, vol. 9. (entire). Mundgod, Indi: Gomng College, Also vilble t: TBRC W Beijing, Chin: Pe cin yug hrn shin 'gyig pr khng, Mundgod, Krntk, Indi: Drepung Gomng Librry, Trnsltion of the section on the two truths: Guy M. Newlnd s Ph.D. thesis, The Two truths: A study of Mādhymik philosophy s presented in the Monstic textbooks of the Ge-luk-b order of Tibetn Buddhism. Trnsltion of the beginning: Jules Levinson, Wht Does Chndrkīrti Add to Nāgārjun s Tretise? UMA Trnsltion Project Publiction, Trnsltion of the beginning of chpter six: Crig Preston, Mening of The Mnifest, Vessels for the Teching of Emptiness, Nāgārjun s Lives, nd Ten Smenesses: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six, Introduction. Trnsltion of prt of chpter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Wy Autonomy School: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six. Trnsltion of prt of chpter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Wy Consequence School: Jm-yng-shy-p s Gret Exposition of the Middle: Chpter Six. Gret Exposition of Tenets / Explntion of Tenets: Sun of the Lnd of Smntbhdr Brillintly Illuminting All of Our Own nd Others Tenets nd the Mening of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocen of Scripture nd Resoning Fulf illing All Hopes of All Beings grub mth chen mo / grub mth i rnm bshd rng gzhn grub mth kun dng zb don mchog tu gsl b kun bzng zhing gi nyi m lung rigs rgy mtsho skye dgu i re b kun skong In the Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bźd-p i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Lbrng-tr-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedn Sungrb Minym Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, Indi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng (Mundgod, Indi: Go-mng College, 1996). Abbrevited reference: 1996 Mundgod revision. Tipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Tiwn: The Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, 2000). Abbrevited reference: 2000 Tipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod. Musoorie, Indi: Dlm, 1962 [bsed on the old Go-mng edition]. Abbrevited reference: 1962 Dlm. Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje) TBRC W1KG : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbrevited reference: 1973 Ngwng Gelek bl brng. Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W : (PDF of bl brng bkr shis khyil: bl brng bkr shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbrevited reference: 2001 TBRC bl brng. Tibetn scnned edition: scnning of old Go-mng edition by Jongbok Yi t Mundgod in Abbrevited reference: 2017 old Go-mng. English trnsltion (entire root text nd edited portions of the utocommentry nd Ngg-wngpl-dn s Annottions): Jeffrey Hopkins. Mps of the Profound: Jm-yng-shy-b s Gret Exposition of Buddhist nd Non-Buddhist Views on the Nture of Relity. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion (beginning of the chpter on the Consequence School): Jeffrey Hopkins. Medittion on Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publictions, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom Publictions, English trnsltion of root text with Lo-sng-kön-chog s commentry: Dniel Cozort nd Crig Preston. Buddhist Philosophy: Losng Gonchok's Short Commentry to Jmyng Shyb's Root Text on Tenets. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Trnsltion of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Dniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Wy Consequence School (Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998).

288 286 Bibliogrphy Trnsltion into complex-chrcter Chinese: Su-n Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins Esy Access to Jmyng-shy-p s Mps of the Profound: Autonomy School. Trnsltion into complex-chrcter Chinese: Su-n Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins Esy Access to Jmyng-shy-p s Mps of the Profound: Consequence School.. Root Text of Tenets: Lion s Ror / Presenttion of Tenets: Ror of the Five-Fced [Lion] Erdicting Error, Precious Lmp Illuminting the Good Pth to Omniscience grub mth rts b gdong lng i sgr dbyngs / grub p i mth i rnm pr bzhg p khrul spong gdong lng i sgr dbyngs kun mkhyen lm bzng gsl b i sgron me Collected Works of Jm-dbyṅs-bzhd-p i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the Tr-shi-khyil blockprint with some corrections ]. Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje / bl brng pr m). TBRC W : (PDF of bl brng bkr shis khyil: bl brng bkr shis khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In kun mkhyen jm dpl zhl lung sogs nyer mkho i skor phyogs bsgrigs. TBRC W30060: [s.l.]: [s.n.], [2002] Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum ( jm dbyngs bzhd p i rdo rje). TBRC W : (PDF of Go-mng college[?], 1997[?]. Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W8LS [s.l.]: [s.n.], [n.d.]. Jng-ky Röl-py-dor-je (lcng sky rol p i rdo rje, ) Cler Exposition of the Presenttions of Tenets: Beutiful Ornment for the Meru of the Subduer s Teching / Presenttions of Tenets grub mth i rnm bzhg / grub p i mth i rnm pr bzhg p gsl br bshd p thub bstn lhun po i mdzes rgyn Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (rol p i rdo rje). TBRC W :7-220 (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go bod brgyud mtho rim nng bstn slob gling nng bstn zhib jug khng, 1995). Edition cited: Vrnsi, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Printing Press, Also: Lokesh Chndr, ed. Buddhist Philosophicl Systems of Lcṅ-sky Rol-phi Rdo-rje. Śt-piṭk Series (Indo-Asin Litertures), vol New Delhi: Interntionl Acdemy of Indin Culture, Also: An edition published by gm cr phn bde legs bshd gling grv tshng dng rgyud rnying slr gso tshogs p, English trnsltion of Sūtr School chpter: Anne C. Klein. Knowing, Nming, nd Negtion, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Commentry on this: Anne C. Klein. Knowledge nd Libertion: A Buddhist Epistemologicl Anlysis in Support of Trnsformtive Religious Experience. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion of Autonomy School chpter: Donld S. Lopez Jr. A Study of Svātntrik, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion of prt of Consequence School chpter: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness Yog: The Tibetn Middle Wy, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Jñāngrbh (ye shes snying po, eighth century) Autocommentry of Differentition of the Two Truths bden gnyis rnm byed p i grel p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : 8-32 (PDF of: Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). English trnsltion with criticl edition: Eckel, Mlcolm D. Jñāngrbh s Commentry on the Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Hndbook of Mdhymk Philosophy. Albny, N.Y.: Stte University of New York Press, Differentition of the Two Truths stydvyvibhṅgkārik bden p gnyis rnm pr byed p i tshig le u bys p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge). TBRC W : 4-8 (PDF of: Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Kmlshīl (pd m i ngng tshul; c )

289 Bibliogrphy 287 Illumintion of the Middle mdhymkālok dbu m snng b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3887). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5287 Khy-drub-ge-leg-pl-sng (mkhs grub dge legs dpl bzng, ) Compiltion on Emptiness / Opening the Eyes of the Fortunte: Tretise Brillintly Clrifying the Profound Emptiness stong thun chen mo / zb mo stong p nyid rb tu gsl br byed p i bstn bcos skl bzng mig byed Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In dbu m stong thun chen mo. TBRC W00EGS :9-481 (PDF of Mdhymik Text Series, Vol. 1, New Delhi: ed. lh mkhr yongs dzin bstn p rgyl mtshn, 1972). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (mkhs grub rje). TBRC W1KG : (PDF of bl brng pr m: bl brng bkr shis khyil, 199?). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W1KG vol (PDF of Lh s: ser gtsug nng bstn dpe rnying tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khng, 2009). Collected Works of the Lord Mkhs-grub rje dge-legs-dpl-bzṅ-po, vol. 1, New Delhi: Guru Dev, Also: Collected Works of Mkhs-grub dge-legs dpl, vol. 1, New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Also: New Delhi: n.p., English trnsltion: José Igncio Cbezón. A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotted Trnsltion of the stong thun chen mo of mkhs grub dge legs dpl bzng, Albny, N.Y.: Stte University of New York Press, English trnsltion of the chpter on the Mind-Only School: Jeffrey Hopkins. Khy-drub-ge-legpl-sng s Opening the Eyes of the Fortunte : The Mind-Only School. Unpublished mnuscript. Kön-chog-jig-my-wng-po (dkon mchog jigs med dbng po, ) Precious Grlnd of Tenets / Presenttion of Tenets: A Precious Grlnd grub p i mth i rnm pr bzhg p rin po che i phreng b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (dkon mchog jigs med dbng po). TBRC W1KG9560.6: New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, (PDF of New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1971). Tibetn: K. Mimki. Le Grub mth rnm bzhg rin chen phreṅ b de dkon mchog jigs med dbṅ po ( ), Zinbun [The Reserch Institute for Humnistic Studies, Kyoto University], 14 (1977): Also, Collected Works of dkon-mchog- jigs-med-dbṅ-po, vol. 6, New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, Also: Xylogrph in thirty-two folios from the Lessing collection of the rre book section of the University of Wisconsin Librry, which is item 47 in Leonrd Zwilling. Tibetn Blockprints in the Deprtment of Rre Books nd Specil Collections. Mdison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin-Mdison Librries, Also: Mundgod, Indi: blo gsl gling Press, Also: Dhrmsl, Indi: Tibetn Culturl Printing Press, Also: Dhrmsl, Indi: Teching Trining, n.d. Also: A blockprint edition in twenty-eight folios obtined in 1987 from Go-mng College in Lh-s, printed on blocks tht predte the Culturl Revolution. English trnsltion: Geshe Lhundup Sop nd Jeffrey Hopkins. Prctice nd Theory of Tibetn Buddhism, New York: Grove, 1976; rev. ed., Cutting through Appernces: Prctice nd Theory of Tibetn Buddhism, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Also: H. V. Guenther. Buddhist Philosophy in Theory nd Prctice. Bltimore, Md.: Penguin, Also, the chpters on the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School: Shōtrō Iid. Reson nd Emptiness, Tokyo: Hokuseido, Mitrey (byms p) 4. Ornment for the Cler Reliztions

290 288 Bibliogrphy bhismyālṃkār/ bhismyālṁkār-nām-prjñāpārmitopdeśśāstrkārikā mngon pr rtogs p i rgyn/ shes rb kyi ph rol tu phyin p'i mn ngg gi bstn bcos mngon pr rtogs p'i rgyn shes by b'i tshig le'ur bys p Snskrit editions: Amno, Ko ei. A study on the Abhismy-lm k r-k rik -s str-vrṭti. Rev. ed. Yni City, Jpn: Rokoku Bunko, Stcherbtsky, Theodore nd Eugène Obermiller, eds. Abhismy ln k r-prjn p rmit - Updes -ś str: The Work of Bodhisttv Mitrey. Bibliothec Indo-Buddhic Series. Reprint ed. Delhi, Indi: Sri Stguru Publictions, Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3786). TBRC W :3-28 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe Choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). English trnsltions: Brunnhölzl, Krl. Gone Beyond: The Prjn p rmitā Su trs, The Ornment of Cler Reliztion, nd its Commentries in the Tibetn Kgyu trdition. The Tsdr Foundtion series. 2 vols. Ithc, NY: Snow Lion Publictions, Groundless Pths: The Prjñāpārmitā Sūtrs, The Ornment of Cler Reliztion, nd Its Commentries in the Tibetn Nyingm Trdition. Ithc, NY: Snow Lion Publictions, Conze, Edwrd. Abhismyālṅkār: Introduction nd Trnsltion from Originl Text with Snskrit-Tibetn Index. Rom, Itly: Is. M.E.O., Hopkins, Jeffrey nd Jongbok Yi. Mitrey s Ornment for the Cler Reliztions. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, 2015: downlodble t um-tibet.org.. Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Explntion of the Tretise Ornment for the Cler Reliztions From the Approch of the Mening of the Words: The Scred Word of Mitreynāth. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, 2014: downlodble t umtibet.org.. (contining 203 of the 274 stnzs) The Hidden Teching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtrs: Jm-yng-shy-p s Seventy Topics nd Kön-chog-jig-my-wng-po s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies, 2014: downlodble t um-tibet.org. Sprhm, Greth. A ryvimuktisen, Mitreyn th, nd Hribhdr. Abhismy lm k r with Vṛtti nd Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jin Publishing Compny., Golden Grlnd of Eloquence: legs bshd gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jin Publishing Compny, Nāgārjun (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.) Tretise on the Middle / Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom mdhymkśāstr / prjñānāmmūlmdhymkkārikā dbu m i bstn bcos / dbu m rts b i tshig le ur bys p shes rb ces by b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3824). TBRC W :3-39, vol. ts (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5224, vol. 95. Edited Snskrit: J. W. de Jong. Nāgārjun, Mūlmdhymkkārikāḥ. Mdrs, Indi: Adyr Librry nd Reserch Centre, 1977; reprint, Wheton, Ill.: Agents, Theosophicl Publishing House, c1977. Also: Christin Lindtner. Nāgārjun s Filosofiske Verker, Indiske Studier 2. Copenhgen: Akdemisk Forlg, English trnsltion: Frederick Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Mening. Nshville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, Also: Kenneth Ind. Nāgārjun: A Trnsltion of His Mūlmdhymkkārikā. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, Also: Dvid J. Kluphn. Nāgārjun: The Philosophy of the Middle Wy. Albny, N.Y.: Stte University Press of New York, Also: Jy L. Grfield. The Fundmentl Wisdom of the Middle Wy. New York: Oxford University Press, Also: Stephen Btchelor. Verses from the Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime. New York: Riverhed Books, Itlin trnsltion: R. Gnoli. Nāgārjun: Mdhymk Kārikā, Le stnze del cmmino di mezzo. Enciclopedi di utori clssici 61. Turin, Itly: P. Boringhieri, 1961.

291 Bibliogrphy 289 Dnish trnsltion: Christin Lindtner. Nāgārjun s Filosofiske Verker, Indiske Studier 2. Copenhgen: Akdemisk Forlg, Seventy Stnzs on Emptiness śūnytāspttikārikā stong p nyid bdun cu p i tshig le ur bys p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3827). TBRC W :49-55 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5227, vol. 95. Edited Tibetn nd English trnsltion: Christin Lindtner. Mster of Wisdom. Oklnd: Dhrm Publishing, English trnsltion: Dvid Ross Komito. Nāgārjun s Seventy Stnzs : A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Precious Grlnd of Advice for the King rājprikthārtnāvlī rgyl po l gtm by b rin po che i phreng b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4158). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Del-hi Krmpe choedhey, gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dhrm vol. 93. Snskrit, Tibetn, nd Chinese: Michel Hhn. Nāgārjun s Rtnāvlī. vol. 1. The Bsic Texts (Snskrit, Tibetn, nd Chinese). Bonn: Indic et Tibetic Verlg, English trnsltion: Jeffrey Hopkins. Nāgārjun s Precious Grlnd: Buddhist Advice for Living nd Libertion, Ithc, New York: Snow Lion Publictions, Supersedes tht in: Nāgārjun nd the Seventh Dli Lm. The Precious Grlnd nd the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, trnslted by Jeffrey Hopkins, London: George Allen nd Unwin, 1975; New York: Hrper nd Row, 1975; reprint, in H.H. the Dli Lm, Tenzin Gytso. The Buddhism of Tibet. London: George Allen nd Unwin, 1983; reprint, Ithc, New York: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion: John Dunne nd Sr McClintock. The Precious Grlnd: An Epistle to King. Boston: Wisdom Publictions, English trnsltion of 223 stnzs (chp. 1, 1-77; chp. 2, 1-46; chp. 4, 1-100): Giuseppe Tucci. The Rtnāvlī of Nāgārjun. Journl of the Royl Asitic Society (1934): ; (1936): , Jpnese trnsltion: Uryūzu Ryushin. Butten II, Seki Koten Bungku Zenshu, 7 (July, 1965): Edited by Nkmur Hjime. Tokyo: Chikum Shobō. Also: Uryūzu Ryushin. Dijō Butten, 14 (1974): Ryūju Ronshū. Edited by Kjiym Yuichi nd Uryūzu Ryushin. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsh. Dnish trnsltion: Christin Lindtner. Ngrjun, Juvelkeden og ndre skrifter. Copenhgen: Nvidhrm Stnzs Demonstrting Condenstion of Exclusions piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśkārikā ldog p bsdus p bstn p i tshig le ur bys p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4293, sgr mdo, she 250b TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5782, sgr rig p, le 245b (vol.140, p ). [N] le 230b [Kinsh] 3782, le 316b.1 (p ). Commentry on Stnzs Demonstrting Condenstion of Exclusions piṇḍnivrtnnirdeśvārttik ldog p bsdus p bstn p i rnm grel Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4294, sgr mdo, she [N] le b.2). TBRC W : (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe

292 290 Bibliogrphy choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Peking 5783, sgr rig p, le b.7 (vol.140, p ). [N] le b.2. [Kinsh] 3783, le 322b.1 (p ). Ngg-wng-pl-dn (ngg dbng dpl ldn, b. 1797), lso known s Pl-dn-chö-jy (dpl ldn chos rje) Annottions for (Jm-yng-shy-p s) Gret Exposition of Tenets : Freeing the Knots of the Diff icult Points, Precious Jewel of Cler Thought grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In TBRC W (PDF of Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, 1964.). Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅg-dbṅ Dpl-ldn of Urg, vols. 4 (entire)-5, Delhi: Guru Dev, Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (ng dbng dpl ldn). TBRC W (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Mongolin Lm Gurudev, 1983). Tipei edition: Drepung Gomng Librry (Tipei, Tiwn: Corporte Body of the Buddh Eductionl Foundtion, 2007). Explntion of Veil Truths nd the Ultimte in the Four Systems of Tenets grub mth bzhi i lugs kyi kun rdzob dng don dm p i don rnm pr bshd p legs bshd dpyid kyi dpl mo i glu dbyngs Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (ngg dbng dpl ldn). TBRC W5926.1:9-280 (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Mongolin Lm Gurudev, 1983). New Delhi: Guru Dev, Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅg-dbṅ Dpl-ldn of Urg, vol. 1, Delhi: Mongolin Lm Gurudev, Trnsltion of the chpter on the Gret Exposition School: John B. Buescher. Echoes from n Empty Sky: The Origins of the Buddhist Doctrine of the Two Truths. Ithc, Snow Lion Publictions: Stting the Modes of Explntion in the Textbooks on the Middle Wy nd the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling nd Go-mng Colleges: Festivl for Those of Cler Intelligence blo gsl gling dng bkr shis sgo mng grw tshng gi dbu phr gyi yig ch i bshd tshul bkod p blo gsl dg ston Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (ngg dbng dpl ldn). TBRC W5926.3: (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Mongolin Lm Gurudev, 1983). Word Commentry on the Root Verses of (Jm-yng-shy-p s) Gret Exposition of Tenets tshig grel / grub mth' chen mo i mchn 'grel gyi skbs skbs su mdzd p i rts b i tshig grel zur du bkod p In Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅg-dbṅ Dpl-ldn of Urg, vols. 4 (entire)-5, Delhi: Guru Dev, Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (ng dbng dpl ldn). TBRC W (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Mongolin Lm Gurudev, 1983). grub mth chen mo i mchn grel dk gnd mdud grol blo gsl gces nor, Tipei Edition (see bove), includes Ngg-wng-pl-dn s Word Commentry on the Root Verses. Prjñāmokṣh (shes rb thr p) Commentry on (Atish s) Quintessentil Instructions on the Middle Wy dbu m i mn ngg ces by b i grel b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (dpe bsdur m). TBRC W1PD : (PDF of Pe cin: krung go i bod rig p i dpe skrun khng, ). Ren-d-w Shön-nu-lo-drö (red mdʼ b gzhon nu blo gros, ) Commentry on (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle : Illuminting the Tenble dbu m rts bʼi ʼgrel p ʼthd pʼi snng b Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung ʼbum (gzhon nu blo gros) TBRC W : (PDF of Kthmndu: S sky rgyl yongs gsung rb slob gnyer khng, 1999). Shāntidev (zhi b lh, eighth century C.E.) Engging in the Bodhisttv Deeds

293 Bibliogrphy 291 bodhi[sttv]cryāvtār byng chub sems dp i spyod p l jug p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 3871). TBRC W : , dbu m, vol. l (PDF of Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ). Snskrit: P. L. Vidy. Bodhicryāvtār. Buddhist Snskrit Texts 12. Drbhng, Indi: Mithil Institute, Snskrit nd Tibetn: Vidhushekr Bhttchry. Bodhicryāvtār. Bibliothec Indic, 280. Clcutt: Asitic Society, Snskrit nd Tibetn with Hindi trnsltion: Rāmśṃkr Tripāthī, ed. Bodhicryāvtār. Buddh-Himāly-Grnthmālā, 8. Leh, Ldākh: Centrl Institute of Buddhist Studies, English trnsltions: Stephen Btchelor. A Guide to the Bodhisttv s Wy of Life. Dhrmsl, Indi: Librry of Tibetn Works nd Archives, Mrion Mtics. Entering the Pth of Enlightenment. New York: Mcmilln, Kte Crosby nd Andrew Skilton. The Bodhicryāvtār. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pdmkr Trnsltion Group. The Wy of the Bodhisttv. Boston: Shmbhl, Vesn A. Wllce nd B. Aln Wllce. A Guide to the Bodhisttv Wy of Life. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Contemporry commentry: H.H. the Dli Lm, Tenzin Gytso. Trnscendent Wisdom. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, H.H. the Dli Lm, Tenzin Gytso. A Flsh of Lightning in the Drk of the Night. Boston: Shmbhl, T-drin-rb-tn (rt mgrin rb brtn, tre hor dge bshes, ) Annottions / Annottions for the Diff icult Points of (Tsong-kh-p s) The Essence of Eloquence : Festivl for the Unbised Endowed with Cler Intelligence drng nges rnm byed legs bshd snying po dk gnd rnms mchn bur bkod p gzur gns blo gsl dg ston Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W1KG10421, 1 vol. (No publiction dt). Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grgs, Tg-tshng Shy-rb-rin-chen (stg tshng lo tsā b shes rb rin chen, b.1405) Explntion of Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets : Ocen of Eloquence grub mth kun shes ns mth brl grub p zhes by b i bstn bcos rnm pr bshd p legs bshd kyi rgy mtsho Tibetn digitl edition: In grub mth kun shes ns mth brl sgrub p zhes by b i bstn bcos: TBRC W29895: (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khng, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kngr, Indi: Dzongsr Institute, 2001; lso, Thimphu, Bhutn: Kun-bzngstobs rgyl, 1976; nd photogrphic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sngpo, no other dt. Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets grub mth kun shes ns mth brl grub p zhes by b i bstn bcos Tibetn digitl edition: In grub mth kun shes ns mth brl sgrub p zhes by b i bstn bcos: TBRC W29895: (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khng, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kngr, Indi: Dzongsr Institute, 2001; lso, Thimphu, Bhutn: Kun-bzngstobs rgyl, 1976; nd photogrphic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sngpo, no other dt. Tsong-kh-p Lo-sng-drg-p (tsong kh p blo bzng grgs p, ) Explntion of (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Ocen of Resoning / Gret Commentry on (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle dbu m rts b i tshig le ur bys p shes rb ces by b i rnm bshd rigs p i rgy mtsho / rts

294 292 Bibliogrphy shes ṭik chen Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p, bl brng pr m). TBRC W :5-622 (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6153, vol Also: Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Printing Press, n.d. Also: rje tsong kh p i gsung dbu m i lt b i skor, vols Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, Also: Delhi: Ngwng Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Dev, English trnsltion: Geshe Ngwng Smten nd Jy L. Grfield. Ocen of Resoning: A Gret Commentry on Nāgārjun s Mūlmdhymkkārikā. Oxford: Oxford University Press, English trnsltion (chp. 2): Jeffrey Hopkins. Ocen of Resoning. Dhrmsl, Indi: Librry of Tibetn Works nd Archives, Extensive Explntion of (Chndrkīrti s) Supplement to (Nāgārjun s) Tretise on the Middle : Illumintion of the Thought dbu m l jug p i rgy cher bshd p dgongs p rb gsl Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p, bl brng pr m). TBRC W :5-582 (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6143, vol Also: Dhrmsl, Indi: Tibetn Culturl Printing Press, n.d.; Srnth, Indi: Plesure of Elegnt Syings Press, 1973; Delhi: Ngwng Gelek, 1975; Delhi: Guru Dev, English trnsltion (chps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compssion in Tibetn Buddhism, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, 1980; the portion of the book tht is Tsong-kh-p s Illumintion of the Thought (chpters 1-5) is downlodble t: English trnsltion (chp. 6, stnzs 1-7): Jeffrey Hopkins nd Anne C. Klein. Pth to the Middle: Mdhymk Philosophy in Tibet: The Orl Scholrship of Kensur Yeshy Tupden, by Anne C. Klein, , Albny, N.Y.: Stte University of New York Press, Four Interwoven Annottions on (Tsong-kh-p s) Gret Exposition of the Stges of the Pth / The Lm rim chen mo of the incomprble Tsong-kh-p, with the interlinel notes of B-so Chos-kyi-rgyl-mtshn, Sde-drug Mkhn-chen Ngg-dbng-rb-rtn, Jm-dbyngs-bshdp i-rdo-rje, nd Br-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub lm rim mchn bzhi sbrgs m/ mnym med rje btsun tsong kh p chen pos mdzd p i byng chub lm rim chen mo i dk b i gnd rnms mchn bu bzhi i sgo ns legs pr bshd p theg chen lm gyi gsl sgron Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In lm rim mchn bzhi sbrgs m (bl brng bkr shis khyil pr m). TBRC W :3-978 (PDF of bl brng bkr shis khyil edition printed from the 1807 bl brng bkr shis 'khyil blocks in 1999?). Also: New Delhi: Chos- phel-legs-ldn, Also: Gomng Librry, 2016 Gret Exposition of the Stges of the Pth / Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teching All the Stges of Prctice of the Three Types of Beings lm rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyms su blng b i rim p thms cd tshng br ston p i byng chub lm gyi rim p Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p, bl brng pr m). TBRC W :51026 (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, [199?]). Peking 6001, vol Dhrmsl, Indi: Tibetn Culturl Printing Press, Delhi: Ngwng Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Dev, Edited Tibetn: Tsultrim Kelsng Khngkr. The Gret Tretise on the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment (Lm Rim Chen Mo). Jpnese nd Tibetn Buddhist Culture Series, 6. Kyoto: Tibetn Buddhist Culture Assocition, English trnsltion: Lmrim Chenmo Trnsltion Committee. The Gret Tretise on the Stges

295 Bibliogrphy 293 of the Pth to Enlightenment. 3 vols. Joshu W.C. Cutler, editor-in-chief, Guy Newlnd, editor. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion of the prt on the excessively brod object of negtion: Elizbeth Npper. Dependent-Arising nd Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publictions, English trnsltion of the prt on the excessively nrrow object of negtion: Willim Mgee. The Nture of Things: Emptiness nd Essence in the Geluk World, Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, English trnsltion of the prts on clm biding nd specil insight: Alex Wymn. Clming the Mind nd Discerning the Rel, New York: Columbi University Press, 1978; reprint, New Delhi, Motill Bnrsidss, Introduction to the Seven Tretises on Prime Cognition: Clering Awy the Mentl Drkness of Seekers sde bdun l jug p i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel Tibetn digitl reprint edition: TBRC W1KG vol (PDF of Srnth, Indi: dge ldn spyi ls khng, 1972). sde dge, New Zhol Pr-khng edition of the collected works of Tsong-kh-p, Vol. tsh. Medium-Length Exposition of the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment to be Prcticed by Beings of the Three Cpcities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment to be Prcticed by Beings of the Three Cpcities together with n Outline / Short Exposition of the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment skyes bu gsum gyis nyms su blng b i byng chub lm gyi rim p / skyes bu gsum gyi nyms su blng b i byng chub lm gyi rim p bring po s bcd kh skong dng bcs p / lm rim bring / lm rim chung ngu Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p, bl brng pr m). TBRC W :5-474 (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, 199?); Peking 6002, vol Also: Mundgod, Indi: dg ldn shr rtse, n.d. (includes outline of topics by Trijng Rinbochy); Bylkuppe, Indi: Ser Je Librry, 1999 (includes outline of topics by Trijng Rinbochy); Dhrmsl, Indi: Tibetn Culturl Printing Press, 1968; Delhi: Ngwng Gelek, Also: Delhi: Guru Dev, English trnsltion of the section on specil insight: Jeffrey Hopkins. In Tsong-kh-p s Finl Exposition of Wisdom. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Robert Thurmn. The Middle Trnscendent Insight. Life nd Techings of Tsong Khp, Dhrmsl, Indi: Librry of Tibetn Works nd Archives, Edited Tibetn text nd Jpnese trnsltion of the section on specil insight: Tsultrim Kelsng Khngkr nd Tkd Yorihito. A Study of Tsong khp s Mādhymik Philosophy 1: Annotted Jpnese trnsltion of the Vipśynā Section of Medium Exposition of the Stges of the Pth (Lm rim). Tsong kh p chuugn tetsugku no kenkyuu 1, Bodidousidiron chuuhen, kn no shou: wyku, Tsultrim Kelsng Khngkr nd Tkd Yorihito, Kyoto: Buneido, Jpnese trnsltion: Tsultrim Kelsng Khngkr nd Tkshi Rujink. The Tretise on the Stges of the Pth to Enlightenment by rje Tsong kh p: An Annotted Jpnese Trnsltion of Byng chub Lm rim chung b. Kyoto: Unio Corportion, Tretise Differentiting Interpretble nd Definitive Menings: The Essence of Eloquence drng b dng nges p i don rnm pr phye b i bstn bcos legs bshd snying po Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p). TBRC W : (PDF of New Delhi: Ngwng Gelek Demo, 1975). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p, bl brng pr m). TBRC W : (PDF of bl brng: bl brng bkr shis khyil, 199?). Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p). TBRC W (PDF of sde dge lhun grub steng: sde dge pr khng, n.p.).

296 294 Bibliogrphy Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In gsung bum (tsong kh p). TBRC W : (PDF of Dhrmsl: Sherig Prkhng, 1997). Peking 6142, vol English trnsltion of the Prologue nd Mind-Only section: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism. Dynmic Responses to Dzong-k-b s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 1. Berkeley: University of Cliforni Press, English trnsltion of the introductory section on the Middle Wy School; Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness in the Middle Wy School of Buddhism: Mutul Reinforcement of Understnding Dependent-Arising nd Emptiness. Dynmic Responses to Tsong-kh-p s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 4. UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies. English trnsltion of the entire text: Robert A. F. Thurmn. Tsong Khp s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Editions: see the prefce to Hopkins criticl edition of the Introduction nd section on the Mind- Only School, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 355. Also: Plden Drkp nd Dmdul Nmgyl. drng nges legs bshd snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive nd Interpretble, Mundgod, Indi: SOKU, Ye shes thbs mkhs. shr tsong kh p blo bzng grgs ps mdzd p i drng b dng nges p i don rnm pr byed p i bstn bcos legs bshd snying po (The Estern Tsong-kh-p Lo-sng-drg-p s Tretise Differentiting Interpretble nd Definitive Menings: The Essence of Eloquence ). Tā l i bl m i phgs bod, vol. 22. Prt Two, Vrnsi: Centrl Institute for Higher Tibetn Studies, Ye-shy-dy (ye shes sde, fl. 8th century) Distinctions in the Views lt b i khyd pr Tibetn digitl reprint edition: In bstn gyur (sde dge, 4360). TBRC W : (Delhi, Indi: Delhi Krmpe choedhey, Gylwe sungrb prtun khng, ).

297 2. OTHER WORKS Dreyfus, Georges B.J. nd Sr L. McClintock, The Svātntrik-Prāsṅgik Distinction: Wht Difference Does Difference Mke? (Wisdom Publictions, 2003) Hopkins, Jeffrey. Absorption In No Externl World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism. Dynmic Responses to Dzong-k-b s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 3. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Medittion on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publictions, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, M.: Wisdom Publictions, Nāgārjun s Precious Grlnd: Buddhist Advice for Living nd Libertion. Ithc, NY: Snow Lion Publictions, McDonld, Anne. In Cler Words: The Prsnnpdā, Chpter One. Vienn: Verlg der Österreichishen Akdemie der Vissenschften, Rogers, Ktherine Mnchester. Tibetn Logic. Ithc, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publictions, Yotsuy, Kodo. The Critique of Svtntr Resoning by Cndrkīrti nd Tsong-kh-p: A Study of Philosophicl Proof According to Two Prāsṅgik Mdhymk Trditions of Indi nd Tibet. Tibetn nd Indo-Tibetn Studies 8. Stuttgrt: Frnz Steiner Verlg, 1999.

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299 Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetn Buddhist Studies t the University of Virgini where he tught Tibetn Buddhist Studies nd Tibetn lnguge for thirty-two yers from He received B.A. mgn cum lude from Hrvrd University in 1963, trined for five yers t the Lmist Buddhist Monstery of Americ in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetn Buddhist Lerning Center in Wshington, New Jersey), nd received Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in He served s His Holiness the Dli Lm s chief interpreter into English on lecture tours for ten yers, At the University of Virgini he founded progrms in Buddhist Studies nd Tibetn Studies nd served s Director of the Center for South Asin Studies for twelve yers. He hs published fifty-one books, some of which hve been trnslted into totl of twenty-two lnguges. He published the first trnsltion of the foundtionl text of the Jo-nng school of Tibetn Buddhism in Mountin Doctrine: Tibet s Fundmentl Tretise on Other-Emptiness nd the Buddh-Mtrix, nd two on the Nying-m view, Fundmentl Mind: The Nyingm View of the Gret Completeness nd Mi-pm-gy-tsho s Primordil Enlightenment: The Nying-m View of Luminosity nd Emptiness, Anlysis of Fundmentl Mind, with orl commentry by Khetsun Sngpo. He hs trnslted nd edited sixteen books from orl techings by His Holiness the Dli Lm, the lst four being How to See Yourself s You Relly Are; Becoming Enlightened; How to Be Compssionte; nd The Hert of Medittion: Discovering Innermost Awreness. He is the Founder nd President of the UMA Institute for Tibetn Studies.

300 The first stnz of the first chpter of Nāgārjun s Fundmentl Tretise on the Middle Clled Wisdom is: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not cuselessly Do ny things Ever rise nywhere. Unchrcteristiclly, Nāgārjun sys nothing more bout the first leg of this resoning tht things re not produced from self. He immeditely proceeds to the resoning proving tht things re not produced from other by exmining the four types of conditions. His principl Indin commenttors, however, explin the refuttion of production from self in vrying detil, the differences engendering the split between wht cme to be clled the Autonomy School nd the Consequence School. Buddhpālit s commentry on the refuttion of production from self provoked Bhāvvivek into extensive criticism nd hence into demonstrtion of his own preferred style of commentry. The present book provides two Tibetn explntions of the controversy, shorter nd longer, by the Tibetn scholr Jm-yng-shy-p Ngg-wng-tsöndrü. Included lso re trnsltions of Buddhpālit s nd Bhāvvivek s commentries s well s the first trnsltion into English of Avlokitvrt s extensive Bhāvvivek s presenttion, his minute exmintion llowing Bhāvvivek s terse text to be seen in high relief. Bhāvvivek s rgument is seen s it could not be otherwise. This complex topic is used in Tibetn monstic colleges to drw students into fscinting reflections bout how phenomen pper nd thereby to explore the nture of the relity behind ppernces. um-tibet.org