The History of Philosophy

Transcription

1 The History of Philosophy Descartes to Hume THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Descartes to Hume Useful collections of papers (hereafter referred to by their editors names) R. Ariew, J. Cottingham, and Tom Sorell Descartes Meditations: Background Source Materials (C.U.P.) V.C. Chappell Hume (Doubleday) referred to as Chappell-H J.A. Cover & Mark Kulstad Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett) W. Doney Descartes: Critical Essays (Macmillan) Harry G. Frankfurt Leibniz (Notre Dame) Marjorie Grene Spinoza (Anchor) Michael Hooker Leibniz Critical and Interpretive Essays (Manchester U.P.) George Morice David Hume: Bicentenary Papers (Edinburgh U.P.) Amélie Rorty Essays on Descartes Meditations (U. of California P.) A. Sesonske and N. Fleming Meta-Meditations (Belmont) Colin Turbayne Berkeley Critical and Interpretive Essays (Manchester U.P.) Godfrey Vesey Philosophers Ancient and Modern (C.U.P.) Relevant Oxford Readings (referred to as: OR <editor>): Vere Chappell Locke John Cottingham Descartes Jonathan Glover The Philosophy of Mind I.C. Tipton Locke on Human Understanding R.S. Woolhouse Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science Relevant Cambridge Companions (referred to as CC <editor>): Vere Chappell Locke John Cottingham Descartes Don Garrett Spinoza Nicholas Jolley Leibniz David Fate Norton Hume Frequently Used Abbreviations: A.P.Q. American Philosophical Quarterly J.H.P. Journal of the History of Philosophy J. Phil. Journal of Philosophy P.A.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society P.A.S.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume Phil. Q. Philosophical Quarterly Phil. Rev. Philosophical Review Peter J. King As you ll quickly discover, there are far more topics here than we could cover in a term; in fact there are nearly enough for three terms. Yet I ve skimped on Leibniz and Berkeley, and have condensed a number of immense questions into single essay-topics. Clearly we ll have to make some choices but they don t have to be the same for everyone. As long as both members of each tutorial pair work on the same topics every week, I m almost completely flexible as to which topics you choose. Almost, because concentrating entirely on a couple of writers or spreading the eight essays too thinly over the different writers won t do you any good when it comes to Schools. Note that some of the topics aren t relevant to the Oxford paper; I use this hand-out for a number of courses at different universities.

2 P Some notes on writing essays HILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can t just set down your answer you have to show how you got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such a hurry to get her ideas down to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory that she forgets to argue. Without arguments, all you have is a set of opinions, however interesting; with arguments, you have philosophy. With good arguments, you have good philosophy. TRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from the S amount of work put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesn t only make it difficult for the reader to follow what you re saying it can make it difficult for you to keep track of what you re saying, leading to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance. Make an essay plan before you start writing, and try to stick to it. It shouldn t be too detailed, otherwise it ll be too rigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including an introduction to and explanation of the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and some sort of conclusion. Whatever your position, be sure to treat the positions with which you disagree as fully and sympathetically as possible before you start to criticise them; apart from anything else this will help you to avoid knocking down straw men. Don t strive too hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (if they do) as you think and write about other people s ideas and arguments. If you do come up with what you think is an original idea or argument, don t be too protective towards it; be at least as critical of it as you would be of anyone else s. RITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to allow C the reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author, title, and page number; in the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give the edition you re using, and if possible use a standard reference system (often found in the margins or at the top of each page). If you re unsure, check to see how other authors do it, or ask me. Never use other writers words or even ideas without acknowledgment (see under plagiarism below). Details should be given in a separate bibliography; the reference in the text is to author and page. ANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language and this includes L spelling and grammar. Don t underestimate the problems caused by misspelling (the differences between intention and intension, or ingenious and ingenuous, are more important than the single letters involved). This is even more true of grammar and punctuation. Keep your language simple: don t use three syllables where one will do, or had it not been written by him instead of if he hadn t written it. Make sure that quotations fit into their new contexts (avoid, for example, Descartes said that I can be certain ; write either Descartes said: I can be certain or Descartes said that he could be certain ). LAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to suggest P avenues of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not there to be repeated parrot-fashion. If you need to quote from another writer, mark the quotation clearly (see above, under Critical apparatus) but again, don t overdo it. RACTICAL MATTERS. N.B.: occasionally I give more than one essay question; these are alternatives, P so choose one. Don t read too much (or, of course, too little); three or four items from the relevant reading list is usually about right (one introductory or general work, and two or three others). If you want to (or have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to me about it; too often I find that essays have suffered because students have depended upon what are frankly bad and misleading books. If you use a word-processor (and I d advise it), use the spell-checker, but don t rely upon it; read through (preferably aloud) what you ve written, at least once. Don t bother with grammar-checkers I ve yet to see one that works properly. Descartes and doubt What was the purpose of Descartes method of doubt? René Descartes Meditations I Discourse on the Method Parts 1 5 A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 2 (and in Doney) Norman Malcolm Dreaming and Skepticism (Phil.Rev. LXV, 1956; and in Doney; and in Sesonske & Fleming) H.G. Frankfurt Dreamers, Demons, and Madmen I Bernard Williams Descartes chapters 2 and 7, and Appendix 3 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations pp , , Francisco Sanches That nothing is known (in Ariew, et al.) Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism 1 and 2 Michael Williams Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt (in Rorty [ed.], Essays on Descartes Meditations; reprinted in OR Descartes) How many arguments to bring his beliefs into doubt does Descartes offer? What exactly are they, and how many of them work? Has the method of doubt excluded too much, and if so, how could it be improved? Is the method possible even on its own terms that is, can one throw out all one s beliefs in order to sort them out? Indeed, what exactly does he do with the beliefs he used to hold does he throw them out (albeit temporarily), or does he simply withhold assent?

3 The first certainty Can Descartes really reach the cogito using the method of doubt? And if so, what use is it? René Descartes Meditations II Discourse on Method Part 4 E.M. Curley Descartes Against the Sceptics chap. 4 André Gombay Cogito Ergo Sum : Inference or Argument? (in Butler) Jaacko Hintikka Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance? (Phil.Rev. LXXI, 1962; and in Doney; and in Sesonske & Fleming) H.G. Frankfurt Descartes Discussion of His Existence in the Second Meditation (Phil.Rev. LXXVI, 1966) Norman Malcolm Descartes Proof That His Essence Is Thinking (Phil.Rev. 1965; and in Doney) Peter Markie The Cogito and its Importance (CC Descartes; reprinted in OR Descartes) Jean de Silhon The immortality of the soul (in Ariew, et al.) second discourse S. Tweyman The Reliability of Reason (in Butler) John Watling Doubt, Knowledge, and the Cogito in Descartes Meditations (in Vesey [ed.] Philosophers Ancient and Modern) Bernard Williams Descartes chapter 3 Could we replace cogito with some other verb? Any other verb? And anyway, what exactly does cogito cover? What is the logical status of ergo? Is the whole thing an argument can we infer sum from cogito? If the cogito is a proposition, is it necessary or contingent? What sort of certainty does it have? Clarity and distinctness Evaluate Descartes suggestion that he could take it as a general rule that whatever we conceive very clearly and distinctly is true (Discourse on Method, IV) René Descartes Meditations II, III, & V Replies to second objections Discourse on Method Part IV E.J. Ashworth Descartes Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas (in Butler) E.M. Curley Descartes against the Skeptics chapter 5 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo A compendium of philosophy in four parts (in Ariew, et al.) part 1 H.G. Frankfurt Demons, Dreamers and Madmen chapter 3 A. Gewirth Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes (Philosophy 13, 1943; reprinted in Doney and in OR Descartes) A.K. Stout The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes (in Doney) Bernard Williams Descartes chapter 7 Is Descartes argument for the reliability of clear and distinct ideas sound? Is it the only reason he has for accepting clarity and distinctness as marks of certainty? What can be said in favour of such a notion? Is there a better argument available one that Descartes missed, or omitted to mention? If clarity and distinctness don t do the job Descartes requires, would anything? And what are clarity and distinctness marks of?

4 God: the argument from ideas Outline the structure of the argument used by Descartes in Meditation III, attempting to be as clear as possible about the assumptions upon which the it rests and any subsidiary arguments used by Descartes to defend these assumptions. Does the argument work? If not, where does it go wrong? René Descartes Discourse on the Method IV Meditations III The Principles of Philosophy I, John Cottingham Descartes chapter 3 E.M. Curley Descartes Against the Sceptics chapter 6 Georges Dicker Descartes chapter 3 J.L. Mackie The Miracle of Theism chapter 2 J.-B. Morin That god exists (in Ariew, et al.) Francisco Suárez Metaphysical disputations (in Ariew, et al.) pp Bernard Williams Descartes chapter 5 It s important to be clear as to the metaphysical and conceptual framework within which Descartes argument is situated. In particular, make sure that you ve understood (and that you explain) the notion of degrees of reality, the Causal Adequacy Principle, and the distinction between formal and objective reality. Unless you re absolutely clear as to the rôle in the argument of each of these, you ll not be able to understand why the argument is supposed to work, nor why it doesn t. It might seem obvious to you where Descartes goes wrong. I don t think that it s at all obvious, in fact so if you think that it is, you ve probably got the wrong answer. Error and the will Does Descartes manage to defeat scepticism and leave room for human error? René Descartes Meditations IV H. Caton Will and Reason in Descartes Theory of Error (in J.Phil. 1975) Pierre Charon Wisdom (in Ariew, et al.) Bk II, chap. 2 (pp 56 67) John Cottingham Descartes Anthony Kenny Descartes on the Will (in Butler; reprinted in OR Descartes) Anthony O Hear Belief and the Will (in Philosophy 1972) Bernard Williams Descartes chapter 6 Margaret Wilson Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation (in Cover & Kulstad [ed.] Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy) Descartes chapter 4 What can Descartes mean by saying that the human will is infinite? Is his account of judgement satisfactory? What is the connection between this problem and the definition of knowledge with which he s working? There are clear parallels between Descartes approach to error and a common theological approach to the problem of evil in both cases god s supposed power, knowledge, and rôle as creator, are at odds with certain facts about the world. If you ve done any work on the latter problem, it might be applicable to this essay (but be careful not to overdo the parallels).

5 God: the ontological argument Can Descartes show that god s existence follows from his essence? If he can, does this mean that Descartes has proved that god exists? René Descartes Meditations V William P. Alston The Ontological Argument Revisited (Phil.Rev. LXXIX, 1960; and in Doney; and in Plantinga) Jonathan Barnes The Ontological Argument see especially pages 15 18, John Cottingham Descartes chapter 3 J.N. Findlay Can God s Existence Be Disproved? (Mind 1948; reprinted in his Language, Truth, and Value, in Plantinga, and in Flew & MacIntyre) interesting mainly for his ontological argument against the existence of god John Hick Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards) Anthony Kenny Reason and Religion chapters 3 and 4 Anthony O Hear Experience, Explanation, and Faith chapter 4:3 J.-B. Morin That god exists (in Ariew, et al.) Alvin Plantinga The Nature of Necessity chapter 10 (pp ) [ed.] The Ontological Argument readings from the main historical philosophers, plus some important 20th-century papers James F. Ross On Proofs for the Existence of God (Monist 54:2, 1970; also in Donnelly) Francisco Suárez Metaphysical disputations (in Ariew, et al.) pp Richard Swinburne The Coherence of Theism chapter 14 Bernard Williams Descartes chapter 5 The various advocates of the ontological argument anticipate some objections, and attempt to meet them; what are they, and do they succeed? What objections do you think they haven t anticipated? Not anticipating an objection isn t the same as not being able to meet it; what answers might they have offered? Of what kind of god do the ontological arguments claim to prove the existence? How useful would such a concept of god be to religion? The real distinction between mind and body State and criticise Descartes argument for a real distinction between mind and body. René Descartes Meditations II and VI Passions of the Soul I David Armstrong A Materialist Theory of the Mind chapters 1 & 2 Andrea Christofidou Descartes Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions (J.H.P. 39, 2001) Paul Churchland Matter and Consciousness chapter 2 John Cottingham Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science (in CC Descartes) E.M. Curley Descartes Against the Sceptics pp ; pp John Foster The Immaterial Self chapter 7 and passim R.C. Richardson The Scandal of Cartesian Interactionism (Mind 91, 1982) Geneviève Rodis-Lewis Descartes and the Unity of the Human Being (trans. Cottingham; OR Descartes) Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind chapter 1 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo A compendium of philosophy in four parts (in Ariew, at al.) part 3 Bernard Williams Descartes chapters 4 and 10 Margaret D. Wilson The Epistemological Argument for Mind Body Distinctness (Noûs X, 1976; reprinted in OR Descartes) R.S. Woolhouse Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (Routledge) chapters 8 & 9 What part does the notion of god play is such a concept necessary to the argument, and if so, how? Be very careful with the reading: don t take anybody on the reading list without question, especially Armstrong, Churchland, and Ryle. This is, of course, true for any essay, but these three have very particular axes to grind, and should be read with great caution and mistrust. One of the most common mistakes made by casual commentators is to treat Descartes argument as being complete by the end of Meditations II. Make sure that you read Meditations IV carefully; what might Descartes need that he isn t entitled to until the end of his project?

6 Descartes: a beast to the beasts? Does Descartes view of mind and body imply that we have no moral responsibilities towards animals? René Descartes Meditations passim (and other works as relevant (especially the letters); use indexes, and references in the secondary literature) Stephen Clark The Moral Status of Animals John Cottingham A Brute to the Brutes? Descartes Treatment of Animals (in Philosophy 53, 1978; reprinted in OR Descartes) Peter Harrison Descartes on Animals (in The Philosophical Quarterly 42/167, 1992) D. & M. Radner Animal Consciousness pp 60 4 Tom Regan & Peter Singer [edd] Animal Rights and Human Obligations Jean de Silhon The two truths (in Ariew, et al.) pp Peter Singer Practical Ethics chapters on animals Descartes has often been accused of being the philosophical father of a certain set of views about animals that they don t really feel pain (or that they feel it significantly less than we do), that they have no consciousness, no minds or souls. We re not really concerned here with the truth of such views, nor with the logical connection between these views and the conclusion that we have no, or much reduced, moral obligations towards animals (though we might well discuss these topics when we meet). We re concerned primarily with the question: does what Descartes says commit him to any such attitude towards animals? To what is he committed? The Cottingham and Harrison papers offer (different) defences of Descartes, and should be especially helpful with regard to references to Descartes writings. Mind and body Assess Spinoza s success in solving the mind/body problem. Baruch Spinoza Ethics Part II, up to proposition xiii Jonathan Bennett A Study of Spinoza s Ethics chapter 2, sections 12 and 13; chapter 6 Spinoza s Metaphysics (in CC Spinoza) Stuart Hampshire Spinoza pp Genevieve Lloyd Spinoza and the Ethics pp 48 55, Roger Scruton Spinoza pp G.N.A. Vesey Agent and Spectator: The Double-Aspect Theory in The Human Agent (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. I) Again, going back to Descartes should provide useful background (see your essay on Cartesian dualism from week two of Trinity). Is Spinoza s account as intuitively attractive as that of Descartes? If not, why not? We ll be looking at Spinoza s account of knowledge and error next week, so for the moment concentrate on his basic position concerning mind and body. If he has succeeded in avoiding the problems which the dualist faces, what (if any) new problems has he come up with? Do his problems serve to highlight problems to be found, though not so obviously, in Descartes?

7 Knowledge and error Critically discuss Spinoza s account of knowledge. Baruch Spinoza Ethics Part II, from proposition xiv to the end (referring back to postulates and lemmas when necessary) Jonathan Bennett A Study of Spinoza s Ethics chapter 2, section 14; chapter 7 R.J. Delahunty Spinoza chapter III Guttorm Fl istad Spinoza s Theory of Knowledge in the Ethics (Inquiry 12, 1969; reprinted in Grene) Stuart Hampshire Spinoza chapter 3 Genevieve Lloyd Spinoza and the Ethics pp 55 70, Roger Scruton Spinoza pp Margaret D. Wilson Spinoza s Theory of Knowledge (in CC Spinoza) Descartes set out to try to show how knowledge was possible how does Spinoza s project differ from this initially? How does his different problem, and the resulting difference in approach, affect the attractiveness and usefulness of his account? Despite the differences, Spinoza was well aware of Descartes work, had written about it, and was influenced by it in many ways. What are the connections between Spinoza s approach to knowledge and that of Descartes? Would Spinoza have been better off without some of the Cartesian concepts? What exactly is the difference, for Spinoza, between error and ignorance? Between knowledge and mere true belief? He seems to say, with Descartes, that error is the result of our being embodied, and that seen purely in terms of itself, the mind doesn t err (Ethics II, xvii, Schol.). Is this really what he means? Can it be made sense of within his philosophy? Freedom Critically discuss Spinoza s views on human freedom. Does the concept of a free person make sense even on his terms? Baruch Spinoza Ethics Part I, def. 7, prop. xvii, and prop. xxxii to the end (incl. Appendix); Part II, prop. xxxv Schol., prop. xlviii, and prop. xlix Scholia ; Part III, prop. 2 & Schol.; Part IV, prop. lix to lxxiii; Part V, from Preface to prop. xx Jonathan Bennett A Study of Spinoza s Ethics chapter 13 Stuart Hampshire Spinoza chapter 4 Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom (in Grene) Genevieve Lloyd Spinoza and the Ethics chapter 3 Roger Scruton Spinoza chapter 5 Given the immediate strangeness of Spinoza s position (a strangeness echoed at some point in many, if not all, philosophers who try to build grand metaphysical systems), you need to be especially careful when describing and explaining his account of freedom. Try to keep separate the two questions implied by the essay title is Spinoza s view internally consistent, and is it consistent with what we consider to be minimal conditions for an adequate account of freedom?

8 Substance Explain and compare the views of Descartes and either Leibniz or Spinoza on substance. René Descartes Principles I, 51 ff Replies II, IV G.W. Leibniz Monadology Discourse on Metaphysics 8 16 The Leibniz Arnauld Correspondence Letters to de Volder of 6th July & 27th December, 1701 Baruch Spinoza Ethics Part I, from the definitions through to proposition xx; Part II, to proposition 7. Letters 2, 27 at end, 68 Jonathan Bennett A Study of Spinoza s Ethics (difficult, and inclined to treat Spinoza as a 20th century philosopher, but rewarding nevertheless) ch. 3 Spinoza s Metaphysics (in CC Spinoza) A Note on Descartes and Spinoza (Phil.Rev., 1965) Edwin Curley Spinoza s Metaphysics chapter 1 Montgomery Furth Monadology (Phil.Rev. 1967; and in Frankfurt) Stuart Hampshire Spinoza chapter 2 Joshua Hoffman & Gary S. Rosenkrantz Substance: Its Nature and Existence chapter 1 and passim Genevieve Lloyd Spinoza and the Ethics chapter 2 Benson Mates Leibniz chapter 2 Donald Rutherford Metaphysics: The late period (in CC Leibniz [see also the Mercer & Sleigh paper on Leibniz s early metaphysics]) Roger Scruton Spinoza chapter 3 R.C. Sleigh Leibniz and Arnauld chapter 5 R.S. Woolhouse The Nature of an Individual Substance (in Hooker) Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz passim Catherine Wilson Leibniz s Metaphysics especially chapters II, III, & V J.M. Young The Ontological Argument and the Concept of Substance (A.P.Q., 1974) Leibniz and Spinoza can be seen very much as following in the footsteps of Descartes though the ways in which they do so are clearly very different. It can be useful, therefore, to keep Descartes (and, indeed, Aristotle s) notion of substance in mind. It s also useful to keep in the back of your mind the question: why do the two authors go for the concepts of substance they do? How do those concepts fit into their general logical and metaphysical systems? Leibniz s logical armoury 1. Does it follow from the principle of sufficient reason that two things perfectly indiscernible from each other do not exist? 2. Discuss the Necessary/Contingent distinction in Leibniz's metaphysical system. G.W. von Leibniz Monadology Discourse on Metaphysics 8 13 The Leibniz Arnauld Correspondence The Nature of Truth Necessary and Contingent Truths Primary Truths C.D. Broad Leibniz: An Introduction chapter 2 Stuart Brown Leibniz: Reason and Experience chapters 2 & 3 S. French Why the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is not contingently true either (Synthèse 78) Dennis Fried Necessity and Contingency in Leibniz (in Woolhouse) Hidé Ishiguro Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language chapter 7 Benson Mates The Philosophy of Leibniz chapters 5 & 6 G.H.R. Parkinson Philosophy and Logic (in CC Leibniz) Logic and Reality in Leibniz s Metaphysics chapters 3 and 5 ( 1 and 2) Nicholas Rescher Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy chapters III & IV R.C. Sleigh Leibniz and Arnauld chapter 4 Truth and Sufficient Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz (in Hooker) David Wiggins The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate (in J.J. Thomson [ed.], On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard L. Cartwright) Margaret Wilson On Leibniz's Explication of Necessary Truths (in Frankfurt) Are Leibniz's Principles of Sufficient Reason and of Perfection consistent with each other, and with the rest of the metaphysical system? What does Leibniz draw out of the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Is the incompleteness of an infinite analysis due to our epistemic limitations? How, and in accordance with what, does god select the world that he actualises? What is Leibniz's conception of a possible world (see also the question on god and evil, below)?

9 Leibniz on space and time 1. Does it make sense to suppose that god might have created the universe sooner than he did? 2. What does Leibniz think the relationship is between the claim that space and time are not absolute and the claim that they are mere ideal things? G.W. von Leibniz Leibniz Clarke Correspondence III, 2 6; IV, 8ff; V, 27 32, 36 65, 79 80, Discourse on Metaphysics 8 18 Monadology especially 56 57, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding Book II, especially chapters xiii xv A Specimen of Discoveries about Marvellous Secrets C.D. Broad Leibniz s last controversy with the Newtonians (Theoria 12, 1946; also in Woolhouse) Gerd Buchdahl Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science chapter 7 Daniel Garber Leibniz: Physics and philosophy (in CC Leibniz) Alexandre Koyré From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe chapters 11 & 12 (reprinted as Leibniz and Newton in Frankfurt) Ernst Mach Newton s views of time, space, and motion (extract from The Science of Mechanics, in Problems of Space and Time, ed. Smart) Isaac Newton Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Scholium to the Definitions; also in Smart) Jonathan Powers Philosophy and the New Physics pp Catherine Wilson Leibniz's Metaphysics chapter VI Leibniz extract 1 (from Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Pre-Established Harmony contained in the Second Edition of Mr Bayle s Critical Dictionary, Article Rorarius [1702]; transl. & ed. Loemker) I acknowledge that time, extension, motion, and the continuum in general, as we understand them in mathematics, are only ideal things that is, they express possibilities, just as do numbers. Even Hobbes has defined space as a phantasm of the existent. But to speak more accurately, extension is the order of possible coexistence, just as time is the order of possibilities that are inconsistent but nevertheless have a connection. Thus the former considers simultaneous things or those which exist together, the latter those which are incompatible but which we nevertheless conceive as all existing; it is this which makes them successive. But space and time taken together constitute the order of possibilities of the one entire universe, so that these orders space and time, that is relate not only to what actually is but also to anything that could be put in its place, just as numbers are indifferent to the things which can be enumerated. This inclusion of the possible with the existent makes a continuity which is uniform and indifferent to every division. Leibniz extract 2 (from letter to de Volder, 19 viii 1702; transl. & ed. Loemker) I had said that extension is the order of possible coexistents and that time is the order of possible inconsistents. If this is so, you say you wonder how time enters into all things, spiritual as well as corporeal, while extension enters only into corporeal things. I reply that the relations are the same in the one case as in the other, for every change, spiritual as well as material, has its own place [sedes], so to speak, in the order of time, as well as its own location in the order of coexistents, or in space. For although monads are not extended, they nevertheless have a certain kind of situation [situs] in extension, that is, they have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through the machine which they control. I do not think that any finite substances exist apart from a body and that they therefore lack a position or an order in relation to the other things coexisting in the universe. Extended things involve a plurality of things endowed with position, but things which are simple, though they do not have extension, must yet have a position in extension, though it is impossible to designate these positions precisely as in the case of incomplete phenomena. (see also his letter to de Volder of 30 vi 1704) There are two main strands of thought in Leibniz: first, his account of space and time as well-founded phenomena, and the explanation of this in terms of his theory of monads; secondly, his debate with Clarke (and hence Newton) over whether space and time are relative and absolute. You will probably only have time in the essay to deal with one of these strands, but you should make sure that you know enough about the other strand to be able to comment on any tensions between the two approaches. Can Leibniz consistently maintain that space is relational and that the non-existence of vacua is contingent? Is he right to claim that if space is a real, absolute being', then it must be eternal and infinite? What does he mean by ideal'? Why didn t he consider the possibility that space and time might be relational but real? Must space be a substance if there are quantities of it?

10 God, freedom, and creation 1. To say that god can only choose what is best is effectively to deny him freedom of choice. Can Leibniz meet this objection? 2. Can it be true that god has rendered every event certain and determined, without derogating from the liberty of his creatures? G.W. Leibniz Discourse on Metaphysics especially Necessary and Contingent Truths On Freedom Theodicy R.M. Adams Must God Create the Best? (Phil.Rev. 81, 1972; also in Morris [ed.] The Concept of God) Leibniz s Theories of Contingency (Rice University Studies 63:4; reprinted in Hooker) David Blumenfeld Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World (in CC Leibniz) George Gale On What God Chose: Perfection and God s Freedom (Studia Leibnitiana 8, 1976) Michael Hooker & Mark Pastin Leibniz and Duhemian Compatibilism (in Hooker) John Hostler Leibniz s Moral Philosophy chapter 8 Anthony Kenny The God of the Philosophers chapter 7 (reprinted in Morris [ed.] The Concept of God as The Definition of Omnipotence ) J.L. Mackie Evil and Omnipotence (Mind 64, 1955; also in Mitchell [ed.] The Philosophy of Religion) William E. Mann God s Freedom, Human Freedom, and God s Responsibility for Sin (in Morris [ed.] Divine & Human Action) Alvin Plantinga The Free Will Defence (in Black [ed.] Philosophy in America; also in Mitchell [ed.] The Philosophy of Religion) R.C. Sleigh Leibniz and Arnauld chapter 5 Quentin Smith & L. Nathan Oaklander Time, Change, and Freedom dialogue 10 Catherine Wilson Leibniz s Metaphysics chapter VIII This is a topic in which it s easy to get lost. Much of the secondary reading concerns the problem of evil in anon-historical, non-leibnizian way; be careful not to get side-tracked, but to use these discussions in order to throw light on what Leibniz is saying. Compare Leibniz s problems here with those of Descartes (when dealing with error) and Spinoza; whose approach is more promising? Leibniz and Locke on innate ideas One member of each pair should write an essay defending the notion of innate ideas, the other attacking it. G.W. Leibniz New Essays Concerning Human Understanding Book I John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book I Margaret Atherton Locke and the Issue over Innatenes (in OR Chappell) Michael Ayers Locke: Epistemology & Ontology volume I passim Martha Brandt Bolton Leibniz and Locke on the Knowledge of Necessary Truths (in Cover & Kulstad) René Descartes Comments on a Certain Broadsheet sections E.J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding chapter 2 Hidé Ishiguro Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language pp Nicholas Jolley Leibniz and Malebranche on Innate Ideas (Phil.Rev. 97, 1988) Ian Hacking Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy? chapter 6 John Harris Leibniz and Locke On Innate Ideas (in OR Tipton) Robert McRae The Theory of Knowledge (in CC Jolley) J.L. Mackie Problems From Locke chapter 7 Grenville Wall Locke s Attack On Innate Knowledge (in OR Tipton) Catherine Wilson Leibniz s Mewtaphysics chapter VII, sections 41 and 42 R.S. Woolhouse Locke chapter 1 Is Locke really attacking innate ideas, innate principles, or innate knowledge? What exactly does he rule out, and what might he allow (see Extract 1 below for one opinion). Is he entitled to rely on the principle that we can t have knowledge of which we re unaware (see the rôle of memory)? Are Locke s reason s for attacking (and Leibniz s for defending) innatism purely epistemological and metaphysical? What political and religious factors might there have been, and should such factors have played a significant part in the philosophical debate? Leibniz attacks Locke s account of knowledge, but what exactly does he want to put in its place? If you spend any time on Chomsky s Cartesian linguistics (for example, via Hacking s book), you should ask yourself whether Locke or Leibniz would have been happy with such a theory. Is Chomsky really resurrecting the notion of innate ideas, as he seems to think? (What was Descartes version innatism?)

11 Extract 1 (from R.I. Aaron, John Locke, p.95) To begin with, Locke is not denying prenatal experiences. He recognises that the child in the womb may experience hunger. But such an experience is not different in kind from the post-natal experience of feeling hungry. Nor, again, does Locke deny what psychologists today term innate dispositions. He nowhere discusses such things as tropisms, reflexes, and instincts. Once, when Pierre Coste mentioned instinctive knowledge in animal life as needing explanation, he replied a little tartly: Je n ai pas écrit mon livre pour expliquer les actions des bêtes. His attitude here may be criticised. It is possible that much insight might be gained into the cognitive side of our nature by studying the lowlier forms of psychical activity. But in Locke s opinion, as in the opinions of his opponents, the theory of innate knowledge was meant to explain cognition at its highest and best, something far beyond the reach of animals. Indeed, it was just because this cognition was thought so excellent that it was necessary to introduce a fresh, non-natural faculty, pertaining to the inner essence of the soul of man, in order to explain it. Nothing that Locke says here in any way affects instinctive knowledge, if it exists, or, again, innate dispositions. He admits the latter, for instance, the innate disposition to seek the pleasant and avoid the painful. It is no theory of innate dispositions which he attacks in attacking innate knowledge. He is there concerned with what claims to be supra- rather than sub-rational. Extract 2 (from a sermon by Berkeley, 1751) But neither is the use of our reason, the only natural means, for discovering the will of God, the same being also suggested by a natural conscience, and inward feeling implanted in the soul of every man, previous to all deductions of reason, there being nothing more natural to our minds, than that distaste, disquiet, and remorse attending evil actions, and on the other hand, that joy and satisfaction which is the constant encouragement and reward of good ones. That there are appetites and aversions, satisfactions and uneasinesses, inclinations and instincts, originally interwoven in our nature, must be allowed by all impartial and considerate men. It is, I say, evident that the Soul is so constituted, in her original state, that certain dispositions and tendencies will not fail to shew them selves, at proper periods, and in certain circumstances; which affections, because they are universal not confined to any age or country, and not to be accounted for by custom or education, but alike in all nations and all times, are properly said to be natural or innate. Thus, for example, the fear of death and the love of one s children are accounted natural, and the same may be said of divers other instincts and notions, such as the apprehension of a superior being, the abhorrence of many crimes and vices, the relish of things good and vertuous, which are to be looked on as natural inbred dispositions, resulting from the natural make of our minds, inasmuch as, though they do not appear in our earliest infancy, yet in the growth and progress of the soul, they are sure to shoot forth to open and display themselves as naturally as leaves and blossoms do from a tree. And all these natural tendencies and impressions on the conscience, are so many marks to direct and inform the mind, of the will of the author of nature. God therefore is not without a witness, even among the Gentiles of whom Saint Paul observeth that not having the revealed law they are a law to themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts. Hobbes & Locke: covenants & contracts a) How could people in a Hobbesian or a Lockean state of nature come to make a covenant or a contract? b) Is Hobbes justification of the power of the sovereign compatible with his conception of a person in the state of nature? Thomas Hobbes Leviathan chapters 1 15 John Locke Two Treatises of Government especially II Richard Ashcraft Locke s Two Treatises of Government Locke s political philosophy (in CC Chappell) J. Dunn The Political Thought of John Locke D.P. Gauthier Morality and advantage (Phil.Rev. 1967; & in Practical Reasoning, ed. Raz) David Lloyd Thomas Locke on Government Michael Oakeshott Hobbes on Civil Association G. Parry John Locke John Rawls A Theory of Justice section 52 What are the rôles of the stories each writer tells of the origins of society? Are we dealing with parables or simplified history? How might this affect what we say in each case?

12 Locke: property a) Does Locke succeed in justifying any property rights with his argument from labour? If so, which? b) Does Locke show that, if persons own themselves, they must be able to own things external to themselves? John Locke Two Treatises of Government I 29, 39 43, & 86 93; II 1 16, 25 51, , 149, 183 L.C. Becker Property Rights: A Philosophical Analysis chapter 4 G.A. Cohen Marx and Locke on land and labour (Proceedings of the British Academy 71) Nozick on appropriation (New Left Review 150) J. Dunn The Political Thought of John Locke especially chapters 1 & 7 J.W. Harris Legal Philosophies chapter 7 part 1 C.B. Macpherson The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism chapter 5 Robert Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia pp K. Olivecrona Locke s theory of appropriation (Phil.Q. 24) G. Parry John Locke especially chapters 3 6 Alan Ryan Property L. Strauss Natural Right and History chapter 5B J. Waldron The Right to Private Property introduction & chapter 6 S. Wolin Politics and Vision chapter 9 What metaphysical and epistemological issues arise if we treat property rights as Locke suggests? Do the conditions he places upon such rights undermine the claim that they re genuine rights or strengthen it? Locke: primary and secondary qualities What exactly is the distinction? Why does Locke make it, and should we accept it? John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding II,iv,viii; IV,iii George Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge sections 9 15 Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous First Dialogue Peter Alexander Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities (in OR Tipton) Michael Ayers Locke: Epistemology & Ontology volume I passim; see especially pp 29 31, 62 65, 183f., and Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume chapter 4 Gerd Buchdahl Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science chapters 3 5 E.A. Burtt The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science chapters 4 (A B), 6 (B,C), & 7 ( 1 5) A. Butterfield The Origins of Modern Science chapter 6 R.E. Butts & J.W. Davis The Methodological Inheritance of Newton chapters 1 & 4 John Campbell Locke on Qualities (Canadian J.Phil. 10, 1980; also in OR Chappell) John W. Davis Hume on Qualitative Content (in Morice) Galileo Galilei Il Saggitore (The Assayer) trans. Danto in his Introduction to Contemporary Civilisation in the West, vol. I [2nd ed.], pp , & in Danto & Morganbesser [edd] Philosophy of Science John Losee A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science chaps 8 10 E.J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding chapter 3 Edwin McCann Locke s Philosophy of Body (in CC Chappell) Colin McGinn The Subjective View pp 5 23, J.L. Mackie Problems From Locke chapter 1 Isaac Newton Principia General Scholium Margaret Wilson Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary- Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke? (in Turbayne) R.S. Woolhouse Locke s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge J.W. Yolton Locke and the Compass of the Human Understanding chapters 1 6 Does Locke think that he can prove or demonstrate that objects have certain qualities and, in some sense, lack others, or is he content with probability here? Locke takes it that he s correcting a common error we make about the nature of the world; what exactly is that error? What rôle do models play in Locke s view of the world? Is he forced into his theory of primary and secondary qualities because he s adopted a particular model? What model has he adopted? Many of the commentators are somewhat misleading when it comes to Locke s account; pay close attention, not only to the passages in Locke where he s talking about the distinction, but also to how he defines quality in general.

13 Locke: substance and essence 1. Critically examine the way in which Locke interprets the distinction between real and nominal essences. 2. What exactly does Locke think about substance? John Locke Essay, II,xxi; xxiii,1 11; xxii,6 11: III,vi,1 9; ix,12 13 and 17 20: IV,iii,11 16 and 23 26; vi. Michael Ayers Locke: Epistemology & Ontology volume II passim; see especially pp 40 42, 56 58, and Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume pages Substratum (History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, 1987; also in OR Chappell) Martha Brandt Bolton Substances, Substrata, and Names of Substances in Locke s Essay (Phil. Rev. 85, 1976; also in OR Chappell) The Idea-Theoretic Basis of Locke s Anti-Essentialist Doctrine of Nominal Essence (Mind, Ideas, and Objects, edd Cummins & Zoeller; also in OR Chappell with a new, even longer title) I.M. Copi Essence and Accident (J. Phil. LI, 1954; also in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Schwartz) Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity pages ; also as Naming and Necessity (The Semantics of Natural Language, edd. Davidson and Harman, pages ) E.J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding chapter 4 J.L. Mackie Problems From Locke chapter 3 Hilary Putnam Is Semantics Possible? and Meaning and Reference (both in Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol II; also in Schwartz) R.S. Woolhouse Locke s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge chapters 6 8 John Williamson Boyle and Locke: on Material Substance (in Philosophers of the Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gilmour) In terms of the ideas of his time, what is the point of Locke s account of real and nominal essences? Could it be restated in terms of modern ideas? This topic, as is hinted at in the reading, is more interesting as a problem for the philosophy of the last thirty years than as a problem for Locke nevertheless, it s useful to see the connections and the differences, so don t neglect the Essay. What is personal identity? How do you know? John Locke Essay II,xxvii Locke & Hume: personal identity David Hume Treatise of Human Nature I,iv,6 and Appendix Michael Ayers Locke: Epistemology & Ontology volume II, part III Jonathan Bennett Locke s Philosophy of Mind (in CC Chappell) John Bricke Hume on Self-Identity, Memory, and Causality (in Morice) E.J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding chapter 5 J.L. Mackie Problems From Locke chapters 5 and 6 Thomas Nagel Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness (Synthèse 22; also in OR Glover) Harold Noonan Hume on Knowledge chapter 5 Derek Parfit Personal Identity (Phil. Rev. 71; also in OR Glover) David Pears Hume s System part II, chapters 8 & 9 Terence Penelhum Personal Identity (in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards) Barry Stroud Hume chapter 6 Bernard Williams The Self and the Future (Phil. Rev. 70; also in his Problems of the Self, and in OR Glover) This week the so-called primary reading is probably best treated as a (necessary) adjunct to the modern discussions. I don t think you ll find Locke and Hume at all irrelevant or unuseful. The secondary material specifically on Locke and Hume should help to bridge any gap, as will Penelhum s article in the Encyclopaedia. Perhaps the best tip I can give you is not to be too ambitious; zero in on one of the topics mentioned in the essay titles, working out the implications of the philosophical discussion in just that area. When we come to discuss the issues (as a group, incidentally), I hope that you ll have gained sufficient grasp of the general principles to be able to see their applications to the areas covered by other people.

14 Idealism (Ronald Knox) There once was a man who said, God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there s no-one about in the Quad. Berkeley s idealism Discuss Berkeley s arguments for idealism. How much force do they have? George Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous Edwin B. Allaire Berkeley s Idealism (Theoria 29, 1963; also in his Essays in Ontology [Iowa Publications in Philosophy 1, 1963]) Berkeley s Idealism Revisited (in Turbayne) Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes especially chapters V and VI M.F. Burnyeat Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed (Phil. Rev. 91, 1981; also in Vesey) Jonathan Dancy Berkeley: An Introduction especially chaps 2, 5, & 6 Thomas Nagel The View from Nowhere chapter 6, sections 1 and 2 George Pitcher Berkeley passim, but see especially chapters VIII X G.J. Warnock Berkeley chapters 5 and 6 Margaret Wilson Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary- Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke? (in Turbayne) A Reply (Anon., but possibly Bertrand Russell) Dear Sir, Your astonishment s odd, I am always about in the Quad; And that s why this tree Will continue to be, Since observed by Yours faithfully, GOD. Much of Berkeley s argument for idealism is actually an attack on realism for our purposes we can treat it as an attack on Locke s realism (though Berkeley had scientists such as Newton and Boyle at least as firmly in his sights). To what extent do his arguments depend upon his misunderstanding of Locke s position with regard to primary and secondary qualities, and to perception? Hume: ideas and impressions 1. Are all our thoughts copies of impressions? How would one know? 2. Can I know what sour means if I ve never tasted anything sour? 3. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? Has Hume any adequate basis for this manoeuvre? David Hume Enquiry sections I III Treatise I,i,1 7; I,iii,4 (1st paragraph); I,iii,5 (including the paragraph added in the Appendix) Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume chapter 9 R.J. Butler Hume s Impressions (in Impressions of Empiricism, ed. Vesey) Peter Geach Mental Acts sections 5 10 D.G.C. MacNabb David Hume chapter 1 Harold Noonan Hume on Knowledge chapter 2 John Passmore Hume s Intentions chapter 5 (6) David Pears Hume s System part I, chapters 1 3 Barry Stroud Hume chapters 1 & 2 R.P. Wolff Hume s Theory of Mental Activity (Phil. Rev., 1960; also in Chappell- H especially pages ) Are all the contents of the human mind (ie impressions and ideas) rightly to be called perceptions? Including, say, memories of anger, complex abstract ideas like the idea of justice? Note the distinction (drawn more clearly in the Treatise) between simple and complex ideas. Just how should this be drawn? Reflect on the distinction, and see if it helps get Hume out of his own missing shade of blue counter-example to his thesis. How could Hume show the distinction between the idea of ancestry and the idea of progeny? Ideas or thoughts can Hume assimilate all thoughts to complex ideas? In other words, is the complexity of a virtuous horse really comparable to the complexity of a proposition such as: If he s not in College, he ll be late for the meeting? Are force and vivacity enough to distinguish impressions from ideas? Why are the ideas of a man diseased or disordered still called ideas, if they are as vivid as impressions? Are there memory impressions? And is the idea of pain a faint pain?

15 Hume on belief 1. Hume s account of belief is satisfactory if it is interpreted as an account of what it is to be thinking about something. Discuss. 3. An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea. Discuss this statement in the context of Treatise I,ii,7. David Hume Enquiry passim, and especially sections IV, V, IX, XI Treatise I,iii,7 10 and Appendix (pages ) Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume pages Edward Craig Hume on Thought and Belief (in Vesey) R.J. Fogelin Hume s Scepticism in the The Treatise of Human Nature passim Peter Geach Assertion (Phil. Rev., 1965; also in Logic Matters, Geach, pp 263 5) Harold Noonan Hume on Knowledge John Passmore Hume s Intentions chapters 2, 5, and 6, and especially pages David Pears Hume s System part I, chapters 3 & 4 A. Phillips-Griffiths [ed.] Knowledge and Belief especially the papers by Malcolm, Price, and Pritchard R.P. Wolff Hume s Theory of Mental Activity (Phil. Rev., 1960; also in Chappell- H) Keep the notion of memory in mind throughout. In general, would what you want to say about belief hold for memory too? How does the claim that force and vivacity distinguish belief from the imagination hold up? Compare the essay on ideas and impressions. Bear in mind that one usually believes that p that is, the object of a belief is a proposition. Forceful and vivacious feelings are occurrences. Is believing an occurrence? How, on Hume s account, would you know that somebody else believed something? Does one say I am believing that p? If you reject Hume s account, how would you like to explain belief? Is Hume s a causal account of the origin of beliefs? How do reasons differ from causes? Does Hume leave any room for reasons? Or evidence? Does Hume, in the Appendix to the Treatise, more or less admit that he hasn t really got off the ground with the whole issue? Hume: relations of ideas and matters of fact 1. Is the contrary of every matter of fact possible? 2. Is Hume s distinction the same as the modern one(s) between necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic, or a priori and empirical? David Hume Enquiry sections IV, VII, XII Treatise I,iii,1; I,ii,2 (first three paragraphs only); I,iii,3 4 John Locke Essay IV,iii iv; IV,vi; IV,viii A.J. Ayer Language, Truth, and Logic chapters 4 and 5 Jonathan Bennett Locke, Berkeley, Hume chapter 10 R.J. Fogelin Hume s Scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature chapters IV and VI Harold Noonan Hume on Knowledge pp W.v.O. Quine Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Phil. Rev., 1951; also in his From a Logical Point of View) Anthony Quinton The a priori and the analytic (in Strawson [ed.], Philosophical Logic) Aaron Sloman Necessary, A Priori, and Analytic (Analysis, 1965) Smithurst Hume on Existence and Possibility (P.A.S., ) pp Galen Strawson The Secret Connexion Barry Stroud Hume pages What are the various rôles played by Hume s different criteria: intuitive/demonstrative certainty; discoverability by the mere operation of thought; independence of what is anywhere existent in the universe; the conceivability of the contrary; not implying a contradiction; conceived with facility; founded on the relation of cause and effect; demonstrative certainty; discoverability of truth by abstract reason or reflection? Is conceivability a test of possibility? Is conceivability just a matter of forming mental pictures? See the Stroud and Smithurst references for this; what do you think of the Goldbach s Conjecture example? Should one distinguish (and does Hume distinguish) between (a) what makes a proposition true and (b) how we come to know whether a proposition is true?