7AAN2011 Ethics. Basic Information: Module Description: Teaching Arrangement. Assessment Methods and Deadlines. Academic Year 2016/17 Semester 1

Transcription

1 7AAN2011 Ethics Academic Year 2016/17 Semester 1 Basic Information: Credits: 20 Module Tutor: Dr Nadine Elzein (nadine.elzein@kcl.ac.uk) Office: 703; tel. ex Consultation hours this term: TBA Seminar time and venue: TBA. Module Description: In this course, students will be introduced to various areas of moral philosophy, and will examine some of the core ideas that have shaped contemporary debates. The course will focus on three main areas: Moral motivation and objectivity, actions and consequences, and moral responsibility. The course will engage throughout with questions relating to the nature and basis of moral obligations and to the extent of moral accountability. Teaching Arrangement 2-hour weekly seminar. Assessment Methods and Deadlines Formative assessment: 2 essays X 1,500-2,000 words each, from two of the main areas of focus of the course, due on o Friday 4th November (1st essay) and o Friday 9th December (2nd essay) Formative essays must be completed by the deadline in order to receive feedback. This feedback is crucial for your summative assessment. Please submit essays by to me. You will receive feedback on your essays: 1st essay: feedback by Monday 28th November 2nd essay: feedback by Friday 31 st December. Summative assessment: One two-hour examination in the May-June examination period. The course is split into three parts: 1. Values, reasons, and moral motivation 2. Actions and consequences 3. Freedom and moral responsibility. You will be asked to answer TWO questions, from two DIFFERENT parts of the course.

2 Schedule and Suggested Reading Part 1: Values, Reasons, and Moral Motivation Week 1: Morality and Motivation: Could an agent sincerely accept that she is morally obliged to do something and yet have no inclination at all to do it? What is the best way in which to understand the relationship between moral reasons and motivation? Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy article on Moral Motivation, by Connie Rosati: Core reading: Williams, Bernard. Internal and External Reasons, in his Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press: 1981) pp Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press: 1989), chapter 3: Externalist Moral Realism, pp Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: 1978), Part One: Ethics and Human Motivation (chapters I-IV), pp Smith, Michael. The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller, Analysis, Vol. 56 (1996), pp Shafer-Landau, Russ. Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 192 (1998), pp Foot, Philippa. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (1972), pp Also in her Virtues and Vices (OUP: 2002), chapter XI, pp Week 2: Subjectivism and Non-Cognitivism: In what sense, if any, do claims about morality depend on the attitudes or feelings of those making them? Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (McGraw Hill: 1995), ch. 3 Subjectivism in Ethics, pp Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, Mind, 46:181 (1937). Reprinted in Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis. Mackie, J. L. Inventing Right and Wrong (Pelican: 1977), Part 1: The Status of Ethics, pp Smith, The Moral Problem (Blackwell: 1995) ch. 2: The Expressivist Challenge, pp Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford University Press: 1977), Ch. 1, pp Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Dover: 1956) The Emotive theory of Ethics (introduction), pp. 3-30, and ch. VI Critique of Ethics and Theology, pp

3 Week 3: Objectivity, Impartiality, and Realism: What would it mean for morality to be objective? Could there be any basis upon which to believe that there are moral facts? Jacobs, Jonathan. Dimensions of Moral Theory: An Introduction to Metaethics and Moral Psychology (Wiley- Blackwell: 2002), Chapter 1: Objectivity and Subjectivity, pp. 1-41, and chapter 4: Naturalism and Non-Naturalism, pp McDowell, John. Values and Secondary Qualities, in Morality and Objectivity, edited by Honderich (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1985), pp Also in his Mind, Value and Reality (Harvard University Press: 1998), ch. 7, pp Nagel, Thomas. A View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press: 1986) chapter VIII, Value, pp Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press: 1989), ch. 2 Moral Realism and Moral Enquiry, pp , ch. 4 Does Moral Realism Matter?, pp , and ch. 6-7 Moral Realism and the Is/Ought Thesis and A Posteriori Objections to Moral Realism pp Sturgeon, Nicholas. Moral Explanations, in Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings, edited by Sher (Harcourt and Brace, second edition: 1996), pp And in: Essays on Moral Realism, edited by Sayre-McCord (Cornell University Press: 1988), p Also in Morality, Reason, and Truth, edited by Copp and Zimmerman (Rowman and Allanheld: 1985), pp Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Moral Objectivity, in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, by Harman and Thomson (Blackwell: 1996) Part II, ch. 6, pp Part 2: Actions and Consequences Week 4: Consequentialism, Integrity and the Demands of Morality: In what sense, if any, is consequentialism alienating? Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy (McGraw Hill: 1995), ch. 8. The Debate over Utilitarianism, pp Williams, Bernard. Consequentialism and Integrity, in Consequentialism and its Critics, edited by Samuel Scheffler. Railton, Peter. Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 13, (1984). Reprinted in Consequentialism and its Critics, edited by Samuel Scheffler. Further reading Nagel, Thomas. Living Right and Living Well, The View from Nowhere, Chapter 10. Kagan, Shelly. Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Philosophy and Public Affairs, Williams, Bernard. Persons, Character, and Morality, and Utilitarianism and Self-

4 Indulgence, both in his book Moral Luck. Week 5: Act vs. Rule utilitarianism: Is there a significant difference between act and rule utilitarianism? What role should rules play for a committed utilitarian? Act vs. rule: Smart, J.J.C. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, secs. 2 and 7, in Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Core Reading Lyons, David. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (OUP: 1965), Preface and Ch. IV, Rule Utilitarianism, pp Hare, R. M. Moral Thinking, chapters 2-3. Further Reading Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, Philosophical review, vol. 64 (1965). Reprinted in his Collected Papers. Reading week: NO LECTURE Week 6: Deontological Constraints: Are there any good justifications for deontological constraints? Nozick, Robert. Side Constraints, in Consequentialism and its Critics, edited by Sammuel Scheffler (Oxford University Press: 1998), pp Reprinted from his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell: 1980) pp Nagel, Thomas. Ch. IX Ethics, in The View From Nowhere (Oxford University Press: 1986) pp Kamm, Frances. (2000) Nonconsequentialism, in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Edited by Hugh LaFolette. (Blackwell: 2000) pp Otsuka, Michael. Review: Kamm on the Morality of Killing. Ethics, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Otober, 1997), pp Foot, Philippa. Utilitarianism and the Virtues Mind, Vol. 94 (1985), reprinted in Consequentialism and its Critics, edited by Samuel Scheffler. Week 7: Doing, foreseeing, and allowing harm: Is killing somebody worse than letting somebody die? Are there good justifications for our usual disparity in attitudes towards these? Rachels, James. Active and Passive Euthanasia, The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 292, No. 2 (January: 1975), pp Reprinted in Applied Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford University Press: 1986) pp

5 Foot. Philippa. 1978, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. In her Virtues and Vices (Oxford University Press: 2002) pp Quinn, Warren. Morality and Action, (Cambridge University Press: 1993), ch. 7 Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and ch. 8 Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, pp Bennett, Jonathan. Whatever the Consequences, Analysis, vol. 26, No. 3 (January 1966), pp Kagan, Shelly. (1998), The Additive Fallacy, Ethics, vol. 99. Part 3: Freedom and Moral Responsibility Week 8: Determinism and the Ability to Otherwise: Should we be worried that determinism undermines moral responsibility on the basis that it rules out alternative possibilities? Frankfurt, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (December 1969), pp Also in Free Will, edited by Watson, second edition, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press: 2003), pp And in Free Will, edited by Derk Pereboom, Hackett Reading in Philosophy, pp (And in virtually every other free will anthology). Otsuka, Michael. (1998), "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame", Ethics, Vol. 108, pp Peter Van Inwagen An Argument for Incompatibilism, in Free Will, edited by Watson, second edition, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press: 2003), pp David Lewis, Are we Free to Break the Laws? in Free Will, edited by Watson, second edition, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press: 2003), pp Week 9: Compatibilism and Control: What does it mean for an agent to be in control of her own actions? Can we understand free will in a way that s consistent with determinism? Frankfurt, Harry. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1 (January 1971), pp Also in Free Will, edited by Watson, second edition, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press: 2003), pp And in Free Will, edited by Derk Pereboom, Hackett Reading in Philosophy, pp (And in virtually every other free will anthology). Watson, Gary. Free Agency The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8 (1975), pp Also in Wolf, Susan, Asymmetrical Freedom, in Free Will, edited by Derk Pereboom, Hackett Reading in Philosophy, pp

6 Dworkin, Gerald. Acting Freely, Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1970), pp Week 10: Reactive Attitudes and Blame: What role do the reactive attitudes play in our day-to-day ascriptions of moral responsibility? Can we take seriously the idea that nobody is ever morally responsible? Jonathan Bennett, Accountability, in Zak van Straaten, Philosophical Subjects (Oxford UP, 1980). Also available from Bennett s web site < Strawson, Peter. Freedom and Resentment, in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (Routledge: 2008), pp Also in Free Will, edited by Watson, second edition, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford University Press: 2003), pp And in Free Will, edited by Derk Pereboom, Hackett Reading in Philosophy, pp (And in virtually every other free will anthology). Watson, Gary. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme. In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge University Press: 1987) edited by Ferdinand Shoeman, pp Also in his book Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press: 2004), pp D. Pereboom. Free Will, Love, and Anger. Ideas y Valores, (141): pages , 2009.