THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press. Table of Contents

Transcription

1 THE NATURE OF MIND Oxford University Press Table of Contents General I. Problems about Mind A. Mind as Consciousness 1. Descartes, Meditation II, selections from Meditations VI and Fourth Objections and Replies, Principles I, 9, 11, 32-5, 66-71, and selections from Discourse V (tr. Cottingham et al); selections from Letters to Newcastle ( ), More (2-5-49), and Elizabeth ( ) (tr. Kenny) 2. Locke, selections from Essay (ed. Nidditch) II.i.2-5; II.i.19, II.xxvii.9, IV.vii.4 (the transparency of thought); II.viii.7-15, 23-6 (primary and secondary qualities); IV.iii.6, x.9-10 (superadded qualities) 3. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, selections from Essays I, v and II, xvi B. Mind and Nature 4. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, ch. 1, ("Descartes' Myth") 5. P. F. Strawson, "Self, Mind and Body," Common Factor Gareth B. Matthews, "Consciousness and Life," Philosophy G. E. M. Anscombe, "The First Person," in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language II. Self and Other A. Knowing Other Minds 8. Bertrand Russell, "Analogy," Part VI, ch. 8 of Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits 9. Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds," The Journal of Philosophy Stuart Hampshire, "The Analogy of Feeling," Mind

2 THE NATURE OF MIND, TOC P. F. Strawson, "Persons," in Feigl et al, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II B. Privileged Access 12. Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, ch. 6 ("How Is Self-Knowledge Possible?"), 1-4, D. M. Armstrong, "Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?", The Philosophical Review Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories," 5 ("The Privacy Objection") The Review of Metaphysics 1965 C. The Theory Approach 15. C. S. Chihara and J. A. Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language," American Philosophical Quarterly Hilary Putnam, "Brains and Behavior," in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy II III. Mind and Body A. The Topic-Neutral Approach 17. J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in V. C. Chappell, ed., The Philosophy of Mind 18. Jerome Shaffer, "Mental Events and the Brain," The Journal of Philosophy D. M. Armstrong, "The Causal Theory of Mind," Neue Hefte für Philosophie Keith Campbell, Body and Mind, ch. 5 ("Central State Materialism"), pp , 86-9, B. Functionalist Approaches 21. Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," in his Philosophical Papers, vol. II 22. David Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification," Australasian Journal of Philosophy Ned Block, "Troubles with Functionalism," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science IX (abridged by Block) 24. David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in Ned Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology

3 THE NATURE OF MIND, TOC 3 vol. I, (with Postscript: "Knowing What It's Like") in Lewis's Philosophical Papers vol. I C. The Mental-Physical Contrast 25. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp , 75-76, , , and Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," in Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson, eds., Experience and Theory 27. Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1984 D. Eliminative Materialism 28. Paul Feyerabend, "Mental Events and the Brain," The Journal of Philosophy Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, ch. 2 ("Persons without Minds"), 1-4, W. V. Quine, "States of Mind," The Journal of Philosophy 1985 IV. The Nature of Mind A. Thinking 31. Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving, ch. 11 ("Intentional Inexistence") 32. W. V. Quine, Word and Object, selection from 45 ("The Double Standard"), pp W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," in his Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised and enlarged edition 34. Roderick M. Chisholm, The First Person, chs. 3 and 4 ("The Problem of First Person Sentences" and Indirect Attribution") 35. J. A. Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes," The Monist Daniel C. Dennett, "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works," in A. F. Heath, ed., Scientific Explanation, and postscript, "Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions," from his The Intentional Stance 37. Fred I. Dretske, "The Intentionality of Cognitive States," Midwest Studies in Philosophy Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language 39. Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge,

4 THE NATURE OF MIND, TOC 4 Lecture II: Minds," in Castaneda, ed., Action, Knowledge, and Reality B. Sensing 40. Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Status of Appearances" (ch. 6 of Theory of Knowledge, 1st ed.), pp Frank Jackson, "The Existence of Mental Objects," American Philosophical Quarterly Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," The Journal of Philosophy Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," Philosophical Studies Christopher Peacocke, "Colour Concepts and Colour Experiences," Synthese Wilfrid Sellars, "Phenomenalism," 6, in his Science, Perception and Reality, and "Being and Being Known," 19-26, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1960 C. Consciousness, Self, and Personhood 46. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, ch. 7, 6-7 ("The Self" and "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'), pp , 191, and Thomas Nagel "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," Synthese Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," The Journal of Philosophy Robert M. Gordon, "Emotions and Knowledge," The Journal of Philosophy Norman Malcolm, "Thoughtless Brutes," APA Proceedings and Addresses David M. Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness," Philosophical Studies 1986 V. Psychological Explanation A. The Computational Approach 53. J. A. Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology," with Stephen P. Stich's commentary ("Paying the Price for Methodological Solipsism") and "Stich" from Fodor's

5 THE NATURE OF MIND, TOC 5 "Response," all in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences Daniel C. Dennett, "Brain Writing and Mind Reading," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science VII (with postscript from Brainstorms) 55. John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," with J. A. Fodor's commentary ("Searle on What Only Brains Can Do"), and "IntrinsicIntentionality and Observer- Relative Ascriptions of Intentionality" and "Fodor" from Searle's "Response," all in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1980; plus a new commentary by Fodor ("After-thoughts: Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room") and a new reply by Searle ("Yin and Yang Strike Out") 56. Hilary Putnam, "Computational Psychology and Interpretion Theory," in his Philosophical Papers, III B. Individualism 57. Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy Brian Loar, "Social Content and Psychological Content," in Robert Grimm and Daniel Merrill, ed., Contents of Thought 59. Robert Stalnaker, "On What's in the Head", Philosophical Perspectives 1989 C. Scientific vs. Folk Psychology 60. Stephen P. Stich, "Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis," The Monist Paul M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," The Journal of Philosophy Daniel C. Dennett, "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology," in Richard Healey, ed., Reduction, Time and Reality, and "Reflections: Instrumentalism Reconsidered," from Dennett's The Intentional Stance Bibliography, organized by section