CHAPTER - I INTRODUCTION

Transcription

1 CHAPTER - I INTRODUCTION

2 CHAPTER - I INTRODUCTION The philosophy of common sense is a natural reaction against philosophical paradox and scepticism. Philosophers have frequently meant by common sense an intuitively based common consent. The term -common sense' is employed to designate a body of beliefs which are presupposed by us in ordinary life and in the sciences as well. It is used to refer to a body of beliefs which are generally or universally accepted as true but some of which may in fact be false or turn out to be natural prejudices. A belief is a common sense beliefif and only if it is (i) descriptive of facts (ii) contingently true (iii) has the evidence of senses an3 (iv) is presupposed by us both in ordinary life and in the sciences as well. Any belief which satisfies each one of these conditions is considered to be a common sense belief. For instance, the belief that one can know the existence of material things is a belief of common sense.

3 Historically speaking, there have been some philosophers who started their inquiry with a set of common sense beliefs, but by way of their analysis and arguments arrived at conclusions which either went beyond common senso or contradicted it flatly (e.g. George Berkeley). But there are some other philosophers who used common sense as the starting point for developing their philosophy, (e.9. Thomas Reid, William Hamilton and G.E. Moore). Common sense philosophy is a reaction against the idealistic tradition and sceptical philosophy. According to idealism there is no substance over and above ideas; material objects, such as a stone or a table, are simply a collection of ideas. And the idealistic tradition observes that objects do not exist independent of mind's awareness. Thus Berkeley's dictum -esse is percipi' asserts the view that an object of the external world exists as long as it is perceived by the mind. If no mind perceives it, it implies that the object does not exist. Such a radical view Berkeley held because 01 his serious commitmeni: to the idealistic tradition. This supposition of Berkeley's is vehemently opposed by common sense which believes that material objects certainly exist in the external world, even though one may not perceive them.

4 Similarly the sceptical outlook of David Hume is another serious preoccupation for common sense philosophy to be countered. Hume said that causal relations are only psychological and not logical. Accordingly he denied the causal relation as an invariable relation between fire and the burning of fingers, bread and the nourishing of hunger and so on. This supposition of Hume's is opposed to common sense thinking. Common sense does believe in the invariable and inseparable relation between fire and burning of fingers, water and the quenching of thirst and so on. Common sense philosophers flatly reject the sceptical thought of Hume. Common sense belief is as old as man because man instinctively believes that the world in which he lives and which his senses perceive is real. Aristotle may be called the first common sense philosopher. In contrast to the position maintained by Plato, Aristotle holds that universals are realities in things. He contends that forms or ideas of things are inherent in them and not apart from them. Therefore form and matter are inseparably connected with each other. So Aristotle asserts that the world of sense is not a shadow of the ideal world as held by Plato. but is a real world.

5 However, it was in the eighteenth Century that attempts were made to develop common sensc philosophy as a system or school of thought. Berkeley's ( ) doctrine of -ewe is percipi' established subjective idealism. Hume's ( ) influential works An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and A Treatise of Human Nature paved the way for -scepticism'. As a reaction against Berkeley's idealism and Hume's scepticism, the philosophy of common sense was developed. In a sense, Berkeley and Hume helped the development of common sense philosophy. During the eighteenth century in France Scotland, to a greater or lesser degree, philosophies and were centred round the common sense view. They safeguarded the beliefs of common sense by defending their authority and by exposing the contraries of these beliefs to rejection. The French philosopher Jesuit Claude Buffier ( ) maintained that we were threatend by scepticism about all matters of fact. He thought that what we need was an unquestionable authority for the fundamental convictions shared by all normal men about matters of fact. Common sense put us into assured possession of such -first truths' as that there was an external world. They were and

6 always had been acknowledged by the vast majority of mankind. The Scottish school, founded by Thomas Reid ( , a British thinker, was a reaction against the idealism of Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume. The main purpose of Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense was to defend common sense against the philosophical paradox and scepticism of Hume. Reid says that the truths of common sense cannot he made evident hy deductive proofs. But there is absurdity in the opinions contrary to common sense beliefs. His procedure in defending common sense is to remind us of its command over us. Common sense so determines the nature of ordinary lanquage that the philosopher who is trying towards an opinion against common sense is liable to need another language, and his utterance is continuous with incoherence between its structure and its content. The beliefs of common sense govern the behaviour even of those who repudiate them. The paradoxical or sceptical philosopher cannot safeguard his opinions except to believe with and act like other men.

7 Reid argues that as in the name of theory some philosophers advocate opinions contrary to common sense, it is the task of a philosopher to defend common sense. are no ultimate truths from which common sense beliefs There can be derived. They have the authority of first principles. They carry their evidence with them. They are imposed upon us by -the constitution of our nature'. To quote Reid : If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for thcm; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is ~anifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd. Their defence is in a way drawing attention to their authority. Common sense has inunense conmland over us. The principles of common sense are obviously true. There is more than obvious falsity in their denial. To deny or even to doubt any of them is to involve oneself in absurdity Reid holds the view that the principles of common sense are implicit in our conduct. We have no choice but to act in accordance with them, whether we accept them or not. Many of them have helped to mould the structure of

8 common language every-where. They have been the basic convictions of mankind. In Reid's doctrine the existence of common sense has theistic presuppositions. Common sense beliefs are the inspiration of the Almighty. He did not, however, maintain that belief in common sense necessarily depended upon belief in God. What he says is that common sense beliefs are imposed upon us by the constitution of our nature that has been established by God. Reid holds that the man who can see no grounds for a belief in God ought to see no grounds for a belief in any mind besides his own. We are forced to believe in the common sense view about the existence of material world and of other intelligent beings. Any argument which tries to disprove common sense is less certain. A philosopher may argue against common sense but in actual practice he acts according to it. Common sense statements are self-evident. Therefore, according to Reid, any philosophical theory should be rejected, when corrupts common sense and common language. it Reid observes that an external object which is immediately present to our perception needs no intervening process to mediate for us its reality. He rejects the

9 representative theory of perception and its notions of ideas and impressions, and claims that we apprehend external things immediately and directly. He criticises Hurne's interpretation of the generally accepted principles such as causation, as expressions of passive habits of imaginative supplimentation. In the Scottish school of common sense, founded by Reid, was followed by thinkers like James Beattie, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown and William Hamilton. James Beattie ( ) a colleague of Reid, was famous as a critic of the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume. llis philosophical contribution consists in his work: Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Following Reid, Beattie argued that mankind is possessed of a faculty called common sense, which perceives truth by an instinctive impulse. It is natural, and it acts independently of our will. BY att~ndinq to this faculty, we may provide ourselves with a set of indisputable first principles, safe from sceptical doubts. We may also turn this faculty on the sceptical philosophers and expose the lack of truth in their sophistical doctrines. This latter enterprise was Beattie's

10 chief interest. His principal targets were the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume. He construed Berkeley's denial of substance as a denial of the real existence of such things as tables and chairs, and joked repeatedly about Berkeley's followers breaking their necks because they could not distinguish between real precipices and imagined ones. For Beattie the world is not changed for those who take Berkeley seriously but is only talked about differently. Hilme received by far the largest part of Beattie's attention and from time to time the strictures on Hume's philosophy gave way to outright attacks on Hume's thought. He found Hume's denial of the distinction between objects and perceptions as untenable because ordinary language went against it. Further, by defining the self as a bundle of perceptions, Hume was at a loss to account for a percipient being to perceive these perccptions. Dugald Stewart ( ), a follower of Reid, tried to systematise Reid's doctrine more thoroughly and to apply it more extensively. He gave elegant literary expression to Reid's ideas. Stewart renamed Reid ' s principles of common sense as the fundamental laws of human belief. He proposed universal consent as the criterion for

11 common sense. He observes that common sense propositions were more certain than any other propositions for or against them. Common sense beliefs were accepted in practice even by those who claimed to reject them. Thomas Brown ( ) shared with the common sense school, a number of its metaphysical doctrines and its appeal to intuitive truths. Philosophy for Brown, was very largely -analysis'- analysis of the genuinely complex into its,elementary constituents and of the deceptively simple into its real complexity. Brown's philosophic position is a sort of compromise between the associationist tendencies of the older empiricism and the intuitionist views of Reid. He forms a bridge from the philosophy of common sense to the later empiricism. He accepts certain intuitive principles of beliefs. Regarding the problem of perception, he is nearer to sensationalist views. ~egarding causality, he comes closer to Hume's view but rejects Hume's sceptical conclusions. William Hamilton ( ) gave new force to Scottish philosophy. Ile brought this school of thought into the foreground and enabled it to gain pre-eminence over all othcr philosophical schools. He was influenced by

12 Kantian philosophy. He adopted Kantian ideas. His philosophy advances beyond Reid. He does not merely appeal to the understanding of the plain man, but critically analyses the process of knowledge. He adds Kant's critical thinking to Reid's philosophy. Hamilton advocates the sovereignty of common sense. He says that the convictions of comon sense come to us with the backing of our entire cognitive nature. These common sense convictions constitute the tests for other truths. The truth of common sense convictions must be presumed because they are too elementary to have antecedents. Reid and Hamilton both think that criticism may be necessary in order to determine common sense belief. Once this fact is established, it follows that the belief is true. The -critical common sensism' professed by the American philosopher C.S.Peirce ( ) follows the views of Reid and Hamilton. He is of the opinion that common sense beliefs are based on instinctive nature. And these instincts will undergo change. Hence common sense beliefs may undergo change as men become civilised and civilisation develops. Peirce holds that common sense beliefs are not ordinary beliefs which we either accept or

13 reject, but they exist as life-long *belief habits'. They are doubt resistent when criticised. In claiming *indubitability1 for a belief of common sense Peirce was not declaring it's truth. Propositions which are indubitable 2 for time being may turnout to be false. Following Reid, Henry Sidgiwick ( ) held a common sense dualism of mind and matter. He observes that common sense when organised into a science, becomes 3 corrected. He claims that common sense is a great mass of ore, rich with valuable metals and it needs a philosophical tinge. It must be purged of its confusions and contradictions. According to G.F. Stout ( ) common sense corrects itself in its evolution. He holds that common sense subsists. in the agreement of iynorant and educated belief. This unanimity is the result of a long developmenti during which the differences of opinion come down, and mistakes of common sense itself can be corrected. He thinks that when a conflict arises between common sense and scientific or philosophical opinion, the final decision rests with sense 4. common

14 Common sense philosophy, which was initiated by Aristotle and developed from the times of Reid, was systematised in the writings of G.F.Moore ( ), the most distinguished exponent of this philosophy. Moore led the revolt of British empiricism and common sense realism against German transcendentalism and Absolutism. ne influenced the course of philosophical thinking in England. He brought about common sense trend of thought in a unique way. Most of his writings are in the form of short papers and essays, but yet some of them are regarded as philosophical land-marks. The present study is concerned with an exposition and evaluation of Moore's thought. A thumb-nail sketch of his distinguished career may not be out ot place here. Moore was born in 1873 in a suburb of London called Upper Norwood. His early education was at Dulwicb College. He learned the classical languages Greek and Latin, among the modern European languages French and German, as it was the practice of those days. Moore joined the Trinity College, Cambridge in At the end of his first year, he made the acquaintance of Bertrand Russell, who was his senior by two years. On his advice and

15 encouragement, Moore began to study philosophy. Henry Sidgiwick, James Ward, G.F. Stout, J.E.McTaggart and Henry Jackson were his teachers at Cambridge. influenced by the philosophy of McTaggart. He was much Tn the summer vacation of 1.895, on the advice of James Ward, Moore went to the University of Tubingen in Germany for about five weeks to attend lectures on Kant by Sigwart and some lectures on Plato by Professor Crusius. For a Fellowship of the Trinity College in Cambridge Moore wrote a dissertation on Kant, and was selected in 1898 for the fellowship, which was generally called prize fellowship. During that year he became a member of the Aristotelian Society of London. The fellowship was given to him unconditionally for six years. During the years of his fellowship, Moore contributed some articles to Baldwin's ~ictionary of Philosophy and wrote a number of papers and took part in symposia. He published his first book Principia Ethica in Me also worked as review sub- editor for the International Journal of Ethics under J.S. Mackenzie. In 1904, Moore's fellowship lapsed. ~e applied for a continuation of it in the form of Research

16 Fellowship. However his application was not considered. Then Moore stayed with a friend of his in Edinburgh University upto From 1908 onwards, he lived in Richmond with his two sisters. During this time Moore wrote a Review of Russell's Principles of Mathematics and also wrote several thought-provoking papers. During his stay at Richmond, Moore was invited to give two courses of lectures on Metaphysics at the Morley College. He also published a book entitled Ethics (1912) for the Home University Library. In 1911, Moore again came to Cambridge to hold a lectureship in Moral Science. In 1912, he made the acquaintance of Wittgenstein, who attended his classes at Cambridge. In 1913, Moore was awarded the Degree of Litt.D. by his own University. He also received the Honorary Degree of LL.D, from the University of St. Andrews. In 1918, he was elected a fellow of thc British Academy. In Moore became the Editor of the famous journal Mind. He held this office with distinction for more than twenty years. In 1925, he succeeded James Ward as Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic. In 1939, at the age of 65 Moore retired from his office. After his retirement in Cambridge, Moore was invited to Oxford to give lectures.

17 In 1940, Moore was invited to the U.S.A. as a Visiting Professor. He delivered lectures at Princeton, Mills College, California and Columbia Universities. Some of the important works of Moore are Philosophical Studies (1922), Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953), and Philosophical Papers (1959). He also contributed many extremely important articles to Mind, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and other philosophical periodicals. Moore's interest was mainly analytical and critical. He did not believe in Metaphysics. On the contrary he was a criticof what he regarded as the fallacies and confusions of Metaphysics. His essay "A Defence of Common Sense" which he contributed to Contemporary British Philosophy (Second Series) had an immense influence on British Philosophy. "An Autobiography' and "A Reply to My Critics" which he contributed to The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (1942) throw much light on his personality and his philosophical position. Moore died at Cambridge on October 24, 1958 at the ripe age of 85.

18 5 Moore is called a philosopher's philosopher. For him philosophy is no mere academic exercise. He has made a lasting impact on modern western philosophers, especially his contemporaries. His exposition of the fundamental issues of philosophy is lucid. His mode of analysing philosophical problems is both attractive and thought- provoking. There is a great integrity and accuracy in his writings. Referring to Moore, A.R. White said, "I regard him as that type of genius which has an infinite capacity for taking painsu6 Russell opined that while Moore took the lead in rebellion, he followed with a sense of 7 emancipation. Moore avoids the use of technical terms of mathematics and science in his writings. The significance and the influence of Moore on modern philosophy and his contributions to it becomes obvious from the number of questions he has raised, and the amount of discussion his writings have inspired. In particular, his views regarding perceptual knowledge have provided contemporary philosophy not only many new problems, but also new trends of thought for approaching them. His analytical approach to particular problems and his steady pursuit of methodological questioning are characteristic of

19 his writings. He is always interested in investigating into the epistemological aspect of a given problem and in giving new dimensions to it. Moore's major objective is to defend and justify the claims of common sense, particularly those expressed in everyday perceptual statements, against any view that contradicts them. While defending and advocating common sense philosophy, he criticises idealism and scepticism. He criticised idealism first in his essay, "The Refutation of deali ism"'. This was meant to refute the idealistic world view and criticise the subjectivist theory of knowledge represented by Berkeley. This historic essay is usually said to mark the beginning of the common sense realism. Moore's paper, "A Defence of Common Sense" 9 gives a long list of propositions that are obviously true. According to him these propositions taken together, imply the truth of common sensc view of the world. These propositions accept the existence of material thinys, space, time and other minds besides one's own. Referring to the philosophers who deny the existence of material things, space and time, Moore says that the views of these philosophers are incompatible with obvious truths. He

20 regards them as paradoxical opinions which are inconsistent with what they themselves know to be true. A sceptical philosopher, for example, sets himself to persuade others that he alone exists. Moore defends common sense by showing that certain beliefs that we are naturally inclined to hold, and consequently that most men do hold, are supported by the principle of weighted certainties and by showing that the traditional counter claims of sceptics are self- contradictory. It is important to note that Hoore does nut argue that because a certain belief is a belief of common sense it is necessarily and indisputably true or need not be subjected to assessment. He does not think that common sense never errs. Moore treats universal or general acceptance as the identifying mark of common sense However, he admits that things tliat everybody once belief. believed at time may turnout to be false. He is prepared to allow that there might be many false propositions within the boundaries of the common sense view of the world. Moorc was not only a pioneer of common sense realism but also the driving force behind it. His importance lies not only in stating and establishing the

21 common sense view of knowledge but also in introducing a new method of argument in philosophy. He influenced a number of other thinkers like Bertrand Russell and C.D.Broad. He gave a strong impulse to academic philosophy and contributed in many ways to its development. The present work is an exposition and evaluation of Moore's defence of common sense against idealism and scepticism. It also discusses Moore's defence of ordinary language and his notion of analysis. There are seven chapters in it, including the present one, which forms the first chapter. This introductory chapter aims at explaining the meaning of common sense and traces briefly the emcrgence and development of common sense philosophy from the times of Aristotle to the times of Moore. The second and third chapters are concerned with analysing Moore's refutation of idealism and scepticism. The fourth chapter discusses Moore's defence of common sense, his arguments for the reality of material things, space, time and the existence of other human beings. Moore was not without his critics. His defence of common sense was criticised by Malcolm, Lazerowitz, Ambrose and Wisdom, from different perspectives. The critics'

22 views are elucidated and examined in the fifth chapter. Chapter six attcmpts to present a comprehensive picture of Moore' s conception of analysis and sense-data, and examines the question, "Is Moore's notion of analysis and sense-data in any way incompatible with his views of common sense?". Chapter seven, the concluding chapter, summarises the discussion and observations made in the preceding chapters. It also attempts to estimate Moore's defence of common sense. As indicated earlier, while defending common sense, Moore rcfuted Lhe assumptions of both idealism and scepticism. The succeeding two chapters will take up this discussion.

23 REFERENCES Reid. Thomas., An Inquiry into the Human Mind edited with an introduction by Timothy Duggan, Chicago; The University of Chicago, 1970, p. 32. Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers, Vol.V, Harvard University Press. 1933, p.347. Sidgiwick, Henry., Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant ed. Ward, J. London, 1905, p.425. Stout, G.F., Mind and Matter Cambridge, 1931, p.11. White, A.R., G.E. Moore : A Critical Exposition Oxford. Black Well and Mott Ltd., 1969, p.1. Ibid, p. 1. Russell, Bertrand., "My Mental Development", The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Schilpp, P.A., New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1951, p.12. First published in Mind N.S. Vol. XII, 1903 and Republished in his Philosophical studies, London. Routledqe and Xeqan Paul Ltd., First published in Contemporary British Philosophy (Second series), ed. J.H. Muirhead. London, Macmillan Company Ltd., 1925 and republished in Moorc's Philosophical Papers, London, George Allen & unwin Ltd., 1959, pp