1 Russell s Problems of Philosophy IT S (NOT) ALL IN YOUR HEAD J a n u a r y 1 9 Today : 1. Review Existence & Nature of Matter 2. Russell s case against Idealism 3. Next Lecture
2 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter The Question of Chapters 2 & 3 1. Is there any such thing as matter? 2. If so, what is its nature? 2 Sensible start answering (1) our indubitable sense-data! How to go from sense-data to existence of matter? Not via deductive proof no Cartesian certainty Via abduction (inference to the best explanation) Data = the things we know directly (our sense data) One hypothesis that explains this data is that there are physical objects which, via interactions with other physical objects, cause our sensations This hypothesis provides the best explanation of sensations Ergo, our sense-data provides good grounds for believing in matter!
3 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter Two Questions for this argument I. Why think the external world hypothesis is better than one that denies the existence of matter (e.g. Idealism)? 3 The external world hypothesis better explains the continuity of intraand inter-subjective experience; also (i) fits with common sense idea of cat (dog) moving across the room, rather than popping into/out of existence, and (ii) our communicative practices II. What are the criteria for determining which hypothesis is best? The external world hypothesis seems to be the simplest, when we take into account the need to explain our sensations
4 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter 4 Upshot although [the non-existence of matter] is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose it is true; and it is in fact a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that there really are objects, independent of us, whose action on us causes our sensations. (PoP, 10) Some Questions to consider: What is simplicity? Why should we expect the world to be simple, rather than complex? How do we know that we ve consider all the relevant alternative hypotheses? Should missing one undercut our confidence our answer?
5 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter Russell thinks the external world hypothesis is an instinctive belief one supplied by (our?) nature Further, he claims that I. Knowledge must be systematic one belief must be mutually interlocked with other beliefs to form a whole (holistic, rather than atomistic) II. 5 The only justifiable reason to reject an instinctive belief is another instinctive belief Of course, both of these points are questionable [Question to think about: what role do they play in Russell s argument? Why does it matter for Russell that belief in the external world is instinctive?]
6 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter The Key Points from Chpt. 2 I. We have reason to affirm the simplest theory that explains the deliverances of our senses How should we understand simplicity here? II. Knowledge must be systematic one belief must be mutually interlocked with other beliefs to form a whole (holistic, rather than atomistic) A system of beliefs can be interlocking but wrong (e.g. a set of beliefs about a fictional world) III.The only justifiable reason to reject an instinctive belief is another instinctive belief Plenty of instinctive beliefs have turned out to be false 6
7 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter Chapter 3 addresses (2) that is, it aims to answer: 7 What is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my perception of it? (PoP, 13) Russell s answer physical science tells us matter s nature! however, it can only tell us structural information about reality, not about what things are like intrinsically Map Analogy a map captures the structure of the territory it describes; the relations of the map s symbols convey information about the relations of the things depicted, not their natures Thus we find that although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by the senses (PoP)
8 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter What we can come to know about the external world via our sense-data Temporal order (e.g. before and after), not duration Spatial order (e.g. arrangement of parts), not shape (Potentially) Difference/similarity 8 What we can not come to know about the external world via our sense-data Any intrinsic properties of physical objects What we can possibly know from our sense data is what is preserved across circumstantial variation The only stuff that is like that is structural
9 2.0 Review Existence & Nature of Matter What have we learned so far? I. Our knowledge of the external world comes via our senses; what the senses deliver directly is our sense data 9 II. III. IV. Sense data does not reveal directly the properties of physical objects (due to the relativity of appearances), but the patterns of sense data provide us with signs of the pattern of material things that cause them We ve good reason to suppose there is a correspondence between sense data and physical objects because the external world hypothesis is the best explanation for our sense data While we can t confront the external world directly, it speaks to us via the structure of our sense data, which is immediately given
10 10 Idealism the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental (PoP) While flying in the face of common sense, Idealism is not to be dismissed as obviously absurd Russell s epistemological story prevents him from dismissing Idealism given that all we can get is structural information, we don t know that physical objects aren t intrinsically mental common sense leaves us completely in the dark as to the true intrinsic nature of physical objects, and if there were good reason to regard them as mental, we could not legitimately reject this opinion merely because it strikes us as strange. The truth about physical objects must be strange. (PoP)
11 The Idealist Problem Idealism is a thesis about the intrinsic nature of physical objects (i.e, that, intrinsically, they re mental) 11 We only have structural knowledge of physical objects, not about their intrinsic natures So, given what we ve secured so far, nothing proves Idealism is wrong Russell concedes that sense-data is partly mental our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, in the mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting. (PoP) Given the Conflicting Appearances Argument, this makes sense!
12 But Russell disputes the claim that nothing else but sensedata can be known by us 12 [Berkeley] shows that all we know immediately when we perceive the tree consists of ideas in his sense of the word, and he argues that there is not the slightest ground for supposing that there is anything real about the tree except what is perceived. It s being, he says, consists in being perceived. (PoP) Berkeley argued we can only solve the sceptical problem by closing the gap between our ideas of objects and the objects themselves A. Eliminate ideas and allow for direct perception of external objects B. Eliminate objects and treat ideas as the real thing Since we only immediately grasp ideas, Berkeley goes for (A)
13 13 Berkeley s Solution - Simplify to the two things we can be certain of the mind & the idea! In short, adopt a mind-only metaphysics! Berkeley s Key Claim To be is to be perceived (esse est percipi) Of course, there s one obvious problem with this story
14 According to Berkeley, things don t pop out of existence when we re not around to perceive it because God s always perceiving everything! For Berkeley, the persistence and regularity of the objects we perceive is an everyday proof of God s existence 14 Thus apart from minds and their ideas there is nothing in the world, nor is it possible that anything else should ever be known, since whatever is known is necessarily an idea. (PoP)
15 15 God in the Quad by Ronald Knox There was a young man who said, "God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there's no one about in the Quad." REPLY Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd: I am always about in the Quad. And that's why the tree Will continue to be, Since observed by Yours faithfully, GOD.
16 16 Russell doesn t offer a direct critique of Berkeley s argument instead, he thinks the argument he gives is sufficiently strong to obviate the need to discuss Berkeley s actual arguments for Idealism It s also worth noting that idea and sense data are not strictly synonymous [Berkeley] gives the name idea to anything which is immediately known, as, for example, sense-data are known. But the term is not wholly confined the sense-data. There will also be things remembered or imagined, for which such things also have immediate acquaintance at the moment of remembering or imagine. All such immediate data [Berkeley] calls ideas. (PoP)
17 A Quite Aside on Berkeley s Idealism Hang on a minute how can Berkeley block scepticism if he allows idea to also include imagined things? 17 More pointedly, how does Berkeley tell the difference between real and imaginary ideas? Berkeley a real idea must be sufficiently lively, strong, vivid, affecting, distinct, orderly, steady, & coherent For Berkeley, these aren t marks of reality they are constitutive of it! To be real just is to be an idea with these qualities
18 Russell initiates his attack by highlighting an ambiguity While ideas are in our minds, we can mean different things by this We speak of bearing a person in mind, not meaning that the person is in our minds, but that a thought of him is in our minds. (PoP, #) Distinguish between The thought (the psychological episode) What the thought is about (the content/subject matter) 18 These are clearly distinct! I can have someone in mind to invite to dinner, but this doesn t mean they re a psychological episode! I can forget to invite them they went out of my mind but this doesn t mean that they ceased to exist!
19 Russell s objection to Berkeley s argument for Idealism is that it equivocates between these two different notions 19 To argue that the tree itself must be in our minds is like arguing that a person whom we bear in mind is himself in our mind (PoP) The second step of Russell s critique is that we need an argument to show that sense-data are mental While the presence of a sense-datum relies upon several factors, including there being a mind it doesn t follow that the sense-datum is itself mental We saw that Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the tree were not being perceived. But this is an entirely different point from the one which Berkeley seeks to prove (PoP)
20 Furthering this, Russell notes that the arguments he has given don t prove that sense-data are mental they only show that the existence of sense-datum depends upon the relation of our sense organs to some physical object 20 That is to say, they proved that a certain colour will exist, in a certain light, if a normal eye is placed at a certain point relatively to the table. They did not prove that the colour is in the mind of the percipient. (PoP) According to Russell, Berkeley confuses act and object Suppose you kick your friend (you horrible, horrible person!) The action is the something you did namely, kicking your friend; the object is the something you did the action to namely, your friend
21 Russell uses this distinction to block Berkeley s argument: Distinguish the mental act of apprehending from the object that is apprehended (the sense-data) just because the act is mental doesn t mean the object is! Upshot Berkeley has not given us a reason to think that the objects of our sensations are themselves mental Russell says that we need to respect the act/object distinction, if we re to understand the mental: 21 The question of the distinction between act and object in our apprehending of things is vitally important, since our whole power of acquiring knowledge is bound up with it. The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of a mind. Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind s power of knowing things.
22 Russell goes on to dismiss the argument that what has no practical significance for us cannot be real This may be a limitation on our part, rather than the thing itself It may have a theoretical significance for us He also dismisses the argument that we cannot know anything exists that we cannot itself know because it equivocates between two notions of knowledge Knowledge of Truths the sort of knowledge which is opposed to error, the sense in which that we know is true, the sense in which applies to our beliefs and convictions, i.e., what are called judgements. Knowledge by Acquaintance applies to our knowledge of things, which we may call acquaintance. This is the sense in which we know sense-data Wissen & Kennen (German), savoir & connaitre (French) 22
23 What is the difference between these two relations? 23 Knowledge of Truth relates judging subject to a truth ( that clause) Acquaintance relates perceiving subject to a thing (e.g. a sense-datum) To grasp the difference, we need to get what truth is the topic of Chapter 12! In light of this distinction, the argument becomes something like, We can never truly judge that something which we are not acquainted with exists Then the argument clearly fails since true judgment and acquaintance are different kinds of relations, relating different kinds of entities, it does not follow that the former obtains if the latter does No reason to hold that the obtaining of true judgement tracks the obtaining of acquaintance relations you can make true judgement without acquantiance!
24 3.0 Next Lecture 24 Tuesday 24 January 12:00 13:00 Joseph Black Building 419 Knowledge by Acquaintance & by Description Reading: Russell Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 5 Take care and see you on Tuesday!
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