Encyclopedia of Information Ethics and Security

Transcription

1 Encyclopedia of Information Ethics and Security Marian Quigley Monash University, Australia InformatIon ScIence reference Hershey New York

2 Acquisitions Editor: Development Editor: Senior Managing Editor: Managing Editor: Assistant Managing Editor: Copy Editor: Typesetter: Cover Design: Printed at: Kristin Klinger Kristin Roth Jennifer Neidig Sara Reed Diane Huskinson Maria Boyer Sara Reed Lisa Tosheff Yurchak Printing Inc. Published in the United States of America by Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Suite 200 Hershey PA Tel: Fax: Web site: and in the United Kingdom by Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 3 Henrietta Street Covent Garden London WC2E 8LU Tel: Fax: Web site: Copyright 2008 by IGI Global. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Encyclopedia of information ethics and security / Marian Quigley, Editor. p. cm. Topics address a wide range of life areas affected by computer technology, including: education, the workplace, health, privacy, intellectual property, identity, computer crime, cyber terrorism, equity and access, banking, shopping, publishing, legal and political issues, censorship, artificial intelligence, the environment, communication. Summary: This book is an original, comprehensive reference source on ethical and security issues relating to the latest technologies. It covers a wide range of themes, including topics such as computer crime, information warfare, privacy, surveillance, intellectual property and education. It is a useful tool for students, academics, and professionals --Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN (hardcover) -- ISBN (ebook) 1. Information technology--social aspects--encyclopedias. 2. Information technology--moral and ethical aspects--encyclopedias. 3. Computer crimes- -Encyclopedias. 4. Computer security--encyclopedias. 5. Information networks--security measures--encyclopedias. I. Quigley, Marian. HM851.E dc British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this encyclopedia set is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this encyclopedia set are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher.

3 Meta View of Information Ethics Charles R. Crowell University of Notre Dame, USA M Robert N. Barger University of Notre Dame, USA INTRODUCTION That computing and information systems give rise to specific ethical issues related to the appropriate uses of such technology is a viewpoint that, according to Bynum (2001a), is traceable at least as far back as Norbert Wiener s seminal work in the 1950s (Wiener, 1954). From this important idea, a field of inquiry emerged that came to be known as computer ethics (Maner, 1980). As with many emerging fields, however, scholarly debate arose as to how computer ethics should best be defined (cf. Bynum, 2001b). While various distinct positions have been advanced in this regard (e.g., Moor, 1985; Johnson, 2001), a broad characterization of the field is that computer ethics deals with the personal and social impacts of information technology, along with the ethical considerations that arise from such impacts (Bynum, 2001b). More recent views localize computer ethics within a still broader philosophical domain of information ethics (Floridi & Sanders, 2002). In this article it is not our aim to review historical or current developments in the field of information ethics, per se. Rather, our goal is to discuss an important but somewhat neglected aspect of this field: namely, its metaethics. In its broadest sense, metaethics can be defined as the generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments as well as about how such judgments are to be justified (Barger, 2001). Positioned in this way, metaethics is not about isolated individual judgments concerning whether certain actions are right or wrong. Rather, it is about how one s particular worldview, also known as a Weltanschauung, is propaedeutic to the formulation of such ethical judgments. A person s worldview is his or her own collection of beliefs about reality and existence, which can be multifaceted including beliefs relating to whether human nature is fundamentally good or evil, whether absolute standards of conduct exist, whether there is a supreme power in the universe, and so forth. In philosophy, the study of being and existence is called metaphysics. This very term, derived from its Greek roots, connotes a higher or more advanced (meta) understanding of reality (physics). A personal metaphysical position is basically equivalent to someone s worldview or fundamental beliefs about reality (Barger, 2001). Metaphysics is described here as a set of beliefs because it is based on ideas that cannot be proven or verified. Aristotle called metaphysics first principles (McKeon, 1968) in deference to the notion that a foundation of meaning is prerequisite to the interpretation of any particular events or actions within the larger universe of that meaning. The reason more than one metaphysics exists is that different people adopt different personal explanations of reality. Once a personal metaphysical worldview is adopted, that view inevitably influences personal decisions about ethical matters (Barger, 2001). It is in this sense, then, that a person s view of reality is propaedeutic to one s stand on value questions. As others have noted, several traditional philosophical positions exist that commonly influence personal metaphysics and ethical decision making (Barger, 2001; Johnson, 2001). The purpose of the next section is to review those positions along with their primary ethical implications. background: major metaphysical POSITIONS AND THEIR ETHICS Idealism The term idealism applies to a collection of metaphysical positions, all of which share a common notion that the mental realm predominates over the physical (Wikipedia, 2006). Many philosophers (e.g., Socrates, Copyright 2008, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

4 Plato, Berkeley, Kant) have emphasized the primacy of mentality because they believed the mind to be the only means by which human experience occurs. In this view, humans can have no direct experience of physical objects, only mental perceptions (i.e., ideas ) of objects fueled by the senses. This has led some idealists to question whether or not anything other than the mental realm really exists. It is in this sense, then, that idealism elevates mentality, which it holds to be a uniquely human quality, to a position of preeminent importance. Only ideas are thought to be able to achieve a kind of perfection or ideal form; the physical realm, if it exists at all, is flawed, imperfect, and subject to degradation over time. Ideas, on the other hand, can achieve a kind of timeless, universal quality that physical objects cannot. Idealism gives rise to a form of deontological or duty-based ethics perhaps epitomized in the work of Immanuel Kant (Johnson, 2001). Kant believed that because the essence of human nature was its rationality, a code of conduct was required befitting that essence. Accordingly, Kant proposed several forms of what he called the Categorical Imperative as the universal standard for human action. The first form emphasized its universality: Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant, 1993). In other words, if you wish to establish a particular ethical standard, you must be willing to agree that it would also be right for anyone else to follow it. As Barger (2001) indicates, this form is very close to what is commonly known from the New Testament as the golden rule. A second form of the Categorical Imperative emphasizes the dignity of human nature that derives from its mentality: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only (Kant, 1993). Reflected in this form is the notion that because each human is a rational being, all humans should be treated in a manner respectful of this quality (Johnson, 2001). Like the timeless perfection of ideas, idealist moral imperatives are a priori and absolute. That is, these imperatives do not admit of exceptions and are stated in terms of always or never. For example: Always tell the truth or Never tell a lie. Realism This metaphysical position, also known as naturalism (Barger, 2001), holds that reality is material, natural, and physical. As such, reality is quantitative, measurable, governed by the laws of nature, and subject to the operation of cause and effect. The universe, according to the realist, is one of natural design and order in which matter takes precedence over mentality. For some realists, if the mind exists at all, it can be explained by physical mechanisms like brain functions (Searle, 2000). The resultant ethical position that flows from a realistic metaphysics holds that conformity with nature is good. Therefore, people should strive to promote habits that would, for example, enhance personal health (by exercising, not smoking, etc.), or protect our environment and its resources (by not polluting, recycling, etc.). In a sense, realism leads to its own form of deontological ethics with a universal mandate derived from a more natural law: live in harmony with nature. Pragmatism Within a pragmatic metaphysics, reality is not so easily localized in the mental or physical realms as it is for the idealist and realist. The pragmatist finds meaning neither in ideas nor things, but rather believes that reality is a process, a dynamic coming-to-be instead of a static state of being. Reality is to be found in change, activity, interaction, and experience. Since change is ubiquitous, nothing can have a permanent essence or identity. The only constant is change, and the only absolute is that there are no absolutes! Pragmatism leads to a form of utilitarian ethics (Barger, 2001; Johnson, 2001) in that all moral values must be tested and proven in practice since nothing is intrinsically good or bad. If certain actions work to achieve a socially desirable end, then these actions are ethical and good. Consequences, therefore, define good and evil on this view. The maxim that follows from this pragmatic ethics is that the end justifies the means. That is, if an act is useful for achieving some laudable goal, then it becomes good. Accordingly, a means has no intrinsic absolute value, but only gains value relative to its usefulness for achieving some desired result.

5 Results or consequences are the ultimate measure of goodness for a pragmatist, since the usefulness of a means to an end can only be judged after the fact by the effects of that means. Thus, for the pragmatist, there can be no assurance that any action is good until it is tried. Even then, its goodness is only held tentatively, as long as it continues to work. If ever there is a dispute about which ends should be pursued and which means are more effective for achieving an end, the pragmatist looks for guidance from the group since collective wisdom is more highly esteemed than that of an individual. Since the group is valued more than the individual, the pragmatist strives for the greatest good for the greatest number (Barger, 2001). Existentialism The existentialist joins with the pragmatist in rejecting the belief that reality is a priori and fixed. But, unlike a pragmatic emphasis on the controlling group, the existentialist holds that reality must be defined by each autonomous individual. The existentialist notions of subjectivity and phenomenological self imply that the meaning or surdity of an otherwise absurd universe is individually determined (Sartre, 1992). Any meaning attached to the world must be put there by the individual and it will be valid only for that individual. Thus, each person s world and self-identity is the product of that person s own choices. In a sense, each person can be defined as the sum of his or her choices. It follows, therefore, that reality is different for each individual. We each live in our own world and are determined/defined by our choices. An existentialist worldview also leads to a kind of utilitarian ethics in which moral values are individualized through personal rather than group choices. Each personal choice reflects a preference for one alternative over others. Anyone who makes a choice freely and authentically (Sartre, 1992) is therefore acting in a moral fashion. This aspect of existentialism is reminiscent of Polonius s advice to his son in Shakespeare s Hamlet: To thine ownself be true (Act I, Scene iii). As some have suggested (e.g., Onof, 2004), existentialism, especially as presented by Sartre (1992), may represent a form of relativistic moral imperative with the same kind of universality that characterizes Kant s Categorical Imperative. blended Worldviews No person s actions are governed all the time by just one worldview (Barger & Barger, 1989). The possibility of blended worldviews has led some writers to posit guidelines for dealing with ethical dilemmas that appear to be derived from multiple metaphysical positions. Donn Parker (cited in Rifkin, 1991, p. 84), for example, offers several guidelines for action that seem at first glance to include both idealistic and pragmatic elements. Parker s seemingly idealistic guideline is something he calls the Kantian Universality Rule, which states: If an act or failure to act is not right for everyone to commit, then it is not right for anyone to commit (Rifkin, 1991). This Universality Rule is just an alternate formulation of the Categorical Imperative discussed above. Another of Parker s guidelines is called The Higher Ethic, which states: Take the action that achieves the greater good (Rifkin, 1991). This maxim appears to be an instance of the pragmatic motto we discussed earlier. Whatever the exact philosophical analysis of Parker s guidelines may prove to be, the fact that they are in sync with seemingly different worldviews could enhance their practical usefulness for ethical decision making among those with a blended metaphysics. ImPLICATIONS FOR THREE COmPUTING-RELATED ETHICAL DILEmmAS The different worldviews noted above seem to offer divergent solutions for many possible ethical information technology-related dilemmas. We select but three hypothetical dilemmas for purposes of illustration. They have to do with piracy, privacy, and authoritydeception. While these examples are set in an educational context, we think they are readily transferable to other settings. Our argument here is that any divergence in the ethically correct solutions to these dilemmas can be traced rather directly to the seemingly different ethical standards associated with each separate worldview. Due to space limitations, we will consider two hypothetical response alternatives for each dilemma: a deontological or absolutist type of solution and a relativist utilitarian solution. M

6 Piracy First consider piracy, a common ethical dilemma in today s digital world, involving wrongful appropriation of computing resources. As an example, suppose someone uses a personal account on a university s mainframe computer for something that has no direct relation to university business. Such use could involve anything from sending a personal message to a friend, to conducting a full-blown private business on the computer (billing, payroll, inventory, etc.). Is there anything unethical about such computer usage? An absolutist position would likely say that the abovedescribed activities are indeed unethical whether only the message is involved or the larger-scale business activities (although an absolutist would recognize a difference between the two in the degree of wrong being done) provided that such use is prohibited by the university s published computer utilization policies. The guiding principle here would be based on the purposes for which the university (i.e., the computing-resource owner) intended the computer to be used. Any utilization for purposes other than what was intended, as specified in the usage policy, would be unethical. On the other hand, a relativist might say that only the full-scale business activities really were unethical because they tied up too much memory and slowed down the machine s operation, thereby depriving other legitimate users of access to, or reasonable performance of, the computing resources in question. However, the personal message might not be unethical because it represented no significant drag on operations or no deprivation of services/performance for other legitimate users. The guiding principle here is consequences or harm: no harm, no foul. Privacy Next consider a dilemma having to do with privacy. Suppose a student enters a public computer lab on campus and encounters a machine still logged into the account of another student who forgot to log off when she left. The student decides to access the personal files of this account owner that are available on the system. Is this behavior unethical? An absolutist position would maintain that the behavior was unethical because the only person who is entitled to access someone s personal files is the owner of those files, unless the owner knowingly grants permission to others. A relativist position would be based on the consequences. If the intrusive student logged the account owner off the system after snooping around and never revealed to anyone any confidential information he or she may have seen, then no harm would be done. So, it could be argued that the intrusive student s snooping was not unethical. But, if that student passed on any personal or confidential information about the account owner, then unethical action could be involved since potential harm might result. Authority-Deception Finally, let us look at a dilemma involving what may arguably be regarded as an abuse of power by authority, but which certainly involves at least an instance of deception. A student is strongly suspected by his university of a major fair-use computer-policy violation involving a hoax allegedly being sent by the student under the name of a prominent administrator. This proved to be exceedingly disruptive to student affairs until it was identified as being fraudulent. The student suspect, though not a professional hacker, was adept enough to cover his electronic tracks well. However, the administration decided to confront the student and falsely inform him that they had hired an outside expert whose skills were sufficient to uncover electronic evidence of the student s perpetration of the hoax. The suspect thus was being deceived in an effort to force an admission of responsibility, which the student eventually did provide. Did the administration behave unethically in this instance? An absolutist position would maintain that lying under any circumstances is wrong. This follows, of course, from an idealist emphasis on the universal importance of truth. A relativist could argue, however, that the end justified the means in this case. The greater good was being served by any means used to identify the perpetrator, dispense a severe penalty, and hopefully deter future instances of similar computer-use violations. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE TRENDS There is little doubt that technology use will continue to escalate. As it does, so will the potential for ethical

7 dilemmas arising from such use. While there is some controversy about whether technology-based ethical dilemmas are unique, or merely instances of age-old moral questions (Johnson, 2001), it is clear that ethics must be an ever-increasing focus of our educational system at all levels. The field of moral psychology may have much to offer in this regard. As those who study the process of moral development formulate and test theories about various psychological and behavioral factors contributing to ethical decision making, it becomes possible to consider whether or not and to what extent technology may impact those factors (cf. Crowell, Narvaez, & Gomberg, 2005). Such efforts may help to illuminate the educational practices and tools that will be needed to effectively prepare students to understand and resolve technology-related ethical dilemmas. Moreover, it is of continuing importance to explore how metaethical analysis may be helpful in understanding and promoting moral education and personal development. REFERENCES Barger, R.N. (2001). Philosophical belief systems. Retrieved April 23, 2006, from ~rbarger/philblfs.html Barger, R.N., & Barger, J.C. (1989). Do pragmatists choose business while idealists choose education? Charleston: Eastern Illinois University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED ) Bynum, T.W. (2001a). Computer ethics: Its birth and its future. Ethics and Information Technology, 3, Bynum, T.W. (2001b). Computer ethics: Basic concepts and historical overview. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 23, 2006, from plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/ethicscomputer/ Crowell, C.R., Narvaez, D., & Gomberg, A. (2005). Moral psychology and information ethics: The effects of psychological distance on the components of moral behavior in a digital world. In L.A. Freeman & A.G. Peace (Eds.), Information ethics: Privacy and intellectual property (pp ). Hershey, PA: Idea Group. Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. New York: Macmillan. Floridi, L., & Sanders, J.W. (2002). Mapping the foundationalist debate in computer ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 4, 1-9. Johnson, D.G. (2001). Computer ethics (3 rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Kant, I. (1993). Critique of practical reason and other writings (L.W. Beck, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1788). Maner, W. (1980). Starter kit in computer ethics. New York: Helvetia Press. McKeon, R. (Ed.). (1968). The basic works of Aristotle. New York: Random House. Moor, J.H. (1985). What is computer ethics? In T.W. Bynum (Ed.), Computers and ethics (pp ). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Onof, C.J. (2004). Jean-Paul Sartre ( ): Existentialism. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 23, 2006, from edu/s/sartre-ex.htm Rifkin, G. (1991). The ethics gap, 25(41), Sartre, J.-P. (1992). Being and nothingness (Hazel Barnes, Trans.). New York: Washington Square Press. (Original work published 1943). Searle, J.R. (2000). Consciousness. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, Shakespeare, W. (n.d.). Hamlet. In C. Knight (Ed.), The pictorial edition of the works of Shakespeare. New York: P.F. Collier. Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings: Cybernetics and society (2 nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Wikipedia. (2006). Idealism. Retrieved April 23, 2006 from sm&oldid= M

8 KEY TERmS Existentialism: A view that reality is not objective, rather it is subjective and must be constructed by each individual. Idealism: A view that reality is ultimately grounded in the perfect, abstract, ideal world, the world of spirit and ideas. Information Ethics: A field concerned with the personal and social impacts of information technology, along with the ethical concerns to which those impacts give rise. Metaethics: The generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments (i.e., about their basis) as well as about how such judgments are to be justified. Metaphysics: The branch of philosophy devoted to the study and analysis of reality and existence. Pragmatism: A view suggesting that reality is not static in the sense of depending on absolute ideas or matter, but rather is ultimately in process and must be constantly probed and determined by social experimentation. Realism: A view emphasizing the ultimate importance of the natural world, that is, the physical, material, sensible universe. Worldview: A person s own assumptions about reality and existence; also known as a Weltanschauung or personal metaphysics. 0