IMMANUEL KANT ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW

Transcription

1 IMMANUEL KANT ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW

2 In Memory of My Father and of Professor H. ]. Paton

3 IMMANUEL KANT ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by MARY J. GREGOR MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1974

4 I974 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-13: e-isbn-13: / DOl: /0./007/ /

5 CONTENTS TRANSLATORS INTRODUCTION NOTE IX XXVI ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW PART 1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC BOOK 1. ON THE COGNITIVE POWERS On Self-Consciousness 9 On Egoism IO On Voluntary Consciousness of Our Ideas I3 On Observing Oneself I3 On Ideas That We Have without Being Conscious of Them I6 On Distinctness and Indistinctness in Consciousness of Our Ideas I8 On Sensibility as Contrasted with Understanding 2I Apology for Sensibility 23 On Ability with Regard to the Cognitive Powers in General 26 On Artificial Play with Sensory Semblance 29 On Permissible Moral Semblance 30 On the Five Senses 32 On Inner Sense 39 On the Causes that Increase or Decrease the Intensity of Our Sense Impressions 40 On the Inhibition, Weakening, and Total Loss of the Sense Powers 43 On the Constructive Power belonging to Sensibility According to Its Various Forms 50

6 VIII CONTENTS On the Power of Bringing the Past and the Future to Mind by Imagination 56 On Involuntary Invention in a State of Health - That Is, on Dreaming 63 On the Power of Using Signs 64 On the Cognitive Power Insofar As It Is Based on Understanding 68 On Deficiencies and Diseases of the Soul with Respect to Its Cognitive Power 73 On Talents in the Cognitive Power 89 BOOK II. THE FEELING OF PLEASURE AND DISPLEASURE On Sensuous Pleasure A. On the Feeling for the Agreeable, or Sensuous Pleasure in the Sensation of an Object 99 B. On the Feeling for the Beautiful, or Taste!O7 BOOK III. ON THE ApPETITIVE POWER On Affects in Comparison with Passion 120 On the Passions 132 On the Highest Physical Good 142 On the Highest Moral-Physical Good 143 PART II. ANTHROPOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION A. The Character of the Person 151 I. On [a Man's] Nature On Temperament On Character as [a Man's] Way of Thinking 157 On Physiognomy 160 B. On the Character of the Sexes 166 C. On the Character of Nations 174 D. On the Character of Races 182 E. On the Character of the Species 182 Description of the Character of the Human Species 190 NOTES 195 INDEX 209

7 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION In a footnote to the Preface of his A nthropology Kant gives, if not altogether accurately, the historical background for the publication of this work. The A nthropology is, in effect, his manual for a course of lectures which he gave "for some thirty years," in the winter semesters at the University of Konigsberg. In 1797, when old age forced him to discontinue the course and he felt that his manual would not compete with the lectures themselves, he decided to let the work be published (Ak. VII, 354, 356). The reader will readily see why these lectures were, as Kant says, popular ones, attended by people from other walks of life. In both content and style the Anthropology is far removed from the rigors of the Critiques. Yet the Anthropology presents its own special problems. The student of Kant who struggles through the Critique of Pure Reason is undoubtedly left in some perplexity regarding specific points in it, but he is quite clear as to what Kant is attempting to do in the work. On finishing the Anthropology he may well find himself in just the opposite situation. While its discussions of the functioning of man's various powers are, on the whole, quite lucid and even entertaining, the purpose of the work remains somewhat vague. The questions: what is pragmatic anthropology? what is its relation to Kant's more strictly philosophical works? have not been answered satisfactorily. A proper discussion of the relation between the A nthropology and Kant's critical works would require a book in itself. In this introduction, however, it may be possible at least to remove some of the ambiguity regarding Kant's conception of "pragmatic anthropology" and so to situate it within the context of his system. The Anthropology is generally referred to as Kant's work in empirical psychology, his attempt to catalogue the powers of the mind and to describe their functioning in some detail. Though this description needs

8 x TRANSLATO~S INTRODUCTION to be qualified, it can serve as a preliminary conception to introduce the distinction between rational and empirical psychology. Having followed Kant's argument that our theoretical study of the human mind cannot descend into the empirical without ceasing to be genuine science, we may be better able to judge why, in undertaking an empirical study of man, Kant chose to write anthropology - and, moreover, pragmatic anthropology - rather than empirical psychology. Although Kant refers repeatedly to anthropology as a "science," and even mentions the difficulties, in the way of accurate observation, involved in raising it to the rank of a science "in the formal sense," he seems to mean by this only that anthropology, under the guidance of philosophy, can achieve a certain systematic form. Within the over-all classification of the human faculties into those of cognition, feeling and appetite, the anthropologist can assume, for example, the structure of knowledge established in the Critique of Pure Reason, which defined the role of the various cognitive powers and their relation to one another in experience. Hence he has a general schema - a complete list of headings, as Kant puts it - into which he can fit his more detailed divisions of the human powers and his observations of the ways men use and misuse them. More precisely, Kant sees anthropology as a collective undertaking, with philosophy providing the ground plan that draws together the work of the various anthropologists into a systematic whole. But anthropological knowledge consists in generalizations from facts established by observation of men's behaviour; and a collection of such facts and generalizations does not become a science in the strict sense merely because they are arranged in a certain systematic order. In order to enter upon "the sure path of a science," such a body of knowledge would need a "rational part" or "metaphysical first principles" which would provide an a priori basis, and hence apodictic certitude, for its empirically learned laws. And Kant maintains that in our knowledge of the human mind, as distinguished from bodies, we have no adequate basis for a pure or rational part of psychology that would enable its empirical part to become a genuine science. In order to clarify this point, we must go back to Kant's discussion of the relation between the pure and the empirical parts of a science. * In both theoretical and practical knowledge, Kant distinguishes between empirical knowledge and the metaphysical principles of know- The principal source for the following discussion is Kant's Metaphysische Anjangsgrande der Naturwissenschaft, Preface (Ak. IV, 467 ff.). For a detailed discussion of this distinction with reference to moral philosophy, cf. my Laws of Freedom, pp

9 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XI ledge and, within the latter, between two kinds of metaphysics. With regard to the metaphysics of nature, where the distinction is developed more explicitly, we have on the one hand its "transcendental part" and, on the other, the metaphysics of corporeal and of thinking nature. The essential difference between the two is that the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, whose framework is elaborated in the Critique 0/ Pure Reason, deals with the a priori intuitions, concepts and principles which are the conditions of possible experience as such and, accordingly, has no special reference to the determinate kinds of natural objects that may be given to the senses. The metaphysics of corporeal and thinking nature, on the other hand, seeks to determine what can be known a priori regarding certain types of objects - body and mind - that are given to the senses. From this it follows that the transcendental part of metaphysics is "pure" knowledge in the stricter sense of the term: in other words, the elements of knowledge it contains are independent of sense experience regarding both their content and the connection asserted between them; for their content is derived by reflection upon the activity of the mind itself, not from sense experience, and the connection is made by reason independently of sense experience. The metaphysics of corporeal and thinking nature, however, must admit such empirical knowledge as is necessary to give us the concept of an object of outer sense or of inner sense in general, i.e. the empirical concept of body or of mind. So it is pure knowledge only in the wider sense of the term: its central concept - matter, in the case of corporeal nature - is derived from sense experience, but it asserts only those laws of matter which can be enunciated without further recourse to experience. By virtue of this, it is the "pure" or "rational" part of physics, as distinguished from empirical physics, the laws of which must be learned by observation and experiment. Now, Kant argues, an empirically learned body of knowledge can become a science in the strict sense only insofar as there is a pure or rational body of knowledge corresponding to its object. As we have seen, the mere presence of empirical elements in cognition does not militate against its apodictic certitude, which is the mark of genuine science. It is not the origin of the concepts themselves but rather the sort of connection asserted between them that is relevant. To the extent that an a priori connection can be demonstrated between empirically learned concepts, such statements are laws in the strict sense of the term, principles characterized by true universality and necessity. The concepts so connected may be derived from experience. The connection

10 XII TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION itself may be learned from controlled observation and experiment. The crucial question is whether the connection can be demonstrated a priori. With regard to Newtonian mechanics, the Metaphysical First Principles ot Natural Science is, itself, Kant's affirmative reply. A rational part of physics can be constructed. Hence the empirical part of physics constitutes a genuine science. However, it is Kant's reply to the question regarding the rational part of psychology that concerns us here. In the first Critique Kant established that nothing can be done, toward a science of rational psychology, with the purely formal unity of the "I" as subject of consciousness (A 343). Since the "I" is without content, it provides no basis for such a science, and "nothing is left for us but to study our soul under the guidance of experience" (A 382). The question, in the Metaphysical First Principles ot Natural Science, is whether this empirical study of the soul can ever become a genuine science, corresponding to empirical physics. And Kant's reply is, in short, that since there cannot be a pure or rational part of psychology - that is, metaphysical first principles of thinking nature - the empirical study of the soul cannot become a genuine science. If we are dealing with objects as determinate natural things "which can be given (as existing) outside of thought," mere concepts are not enough (M.A.d.N., Ak. IV, 470). From concepts we can establish only logical possibility, i.e. we can show only that the concept is not selfcontradictory. Because of the passive element in human knowledge, sensibility, we can know objects as existing outside of thought only if they are given in intuition. And in order to have a priori knowledge of existing objects, we must be able to construct the concept corresponding to the object, i.e. to exhibit that concept in pure intuition. Since the construction of concepts is the work of mathematics, it follows that "in any particular doctrine of nature only as much genuine science is to be found as there is mathematics in it" (ibid., 470). Since bodies are given to sensibility under the form of space, there is a pure part of physics, and empirical physics is a science. But appearances of inner sense are in the form of time alone, and time, unlike space, cannot yield sufficient material for construction of a pure part of psychology. Time, most notably, has only one dimension; and even to speak of time as having one dimension is to think of it by analogy with space (ibid., 47I; K.d.r. V. B So). Accordingly, Kant concludes, empirical psychology cannot become a genuine science. In the case of practical or moral philosophy, it may be noted, the

11 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XIII situation is quite different. Here, Kant suggests, we do have both a transcendental part of metaphysics, i.e. a study of the supreme principle of morality as a law for rational beings as such, and a part analogous to the metaphysical first principles of corporeal nature, which applies this principle to a limited amount of empirical knowledge, to "men considered merely as men," without reference to the contingent circumstances in which men may find themselves (Meta physik der Sitten, Ak. VI, 205, 468). But at this point the analogy breaks down. There can be no empirical part of ethics corresponding to empirical physics. While the laws of empirical physics must be grounded in the a priori principles of rational physics, the physicist learns these laws from experience. On the other hand, no moral rule - no matter how much empirical knowledge it contains - can be learned from experience: because the thought of duty must be the motive in moral action, any moral principle must be, to this extent, a conscious application of the supreme principle of morality. While the philosopher supplies a metaphysics of nature for the physicist, every man, as a moral being, has a metaphysic of morals in himself. Instead of an empirical part of ethics, Kant speaks of moral anthropology, which seems to be a theoretical study of man with reference to the factors in him that help or hinder the development of morality (ibid., 2I7). Below the level of transcendental philosophy, then, there is no genuine science of the mind, but only empirical psychology on the one hand and, on the other, anthropology, which can be studied from either a moral, a pragmatic, or a physiological point of view. Why Kant chose the last of these for his empirical study of man must remain, to some extent, a matter of speculation. But the text of the Anthropology provides clues as to why he rejected empirical psychology and physiological anthropology. In Kant's terminology, there is a distinction between psychology and anthropology. The anthropologist prescinds from the question of whether man has a soul "in the sense ot a separate, incorporeal substance"; the psychologist believes that he perceives a soul within himself and studies his inner experience as states of this separate substance (Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Ak. VII, I6I). This is, indeed, a startling description of empirical psychology; but two considerations help to explain it. First, Kant remarks, earlier in the Anthropology (142), that "people who study the soul" usually confuse inner sense with pure apperception. In other words, by confusing the pure self-consciousness which is the merely formal condition of experi-

12 XIV TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ence with our empirical consciousness of our states of mind, they regard the empty and formal "I think" as an object of inner experience, a thinking substance. Kant's description of psychology, in other words, is a statement of what psychologists actually do, rather than what they ought to do. Secondly, as a statement in the Collegentwurfe shows (Ak., XV (2), SOl), he wants to distinguish pragmatic anthropology from both psychology, which traces mental phenomena to a principle other than the body (a "soul"), and physiology, which traces them to the brain. Pragmatic anthropology does not try to "explain" mental events and human behaviour generally by tracing them to their source in a principle or substance, whether corporeal or incorporeal. The procedure of the psychologist is illegitimate; that of the physiologist is legitimate, but of very limited value - we shall have to return to this point shortly. Granting, however, that the psychologists of Kant's day were confused, Kant could have reformed the study of empirical psychology, as he did not hesitate to reform metaphysics and ethics. What, on Kant's principles, could empirical psychology legitimately do, and why did Kant not undertake such a study? In order to avoid the complexities of Kant's doctrine of inner sense, let us merely say that the psychologist could, at least, study his own states of mind, the appearances of inner sense, and work toward a set of generalizations regarding their sequence. Kant's objections to empirical psychology would then center on the method of introspection it involves. In a study of this kind there is an unduly wide field for error. For appearances of inner sense, being in the form of time alone and so in flux, do not have the permanence that is required for accurate observation. Moreover, this preoccupation with his inner experience can endanger the psychologist's mental health, since he can easily come to regard the inventions of his imagination as either appearances originating in outer sense or even, given a certain bent of mind, inspirations from a supernatural source (Anthr., Ak. VII, 133, 160) - not to mention the psychologist's temptation to experiment with his own mind, in order better to understand abnormal states (ibid., 216). The only remedy - or, we might add, preventive - for this withdrawal into inner experience is to turn one's attention outward, to objects of outer sense. If we are to undertake an empirical study of the mind, it should take the form of anthropology, which is oriented to "the world," the behaviour of men in society. It is true that, in order to interpret the behaviour of others, we must begin by studying our own mental processes: these are the only mental activities of which we have, so to

13 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION xv speak, an inside view. But there is a profound difference between a morbid preoccupation with our inner experience and a study of the use we can make of our own powers and of other men. Given Kant's distrust of psychology, it is clear that his empirical study of men would take the form of anthropology. And, within anthropology, Kant was in a sense not free to study "physiological anthropology." Such a study would examine the causal influence of changes in the body - especially the brain cells - on the functioning of man's powers and on his behaviour generally. As examples, Kant mentions Descartes' theory of material ideas and the efforts of forensic medicine to account for certain kinds of criminal behaviour. But the study of physiology is in its infancy and, as Kant puts it, we simply do not know enough about the brain to explain human activity in terms of events in the brain cells (ibid., IIg). Moreover - and this, I take it, is a separate point - we do not understand how to use physiological knowledge for our purposes. Even if we had a far greater knowledge of physiology than is the case, we would still remain mere "spectators," watching and, perhaps, understanding the play of our ideas, feelings, etc. We would, in short, be adopting the spectator's, the outsider's view of both knowledge and action, and so missing the essential point of them both. In discussing freedom as the necessary presupposition of moral action, Kant makes his well-known distinction between the observer's and the agent's view of human action, a distinction which, although it refers specifically to freedom in the sense of moral autonomy, is to some extent applicable to the relative freedom that characterizes human action as such. Observing our own or other people's actions as physical events, we regard the subject as passively affected by his sensibility, as a member of the sensible world. As conscious of our own spontaneity, we regard ourselves, by virtue of the pure activity of our practical reason, as the authors of our own actions, as members of the intelligible world (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik del' Sitten, Ak. IV, 45off.). When we descend to the relative freedom that can be discussed outside the context of moral philosophy, the metaphysical significance of Kant's distinction between these two standpoints disappears. But a difference of standpoint remains, which is the difference between the viewpoint of the physiologist and that of the practical anthropologist. While a mere spectator would view another person's action as a causal sequence between two events, in terms of stimulus and response, the agent regards himself as free, that is, as acting on a maxim or subjective prin-

14 XVI TRANSLATO~S INTRODUCTION ciple of action in which he generalizes both the incentive and the action and, to use Paton's term, wills the action as an instance of a concept. If we do not adopt the spectator's view of other people's actions, it is because of our inside knowledge of our own actions. Less familiar, perhaps, is Kant's parallel argument regarding the nature of thought. In the Groundwork, he introduces the autonomy of practical reason by considering the autonomy of theoretical reason, its freedom to act in accordance with the principles of its own functioning (ibid., 448). Though we cannot observe other people's thinking processes as we can observe their behaviour, here too we can distinguish between the spectator's viewpoint, according to which one mental event would follow upon another (as in the empirical association of ideas), and the point of view of the thinker, in which a mental event which is the affirmation of a conclusion follows from insight into the meaning and connection of the premises. The Anthropology seems to echo this point, when Kant notes that the power of abstraction shows that the mind is autonomous, i.e. not determined to attend to the sequence of sense representations, no matter how strong they may be (Ak. VII, 131). Physiological anthropology might, indeed, be of some use to society if our knowledge of physiology were more highly developed. If, for example, we could explain a criminal's behaviour by changes in his brain cells, we would know that he needs medical attention and not punishment. But in such a case we would be asserting, in effect, that the crime was not really a human action (ibid., ). In any case, physiological anthropology would fail to attract Kant's interest, since it would prescind from what he considers the essential character of human thought and action. * Physiological anthropology could legitimately deal with man only in his passive aspect, as the "plaything" of his senses and imagination, e.g. with the way he is affected by ideas of which he is not directly conscious (ibid., 136). If it tries to go beyond this, it misses what is distinctive about man as a rational being. Kant's choice, then, was one between pragmatic anthropology and moral anthropology, i.e. between a study of men with a view to formulating rules about how they can use one another for their purposes, and a study of men directed to rules about the way they can use their natural powers and dispositions to make the practice of morality easier and more effective. Both of these, it should be noted, are empirical The same objection would, I think, apply to what we now call behavioural psychology, which would avoid the dangers of introspection only at the expense of giving an essentially irrelevant account of hllman behaviour.

15 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XVII theoretical knowledge of men which, assuming that we have certain ends (pragmatic or moral ones), provide us with material for formulating rules to achieve these ends. Perhaps a formal treatise on moral anthropology would have raised such far reaching questions about the relation of the sensible and intelligible worlds that it could never be treated in popular lectures. In any case, the work we have is pragmatic anthropology, and we must now try to clarify the meaning of this term. As soon as we raise the question of the nature and purpose of pragmatic anthropology, however, we find ourselves involved in a series of apparent inconsistencies. On the one hand, Kant maintains that whereas physiological anthropology studies "what nature makes of man," pragmatic anthropology studies "what man as a free agent makes, or can and should make, of himself" (ibid., II9). Apart from one lapse, which seems to be mere carelessness, he consistently maintains this distinction. In his works on moral philosophy, however, he distinguished between moral philosophy, which prescribes what man ought to do, and anthropology, which is experiential knowledge, a "doctrine of nature," and studies men as they actually are (Gr., Ak. IV, 388-9; M.d.S., Ak. VI, 385, 405-6). Now if empirical knowledge of men can yield only a general description of men's tendencies to behave in certain ways, how can pragmatic anthropology study man as a free agent and determine what he should make of himself? Within the Anthropology, the notion of what man can and should make 01 himself develops along with the meaning of the term "pragmatic." In this respect the first part of the Anthropology, the Didactic, takes on its full significance only in the light of the concluding section of the Characterization, which attempts to "characterize" the human species. But some general considerations will help to reconcile, provisionally, the apparent inconsistencies we noted above. First, anthropology is, as Kant's ethical writings state, experiential knowledge of general tendencies in human thought and action, psychological observations about human behaviour (using "psychological" in a non-kantian sense). As such, it is a study of men as they are, of the ways in which they tend to "use and misuse" their powers. But even to speak of "misusing" our powers implies the idea of a norm from which we are deviating: to say, for example, that the most serious fault of imagination is "lawlessness" implies that, in the proper order of things, imagination mediates between sense and understanding and is subject to the laws of understanding. And the principle at work here extends through the discussion of feeling and appetite, as well as cognition. This

16 XVIII TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION detennination of the nonn is one of the most significant ways in which philosophy can be said to direct the anthropologist's work. In determining the fonnal structure of knowledge, theoretical philosophy indicates the proper relations of the cognitive powers to one another, just as practical philosophy, reflecting on the nature of reason insofar as it determines action, indicates the due relation of desire and reason. To apply any such nonn to man's use of his powers, however, is already to regard man as, in some sense, a free being. In the MetaPhysic 0/ Morals, discussing man's duty of adopting his natural perfection as an end, Kant points out that man, "as a being who is able to set ends for himself... is indebted for the use of his powers not merely to natural instinct but rather to the freedom" by which he determines what the scope of his powers should be (Ak. VI, 441). In man, both the higher cognitive powers and the appetites are, to some extent, released from the mechanical rule of their functioning which characterizes lower animals, and their proper ordering becomes a task, an end to be achieved, rather than a given fact. In short, the Anthropology is a collection of empirical rules about the way men behave. But to the extent that it considers certain ways of using our powers as, in some sense, good, it regards us as, in some sense, rational and hence free beings, and indicates what we can and should make of ourselves. To specify in what sense pragmatic anthropology regards man as free we must define the term "pragmatic." Unfortunately, Kant uses "pragmatic" in several different senses, and we cannot understand what he is doing in the Anthropology without both distinguishing and relating them. The most familiar sense of "pragmatic" is, perhaps, the one used in the Groundwork, where Kant distinguishes between three types of objective practical principles: the technical, the pragmatic or prudential, and the practical or moral. Objective practical principles in general are principles of practical reason on which a rational agent would necessarily act if his reason were in control of his inclinations, and on which an imperfectly rational agent, whose inclinations may be at variance with his reason, ought to act. For him, these objective practical principles are imperatives. The essential difference among imperatives is that between moral or categorical imperatives, which prescribe certain actions as unconditionally necessary, and hypothetical imperatives, which prescribe certain actions as rationally necessary under the condition of our having certain ends to which the actions in question are the rational means. The difference between an imperative of skill or

17 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XIX a technical imperative and an imperative of prudence or a pragmatic imperative is, according to this text, that the former prescribes the means to an arbitrary end, while the latter prescribes the means to an end which all men have, i.e. happiness (Gr., Ak. IV, 414ff.). Elsewhere, including the Anthropology, Kant regards reason in its prudential function as determining not only the means to happiness but the composition or content of the end itself: that is, determining which of the individual's desires can be satisfied in an integral whole (Gr., Ak. IV, 405; Anthr., Ak. VII, 266). In the Anthropology, however, "pragmatic" generally refers, more narrowly, to skill in using other men for one's own purposes. Nor is this merely a matter of Kant's offering, as he sometimes does, a formal definition which he subsequently ignores. On the contrary, the discussion is often directed specifically to the "pragmatic" use we can make of anthropological observations. To appreciate this point, we need only compare Kant's ethical treatment of the passions as abridgements of inner freedom with his pragmatic discussion of the way one can manipulate a man dominated by a passion and, by playing on it, use him for one's own purposes (ibid., 271ff.). In terms of the Groundwork's classification of principles, the Anthropology seems intended to provide us with such knowledge of men as will enable us to formulate technical rules for using them. If the Anthropology is not a study of man in the abstract but of "the world," it will regard men, not as using things in general, but as using each other for their purposes. As for the end at which men's actions aim, a footnote in the Groundwork connects its use of "pragmatic" with the Anthropology's. There Kant points out that the term "prudence" [Klugheit] has two meanings: "worldly wisdom" [Weltklugheit], which refers to a man's skill in influencing others in order to use them for his own ends, and "personal wisdom" [Privatklugheit], which is sagacity in combining all these ends to his own lasting advantage. The value of worldly wisdom is located in private wisdom; and if a man has worldly wisdom without private wisdom, it would be better to call him clever and astute, but on the whole imprudent. (Gr., Ak. IV, 416n.). In more general terms, when a principle of skill comes into conflict with the principle of prudence, prudence over-rides skill; but when there is no conflict between the two, principles of skill are taken up into prudence: insofar as he is rational, a man will use the most effective means toward promoting these goals that are integral to his own happiness.

18 xx TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION If we insist on distinguishing skill and prudence in terms of the Groundwork's classification of principles, pragmatic anthropology seems to be empirical knowledge of men collected with a view to the principles of skill we should adopt in using other men for whatever purposes we may have. Every science, Kant notes, has a "practical part" which, assuming that we may have certain ends, lays down imperatives by which we are to reach them (ibid., 415). Pragmatic anthropology would then regard man as a free being in the sense of a being who can set ends or act on maxims (these are merely different ways of saying the same thing), and consider what he can and should make of himself as a being capable of using other men effectively in pursuit of his ends. It would, presumably, have as its background the "pragmatic" view of man in the wider sense of prudential, assuming that his purposes are consistent with his own lasting advantage. In this way the Anthropology could, perhaps, be made verbally consistent with the Groundwork. But within the context of the Anthropology it would, I think, be a mistake to make too much of this distinction between skill and prudence. Kant himself seems quite casual about maintaining it. At one point, for example, he refers to skill as a man's "dexterity in achieving whatever ends he has chosen," and to prudence as "using other men for his purposes" (Anthr., Ak. VII, 201). Again, he refers rather vaguely to the integral satisfaction of one's inclinations as a matter of the "sensuously practical" (ibid., 267); the opposite of this, i.e. the satisfaction of one inclination at the expense of all the others, is "pragmatically ruinous." In another text, principles of skill and prudence are lumped together under the term "pragmatic" (ibid., 235); at one point, it is by prudence that one "can manipulate fools" (ibid., 271). Again, man's "technical predisposition" stresses his ability to handle things, physically, in any number of ways (ibid., 322). One gets the impression that in describing the aim of pragmatic anthropology as an indication of the ways one can use other men for one's purposes, Kant is not overly concerned with precisely what these purposes may be. His emphasis is, rather, on the fact that we are considering man as a citizen of the world, as interacting with other men and hence "using" them in the way a rational being uses anything, that is, as means to the ends he has himself adopted. This impression is confirmed when, in Kant's final characterization of man in terms of his whole species, the Anthropology opens out into a prospect that makes man's conscious aims of secondary importance. This emphasis on man as a being who interacts with other men in

19 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION XXI pursuit of his ends brings us to the Anthropology's characteristic use of "pragmatic," one aspect of which was foreshadowed in the Metaphysic of Morals. There, it will be recalled, Kant discussed man's imperfect duty to himself "from a pragmatic point of view," that is, his duty to include among his ends the cultivation of his natural powers, especially his practical reason and the powers he can use in achieving the ends he sets by it. The ground of this duty is not prudential considerations: Kant leaves open the question of whether Rousseau was right in maintaining that man is better off, in this respect, in his crude natural state. It is, rather, the fact that man is a being capable of setting ends that establishes his duty of "making himself a useful member of the world" (M.d.S., Ak. VI, 444ff.). This use of "pragmatic" is, in one respect, close to that of the Anthropology, in that it stresses man's liberation from nature by the cultivation of the arts and sciences, that is, by culture. For reasons which will become clear later on, the Anthropology emphasizes, rather, man's liberation from nature through the discipline of his inclinations required for life in society. Having first defined man's "pragmatic predisposition" as man's predisposition "for using other men skilfully for his purposes," Kant goes on to describe it as man's predisposition to become civilized through culture, "especially the cultivation of social qualities," and, in social relations, to leave the crude state of his nature, where private force prevails, and become "a well-bred (if not yet moral) being destined for concord" (A nthr., Ak. VII, 324). In both cases, though with a significant difference, "pragmatic" refers to the cultivation of the natural powers and tendencies found in man: first, his power to set ends and act effectively in pursuit of them and, secondly, his tendency to become a civilized member of civil society. The fact that Kant regards this sense of "pragmatic" as merely an elaboration of man's predisposition to use other men skilfully for his purposes forces us to reconsider the significance of the latter phrase. I suggested earlier that in the Anthropology Kant is not particularly concerned to specify exactly what the purposes envisaged in pragmatic principles may be. The reason for this is, I think, indicated in his summary characterization:of the human species in terms of its technical, pragmatic, and moral predispositions: The sum total of what pragmatic anthropology has to say about man's destiny and the character of his development is this: man is destined by his reason to live in a society with men and in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to make himself moral by the arts and sciences. (ibid., )

20 XXII TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION Pragmatic anthropology studies "the world," man in a state which is a step in his development from animal rationabile to animal rationale. Although the anthropologist cannot prescribe what man ought to make of himself in moral terms - that is the work of moral philosophy - neither can he ignore what we know of man from moral philosophy: namely, that he has within him the power of pure practical reason and is, accordingly, his own final end. To ignore this predisposition would be to present a false view of man. Pragmatic anthropology, as I noted earlier, works under the guidance of philosophy; and in the present context the most relevant branch of philosophy is philosophy of history, which searches out the value of history, and which Kant proceeds to summarize in concluding the Anthropology. * Briefly, and in an over-simplified form,** Kant views history as the account of what nature does to prepare the human race for its final end. This end, the realization of moral autonomy, is something that each individual can achieve only by himself, in complete independence from nature. But, taking the human race collectively, nature can and does impel man toward a state in which he is ready to realize his capacity and predisposition for freedom and, ultimately, for moral freedom. For the state of civil society which man's "unsocial sociability" impels him to enter provides the framework within which the "seed of good" inherent in him can develop. The materials nature has to work with are man's natural instincts, by virtue of which he is both social and anti-social, and his capacity for rational action. Man is by his nature a being who needs and wants to live in peace with his fellow men and yet, because of his natural desire for unrestricted freedom, cannot avoid coming into conflict with them. But he is also, as Kant puts it, "resourceful"; and so, to escape from this intolerable state of conflict, he concludes with his fellow men an agreement to renounce the private use of force and live in a state where each man's exercise of freedom is limited, by the authority of a governing body, to conditions under which it is compatible with the freedom of other men. But a similar situation exists among nations, which continue to make war on one another until, for their own preservation, they are compelled to renounce the use of force and form an international society which will bring about "perpetual peace." The main sources for Kant's philosophy of history, apart from the Anthropology itself, are indicated in my notes to the text, note I to page 3. Particularly relevant to the content of the A ntkropology is Kant's emphasis on nature's way of counteracting man's tendency to passive enjoyment and spurring him to the activity that is necessary if he is to realize his capacity for freedom.

21 TRANSLATOR~ INTRODUCTION XXIII In all this, "nature's purpose" is to be distinguished from the conscious purposes of men. In forming a civil society or an international society, and in the conflict that leads to this, men are seeking their own security and their advantage in terms of well being, whereas nature is aiming at the development of their capacity for rational action. It is, in other words, aiming at their freedom. But man's freedom, as we have seen, is not necessarily moral freedom. The setting of any end whatsoever, "of an arbitrary end in general" - or, to put it differently, action on a maxim - is a work of freedom, not a mechanism of nature, as is natural instinct. On the one hand, this sort of freedom raises man above the level of nature; on the other hand, man here remains, ultimately, within the realm of nature, because the basis on which he adopts his ends is inclination. Within this relative freedom, however, we can distinguish two aspects. The Metaphysic of Morals stresses one aspect: man's ability to rise above the level of instinct and act in pursuit of ends. This it can do because, as moral philosophy, it can prescribe obligatory ends to man - his own natural and moral perfection and the happiness of other men. But if we abstract from what moral philosophy enjoins, this liberation from instinct is dangerous both to himself and to his fellow men. By it man is free not only to pervert his instincts that lead to his selfpreservation and the preservation of the species, but to expand his desires ad infinitum. Given the additional consideration that in a state of culture man's desires and passions are raised to their highest pitch, the result of this aspect of man's freedom, taken in isolation, is a "splendid misery" (Kritik der Urteilskraft, Ak. V, 43Iff.). The Anthropology, accordingly, stresses the other aspect of freedom involved in civil society, the development of man's tendency to become a well-bred member of society who can live peacefully with his fellow men. * In civil society the individual can no longer resort to private force to achieve his ends. He must rather use skill in his dealings with other men and influence them to help him achieve his ends. And this means, essentially, that he must cultivate the social qualities that will make other men like and admire him. This is the consideration that seems to provide the ultimate link between Kant's earlier use of "pragmatic" in the sense of skill in using other men for one's purposes and his reference to man's "pragmatic" predisposition to become a well bred member of * Both aspects of this freedom are discussed in their relation to each other in the Appendix to the Critique of Judgment.

22 XXIV TRANSLATOR~ INTRODUCTION society. A pragmatic view of the world, then, stresses the aspect of man's social freedom that consists in the discipline of his inclinations which is essential to refined social intercourse. So, for example, the anthropologist finds woman a more interesting study than man: being physically weaker, she must rely on persuasiveness to achieve her ends, the "pragmatic consequence" of which is that woman must "discipline herself" in practical matters (Anthr., Ak. VII, 303ff.). But nature's purpose in making woman as she is - and it is only in civil society that woman's nature reveals itself - is not only the preservation of the human species but its refinement through the development of social qualities (ibid., 306). While this sort of refinement implies discipline of the inclinations, it is not yet moral freedom. Man can discipline his immediate inclinations with a view to persuading others to co-operate toward whatever ends he may have, whether these are arbitrary ends or his own happiness. But in nature's scheme of things, this process of rising above his "crude" nature by becoming both cultured and civilized is a step toward moral freedom. We have noted that man is by nature both social and anti-social. The social aspect of his nature takes the form of a natural desire to be loved and respected by others and, when his anti-social demand for unlimited freedom is limited by law, this desire expresses itself in his development of social qualities. In Kant's "anthropological characterization" of nations, England and France, "the two most civilized nations on earth," appear as the respective embodiments of this twofold desire. The French have developed the qualities that make them amiable: their natural taste for conversation influences them to be obliging and kind to others and must lead them to become "gradually, generally humanitarian according to principles" (ibid., 313). The English, on the other hand, waive any claim to be loved and want only respect. To this end the Englishman strives to compensate for his natural lack of a national character by "making a character for himself," i.e. by developing qualities of firmness and resolution in holding to whatever principles he has adopted. This is not yet moral character: as the Frenchman is, basically, trying to satisfy his need for communication, so the Englishman is trying to make himself a man of consequence (ibid., 314). But he has a semblance of moral character and an attitude that is conducive to it (ibid., 293). As Kant notes, we first develop a character, then good character (Ak., XV (2), 514). The points of interest here are, first, that Kant regards both the amiability of the French and the resoluteness of the English as resulting from their

23 TRANSLATO~S INTRODUCTION xxv respective cultures (Anthr., Ak. VII, 315), and that both these qualities, though not moral in themselves, are conducive to morality. In the Metaphysic of Morals, after discussing our duties of persuing our natural and moral perfection and our duties of love and respect toward others, Kant concludes by considering the "duties of social intercourse," of cultivating such qualities as sociability, hospitality, courtesy, affability, by which, instead of isolating ourselves in the morality we have attained, we take it into society and, by "associating virtue with the graces," bring virtue into fashion (M.d.S., Ak. VI, 473-4). Here we are, so to speak, working down from the individual's moral principles to his external social conduct. The same theme is prominent in the Anthropology; but there we are working up from the natural development of the human race to its final end in morality. The problem of how this is to be brought about is full of difficulties, and at times Kant seems even to doubt the relevance to morality of the sort of freedom man acquires through culture and civilization (d. Zum ewigen Frieden, Ak. VIII, 355, 366). On the whole, however, his pragmatic anthropology views man in his social relationships against the background of society conceived as a state in which man develops the freedom that is preparatory to moral freedom. It is unfortunate that Kant did not see fit to develop this concept of pragmatic anthropology more explicitly before the concluding pages of his work. Perhaps he expected his readers to gather all this from the first paragraph of his Preface, which does in fact situate the work within the context of his philosophy of history. But unless the reader is exceptionally acute, he is likely to overlook the full significance of Kant's opening statement, take the Anthropology as a study of men leading to "pragmatic" rules in the familiar sense of the term, and be left with the feeling that he has somehow missed the point of what Kant is doing. The notion of "pragmatic" rules does not readily unite with the Anthropology's!avowed purpose of studying what man can and should make of himself. I am well aware that this introduction raises more problems than it solves. But if it serves to orient the reader in "pragmatic anthropology," it will have served its purpose.

24 NOTE Two editions of the Anthropology were published during Kant's lifetime: the first edition of 17g8 and the second edition of The Berlin Academy edition, which I have used in this translation, is the second, amended edition, which, on the whole, differs from the first only in minor points of exposition. Where the second edition differs from Kant's manuscripts or from the first edition, the Academy edition cites the variants, which I have used in the few instances where they seem to expand or clarify the text. Any material so inserted is indicated by brackets, along with a footnote stating its source. The Academy edition also gives such of Kant's marginal notes as are legible, and these have occasionally proved helpful in interpreting the sense of the text. The marginal numbers in my translation are to the pages of the Academy edition, volume VII. Volume XV of the Academy edition, which comprises two volumes (cited as XV (I) or (2)), contains Kant's Nachlass on anthropology, which the editors have arranged according to the chapter headings of the Anthropology. It also contains two outlines for Kant's course of lectures in anthropology, one for the years , and one for go. Although this material adds little to the published text - which, in case of discrepancy, naturally has greater authority - it is sometimes useful to the translator insofar as it occasionally gives a synonym or a Latin equivalent for an ambiguous word or phrase. Moreover, it helps to account for the ambiguity of certain terms, and warns the translator against a mechanical translation of them. In the Anthropology's classification of mental illnesses, for example, Wahnsinn appears as one of the four types of mental derangement; yet the term is also used in such a way as to seem equivalent to mental derangement. The N achlass reveal that, in one of Kant's experimental classifications, he equated Wahnsinn with Verruckung, and this points to a generic as well as a specific use of the term.