# 1/9. The First Analogy

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1 1/9 The First Analogy So far we have looked at the mathematical principles but now we are going to turn to the dynamical principles, of which there are two sorts, the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought. Of these two kinds of dynamical principles the Analogies receive by far the greater degree of Kant s attention and have provoked the most intense responses in the secondary literature. We are going to begin looking at them by detailing the nature of the dynamical principles on Kant s view, the reasons he characterises these principles as regulative rather than constitutive, the general principle of all the analogies and, finally, the specific treatment he gives of the principle of the First Analogy. Just prior to his treatment of the principle of the Axioms of Intuition Kant indicated some contrasts between the mathematical and the dynamical principles. The dynamical principles were there stated to be concerned in some way with the existence of appearances and, whilst indicated to possess the character of a priori necessity had the sense of this restricted to that the condition of empirical thought in some experience (A160/B200). The synthesis at work in the dynamical principles was also indicated in a second edition footnote to be different from that in the mathematical principles. The synthesis of the dynamical principles involves a combination whose elements we were there told necessarily belong together with the examples given of causes and effects and substances and accidents. The two elements of the dynamical synthesis are heterogeneous with each other but is not, like

2 2/9 that of the mathematical elements, arbitrary, as it concerns, in some sense, the existence conditions of what is combined. When Kant turns to accounting for the general principle of all the analogies some of these characterisations are returned to and expanded upon. So Kant again refers to the dynamical principles as concerned the existence of appearances indicating that what these principles will tell us concerns the relation of appearances to each other in respect of their existence. The principles of mathematics involve a procedure of construction whereby intuition is determined but there is no process whereby existence itself can be constructed and because of this the dynamical principles concern only relations between what exists. This restriction of their scope to the relations between existents is what leads Kant to term the dynamical principles regulative as opposed to the constitutive principles we were dealing with in mathematics. To illustrate the difference between the mathematical and dynamical principles Kant utilises an example from perceptual experience. Perceptions stand in relation to each other in a general sense. If we are having a perception we relate this perception to others that preceded it and still others that will come subsequent to it. This general procedure we adopt with regard to perceptions involves no determinate sense of either what the previous perceptions were of or what type of magnitude they may have involved but despite this indeterminancy we still assert a general necessity of sequence in perceptions. This point is used by Kant to make clear both

3 3/9 why he terms the principles we are now going to treat analogies and what the philosophical import of an analogy is: In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulas which express the equality of two quantitative relations, and are always constitutive; so that if three members of the proportion are given, the fourth is likewise given, that is, can be constructed. But in philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two quantitative relations; and from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a fourth, not the fourth member itself. The relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected. An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception. (A179-80/B222) The difference then, is, that with mathematics we are able once we have established a relation between certain proportions to determine the nature of what will follow. We cannot do this in philosophy but we can arrive at a rule by means of which it will become possible to search for what will come next even though what it specifically is will not arise from this given rule. Regulative principles have a different kind of evidence from mathematical ones though both are certain due to the ability of mathematical principles to determine the structure of intuition. We can now turn to the discussion of the general principle underlying all of the analogies. This is given slightly differently in the two editions of the Critique. In the first edition it is stated at A176-7 as follows: All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one time. This principle is clearly a priori in stating a universal condition of appearances. As we would expect given the general account we have uncovered of dynamical principles this one concerns a relation between the existences of

4 4/9 appearances such that they are governed by a priori rules that concern their temporal relation, temporality being expected given that the Analogies are, in general, schematizations of the category of relation. The principle of all the analogies is stated slightly differently in the second edition of the Critique where it becomes: Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions (B218). The focus has shifted from appearances to experience and in so shifting it Kant here indicates what will effectively be the result of the discussion of the analogies, namely, a determination of experience in his own sense, what Lewis White Beck termed Kantian or K experience. The second difference between the two versions of the principle is that a different criteria of the a priori is here used since the second edition version refers to necessity whilst the first edition version only referred to universality. Finally, the reference to existences is not explicitly stated in the second edition formula though it is surely assumed there. Instead of this we have in the second edition a clear reference to perceptions and although the importance of this reference was not included in the formula of the first edition it was understood in the argument there as it gave us the example by which we distinguished dynamical from mathematical principles. The general proof of the principle of all the analogies includes three new paragraphs in the second edition. Here Kant describes experience as a knowledge which determines an object through perceptions (B218). This determination of the object is referred to as involving, as we would expect from the argument of the Transcendental Deduction, synthetic unity which

5 5/9 unity is stated to contain the essential in any knowledge of objects of the senses (B218). Up until to this point Kant has been using experience in the sense that is specific to him but he subsequently refers to experience in the other sense, the sense that describes what was indicated by empiricists, what Lewis White Beck termed Lockean or L experience. In that kind of experience, perceptions come together only in accidental order (B219) so that no necessity is involved. This is what Kant generally terms apprehension or empirical intuition. Going back to his own portrayal of experience as involving knowledge of objects through perception Kant states that the relations involved in the manifold of intuition have to be represented, though not constructed, in time. At this point Kant adds the premise that we will see guides a great deal of his general treatment of the analogies which is that time itself cannot be perceived. Time itself is not given as a specific object of perception so that the temporal relation of perceptions requires to be given to us by means of concepts that a priori connect these perceptions to each other. These concepts will, naturally, be the categories, specifically, the categories of relation. There are three modes of time subsequently listed, duration, succession and coexistence and we should expect that these three modes will be related to the three categories of relation in the three analogies of experience (substance, causality and community). The general principle of the analogies has been indicated to rest upon the same necessary unity of apperception we saw to play a key role in the argument of the Transcendental Deduction. The first edition account of the general principle

6 6/9 effectively does not contain this general description of the proof of it merely listing, as we have already done, reasons for viewing the analogies as dynamical and regulative rather than mathematical and constructive so the second edition treatment here adds a new level to the discussion. Turning now to the principle of the First Analogy, the principle of this is altered between the two editions of the Critique. The first edition formulation is stated at A182: All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination that is, as a way in which the object exists. This formulation states a universal condition of appearances thus meeting one of the criteria of the a priori. In this formula we are given a distinction between that is which is permanent and that which is transitory and this distinction conforms to that between the object and the way in which the object is said to exist. From the formula alone we have, however, little clue how to understand the distinction that it invokes. The second edition formula, given at B224, is entitled the principle of the permanence of substance, a title that refers us back to the first edition formula. However the formula of the second edition is itself stated in a way that appears to involve new factors. This formula states: In all change of appearance substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. The second edition formula, like the first edition one, states a universal condition of appearances, thus meeting again one of the criteria of the a priori. The second edition formula is again like the first edition formula in describing a distinction between change and permanence and in invoking substance as that which is

7 7/9 permanent. However, the second edition formula adds a further element which was not present in the first edition, which is a conservation principle when it is stated that the total quantity of substance remains constant. In a sense this was implied by the first edition formula but it was not there stated and the first edition formula s reference to the object is absent from the second edition. The proof of the principle of the First Analogy includes a new paragraph in the second edition. Kant begins it by restating the general point that all appearances are in time and in it alone can succession or coexistence be represented. So it follows from this that the time in which succession and coexistence are represented has to be understood as unchanging. Since, as we have already noted, time itself cannot be perceived, then there has to be something that stands in for time in general in the objects of perception, something that, by contrast to change, can represent permanence. Substance is the general philosophical title given for this substratum of reality and what belongs to existence is a determination of substance. So the permanent that represents time would be that which is real in appearances and be unchangeable in existence, its quantity neither increasing nor diminishing. This general position is then followed by turning to the data of perception which involves the basic sense that there is change occurring. Empirical perception (or apprehension) would thus not itself enable us to arrive at the distinction between succession and coexistence as it would give no sense of duration. In order to distinguish succession and coexistence on

8 8/9 the basis of duration we require an underlying ground that exists permanently. Permanence is taken to a predicate that attaches above all to time in general since if time was affected by change we would require another time in which to represent this change. Further, we need permanence as a notion in order to be able to measure quantity as without it we would only have coming into and going out of existence as data and no magnitude would appear from this. All existence and all change in time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists. (A183/B227) What changes thus belongs to the determination of what continues as permanent. This is generally stated in philosophy as the proposition that substance remains whilst accidents change, a proposition that Kant indicates is a synthetic a priori one. As it is a synthetic a priori proposition it has to be proved by means of reference to the conditions of possibility of experience. That nothing can come from nothing is a consequence of the principle of permanence and is restated in connection with the general argument as involving the point that the unity of experience would not be possible if completely new substances could come into existence. This is impossible as it would render the identity of that which subsists variable in which case it would no longer be a representation of that which is permanent. What comes to be and what are only alterations of that which remains constant so that, in a sense, it is only the substance which suffers alteration, that is, alterations affect its mode of being.

9 9/9 For something to absolutely begin in existence there would have to have been a time when it was not. But how could this be understood except in reference to what is? So substances are what enable there be a determination of time as inclusive of duration and indicative further of the unity of time. So phenomenal substances are the grounds of possibility of the utilisation of temporal notions as they provide us with the sense of permanence necessary for the conception of duration but the fundamental character of them must itself remain further unknown as we can work only here by analogy, we cannot constitute the nature of the things in question as we could the conditions of intuition. This is what is meant by describing the principle concerning substance as regulative only.

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