The Friend of My Friend: Britain's Relationship with Iberia & Barbary

Transcription

1 The Friend of My Friend: Britain's Relationship with Iberia & Barbary Caitlin M Gale, DPhil Candidate, University of Oxford There has been considerable research into the relationship between Europeans and the North African region known as Barbary, and the Barbary corsairs, with scholars such as Ellen Friedman and Robert C Davis focusing on that relationship in terms of forced interactions captive Europeans the Corsairs held for ransom. However, those types of studies are part of a broader circle of interactions, one in which those relationships were not always hostile. During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the neutral region was in many ways a forgotten battleground where the British and French attempted to out-manoeuvre one another for diplomatic and economic benefit. Instead of being a hindrance or a distraction to the wider war, the North African Barbary states corsair institution, usually disregarded as mere piracy, was utilised by the British Government, and by extension the British Royal Navy, as a supplement to their military actions in the Mediterranean. This was accomplished in two main ways: as a supplier of victuals for British military forces in the Mediterranean and through the diplomatic channels provided by their treaties with the region upheld by British consuls. Likewise, the British assisted their allies in their negotiations with the region, especially catholic Iberia whose religious past and territorial holdings on the North African coast caused difficulties for Portugal and Spain. Britain s symbiotic relationship with Barbary, and the benefits of that relationship for British allies, reached new levels of importance when the war moved into Iberia with the start of the peninsular war. The resources and protection provided by the British-Barbary relationship was crucial to the success of the Anglo-Iberian allies during that conflict. Faculty of History University of Oxford George Street Oxford, OX1 2RL United Kingdom Oxford OX1 2RL

2 I d first like to thank the Department of the Arts and Humanities at the Brunel University for the bursary which made travelling to Portugal for a conference a month before submitting my dissertation seem like a good idea The Enemy of my enemy is my friend. But that does not mean the friend of my friend is necessarily my Friend as well. C.R. Pennell described the Strait of Gibraltar as either a barrier between Morocco and Spain, or a link. 1 Pennell quite neatly manages to argue both for and against a Braudelian conception of the Mediterranean; that the Mediterranean itself is a uniting factor. I personally favour Andrew Hess, for whom the Mediterranean, and particularly the narrow strait of Gibraltar, is a meeting point between two diverse civilisations. The Mediterranean acted as the liminal frontier boundary between the Spanish and the North African borders (both having at various times part of the other). Hess argues the grey, indistinct boundary between Catholic Iberia and Muslim North Africa was a frontier territory where distinct differences between identities are so important because the reality is that they are not so different in the first place. For Hess, it is not that he disagrees with the Braudelian view, but that the similarities among Mediterranean cultures made differences so important such as the development of opposing forms of corsairs carried out by both Christian Europeans and Muslim North Africans. Corsairs are not pirates. If anything, corsairs were closer to privateers, operating in a specific Mediterranean context. Both Christians and Muslims across the Mediterranean took part. The reality was the corsairs, and the states from which they 1 Pennell, Bandits at Sea, 56.

3 operated, had certain rules hat governed their actions. Furthermore, by Europe opening diplomatic relations and entering into treaties with those states directly conferred legal recognition on the corsair s actions. Europe itself legitimized Barbary s corsair warfare. For the Ottoman states, the corsairs were an extension of the gazi culture that had propelled the Turks forward in their conquest of Asia and Europe. Across North Africa, the corsairs were initially reconquering territory and later defending that territory from Spanish attacks and incursions. In Morocco, beyond Ottoman control, both the Sa diyan and Alawite dynasties based their legitimacy on their descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad and their ability to continue the jihad against Iberian incursions, especially against the Portuguese as they expanded in Western Africa and interfered with Moroccan control of the western Trans-Saharan Slave trade. Corsair attacks and raids, both Muslim and Christian, predated the sixteenth century, but with the coming of the Sa diyan dynasty in Morocco and extension of Ottoman power in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, corsair practice became an official part of the four North African states economy, society, and reputation. From the beginning, they placed themselves against the Spanish and Portuguese, especially after the expulsion of the Moriscos in the early 17 th century. In contrast, the English entered the Mediterranean rather late, in the 1580s.. By the early eighteenth century, Britain had reached diplomatic and trade agreements with all four Barbary states, established consuls there who effectively operated as ambassadors (equal in pay and duties), and the corsairs of North Africa no longer posed a threat to them. In truth, for all the seventeenth century had been the golden age of piracy, what Lemnouar Merouche called the century of the corsair, the eighteenth century was the century of trade. By establishing treaties of peace and

4 friendship with Barbary, France and Britain were able to protect their shipping from the corsairs, for a price (sometimes money more often military stores) and trade for necessary raw materials, most especially food. In turn, the corsairs were not at war with those maritime powers but able to carry on their economic predation at the expense of smaller states who could not afford those treaties. This further benefitted France and Britain, for it ensured that their shipping and protection was desired, and drove their competitors from the sea. Catholic Iberia was not so lucky. Treaties came and went. In Morocco, Iberian relations improved as Moroccan Emperors Sidi Muhammad and his sons, Mawlay Yazid followed by Mawlay Suleiman, relied on foreign trade to bolster support and fill the treasury as Morocco s corsair activities dried up and revenue from the Trans- Saharan slave trade slowed down. Mawlay Suleiman during the dynastic struggle in the early years of his reign tried to grant the Spanish and Portuguese exclusive rights to the grain trade first in Fez and then in Larache, though he was thwarted by the mass protests in the city. Complications could easily flare up though, owing to tensions over Spanish Ceuta. James Matra, British consul in tangier, reported, There doesn t appear to be the least design to interrupt the British Trade, the Mountainmen declaring their friends the English are welcome to the country as their commerce is an advantage to it, but they will not stand for the Spaniards, whom they thereafter plan to force from this place. 2 North Africa still provided the training ground for young Spanish officers. Unlike the amicable and symbiotic relationship between France and Barbary or Britain and Barbary, Iberian relations were still fraught. 2 NA FO 52/10 no Matra to Dundas, 5 Mar 1794.

5 In the run up to the start of the French Revolutionary War, it was not the Mediterranean strategy of either France or Britain to protect other nations from Barbary. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, Lord Sheffield responded to the American request for continued protection from North Africa and succinctly laid out the British policy vis-à-vis weaker foreign states and Barbary: It is not probable the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them there from the Barbary States That the Barbary States are advantageous to the maritime powers is certain. If they were suppressed, the Little States of Italy, &c. would have much more of the carrying trade The armed neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers, as the Barbary States are useful. 3 France likewise had no interest in helping out other nations, A 1777 memoranda reads: Spain desires to destroy Algiers, France to reduce it to respect. It is not in the interests if French commerce that Algiers should be at peace with // Spain. Only once during the French revolutionary war did Britain attempt to assist Portugal negotiate a truce with Barbary in Algiers in 1793 and 4. Britain relied upon all of North Africa to supply her military forces, land and sea, in the Mediterranean, especially as places like Gibralatar, Malta, Minorca, Corsica, and Toulon were unable to produce enough food to support themselves. A Portuguese peace with Algiers 3 John, Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, (London: J. Debrett, 1784),

6 would have opened up trade to that regency and supported the long-time British ally. Unfortunately the peace process broke down over Portugal s refusal to pay the tribute and the Netherlands reaching a separate peace agreement. The Spanish on-again off-again alliance with France meant Britain devoted considerable attention to Spanish relations with Barbary. Most especially in the early days of the Napoleonic war when Spain was technically neutral and Britain was desperate to keep her from again allying with France, Britain took great efforts behind the scenes, employing the full extent of her diplomatic corps in North Africa to protect Spanish ships. Once Spain officially re-joined the war on the French side in late 1804, it was a different game entirely. In the new year, The British government issued a departmental circular to all the consuls in North Africa instructing them to inform the rulers in their respective states Britain was now at war with Spain. It advised the consuls to be vigilant against any mischief that might occur but also urge Barbary, to distress and annoy [Spain] by making captures of their ships and destroying their commerce. 4 Effectively, Britain was wishing Barbary Happy Hunting. Spain had already begun attacking British ships transporting the neverending grain and cattle to Gibraltar, which hurt the North African traders as much as the British garrison. The turning point for the British war strategy in the Mediterranean came after the Battle of Trafalgar in October Much has been written about the importance of the Battle of Trafalgar, owing to the death of Nelson at his hour of victory or its position as the last great fleet action in the age of sail, but the reality is it accomplished very little. Napoleon was still master on land. He had never based his 4 NA FO 8/5 Camden to Matra, 11 Jan 1804.; NA FO 335/46 folder 1, Camden to Oglander, 11 Jan 1804.

7 military strategy on naval might. Napoleon had to be defeated on land, a process that took another ten years to accomplish Trafalgar was still a turning point however. In the Mediterranean, an enclosed sea far easier to control than open ocean, Britain had achieved sea control meaning she could blockade, direct trade, and operate as she desired. The joint economic sanctions Britain and France imposed on each other after Trafalgar, Napoleon s Berlin Decrees and the British Orders in Council, effectively shut continental Europe off to trading with anyone outside Napoleonic control. These economic attacks made it nearly impossible for neutral states to trade or operate. The American Embargo act of 1807 was a direct response to this, for all it hurt American trading far more than the British or the French. The one exception was the Barbary States. They were neutral and it behoved both Britain and France to keep them as such. After Trafalgar, Britain s sea control in the Mediterranean finally succeeded in undoing the French dominance in North Africa that had existed since the Franc- Ottoman joint naval action in the 1540s. The British victory at Trafalgar meant the British were now the major power in the Mediterranean. The British had been trading in Barbary since the 1580s, but now they had the means to overtake French interests. In the 1780s, a full 80% of Tunis s trade went to the French port of Maresilles alone. By the 1810s, 80% went to British Malta. But a curious thing happened in Barbary after Trafalgar. Corsairing decreased. Not because the British were using their sea control to combat the pirates. The corsairs and their attacks on the naval enemies of Britain were used to supplement British sea control corsairs and privateers are excellent examples of extra-state actors providing military might by practicing sea denial making it dangerous to use certain waterways due to military or economic threats. The British combined their sea

8 control in the Mediterranean with the Barbary corsairs to ensure the maximum benefit to their mercantilist desires to great effect the economic value of the Mediterranean to the British sky-rocketed during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Rather, the wars had disrupted the normal flow of trade around the Mediterranean; the war and Continental blockade shut out the neutral carriers. The Barbary States filled in that gap. Corsairing did not disappear, but in all four states corsair vessels and captains turned to legitimate trade and the Barbary merchant marine was born. British strategy no longer required the exclusion of Europe from Barbary. For one, most of Europe was shut up under the Continental system. For another, Britain wanted to break that system and win allies to her side, no matter what. The Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Barbary states in the west took over the intra- Mediterranean trade, which supplied the British forces in the Mediterranean over 400,000 people. The French invasions of Portugal and Spain in late 1807 and spring 1808, followed by the Dos de Mayo uprising, brought about a complete change in the British Mediterranean strategy from the previous war. Immediately the British moved to support both countries, militarily, financially, and diplomatically. With the arrival of the future Duke of Wellington and the British Army, Barbary, via Britain, was feeding and supporting the peninsular forces against the French. Now, Ensuring peace with Barbary for British allies made it easier for British forces to supply and support their European allies in the Mediterranean. In 1810, the British succeeded in securing a two year truce for the Portuguese with Algiers as well as a shipment of 3000 tons of corn for Lisbon. The 1801 treaty between Morocco and Britain permitted 1,000 cattle each year for the British fleet and another 2000 for Gibraltar, but exports were usually well in excess of this. In October 1810, the Moroccan emperor, Emperor Suleiman, permitted the export another 1,000

9 cattle to Gibraltar in exchange for gunpowder and cannons. The following January, 200 oxen were sent to Cadiz plus grain and barley for His Majesty s forces in Portugal. Charles Stuart, British ambassador to Portugal directed Oglander, British consul in Tunis, to recommend Tunisian merchants sell their grain in Portugal owing to, the failure of the harvests in the provinces of Portugal laid waste during the late invasion. 5 Morocco promised to provide anything the British could desire for their efforts in Spain against the French, but negotiations subsequently broke down over the British and Spanish requests for Morocco s highly valued and much sought after horses, an animal holding a special place in Islam. Moroccan foreign Minister, Muhammad b. Abd al-salam al-salawi, a black high-ranking slave in the Moroccan slave army who was at various times governor of Fez, Tangier, and Tetuan, and decidedly pro-british promised: an assurance of the great satisfaction this government would feel in being instrumental to expel the French from Spain, but to allow Christians the purchase and exportation of horses was contrary to their religion, that they would furnish at their own expense two thousand horses or more if necessary, and to expedite the grand object, the horses should be immediately taken from the cavalry and the whole might be ready by the period we could send vessels for them, that for this essential service money could not be received, the Moors must obtain a reciprocal benefit from Spain in order to sanction His Imperial Majesty s conduct 5 NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 12 Dec 1811.

10 Unfortunately, Morocco wanted Ceuta, further fuelled by fears that France would launch an invasion through the garrison (And Napoleon had been discussing plans for an invasion of North Africa since 1808). It was refused. In the end, though the supply of foodstuffs never ceased, Horses were never supplied by Morocco but they were by Algiers. Wheat was a constant problem; 1811 coincided with another bad harvest in England. Stuart ordered Oglander, to spare no expense to persuade the Moorish government to give their consent for the exportation of a quantity of wheat, Indian corn, and Barley to Lisbon, 6 Wellington told Stuart the bad harvest in Britain meant Portugal could only get grain from the Mediterranean and America, urging the ambassador to make an effort to get grain from the coast of Africa. 7 By the end of 1811, Bonaparte s planned invasion of Russia was already drawing men away from the French peninsular forces. The withdrawal of French troops provided the opportunity for Wellington to begin the reconquest of Spain in early In many ways, 1812 was the beginning of the end of Bonaparte s power in Europe. He siphoned troops away from his forces fighting in the Iberian Peninsula to aid his campaign against Russia doomed from the start and the reduction of troops in Spain provided the perfect opportunity for the British and Portuguese troops to push into Spain. Portugal s continued independence from Bonaparte and the increasing progress in Spain destroyed the efficacy of Bonaparte s continental system at the same time as the Emperor destroyed his own army in the Russian winter. 6 NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 23 Dec DDW, v. V, 393: to Charles Stuart, 6 Dec 1811.; DDW, v. 5, 411: To Charles Stuart, 17 Dec Krajeski, 150.; NA FO 8/5 Stuart to Wellesley, 30 Nov 1811.; NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 12 Dec 1811., NA FO 77/6 Oglander to James Chapman, 22 Dec 1811.; Knight, Sustaining the Fleet, 53-4.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 20 Apr 1811.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 23 Jan 1811.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 12 Dec 1811.; Esdaile, Wellington, 61-2.; Don W. Alexander, French Replacement Methods during the Peninsular War, Military Affairs 44, no. 4 (1980), ; Godfrey Davies, The Whigs and the Peninsular War, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 2 (1919), 127.; Kennedy, 169.

11 Admiral Edward Pellew and the Mediterranean fleet provided auxiliary support for their allies on land; transporting supplies and victuals from around the Mediterranean and keeping the French under blockade. It was also a time of petty disruptions for the fleet: one of the major sources of grain for the peninsular campaign the United States was in danger due to the outbreak of war between the U.S. and Great Britain. The War of 1812 put further stress on the victualling support for the peninsular army. Wellington told the British government: you will readily believe that these accounts [of war] have occasioned a good deal of anxiety. Not only Portugal but the neighbouring provinces of Spain have subsisted upon these importations. The War of 1812 had the potential to be disastrous. Prior to 1812, the amount of grain from the United States had been increasing: in 1811 the U.S. export of grain was seven times that of A total loss from the United States market was impossible to allow. 10 American ships were given British licenses to transport supplies for the Peninsular Army. American wheat supplies continued to cross the Atlantic. 11 The U.S. government did not prohibit their ships from using British passes until July 1813, and by that point the continental system was rapidly deteriorating and grain could be again obtained from the Baltic after Bonaparte s disastrous Russian campaign. 12 By the time the war with the U.S. could actually harm British operations in the Mediterranean, the landscape of the war had changed once again. Wellesley received Admiral Pellew s May report recommending British assist the Spanish in procuring a treaty with Algiers. Spain was aware of the report but 9 Hall, 6.; Robson, Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 561.; Jackson. 20.; Hall, Knight, Britain Against Napoleon, 426.; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, ; Black, War of 1812, 119, ; Lambert, 58, 207-8, 425.; Robson, Knight, Britain Against Napoleon, 426.; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 571.; Black, War of 1812,

12 financially strapped; as the only way to placate the Dey was to pay the tribute, the Spanish government was in a bind. As the dispute between Algiers and Spain threatened not just Spanish interests, but British as well, Wellesley recommended: That if the Spanish provided an envoy to negotiate, the British would bank-roll the negotiations. Thus, with promised financial assistance, Pellew dispatched a Captain Adam of the HMS Invincible to Algiers to commence negotiations with the Dey. From this point onwards, Britain assumed the role of protector of the Mediterranean, negotiating with and sometimes even paying for her European allies treaties with North Africa to allow further her end game of defeating France. Britain could no more afford to have her allies, with their ships carrying British supplies, attacked by the Barbary corsairs than her own. This was a major change from the British position during the French Revolutionary war, when Britain would assist, diplomatically, in arranging treaties but not provide the financial backing or earlier, when Britain would do neither. Pellew dispatched three ships to prevent any unpleasant occurrence as he believed, the Spanish trade may be exposed to considerable risk 13 Algiers declared war against Spain (in September, by which point the Algerines had already successfully captured vessels off Majorca. 14 Pellew s declaration of providing the fullest protection as our allies put him at odds with the British position in Algiers, a conflict with Britain s role as protector of the Mediterranean. Luckily, Adam reported his success in re-establishing peaceful relations between Spain and Algiers. Adam s wrote of the successful release of eight Spanish ships, crews, and cargoes and the Dey s promise Spanish vessels would be respected as allies of Britain. Algiers continued shipments of cattle and grain during the dispute, 13 NA ADM 1/423 no, 324, Pellew to Croker, 18 Aug NA ADM 1/424 no. 357, Pellew to Croker, 12 Sept 1812.

13 which was a relief to those involved the extensive British system in the Mediterranean. Britain could not have afforded to lose either Spain as an ally or Algiers as a trade partner. Morocco continued to provide necessary supplies for the British in the Mediterranean. 15 Green informed the Secretary of State, that more grain from Morocco was recieved for the forces in the Peninsula in November. 16 Morocco s position and continuous support through victualing supplies was extremely necessary when the Peninsular army finally started to make gains over Bonaparte. 17 The British Special Envoy Extraordinary William A Court, was sent to the Barbary states in 1813 to further British efforts in the region as the Peninsular war reached a critical stage. Ambassadors Charles Stuart, in Portugal, and Henry Wellesley, in Spain, were directed to provide A Court with any information he needed, particularly relating to the cattle and grain requirements of the military and people in the Iberian Peninsula. A Court departed with the auspicious news of the Russian defeat preceding him. He reached Lisbon on 21 May, and the Portuguese sent an envoy with A Court to Algiers to secure a permanent peace between with that regency. They arrived in Algiers on 10 June and A Court presented his credentials to the Dey shortly afterwards. A Court, on Portugal s behalf, reduced the Dey s price for peace, which saved the Portuguese over $100,000 (Spanish). The Portuguese were to pay an additional $24,000 (Spanish) a year as tribute, and a biennial consular present of $16,000 (Spanish). A Court used the threat of British naval action to secure the reduction, though A Court recognized such a peace could endure only as long as Britain was willing to enforce it. A Court was assured the Spanish-Algerine truce (1810) would continue to be respected. 15 NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 12 Dec NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 29 Jul 1812, 17 Davies, The Whigs,

14 After the efforts in 1813 brought the Mediterranean under British influence and the combination of Russian and Peninsular victories over the French, by 1814 the British had arranged the chessboard in the Mediterranean to suit her interests and needs. Even the American war of 1812, still on going, was no longer a threat to British efforts in Europe; as Bonaparte s continental system fell apart, markets in Europe reopened making up the loss of American shipping in In early April, 1814, the Allied forces in Paris forced Bonaparte to abdicate and take exile at Elba Knight, Britain Against Napoleon, 449