Kamhau-Sukte Chins and Manipur

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1 Chapter 2 Kamhau-Sukte Chins and Manipur Manipur's southern frontier marched with the most northerly tribes of the Chin hills over whom neither Manipur nor the Burmese authorities had exercised any control. Until the British arrived on the scene after the First Anglo-Burmese War ( ) Manipur's southern limits were never clearly defined.' There had been, however, a north and north-west movement of tribes into Manipur and the Lushai hills decades before that. What impelled this movement is not clear. Some spoke of the exhaustion of jhum lands, others said that Shindu pressure from the south had been responsible.^ The movement of these tribal people remained a recurring feature of the ' Manipur's boundaries in fact took long to settle. In 1832 the river Jiri and the branch of the river Barak was made her western limits towards Cachar, in the north, towards the Naga hills some understanding was arrived at in 1842, but the exact limits of the state was never settled and the problem remained unresolved till the early seventees. The Kabaw valley in the east was handed over to Burma (see below) in , but here too the correct boundary was never indentified. For the Cachar- Manipur boundary, H K Barpujari, Assam in the Days of the Company, (Reprint Shillong 1996) pp.loff; Jayanta Bhusan Bhattacharjee, Cachar Under British Rule in North East India, New Delhi 1977, pp.58ff; for Manipur's extension towards the Naga hills, H K Barpujari, Problem of the Hill Tribes: North East Frontier, Vol I, Guwahati 1970, Reprint Shillong 1996, pp ; S K Barpujari, The Nagas: The Evolution of their History and Administration(l ) A Documentary Study, Guwahati 2003, p.98; ; see also by the same author, "Naga Hills Boundary Disputes ", in Journal of Indian History, August 1973, SI. No. 152, pp FPAP August 1872 No.70; Edgar to Commissioner, Chittagong, 3 April 1872, p.31 See also R H Snyed Hutchinson, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Delhi 1916, passim.

2 54 history of the region; an official report, written as late as in the 1890's, describes what this was all about: Nothing does more to establish a chief and bring him followers and influence than success in raids upon weaker chiefs, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill Tipperah, and upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts and tea gardens. In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs, a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst the people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off fi-om the more crowded forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refiige in our territory or in Tiperrah or Manipur, where they are often followed, themselves or killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new-comers.' The result was that vast tracts of land in southern Manipur were occupied by cognate tribe broadly referred as Kukis. The Manipuris called them Khongsais,'* a term ' Quoted in Birendra Chandra Chakraborty, British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1858, Calcutta, 1964, p.49 This was first noticed by Colonel Frederick Lister, who led an expedition into the Lushai hills in land wrote in his report: "It would appear that the tribes to the south have been gradually driving one another in a northerly direction; for, first, some Nagas that were located in the Boobun Hills in southern Cachar were obliged by the Tangune Kookies to flit and to take up their abode in the hills north of the Borak, when the Tangunes took possession of their ground, and they having in their turn been driven up by the Chansen and Tadoe tribes, the Tangunes were also afterwards obliged to vacate and to move on into the northern hills, and after them the Changsens were obliged to do so likewise; and the Thadoes, who had been driven up by the Luchyes, a very powerful tribe, first settled about seven years since within eight and ten miles south of this station, and became Company's ryots, and made themselves usefiil by cutting timber, bamboos, canes, & c, which they used to bring to market, but after having been located there for some four years, the Luchye Kookies in November 1849 attacked them, burnt three of their villages, killed several of the inhabitants, and took away several of them into slavery, and then the whole of the Tadoe tribe flitted, left the south and settled down in the northern hills. "About the same time the Luchye Kookies attacked the villages in Cachar, they committed other atrocities in Sylhet and in Manipur. It was the first that had ever been heard here of the Luchyes, and from the inquiries I made, it appeared that they were a very powerfiil, warlike, set of people, consisting of the Luchyes, Chillings, and Gattaes, and who were said to be also well armed and independent, and residing from eighth to ten days' journey south of this. And to the south of them again there are the Poe Kookies, who are said to be still more powerful than the Luchyes, and who it is said exact a kind of tribute from them", in Alexander Mackenzie, History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North East Frontier of Bengal, Calcutta 1884, pp.287ff * William McCulloch in his Account of the Valley of Manipur, Calcutta 1859, recorded these tribes as Khongjais. On this basis Carey and Tuck in The Chin Hills, Vol.1 op.cit. p. 140, referred to the Zous, Thados and Guite as Khongjais.

3 55 that only later was recognised to indicate several groups or clans. In February 1831 Captain George Gordon, an officer appointed to organise the defence of the state, reported that these new comers had been raiding some southern villages and carrying their depredation upto the valley of Manipur itself. As he wrote: These aggressors are said to be powerful Kookies who for several years past have been gradually advancing from the southwards amongst the vast maps of mountains, which to the south of Manipur, occupy, without any intervening valley, the whole space between Bengal and Ava. Their present headquarters is said to be about five days in a south-westerly direction fi-om the valley of Munnipore; from which as a centre they are now carrying on their depredations against all the surrounding villages and have with the aid of a few muskets they have by some means acquired in addition to their poisoned arrows, destroyed several not only in the immediate vicinity of Munnipore but also have extended their savages amongst the Baungshes in the direction of Cachar several of whom I have just heard have fled for protection to that coimtry.^ The British at this time was concerned with the defence of Bengal's Eastern Frontier. Manipur had been turned into a buffer state against the Burmese after the First Anglo-Burmese War. Gambhir Singh, who the Burmese were obliged to recognise as Raja by the Treaty of Yandaboo, was given a free hand to establish his authority over the surrounding hill tribes. This he was in a large measure able to do. Just before Gambhir Singh's death in January 1834, however, it had been realized largely as a result of the surveys of Captain Francis Jenkins and Captain Robert Boileau Pemberton made during , that Manipur's rather small population and absence of an economic development made her an ineffective buffer against the Burmese. As the Governor General Lord William Bentinck observed in a minute dated 25 March 1833: "The result of our late enquiries have clearly shown that, after an ^ FPC February 1831, No. 108; Captain George Gordon to Swinton, Chief Secretary to Government of India, Calcutta, 18 February.

4 56 uninterrupted tranquility of seven years, this small State is still considered as totally incompetent to defend itself against a Burmese invasion."^ A new treaty was concluded with Manipur in 1833, by which inter alia, the state was obliged: "In the event of war with the Burmese, if troops be sent to Manipur, either to protect that country or to advance beyond the Ningthee, the Rajah, at the requisition of the British Government, will provide hill porters to assist in transporting the ammunition and baggage of such troops," and again "In the event anything happening in the Eastern Frontier of the British Territories, the Rajah will, when required, assist the British Government with a portion of his troops." In terms of a treaty concluded in 1834, the disputed Kabaw valley was transferred to Burma, Manipur being compensated by an annual grant of Rs.6000.^ By this the two small chiefships in the north under the Shan Sawbwa or chief, Kale and Sumjok remained under Burmese rule. * Quoted in Mackenzie, op.cit., pp , "Its entire population," Bentinck continued, "is supposed not to amount to more than 30 or 40,000 souls and its available revenue to 4 or 5,000 rupees a year. Its situation- surrounded by mountains- excluded it from any great participation in the advantages of traffic, and the whole tenor of the several communications made to Government by the Officers most intimately acquainted with the country proves that at this moment it is without the means of efficiency extending its agriculture. "The Levy, consisting, as we are told, of 3,000 men, is shown to be but very imperfectly disciplined and very little under the control of the Officers specially appointed for the purpose of ensuring its efficiency. And although we may fairly assume that, armed as they now are, they would be a match for an equal number of Burmese, we could hardly place any great reliance upon their undisciplined efforts when opposed to the vastly superior force, which, in-thcevent of war, would inevitably be brought against them." Pemberton later remarked in his Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India, Calcutta, 1835, p.48, "Their country is to be regarded principally as an advanced military position for defence of the eastern frontier and its utility must of course entirely depend upon its natural resources, and the efficiency of its military force. ' For details, D G E Hall's Henry Burney op.cit see also, Anthony Kaba, "The Manipur Political Agency with special Reference to the Frontier Problem, ", unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Department of History, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 2001.

5 57 On 7 February 1835, just before his imminent departure from India, Bentinck recorded another Minute on Manipur, in which he created a Political Agency at Imphal, its capital. British objectives were thus spelt out clearly: The preservation of a fiiendly intercourse, and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government, and, as occasion may require, with the Burmese Authorities on that frontier, and more especially to prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the Manipuris and the Burmese, it may be necessary to retain an Officer in the character of Political Agent in that quarter. Lieutenant Gordon, whose ability, intelligence, and local knowledge have more than once brought favourably to the notice of Government, seems to be well qualified for this situation, and I beg to propose that he may be appointed to it on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,000 per mensem.^ Rise of Kam Hau The establishment of a Political Agency coincided with the rise to power of the Suktes under Kam Hau in the hills south of Manipur. Suktes tradition traces their power to Khan Thuam of Mualbem village. Khan Thuam's initial success, however, provoked a combination against him, and he was soon obliged to flee to Falam country and take shelter under the protection of Rallang Chief Khuang Ceu by giving tribute to him. With the help of Khuang Ceu, Khan Thuam and his eldest son Kam Hau, were able to overcome all opposition. After his position became relatively secure Khan Thuam returned to Mualbem where he assumed all the trappings of a Chief After he Mackenzie, op.cit. p.l53 '.Sukte Laibu Bawl Committee Sukte Beh leh Tedim Gam Tangthu, Chin State 1996, p.30; Nine Chiefs who conspired to kill Khan Thuam were : Vungh Vial of Saizang, Mang Song of Lamzang, Tun Kam of Vangteh, Do Mang of Lophei, Ciang Phut of Kaalzang, Suan Thuk of Thuklai, Go Mang of Khuasak, Han Kam of Buanman, and Kaih Mang of Mualbem.

6 58 consolidated his position at Mualbem he embarked upon territorial expansion in the now well known Tedim region, pushing in the process less powerful tribes towards the border of Manipur. The principal among these were the Thados, Guite and Zou. William McCuUoch Political Agent in Manipur, who studied these tribes and wrote about them, found them in the 1840's scattered around the valley of Manipur."^ From here some were moved on through the hills to north and south. The Guite and Zou tribes also moved to the eastern border of the Lushai Hills." What remained of these tribes in their original home were assimilated into the Sukte fold. Bertram Carey and Henry Newman Tuck, two officers who obtained a first hand knowledge of the region after its annexation in 18^6, best described the impact of the Sukte expansion: The Thados offered a good resistance to Kantum and most of their villages were committed to the flames before they submitted; the Yos either migrated north out of the Soktes' reach or quietly submitted, and the Nwites did not offer any resistance whatever.*^ After bringing the entire northern hill tract upto the border of Manipur in the north and Falam in the south under his control, Khan Thuam established a compact and strong Sukte domain. He levied all forms of customary duesfi-omhis subordinate villages. A popular folk song thus described the extent of the Sukte kingdom: Siahtaang kaihna sak ciang Teimei, ka hialna Lamtui hi e. Sak ciang Teimei sang ciang Lamtui, a lai ah kamkei hi 'ng e. (What I rule extends to Manipur in the north, and ends at Falam in the south; Manipur to the north and Falam to the south, I am the tiger in the middle.)'^ '" McCuUoch, op «?, p55 '' Carey & Tuck, op at p 140 (A number of Guite clans migrated to northeastern Lushailand and southern Manipur.) ^-Ibid.^\\9 '^ Sing Khaw Khai, Zo People and their Culture, Churachandpur 1995, p 26

7 59 After his death in about 1848 Khan Thuam was succeeded by his youngest son Za Pau at Mualbem according to Sukte tradition of ultimogeniture.* Kam Hau, the eldest and more capable son, established the village of Tedim during his father's life time. He was temporarily repulsed from there by certain Zous and Thados, but years later, sometime in the early part of the century, he regained Tedim. The village soon attracted a large number of warriors from neighbouring areas and in a short span of time it became one of the largest villages in these hills and the seat of Kam Hau's power. Following in his father's footsteps, Kam Hau succeeded in subduing the remaining subordinate tribes and villages of the northern hills. The acquisition of firearms from Burma is said to be the major factor in his and his father's success. Within a few years Kam Hau was recognized as the most powerful Sukte Chief and ruled the entire region east of the river Manipur, or the Nankathe as it is known in its lower reaches in the Sukte country, comprising over 135 villages.'"* He had become more popular than his brother Za Pau who controlled the region west of that river. The villages which belonged to Kam Hau were distinguished from the existing Sukte tract as the Kamhau and the people were often, if erroneously, called Kamhaus. Early writers and official reports had thus gone asfray in describing the Sukte and Kamhau *According to the custom of the Sukte the elder sons go out into the world and found their own villages, whilst the youngest son inherited almost all the father's property and the chieftainship of the tribe or clan, his elder brothers becoming subordinate to and paying him the tribute which is due to the head of the tribe... ''* Sukte Laibu Bawl Committee, op.cit. p.44

8 60 as two distinct tribes.'^ Of the Kamhau-Sukte power Sir Alexander Mackenzie rightly observed in 1883: The Manipuris consider this tribe to be a much more formidable one than the Lushai. They are a constant source of trouble to them, and have at times rendered the southern portion of Manipur uninhabitable...the Lushais hold the Sookties in great dread, and are falling back before them. They are well supplied with fire-arms, supposed to be procured from Burma, whence they also obtain their ammunition. They have never had any dealings whatever with the British government.'^ Kam Hau's power was also felt in the Kale-Kabaw valley. There were reports of his raids into the villages in Kale, though some of these were said to have been avenged by the Sawbwa, or Shan chief, in Raids were directed towards Yazagyo, known as the main market for the hill people. This state of affairs had considerably strained the relations between the Kamhaus and the Shans of the valley." For some years the Kamhaus, and to a lesser extent the Suktes, kept Manipur's southern frontier in a state of alarm. This had led to the scattering of the Khongsais, mainly of the Thado Kuki clans, which like the depredation of the Kamhau-Suktes, equally threatened the peace of the valley. It was only after the arrival of Colonel William McCulloch as Political Agent in Manipur in 1844 that an effort was made to establish peace in the region.'^ There was one important consideration with which this '* The term Sukte and Kamhau will hereafter be used when referring to chiefs and men with respect to the location of their villages either west or east of the Manipur or Nankathe river. Today, these groups of people are commonly known as Tedim Chin or rather Zomi as they preferred to be called so. '^ Mackenzie, op.cit. p. 163 '^ Carey & Tuck, op.cit. p. 120 '* James Johnstone in his My Experience in Manipur and the Naga Hills. London, 1896, Reprint New Delhi 2002, p.45 writes: "Colonel McCulloch's policy of planting Kuki settlements on exposed frontiers, induced the Government of Bengal to try a similar experiment, and a large colony of Kukis were settled in 1855 in the neighbourhood of Langting, to act as a barrier for North Cachar against the raids of the Angami Nagas."

9 61 question was linked. The Sylhet-Manipur road, which was then under construction, passed through the Kabul Naga territory. The upkeep of this road greatly depended on the Kabuis who felt constantly threatened by the northward movement of the Thados. Lushai disturbances in both Cachar and Manipur, which had become intense from the middle of the 1840's, too had acted upon the fears of the defenceless Kabuis. McCuUoch's solution was to plant a line of Thado colonies as a buffer to the Kabul villages. He thus wrote to E R Lyon, Superintendent of Cachar, on 26 November 1846: There is ample space for such Kookies as might wish to settle under Munnipore and a strong body of that tribe will be affected to Munnipore settled to the south of the Koupooees would force a bulwark to the latter and consequently tend to the efficiency of the Munnipore road; whilst from the similarity of the languages of all the Kookis tribes there would be in every likelihood that such Kookies would hear of any projected attack of the wild savages of the south and by giving notice to the authorities here they would be unable to prevent it or at least moderate its violence.'^ Towards the close of the 1840's McCulloch with the help of Raja Nur Singh carried out the settlement of the Khongsais. Large tracts were made available to them for cultivation. Some of them were used as irregulars; arms were freely supplied to them and these settlements often came to be called 'sepoy village.'^^ Manipur's Abortive Expedition and After The settlement of the Thados, however, did not end the problem of Manipur's southern frontier. Disturbances continued. In the 1850's the Kamhaus under Go Khaw " FPC 19 December 1846, Nos " Mackenzie, op.cit. pp

10 62 Thang raided the Thado Kuki villages of Mombee (Lawmpi)* and Heeroway in southern Manipur. In 1855 another Manipur village, Namfow, was burnt, again by the Suktes. The following year an even more serious outrage occurred. An exasperated Chandrakirti Singh who had in the meanwhile succeeded to the Manipur Raj decided upon strong military action. In January 1857, he led 1500 strong punitive expedition against the Kamhau- Suktes. "He was so impressed with the importance of the operations of the expedition being brought to a successfiil issue" wrote Mackenzie, "that, with the object of encouraging his force, he accompanied in person." When he arrived near Tedim, the Kamhau stronghold, he found himself opposed by a combined force of the Kamhau, Sukte, and Sihzang. What happened then is best described by Mackenzie: It nevertheless ended in disgracefiil flight of the Manipur troops. They neglected to secure the line of communications, provisions consequently became short and, instead of falling back on their line of advance, they, after some skirmishing with the enemy, fled in confusion by another and unknown route, along which it must have been known that they could not possibly obtain provisions Colonel McCuUoch who was then Political Agent, believed sheer cowardice to have been the cause of the failure of the expedition. The troops barely left their Rajah, who with some twenty followers, arrived some days after they had reached the valley.^^ It was said that the Manipuris on that occasion lost altogether 287 guns. Shortly after Chandrakirti Singh returned to Imphal the Suktes made overtures of peace with Manipur. That these tribes, who had so recently worsted the troops of a * Mombee or Lawmpi located in Manipur. There is another village of the same name which the Kamhau people called Mualpi in northern Chin hills, hi all probability the Thados who were the original inhabitants of the village in the Chin hills called the new village in Manipur of the same name. -' Ibid "Ibid -'Ibid

11 63 more powerful state, should so quickly change their attitude is to be explained by the emergence of a new power to the east of the Kamhau-Sukte territory. In the late 1840's as Kam Hau was consolidating his position around Tedim, another tribe was establishing its hold at Champhai, on the western border of the Sukte country driving out the Thados from there. This tribe, soon to be known as the Lushais, established its control over the fertile region under two brothers Poiboia and Vanhnuailiana. Of the latter John Ware Edgar, the legendary Deputy Commissioner of Cachar who knew these tribes at firsthand wrote: (He was) undoubtedly the ablest and most powerful chief...in his youth he seems to have been constantly fighting, and always apparently more or less successful. He fought various tribes to his south known to the Kookies by the general name of Poi and carried off, or induced to accompany him, numerous families of those villages, whom he settled down either in separate villages or in the villages of his own Kookies.^'* Vanhnuailiana, Edgar further adds: Followed the same policy towards the Soktes another family of Kookies, whose head is Kamhow, the powerful chief of Molbhem, and we found hundreds of Sokte families settled among this Lushais in whose villages we have lately been.^^ Edgar wrote that in the aftermath of the Lushai Expedition of 1872, and what he was describing actually took place some twenty-years earlier. This eastward expansion of Vanhnuailiana other members of the Lushai family had already established themselves in the west began after 1850, with a drive towards the south-west of Manipur. But he could make no headway because of Colonel William McCuIloch's effective management of that part of the frontier. Consequently the Lushais began to exact '' FPAP August 1872, No.70; Edgar to Commissioner, Chittagong, 3 April -^ Ibid

12 64 pressure on the region near the salt springs of Chivu and the south of the Manipur frontier. The preoccupation of the Kamhau-Suktes with the Lushais on their western border as a result gave a freehand to smaller and subordinate tribes to indulge in their own petty raids into Manipur. In April 1859 Guite warriors who had quarreled with a Haokip clan of Thados fell upon one of the villages near Sugnu. This was followed by another though less serious raid on Saitol which was burnt and cattle driven away. These events were sufficient for the Maharaja^^ to raise a line of stockades on his southern frontier. Not until the Lushai Expeditions of would the Kamhau- Suktes again emerge as an important factor in the politics of the frontier. Until then the relations between the Lushais and Manipur were not a cause for concern. In 1867 Edgar on a visit to Manipur found out how the Lushais and the Thados had got along with each other: Messengers were sent from time to time to the Lushai chiefs nominally from the Rajah, but really from the Political Agent, and presents were sometimes sent down. These messengers were always Kookies in which Colonel McCuUoch could put trust....the Munipore Kookies used at that time to shoot over the hunting grounds of the Lushais near the great salt spring called Chiboo, and when they killed anything, they left a hind leg at the spring for the Lushais, who in their turn, when lucky, used to leave a leg for the Thadoes.^^ All this tribal camaraderie suddenly came to an end when that some Thados fell upon and killed seven of Poiboi's men near Chivu, four of whom were hunting while three "* The Treaty of Yandaboo between the Burmese and the British referred to Gambhir Singh as Raja, and this term continued to be in use throughout East India Company's days, after which for reasons not found in any document or report, the ruler was referred to as Maharaja. -^ FPAP August 1872,op.cit.

13 65 were making salt. During widespread disturbances took place in Manipur- Cachar border.* In November the Naga village of Mentha in Manipur territory was attacked and burned by Vanpuilala and Poiboia, and several captives carried off. On 2 February in the following year a great attack was made on a stockade in the Kala Naga region, which was strongly garrisoned by Manipuri's sepoys, by several chiefs among whom one Lenkon was said to be the most prominent. The stockade was taken, and a Manipuri officer and several sepoys were killed. At about the same time some Naga villages were attacked and destroyed. Later in the year, in November a Naga village near Manipur's Khopum valley was laid waste by the Lushais. In fact the extent of the disturbances was unprecedented; from Manipur in the east to Cachar and Tripura in the west and even south in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The result was the Expedition of 1869.'^* Two military columns armed with mountain guns moved up into the Lushai hills, one under Assam's General Officer in Command Brigadier General Nuthall advancing along the course of the river Dhaleswar to the western chief Suakpuilala's village, and the other under the Commissioner of Dacca Division along the Sonai to eastern villages of Vanpuilala. A third, police column, also moved up from Sylhet to effect a junction with the *How Httle was known of the reasons behind these can be seen in the Government of India letter to the Secretary of State, on 12 February 1869 which said: "We have not yet been informed of the real origin of these disturbances, but it is not uiplikely that they are in some measure connected with the movements of Kunhye Sing, one of the Muimiporee Princes, who is opposed to the present Raja of Murmipur, and has gone into outlawing..." quoted in Birendra Chandra Chakravorty, op.cit. p. 55. One of the principal reasons was, however, the extension of tea garden deep into tribal territory. This accounts for the tea garden becoming the main targets of Lushai raids. See H K Barpujari Problem of the Hill Tribes Vol.11 op.cit.^.u9. "* For details Mackenzie, op.cit.; H S Lalsangpuia, "Frontier Policy under Lord Mayo with Special Reference to the Lushais in the North East Frontier ", unpublished M Phil thesis, Department of History, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong 1983, p.22ff

14 66 General's forces. The expedition failed, beaten by the weather. However, success attended a Manipur force, consisting of 110 Thados or Khongsais, of whom about ninety were armed with muskets, who had been ordered to cooperate from the Manipur side. A portion of it was able to move up the Sonai river, to one of Vanpuilala's villages, and within sight of the mother village, the headman of which as well as those of Vanpuilala's villages had offered them submission. The failure of the 1869 punitive measures led to a lengthy correspondence in the middle of 1869 between the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Sir William Grey and the Viceroy Lord Mayo on the future policy. On these discussions further and more intense Lushai raids on the British, and Manipuri, territory had a powerful impact. Mayo, despite his aversion to military measures finally sanctioned another punitive expedition into the Lushai hills.^^ The details of the proposed expedition he left toj'^ Commander in Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, who turned into a huge military expedition. Napier organised two large columns, one, the Left Column, under Brigadier General Sir Charles Brownlow to move against the western Lushai, and the other under Assam new General Officer in Command Brigadier General Sir George "' FPAP December 1869, No.245; Secretary Bengal to Secretary Foreign Department, Government of India, 17 August The Lieutenant Governor thus remarked on the failure of the Expedition, "The organization and management of the whole expedition was a more decidedly military character than suitable for expedition of this sort. A small force of picked troops under a select officer and supported by a body of well drilled and well armed police...would be likely to be more successful in such a country against such an enemy or the Looshais than a force having a military organization commanded by an officer of high rank hampered by impeditions inseparable from a force of that character". These observations, it will soon be seen, was totally cast in the military authorities. For Lord Mayo's policy see Sir William Hunter, Life of the Earl of Mayo: the Fourth Viceroy of India, Vol. I, London 1875, pp

15 67 Bourchier from Cachar against the eastern Lushais, principally the group of villages in 31 and around the Champhai valley. The Lushai Expedition: Kamhau-Manipur Relations Manipur was once again required to cooperate, this time with Brigadier- General Bourchier's column with a small contingent of troops. It was believed, largely on account of the views of John Edgar, Cachar's highly regarded Deputy Commissioner, that Manipur was in a better position than the military in Cachar to exert pressure on the Lushais east of the Tuivai river. Bourchier's idea was to have Manipur's troops occupy positions along its southern frontier towards the Lushai hills, with a force stationed at Moirang to operate from that side if necessary. On 19 October 1871 he thus wrote to Major-General William Frost Nuthall, the officiating Political Agent in Manipur: 1 have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a land of posts along the southern frontier of Munnipoor and keeping in the valley near Moirang a small compact force capable of supporting itself to act against the most eastern tribes should information reach you that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdong and others against whom the column I command with advance. The selection of posts was left to Nuthall, but he was advised, "the summits of the ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions extending a far ^' The literature on the Lushai Expedition is fairly extensive: Lord Roberts, Forty One Years in India, 2 Vols. London 1897; A S Reid Chin-Lushai Land, Calcutta 1893; R G Woodthorpe, The Lushai Expedition, , London, 1873; also see appendices in Mackenzie, op.ci7.pp

16 68 eastward (as possible)." Nuthall was to judge for himself the necessity of any advance beyond Moirang. Nuthall did not consider Moirang sufficiently advanced to the south to obtain any information of the Kamhaus, much less controlling them or of rendering prompt cooperation to Bourchier should this be required. Bourchier accordingly allowed him to move down to Tseklapi, and spelt out the task for the Manipur contingent: It is obvious that the eastern tribes will require watching, and this will be the special duty of the Contingent, and will be of a delicate nature. Kamhaus present attitude towards the other tribes might be termed by us to maximum advantage and it is to be hoped that the state of things will continue, but on the other hand, should he undoubtedly have cast in his lot with the other tribes you will be in a position to attack him. In accordance with these instructions Nuthall got Maharaja Chandrakirti Singh to strengthen the frontier defences in the south, four of the twelve military posts he established being located in the east north of Kamhau. By 15 December 1871 over eighteen hundred Manipuri troops and two hundred and fifty Thado auxiliaries, accompanied by two majors and General Nuthall, who was in virtual command, occupied Tseklapi. Before the Contingent left Imphal a Kamhau deputation waited upon the Political Agent offering themselves for the Lushai expedition and seeking permission to be allowed to proceed forthwith to attack the eastern Lushai villages. This Nuthall forbade. But on being told by the Manipuris that the Kamhau men had on his refiisal were overheard to say that they would do as they pleased, ordered them to send in hostages by 15 December, to "enable us to curb their warlike proclivities". Nuthall ^- FPAP August 1872, No. 83, Nuthall to Aitchison, 12 April 1872, submitting final report on the Manipur Contingent.

17 69 seems to have been influenced on this by the two majors. When the hostages did not make their appearance, they expressed to Nuthall their apprehension of Kamhau's intentions that he had always been a doubtful ally, had never come in himself or rendered implicit submission. They urged upon him the need to move the force further south to make its influence felt by the Kamhaus and prevent any hostile design on their part.^^ General Nuthall accordingly began to survey the southern frontier and on 24 December reached Chivu. "The superiority of this position", he later reported, "from the object we had in view, viz, to watch and restrain Kanhow, was so apparent that I alone resolved to remain here". And remain the Contingent did for the next two months, anxiously awaiting developments as Bourchier's column advanced on to the eastern Lushai hills and inflicted heavy punishment in villages implicated in raids into Cachar. By February 1872 sickness appeared in the Manipuri camp and provisions were running short. By the close of February 1872 the Lushai Expedition was over and Bourchier had returned to Silchar.^'* On 6 March Nuthall received a communication from him that the expedition having been brought to a successful conclusion the services of the Contingent was no longer required. The next day the Nuthall and the Manipur troops began their march back to Imphal. On the 7 the Contingent met with what Nuthall called an "unexpected adventure". That morning several hundred Kamhaus, of whom more than a hundred were armed with muskets suddenly appeared in the Manipuri camp. Among them was " Ibid ^^ A S Reid, Chin-Lushai Land, Calcutta 1893, Reprint Aizawl 1976, pp.26-28

18 70 Go Khaw Thang, instantly recognised by one of the Thados as the chief responsible for a raid into Manipur a year ago. The two Manipuri majors, after some queries told Go Khaw Thang that since he had violated the Political Agent's orders and moved into Lushai territory and raided their villages he should at once proceed and meet Nuthall who was several miles ahead towards Moirang. After failing to persuade the Kamhau chief to meet Nuthall the two majors decided to apprehend him. How this done, is thus described by Nuthall: The Majors then...got the Chiefs into familiar conversation, handed them a percussion marked to try, and asked to try theirs, and having on their way discharged the three muskets of the three Chiefs at once had their seized, whereupon Kokatung, putting his forefinger in his mouth, gave a war alarm (a whistle), and his force stood to arms, and a momentary struggle ensued; the sepoys however overpowered and made prisoners of 56, and took 52 muskets, with injury to themselves of only four men wounded, all of whom are doing well.^^ The prisoners were then marched off to Imphal and were placed in irons in jail. Chandrakirti Singh expected to use them in the event of future troubles with the Kamhaus. Nuthall was elated that the "loss of so many arms to the tribe will tend to break its power and restrain its preying upon the Lushais at this time of their weakness", and hoped that the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy would acknowledge "the judicious and resolute conduct" of the two majors. Both Bourchier and Edgar condemned their conduct as treachery. The apprehension of Go Khaw Thang and the two chiefs who had accompanied him along with their followers and the refugees brings out the '^ FPAP August 1872, No.79; From Political Agent, Manipur to Officer Commanding Cachar Column, 13 March 1872.

19 71 complicated nature of the relations of the Kamhau-Sukte with Manipur on one hand and with the eastern Lushais on the other. Manipur had been smarting under the failure of the expedition in 1855 against the raids two years earlier by the very same Go Khaw Thang. The peace that Colonel McCulloch patched between Manipur and the Kamhaus after the expedition proved short lived. In the ten years since then there were as many as six raids into Manipur, and after Kam Hau's death in 1868 another three, all attributed to the late chief and his successors. In all these raids large numbers of Manipuri subjects mainly Kukis of the Thado group, were carried off Thus Manipur used the Lushai Expedition and the military movement south to deal with their bitter enemies, the Kamhaus, the apprehension of Go Khaw Thang being an unexpected bonus. General Nuthall who stood in for Dr Robert Brown on the latter's furlough, had little experience of the politics of the Manipur fi"ontiers and failed to understand the motives of the Manipuri majors. He was at any rate more concerned with the Lushais. Feuds between the Kamhaus and the Lushais, as shown earlier, had been long standing. Many Kamhau villages had been established near Lushai areas; Bourchier's column encountered one, Engo situated at 6,700 feet above sea level near the Champhai valley, composed enlist of Kamhaus. Some Suktes had of course migrated after Kam Hau had established his authority and had settled under the Lushai chief Vanhuailiana. From 1869 onwards when the attention of the Lushais were diverted towards Cachar, whose tea gardens they constantly plundered, "Kanhow and other tribes" as Edgar reported, "were getting more daring in their aggression on their

20 72 villages".^^ There were reports, for instance, in early February 1872 that "Shindoos and Kanhows" had attacked and cut up two villages, one belonging to Vanhnuailiana's brother and the other to his son, killing many and carrying off captives. ^ Even as Bourchier was on his way towards Lushai chief Lalbura's village it was sacked by the Kamhaus.^* After the defeat of the Lushais by Bourchier the Sukte-Kamhaus who were under the protection of the former decided to return to their old homes; a thousand immediately sought the protection of the Kamhaus.^^ It was these refugees escorted by Go Khaw Thang and his warriors whom the Manipur majors had encountered and apprehended. This was Edgar's version, and from the available evidence appears to have been the truth: They evidently went into the midst of the camp in perfect reliance (Edgar said of the chief and his men) on the friendlies of the Murmipoorees, for, as the result showed, they put within reach of the latter the women and children as well as the property of the refugees. Their suspicion was not even aroused when the Muimipooree officers fired off the muskets of the chiefs, and when each armed man was surrounded by a group of three sepoys. I do not believe that the Soktes had the slightest intention of attacking the Munnipooree camp. The charge was in all probably afterwards invented by the Majors to excuse their own conduct. This evident that the latter could not resist the temptation of getting possession of the refugee, for the Munnipoorees are even more eager than the hill chiefs themselves to get hold of Kookie and Naga subjects.'*'* Ibid, No. 70; Edgar to Commissioner Dacca Division, 3 April ^'' FPAP March 1871, No.548; Telegram, Political Agent Manipur (Dr Brown) to Foreign Secretary, Government of India. ^* The Pioneer of 7 May 1872 thus reported what Bourchier's column saw on 17 February when they reached the village: "Other invaders had been there before them; and signs of war and slaughter greeted on everyside. The (temporary) withdrawal of the Manipur contingent from the frontier owing to sickness, had set free the Soktes Kookies- old enemies of the Lushai, who, seizing the opportunity and knowing the panic caused by the advance of the British column made fierce onslaught on Lalboorah under the guidance of Kamhau, their chief. Mackenzie, op.cit, vide Appendix K, p.580. ^' The punishment of the Lushai villages had in fact led to migration of the captive Thados and Suktes in large numbers into Manipur. *" FPAP August 1872, Nos.70, Appendix C; From Edgar to Brigadier-General Bourchier, 21 March 1872.

21 73 A month later a Kamhau embassy led by one Kai Khual but sent in by Chief Za Tual was in Manipur to plead for the release of their chief He was informed that so long as a single subject of Manipur remained in their hands no proposition of any kind would be entertained."*^ In October 1872 a second embassy consisting once again Kai Khual and others arrived in Manipur bringing with them four women captured a year earlier and an elephant tusk for the Maharaja. From one of the four women. Colonel Mowbray Thompson, Nuthall's successor as Political Agent, learnt that the object of the first embassy was to ascertain if whether Manipur intended to release Go Khaw Thang, if not they would attack and destroy all Manipuri villages in their frontier hills. That summer rumours spread in the frontier villages of the possibility of a Kamhau invasion of Manipur. In September a thousand Thados had actually migrated to territories under Burmese control to avoid getting involved in the Manipur-Kamhau conflict."*^ Kai Khual denied this saying that they could never hope to cope with Manipur in arms. He was told by Thompson that: It is my wish that peace should be made between your tribe and Muimipoor without further bloodshed. As you appear to have been the aggressor in attacking Murmipoorie villages, it is your duty to make the first fiiendly advance, and Munnipoor as the more powerfiil state has a right to demand you shall do so. On your part you should promise by a certain date the captives will be returned, and that you will keep peace towards Munnipoor and her tributaries for the future. If on going back to your Chief he will promise to do the above, I will arrange with the Murmipoor authorities for meeting your good intentions halfway, if on the other hand he will not consent, I fear the Munnipoor authorities will not rest contented until they have taken their Sepoys to Yatole's village and punished your tribe for their misconduct, by 41 FPAP January 1873, Nos ; Political Agent Manipur to Secretary Foreign Department, Government of India, 2 October 1872; see also General Nuthall letter of 25 April. "*- Ibid. See Office Note, January 1873.

22 74 burning their homes, destroying their stores of grains and driving off their cattle. The Manipuri officials, however, took the Kamhau threat seriously and began military preparations with the object of sending an expedition into the Kamhau country in the winter. John Edgar, who was asked for his comments on the situation on account of his unrivalled knowledge of the frontier and the tribes, was convinced that "the Munnipoori officials, and possibly the chief himself, are determined to avoid a peaceful settlement of their dispute with Kanhow" and that: If they try honestly to make term with the Sooktees, they might be successful, for the latter had shown a desire to avoid fighting, which could scarcely have been expected after the way in which were treated by the Munnipooris during the Looshai Expedition.'*'* Edgar sounded a note of warning that Manipur should not be allowed to attack the Kamhaus who would "certainly make reprisal on the hill people and so give the Munnipoori officials an excuse for attacking Kamhow". The Government of hidia anxious to avoid any complications on this part of the frontier particularly in view of the proposed topographical survey south of Cachar accordingly directed the Political Agent to sort out Manipuris relations with the Kamhau-Sukte. ^ The Maharaja was to be given to understand that any improvoked hostilities with tribes beyond his boundary may involve him in difficulties with Burma and will not receive the approval of the Government of India. ^/Wc?. 2 October *"* Ibid, Note by Edgar on "Kamhow and Munnipoor", 20 December ''^ Ibid, see note by Charles Aitchison, 18 January '*^ Ibid, Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, to Political Agent, Manipur, 30 January 1873.

23 75 Fortunately, Thompson was able, so it seemed, to win the confidence of the Kamhaus. Before the communication of the Government of India reached Manipur, Kai Khual had returned with twenty-six captives. Thompson was able to prevail upon the Maharaja to reciprocate by liberating an equal number of Kamhau captives. He thus reported to the Government of India: I have been more successful with them than I anticipated. I thought from the sullen manner in which they left me that there was trouble in store for Munnipore, but two days ago I was pleasantly surprised by seeing the same deputation return, accompanied by some 26 captives they made from the Munnipoor Naga tributaries as far back as two years ago. They acted on the advice I gave them. I have suggested the Raja of Munnipore to at once liberate 26 of the captives, which he so treacherously made last March. The Munnipoorie authorities are pleased at my success, and say they have never known the Kamhow tribe to restore captives before. Evidently the success of the Political Agent in setting the border problems on the path of peace removed the imminent danger^ another confrontation on Manipur's.^''"'^ southern border. A (third) Kamhau deputation, once again under Kai Khual, again returned to Manipur during the latter part of January 1873 bringing with him 14 other captives. Go Khaw Thang had in the meanwhile succumbed to the rigours of prison life in Imphal, but this did not prevent a settlement. On 16 March 1873 under the aegis of the Political Agent, the Kamhau deputation and the Maharaja of Manipur signed a peace treaty on the banks of river at Imphal. On the following day Thompson informed the Government of India what he had achieved and how: I then told him (Kai Khual) I would arrange with the Raja for the restoration of ten of his clansmen, that being at the rate of one adult for every two children, and also, that if his tribe was prepared to swear allegiance and fealty to '*'' Ibid, From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, 15 December 1872.

24 76 Munnipore, I should not insist on their leaving Munnipore territory, but would use my endeavours with the Raja to persuade him to acknowledge them as his subjects, and advise him to release the son of their late Chief Kokatung, who was in jail, and with him swear peace and friendship for the future. To this, Kikoul agreed, and said, we want peace with Munnipore, and shall be done as you say if Kokatung's son is released, and his dead father's skull and bones made over to us. I did not like this latter part of the arrangement at all, but on referring the matter to the Munnipore authorities, they, after wasting some time in considering how they should act, decided in following my advice, and said, unless we give up Kokatung's skull and bones, there will be no use in swearing peace at all, for the Sooktees or Kamhows will never be satisfied without the remains of their dead are given up to them. I have therefore complied with both their wishes, and peace was sworn yesterday on the banks of the river Eemphal, when, after the oath was repeated, first by a Munnipooris, and then Kokatung's son, a live dog was cut in halves by the latter, and then all of the ten captives, and Kikoul the chief, drank gun-powder water, which completed the ceremony, and in the evening the whole of those released took their departure for their native hills. According to the agreement, both parties restored captives to each other. Kai Khual also secured the release of the son of their late chief Go Khaw Thang and, what he persistently insisted, the bones of his dead father. However, there were eight more Kamhau captives in the possession of the Maharaja, which was agreed, would be restored after the release of the ten captives still supposed to be with the Kamhaus. Though the Manipur Durbar was very anxious to get Za Tual to come and take oath of allegiance to the Maharaja before they would release Go Khaw Thang's sons, the Political Agent dissuaded them from ftirther insisting as such a proceeding might lead to complications with Burma. Neither the Political Agent nor the Manipuris realised that the Kamhaus were merely temporising, only to obtain the release of their chiefs and the remains of their great leader. Memories of their treatment by the Manipuris "* FPAP April 1873 No.226; From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, 17 March 1873.