Al Qaeda Affiliates Operating in Failed States: The Next Front in the War on Terror

Transcription

1 2012 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference Al Qaeda Affiliates Operating in Failed States: The Next Front in the War on Terror Dr. Anthony Celso Department of Security Studies and Criminal Justice Angelo State University San Angelo, Texas Abstract The essay employs a comparative analysis to examine the future of Al Qaeda affiliates operating in Somalia, Yemen and the Maghreb. Among the issues examined are the impact of failed states, tribal structures, criminal enterprise, and counter terror policies on affiliate armed and financial capability. The paper argues that Al Qaeda affiliates are increasingly confined to the periphery of collapsed and weak states and their future regeneration may be contingent on the emergence of power vacuums caused by regime overthrow. Despite such opportunities, Al Qaeda affiliates are likely to fail because of the effect of internal factionalism, the de-legitimating effect of their criminal activities and the impact of domestic and international counter terror policies. I. Introduction: The Emergence of Al Qaeda Affiliates in Failed States The rise of Al Qaeda affiliates represents how jihadism has morphed into a multi-front struggle. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Shabaab represent an acceleration of jihadist efforts to attack near and far enemies. 1 Often hailed as an Al Qaeda success making the war on terror more difficult, this is far from the truth. The alliance between Al Qaeda central and its affiliates represent mutual failure and frustration as local and international jihadists have failed to achieve their objectives. The collapse of Al Qaeda s Taliban protected sanctuary and the disruption of its centralized command and control system after the U.S. invasion led to the organization s post 9-11 strategy to open multiple fronts. 2 This involved a variety of tactics including the encouragement of lone wolf terrorist attacks in Western countries and supporting Islamist insurgents fighting foreign occupation forces. Frustrated in their inability to dislodge native regimes regional Islamists leapt at the opportunity to revive their struggle by aligning with Al Qaeda. These alliances hoped to turn singular failure into mutual success. Al Qaeda s relationship with these groups was built upon an indigenous tradition of radical jihadism. 3 Prior Al Qaeda presence in these areas and past joint efforts facilitated this union. These networks have risen in counties ravaged by civil war and guerrilla insurgencies. Arab veterans of the Afghan campaign against the Soviets have played formative roles in Al Shabaab, AQAP and AQIM and have contributed to an internationalization of the jihadist war. 4 Somalia, Algeria and Yemen have years of chronic warfare that, in some cases, led to state implosion. Somalia is a dire case lawless since 1991 with Al Shabaab in control of two-thirds of the country. 5 Yemen has been plagued by numerous insurgencies and is bordering on state collapse. Algeria, similarly, was convulsed by a decade long civil war that became the impetus for a variety of radical Salafijihadist movements of which AQIM is the latest manifestation. Al Qaeda franchises developed in these countries because of chronic state failure, autocratic government and tribal conflicts. These groups are strongest in remote areas where central authority is weak and heavily resented. AQIM and AQAP have also benefited by tribal alliances and criminal activity that give them a secure base of operations. 6 Emerging as autonomous movements committed to native insurgencies, these affiliates have branched out in attacking the far enemy of the West. Al Qaeda s incorporation of these groups has resulted in simultaneous wars against internal and external enemies. These groups target Western interests inviting concern from American and European security agencies. The three cases have involved cross border attacks and the targeting of Western interests inviting retaliation. Al Qaeda and its franchise operations seek an equitable distribution of labor: local groups gain by receiving training and skilled fighters, while Al Qaeda central enlarges its field of operations to strike at Western targets. Al Shabaab, AQAP and AQIM actions have the trademark (IED and suicide bombings) of Al Qaeda central. 7 This cross fertilization of activities, however, has failed to stem the decline of regional jihadist networks. Al Qaeda branches are confined to remote areas on the margin of failed states. The variations between Al Qaeda affiliates have flourished in failed states and they have waged a simultaneous jihadist struggle against near and far enemies /12 $ IEEE DOI /EISIC

2 affiliates reflect their different ethnic, tribal, geographic and political contexts. Figure one provides a snapshot of these variances. What follows is an effort to look at these differences as well as their similarities. Terror Network Figure One Group integration with Tribes, Sources of Finance and Enemies. Al Shabaab Minor integration into tribal clans as Al Shabaab coerces of the local population. American European Somali Diaspora financial support, control over Kismayo port, tax on local population and protection money from Somali pirates and traders. Group targets near enemy of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and far enemy of Ethiopian, AU troops and the United States who support the TFG. AQAP AQIM II. Al Shabaab Excellent integration of fighters into clan and tribal structure. Saudi charity support and arms dealing. Targets near enemy of Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the far enemy of the United States that serves as patron for both governments Moderate integration of foreign fighters into Sahel Tuareg tribes. Kidnapping and ransom of Western workers and tourists, protection money from facilitation of drug, tobacco, and arms trades. Targets include near enemy of Magreb and Sahelian states (especially Algeria and Mali). Far enemy of the United States and France targeted for support of regional governments. The origins of this organization lies in the Islamist Salafist groups in the 1970 s whose clerics were trained in Saudi Arabia. Formed to oppose the Barre dictatorship Al-Ittihad al-islamiyya (AIAI) mobilized in the 1980 s to transplant Saudi Wahhabism in a country steeped in moderate Sufi traditions. 8 The group s agenda changed after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991 and the disintegration of central authority as warring clans carved out fiefdoms. The country s descent into warlordism and draught led to massive starvation and death. UN famine relief efforts were complicated by warlord seizures of grain supplies that tragically contributed to the severity of the civil war. UN peace keepers diversified their mission in a failed effort to disarm the militias. Participating U.S. forces were caught in a deadly maelstrom dramatized by the downing of two Blackhawk helicopters and the death of 19 soldiers in an effort to capture a Somali warlord. Operating in the region, bin Laden s network used Sudan to support radical Islamist groups fighting UN peacekeepers. The region would be convulsed by terror incidents in 1998 including the use of Al Qaeda African operatives to bomb the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 9 This event was Al Qaeda s first significant attack against U.S. interests indicating the global reach of the network. Washington s subsequent retaliation (including striking terror camps in Afghanistan and destroying a Sudanese chemical plant suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons) failed to deter Al Qaeda. Islamist warlords formed the Islamic Court Union (ICU) in the 1990 s a factor that contributed to Al Shabaab s formation. The ICU fought against the Western supported Transitional Federal Government (TFC) throughout the decade. The ICU s aim was to centralize authority, impose Shariah law and eliminate disorder. Al Shabaab s emerged as an ICU militia and due to Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia the group became more extreme in its jihadist ambitions. 10 The TFG s patchwork alliance of moderate warlords supported by Ethiopian troops who feared that an Al Shabaab victory would inspire Somali irredentists in their country fought pitched battles against the Islamists. Support for Al Shabaab by Somali Diaspora communities in the West resulted in money and jihadists to fight Ethiopian troops and the TFG. 11 The Somali community in Minneapolis was especially active and became an active recruiting base for young Somali-Americans to join the fight. They would be followed by Arab jihadists aligned with Al Qaeda. Al Shabaab s insurgency and martyrdom operations took a considerable toll on the Ethiopian army which suffered over a thousand dead between 2007 and Many Al Shabaab leaders and foot soldiers were veterans of the Afghan campaign and Taliban protected terror training camps. Foreign fighters play a key role in the organization s Shura (Leadership Council) and have redirected the group s strategy toward greater Islamic militancy and the use of suicide bombers. 12 Some observers see increase cooperation between Al Shabaab and AQAP. 13 Many of these fighters are heavily resented by the local populations because of the group s use of forced marriages involving these Jihadists. 14 The prominence of Arab jihadists in the movement and the notoriety of the 1998 embassy attacks would not be ignored by U.S. policymakers. There have been numerous American attacks against Somali operatives including a 2002 Predator drone strike and special forces operations in 2005 and 2009 that have killed key leaders. 15 Al Shabaab s internationalist agenda includes support for Somali irredentist movements in Ethiopia and Kenya and the organization envisions an Islamic caliphate in the region, Guerrilla operations continue against the FTC and African Union troops who replaced the Ethiopians a few years ago. 264

3 Since Ethiopia s 2009 withdraw, external support by the Somali diaspora community has declined as many have become repulsed by the organization s barbaric tactics. Al Shabaab s has failed to learn from from Al Qaeda in Iraq s (AQI) failures and their activities have similarly alienated local clans. The group s implementation of Shariah law (amputations for theft are common), its brutalization of the local Sufi population and interference with global food relief operations have reduced its popular appeal. 16 Nonplused by its declining popular support, Al Shabaab declared fidelity to Al Qaeda in Half of its Shura council is populated by foreigners exacerbating its dependence on Salafist-jihadist doctrine and inviting greater resistance by Sufi Muslims who have formed militias to combat the Islamists. 17 The group continues to impose zakat or a tax on the local population and earns protection money from Somali pirates and control over the country s main port of Kismayo. The Salafist-jihadist Al Shabaab has expanded beyond Somalia s borders with attacks in Kenya and Uganda during the 2010 World Cup. 18 The bombings were the group s retaliation for these countries participation in the AU force supporting the FTG. Al Shabaab s wider sphere of operations has led to fears of an escalation of the conflict and the potential radicalization of Muslim populations in the region. Despite such anxieties and the group s control over much of the South-Central part of the country, Al Shabaab s has suffered recent reversals. Its forces have been driven from Mogadishu by AU and FTG forces. Recent U.S. strikes have devastated the movement by killing key leaders. The group s precarious existence mirrors that of other Al Qaeda branches. III. AQAP Yemen is the ancestral home of bin Laden and a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. Salafism is firmly embedded in many tribes and radical Islamist discourse has resonance in the population. 19 Many Yemenis fought in the killing fields of international jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq. The county was also the site of previous Al Qaeda attacks including a failed 1999 plot against the USS Sullivan and the successful 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. AQAP s growth in Yemen can be traced back to the Saudi government s 2003 crackdown on Al Qaeda operatives. 20 The repression of the Saudi Al Qaeda network was in retaliation for the spate of attacks against the Kingdom s foreign workers complexes that killed hundreds including many Saudis. Using established escape routes and smuggling networks, many Al Qaeda operatives escaped to Yemen. Saudi fighters in Yemen have historical precedents. Bin Laden set up camp in the country to train jihadists to fight Marxist South Yemen during the country s 1994 civil war. 21 Al Qaeda has been present in the country for decades and its network has tribal alliances with clans opposed to the central government. These connections played key roles in the recruitment of fighters for the Iraqi jihad. 22 Convulsed by secessionist movements, Yemen has been the scene of chronic civil war. Despite the country s1994 unification, Yemen remains the quintessential failed state with multiple insurgencies including a Shi ite northern revolt, rebellions by anti-government tribes, and Southerners clamoring for independence. Al Qaeda has shrewdly alternated in its support for these insurrections to maximize its strategic position. 23 Lawlessness pervades the country with the release of numerous jihadists who have the will to fight. AQAP s ranks were augmented by a 2006 jail break in which Al Qaeda agents escaped. 24 Many tribes support Al Qaeda as a marriage of convenience and the terror organization has successfully imbedded its leaders into Yemen s tribal structure. Al Qaeda s support for Northern Sunni tribes fighting Shia rebels and its assistance for anti-government tribes has augmented its popular appeal. AQAP has not repeated the failures of AQI and Al Shabaab and has firmly incorporated its foreign fighters in local insurgencies. 25 AQAP s international agenda includes targeting of foreigners (many foreigners have been kidnapped and killed) and it has attacked the Saudi and Yemeni governments. The failed 2009 plot to kill Saudi deputy interior minister underscores its dangerous capabilities. The network has made a major effort to recruit foreign jihadists. Born in New Mexico the late radical imam Anwar al-awlaki reportedly met 9-11 attackers when he preached at a California mosque. While initially condemning 9/11, he became radicalized by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 26 He came to Yemen in 2005 preaching jihadist causes. Awlaki became a celebrity in jihadist circles because of his English language e-magazine Inspire and his involvement in numerous attacks and plots. Among the most notorious were the 2009 Fort Hood shooting where 13 American service men were killed by Awlaki acolyte Colonel Hassan Nidal, the aborted 2009 Christmas Day bombing by Nigerian believer Farouk Abdulmultallb and the cargo jet bombing plot foiled by British and Saudi intelligence tow years ago. The Yemeni-American became enemy number one in 2009 and was considered to be more dangerous than bin Laden. After a number of failed assassination attempts, Awlaki s death via a Predator drone strike in 2010 was a blow to its international operations. Whether AQAP can recover its international capability is unknown. AQAP has many internal enemies. Its warfare against the Shia rebels and pro-government tribes leave it in a vulnerable position. Even its tribal alliances can be undone by state bribes and coercion. Despite such problems, last year s insurrection against th government and the end of President s Saleh 33 year rule allows AQAP a strategic opening. 27 The resulting power vacuum has given AQAP a sanctuary in towns governed by supporting tribal warlords. The Obama Administration seeks to groom a successor government dominated by former regime officials committed to fight Islamic extremism. Denying AQAP sanctuary is an Administration priority. Failure to achieve this objective, could give AQAP a larger sphere of operation to attack Western interests. Some reports indicate that AQAP has terror training camps in coastal Abiyan Provence and in remote mountainous regions. 28 AQAP has increased the pace of attacks against government forces (killing hundreds) and the central government in Sana has failed to commit substantial troops in outlying areas because of fears that instability will spread to the capital. 265

4 IV. AQIM The Arab veterans of the Afghan campaign against the Soviets who played key roles in Al Shabaab and AQAP have an enduring legacy in the Maghreb. 29 Algerians were in the forefront of numerous campaigns in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. These fighters would also be featured prominently in native insurgencies. The Arab Afghan supporters of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) were a dynamic factor in the carnage that swept Algeria in the 1990 s. 30 Home to a number of Islamist organizations that gained political ascendance in the 1980 s, the Algerian Islamic National Front (FIS) won municipal elections and swept the Parliamentary vote in Fearing that the FIS would impose an Iranian like clerical state, the military seized power in 1991 denying the Islamists political power. The Islamists whom were driven underground mounted a brutal guerrilla and terror campaign. Due to the predominance of Afghan war veterans, the GIA became the dominant insurgent group. Driven by nihilistic rage and takfir doctrine that held all opponents as apostates, the GIA wiped out entire villages. 31 Hundreds of thousands died during the Islamist rebellion and he government s equally brutal counter insurgency campaign. Support by radical Islamists among Europe s Algerian Diaspora community contributed to GIA violence against France for its support for the Algerian government. 32 The organization s terror campaign spilled over to France with 1994 s Air France high jacking in Algiers and a 1995 Paris metro bombing that killed six people. The GIA s barbaric tactics soon backfired. Their popular support evaporated and this contributed to the movement s fragmentation with some factions entering into dialogue with Algiers and others continuing to fight. 33 The GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) formed from the reformist wing of the GIA redefined the insurgency by targeting only government forces. The group s ties with Al Qaeda would strengthen GSPC s global outlook over time. 34 Algerians were important players in the Iraqi jihad with the GSPC recruiting many fighters. GSPC leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and AQI leader Abu Musab Zarqawi s close partnership culminated in the sending of many Algerian jihadists to fight U.S. forces in Iraq. 35 Algerians were pivotal in AQI s campaign against U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies. The drain of Algerian fighters weakened the native insurgency. The government s counter terror operations and amnesty agreements, moreover, had a crippling effect on the Islamist insurgency. 36 Bloodied by government security forces, the GSPC moved many of its operation to the Northeastern Mountains and to the remote Sahel region where it had greater freedom of action. Aided by tribal alliances, the Islamists began to kidnap and ransom Western tourists and workers. Recognizing the potential utility of a terror network that spanned from Europe to the Sahel, Al Qaeda formed a 2006 alliance with the GSPC. The alignment culminated in AQIM s 2007 creation and resulted in a short term increase in attacks against government forces and Western interests. 37 AQIM s attacks against the Algiers Constitutional Court and UN building in 2007 resulted in an intense counter terror campaign. Western policy makers took note with France leading the way in security operations. Concern over AQIM s targeting of Westerners in the Maghreb and the Sahel inspired the U.S. to form the Trans Sahara Counter Terror Partnership designed to coordinate and augment antiterror operations of regional states. 38 Despite Al Qaeda central s support and the financial rents from kidnapping and smuggling operations, AQIM has failed to seriously complicate Algerian security. Confined to remote areas of the Northeastern Mountains and the Sahel, the group is highly fractured and its criminal operations (tobacco, arms, and drugs) have degraded its jihadist credentials. 39 The contrast between AQIM s aspirations and its capability is striking. Numerous threats of war against colonial France have resulted in only kidnapping and killing of hostages. AQIM s calls for the re-conquest of Al Andaluz have failed to culminate in attacks on the Spanish mainland or assaults against its Spanish colonial enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. AQIM has been given a boost by the overthrown of Qaddafi. The post war chaos, the presence of Islamist militias and the uncontrolled arms market offer some succor for the revitalization of the movement. 40 Events in Mali replete with a Tuareg rebellion that has control of the North could offer AQIM a substantial terror sanctuary. AQIM s relationship w ith the Islamist militia Ansar Dine is especially troubling given the recent declaration of an independent Tuareg Islamic state in northern Mali that could be a major jihadist recruitment and training center in the region. V. Conclusion AQIM, Al Shabaab and AQAP have progressed from early alliance with to a formal alignment with Al Qaeda. More symbolic than organizational, Al Qaeda s Somali, Yemeni and Maghreb franchises are loosely coordinated and the groups are largely autonomous. 41 Al Shabaab and AQAP have the most advanced relationship because the Yemenis and Saudis have historically played key roles in the East African terror organizations growth and tactics. 42 The precarious existence of these networks that remain hunted by internal and external enemies also impedes their effective coordination. Al Shabaab, AQAP and AQIM operate in the periphery of failed or failing states and rely on criminal finance. Their dependence on illicit activities is highly problematic and it has contributed to a degradation of their Islamist puritanical image. Harassed by security services and U.S. Predator drone strikes, these networks face substantial obstacles. These pressures have exacerbated internal divisions and intra group competition which in the past has been the undoing of many jihadist organizations. Even if major sanctuaries develop in South Yemen and North Mali, Al Qaeda affiliates will encounter internal and external opposition that in the past has weakened radical Islamist groups. Their resort to extreme violence and ideological intransigence invariably creates local enemies and foreign pressure. The collapse of the GIA in Algeria whose ideological extremism produced widespread revulsion may be a presentment of the things to come for AQIM, AQAP and Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab and AQIM face declining popularity due to their extreme violence and the inability of their Salafist ideas to gain resonance in the local population. Political turmoil in Yemen offers AQAP some hope for revitalization as security services fragment and the new government is confounded by chronic disorder. Despite this opportunity, AQAP plans are likely to be confounded by the Arab Spring protest movement and the opening it gives to Islamists to negotiate a peaceful, not violent, path to power. The psychological blow of Osama bin Laden s killing and the fragmentation of Al Qaeda central deny AQAP inspiration and financial support. These factors are likely to limit its operational and motivational capability of AQAP and other AQ affiliates. 266

5 References 1 Rick Ozzie Nelson and Thomas M. Sanderson, A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Report Report of the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program and the CSIC Transnational Threats. Article available at 2 Christopher Swift, From the Periphery to Core: Foreign Fighters and the Evolution of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula available at nfightersarabia.pdf 3 4 David Shinn, Al Shabaab s Foreign Threat to Somalia in Orbis (Spring 2011) pgs ; Peter Pham, Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Orbis (Spring 2011) pgs Andrew Le Sage, Somalia s Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock in NDU Strategic Forum: No 257 (June 2010) available at Shinn, ibid 6 Rob Wise, Al Shabaab: AQAM Futures Project Case Studies Series available at Swift, ibid., 7 8 Shinn, ibid., 9 Jacueline Page, Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia-Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications available at developmentofradicaljihadism 10 Andrew le Sage, ibid., 11 Rob Wise, ibid., 12 David Shinn, ibid., David Shinn, ibid., 15 Christopher Azalone, Al Shabaab Setbacks in Somalia (October 31, 2011). Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point available at 16 David Shinn, ibid., 17 Christopher Azalone, ibid., 18 Rob Wise, ibid., 19 Danielle Sheldon, Al Qaeda in Yemen-Evolving Threat (3/5/2010) available at pingthreats 20 Christopher Swift, ibid., 21 Danielle Sheldon, ibid., 22 Alistair Harris, Exploiting Grievances: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Program Number 11 (May 2010) available at Christopher Swift, ibid., Christopher Swift, ibid., 26 Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al Qaeda Ideologue with Influence in the West. NEFTA Foundation (February 5, 2009) available at 27 Bruce Riedel, Al Qaeda Smells Blood (September 9, 2011) available at aeda_riedel 28 Danielle Sheldon, ibid., 29 William Thornbury and Jaclyn Levy, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CSIS AQAM Futures Case Study 4 (September 2011) available at 30 Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War (Columbia University Press: New York City, 2000) 31 Andre Le Sage, The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb:. INSS Strategic Forum (July 2011) available at 32 Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe (Prometheus Books: New York City, 2006) 33 Stephen Harmon, From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of Algerian Islamist Terrorist Groups Concerned African Scholars Bulletin No. 85 (Spring 2010). Available at armon.pdf 34 Harmon, ibid., 35 Diogo Novio, Islamist Terrorism in Algeria: From GIA to AQIM. IPRIS Viewpoints (February 2010). Available at vp.pdf 36 Martinez, ibid., 37 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Australian National Security available at 38 Andre Le Sage, The Evolving Threat from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, ibid., 39 Wolfgram Lacher, Organized Crime and Terrorism in the Sahel German Institute for International Security Affairs. SWP Comments (January 2011) available at 40 Christopher M. Blanchard, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy CSR Report for Congress (December 8, 2011) available at 41 Rick Ozzie Nelson, ibid., 42 Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb Foreign Relations Committee Report to the Senate (January 21, 2010) available at ommittee/imo/media/doc/yemen.pdf 267

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