To what extent can Iran be accused of destabilising Iraq since 2003?

Transcription

1 To what extent can Iran be accused of destabilising Iraq since 2003? Caitlin Smith Abstract The issue of Iranian involvement in Iraq since 2003 is particularly salient considering the position of Iran on the international stage as something of a pariah, and in light of recent coalition troop withdrawals. It is relatively clear that Iraq has been unstable since the 2003 invasion, yet theorists disagree on the causal factors of such instability. This paper will consider Iran to have played a fundamentally important role in post-2003 Iraq, having affected both stability and instability to its own ends. I will contend that Iran s primary objectives in Iraq since 2003 have been to ensure the primacy of Iran as an economic partner (by way of a Shi a government), and to ensure Western troop withdrawal. Iran can be accused of destabilizing Iraq, but only to the extent that an unstable Iraq is in its own interests, and it would be erroneous to ignore the sometimes stabilizing effect that Iranian involvement has had on the situation in Iraq; not to mention the countless other factors affecting instability, including inherent sectarian divisions and the role of other states. Keywords: Iran, Iraq, instability, involvement, causes POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

2 [i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Quds Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq General David Petraeus (2007) Iraq, since the invasion of 2003 has not had a stable government, nor has it been socially, religiously, ethnically, or economically stable; this goes almost without saying. However, what is not so clear, not to mention agreed upon, is the cause of, or the instigator of this instability, with accusations ranging from the United States (US), to Syria, Iran, through to those who pertain that regardless of foreign intervention, there exists an inherent instability in Iraq, due in part to ethnic and religious sectarianism, [as well as the removal of power and dominance from the minority Sunni population], and exacerbated by the foreign invasion of Whether one believes the role Iran has played in post-2003 Iraq to be positive or negative, its involvement from the outset appears to have been nevertheless consistent, and continues to this day. Iranian involvement in Iraq since 2003 has also shaped and influenced US policy, and has been central to discussions of American strategy there for some time (Kagan 2007). Indeed, the question of Iraqi political and social stability is made all the more relevant in the light of recent troop withdrawals by coalition governments. Certainly, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made no qualms about admitting that Iran will seek to fill the vacuum left by US troops. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein s Ba ath Party following the 2003 invasion had a consequence which was apparently unforeseen or overlooked by the United States government: it allowed for the flourishing of links between the previously brutally suppressed Shi a majority inside Iraq, and their religious counterparts in Iran, (primarily on the basis of religious affiliation), and facilitated significant Iranian influence inside post-saddam Iraq. The extent of Iranian influence is thought by some to be so high that Tehran is often cited as the only clear winner of the 2003 Iraq War (Beeston 2005). However, one cannot overlook the literature on the subject which refutes such a claim, and asserts that the extent of Iranian involvement and influence inside Iraq since 2003 has been massively over-exaggerated by Western governments and is nothing more than panic mongering anti-iranian political rhetoric (Barzegar 2007). POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

3 This paper will aim to address the role of Iran in affecting the evolving political and military situation in Iraq since the 2003 invasion by the allied forces, covering the three broad arguments regarding such involvement. The essay will begin by providing some introductory and theoretical remarks regarding the Iraqi insurgency, and the nature of political stability. The current literature concerning the role of Iran in influencing Iraq s stability since 2003 can be divided into a number of groups and sub-groups, and this is the basis upon which this essay will be structured. The most basic division is between those academics who cite Iranian influence to be the most significant destabilizing factor in post-2003 Iraq, and those who believe Iranian influence to be either insignificant, or to have had a primarily positive effect. Barzegar (2007) contends that the first approach (that Iran s influence in Iraq is both strong and negative) is almost exclusively the view of the great powers, and which analyzes Iranian foreign policy in a negative and pessimistic light. Thus, the first main section of this paper (Chapter Two), examines the literature accusing Iran of destabilizing Iraq, and of acting as the primary destabilizer, as well as providing an exploration into the supposed tenets of Iranian involvement. Using the literature which supports the notion that Iran s actions have largely served to destabilize Iraq, this chapter will provide an overview as to the Iranian contingent inside Iraq, their motivation, method and means, and to what extent such a contingent (if indeed one exists), has served to destabilize the country. The second evaluative section of the paper (Chapter Three) will provide an overview of the literature that, whilst seeing Iran as a heavily influential actor within Iraq, purports that such involvement has had a primarily stabilizing role, and thus disputes the claim that Iran is the main destabilizing factor within Iraq. This chapter will focus on the positive tenets of Iranian involvement, including the ability of Iranian contingents and politicians to affect ceasefires, and the smooth running of elections, as well as having a strong focus on growing economic links between the two countries. Chapter Four will go on to examine the claim that Iranian involvement in Iraq since 2003 has been largely exaggerated, and will therefore examine the literature that charges instability to be largely unavoidable in a failed state that has significant ethnic and religious divisions, as well as those theorists who believe the greatest instigators of violence and instability to be actors other than Iran. This section of the paper will include evaluation of the applicability of various theories of rebellion, as well as failed state theory. Finally, I will explore the reach of Iranian involvement in a particular case study, the 2008 Battle of Basra. POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

4 This paper will contend that the Islamic Republic of Iran can certainly be accused of destabilizing Iraq since 2003, however this is a massively over simplistic answer to the question. I will contend that Iran can be accused of destabilizing Iraq, but only to the extent that an unstable Iraq is in its own interests, and it would be erroneous to ignore the sometimes stabilizing effect that Iranian involvement has had on the situation in Iraq. For Iran, the ideal endgame is not necessarily for stability or instability in terms of the interests of Iraqis; rather, the Iranian regime affects change in Iraq that works to their ends, not to the ends of stability for Iraqis. Iran can be accused of destabilizing Iraq, but they can also be charged with stabilizing many aspects of post-war Iraq, in particular with regard to the economy, and most notably where US and Iranian interests have been complementary. I will charge that where and when it has been in their interests, Iranian groups with links to Iraqi political and military factions have played upon, and exacerbated already existent social fault lines, but that instability within Iraq is in fact inherent due to the social and religious make up of the population. 1. Stability, instability and the Iraqi insurgency 1.1. Stability and Instability First and foremost, it is important to consider and recognize how stability and instability are generally measured. This paper will take stability to have a political basis, drawing on the definitions of Ake (1975) and Hurwitz (1973). Hurwitz (1973: 463) proposes a number of conditions that he suggests preclude political stability, including the absence of violence and governmental longevity. Political stability is the regular flow of political exchanges, whilst political instability is the irregular flow of these exchanges (Ake 1975; Enterline & Greig 2008: 6). Ake contends that political stability exists to the extent that members of society restrict themselves to behavior falling within the limits imposed by the political structure (Dowding & Kimber 1983: 233). According to this working definition, this paper will assume that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was politically stable, considering the absence of challenges to his authoritarian government, and the significant duration of Ba athist rule. The question of whether or not this stability was legitimate, (since it was based on authoritarian rule), I charge to be irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. Gompert et al. (2010) assert that the future stability of Iraq depends on the decisions of each of the main actors (indirectly including Iran through their control over the Shi a groups), to either continue with violence or to reject it, since each party to the conflict has the ability to plunge the country into the depths POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

5 of a sectarian civil war. The same article also points out that whilst extremist groups are certainly still present and are still able to affect stability, these groups (including Al-Qaeda in Iraq), exist on the periphery of the power structure, and may not have the ability to destabilize Iraq in the long term, that is, without the aid of some of the core groups. Therefore, if the core groups, (the government of Iraq, and the main Sunni and Kurd opposition groups), are collectively committed to stability, Gompert et al. charge that such a condition is a realistic possibility. The Brookings Institute Iraq Index charts an extensive variety of security indicators, providing fresh figures monthly, including troop casualties, prison population, mass bombing casualties and the estimated strength of the Iraqi resistance nationwide (Brookings Institution 2012). For the purposes of this essay, stability will generally be measured and evaluated in terms of levels of violence as demonstrated by, for example, civilian casualty figures, incidences of suicide and roadside bombings (including the use of IEDs and EFPs). The paper will not necessarily consider the incidences of US and other allied troop casualties, since stability is concerned with the long-term political and social situation in Iraq, not solely with the instability related to, and violence aimed at a temporary and foreign occupying force. Correspondingly, the ability of such violence and social instability to affect the smooth running of political processes, including the drafting of constitutions, laws, and voter turnout at elections will be of significant importance for an overall evaluation of stability The Iraqi Insurgency It is noteworthy to include a clarification of the working definition of insurgency that will be used in this paper. Insurgency is defined by 2006 The US Army Field Manual Interim (FMI ) Counterinsurgency Operations as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (Department of the Army 2006); however, as Ahmed Hashim (2006: xvii) notes, insurgency can also include the organization of a people against a foreign occupation. Therefore, perhaps a more relevant and suitable definition is that provided more recently by the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide: the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region (United States State Department Website 2009). As with many modern insurgencies, the Iraqi insurgency is multi-faceted, and encompasses and includes a variety of diverse militias, religious sects, and nationalities, all aimed at POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

6 destabilising the political status quo, but each with different and contrasting motives and visions for the future of Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi insurgency, as well as being multidimensional, has developed through stages in which for example one group of insurgents may hold more power than others at different points throughout the protracted conflict. As previously noted, the importance of foreign insurgents is disputed amongst intellectuals; nevertheless, their presence inside Iraq is undeniable. As exemplified by the 2001 RAND publication Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, the impact of foreign assistance on insurgency operations and on the overall success of insurgencies can vary massively (Byman 2001). Byman et al. (2001: xv) provide in said publication a concise overview of the nature of, and motives behind state support for insurgencies, stating that such assistance can be manifested in a number of ways. They list such ways to include financial assistance, the provision of manpower, the supply or movement of weapons, provision of a safe place to organize and train, and finally, intervening states can provide political support to favorable factions. In terms of accusations by state governments vis-à-vis interference in internal Iraqi politics, the United States government has traditionally heaped the bulk of its accusations regarding the assistance of insurgents and the supply of foreign militias on to Syria and Iran; the Bush administration in particular, was extremely vocal in its charges of discord being the result of foreign involvement (Hashim 2006: 139). The most significant U.S charge regarding foreign intervention is that of Iranian funding and backing of Shi ite groups and hostile elements, with the purported intention of securing an Iranian friendly, largely Shi a, Iraqi government (Cordesman 2007: 97). Similarly, and in response to such statements, Ayatollah Khamenei and the clerical Iranian leadership have accused US ground troops and the coalition forces of being the biggest obstacle to Iraqi stability and have claimed that the most fundamental problem of Iraq is the presence of the foreign forces (Fathi & Oppel 2008). The Iraqi insurgency, whilst certainly comprising a myriad of different ideological groups and actors, shares at least one common goal: the removal of US and coalition troops from Iraq. Ahmed Hashim illustrates this point particularly well, by stating that the insurgents know collectively what they do not want, (foreign occupation of Iraq in the form of US ground troops), but that they differ in what they do want. It is incredibly important to note that whilst POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

7 for the purposes of expediency, this paper will refer to both the Sunni and Shi a groups as the insurgency, the bulk of the literature on Iraq makes an important division. The actual insurgency began as a largely Sunni dominated effort, as the conditions immediately following invasion in 2003 were detrimental primarily to the Sunnis (the removal of Saddam Hussein s ruling Ba ath Party structure), and initially hinted at improvements in the conditions of the lives of the 60% Shi a population. However, as Shi a expectations were steadily unrealized, militias began to form, comprising and constituting a formidable counter to the Sunni contingent of the insurgency (Cordesman 2005; Hashim 2006). The Sunni insurgency can largely be divided into two main groupings: the Sunni Nationalists, and the Sunni Islamists and Salafists. The Sunni Nationalists made up the bulk of the original insurgency, encompassing many members of the former Ba athist regime and the more secular sections of Iraqi society, including the 1920 Revolution Brigades (BBC, 2006). The Sunni Islamists comprise groups such as al-qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Ansar al-islam (Ansar al- Sunna), and the Islamic Army in Iraq. Naturally, since the links between Iran and certain Iraqi groups are claimed to be largely based upon religious ties, it is the Shi a militias over whom the Islamic Republic of Iran is charged to hold the most influence. The Shi a militia as a whole, comprises an amalgamation of different groups, and can largely be seen to exist and operate in opposition to the original Sunni insurgency. The two main militias, (based on size and influence) can be said to be the Mahdi Army, led by the radical Iraqi cleric Moqtada al- Sadr, and the Badr Brigades, which is the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (BBC 2006; Cordesman 2005; Hashim 2006). Pirnie (2006: 16-17), states that, [b]y early 2006, U.S officials estimated that Shi ite militias were killing more people than Sunni insurgents were and were becoming the greatest challenge to the Iraqi government. 2. Iran has had a primarily destabilizing role in Iraq Iran s primary strategy to influence events in Iraq since the US invasion has been to place its allies within the Iraqi political establishment Felter & Fishman (2008: 8) POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

8 2.1. Literature Review Those who adhere to the notion that meddling by Iran following the 2003 invasion has played a pivotal and exacerbating role in destabilizing Iraqi politics, generally maintain that a strong and stable Iraq is fundamentally opposed to Iranian interest. Kenneth Katzman (2007: 169) sums up the proponents argument rather succinctly, stating that, Iran s aid to Iraqi Shiite parties and their militias is contributing to sectarian violence that has threatened the U.S stabilization effort. Reuel Gerecht (2004), also claims that, [c]lerical Iran's primary objective is to ensure that Iraq remains destabilized; incapable of coalescing around a democratically elected government ; Gerecht (2004) goes on to argue that Iranian support for Shi a groups exacerbates and fuels sectarian divisions inside Iraq. As we can see from Gerecht s statement, one should be aware that sectarian tension and other internal social factors are most certainly not ignored by those academics who adopt such a stance regarding Iranian involvement; rather these are considered to be the fault lines which are often said to be played upon and exploited by such foreign meddling. In a 2011 report assessing the threat of withdrawal from Iraq, Frederick Kagan (2011) identified Iran as posing the most immediate and serious threat to Iraqi security Iranian incentive to destabilize Iraq The literature accusing Iran of enduring links with Iraqi Shi a groups is based largely upon the assumption that Iran (and in particular the Islamic clerical leadership), has a massive stake in the future of Iraq, and that as such, Iranian involvement stems from a strategic (and Realist) need to influence the political make-up of Iraq (Gerecht 2004; Katzman 2008). Certainly, Iraq under Sunni Ba athist rule was no friend to Shiite Iran, and some authors have gone so far as to suggest that the removal of the Sunni leadership as a result of the 2003 war has bred only one benefactor: Iran (Gerecht 2004). Katzman (2012: 41) cites that Iranian foreign policy is the product of the ideology of Iran s Islamic revolution, blended with longstanding national interests. This body of literature follows the assumption that a stable Iraq with a democratic system installed as the result of a foreign invasion, is not in the interests of the theocratic government of neighboring Iran, and that Iran is therefore seeking to destabilize Iraq. Indeed, the general consensus within Washington (Katzman 2008) is that Iranian actions towards Iraq, and its policy there, severely hamper US efforts at stabilization. This body of literature often relays POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

9 the argument that Iranian interest in the future of Iraq is so high (at least in part), because until the invasion in 2003, Iraq stood as the only other militarily viable state in the region, acting as a balance to the growth of Iranian power. Since the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iran has emerged as something of a regional hegemon, and the strongest chance Iran has of retaining this position is the prevention of a strong government emerging in Iraq (Guzansky 2011). Coupled with this assertion often comes the idea of instability in Iraq serving as a diversionary factor for the United States, deterring attention and military interest away from an emerging nuclear program in Iran (Katzman 2008). Another element, which cannot be ignored, is an Iranian fear of the rise or growth of a strong Iraqi military force, a fear that stems at least in part from the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. In this vein, an Iranian-friendly Shiite government in Iraq would remove or at least alleviate traditional threat perceptions of Iraq as a strategic military adversary (Bargezar 2007). Felter & Fishman (2008: 6) neatly conflate these ideas in the following sentence: Iran has a robust program to exert influence in Iraq in order to limit American power projection capability in the Middle East, ensure the Iraqi government does not pose a threat to Iran, and build a reliable platform for projecting influence further abroad. Felter and Fishman (2008: 6) continue to describe the political and paramilitary methods of Iranian control over Iraq since 2003, and state that although Iranian influence can often be constructive, it is also duplicitous : Iran publicly calls for stability while subverting Iraq s government and illegally sponsoring antigovernment militias Iranian Political Involvement in Iraq Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics has been almost consistent since 2003, yet the American led invasion by no means spelt the beginnings of Iranian efforts to exert influence over politics in Iraq, and links can be cited as far back as the 1980s. Whether one believes Iranian political influence over post-2003 Iraq to have been distinctly positive or negative in terms of stability, it is agreed upon by most scholars that the ideal endgame politically for Iran, would be for a Shi ite dominated government to emerge in Iraq. What is debated is whether Iran is committed to exerting long term control over such a government, and whether the Iranian government would be comfortable in allowing a Shi ite Iraqi government to become militarily and political powerful. It has even been claimed that the Iranians exerted and exercised massive amounts of political clout over the wording and timeline of US troop withdrawal in POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

10 the 2008 US-Iraq Security Agreement. Certainly, literature on Iranian influence in Iraq stresses Tehran s engagement with Iraqi political circles (Thompson 2009: 1). It is primarily through Iraq s Shi a political parties, (although links have also been made to certain secular and Sunni groups) that Iran exerts control over the political sphere in Iraq, apparently preying on the volatile and delicate sectarian balance, and using its religious prowess to garner favor in the Shi ite community. Many of the links between political parties in Iran and Iraq were originally forged following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, with countless Iraqi political figures seeking exile in Iran, and returning in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion to influence the politics in their home country; the current Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al- Maliki himself spent time in Iran, (although most of his exile was spent in Syria) during the rule of Saddam Hussein (Al-Jazeera English 2011). Similarly, the radical Shi a cleric Moqtada al-sadr is known to have strong links with the Iranian religious and governmental establishment, although the Sadrist movement was historically anti-iranian (Cockburn 2008: 167). Many of the scholars who believe Iranian influence in Iraq to have been negative and conducive to instability, for example Alsis et al. (2011: 13), contend that since the first postwar elections, Iran has backed all of the major Shi ite parties to varying degrees, ensuring that whichever party wins elections will be beholden to Tehran. According to Alsis et al., this is part of a strategy in which Iran seeks to support whichever faction will benefit it most, but which has ultimately led to Shiite divisions, and thus instability in many cases; the Maliki- Sadr compromise in the March 2010 parliamentary elections, which was made possible largely due to Iranian negotiations and persuasion, can be seen to have created an untenable and shallow stability, of whose main beneficiary was Iran, and of which the resulting alliance was beholden to Iranian influence (Alsis et al. 2011: 15; Chulov 2010). In the same vein, proponents of this view argue that despite the appearance of political stability which coalitions like this garner, the fundamental and far-reaching divisions within the Iraqi population and political environment are overlooked, and swept under the rug, only to erupt further down the line. A surge in violence following the 2010 elections for example, leads us to question whether apparent political stability (weak coalitions, the holding of elections, etc.), as propagated by POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

11 Iran in favor of the Shi ites, is actually conducive to social stability, or whether such a condition simply serves to whitewash and thus diminish the reality of the situation on the ground. The Brookings Institute Iraq Index (2006) charts a peak in multiple fatality bombings in January 2005, following the election, and again in the later months of the same year. Such a trend is commonplace, and peaks in violence throughout Iraq appear to correlate strongly with religious and political events such as Ramadan and elections. For example, Cordesman cites that the number of attacks peaked to some 700 per week in October 2005, before the October 15th referendum on the constitution, compared to 430 per week in mid- January (Cordesman 2006: iii). Certainly one cannot necessarily say that Iran is wholly to blame for such violence. However, if one is to believe that the political and electoral results would not otherwise have been possible without the lead or involvement of Iran, and such results sparked violence, then there must to some degree be an association between the two. There are a plethora of political groups and parties that have been linked to Iran s own political establishment as well as to independent elements within Iran. Perhaps the most important of these groupings, in terms of influence and linkages, can be said to be the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), (previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq); although in more recent years, the Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-sadr has quite possibly become more influential as Sadr has increased links with Iran (Cockburn 2008). The fact that the Sadr movement was previously so anti-iranian, and the ease with which Tehran appears to have molded the movement into a pro-iranian agent lends credence to the argument that Iranian strategy is based largely on strategic and self-interested motives. According to Cockburn (2008: 169), Iranian intelligence sought to mold a militarily viable Shi ite ally with significant popular support, in order to both counter any possible rise (of the ISCI in particular, who had some corresponding aims with the United States) of a Shi ite party whose association with Iran was anything other than solid, and to provide a feasible military threat against any possible US attack on Iran United Iraqi Alliance The links between ISCI and the Iranian regime are to a certain extent undeniable, not least because the ISCI was created in Tehran in the 1980s to counter Iraqi aggression against Iran. It is the ISCI (previously SCIR) that holds the longest and probably strongest ties with Iran, and for a while it was this Shi ite group through which Iran exerted the most power in Iraq, POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

12 primarily through the military wing of the ISCI, the Badr Brigades, who are known to have been armed and trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War (Katzman 2010: 1). In more recent years, many members of the Badr Corps have been incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces, suggesting the possibility of increasing Iranian hold and sway over the very basic structural elements of post-war Iraq. The question to be addressed however is not simply the extent or reach of the Iranian influence over the ISCI, rather it is to what extent such influence can be said to have been detrimental or conducive to stability. The alliance, which included all the major Shi a parties, (most importantly Da wa and ISCI) was forged with the aid of Iran (both direct and overt, and indirectly through the ISCI) and had the expressed aim of uniting Shi a political factions so as to provide a solid electoral bloc to oppose Sunni voter capacity (Cordesman 2008; Katzman 2008). The ISCI, the Sadrists, and the Da wa Party joined together along with a number of other parties, (mainly Shi a) in 2005 to form the United Iraqi Alliance, winning a majority of seats in the 2005 elections (Katzman 2008). The creation of the United Iraqi Alliance (also known as the Watani List) in 2005 by the ISCI under Iranian auspices certainly gives credence to the assertion that the aim of Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics is to prevent the revival of a Sunni dominated government by improving the electoral chances of Shi ites. It would appear, upon examination of the available evidence, that Iran seeks to promote Shi a unity on an official political basis during elections, but that such efforts at reconciliation diminish once Shi a power is assured and they win a majority at elections, which in turn leads to Sunni violence and instability. Gompert et al. (2010) claim that the greatest threat the United Iraqi Alliance poses to stability and security in Iraq is in fact not to the coalition forces (as the Sunni groups do), but rather in the intra-shi a tension between the different Shi a groupings, namely and most notably the ISCI (or their military wing, the Badr Corps), and the Mahdi Army. Such intra-shi a rivalries have been thrown into the fore recently, with divisions increasingly drawn along lines based around allegiance to Iran. A split within the Sadrists led to the formation of The League of the Righteous (Asa ib Ahlil Haq), who then began to propagate an even more pro-iranian stance than Sadr himself, dealing directly with the Iranian government and limiting the nationalist rhetoric espoused by Sadr (Al-Khoei 2012). Cockburn (2012) states that the entry into politics of this staunchly pro-iranian Shi a group is particularly worrying for the United States, who have spent years trying to counter Iranian influence inside Iraq. Al-Khoei (2012) and POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

13 Cockburn (2012) both assert that Nouri al-maliki, under the guiding hand of Tehran, may actually be accelerating and precipitating divisions within rival Shi a factions, suggesting that politics in Iraq may not be so strictly based on sectarian lines as once thought. The rise of the League of the Righteous also suggests that since the Sadrists have traditionally been Iraqi nationalists and Shi a Islamists rather than creatures of Iran (Cockburn 2012), the Iranian authorities have perhaps sought out and propelled to power, an opposing Shi a group, both to counter the Sadrists, and to keep a foot in the door of Iraqi politics. If the United Iraqi Alliance served to cement at any level, allegiances between the Shi ites, (and this in itself we have seen to be highly debatable) it has been claimed that the formation of, and the electoral victory of the United Iraqi Alliance served to massively increase and radicalize the divide between the Shi a and the Sunnis of Iraq (Karmon 2007). Karmon cites that when the ISCI took over the Interior Ministry, allowing the Badr Corps entry into the very core of Iraq s security infrastructure, Iraq witnessed a massive rise in the killings of Sunnis by Shi a elements. Certainly one cannot ignore the other side of the coin: if Iran is encouraging violence on the side of the Shi a, then there are obviously those who argue that other foreign states are fuelling violence by Sunnis, for example Saudi Arabia (Cockburn 2008). Cockburn (2008: 182) cites that the alliance of the major Shi a groups in the 2005 election, allowed for the first instance of organized Shi a retaliation against the Sunni insurgency. The formation of United Iraqi Alliance, being as it was an allegiance between apparently hostile rival factions appears therefore to demonstrate the influence of a higher authority, pulling strings behind the scenes; why else would the diametrically and militarily opposed Sadrists and ISCI choose suddenly to ally with each other unless they had been provided with significant impetus? Importantly, the alliance facilitated the election of a number of Sadrist elements, and propelled Moqtada al-sadr into the forefront of Iraqi politics. Certainly, Sadr had been a prominent and influential figure for years prior to the creation of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005, but the electoral success of the coalition gave Sadr and other Shi a groupings a degree of political power that they could not even so much have imagined a decade earlier. This propelling into power of Sadr by Iran, irrelevant of their reasons for doing so, turned out to be something of a double-edged sword. In order to gain the allegiance of Sadr s Madhi Army, Iran offered massive financial incentive, and although evidence for such POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

14 financial transactions is not forthcoming, neither are denials from either side as to their occurrence. The bolstering of political authority and financial and military ability gave the Madhi Army the power to become decidedly more active throughout Iraq, and expand their influence north, which meant the stirring of ethnic tensions in cities and regions not so accustomed to Sadr s radical form of Shi a Islam. Many Shi a resented the hold of Iran over Sadr and his Madhi Army, whilst the Sunni insurgency found more and more that their grievances were directed at the Shi a militia rather than the US and coalition forces (Cockburn 2008; Hashim 2006), stoking severe sectarian divisions and instigating massive unrest; Sunni suicide attacks on Shia targets, kidnappings, and disappearances intensified since the January 2005 elections (Karmon 2007: 281). In allowing and facilitating the strengthening of the Madhi Army both politically and militarily, Iran (at least indirectly) also facilitated the increase in sectarian tensions and thus instability; the US troop surge in 2007 was at least partly aimed at loosening the grip of the Madhi Army over Baghdad (Cockburn 2008). The information and literature citing the Iranian political influence to have been distinctly negative and detrimental to stability covers a wide variety of standpoints. Consideration of the information and evidence would perhaps lend one to conclude that whilst allowing for the smooth running of elections, (which could be seen to have been conducive to a kind of false stability) Iranian meddling in Iraqi politics served to increase instability in a number of ways. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, Iranian influence can be said to have increased violence and aggression between Shi a and Sunni in Iraq, perhaps diverting the attention of the Sunni insurgency away from US and allied troop presence, towards the Shi a militias. The Brookings Institute Iraq Index (2009) shows that US troop fatalities fell dramatically from 2004 (prior to electoral success of United Iraqi Alliance), to 2006, whilst figures for Iraqi casualties remained the same, or in cases grew. Secondly, intra-shi a tensions have not been eradicated by the alliance. Although we cannot safely say that the Shi ite parties of Iraq would not have allied of their own accord, or that stability may have indeed have suffered more so had elections not been able to go ahead or had not spawned a clear victor, it is clear that Iranian hands in the promotion and empowerment of certain Shi a political groups went some way to instigating instability in Iraq, not least in the growth in sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shi a. POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

15 Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that whilst Iran appears to aid the stable and secure conditions necessary for the election of Shi a political parties, they are also accused of facilitating the continued rivalry and factionalism between the Shi a as a whole, possibly so as to prevent the rise of any one party that could in future threaten Iran s national security or its position as regional hegemon Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq According to Kenneth Katzman (2010: 2), Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias peaked between 2005 and 2008, and takes the form of both material aid (i.e. physical arming of militia groups, or the contribution of troops), as well as the training or harboring of militias or insurgents. The primary basis of material support from Iran appears to come from the Quds Force (the arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] which is charged with extraterritorial missions), although recently reports have surfaced alleging that Lebanese Hezbollah has also become involved in militarily training Iraqi Shi a militia, at the behest of Iran (Alsis et al. 2011: 41; Katzman 2008; Lageunesse 2009: 9). In 2010, the US State Department attributed the bulk of Iranian sponsored terrorist activity to the Quds Force (Katzman 2012); it is believed that an Iranian government department, Department 9000, acts as a liaison between the IRGC and the Special Groups inside Iraq (Cordesman 2007). As previously noted, the Iraqi military group linked most strongly (with regard to available evidence and overt or official ties) to Iran, is probably the Badr Corps, the armed wing of the ISCI, which, even prior to 2003, was described as Iran s most important action arm inside Iraq (Felter & Fishman 2008: 7). However, whether or not links between the military groups inside Iraq can be made to the Iranian establishment, it is important for the sake of this paper to establish and recognize whether such links have actually facilitated the disruption of stability, or whether it is in fact other agents, states, or groups whose involvement serves to destabilize the situation in Iraq to a greater degree. Bergner (2007) claims that the Iraqi Shi a groups would be unable to carry out such destructive or lethal attacks without the coordination or supply of weapons and training from Iran, and asserts that this is part of a long-term plan to affect and facilitate reliance upon Tehran. Assertions of Iranian backing of, and arming of Shi a militias in Iraq has often formed the basis of US government criticism against Iranian involvement in Iraq, and President POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

16 Ahmadinejad himself is known to have expressed a desire for Iranian troops to begin training Iraqi Security Forces after the US departure (Katzman 2012). Naturally, those authors who claim Iranian influence to be negative, cite the arming and training of militias as distinctly and solely detrimental to stability, however there are also arguments that in fact the majority of the instability and violence stems from the Sunni insurgency, and that Iranian backing of Shi a militias actually acts as an opposition and balance against Sunni violence. Kagan (2007), in accordance with Katzman (2010), cites that by 2007, coalition sources estimated that around half of the violence perpetrated against coalition forces was at the hands of Iranian backed Shi a militias, a marked change from previous years, in which the Sunni insurgency was believed to be culpable for the bulk of the instability; (2007 also marked the troop surge by coalition forces). Nevertheless, those who believe Iran s military influence to have been negative provide damning evidence and arguments that Iranian weapons, and Iranian trained Shi a militias have been carrying out attacks against both coalition and Iraqi forces (Katzman 2012, US State Department 2011). In accordance with the literature review provided by this paper, scholars such as Katzman pertain that Iran s motive behind increasing the violence via military assistance to certain Iraqi factions is multi-faceted: to cement divisions within Iraq, thus preventing the emergence of a strong government; to ensure the allegiance of certain Shi a factions; and to impose significant military losses on the coalition forces. Gabriel Lageunesse (2009: 1) claims that: there is significant evidence supporting Iranian culpability as an accessory for facilitating, aiding and assisting Shi a death squads in their commission of crimes against humanity in Iraq. However, there is insufficient data to determine if Iran exercised the level of control necessary to demonstrate state liability. This is an important point, since the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, Qassim Suleimani is directly answerable to Ayatollah Khamenei, not to President Ahmadinejad. Similarly, Kimberly Kagan (2007: 1) denotes that whilst the motives behind such military assistance have evolved over time, Iran has consistently supplied weapons, its own advisors, and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors to multiple resistance groups in Iraq. As well as precipitating instability, the Special Groups are being used by Iran to discredit the American occupation, and there is certainly evidence to suggest that the Iranian leverage over the Shi a groups has been used to pressure the Iraqi government into reducing the long-term POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

17 presence of U.S. forces in the country, notably the US-Iraqi Security Agreement of 2009 (Knights 2010). The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) was established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 with the express purpose of exporting the revolution ; in other words, the body was charged with extra-territorial missions, which many claim today, to include the destabilizing of Iraq by exacerbating sectarian tensions in order to affect the political outcome there. Lebanese Hezbollah is also included amongst the groups said to be directly accountable to and reliant upon the Quds Force, and as previously noted, has been accused of involvement inside Iraq in recent years (Katzman 2008; Lageunesse 2009). Certainly, if one looks to the way in which Iran has developed Hezbollah inside Lebanon, parallels can begin to be drawn between the apparent grooming and funding of certain Shi a groups in Iraq, and the initial linkages held between Hezbollah as a militant group and their subsequent growth (with the aid of Iran), into a viable and strong political force in Lebanon, apparently at the behest of, and beholden to Tehran. According to Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, Iranian high command is in essence using Hezbollah as both a means and an ends; Hezbollah is being used inside Iraq to both facilitate the transfer of weapons and the training of Shi a groups, and it is also the model upon which Iran is basing the Shi a groups upon; the goal being to develop the Iraqi special groups into a network similar to the Lebanese Hezbollah (Bergner 2007). It is claimed, by Kimberly Kagan (2007) amongst others, (Alsis et al. 2011; Cordesman 2007; Ware 2005) that the involvement of Iran in the training, direction and arming of Iraqi Shi a contingents, has directly increased their lethality, effectiveness, and coordination, resulting in increased violence and as a result, increasing instability in Iraq. In other words, those authors who charge that Iran s military involvement has been negative, claim that the Shi a militias have been fuelled, financed, and aided by bodies such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, in particular the Quds Force, and that as such, the effectiveness of Shi a attacks has grown significantly. Kagan (2007) cites the source of much of the US intelligence reports claiming Iranian involvement in anti-coalition attacks, as coming from Mujahedeen e-khalq, an anti-iranian Iraqi group; the evidence from this group led US intelligence to conclude in 2004 that the IRGC-QF was both transferring and distributing weapons throughout Iraq, including 1000 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) in December 2003 (Kagan 2007: 6). The reliability of the intelligence from such a group can certainly be questioned, but it is important POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

18 nonetheless if only for the fact that it strongly influenced US policy in the region, and that the US at the time considered the group to be reliable. If the level of Iranian involvement were indeed as high and as organized as this, as early on in the conflict as 2003, (Kagan also states that the QF command centre was relocated from Tehran to Mehran, a city on the Iraqi border) then one is led to believe that at the height of Iranian involvement ( according to Katzman), the level of interference would have been considerable. The facilitation of the transfer and movement of arms, and the provision of Iranian weapons to Iraqi Shi a militia groups is said to be one of the fundamental ways in which the IRGC-QF is affecting the stability of Iraq. US officials repeatedly claim that there is compelling evidence linking Iran to the supply of weapons in Iraq, accusations that are vehemently denied by the Iranian government. The Iranian government often counters such accusations by claiming that Iranian manufactured weapons used in Iraq had been transferred there prior to 2003, yet many of the markings found on such weapons apparently indicate recent manufacture (Lageunesse 2009). Explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) are the biggest cause of US troop casualties in Iraq, and US officials claim that the main component for such weapons is manufactured in Iran (USA Today 2009); incidentally, the training alliance between Hezbollah, Iran, and Shia militias corresponds, temporally, with the increased use of EFPs in Iraq (Kagan 2007). It would appear that the bulk of the evidence linking Iran to Shi a militias inside Iraq is based upon the tracing and origin of rockets fired at US bases, suggesting that Iran s support to the Special Groups is aimed primarily at anti-us operations rather than the exploitation of sectarian divisions; however one would not be incorrect in suggesting that such evidence may simply be more obtainable, and experts just may not have access to the evidence linking Shi a weapons to attacks on Sunni insurgents. In fact, Knights (2010) suggests that Iranian supplies of EFPs have often been used to fuel intra-shi a rivalries, citing the assassination of two provincial governors and two provincial police chiefs in the latter half of 2006, all Shi a-on-shi a political killings using EFPs ; such examples demonstrate the reach of Iranian influence, and the extent to which Iran is able to exploit all aspects of divisions and instability within Iraq. Felter & Fishman (2008: 8) detail how the links formed between the IRGC and groups such as the Badr Corps prior to 2003 are still existent to this day, and claim that the same individuals who were culpable for stirring tensions and cementing links with Tehran then, are responsible POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN

19 for funneling weapons to Iraqi militants today, including Abu Mustafa Sheibani and Abu Mahdi al-muhandis (Muhandis being the leader of Kataib Hizb Allah, a militant group firmly under the control of IRGC-QF). Importantly, this weapons network is known to have links to often competing Iraqi factions, including Jaish al-mahdi (the Madhi Army), and the Badr Corps; this is in accordance with assertions that the Iranian government and IRGC are lending their support to rival political factions inside Iraq in order to stir sectarian tensions and ensure the reliance on Tehran of numerous and varying groups depending on their perceived advantage to the Iranian national interest. There have also been reports that Iranian paramilitaries have been supporting and assisting certain Sunni groups in their attacks against US troops, which further fuels the argument that Iranian interest is multi-faceted and based on tenets other than religious alignment, as well as the belief that sectarian divisions are being exploited by Iran (Cordesman 2007); A consistent feature of Iran s patronage has been careful efforts to spread Tehran s bets across many different horses (Knights 2010). Weapons networks, according to Felter & Fishman (2008: 39) shape the overall pace and level of violence. As well as direct provision of weapons, the Iranian government has been accused of both training and funding Special Groups (Shi a groups with purported links to Iran) inside Iraq, Kagan (2007) estimating that they receive up to 3m in funding and equipment each month. There is considerable evidence to suggest that members of Iraqi Special Groups have been privy to training at the hands of both IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah, although as with the issue of funding, it is much more difficult to attribute direct and specific acts of violence to Iran, partly because the level of their involvement allows them to deny responsibility. The apparent responsibility of Iran for influencing levels of violence has been documented in a 2007 report by Anthony Cordesman, who quotes a Madhi Commander as saying: Iran has paid money for people to attack US soldiers. The order didn t come from us (Cordesman 2007: 90). It is claimed that the levels of training provided and offered by Iranian contingents to Iraqi militia groups has increased since 2003 in both potency and volume, and that, as previously noted, Iranian involvement allows for and furthers instability in Iraq. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as Lebanese Hezbollah (under the guidance of Tehran), have both been accused of providing training programs to Iraqi militants, ranging from entry POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN