The Russian Government s Decision to Intervene Militarily in Syria: Russia s Understanding of Temporally Proximate Developments through the Lens of

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1 The Russian Government s Decision to Intervene Militarily in Syria: Russia s Understanding of Temporally Proximate Developments through the Lens of Aversion to US-Backed Regime Change in the Middle East Lindsey Cohen IMEMO/Harriman Young Analysts Conference The US and Russia as Global Actors January 31, 2019

2 In Summer 2015, the Russian government decided to intervene militarily in Syria, likely in response to temporally proximate developments: (1) the Syrian Army s loss of a series of strategically significant territories to terrorist groups and (2) the increased military involvement of the US and its anti-assad Middle Eastern allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Syria. However, the Russian government likely understood these developments in terms of a larger aversion to a perceived US policy of imposing regime change in the Middle East in pursuit of US geopolitical dominance. The Timing of Russia s Decision to Intervene: al-assad s Territorial Losses to Terrorist Groups and the Increased Involvement of the US and its Middle Eastern Allies The Russian government likely decided in late July or early August 2015 to intervene in Syria. 1 Notably, in late July 2015 the commander of Iran s special operations Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani, traveled to Moscow, where he met with President Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. 2 Since Soleimani [oversaw] Iran s support of the Shiite militias fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Iranian military assistance to Syrian President Bashar al-assad, 3 the details of military cooperation between Russia and Iran in Syria may have been discussed at this meeting. Then, on 4 August, the Iranian government hosted a meeting between Russian deputy foreign minister and special representative for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-muallem. 4 The same day, the commander of the Russian airborne troops told a Syrian reporter: Of course we will execute the decisions set forth by the country s leadership, if there s a task at hand. 5 On 31 August an Israeli news outlet reported: [a]ccording to Western diplomats, a Russian expeditionary force has already arrived in Syria and set up camp in an Assad-controlled airbase. 6 2

3 The timing of the Russian government s decision to intervene in Syria suggests a correlation between Russian decision-making and temporally proximate developments in Syria. First, the Syrian Army lost a series of strategically important territories in western and southern Syria to terrorist groups. Observers perceived these losses as a turning point, showing that Assad s forces were overstretched and pointing to a new unity and assertiveness by opposition forces. 7 In March, the Syrian Army lost the provincial capital Idlib city, located in northwestern Syria, to a coalition between al-qaeda s Syrian branch Nusra Front and the Islamist groups Ahrar al-sham and Jund al-aqsa. 8 In April, IS and Nusra Front achieved the deepest foray yet into the Syrian capital [Damascus], 9 and Nusra Front captured the Nasib crossing with Jordan, the final-remaining Syria-Jordan border crossing under al-assad s control. 10 In May, IS captured the ancient city Palmyra in Homs province. 11 In early July, a coalition including Nusra Front and Ahrar al-sham forced the Syrian army from several towns in Aleppo. 12 Statements by Russian government officials reveal that they were aware of and concerned by the Syrian Army s territorial losses to terrorist groups. During a 29 June meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister al-muallem, Putin stated: We know the difficulties in Syria and how it is developing, particularly as concerns the attacks by international terrorism. 13 On 4 August, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated, the Russian side expresses increased concern at the highest level with how the so-called Islamic State expands its influence further and how the territory controlled by terrorists grows in Syria and Iraq. 14 To justify Russian military intervention in Syria, Putin has pointed to post-soviet Russia s experience of terrorist attacks and the need to prevent Russian citizens fighting for IS in Syria from returning home. 15 Second, the US, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia increased their direct and indirect military involvement in Syria in support of opposition groups. In March 2015, Turkey and Saudi Arabia 3

4 began supporting extremist opposition groups, such as the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-sham, and Jund al-aqsa coalition that captured Idlib city. 16 In early May, the US began implementation of a $500 million program based at sites in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to train and arm up to 15,000 people from moderate Syrian opposition groups to fight against IS. 17 The Russian government seemed particularly concerned by the stated US commitment to defend opposition forces trained under its program if these were attacked by the Syrian Army. 18 On 23 July, US President Obama and Turkish President Erdogan agreed that the US air force would launch strikes against IS from the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, and on 24 July, the Turkish military began launching its own air strikes against IS forces in Syria. Several days later the US and Turkey began jointly launching air strikes to clear IS forces from territory near the Turkish border and replace them with moderate opposition forces. 19 Russian government officials tended to express concern with the increased involvement of the US, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia through a narrative linking foreign support for opposition groups in Syria with the spread of terrorism there. The Russian government may have perceived the increasingly imminent collapse of the al-assad government and the spread of terrorism as connected issues. A 7 July Russian News Agency TASS article asserts that Turkey and Saudi Arabia actively aid the expansion of IS in Syria because they are driven by a desire to overthrow Bashar al-assad. 20 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserted that the US commitment to defend Syrian opposition forces will hamper anti-terrorist efforts and [s]ometimes, it is difficult to see who is fighting against whom. 21 Moreover, Lavrov asserted that by conducting airstrikes against IS without approval from the Syrian government, the US and its allies were undermining both the sovereignty of the Syrian government and its efforts to combat terrorist groups. 22 4

5 Significance of Temporally Proximate Events: Russian Aversion to US-Backed Regime Change Arguably, the Russian government understood immediate events in Syria through a larger aversion to a perceived US policy of regime change in the Middle East. 23 Significantly, events in Syria were viewed in the larger context of the US war in Iraq, which brought the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the NATO airstrikes in Libya, which contributed to the overthrow of Muammar al-gaddafi in The Russian narrative that foreign support for the Syrian opposition was enabling the spread of terrorism has been applied to other US interventions in the Middle East. Writing in 2009, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov asserted: The American invasion [in Iraq] actually helped fuel the spread of terrorism. 25 He described the US- Iraq war as a situation where one state accused another of having an antidemocratic regime [and] took it upon itself to interfere in that sovereign state s domestic matters, using military force to topple a regime that was not to its liking. 26 Russia s December 2015 National Security Strategy, published after Russia began its military intervention in Syria, broadly linked US-backed regime change with the expansion of terrorism in the Middle East: The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts is becoming increasingly widespread.territories affected by armed conflicts are becoming the basis for the spread of terrorism. 27 While President Obama viewed US policy towards Syria as a necessary response to al-assad s use of chemical weapons against his own people and the expansion of IS, 28 President Putin viewed US policy as part of a geopolitically-motivated strategy to dominate the Middle East at the expense of destabilizing the region and violating the international norm of sovereignty. 29 5

6 Statements and speeches by President Putin in September and October 2015 presented Russian support for President al-assad as a rejection of perceived US Middle East policy. 30 At the 15 September 2015 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Putin rhetorically urged the US and its allies to set aside geopolitical ambitions, leave behind so-called double standards and the policy of direct or indirect use of individual terrorist groups to achieve one s own opportunistic goals, including changes in undesirable governments and regimes. Putin also pointed to the examples of Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, asserting [w]e did not destroy government institutions there, creating power vacuums that were immediately filled by terrorists. Putin concludes that without Russian support for al-assad, the situation in Syria would look like that in post-gaddafi Libya. 31 Similarly, during his 28 September 2015 speech at the 70 th Session of the UN General Assembly, Putin stated that by intervening in the Middle East in pursuit of regime change, the US and its allies have created a [p]ower vacuum in some countries which [was] quickly filled by extremists and terrorists. According to Putin, the US and its allies use terrorist groups in Syria in order to achieve their geopolitical goal of toppling al-assad. From Putin s perspective, Russia s support for the al-assad government is about recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world. 32 Conclusions The timing of the Russian government s decision to intervene militarily in Syria suggests the importance of temporally proximate developments. By late July/early August 2015, the Syrian Army had lost strategically significant territories to terrorist groups and the US and its anti-assad Middle Eastern allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia had increased their military 6

7 involvement. President Putin and other Russian government officials asserted a narrative regarding US intervention in Syria that has been applied to US intervention in the Middle East more generally: foreign-backed regime change enables the expansion of terrorism in the Middle East. This narrative suggests that the Russian government understood temporally proximate developments in Syria through the lens of its aversion to the perceived US policy of imposing regime change to attain geopolitical dominance of the Middle East. 1 The Federation Council did not approve military intervention in Syria until 30 September 2015, after military preparations transfer of personnel and equipment, construction of temporary housing had already been made. Meeting with Government Members (President of Russia, September 30, 2015), 2 Karen DeYoung, U.S. Raises Concern about Iranian s Reported Visit to Moscow, The Washington Post, August 13, 2015, raises-concerns-about-iranians-apparent-visit-to-moscow/2015/08/13/35a75a32-41e1-11e5-8e7d- 9c033e6745d8_story.html?utm_term=.32b158d4f262; Tom Perry and Laila Bassam, How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow, Reuters, October 6, 2015, Jim Sciutto, Iran s Quds Force Leader Traveled to Moscow in Violation of U.N. Sanctions, Official Says, CNN, August 7, 2015, Maria Baranova, Qasem Soleimani: Iran s architect of Russian Operations in Syria, Russia Beyond the Headlines, October 5, 2016, Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, Exclusive: Quds Force Commander Soleimani Visited Moscow, Met Russian Leaders in Defiance of Sanctions, Fox News, August 6, 2015, 3 DeYoung, U.S. Raises Concern about Iranian s Reported Visit to Moscow. 4 О Встрече Спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации По Ближнему Востоку и Странам Африки, Заместителя Министра Иностранных Дел России М.Л.Богданова с Заместителем Председателя Совета Министров, Министром Иностранных Дел Сирии В.Муаллемом (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, August 5, 2015). 5 Russian Airborne Troops Chief Says Paratroopers Ready to Help Syria in Combating Terrorism, TASS, August 4, 2015, 6 Alex Fishman, Russian Jets in Syrian Skies, Ynetnews, August 31, 2015, 7 Bassem Mroué and Zeina Karam, Bruising Week for Syria s Assad as Troops Suffer Losses, Associated Press, April 2, 2015, 7

8 com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid= Mroué and Karam; Liz Sly, Syrian Rebels Take Strategic Town of Idlib, The Washington Post, March 28, 2015, strategic-town-of-idlib/2015/03/28/59e33562-d55b-11e4-8b1e- 274d670aa9c9_story.html?utm_term=.cd07e1f04a83; Sarah El Deeb, Rebels Seize Northwestern Syrian Town as Government Retaliates, Associated Press, April 25, 2015, 8; Zeina Karam, Syrian Insurgents Seize Last Military Base in Idlib Province, Associated Press, May 19, 2015, IS Enters Palestinian Camp in Damascus; Jordan Closes Border, Associated Press, April 1, 2015, 10 Zeina Karam, Civilians Flee as Militants Seize Most of Damascus Camp, Associated Press, April 4, 2015, IS Group Enters Syrian Town of Palmyra, Nears Ancient Ruins, Associated Press, May 16, 2015, 2; Zeina Karam and Samer N. Yacoub, Islamic State Seizes Ancient Town of Palmyra in Syria, Associated Press, May 20, 2015, 1; Albert Aji and Zeina Karam, Fears Mount over Palmyra as IS Expands Territory in Syria, Associated Press, May 21, 2015, Bassem Mroué, Militants, Rebels in Syria Announce New Push for Aleppo, Associated Press, July 3, 2015, 9; Activists: Insurgents Advance in Syria s Aleppo, Associated Press, July 18, 2015, Meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualem (President of Russia, June 29, 2015), 14 Moscow Concerned with Expanding Influence of Islamic State - Kremlin Spokesman, TASS, August 4, 2015, 15 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly (President of Russia, December 3, 2015), 16 Desmond Butler, APNewsBreak: Turkey, Saudi in Pact to Help Anti-Assad Rebels, Associated Press, May 7, 2015, 8; Ryan Lucas, Syrian Insurgent Gains Expose Assad Weaknesses, Associated Press, April 29, 8

9 2015, Lolita C Baldor, Syrian Rebel Training Has Started in Jordan, Associated Press, May 7, 2015, 8; Desmond Butler, US Plans for Anti-Islamic State Training Drawing Skepticism, Associated Press, April 10, 2015, Suzan Fraser, Turkey, US to Provide Air Protection to Syrian Rebels, Associated Press, May 25, 2015, 1; Lolita C Baldor, US Begins Armed Drone Flights from Turkey, Associated Press, August 3, 2015, Lavrov, Kerry Discuss US Plans to Bomb Syria Government Troops, TASS, August 3, 2015, 19 Josh Lederman, Turkey Allows US to Use Key Air Base to Strike Islamic State, Associated Press, July 24, 2015, 4; Diamond Butler, In Shift, Turkish Jets Strike Islamic State Targets in Syria, Associated Press, July 24, 2015, 4; Suzan Fraser, Turkish Jets Join US-Led Coalition in Airstrikes against IS, Associated Press, August 29, 2015, 1; Zeina Karam and Julie Pace, US, Turkey Plan for safe Zone Free of IS in Northern Syria, Associated Press, July 27, 2015, Contradictions between Arab States Hinder Fight against Islamic State, TASS, July 7, 2015, 21 Lavrov, Kerry Discuss US Plans to Bomb Syria Government Troops. 22 Lavrov, Kerry Discuss US Plans to Bomb Syria Government Troops. 23 In this sense, I agree with Dmitri Trenin, Putin s Syria Gambit Aims at Something Bigger Than Syria (Carnegie Moscow Center, October 13, 2015), 359, As Trenin writes, Shoring up the Assad regime and killing jihadi fighters are not, of course, the only objectives that Russia is pursuing in Syria. Moscow s intervention is as much about Washington as it is about IS. For the Russians, it is not a problem if Assad eventually departs, but he should not leave as a result of U.S. pressure or of a U.S.-backed rebellion. 24 Significantly, NATO began its airstrikes in Libya after Russia abstained from UN Security Council Resolution Samuel Charap, Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention, Survival 55, no. 1 (March 2013): 37 38; Ronald Dannreuther, Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution, Journal of European Integration 37, no. 1 (2015): 82 83, 9

10 Dmitri Trenin, Russia s Interests in Syria (Carnegie Moscow Center, June 9, 2014), Robert Freedman, From Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Putin: Has Mosccow s Policy in the Middle East Come Full Circle?, Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5, no. 2 (2018): , 25 Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present (Basic Books, 2009), Primakov, Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015, II.18, Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf. 28 Additionally, in contrast to the Russian narrative blaming US intervention against al-assad for the spread of terrorism in Syria, Obama asserted that violence committed by the al-assad regime was aiding the rise of terrorist groups in Syria. See: President Obama Addresses the United Nations General Assembly (The White House (President Barack Obama), September 24, 2013), th Session of the UN General Assembly (President of Russia, September 28, 2015), Charap, Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention, Vladimir Putin Answered Russian Journalists Questions (President of Russia, September 4, 2015), CSTO Summit (President of Russia, September 15, 2015), 70th Session of the UN General Assembly ; Vladimir Putin, Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS, interview by Charlie Rose, September 29, 2015, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club (President of Russia, October 22, 2015), 31 CSTO Summit th Session of the UN General Assembly. Bibliography 70th Session of the UN General Assembly. President of Russia, September 28, Activists: Insurgents Advance in Syria s Aleppo. Associated Press, July 18, Aji, Albert, and Zeina Karam. Fears Mount over Palmyra as IS Expands Territory in Syria. Associated Press, May 21, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response. Congressional Research Service, January 2,

11 Baldor, Lolita C. Syrian Rebel Training Has Started in Jordan. Associated Press, May 7, US Begins Armed Drone Flights from Turkey. Associated Press, August 3, Baranova, Maria. Qasem Soleimani: Iran s architect of Russian Operations in Syria. Russia Beyond the Headlines, October 5, Butler, Desmond. APNewsBreak: Turkey, Saudi in Pact to Help Anti-Assad Rebels. Associated Press, May 7, US Plans for Anti-Islamic State Training Drawing Skepticism. Associated Press, April 10, Butler, Diamond. In Shift, Turkish Jets Strike Islamic State Targets in Syria. Associated Press, July 24, Charap, Samuel. Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention. Survival 55, no. 1 (March 2013): Contradictions between Arab States Hinder Fight against Islamic State. TASS, July 7, CSTO Summit. President of Russia, September 15, Dannreuther, Ronald. Russia and the Arab Spring: Supporting the Counter-Revolution. Journal of European Integration 37, no. 1 (2015): DeYoung, Karen. U.S. Raises Concern about Iranian s Reported Visit to Moscow. The Washington Post, August 13, c033e6745d8_story.html?utm_term=.32b158d4f262. El Deeb, Sarah. Rebels Seize Northwestern Syrian Town as Government Retaliates. Associated Press, April 25, Fishman, Alex. Russian Jets in Syrian Skies. Ynetnews, August 31, Fraser, Suzan. Turkey, US to Provide Air Protection to Syrian Rebels. Associated Press, May 25,

12 com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid= Turkish Jets Join US-Led Coalition in Airstrikes against IS. Associated Press, August 29, Freedman, Robert. From Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Putin: Has Mosccow s Policy in the Middle East Come Full Circle? Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5, no. 2 (2018): Griffin, Jennifer, and Lucas Tomlinson. Exclusive: Quds Force Commander Soleimani Visited Moscow, Met Russian Leaders in Defiance of Sanctions. Fox News, August 6, IS Enters Palestinian Camp in Damascus; Jordan Closes Border. Associated Press, April 1, IS Group Enters Syrian Town of Palmyra, Nears Ancient Ruins. Associated Press, May 16, Karam, Zeina. Civilians Flee as Militants Seize Most of Damascus Camp. Associated Press, April 4, Syrian Insurgents Seize Last Military Base in Idlib Province. Associated Press, May 19, Karam, Zeina, and Julie Pace. US, Turkey Plan for safe Zone Free of IS in Northern Syria. Associated Press, July 27, Karam, Zeina, and Samer N. Yacoub. Islamic State Seizes Ancient Town of Palmyra in Syria. Associated Press, May 20, Lavrov, Kerry Discuss US Plans to Bomb Syria Government Troops. TASS, August 3, Lederman, Josh. Turkey Allows US to Use Key Air Base to Strike Islamic State. Associated Press, July 24, Lucas, Ryan. Syrian Insurgent Gains Expose Assad Weaknesses. Associated Press, April 29,

13 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. President of Russia, October 22, Meeting with Government Members. President of Russia, September 30, Meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualem. President of Russia, June 29, Moscow Concerned with Expanding Influence of Islamic State - Kremlin Spokesman. TASS, August 4, Mroué, Bassem. Militants, Rebels in Syria Announce New Push for Aleppo. Associated Press, July 3, Mroué, Bassem, and Zeina Karam. Bruising Week for Syria s Assad as Troops Suffer Losses. Associated Press, April 2, Perry, Tom, and Laila Bassam. How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow. Reuters, October 6, President Obama Addresses the United Nations General Assembly. The White House (President Barack Obama), September 24, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. President of Russia, December 3, Primakov, Yevgeny. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present. Basic Books, Putin, Vladimir. Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS. Interview by Charlie Rose, September 29, Russian Airborne Troops Chief Says Paratroopers Ready to Help Syria in Combating Terrorism. TASS, August 4, Russian National Security Strategy, December National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf. Sciutto, Jim. Iran s Quds Force Leader Traveled to Moscow in Violation of U.N. Sanctions, Official Says. CNN, August 7, Sly, Liz. Syrian Rebels Take Strategic Town of Idlib. The Washington Post, March 28, of-idlib/2015/03/28/59e33562-d55b-11e4-8b1e- 274d670aa9c9_story.html?utm_term=.cd07e1f04a83. Trenin, Dmitri. Putin s Syria Gambit Aims at Something Bigger Than Syria. Carnegie Moscow Center, October 13,

14 . Russia s Interests in Syria. Carnegie Moscow Center, June 9, Vladimir Putin Answered Russian Journalists Questions. President of Russia, September 4, О Встрече Спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации По Ближнему Востоку и Странам Африки, Заместителя Министра Иностранных Дел России М.Л.Богданова с Заместителем Председателя Совета Министров, Министром Иностранных Дел Сирии В.Муаллемом. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, August 5, mode=view&_3_displaydatefrom=%d1% &_3_advancedsearch=false& _3_direct=asc&_3_displayDate=%5B TO %5D&_3 _modifiedselection=6&_3_documentssearchcontainerprimarykeys=15_portlet_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ %2C15_PORTLET_ &_3_keywords=%D0%98%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD&_3_filterCategoryId=- 1&_3_delta=20&_3_searchSort=date&_3_format=&_3_andOperator=true&_3_formDat e= &_3_modified=%5b to %5d&_ 3_displayDateto=%D0%BF%D0%BE &_3_selectedLanguage=en_GB&_3_ countonpage=10&_3_resetcur=false&_3_struts_action=%2fsearch%2fsearch&_3_cur =7#. 14

II. From civil war to regional confrontation

II. From civil war to regional confrontation Following the initial legitimate demands of the Syrian people, the conflict took on the regional and international dimensions of a long term conflict. Are neighboring