The Turkish-Russian Rapprochement: Timely Turkish Pragmatism and Future Russia

Transcription

1 HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES The Turkish-Russian Rapprochement: Timely Turkish Pragmatism and Future Russia Policy Studies Unit 17 July 2016

2

3 HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity. To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, (4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit. A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and electronic press.

4 Contents First, INTRODUCTION... 2 Second, Cautious Convergence Third, speeding up of the normalization process... 4 Fourth, Regional and International Attitudes... 5 Fifth: the Turkish role in Syria... 6 Sixth: Future Possibilities... 8 Seventh: The benefits to the Syrians

5 First, INTRODUCTION After more than six months of poor relationships between the two countries, following downing the Russian warplane by the Turkish air force in 24 November 2015, and the killing of its pilot; Turkey has decided to make an apology to Russia, hoping that a public regret will break the ice, improve relationships, and eliminate the negative effects of the crisis with Moscow, whose strength and intervention in the Middle East, was growing consecutively and speedily. Turkey tried to alleviate its apology to the Russians, when the Turkish prime minister, Ben Ali Yildirim, said that his country would not pay compensation to Russia for shooting down their plane, stressing out that the president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had only expressed his regret about the incident in a letter he addressed to Putin, pointing out that Ankara has initiated legal proceedings against the person responsible for the killing of the Russian fighter pilot, in an attempt to suggest that the incident was only a human error. Equally, one day before the Turkish apology, Turkey had announced that they decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel, after six years of breaking. According to the agreement that was signed in Rome; the two sides shall exchange ambassadors again, cooperate in security and intelligence, and coordinate their efforts within international organizations, and it would also be possible for the two countries to discuss further the issue of installing a gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey. According to Israeli media sources, the agreement which was described by Israel as "historic", included preventing Hamas from planning or launching any future attacks against Israel, from Turkey, while allowing them to continue exercising their political activities, as well as transporting goods into the besieged Gaza Strip, through the port of Ashdod. 2

6 Second, Cautious Convergence. The Russia-Turkey relations have been strained after downing the Russian war plane. Turkey at the time, had insisted that the fighter had had entered the Turkish airspace, and stressed that it had been warned ten times in five minutes. Moscow on the other hand had said: The fighter was flying in Syrian airspace, and did not receive any warning before being shot down. The incident was followed by a state of estrangement, even a state of hostility at some times, and then Moscow imposed a series of economic sanctions against Turkey, including preventing commercial flights to Turkey, and banning the import of any Turkish agricultural products. Additionally, the Russian media started a political campaign accusing Turkey to facilitate the movement of the the Islamic State fighters to Syria through its border. As for he relations between Turkey and Israel, they have been strained after the Israeli attack on a Turkish ship, which was trying to break the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip in 2010, killing ten Turkish citizens. The thaw of relations of Turkey with both Russia and Israel raised a lot of questions and criticism, and incited observers and politicians to analyse the causes, dimensions, and the results of these two steps, and the impact of this convergence on the crises in the Middle East in general, and the Syrian issue in particular, considering the major roles Russia and Turkey have in this file. However, Turkey tried to reduce the effects of this convergence, as Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesman for the Turkish president, confirmed that to restore relations with Russia and Israel did not mean a change in Turkey's foreign position, and the policies of Turkey regarding Ukraine, Syria and the Crimea, would not change, however, Turkey would continue to discuss its disagreements with Moscow in this regards. Russia, on the other hand, has commended the Turkish move. The spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said that Moscow believed that Turkey has taken an "important step in the right direction". The Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has also expressed his hope that "the meeting, between the Presidents of the two countries, would 3

7 pave the right way to take practical measures for the normalization of relations" between their countries, pointing out the existence of" a good opportunity "to discuss what needed to discussed. Third, speeding up of the normalization process Regardless of the official comments of the Turkish diplomacy, who insists that these steps responded to external challenges and developments in the region in general, along with security and political developments taking place in Turkey; we can say that these two steps are very critical at the current stage, because they indicate the existence of new projects and plans in the region, giving an insight into what would be the new trends in foreign policy of both Turkey and Russia at the same time, especially with regard to the Syrian file, being the most tricky and complex among the files that are shared between the two countries. In this context, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, met with his Turkish counterpart, Mawlood Jawish Oglu, in the Russian city of Sochi, five days after the Turkish apology, and announcing their agreement to resume the activity a of the Russian-Turkish anti-terrorism group, saying: they agreed on the methods of dealing with the Syrian crisis. On top of that, in a telephone conversation between the two presidents, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it has been agreed to bring forward the date of their meeting, which was supposed to be held on the side-lines of the G20 in China, in September, according to what was declared, to be at the end of this coming July, or the beginning of August. A prominent Turkish media outlet has quoted the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mawlood Jawish Ihsanoglu, referring to the willingness of Ankara to open the (Incirlik) airbase in Adana, to the Russian Air Force, to fight the organization of the Islamic state. However, the Turkish minister has shortly denied that, insisting that Turkey "can cooperation with anyone in the fight against the Islamic state, " adding that he d never mentioned the said airbase. 4

8 It seems from this transition, that a number of changes are going to take place in no time in the foreign policy of both countries, based on the conviction that the whole world has entered a phase of big conflicts, and Turkey does not solely have enough force to solve all the problems, while Russia can no longer ignore the presence of the Turkish influence in the conflicts in the region. Perhaps, these changes will primarily affect the Syrian file, and will lead to concessions and compromises that may satisfy both countries, aiming to achieve a minimum compatibility between them, after their previous contradiction and disputes in goals and methods. Fourth, Regional and International Attitudes Neither the Regional and International attitudes, nor those of the Arab Gulf countries and Egypt, towards of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement are clear. Even the Syrian opposition has not yet formed a clear vision, or a specific program to mitigate any negative consequences that could result from these changes, or to take advantage of any positive results that may result from them. As for the Kurds in Syria, this move was a big shock to them, especially the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, who advocates for a Kurdish self-managed federal in the north of Syria. The Syria Democratic Forces, who belong to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, make up the main militia units protecting people, but considered by Turkey as agents of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), which in turn is categorised as a terrorist group by Turkey. The Kurds were on tenterhooks, especially since Russia said: It did not come to Syria in order to achieve Kurdish project. The United States, on the other hand, has expressed surprise of this Turkish move. A spokeswoman for the US Foreign Affairs stated that America was "astonished" of this convergence; suggesting that this time the Turks has acted alone and without consulting with their US ally. It is worth to mention, Turkey has had strained relations with the US for a few years, because of the fluctuation in its policy towards the Turks, the Kurds and Europeans, and inaction towards the Turkish requests to establish a safe zone on its border with Syria, and the 5

9 US support of some Kurdish militias who have national projects, which Turkey feared would be contagious to its own Kurds. Still in return, the US has expressed in many Western diplomatic circles that it was convinced that convergence would have been difficult, without the knowledge of the US administration. The Iranians, even though they feared that Russia would holding back their influence in Syria, or Russian regional relations would shift to the advantage of Turkey; they welcomed the normalization of the Russian-Turkish new friendship, expressing their hopes that such relations would contribute to "stability and security as well as the fight against terrorism " in the region, and would push Turkey to change its position on the Syrian issue, meaning that they would retreat from supporting the opposition, and abandon its support of the demands of regime change. Soon, the top coordinator of the Syrian case between Iran and Russia, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Shamkhani, paid a visit to Moscow, of which no details had been revealed. Fearing the change in the game rules, The Syrian Kurds announced a draft constitution, particularly in the areas they controlled in northern Syria, in an attempt to impose the logic of the status quo on these two countries. Fifth: the Turkish role in Syria From the very beginning, turkey endorsed the Syrian revolution which broke out in March 2011, starting with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, who stated that he advised Assad to conduct democratic reforms, but in vain. And when the Syrian regime started using military action to kill protesters, Erdogan sent his intelligence service director to Syria; to discuss with the officials transferring the Turkish experience to them, and offered to train the Syrian authorities on democratic action, but failed. Then later, Erdogan announced that he was concerned about the risk of sectarian clashes in Syria, and promised to deal with the Syrian crisis as if as it was "a Turkish internal affair"; because of the long border between the two countries, simultaneously expressing his support to all the Syrian parties on the 6

10 opposition spectrum, especially the Islamic movements. He opened the doors of Turkey for them to hold meetings and conferences, and launch their statements, no matter how hostile to the Syrian authority. With the Turkish attitude, the hopes of Syrian revolutionists grew bigger, feeling they had a very close by ally, and adding to the support some Gulf states, which had a significant impact on driving many events, and gave the Islamic trend of the revolution importance and role, and to the Islamists it gave the moral support they were waiting for him. Turkey ignored the generosity of the Syrian regime (Assad father and son), and how they accepted the current borders, allowed the international rivers to be Turkish rivers, and consented to the annexation of the province of Alexandretta to Turkey. In addition, turkey ignored the growing economic exchange between the two countries, which was touching three billion dollars at the beginning of the events. Turkey decided to assume its position in the Syrian case as part of its regional wide part, because neighbouring Syria has an important regional significance, and it would be unwise for the new Turkish policy to adopt a position of neutrality toward what was going on, fearing that the deteriorating security situation in Syria could reflect on its own security, as well as the threat of the Kurds forming self-governed areas in northern Syria. Turkey has also decided to take advantage of its vitality stemming from its regional position, its Islamic outlook, and its relationship with Asia. Such new position would benefit Turkey in many ways, as well as giving it better conditions to negotiate with Europe, and would strengthen its position in the NATO, on the other hand, supporting the people s movement in Syria, is the other side of the indirect counter movement against Iran, and thus countering the ambitions of Iran in the area. The Turkish role in the area is manifested in three directions: first, the adoption of the Syrian opposition, by hosting it, politically supporting it, providing the needed facilities, and allowing it to hold conferences and meetings in the Turkish cities, Secondly, the reception and care of more than two and a half million Syrian refugees, and its attempt to convince the international community to establish safe zones inside Syrian territory to house them. Thirdly, trying to convince the European Union, and the US administration, to establish firm positions toward 7

11 the Syrian issue, and provoking them to put pressure on the system by various means and methods. Unfortunately, the Turkish efforts have not received the anticipated American and European support, on the contrary, it is safe to say that The United States has disappointed its Middle Eastern ally, by rejecting the establishment of safe zones inside Syria, and allying with the Syrian Kurds who oppose Ankara. Similarly, the Europeans have refused to make concessions in regard to joining the Union European, and NATO have not showed great interest in supporting Turkey, after the Russian war plane incident, for which they blamed Turkey, telling it to solve the problem amicably. But that was not the worst of it. The spread of terrorism to Turkey, through a series of suicide attacks, have caused political tremors and public anxiety, leading, with all these repercussions to put Turkey in a state of relative isolation. As a result, in the last year the Turkish leadership started to exhibit a desire to unzip this isolation, through a realistic and pragmatic revision of its interior and exterior policies, not limited to the Russian- Turkish file, but many other problematic files that Turkey is plagued with. Sixth: Future Possibilities Turkish officials have stated that the Turkish decision and steps towards reconciliation with Russia and Israel have paved the way for a new Turkish foreign policy, but none of them could say for sure what was the nature of this new policy, or perhaps they had no desire in disclosing them at that occasion. Syrians, in turn, at both the political and the public levels, and on both sides, opposition and regime, began to interpret the Turkish move, each according to their desires and wishes. With regard to the Syrian case in general, there are multiple scenarios stemming from about the effects of the upcoming Turkish-Russian rapprochement. These scenarios are not less complicated than the Syrian issue itself, but we can extract several possibilities based on the Turkish and Russian reality, and how the events are unfolding. These possibilities may include: 8

12 1- The Turkish move is, indeed, a true desire to review its foreign policy, and rearrange its relations with neighbouring countries on two levels: regional and international, and can be considered as the physical application of a policy to end the problems which Turkey has been facing over the last five years in particular, and because these changes are governed by Turkey's economic, geopolitical and security interests; it seems they have to be very slow, due to the complexities of the situation and the level of accuracy of any steps that has to be taken in an area marred by instability. 2- This move can also be seen as an urgent economic need for Moscow and Ankara. As we know, in many cases, the economy controls politics, and Turkey wants to restore almost four million Russian tourists, and to resume of exporting its goods to Russia, as well as the recovery of transit trade passing across its lands towards Russia, and their need to the much preferred price of the Russian gas, (Turkey is the second largest importer of Russian natural gas after Germany), and the need for Russia to continue building their nuclear plant (costing $ 20 billion). It is estimated that the economic damage of the bad Russian-Turkish relations is nearly 35 billion dollars annually. Russia, on the other side, wants its share in the Turkish market for gas, and would also want to revive the gas pipeline project to Europe through Turkey, and get the opportunity to implement it, and to bring back the prices of vegetable and fruit to normal, and to resume the import of raw materials, and spare parts for the Russian cars industry from the Turkish market, and is willing to revitalize the real estate and construction market, with the support of Turkey. 3- On a different note, the Syrian regime supporters see this convergence as a desire from Turkey to reverse its hostility towards to Syrian regime, and there has been some leaks from the media about some Algerian mediation in this regard (neither did the Turks nor the Syrian deny this). But this option still seems unlikely, because any change in the Turkish attitude towards the Syrian regime may prove very costly to Turkey, and could guarantee to sabotage both the Turkish-Saudi Arabia relations, and the Turkey-European ones. The risks of this change on Turkey, internally, regionally 9

13 and internationally, are much greater than benefit from thawing relations with the Syrian regime, and it is not enough to share the same sentiments with the regime, regarding the Kurdish federalism, for Turkey to restore relations with it. 4- Some believe that the Russian Turkish rapprochement is the embodiment of the Russian-Iranian estrangement. There are those who say that Russia's relationship with Iran hangs in the balance, with its relationship with Turkey on the other side. When the first drops, the second climbs. This possibility can be enhanced by improving Turkey's relations with all of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, and greater coordination with them on many different levels, including the military level. This would assist in countering the Iranian domination project in the region. Another thing is the presence of Turkish and Russian desire to rework the system of alliances in the region, leading to new partners who will be able to achieve the foundations of a political process, particularly in Syria, and in Iraq and elsewhere on a larger scale. This possibility is enhanced by the unsatisfactory outcome of the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, Syria meeting in Tehran, three weeks before the declaration of the Russian-Turkish return of relations. After the meeting Turkey confirmed that it would cooperate with Iran only partially in the Syrian file, and practically, Russia did not provide any air cover or protection to the Iranian fighters and militias in the southern countryside of Aleppo, which resulted in large losses for the later. Seventh: The benefits to the Syrians All the probabilities mentioned above indicate the existence of Turkish and Russian desires for rapprochement and convergence, which will be to the benefit for their intersected economic, political and strategic interests. Mostly in the next stage, Turkey will seek to deal with the realities on the ground, in a more pragmatic and realistic way, and will focus on fighting Islamic state on both the intelligence and the military levels, cooperating with Russia in this context. In addition to that, Turkey will develop a new strategy to deal with the Kurds 10

14 in Syria file, and will coordinate with Moscow in this respect too, to reach its goals without having to face the Syrian Kurds militarily. Russia in turn will seek to bring Turkey closer, but not to the point where Turkey has to change its stance on the Syrian regime and the Syrian issue in general. This will oblige the Syrian opposition to prepare for each upcoming possibility, and to be in turn pragmatic in dealing with this convergence, and they should focus on the following points: - To have a clear, flexible, realist and homogenous position, and to develop the necessary plan to keep its alliance with Turkey, a strategic one, that would work for the future rather than the present. - Reconfigure the Syrian opposition coalition and the Revolution forces, and the higher commission the negotiations, to convince Turkey that its bet on the Syrian opposition was not a mistake. - To be tolerant towards the Russian-Turkish rapprochement, and not to boycott Russia easily or definitively, but approach it with the clear demands of the Syrian revolution, and try to rid the opposition of failure, corruption and limitedness, which have spread out into the Syrian opposition organizations, especially Turkey-based ones. - Overcome the mistakes of the past, and not put all the Syrian opposition eggs in one basket, and being more politically open to all the other baskets, which will get the Syrians closer to their legitimate national rights. - The continued lack of confidence in Russia or the United States, except when the opposition get tangible results in the interests of the revolution. - To take advantage of this convergence to enable a ceasefire, sponsored jointly by the Russian and the Americans. - To work on mitigating the legal and administrative problems of the Syrians living in Turkey; relieving the Turkish politics from such burden to prevent the human and social pressure from affecting the Turkish decision. 11

15 In the next few weeks, while waiting for a much clearer picture, it is the Syrian opposition s responsibility to dismantle the new changes in the Turkish and Russian politics, and stand with any hypotheses that could enhance the chances of a victory to their cause, and keep rejecting any project, regional or international, that may not serve the Syrian Revolution, with its declared and known basic objectives. 12

16

17 harmoon.org