Reports Collection The Reports collection publishes studies based on personal accounts from operation commanders, written in interview style.

Transcription

1

2 The Cahiers du Retex (Lessons Learned Casebooks) tackle major issues important to the French Army today, providing material for doctrinal research and development. There are four collections: Operations Collection The Operations collection consists of thematic summaries related to a theater of operations or a strategic function, as well as pocket books collections of lessons learned in tactics. Research Collection The Research collection publishes works of a historical or exploratory nature that aim to shine light on a particular issue in force employment. They are generally academic research studies carried out by reserve officers or interns, and are not official documents. Reports Collection The Reports collection publishes studies based on personal accounts from operation commanders, written in interview style. Cover photo: Syria, Fighters of the Free Syrian Army. Reuters 2 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

3 TACTICAL EVOLUTIONS IN SYRIA Cahier du RETEX Research March

4 Tactical evolutions in Syria, This casebook is online on the CDEF website under the DREX tab Cahier du RETEX Research Collection. This study was developed by Adrien DESBONNET, student MRIAE Paris I Sorbonne, research officer at the Centre de Doctrine d Emploi des Forces, under the supervision of Mme Julie d Andurain, Director of studies Research Division/DREX/CDEF CDEF/DREX/B. RECH 1 place Joffre PARIS Pnia : Tél. : Fax : julie.d-andurain@intradef.gouv.fr 4 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

5 CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE ORIGINS OF PROTEST I.1 THE TRIANGLE OF POWER, THE BASIS OF THE SYRIAN REGIME I.1.1 The birth of the Syrian regime is based on the Alawites, the armed forces and the Ba ath Party I.1.2 President Hafez al-assad and the establishment of his regime through strengthening the triangle of power I.1.3 Bashar al-assad s rise to power I.2 A FRAGILE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT I.3 THE FIRST REBEL MOVEMENTS I.3.1 The first demonstrations I.3.2 Emerging rebel groups: claims, structures, and identities CHAPTER II THE REGIME S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY II.1 THE SYRIAN ARAB ARMY IN II.2 A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY INHERITED FROM HAFEZ AL-ASSAD. 26 II.2.1 Hafez al-assad s counterinsurgency, II.2.2 Bashar al-assad s counterinsurgency strategy, II.3 THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE SUMMER OF II.3.1 The reasons for failure II.3.2 The consequences of this failure CHAPITRE III THE SYRIAN REBELS, BETWEEN ATTEMPTED UNIFICATION AND PERMANENT DIVISIONS III.1 THE REBELLION S UNIFICATION ATTEMPTS III.1.1 The difficulties of the first rebel coalitions III.1.2 Developing cooperation programs on the ground III.1.3 Groups with local, provincial and country-wide influence III.2 THE REBEL STRATEGY III.2.1 A rebel strategy is emerging at the national level III.2.2 The tactical challenges of the rebels III.2.3 The rebels and the population Cahier du RETEX Research March

6 III.3 THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS IN THE REBELLION III.3.1 Turkey, a key rear base and source of supply III.3.2 The key role of the Gulf countries III.3.3 The support of Western powers CHAPTER IV ASSAD S NEW STRATEGY: ETHNIC CLEANSING AND CIVIL WAR IV.1 THE POPULATION, A CENTRAL ISSUE IV.1.1 Humanitarian crisis, the regime s ultimate weapon IV.1.2 Propaganda, a pillar essential to the survival of the State IV.2 INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITIAS IV.2.1 The growing confusion between militias and Syrian armed forces IV.2.2 The role of militias in the regime s operations IV.3 THE PRIMARY ROLE OF FOREIGN PLAYERS IN THE FIGHTING IV.3.1 Iranians in Syria IV.3.2 The role of the Lebanese Hezbollah IV.3.3 Shiite militias in Syria IV.3.4 Russian supply IV.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIME S OPERATIONS AND OF THE GEOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IV.4.1 Assessment of operations conducted by the regime since summer IV.4.2 Assessment of the geographical evolution of the conflict CHAPTER V THE SECOND REVOLUTION : THE SURGE OF JIHADIST GROUPS AND THE FRACTURE OF THE REBELLION V.1 AN EMERGING JIHADIST REBELLION V.1.1 The increased number of jihadist groups in Syria V.1.2 The jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war V.1.3 An unprecedented influx of foreign fighters V.2 THE SYRIAN INSURGENCY AGAINST JIHADIST GROUPS: COMBAT OPERATIONS AND COALITIONS V.3 OUTLOOK: WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR JIHADISTS IN SYRIA? CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

7 INTRODUCTION 40 years since Hafez al-assad s 1970 coup and the Assad family s dictatorial 2011marked regime over Syria. Relying on the support of his Ba ath Party, as well as a bloated security apparatus, the Head of State maintained complete control over a Syrian society deprived of freedom and generally living in a climate of fear. The armed forces, where Hafez came from, were brought to the heart of power. Power therefore seemed set in stone, immune to reforms, and only dedicated to serving the interests of a clan controlled by the Assad family. The fall of the regimes of Ben Ali in Tunisia followed by Mubarak in Egypt at the beginning of 2011 showed the danger facing the dictatorial powers that had run several Arab countries for decades. The conflict in Syria, with its own defining features, is a component of these Arab Springs that were to sweep most of the Arab world. The eruption of violence in Syria results from the clash between hopes for political change that were revived by this international wave of protests and the Syrian regime s inability to carry out the wide-ranging reforms that were required. The conflict in Syria is also a new field of action for international jihadism. The war has seen powerful jihadist groups emerge; Syrian territory is now deeply divided. These movements are a threat to both Syria s future and that of its neighboring countries, including Iraq. They are also a matter of concern for Western countries that fear both the jihadists return to their home countries and the rise of groups even more powerful that al-qaeda at its peak, which, for the Islamic State, is the case today. However, the conflict in Syria is a standalone case given the intensity and duration of violence. The regime s counterinsurgency campaign quickly gave way to a civil war resulting in a divided national territory, a geopolitical imbroglio, and a humanitarian disaster. This Lessons Learned casebook describes how the Syrian civil war has evolved and draws lessons from it in terms of counterinsurgency doctrine. This study was conducted with a view to analyzing the tactical evolutions of the various players involved, taking into account the backdrop of geopolitical issues. It also sheds light on the regional turmoil this conflict has caused. As such, it is a relevant case study as part of a more comprehensive approach to conflicts and rivalries in the Near and Middle East regions. Cahier du RETEX Research March

8

9 CHAPTER I THE ORIGINS OF PROTEST I.1 THE TRIANGLE OF POWER, 1 THE BASIS OF THE SYRIAN REGIME Since 1970, Syria s authoritarian and hereditary regime has been based on the Ba ath Party, 2 powerful internal security services, strong armed forces, as well as a cumbersome administration. These different entities are closely linked, interdependent and the pillars of power serving the regime. Alawites found the military to be a means towards social advancement and it became a tool of their power that was to come. From 1952, Hafez al-assad rose through the ranks of the military hierarchy until he came to power in Integrating the Alawites into politics was mainly done through the Syrian People s Party and the Ba ath Party, including in Latakia. 3 It must be remembered, however, that the Alawites do not amount to a single homogeneous, monolithic, community group. In their midst, there are rivalries between cities and the countryside, villages, families, and tribes. I.1.1 The birth of the Syrian regime is based on the Alawites, the armed forces and the Ba ath Party The Alawites, a minority branch of Shiite faith, have gradually emerged as the country s ruling minority. For more than ten centuries, this community was closed in on itself, suffering persecution, contempt and even hatred from other Muslims to an extent that, even today, it is considered as heretical by many Sunnis. The French mandate ( ) put a stop to seven centuries of oppression and led the Alawites out of isolation, going as far as granting them the Alawite State in northwestern Syria until the country s reunification in Meanwhile, a military career path was opened to the more nationalist Sunnis, who had previously overlooked it as they viewed it as an offshoot of the French mandate authorities. Hated and despised by the rest of the population, the 1 Xavier Baron, Aux origines du drame syrien , Paris, Tallandier, The Renaissance or Resurrection Party, an Arab Socialist party created in Damascus in Xavier Baron, op. cit., p The Ba ath Party coup on 8 March, 1963, marked the beginning of the party breakup. A civil-military council, headed by Amin al-hafez, was set up. It expelled the historical founders of the Ba ath Party and overthrew the Syrian Arab Republic. The officer corps rapidly went through a time of far-reaching changes. The Alawites took advantage of the situation and bolstered their dominance by being posted to the elite units around Damas and in strategic sectors connected to power. Meanwhile, the Sunnis were sent to the outer periphery of the country, on the Israeli front. This distribution of power between the Alawites and the Sunnis was one of the critical success factors of the neo-ba athist coup, the hardline wing of the Party led by Salah Jedid, on 23 February, The traditional Pan Arab vision of the Ba ath Party was replaced with a policy of regionalism. Hafez al-assad became Defense Minister and Air Force Commander. On taking over the armed forces, he appointed loyal Alawi officers to key positions, strongly united behind the Assad family, while the lower ranks remained mostly Sunni. The same momentum prevailed within the Ba ath Party, with the Alawites gradually Cahier du RETEX Research March

10 Chapter I The origins of protest replacing the Sunnis. The 1966 coup also opened a major rift within the Party, particularly between Salah Jedid, representing the civilian wing, and Hafez al- Assad, heading the military wing along with his follower from the beginning and soon-to-be Defense Minister, Mustafa Tlass. The 1967 defeat against Israel (the Six-Day War), whose responsibility Hafez al-assad attributed to the civilian wing, was also a political defeat for Damascus. The conflict between the civilians and the military was based on internal socialist politics, relations with other Arab states, and ties to the Soviet Union. For Assad, the fight against Israel took precedent over socialist changes to society. Fighting Israel required cooperation with moderate Arab states and the rival Ba athist regime in Baghdad, something categorically rejected by the civilian wing. Hafez al-assad got rid of his rival during the coup of 13 November, 1970, in the wake of the Jordanian crisis. He did so with the support of the armed forces and avoided bloodshed, referring to how he wanted to reject Syria s intervention to end the intellectual terrorism and dictatorship of the civilian wing. With a view to launching a corrective movement, al- Assad suggested holding elections. On 12 March, 1971, Hafez al-assad was elected with 99.2% of the vote, a figure that attested to the dictatorial nature of the new regime following years of unstable military dictatorship. He then prioritized shattering the influence of the families of large landowners through land reform, so that a class of peasants dedicated to the Ba ath Party could emerge. I.1.2 President Hafez al-assad and the establishment of his regime through strengthening the triangle of power The Constitution of 12 March 1973 granted broad powers to the President as well as a prominent role to the Ba ath Party. Syria officially became a democratic, popular, socialist and sovereign State. The regional commander of the Ba ath Party shall put forward a presidential candidate to the People s Assembly, and then this application is subject to a referendum. Article 8 of the Constitution stipulates that the Ba ath Party is the leading party in the society and the State. A single-party system, a standard feature of dictatorships, was then enforced. In this context, the President is elected for seven years on the basis of a mandate that can be renewed indefinitely. He is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appoints one or several vice-presidents, the Prime Minister and Government members. He assumes sole legislative power when the Parliament is not in session. The role of Parliament is thus reduced to merely rubber stamping the decisions taken by the regional command of the Ba ath Party, led by President Assad. The Government has a similar subordinate role. Furthermore, it was also added to the Constitution that the religion of the President of the Republic must be Islam, a consequence of Sunni pressures in favor of Islam, making it the religion of the state. Syrian troops in Damascus, 1963 President Hafez al-assad 10 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

11 Chapter I The origins of protest Hafez al-assad s regime quickly set up powerful security services, pillars of the regime to be found at all levels of society. These services are multiple, independent of the armed forces and the police and sometimes rivalling them. They are a permanent feature in cities where they work closely with the Ba ath militias, which are also present in rural areas. Also present are the Defense (Companies) brigades, created prior to 1970 and which were headed by Hafez al-assad s brother, Rifaat al-assad, until 1984 when he fell into disgrace. Numbering some 15,000 men, they sometimes had more modern weaponry than the Army, including tanks that would be put to use when quelling the Hama uprising in Alawi General Ali Haydar s Special Forces, estimated at about 10,000 men, completed this security arsenal. Hafez al-assad s power was also shared with his clan. Among his most loyal followers was Mustafa Tlass, an early-days companion and the irremovable Defense Minister, Colonel Ali Zaza, an Alawite and the head of Military Intelligence, the Sunni Abdallah al-ahmar, who controlled the Ba ath Party as Deputy Secretary, i.e. the Party s number two after the President, Abdel Rahman Khleifaoui, a Sunni, who was Prime Minister from 1971 to 1972 and again in 1976, Abdel Halim Khaddam, another Sunni, Minister for Foreign Affairs after the coup and Vice- President in 1984 before breaking with Bashar al- Assad in 2005, General Mohammed al-kholi, an Alawite, the head of Air Force Intelligence, who came directly under the Head of State and General Naji Jamil who succeeded Hafez al-assad as Air Force Commander. It soon became clear that the clan was using its position for private gain and not for the State or society. I.1.3 Bashar al-assad s rise to power These elements were still prevalent, when, on the death of his father, Bashar al-assad took over the country in He was barely prepared for exercising power as it was his elder brother, Bassel, who had been earmarked to rule, before his death in a car accident in Xavier Baron, op.cit., p At this point, Bashar al-assad seemed an openminded and modern man 5, although he was also perceived as a weak figure, for whom it would be difficult to confront the old guard of the regime and the intricate workings of the Ba ath Party. After fifteen years of no meetings, a testament to the extent of Hafez al- Assad s disinterest in the Party, the Ba ath convened on 17 June, 2000, for its 9 th Congress, where Bashar al-assad was unanimously proclaimed leader of the Ba ath Party and the people. The meeting was held in the interests of legitimization and concealing the perpetuation of a hereditary dictatorial system. Three days later, on 20 June, Bashar al-assad was elected General Secretary of the Party. A new Central Committee was formed, notably including Commander Maher al-assad, Bashar s brother, a member of the Presidential Guard; Colonel Manaf Tlass, son of the Defense Minister, an officer of the Republican Guard; General Ali Aslan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; and General Ibrahim al-safi, Commander of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. These appointments give a clear picture of how the presidential function, the Assad family, the Ba ath Party, and the armed forces at the top of the State, are intermingled. On 10 July, Bashar was elected President by referendum, obtaining 97.2% of the vote, without any internal dispute. Once again, the result reflected the dictatorial nature of the Syrian regime, where opposition is non-existent. The first months of Bashar al-assad s rule were referred to as the Damascus Spring, a period during which al-assad rolled out several modernization reforms. His inaugural speech on 17 July, 2000, was filled with promises of change, but remained shrouded in ambiguity. Of note, he put forward that democracy would be a good thing for Syria but that its Western model was unsuitable. He expressed the need for indispensable administrative reform and for those responsible for endemic corruption to be brought to justice. In the first year, Bashar al-assad 5 It was Bassel, his elder brother, who had long been groomed for power. Consequently, Bashar al-assad had not got ready for a military career. He studied ophthalmology in London, where he met his wife Asma. He is deemed to be passionate about new technologies and the Internet. He was urgently recalled to Damascus in 1994, following the death of his brother Bassel. He then received accelerated military training while being prepared by his father for the exercise of power. He was promoted (to) Colonel in At the same time, he was appointed to civilian office, as President of the Syrian Computer Society, an organization founded by his brother Bassel. See Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar el-asad. Anatomie d'un régime autoritaire, Belin, Paris, 2013, p Cahier du RETEX Research March

12 Chapter I The origins of protest did pass about a hundred or so laws to facilitate private investment, the market economy and the opening of private banks, to address unemployment (estimated at 20% of the active population) and the lack of housing. For Bashar al-assad, the Ba ath Party s monopoly, or, in other words, the lack of democracy, did not hinder economic openness. Although Bashar s Syria differs from that of his father in some respects, it is very much a continuum of the regime founded in Unlike under the rule of Hafez al-assad, criticism can exist in Bashar s Syria. The climate of fear has somewhat dissipated but democracy remains absent, without a multiparty system, freedom of the press, nor the separation of powers. Security services also remain very powerful and the Assad clan seems irremovable. The Syrian intelligence agencies, pillars of the Assad regime Bachar al-assad During this period, independent parties were formed and several conferences, trade shows and associations were held: speech and criticism became freer. However, this openness was only really found in the capital and in a few of the country s cities, and it lacked popular support. An opposition movement was formed, with emblematic figures such as the writer Michel Kilo, Riad al-turk, Riad Seif, Aref Dalila, and Burhan Galioun, who were all present as the crisis started in On 26 September, 2000, they published the Declaration of the 99, calling for an end to the state of emergency that had been in force since 1963, amnesty for all political prisoners, and the freedom of assembly, expression and the press. In January 2001, the Declaration of the 1,000 called for free elections, the end of the state of emergency and the political monopoly of the Ba ath Party, and an independent judicial system. Among senior government officials, many were worried about their benefits; consequently, there were laws that had been voted that were not enforced. As a result, criticism was quickly stifled. In 2005, the family clan was bolstered further, as Bashar al-assad engineered the departure of certain members of the old guard, including Abdel Halim Khaddam and Mustafa Tlass. While the Damascus Spring did not alter the structure of the regime it did serve to inject new ideas into society and unite opposition movements, which would resurface in The intelligence agencies, or Mukhabarat, gradually took over from the Ba ath Party as the political backbone of the regime. Their rise to power dates back to the 1982 Hama uprising, which would reveal how the regime needed to tighten control over the population and to counterbalance the power of the Ba ath Party. The intelligence agencies activities were then extended to cover Syrians day-to-day life. Under Hafez al-assad s rule, approval from the Mukhabarat was needed in order to create a business, marry a child or change one s place of residence, leading to very significant corruption in their midst. These agencies are manned by approximately 65,000 full-time and hundreds of thousands of part-time agents, i.e. an average of one agent for every 257 inhabitants. 6 The Syrian security complex is divided into four Intelligence Directorates: the Political Security Directorate, the General Security Directorate, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and the Military Intelligence Directorate. The Directorates are attached either to the Ministry of the Interior or to the Defense Ministry, although those government departments do not really exercise any authority over the intelligence agencies. They are, above all, subject to President Assad s authority. The heads of the Intelligence Directorates report to him twice a day and receive instructions in return. The Republican Guard, headed by Maher al-assad, seems to be the most autonomous entity, as he has further authority over the heads of the various agencies. Although the agencies compete with one another, the rule is that Military Intelligence is the most powerful of the four Directorates. The 6 Wladimir Glasman, Les ressources sécuritaires du régime en Syrie, Institut de Recherches et d Études sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMAM), 19 January, accessed on 21 July, Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

13 Chapter I The origins of protest Republican Guard and the Special Forces are the two Praetorian forces that reinforce the militarysecurity complex. It is designed to monitor and control the political field, protect government premises and the related staff, and its leader, the President of the Republic, Bashar al-assad. 7 The Assad clan, an asabiyyah 8 at the helm Just like Saddam Hussein s hold on power in Iraq and Gaddafi s in Libya, Hafez and then Bashar al-assad s Syria is dominated by a clan that fosters nepotism and interpersonal networks for the running of the country. The clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood uprising between 1979 and 1982 was led by Hafez al-assad s brother, Rifaat. This division of roles is reminiscent of that between Bashar and Maher al- Assad; the latter was responsible for the 2011 repression. From the outset of Hafez al-assad s hold on power, a tribal solidarity and one based on the graduating class of the Military Academy of Homs, where Hafez el-assad studied in 1950, prevailed. This is where he met Mustapha Tlass, who became his Defense Minister. Hafez al-assad also met Mustapha al-kholi in the Air Force. With him, Assad illegally created an intelligence service within the armed forces that became a Ba athist strongpoint in the forces. This is also where he also met two key individuals, both Alawites, Salah Jadid and Mohammed Umran, who secretly created a Military Committee, the main structure for future coups. Bashar al-assad has fostered the same approach at the top of the State ever since he came to power in Of note, his brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, ran the presidential Palace s security services. Bashar al- Assad s wife, Asma, a modern and attractive woman, also plays a role. She is a vital cog in the system, lending moral support to the Sunni side of the regime, as well as representing its cultural, intellectual and human side. Bashar al-assad s mother, Anissa, closely tied to the Head of State s elder sister, Bushra, and his maternal uncle, Mohammed Makhlouf, also play a role in the conduct of policy and repression. 7 Souhail Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar el-asad. Anatomie d un régime autoritaire, Belin, Paris, 2013, pp Esprit de corps. They thereby refuse any political concessions to the opposition, as, in their view, doing so would spell the end of the regime. Important ties also exist with Bashar al-assad s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, a wealthy businessman, who is head of the al-dunya TV station, the regime's propaganda weapon. The above reflects a trend that began under Hafez al- Assad and that was also seen in Iraq under Saddam Hussein: the more a regime is weakened, the more power is concentrated among the personal relatives of the Head of State and the personalization of power and the cult of personality further reinforced. As Syria s economy was liberalized, a new, mostly non- Alawite, economic elite also emerged. Political and military elites in power, along with new entrepreneurial elites, forged links through marriage, building a network of alliances that could be described as a military-merchant complex. The Syrian regime has thus been politically savvy, by creating inter-community alliances with the old Sunni and Christian bourgeoisies. Anissa Makhlouf: Hafez al-assad s wife, Anissa Makhlouf remains highly influential within the family council. Along with the Makhlouf family, her daughter Bushra and her son Maher, she forms a very influential block opposed to any political reform. Mohamed Makhlouf: Ahmed Makhlouf s brother and Rami Makhlouf s father, he made a substantial fortune from managing State and private companies, enabling his son, Rami, to gain Hafez al-assad s confidence. He attends family gatherings. Rami Makhlouf: A powerful businessman, he is said to control 60% of the national economy. He embodies corruption in the eyes of opponents. His empire mainly consists of powerful companies in the construction business and the oil industry; Syriatel, the main mobile telephone operator in the country; and the al-dunya TV channel. He is Bashar al-assad s cousin. Hafez Makhlouf: Rami Makhlouf s younger brother, he was quickly promoted once Assef Shawkat was dismissed as Director of General Security in September He heads the intelligence agencies. Cahier du RETEX Research March

14 Chapter I The origins of protest Jamil al-assad Hafez al-assad Anissa Makhlouf Mohamed Makhlouf Rami Makhlouf Hafez Makhlouf Rifaat el-assad Bashar al-assad Maher al-assad Bushra al-assad Bassel al-assad Majid al-assad Asma Akhras Assef Shawkat Bouthaina Shaabane The Assad clan, a family at the head of Syria Jamil al-assad: Hafez al-assad s younger brother, he was the head of the al-mutarda militia armed by his brother Rifaat s Defense Companies, linked to the Shabiha mafia-style militias. His son Fawwaz manages real estate and commercial companies and is one of the main leaders of the Shabiha militias. He died in Rifaat al-assad: Hafez al-assad s brother, he had a considerable influence on him. He spent a long time as Commander of the Defense Companies (pro-regime militias), but was removed from office in 1984 for plotting a coup against his brother. Asma Akhras: Born in Britain in 1975 to a wealthy Sunni family from Homs, she is the modern, attractive and media-conscious figure of the regime. She actively participates in building up a modern and moderate image of President Assad. Maher al-assad: Brother of President Assad, he is the most influential of the Head of State s entourage. He led the siege of Daraa in 2011 and is reportedly violent and unstable. He is Commander of the Presidential Guard, the Republican Guard and the Army s 4 th Armored Division, allegedly the most powerful. He represents the hard wing of the regime, as well as heading up very profitable business activities. Bushra al-assad: Bashar al-assad s older sister is the head of the national pharmaceutical industry. With her mother, Anissa, and her brother, Maher, she is influential within the family council and opposes any concessions from the regime. Assef Shawkat: He was married to Bushra al- Assad and spent a long time as Commander of the regime s security agencies. In September 2011, Bashar al-assad feared that Shawkat s positive relations with the West would weaken his loyalty and so he was dismissed. He became Deputy Defense Minister and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Unpopular with Maher al-assad, he was dismissed from office in The 2011 repression made him essential to the regime once again. He was killed in a bomb attack in Damascus on 18 July, Bassel al-assad: Hafez al-assad s eldest son, he had been groomed to succeed his father. He died in a car accident in He was head of the Presidential Guard and chairman and founder of the Syrian Computer Society. He was also very influential in implementing Syria s policy in Lebanon. 14 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

15 Chapter I The origins of protest Majid al-assad: The youngest brother of Bashar al-assad, he died in As he suffered from ill health, he never had any political role. Bouthaina Shaabane: The official interpreter for Hafez, and then Bashar al-assad, she later became Minister of Expatriates from 2002 to She is now a political and media adviser to Bashar al-assad. She is known abroad as the voice of the regime s propaganda, keen to present it as a victim of terrorism and disinformation. I.2 A FRAGILE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT The conflict in Syria is the product of deep-rooted dynamics that have shaped Syria s history for decades or even centuries. A well-worn subject in Syria s history, 2011 marked the awakening of the fears of the minorities. In Syria, the Sunnis account for 74% of the population, the Alawites, Ismaili and other Shiites for 13%, the Christians for 10%, the Druze for 3% and there are also Jewish communities in Damascus and Aleppo. 9 The regime relies on the geographical layout of community divisions to stir up the fear of Islamism and gain the support or neutrality of minorities (Alawite, Druze, Christian, etc.). The recent history has taken this direction, for example with the strengthening of the Christians identity as Eastern Christians. Similarly, attacks against the Alawites during the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced the fortress mentality of the Shiite minority, essential for understanding the current conflict. Regionalism and social divisions also affect the geography of the conflict. Bashar al-assad, for example, has played on how Damascus and Aleppo compete with one another, favoring the latter to counter the Damascus success, following the age-old policy of 9 CIA, The World Factbook, accessed on 15 July, divide and rule. Assad opened the city to international competition, causing numerous textile businesses to go bankrupt. 10 The modernizing reforms of the early 2000s accentuated social inequalities, eroding the social basis for the regime. Peasants were especially concerned and would count for a significant number of the 2011 insurgents. Having also suffered droughts since 2005, the regions most affected were among the first to rise up. According to the economist Samir Aita, ,000 out of one million 12 farming jobs were destroyed between 2003 and No longer the priority of the regime, momentum has been gaining ground ever since. In 2013, a total of 17.8% of Syrians were unemployed; 12% of the population was living below the poverty line in Although these numbers alone do not explain the 2011 uprising, they offer a better understanding of the frustrations experienced by the Syrians who took to the streets at that time. Northern Syria is now largely controlled by rebel groups; it has suffered heavily from desertification and scarce resources. Historically absent, the State has only recently become present in the region. This partly explains the difficulty the regime has experienced keeping hold of this now largely lawless territory ruled by warlords. On the economic front, Ba athist voluntarism did not manage to balance out Syria s territory more effectively for the benefit of its outskirts, instead the Aleppo-Damascus axis remains the backbone of the country. 14 Even the coastal region, the stronghold of the Alawite community, has loosened its ties with the Assad clan, which has long since moved to Damascus. Syria is deeply divided; the nation-building project has failed and the risk of partition is still acute. The population distribution across Syria also explains the evolving conflict. Regime strongholds are provided by Druze in the south, Alawites in the coastal area as well as Sunnis tied to the regime 10 Fabrice Balanche, Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-assad, L Orient Le Jour, 25 November, Quoted in Fabrice Balanche, Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-assad, art. cit. 12 Syria s active population numbers roughly six million people. 13 CIA, The World Factbook, accessed on 15 July, Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, Mohammed al-dbiyat, La Syrie au présent. Reflets d une société, Arles, Actes Sud, Sindbad, 2007, p. 87. Cahier du RETEX Research March

16 Chapter I The origins of protest by clan and tribal connections scattered all over Syria. Similarly, informal Druze, Alawi and Christian settlements in most urban centers slow the advance of the rebels and allow the regime to retain strong pockets of resistance. DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIA S POPULATION Finally, the gradual State withdrawal linked with the economic opening, combined with an agricultural farming crisis, has negatively impacted the network of small and mediumsized cities. The private sector has failed to develop its potential due to an excess of red tape and, despite State tax incentives, the closures of local businesses, including in northeastern Syria. A system combining a regulated economy and bureaucracy with economic liberalism and globalization is a contradictory juxtaposition that does not work. The regime has been unable to break with the past, as it is keen on keeping up its supportive patronage networks. 15 Along with the demands for political freedoms, the Syrian crisis is ultimately the result of the regime s failures in economic policy and nation-building. The momentum of the Arab Springs resonated with the country s young population (54% of Syrians are under 25 years 16 ). However, this was only the trigger to an untenable situation. I.3 THE FIRST REBEL MOVEMENTS Source: Atlas du Proche Orient arabe, PUPS, The disproportionate response from the regime to the first peaceful protests of March 2011 and its inadequate reforms set off a rapid escalation of violence throughout the country. The first rebel groups formed quickly, particularly with defectors from the Syrian armed forces, and the insurgency took shape, marking the beginning of the Syrian civil war. I.3.1 The first demonstrations 15 Fabrice Balanche, Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-assad, art. cit. 16 CIA, The World Factbook, accessed on 15 July, In the face of events in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February 2011, at first, the Syrian regime seemed calm and even anxious to meet people s expectations. 16 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

17 Chapter I The origins of protest Little by little, the fear of the uprising spreading fuelled anxiety at the highest levels of the State and measures were taken, such as the 17% rise in salaries for two million government employees. Based in particular on the Damascus Spring, demands were made for the end to the state of emergency and for a new constitution. On 15 March, 2011, a first demonstration was held in Damascus to call for an end to the state of emergency and the special courts. Demonstrations then spread gradually to the other cities in Syria and the number of arrests increased. The first clash occurred in Daraa, in southern Syria; a rural province neglected by the regime and that had sunk into poverty. A group of ten to fifteen teenagers was arrested for writing graffiti on the walls stating, The people want the fall of the regime. The regime gave an unreasonable response: the children were imprisoned and abused. People reacted strongly, and the protests, which remained peaceful, grew in number in the following days, making particular demand for the dismissal of the Daraa Governor as well as the Security Commander. The police shot at demonstrators and the regime deployed reinforcements. Tanks from Maher al-assad s Republican Guard intervened on 23 March. On 31 March, the armed forces withdrew and the prisoners and teenagers were released, the Governor and the Security Commander dismissed. The authorities claimed that the armed forces had been deployed due to armed terrorist groups operating in Daraa, thereby ignoring the real causes of the uprising. This would be a claim to be repeated time after time. The escalation of violence then began, with repression becoming the norm despite the initially peaceful protests. By the end of March, a phase of urban guerrilla warfare was underway, mainly in Homs, Hama, and Latakia. However, it was, to a lesser extent, also present in Bashar al-assad s favored beacons of the country, Damascus and Aleppo. In these cities, predominantly Sunni business circles had linked their interests to the regime and feared for instability. 17 During a speech on 30 March, Bashar al-assad slammed the foreign conspiracy facing Syria, which had to be fought relentlessly. In an effort to secure their neutrality, 300,000 Syrian Kurds, were granted Syrian citizenship 18 as an appeasement measure. Bashar al-assad made this effort to try and prevent the Turkish border from becoming a transit area for rebel weapons and so that Iraqi Kurdistan could not Demonstration in Homs (2011) 17 Xavier Baron, op. cit. 18 Further to the controversial 1962 census, 20% of the Kurds had been deprived of their Syrian citizenship. Cahier du RETEX Research March

18 Chapter I The origins of protest be turned into a secure home base. On 21 April, the state of emergency was lifted, the Supreme State Security Court was dissolved and conditional authorization was issued for certain peaceful demonstrations. However, this had come too late and now demands were dealing exclusively with the fall of the regime. Despite the commitment of the Shabiha, mostly Alawite mafia-style militias, on the side of the regime, the insurgency spread to Deir ez-zour, Idlib and Banias, in Syria s hinterland. the rebel movements, plus, in the event of victory, it did not have a clear program for the country. The main opponents to the regime had been forced into exile several years back, or were imprisoned; they were scattered, lived far away and were sometimes representatives of competing currents. Some of them were indeed Islamists, secular, nationalists, Marxists or liberals. A Syrian National Council (SNC) was finally established on 23 August, 2011 in Istanbul, with 140 members. Half of them did not live in Syria, undermining the legitimacy of the SNC. The SNC tried to coordinate fighting. It was first led by Burhan Ghalioun, a longstanding figure of the opposition living in Paris. However, he was heavily criticized for living far from Syria and his links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey. He was quickly ousted. Opposition demonstration in Homs (2011) I.3.2 Emerging rebel groups: claims, structures, and identities In a country where political opposition is not tolerated and in a context of fierce repression, initially there was no structure to the insurgency. Within a few weeks, a network of local coordination committees developed in the neighborhoods of various cities, mostly composed of young people with no political motivation. By the end of April, these had become the main opposition structure, helping the families of victims and prisoners, caring for the wounded in often illegal hospitals, communicating with foreign media, and preparing demonstrations during the Friday prayer. Little by little, the number of defectors from the Syrian armed forces grew. They were predominantly Sunni and were first and foremost those enlisted in the lower ranks and young conscripts. They formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on 29 July, 2011, headed by Colonel Riad al-assad, who had sought refuge in Turkey. The FSA then claimed several thousand members. From the outset, the FSA had problems getting organized, although it grew increasingly active despite its limited weaponry. Its main problem was that it lacked an undisputed personality as leader to unite The level of violence rose in early 2012, as did the number of armed clashes between the Syrian Arab Army and the FSA. The regime now faced an armed opposition movement that was more and more capable of coordinating its attacks. Several bomb attacks took place in Damascus, particularly against security service buildings. In February, car bombs also exploded in Aleppo, in front of facilities (harboring) housing military intelligence and security forces. Such attacks were first favored by the rebels as they still lacked the unity and sufficient means to launch full-scale offensives. The bomb attack in Damascus on 18 July, 2012, was the most major tactical choice from the rebels. That day, a bomb exploded during a meeting of the main security authorities at the headquarters of the National Security Council in central Damascus, which had nonetheless been placed on high alert. Three top government officials were killed: the deputy Defense Minister and President Assad s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat; the Defense Minister, Dawoud Rajiha and General Hassan Turkmani, a military adviser to Bashar al-assad and his crisis cell. At that time, the armed opposition claimed to have about 40,000 men. Salafist fighter groups also began to appear: Muslim fundamentalists mostly from Syria, although others were from Afghanistan, Libya or Iraq, with the objective of creating an Islamic Republic in Syria. At the beginning of 2012, these groups were still few in number although, along with the regime, they fuelled the transformation of peaceful protests into an armed conflict. The risk was that this conflict 18 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

19 Chapter I The origins of protest would take on a religious aspect. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-nusra claimed responsibility for bomb attacks in Damascus. These Islamist groups receive considerable external support, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Qatar or even al-qaeda. At the beginning, the first armed rebel groups were mainly under the protection of the Free Syrian Army. In 2011, this was the only real opposition force on the ground. Most opponents were in fact men who had the intention of defending their family, their village, and their community. However, some structured rebel groups had existed since as early as 2011, such as the Farouq battalions. Formed in Homs, this organization little by little expanded in size and prominence throughout the country, operating in Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus. It was a member of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, an organization allied with the FSA, created in September The Farouq battalions are well-trained and well-funded and know how to use social networks and media to maintain their reputation Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report, 9, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, p. 41. Cahier du RETEX Research March

20

21 CHAPTER II THE REGIME S COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY The regime s disproportionate response in 2011 was followed by a strategy of counter - insurgency inherited from Hafez al-assad. Bashar al-assad faithfully followed the same methods used by his father thirty years ago when dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion. II.1 THE SYRIAN ARAB ARMY IN 2011 Prior to the conflict, Bashar al-assad s armed forces were considered some of the most powerful in the Arab world. They comprised some 220,000 fulltime soldiers plus 300,000 conscripts (24-month conscription). With 60% of Syria s financial resources 20 at their disposal, they are suitably equipped with technological capabilities. 21 The forces guarantee their officers and non-commissioned officers good social standing, in addition to a pension and, most of the time, other fringe benefits. Some specific cases of corruption or smuggling have also been known, which have increased the resentment of the population against them. Eight of Syria s thirteen Army divisions are conventional armored or mechanized divisions containing four maneuver brigades each. The different brigade types are mixed in a three to one ratio in each division, so that an armored division includes three armored brigades and one mechanized brigade, while a mechanized brigade contains the opposite ratio. Each division possesses additional combat support elements and one artillery battalion from 300 to 500 men, bringing it to a full strength of 15,000 soldiers. One mechanized brigade of 2,500 to 3,500 men is equipped with 105 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and 41 tanks split into three mechanized battalions, one armored battalion and one artillery/ada/engineer battalion. Each armored brigade contains 105 tanks and 31 IFVs and includes three armored battalions, one mechanized battalion and one artillery/ada/engineer battalion. The Syrian Army is composed of about 40 of these brigades. 22 There are also five specialized divisions: the 4 th Armored Division, the Republican Guard and two Special Forces divisions. The 17 th Army Reserve Division also falls into this category. These divisions include three battalions of 300 to 500 soldiers, i.e. about 1,500 men each. The Syrian Arab Army 20 Barah Mikaïl, La Syrie en 50 mots clés, Paris, L Harmattan, collection Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, Barah Mikaïl, La Syrie en 50 mots clés, Paris, L Harmattan, collection Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, Joseph Holliday, The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle, Washington D.-C., Institute for the Study of War, 15 February, 2013, p. 5. Cahier du RETEX Research March

22 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy Conventional units Historically, the 1 st Corps has formed the first line of defense against the Israeli threat. The independent 61 st and 90 th Infantry Brigades occupied fighting positions along the Golan Heights. The second line of defense is manned by the 5 th Mechanized Division tasked with preventing an attack from the south and securing the Jordanian border. The eastern flank side was secured by the 15 th Special Forces Division. The 7 th Mechanized Division had to secure the most direct approach from the northern Golan to Damascus. The 2 nd Corps was responsible for managing the Syrian occupation of Lebanon (until 2005), securing the Lebanese border and providing a second line of defense against a potential Israeli invasion; a real obsession for the Syrian armed forces. The 3 rd Corps is responsible for interior defense and reinforcing the front in case of a war against Israel. The 11 th Armored Division is stationed near Homs, in central Syria. The 3 rd Armored Division secured the northern approach to Damascus (it played a key role in the defense of the regime during the 1984 attempted coup). Finally, the 17 th and 18 th Divisions are independent of Corps structures, and are responsible for northern and eastern Syria. The armor-centric formations and highly personal chain of command were designed for conventional conflict, mainly against Israel, and not to deal with an internal insurgency. This explains in part both the disproportionate response of the regime in 2011 and its inability to decisively fight alone against rebel groups. The Praetorian units The Defense Companies had long been commanded by Hafez al-assad s brother, Rifaat. They included twelve elite brigades of armor, Special Forces, and artillery/ada. Alawites made up 90% of their strength and maintained close tribal links to Hafez al- Assad. After Rifaat s abortive 1984 coup, Hafez reduced them to one division, now known as the 4 th Armored Division, which has been very active since the beginning of the conflict. The 4 th Armored Division (15,000 soldiers) is reportedly the best unit of the Syrian Army. It includes three armored brigades, one mechanized brigade and a Special Forces regiment. All the troops are career military personnel, former officers of conventional units. Eighty percent of the Division s ranks are Alawites. It is headquartered in the Mazzeh military complex, in southern Damascus. The Division Commander is technically Major General Mohammed Ali Durgham, but Bashar s brother, Maher al-assad, is widely suspected of acting as the de facto Division Commander. At 44, he seemed to be the main organizer in suppressing the 2011 protests in Daraa, Homs and Banias. As a close adviser to Bashar, in April-May 2011, he was publicly accused by the United States and the European Union of having been the principal overseer of violence and a facilitator of human rights violations. He is very influential with the Head of State, having appointed two of his cousins, Fawwaz and Mudhir al-assad, at the head of the Shabiha militias. 23 Hafez al-assad established the Republican Guards in 1976 under the command of Adnan Makhlouf, his wife s first cousin. In 2011, they included three mechanized brigades and two security regiments. Their main role was then to protect the country against internal threats. The Division was quartered around the Presidential Palace and in the Qasioun military complex overlooking Damascus northern suburbs. It was outfitted with better equipment and maintained at full strength. Most of its officers are Alawites, although there are Sunnis, such as Manaf Tlass, the son of Mustapha Tlass, Hafez al-assad s longserving Defense Minister, who defected in July The Special Forces Regiments have served as a regime protection force and are a critical component of Syria s national defense. They more closely resemble conventional light infantry units, but they have received specialized training in airborne operations. They were of crucial importance for keeping Hafez al- Assad in power during the 1984 attempted coup. Their commander at the time, however, Major General Ali Haydar, was put under arrest in the 1990s because of his opposition to Bashar. The armament of the SAA For the most part, the Syrian Arab Army operates old Russian-made armaments, particularly a large number of tanks. However, most of them are obsolete: the T-54s, T-55s, T-62s and T-72s date back to the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s respectively. 23 Maher el-assad, le bras armé du régime syrien, Le Figaro, 1 March, accessed on 30 June, Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

23 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy Syrian T-72 tank (Maskana) Syria s land forces military equipment in 2011 Tank and heavy armor Light armored vehicles Armored and wheeled vehicles T T-72 M 1,478 T-62M/K 1,000 T-54/T-55 2,200 T-55 ARV? BMP-1 2,450 BMP BTR-50? BTR-60? BTR-70? BTR BTR-40? BRDM-2 95 Vehicles and missile systems Rocket launcher systems Artillery Towed howitzers BM-21 MRLS 122 mm 280 Type-63 MRLS 107 mm 200 Raad 240 mm (Iranian Fajdr-3)? WS-1 Khaibar 302 mm? M-1931/ M mm 100 M mm 150 D-30 Howitzer 122 mm 600 M mm 600 D mm 20 M mm 50 S mm 50 Cahier du RETEX Research March

24 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy Vehicles and missile systems (suite) Ground-to-Ground missiles FROG-7 18 SS SS-1 Scud B 18 SS-1 Scud C 8 SS-1 Scud D? Fateh-110 M600? SS-C-1B Sepal 4 SS-C-3 Styx 6 Ground-to-Air missiles SA-2 Guideline 100 Pechora-2M? SA-3 Goa? SA-5 Gammon 32 SA-6 Gainful 50 SA-9 Gaskin 20 SA-8 Gecko 56 SA-11 Buk M1? SA-17 Buk M2? SA-13 Gopher 35 SA-22 Pantsir-S1 12 TOR-M1? Portable Ground-to-Air missiles SA-24 Strelets (Igla-S) 32 SA-7 Grail? SA-14 Gremlin? SA-16 Igla-1? SA-18 Igla? Artillery (suite) Self-propelled howitzers D-30 mounted on T-34 chassis 50 2S3 152 mm 50 2S1 122 mm 400 Self-propelled guns ZSU Tungunska-M1 6 Light and Heavy Weapons Mortars Mortar 82 mm 200 M mm Mortar 400 M mm Mortar 100 M mm Mortar 10 Anti-tank rockets/missiles AT-3 Sagger At-4 Spigot 150 AT-5 Spandrel 40 At-7 Saxhorn? AT AT-14 Kornet? Milan Anti-tank 200 RPG-7? RPG-29? Anti-aircraft guns ZU M mm 300 S mm 675 KS mm 25 KS mm 25 Source: and Joseph Hokayem, Radioscopie de la crise syrienne. (¾) Les forces en présence, Revue de Défense Nationale, Tribune n 257. The infantry operates a variety of light armaments, mostly from Soviet arsenals (AK-47/AKM assault rifles, Dragunov SVD sniper rifles, RPK machine guns and RPG antitank rocket launchers) syrienne_forces_defense_terrestres_equipements_militaires_vehicule_blindes_informations.html, accessed on 27 February, The regime also maintains sophisticated air defense systems (SA-17 and SA-22). These Russian groundto-air systems are relatively modern. Although respectively medium- and short-range (with a range of up to 42 kilometers and an altitude up to 25 km for the SA-17s), they are equipped with modern technologies, particularly as regards radar systems, and remain highly mobile and difficult to detect. These sys- 24 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

25 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy tems partly explain the Western powers reluctance to get involved in Syria. Moreover, should they intervene, Russia might feel justified in transferring to Syria the long range surface-to-air S-300PMU-1/2 system (SA-20), which was already purchased by Damascus but whose delivery was blocked as a result of international pressure. 25 spare parts or aviation fuel. Attack helicopters played a crucial role in quelling the rebellion. In 2011, the regime thus had 219 rotary-wing aircraft. 27 Prior to the civil war, the Syrian Air Force had an inventory of more than 350 aircraft, including a majority of obsolete ones. Syrian fixed-wing aircraft include Mig-29s, Mig-25s, Mig-23s, Mig-21s, Su-22s, and Su-24s fighters. It has often been defeated by the Israeli Air Force and has not led any attack outside of Syria since Unlike its Turkish and Israeli neighbors, the Syrian Air Force did not enter into the race for modernizing its air defense systems; any intervention in either of these countries would be considered suicide. It has also had its fair share of desertions, reducing the number of pilots and the number of technicians able to maintain aircraft (both fixed and rotary-wing), prepare them for missions, and ensure that airbases and air traffic control are satisfactorily run. Moreover, few of these aircraft have the capability to attack ground targets, pilots have not been properly trained and interoperability with ground troops is minimal. Very few direct support missions have been conducted since The L-39 Albatros training and attack aircraft, the remaining fighter-bombers, MiG-21s and MiG-23s, the Mi-25 attack helicopters and Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport and air assault helicopters, i.e. 150 airplanes and about 50 helicopters altogether, 26 have greatly contributed to containing and repelling the opposition while terrorizing the population. Helicopters and transport planes (Il-76s in particular) have also enabled the resupply of the forces deployed in fortress cities ; enclaves of the regime in northern Syria. The Air Force is therefore a cornerstone of Damascus power, but it is threatened by the pressure on its airbases, which are surrounded and sometimes overrun by the rebellion, the development of rebel air defense assets (e.g. a MiG-21 fighter was shot down by a Chinese-made FN-6 missile) and a lack of 25 Corentin Brustlein, Étienne de Durand, Guillaume Garnier, Marc Hecker, Élie Tenenbaum, Syrie : l option militaire restet-elle ouverte?, Note de l Ifri, September Interventions en Syrie : que valent les défenses militaires de Bachar el-assad?, Jeune Afrique Blog Défense, 30 August, Syrian MIG fighter The Syrian regime s stand-off strike assets appear to be significant. With the help of North Korea, Syria has been operating Scud missiles (B, C and D variants) since the late 1980s, some of which have a 700-km range. Otherwise, Syria has also been producing M- 600 missiles for several years, a local variant of the Iranian Fateh-110, as well as acquiring Russian-made SS-21A Scarabs. Although both missiles have smaller ranges than the Scuds (250 and 120 kilometers respectively), they are more accurate and require drastically less preparation time (solid propulsion). To this day, ground-to-ground missiles forces might still include dozens of launchers and hundreds of missiles. 28 However, out of the 300 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers fielded in 2011, less than a hundred are still reportedly operational, mainly due to a lack of skilled technicians to operate them. 29 The Syrian Navy has a limited operational capacity. Largely obsolete, with ships often dating back to the 1970s, and poorly trained, it has never been the regime s priority. It is by all means a coastal defense Navy, with low projectability. The armed ships are Petya III light frigates, purchased in 1975 (only one in two is said to be operational). Sixteen Osa-class missile 27 More precisely, 20 MI-14s, 5 Ka-28s, 20 Mi-2s, 138 Mi-8s/ 17s and 36 Mi-25s. ne_forces_defense_terrestres_equipements_militaires_vehicule_blindes_informations.html, accessed on 27 February, Brustlein, Durand, Garnier, Hecker, Tenenbaum, Note de l Ifri, op. cit. 29 Interventions en Syrie, Jeune Afrique Blog Défense, op. cit. Cahier du RETEX Research March

26 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy patrol boats equipped with SS-N-2 Styx missiles are now obsolete. Only the Tir-class missile patrol boats (IPS 18) present a serious threat. Three were purchased from North Korea in 2002, three others from Iran in The boats are equipped with the Iranian Noor anti-ship missile, a local version of the Chinese-made C II.2 A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY INHERITED FROM HAFEZ AL-ASSAD During the first year of the conflict, the Syrian regime applied a counterinsurgency strategy identical to that employed by Hafez al-assad against the Muslim Brotherhood between 1979 and Counter - insurgency has both a military component and a civilian component. The military component is based on three points: measures for creating a safe and secure environment, consolidating the safe and secure environment, and eliminating the threat. Combat tasks include seizing a position, destroying, securing, defending, holding, containing, fixing, pursuing, directing fire support, providing fire support, conducting combat patrol operations, and encircling. 31 II.2.1 Hafez al-assad s counterinsurgency, Faced with the Islamist uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood ( ), Hafez al-assad developed a counterinsurgency campaign combining three strategies: carefully selecting and deploying the most trusted military units (selective deployment); raising pro-regime militias and using those forces to clear insurgents out of major urban areas, and then hold them with a heavy garrison of troops (clear and hold) Brustlein, Durand, Garnier, Hecker, Tenenbaum, Note de l Ifri, op.cit. 31 Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counter - insurgency, German Army Office, Division I - Army Development, Cologne, June 2010, p Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency To Civil War, Middle East Security Report, No.8, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, p. 7. Selective deployment relies on pairing elite all-alawite forces with line troops to compel allegiance. As such, Assad family members played a key role in the campaign. Rifaat al-assad, Hafez s brother, notably commanded the elite troops of the Defense Companies and Major General Shafiq al-fayadh, commanding the 3 rd Armored Division and Hafez s cousin, was sent to Aleppo. At that time, three quarters of the officers and one third of the troops deployed were Alawites. The regime took the additional precaution of expelling all the men who came from Hama, the heart of the rebellion. The Ba ath Party and its sympathizers, members of Ba ath-affiliated Popular Organizations, were also given weapons. The real innovation on the part of the regime, even at the time, was to rely on the support of paramilitary forces and militias. The clear and hold strategy involves deploying armored troops in urban centers, using indirect fire if necessary, and then maintaining a strong military presence in the cities to prevent insurgents from returning. In March 1980, the 3 rd Armored Division cleared Aleppo house by house, the rest of the insurgency being fought district by district, city by city. 33 In Hama, in 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood was strong enough to inflict heavy losses on regime troops. In response, Assad massed artillery ahead of the ground offensive and laid siege to the city with heavy artillery, namely heavy bombing, to prepare the entry of commandos into the city, supported by tanks. The city was then held with several troop garrisons. II.2.2 Bashar al-assad s counterinsurgency strategy, In replicating the strategy used by his father thirty years earlier, Bashar al-assad gave a disproportionate response to the first demonstrations in Like his father, Bashar paired elite units, often comprising Alawites, with carefully selected conventional forces in order to prevent any large-scale defections. The regime relied on the support of Special Forces regiments for the most brutal forms of repression while limiting conventional troops exposure to the population, as in Daraa in This strategy was 33 Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency To Civil War, art. cit., p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

27 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy based on a new task-organization of the Army: trustworthy subunits were reinforced to form effective conventional brigades. Syrian infantry fighting vehicle in Homs (December 2011) Between the summer of 2011 and the end of 2012, the 1 st Armored Division s 91 st, 153 rd and 58 th Brigades were the most active, mainly around the divisional base of Al-Kiswah, south of Damascus. The 76 th Brigade, quickly nicknamed the Death Brigade, was very active in Idlib from February The elite teams of the 4 th Armored Division were deployed, with elements of the 3 rd, 7 th and 10 th Divisions, to the Damascus suburb of Zabadani. All conventional units were employed but only small hand-picked groups were sent into the field. These groups were companysize units. In Zabadani, barely 40 armored vehicles, i.e. a battalion-size unit, were deployed. This strategy has effectively prevented unit-level defections but has severely undercut the regime s available combat power. The operation in Homs is the best example of the clear and hold strategy. After amassing a wide array of elite forces in the city and shelling opposition-held neighborhoods, Assad s forces were able to clear the area. The regime held the city with a heavy troop presence after clearing it by indirect fire, without incurring a high loss of ground forces. During the siege of the city, 3,000 artillery guns were used, i.e. only 80% of the regional assets. Artillery shelling is characteristic of Assad s strategy, as seen from the beginning of 2012 in Zabadani, near Damascus. This operation resulted in the withdrawal of the insurgents from Homs in early March Once the city was cleared by the governmental forces, elite units were redeployed to other fronts, as was the case for elements of the 4 th Armored Division and Special Forces regiments, to Idlib, Daraa or Damascus, while the city was held by conventional units. The regime s tactics worked well in Homs (finally conquered on 7 May, 2014, after a ceasefire was agreed with the rebels), but Assad ultimately lacked the forces necessary to repeat this approach in Syria s northern provinces. Reliance on the support of militias and paramilitary forces is Hafez al-assad s other legacy. Pro-Assad militias were quick to emerge during the conflict. As of 2011, the regime was able to rely on the support of nearly 100,000 Jaysh al-sha bi paramilitaries, or People s Army. There are two types of pro-regime militia. Firstly, the mafia-like Shabiha militias made up of Alawi criminals that are sometimes closely linked to the Assad family. The second type, sometimes also called Shabiha, but mostly referred to as Popular Committees, are made up of minority populations with the aim of protecting their communities. The regime does not have complete control over these groups. The Shabiha s ranks significantly grew in the (themed) mid- 1980s when Hafez al-assad dismantled his brother Rifaat s Defense Companies. Two of Hafez al-assad s nephews, Fawwaz and Mudhir al- Assad, then became feared Shabiha leaders. These groups sometimes come from disadvantaged Sunni classes and earn a living from crime (looting, kidnapping, and trafficking), notably in Deir ez-zor and Daraa. The Popular Committees are apparently made up of Syria s minority communities, such as Christians. They set up checkpoints and secure the supply lines of the regime, but often act in the interests of self-protection rather than in support of Assad. During this counterinsurgency campaign, Assad only relied on one third of his Army. The 4 th Armored Division and the Republican Guard were the only units to have been kept at full strength, i.e. 26,000 soldiers altogether. The twelve highly-active Special Forces probably never operated at full strength, with 50% of Sunnis in their midst. They count some 12,000 fighters. Generally speaking, the regime has never been able to deploy more than the equivalent of one brigade from each combat division (which consists of four brigades on average). The more conventional brigades (27,000 soldiers) have remained close to their Cahier du RETEX Research March

28 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy base (about 15 km), mainly to keep control of them. Thus, out of the 220,000 soldiers that made up the Syrian Army in 2011, only 65,000 were considered trustworthy. Many were regarded with suspicion, confined to their barracks and sometimes locked in detention centers (1,500 Sunni officers were imprisoned in 2012). Defectors amounted to 20 to 30% of the Syrian Armed Forces. Restrictions on the use of all regime forces led to some units being overused and exhausted in early summer The other effect of this strategy was the militias being put to essential use in the fighting after the summer of This also spelled heavy losses for the regime during that time: 2,300 killed in action by June 2012 and nearly 10,000 men put out of action. II.3 THE FAILURE OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN THE SUMMER OF 2012 In summer 2012, after one year of conflict, insurgents still held strongholds in major cities as well as large areas, mainly in northern and southern Syria. The strategy inherited from Hafez al-assad, requiring sizeable forces had worked in Homs, but did not for the rest of Syria. Bashar al-assad could only acknowledge that his counterinsurgency strategy had failed and find a way to boost his forces once again. II.3.1 The reasons for failure Bashar al-assad s regime lacked the resources to apply the same strategy he had employed in major urban centers to Syria s provincial capitals and countryside. This strategy had resulted from the reasonable acknowledgement that controlling Syria s urban population centers was critical for the survival of the regime. Nonetheless, it also guaranteed that his counterinsurgency campaign would fail, by granting the insurgency freedom of movement outside of cities, where it could be enhanced. Three dynamics led to this failure: in cities, the attempt to separate the insurgents from the population only accelerated population displacement along religious and sectarian lines, which in turn increased the partition of the country and entrenched broader civil conflict in Syria; the Syrian Army, which could not generate enough troops, was often confused with the militias; the uneven distribution of regime forces between the south and the center of the country where they are clearly present, and the north, largely left to the insurgents. 34 The cleansing strategy of urban centers consisted of forcing civilians out of insurgent-held areas, rather than clearing insurgents out of population centers. Forced population displacement emerged as an unintended outcome of the early 2012 Homs siege. It transformed the clear-and-hold counterinsurgency strategy into a form of ethnic cleansing. The consequence was the arrival of poor Sunni families in Damascus suburbs, reinvigorating the protest movement in the capital. An emblematic example is that of Rastan, which was liberated in July 2012 but became a ghost town emptied of its inhabitants. II.3.2 The consequences of this failure The first consequence of this failure was a stalemate situation in the conflict. By failing to secure victory in the first year, the regime had allowed A soldier of the Free Syrian Army (Aleppo, 2012) 34 Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency To Civil War, art. cit., p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

29 Chapter II The regime s counterinsurgency strategy powerful rebel groups to form. These could coordinate with each other and after losing control over one area, they could take control of another. Both sides in turn were able to believe victory would be quick, ensuring the escalation of violence and the continuation of the conflict. The absence of a clearcut superiority of the regime combined with the insurgents lack of means and unity perpetuated the illusion of a speedy victory for each side, leading to a stalemate, the partition of the country and a large-scale humanitarian crisis. The other consequence, for both sides, has meant having to call increasingly on external actors to the conflict. The regime persists in shutting the door on any political compromise by betting on a divided international community and increased aid coming from Hezbollah, Iran, Russia and Iraqi Shiite militias. The regime has also been able to reorganize its armed forces; decentralizing command and control and reallocating forces between units. The insurgents attribute their future to a possible Western intervention and aid granted by their different sponsors, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Cahier du RETEX Research March

30

31 CHAPTER III THE SYRIAN REBELS, BETWEEN ATTEMPTED UNIFICATION AND PERMANENT DIVISIONS III.1 THE REBELLION S UNIFICATION ATTEMPTS Since July 2011, The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has tried to impose its authority over the rebel groups on the ground, although the distance between it and them, internal and external rivalries and the diversity of the insurgents all formed obstacles to its leadership. Other actors then asserted their rights and competed with its influence. III.1.1 The difficulties of the first rebel coalitions Created on 29 July, 2011, the FSA is both a label and a structure. As the first nationwide rebel organization with international visibility, it brought together the first groups set up in 2011, including the Free Officers Movement founded on 23 September, 2011, as well as those created later sharing similar features. Fulltime member groups belonging to the structure, most often run by military deserters, acknowledged the Syrian national framework. Those not part of the FSA s structure were instead overseen by civilians and primarily identified themselves with the Islamic faith. There was, however, no clear-cut division between these two categories. The FSA Command and Headquarters, established in November 2012 with Brigadier General Salim Idriss as Chief of Staff, included representatives of Salafist groups (Damascus s al-islam Brigade or Idlib s Suqour al-sham 35 ). Personal infighting, as well as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, meant that the FSA was quickly prevented from extending its authority over all the rebel groups. In addition, maintaining ties between central command and the provincial military councils proved difficult. From the outset, the FSA s legitimacy and authority have been undermined by the distance and the strong influence the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey have over it. The FSA had therefore hoped for an intervention from Western powers to overthrow Bashar al-assad; their decision in September 2013 not to intervene came as a significant blow. Ever since, Salafist and jihadist groups have increasingly taken over the FSA. Rebel groups are granted access to Saudi funds by pledging allegiance to Brigadier General Idriss. Saudi Arabia has the most influence in the FSA Command and Headquarters; a coalition based primarily on mutual contingency interests and rarely on a specific and shared political plan. Groups deemed by Saudi Arabia to be too Islamist and/or too close to Qatar do not have access to its funding, as was the case for members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Syria (al-islam in Damascus, the al-tawhid and al- Fath Brigades in Aleppo, Suqour al-sham in Idlib, the Farouq battalions across the country, etc. 36 ). Brigadier General Idriss thus has no authority over these 35 Interview with Thomas Pierret, Conflit syrien : quelle morphologie des forces insurgées?, DSI, n 94, July-August Interview with Thomas Pierret, Conflit syrien : quelle morphologie des forces insurgées?, DSI, n 94, July-August Cahier du RETEX Research March

32 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions groups since he does not bring them any material aid, meaning that mere cooperation is all that links them. For groups that are completely apart from FSA, such as the al-qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-nusra, the Syrian Islamic Front and various other units formed by villagers or tribes, there is only timely local and operational coordination. Meanwhile, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was founded on 15 September, 2011, dominated by Sunnis and Liberals but also Kurds. It had fraught ties with the FSA, as the latter accused it along with the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), of not serving the revolution, indulging in opportunistic behavior and being nothing more than pawns of Western powers in Syria. On 11 November, 2012, the SNC joined the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (NCSYOF), created in Doha a few days earlier. However, the two organizations clashed over the issue of whether to participate in the Geneva II conference in January The SNC refused to participate and severed all ties to the Coalition, although it joined again in February In October 2012, the SNC claimed to have a $40 million budget coming mainly from Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and France, stating that 90% of the budget was allocated to humanitarian aid. The Supreme Military Command (SMC) was created in Antalya on 7 December, 2012, when 260 rebel commanders expressed renewed interest in unifi - cation, with (security) officials from the US, France, Britain, Jordan, and the Gulf in attendance. The SMC incorporates a representative of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and local coordination committees. It was created with the goal of serving as a Defense Ministry for the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Its objectives were to unify forces on the ground to prevent anarchy; to sideline external rebel elements and reduce their influence over the fate of the people; and to prevent the extremist elements from taking over centers of power. 37 The SMC sought to adhere to democratic principles and emphasized the importance of elections. The command was divided into five geographic fronts with six elected members each: the eastern front, the western/middle front, the northern front, the southern front, and the Homs front. It consolidated the 14 provincial Military Councils into five operational headquarters. Five military deputies and five civilian (assistant) deputies were 37 Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, art. cit. p. 16. appointed by SMC members to head each front. Each front was divided into five departments: Operations, Espionage, Logistics, Financial and Administrative Affairs, and Transitional Justice. There were also two centralized departments, an arms committee and a financial committee. The SMC was a compromise between the Saudi and Qatari visions for it, a condition necessary for the success of the organization. It showed that the rebels had learned from the failures of the High Revolutionary Council of February 2012, the Unified Command of September 2012, led by exiled deserters, as well as the Five Front command, held by the Qataris, and created on 5 November, Lessons had been learned from the division, or even armed clashes, between independent brigades and military councils, the Saudi Arabia/Qatar rivalry or even personality contests. On 28 February, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, pledged non-lethal American aid, through the SMC and the FSA, highlighting the success of the two organizations. They appeared as moderate authorities capable of creating better opportunities for integration and communication and acting as a brake on the radicalization of the opposition. However, there remained many obstacles: the integration of existing command networks, the jihadist groups in the field, the management of the different sources of funding, and the issue of resources flow. In 2014, the Coalition was largely rejected by the FSA and Islamist groups that criticized it for having been imposed by the West. The opposition is therefore fragmented. The division reflects Syria s complexity and the decentralized origin of the revolt and the groups themselves. In the medium term, this is their weakness as well as their strength. Members of the Free Syrian Army during a meeting with UN representatives (2012) 32 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

33 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions III.1.2 Developing cooperation programs on the ground In summer 2012, rebel commanders began to tactically coordinate in order to plan operations and combine resources. This coordination facilitated many important offensives, particularly in eastern Syria, leading to the capture of the rebels first provincial capital, al-raqqah, in March The gradual buildup of HQs, such as the Supreme Military Command (SMC), fulfilled their wish to prioritize campaign goals, deploy support units for priority missions or supply these units with adequate equipment. The SMC enabled a greater integration of groups and better communication. It was based on the rebel leaders bottom-up power and influence. It acted as a communication platform its authority relies on it being able to organize transactions with donors and allocate resources to rebel-held communities. A chain of command was established. Military Council heads were meant to report directly to the General Command. In practice, however, the General Command did not exercise operational control. The FSA coordinates more that it controls and its influence is perceived differently depending on the front. Brigadier General Salim Idriss is recognized more as a political leader than a field commander, restricting his authority in favor of group leaders, resulting in a decentralized structure whose decisions are taken collectively in a bottom-up approach. In , the rebellion s progress in terms of cooperation allowed them to focus on the regime s air infrastructures in northern Syria. One example of this was the capture of the Taftanaz military airport, near Idlib, on 11 January, 2013, through the combined efforts of multiple rebel units. Another is the operations against Minakh, Nayrab and Kweris military airports in Aleppo province, the capture of the al-jarra airbase and Base 80 and coordinated attacks against the Wadi al-deif military base in the Idlib province, stemming from the cooperation between Jabhat al-nusra, the Syrian Islamic Front and SMC subunits Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, art. cit., p We will follow her for the entire paragraph. In the east, the capture of al-raqqah city in March 2013 as well as the al-thawra dam, Syria s largest hydroelectric dam, and oil and gas fields by Jabhat al-nusra and other units in December 2012, was testament to the opposition s progress. The battle for Homs is another example of cooperation between rebel groups, although it was won by the regime. Rebel gains in eastern Damascus, for their part, were the result of offensives carried out jointly by Jabhat al-nusra and the FSA. From 2012, the rebel groups of the Jabal al-zawiya area, i.e. the hills between Hama and Idlib, have been an example of successful and effective rebel cooperation: groups in the area have built command and control structures and offensive and planning capabilities. The main groups are the Suqour al-sham Brigade and the Shuhada Jebel al-zawiya Battalion (or Harmoush Battalion ). A provincial military command was provided by the Military Council of Idlib. Combined attacks, such as that of 28 May, 2012, on a checkpoint near the village of Mughara and simultaneously on the checkpoint in Mariyan, attest to these cooperation and planning capabilities. The SMC and the FSA are trying to convert networks to military hierarchies, although groups primarily identify with their leader: command structures are in fact based on networks rather than hierarchies. Although this suggests that the rebellion cannot suddenly be deprived of its leaders, the population has come to view rebel commanders as independent warlords. Furthermore, the issue of a strict military hierarchy is one of establishing a code of military justice for the rebellion, i.e. codes of conduct and sanctions for those who violate them. The other challenge facing large-scale cooperation is how to overcome Syria s North-South divide. The opening of the Turkish border summer 2012 was a decisive factor in enabling the rebels to take over most of northern Syria. Better access to resources and fallback areas has put them in a much more favorable position than groups in the south. Northern commanders therefore have greater influence, which has led to a certain North-South divide in the rebellion. The issue also lies in the incorporation of independent units. The SMC, in particular, managed to integrate members of the Syrian Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front and cooperate with the Salafijihadist group Ahrar al-sham. Similarly, the FSA was able to conduct combined operations with Jabhat al-nusra. Cahier du RETEX Research March

34 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions Finally, the issue of financing and access to resources is the biggest obstacle to the unification of the rebellion and cooperation between groups. Some are sometimes well-used to receiving funds from various donors mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar who currently tend to favor the most radical groups which explains, in part, why jihadist groups have dominated the rebellion since Antitank and antiaircraft weapons, as well as secure communications equipment, are a prerequisite for rebel success in the cities. The legitimacy of the SMC depends on its ability to procure and distribute them. It has so far been a failure. III.1.3 Groups with local, provincial and country-wide influence Two types of organizational model have emerged from within the rebellion: localized battalions and larger franchise brigade-level organizations whose influence sometimes extends across Syria. Localized battalions tend associate themselves with the FSA. They have limited geographical scope and their raison d être is most often the defense of their own village. They are usually financed by the international sponsors of the SMC and the FSA. There are several hundreds of localized rebel groups in Syria. The franchise brigade-level organizations are often led by civilians or deserters who were formerly NCOs. The ideological aspect of their fight is more pronounced than that of local groups and their private patrons. These brigades may have country-wide influence, such as the Farouq Battalions or the Suqour al-sham Brigade. The Khalid bin Walid Brigade (in March 2012, the largest rebel force in Syria with over 3,000 fighters, nowadays largely dispersed) in the Homs province; the Farouq al-shamal Battalion, (the northern branch of the Farouq Battalions in the Aleppo province); the al-haqq Brigade (a member of the Syrian Islamic Front) in the Homs province; the al-tawhid Brigade (the most important group in the Aleppo province, a member of the Syrian Liberation Front); or even Ahrar al-sham (a member of the Syrian Islamic Front) in the Aleppo and Idlib provinces have, for their part, influence over the provinces. They are independent from, but often cooperate with the FSA or with one another. 39 So-called franchise brigade-level rebel organizations with provincial or even country-wide influence Khalid bin Walid Brigade (Homs province) (disbanded) Farouq Battalions (country-wide) Farouq al-shamal Battalion (Aleppo) Al-Haqq Brigade (Homs) Shuhada Suriya Brigade ( Syrian Martyrs Brigade ) (Jabal al-zawiya, Idlib province) Fajr al-islam Battalion (Maarat al-numan, Idlib province) Suqour al-sham (Idlib province, Jabal al-zawiya) Dara al-thawra Brigade ( The Revolution Shield Brigade ) (Idlib province) Al-Tawhid Brigade (Aleppo province) Harakat Fajr al-islamiyya- ( The Islamic Dawn Movement ) (Aleppo city and province) Ahrar al-sham (Aleppo and Idlib provinces) Umma Brigade (Maarat al-numaan, Idlib province) Liwa al-islam ( Islam Brigade ) (Damascus) Ansar al-islam (Damascus) Al-Furqan Brigades (Damascus) Ahfad al-rasul Brigade (Damascus) Deir ez-zor Revolutionary Council Jabhat al-nusra ( Victory Front ) (country-wide) One level below organizations such as the FSA, the SNC or the SMC, the coalitions of the Syrian Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front nevertheless have country-wide scope. The Syrian Liberation Front was created in September 2012 from a coalition of 20 Islamist groups. It is not directly incorporated into the FSA because it has contempt for its presence abroad. It is, however, a member of the Supreme Military Council. Its key units are Suqour al-sham, the Tawheed Brigade and the Farouq Battalions. 39 Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, art. cit. 34 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

35 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions Islamist groups members of the Syrian Liberation Front Suqour al-sham (Idlib and Hama provinces) Deir ez-zor Revolutionary Council Farouq Battalions (Homs) Tawheed Brigade (Aleppo)) Liwa al-islam (Islam Brigade)) Ansar al-sham (Damascus) Suqour al-kurd Brigade (Qamishli) Suqour Homs Battalion (Homs) Shaheed Ahmed Ouda Battalion (Homs) Shuhada Baba Amr Battalion (Homs) Mohammed ibn Abdullah Battalion (Homs) Jund Allah battalion (Homs) Homs Brigade (Homs) Fursan al-haq Battalion (Homs) Amr bin al-a as Brigade (Deir ez-zor) Al-Iman Brigade (Hama) Qal at Homs Battalion (Homs) The Syrian Islamic Front was created on 21 December, It is made up of Salafist-backed Islamist groups that are seeking to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Syria. However, they are also Syrian nationalists. It is not linked to the SMC as closely as the Syrian Liberation Front but the commander of the al-haqq Brigade is a member of the SMC Council. Many subunits of the Islamic Front are linked to SMC-affiliated brigades and battalions. Ahrar al-sham and Suqour al-islam are its main units. Islamist groups members of the Syrian Islamic Front Ahrar al-sham (country-wide) Harakat al-fajar al-islamiyya (Aleppo province) Liwa al-haq Brigades (Homs province) Al-Iman Combat Brigades (Damascus province) Al-Hamza bin Abdul-Mutallab Brigade (Damascus province) Jeish al-tawheed (Deir ez-zor province) Suqour al-islam (Damascus province) Saraya al-maham al-khassa (Damascus province) Mus ab bin Ameer Brigade (Aleppo province) Jama at al-tali a al-islamiyya (Idlib province) Ansar al-sham Brigades (Latakia province) The specific case of the Kurds in Syria The Kurds have found themselves in a difficult balancing act since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2011, the main local force, the PYD (the Democratic Union Party, the Syrian branch of the Turkish PKK) has sought to retain control of its territory in northeastern Syria. In November 2013, the PYD announced the creation of an autonomous government for Kurdish areas, divided into three zones. Engaged in heavy fighting against ISIL from the end of 2013, the PYD, just like the PKK, is suspected of maintaining close ties to the Damascus regime. The Syrian armed forces did indeed maintain troops in al-qamishli and al-hasakah and the end of 2013 saw the smooth transfer of authority from Syrian to Kurdish authorities. It is very much likely that Bashar al-assad granted autonomy to the Kurds in order to withdraw his troops from northeastern Syria in order to redeploy them on other fronts, or to ensure the neutrality or even the support of the PYD. In response, Turkey, opposed to the PKK, and hence to the PYD, would have turned a blind eye to the numerous Islamists crossing its shared border with Syria with a view to weakening the PYD. Turkey also relied on the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in Syria (close to the Syrian National Council) and Barzani s Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for this purpose. However, this strategy did not prevent the strengthening of the PYD and forced Turkey to negotiate with the PYD and the PKK (peace process) from the summer of Choosing to negotiate could also Cahier du RETEX Research March

36 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions have been motivated by wanting to maintain the ever-present divide between the PYD and the KNC, as keeping Kurds divided is pursuant to the Turkish strategy. 40 Kurdish territories in northern Syria (March 2014) in the Capital of the Omayyads in the Jawbar district of Damascus which involved six brigades, including Jabhat al-nusra. The regime struck back during the summer of 2013, trying to cut the rebel supply lines around Damascus, surrounding the Ghouta areas and launching offensives at Daraya and Moadamiya. The rebel counterattack was Operation Al-Furqan. The increased number of named operations shows that these larger-scale operations were better planned. Twentythree brigades took part, including FSA-affiliated battalions and Islamist brigades such as Ahrar al-sham and Jabhat al- Nusra. Success in Bahariya, Otaybeh and eastern Ghouta opened up the road to the capital. 41 However, the coalition quickly collapsed. III.2 THE REBEL STRATEGY Despite persistent divisions and a lack of equipment, the Syrian rebellion still rules large territories and retains control over certain urban areas. The rebels were often able to implement useful combat strategies, even if these were often makeshift. Joint operations or even genuine campaigns were planned from rural to urban areas. III.2.1 A rebel strategy is emerging at the national level The creation of the Supreme Military Command in December 2012 was a major milestone in the unification of the rebellion and led to the emergence of a broader strategy. Priority was given to phasing out the regime s facilities, such as artillery and air power. Emphasis was then placed on the regime s military and air bases. For the SMC, neutralizing these infrastructures was an absolute prerequisite for victory, Damascus being the ultimate goal. Larger-scale operations followed in 2013, such as Operation Epic Airbases were also attacked: Abu ad-duhur, south of Aleppo; Minnakh, north of Aleppo (40 Mi-8 helicopters); and al-qusayr, near Homs. Rebels seized 40 MANPADS launchers in the fall of 2012 and shot down two helicopters and one fighter aircraft near Aleppo in December In northern Syria, Taftanaz airbase was overrun in January Al-Jarrah military airport and Base 80, in the province of Aleppo, also fell into rebel hands. They also threatened Damascus international airport with their success in eastern Ghouta. The rebels also concentrated forces against isolated regime outposts: in May 2012, seventeen of them had been seized in northern Syria. In January 2013, the regime had only seven combat outposts left north of the provincial capitals. 42 Rebels conducting patrols in Aleppo (2012) 40 C.R., Le cavalier seul des Kurdes en Syrie, Orient XXI, 27 March, accessed on 15 July, Stéphane Mantoux, L armée syrienne. (2/2) Dans la guerre civile ( ), Lettre du RETEX-Recherche, n 1, 20 September, Stéphane Mantoux, L armée syrienne. (2/2), art. cit. 36 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

37 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions However, the buildup of the jihadist groups (see chapter V), together with the gradual decline of the SMC and the FSA due to Western non-intervention and the relative deficiency of their groups external support, failed to achieve the objectives of a national strategy. For the time being, the rebels have not been able to take control over the regime s air and artillery infrastructures and continue to suffer from the asymmetry of the conflict. As the regime is strengthened by its external allies, the rebels do not in fact have the assets necessary to gain ground without losing any. III.2.2 The tactical challenges of the rebels The lack of (materiel) equipment, heavy weaponry and communications (equipment) assets led the Syrian rebellion to employ unconventional tactics. As a result, since June 2012, the rebels have systematically used (fairly) really effective improvised explosive devices 43 (IEDs) throughout Syria, as well as hollow charges against armored vehicles. This is the most characteristic weapon of guerrilla tactics, widely used, for example, in Afghanistan, or more recently in Mali. The rebellion is also developing antiaircraft capabilities, one of the keys to the conflict. During summer 2012, it already counted 15 to 25 ZSU-23 self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon systems, 2 to 5 57-mm towed guns and 15 to 30 SA-7 MANPADS and probably SA-16 and SA-24 systems as well. In October 2012, five helicopters and six fighter aircraft had already been shot down. Although the regime has lost relatively few fighter-bombers (about 20), it has lost more than half of its combat helicopters (Mi-8/17) IED: Igniters, standard and electrical detonators, explosives, detonating devices (detonating cord, time fuse, etc.), miscellaneous equipment (steel wire, nails, spring leaf, dry battery, etc.) whose countless combinations are available to the sapper. The key is to surprise the enemy in the accomplishment of one of his instinctive actions (...) or to rely on his curiosity, his negligence, his hostile feelings, his peacefulness (mine with time-delay) or his human nature (booby-trapped corpse). Enseignements des opérations des dernières campagnes, 3 e bureau de l état-major de l Armée, Ministère de la Guerre, Paris, October 1965, p Stéphane Mantoux, La guerre civile syrienne : interview de Tom Cooper, 10 December, Retrieved from accessed on 13 December, and by 2013 its air power was nearly exhausted. However, the lack of heavy weaponry suitable for taking on Syrian Army tanks has prevented the rebels from militarily gaining the upper hand. Weapon supply depends entirely on border control. Networks for trafficking weapons and combatants are the same as those used during the wars in Lebanon and Iraq. The same clans and families have been running these networks for decades or centuries, mainly motivated by money rather than ideology. The CIA and other Western intelligence agencies are trying to control such trafficking so that certain categories of weapons do not fall into the hands of al- Qaeda-affiliated jihadist groups, although this has never been easy. 45 On the whole, the rebels have been receiving better weapons since February 2013 and the opening of the Jordanian border: RPG-22 and M-79 Osa rocket launchers, Milkor MGL/RBG-6 grenade launchers and M60 recoilless rifles, mainly from former Yugoslavia. In Aleppo, Deir ez-zor and Idlib, the rebels were able to concentrate adequate forces, coordinate their actions, bring in heavy weapons to bear, and sustain operations while under regime air attack. 46 These examples highlight how rebels were able to directly confront regime troops in major cities and that guerrilla warfare in rural areas was not their sole course of action. The rebels went so far as to attack the regime in its stronghold of the coastal region. On 21 March, 2014, the Muarakat al-anfal offensive began (which refers to a Sura of the Quran), in the north of the Latakia province. The Kassab border post was seized by the rebels who broke through to the Mediterranean for the first time since the conflict began. In Damascus, rebel tactics are somewhat different. They consist of taking positions and then withdrawing from them before their forces are too weakened, to finally strike other positions. So far, this has worked well and the rebels are still firmly rooted in the capital. However, the low number of available forces has often resulted in opposition strongholds being cut off: they had to pay a high price for lack of strategic depth. 45 Joseph Hoyakem, Radioscopie de la crise syrienne (¾). Les Forces en presence, Tribune n 257, Revue de Défense Nationale, p Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, art. cit, p. 23. Cahier du RETEX Research March

38 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions This was the case in Rastan, in Talbissa south of Hama, in the old district of Khaldiya in Homs, in Tall Kalakh on the Lebanese border, in al-qusayr and even in several Damascus suburbs, like Qudsaya and Darayya. Maintaining functioning supply lines is a key challenge for the various players in the conflict. The lack of forces on both sides goes a fair way to explain the stalemate in the conflict, with each side struggling to keep its supply lines running. III.2.3 The rebels and the population In March 2011, the population showed strong support for the peaceful movement and then the FSA. If the population is, in the words of Mao Zedong, the water in which the insurgent swims, this grassroots rebel force could have been expected to achieve quick success against the regime. However, with the opposition unable to establish a unified military hierarchy, increasingly, the population came to view rebel leaders as independent warlords, barely capable of presenting their demands. As the SMC failed to draw up a code of conduct, there was a continuation and even an increase in summary executions, looting and abductions, progressively undermining the better part of the insurgency s grassroots base. Finally, Bashar al-assad wielded control over propaganda, denouncing an insurrection run from outside Syria and primarily manned by jihadists. With an increase in jihadist groups in 2013, there was truth to the regime s propaganda w, thereby leading to the population to feel alienated from the rebels. The regime used hunger as a weapon, as well as massively shelling rebel cities, including public service infrastructure, bakeries and hospitals, leading many Syrians to cease support for the insurgents, out of coercion and fear. With the population at stake, the battle of perceptions is crucial during an insurgency. It is apparently the regime who has won it for the time being. The advantage, however, is fragile because it is based more on fear than on adherence to the regime. The center of gravity, i.e. the population, is also at stake in the infighting within the rebellion where secularists, Islamists and jihadists battle it out. III.3 TURKEY, A KEY REAR BASE AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY The Syrian conflict has quickly become a war by proxy for regional powers. Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is, as such, telling. For both sides, their progress and even their survival largely depend on external support. Although the competition for financing and access to resources has sometimes caused divisions among rebel groups, external support remains central to the Syrian insurgency. III.3.1 Turkey, a key rear base and source of supply Turkey is directly concerned by the Syrian conflict, especially since it shares borders with Syria. It was one of the first countries to support the Syrian rebellion and rapidly became one of the main host countries for Syrian refugees, affording considerable freedom to international ONGs within its territory. In 2013, however, the situation grew tense as the Turkish population in the areas surrounding refugee camps could no longer tolerate being in competition with refugees, with them accepting lower wages and thereby disrupting the local economy. 47 Turkey s stance on the situation is due to trying to score points against both the European Union and regional powers. Its government, representing Sunni political Islam, is also involved in the regional rivalry between the Sunnis and Shiites underlying the Syrian conflict. Its support to the rebellion is thus a way to counter Iranian ambitions in Syria. The opening of its border with Syria in the summer of 2012 was crucial for the Syrian rebels and proved instrumental in the rebel takeover of northern Syria. This opening allowed the passage of weapons and combatants in both directions, while providing the rebels with vital fallback areas. In 2013, its strategy 47 Romain Mielcarek, Armes, médicaments, argent : qui livre quoi à Damas ou aux rebelles?, RFI, 29 September, accessed on 15 July, Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

39 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions evolved into a more political posture as it became less directly involved in the conflict. Although Turkey has certainly turned a blind eye to arms trafficking for the rebellion and undoubtedly authorized jihadist fighters crossing its territory to reach Syria, it is unlikely that it was responsible for delivering weapons directly to the rebels. 48 Regular incidents or even direct clashes between Turkey and the Syrian regime also occurred: a Turkish aircraft was shot down in June 2012, and then the Turkish village of Akcakale, next to the Syrian border, was hit by the Syrian regime in October 2012, killing five people. A Syrian aircraft that had entered Turkish airspace was then shot down on 22 March, In March 2014, the two countries exchanged fire during the rebel operation Muarakat al-anfal in the north of Latakia province, the Syrian regime having accused Turkey of supporting rebels in this offensive action. Finally, Assad s policy of openness towards the Syrian Kurds is not only intended to divide the opposition and guarantee the neutrality of large swathes of the territory, but it also aims to deal a blow to Turkey while stoking the claims of Turkish Kurds. III.3.2 The key role of the Gulf countries The Gulf countries, at the forefront of which are Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have rapidly emerged as the main patrons of the Syrian rebels. Qatari humanitarian aid is mainly channeled through Muslim charities to Syrian refugees in Syria s border countries. These organizations are also suspected of covertly being in contact with rebel groups and financing them. 49 Arms shipments are underhanded and have not been officially acknowledged by Doha. In spring 2013, the Financial Times estimated that Qatari aid had reached a staggering amount of more than EUR 2.25 billion. The weaponry provided to the rebels by Qatar are said to benefit only Islamist groups, excluding al-qaeda-affiliated groups. 48 Ibid. 49 Romain Mielcarek, Armes, médicaments, argent : qui livre quoi à Damas ou aux rebelles?, RFI, 29 September, accessed on 15 July, Saudi Arabia is unofficially considered as one of the main arms suppliers to the Syrian insurrection. It has allegedly supplied the heaviest weapons available to insurgents (antitank rocket launchers, air defense missiles as well as ammunition and shells). 50 It has also reportedly financed jihadist groups. In early 2013, Saudi Arabia pledged EUR 240 million in humanitarian aid, although these funds have proved difficult to trace as they have been transferred through dummy NGOs. A similar financial effort was promised by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates at the time. Saudi Arabia has the support of most members of the Arab League and seeks to oppose Iranian influence in Syria and the region. This support is also part of the Saudi Arabia/Qatar rivalry, which materialized in the form of them establishing competing rebel coalitions. III.3.3 The support of Western powers The United States has officially acknowledged having delivered arms to the Syrian rebels (automatic weapons, ammunition, and other equipment including vehicles). Supplying heavy weaponry, such as surface-to-air missile launchers, remains an option but thus far has always been rejected, lest they should fall into the hands of the jihadist movements. American military support remains at a rather low level: EUR 60 million have been pledged, the equivalent of one week of their direct aid to Israel, or 60 days of military aid to Egypt. Washington has also delivered significant quantities of food and medicine. About EUR 400 million of humanitarian aid has been provided so far. In addition, the United States gave a total of EUR 187 million of material and medical assistance directly to the rebels. 51 Although France plays a very active diplomatic role, it maintains that it has not provided any significant military aid, instead preferring a humanitarian approach. Officially, there is only Operation Tamour in Jordan, consisting of the deployment of a field hospital and medical teams for refugees. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, France s small team of Special Forces in Jordan, usually tasked with exchanges and exercises with regional partners, has been reinforced with a view to possible projection 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. Cahier du RETEX Research March

40 Chapter III The Syrian rebels, between attempted unification and permanent divisions should the situation there develop. France has reportedly provided the rebels with non-lethal military equipment only; mainly telecommunications and ballistic protection equipment and night vision goggles. It also provided humanitarian aid to the tune of EUR 12 million in 2012, including two million directly allocated to the opposition, thereby providing the Syrian National Council with means of subsistence which must not be used to buy weapons. Finally, Paris granted Jordan EUR 100 million in 2012 that would be supplemented by EUR 50 million to support the care and welfare of refugees. 52 At the St Petersburg G20 summit in September 2013, Great Britain announced it would send an additional EUR 60 million to Syria for humanitarian purposes (equipment, medical training). In total, EUR 477 million have been allocated to Syrian refugees. Although it has long been the EU s lead advocate of plans to supply arms to the rebels, Great Britain has still not officially recognized such operations. Moreover, with a total of EUR 1.3 billion, the EU is the largest contributor to humanitarian assistance in Syria. France, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Luxembourg and Slovakia contribute to this effort. As Syria s neighbor, Jordan welcomes a lot of refugees and plays on its position as a weakened country to attract international aid. The United States, France and Great Britain allegedly train rebels in Jordan. Finally, Iraq has until recently taken a very low-key approach to the Syrian issue, although many Iraqi Shiite militias went to fight alongside the Bashar al-assad regime. On 27 April, 2014, Iraq conducted an air raid in Syria against a jihadist convoy that was trying to reach its border, killing at least 8 people. 52 Ibid. 40 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

41 CHAPTER IV ASSAD S NEW STRATEGY: ETHNIC CLEANSING AND CIVIL WAR In light of the failure of the campaigns conducted during the first year of the conflict, in summer 2012, Bashar al-assad decided to implement a new strategy, based on laying sustained sieges to cities, worsening the humanitarian crisis, and systematic destruction. Although different means are employed, the regime remains in a posture of counterinsurgency. IV.1 THE POPULATION, A CENTRAL ISSUE IV.1.1 Humanitarian crisis, the regime s ultimate weapon Ethnic cleansing, another approach to the divide and rule policy By clearing insurgent-held cities, from the summer of 2012, Bashar el-assad organized a large-scale forced displacement of mainly Sunni populations. As early as May 2011, militias murdered 108 inhabitants of the Sunni village of Taldou, in the Houleh area of Homs province. Two weeks later, 100 Sunni villagers were killed in Qubeir in the Orontes river valley where Alawites, Christians and Sunnis live side by side. In August 2012, the Sunni suburb of Darayya was heavily bombed and hundreds of people executed. Ever since, these practices have become systematic. Air power has become the most significant instrument in the regime s efforts to displace populations. The regime first employed its helicopters for bombing. Then, during the battle for Aleppo in August 2012, 20 Syrian Air Force jets were committed to compensate for the lack of artillery. The only regime aircraft that can provide accurate direct support is the MI-25 Hind, but Hassad never possessed more than 40 of these valuable attack helicopters. 53 The lack of available aircraft is a clear setback to the regime. However, the helicopter is an essential counterinsurgency weapon. It greatly contributes to the airland maneuver s mobility and security in theatres with limited infrastructure, against a land-based enemy adept at using ambushes. As second lieutenants Rolland and Tisseron note in one of their tactical studies, attack helicopters have a deterrent effect on enemy combatants 54 and reassure ground troops, meaning they are not only maneuver and combat assets. They can also be used for intelligence collecting or as command platforms, depending on the requirements of ground troops and the constraints of the mission. However, given that they are less protected than tanks and more exposed than fixed-wing aircraft helicopters remain vulnerable targets. For combatants 53 For the last two paragraphs, see Joseph Holliday, op. cit, pp For the entire paragraph, see Second Lieutenants Guillaume Rolland and Antonin Tisseron, L Emploi des hélicoptères en contre-insurrection. Quels enjeux pour quelles menaces?, Cahier de la Recherche Doctrinale, Centre de Doctrine d Emploi des Forces, March 2012 (online on the CDEF website, anciennes publications ). Cahier du RETEX Research March

42 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war with few ground-to-air weapons facing enemy air superiority, destroying aircraft on the ground was the preferred course of action during clashes at the end of the Cold War. The distribution of night vision systems [provided to the rebels by France in particular] and the increased protection of airbases hamper this course of action. As a sign of ammunition shortages, improvised bombs made of oil drums have been dropped on cities since August This also demonstrates that the regime s ammunition is designed for conventional war with Israel over the Golan Heights and not for counterinsurgency purposes. The barrel-bombs may be an attempt from the regime to devise new methods for better destroying buildings. The regime has also tried to depopulate (d) rebel-held areas through air power, by targeting bakeries and hospitals, as was observed in Halfiyah near Hama. Ballistic missiles (Scuds, M-600s, SS-21 Scarabs) are also part of the inventory used for forced displacement. Four hundred ballistic missiles are allegedly available. Forty are said to have been launched between mid- December 2012 and February The regime has also developed a robust chemical weapons program. On 21 August, 2013, Damascus was hit by a chemical strike that killed 281 people 56 in Eastern (districts of Ayn Tarma, Duma, Irbin, Jawbar, Kafr Batna, Qas Alaa, and Zamalka) and Western Ghouta (district of Mu addamiyah ash-sham). Other independent assessments conducted, for example, by Doctors Without Borders, reported at least 355 people dead. Several technical counts, according to different sources, assess the number of dead to be approximately 1,500. The strike was the starting point of Phase I of Operation Capital Shield, a large-scale offensive by the regime to regain control of rebel-held districts of the capital. 57 This large-scale and coordinated attack could only 55 Hospitals are a high-value target, The World Today, October & November 2013, p. 37. See also Joseph Holliday, op. cit, p Programme chimique syrien. Cas d emploi passés d agents chimiques par le régime. Attaque chimique conduite par le régime le 21 août 2013, Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié, 02/09/2013, p gouv.fr/actualites/articles/programme-chimique-syrien-etattaque-du-21-aout-2013, accessed on 14 December, Valérie Szybala, Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for Syria s Capital, Middle East Security Report, 16, Institute for the Study of War, January 2014, p. 24. have been conducted by the regime. 58 The combined attack on 21 August displayed a classic tactical concept of operation (artillery preparation, then ground offensive). The use of chemical agents was part of a tactical maneuver that was coherent, in military terms, with the Syrian armed forces doctrine of employment. Credible intelligence from various partners refers to specific preparations in the days leading up to 21 August. The UN also assumes that chemical weapons were used on five sites: in Khan al-assal on 19 March, 2013, where the regime and the rebels both accused each other; in the Jawbar district of Damascus on 24 August, 2013; in Saraqib on the same day; in Ashrafieh Sahnaya on 25 August; in Bahhariye on 22 August; and in Sheikh Maqsood on 13 April. 59 The Syrian regime has one of the largest operational stockpiles of chemical weapons worldwide, i.e. more than one thousand tons of chemical warfare agents and precursors. This arsenal includes several hundred tons of yperite [mustard gas] (stored in final form), several dozens of tons of VX nerve agent (the most toxic chemical warfare agent) and several hundred tons of sarin (the bulk of the stockpiles). Both sarin and VX are organophosphate neurotoxic agents. They are stored in precursor form, i.e. two chemicals that are mixed just before employment, a technique that shows the Syrian regime having mastered chemical weapons technology. Its scientists have also worked on nitrogen yperite, a first generation vesicant agent, as well as an organophosphate neurotoxic with a higher toxicity than sarin. 60 The regime also has a wide range of vectors to deliver its chemical weapons. SCUD-C, SCUD-B, M-600, SS-21 missiles, aerial bombs, and 302 and 320-mm rockets can deliver chemical agents. Bashar al-assad and some of the most influential members of his clan are the only ones cleared to issue the order to use chemical weapons. The order is then transmitted to the officials of the relevant 58 Programme chimique syrien, art. cit. 59 Alexandra Geneste, Syrie, L ONU confirme l utilisation d armes chimiques dans cinq sites, Lemonde.fr, 13 December, h t t p : / / w w w. l e m o n d e. f r / p r o c h e - o r i e n t / a r t i c l e / 2013/12/13/syrie-l-onu-confirme-l-utilisation-d-armes-chimiques-dans-cinq-sites_ _3218.html, accessed on 13 December, Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié, op. cit, p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

43 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war Delivery and range of chemical weapons VX Sarin Yperite Range SCUD-B 500 km SCUD-C 300 km M km SS km Bombs Rockets 50 km Other tactical ammunition Less than 50 km departments of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) (better known as CERS, Centre d Études et de Recherches Scientifiques). Mean - while, the Army Headquarters receives the order and selects the targets, weapons and toxic agents to use. On 14 September, 2013, the United States and Russia concluded an agreement to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria, based on commitments made by Bashar al-assad s regime. On the same day, the Syrian regime acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Dismantling the Syrian chemical weapon program is the responsibility of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based in The Hague. It is governed by Resolution 2118, unanimously adopted on 27 September by the UN Security Council. According to this framework agreement, the entire Syrian arsenal must be destroyed by 30 June, Syria stated it operates 23 sites. In total, the country has nearly 3.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), a figure that could jump to 6.5 million by the end of 2014, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, 2.5 million Syrians took refuge abroad, including one million in Lebanon. 61 The starvation until submission campaign, the weapon of hunger By laying sieges to several cities, the Bashar al-assad regime is implementing a starvation until submission campaign. The United Nations estimates that 61 Out of a total population of 22 million. over 250,000 people were trapped in besieged areas early in February The most critical areas where civilians were at the greatest risk of starvation were in and around Homs and Damascus. The regime s siege on the southern Damascus suburb of Hajar al-aswad gave some insight into how the tactics of besieging neighborhoods had been implemented all over the Damascus countryside. After a regime offensive in September 2012 causing many civilians to flee the suburb, regime forces withdrew and positioned themselves around the edges of Hajar al-aswad. In December 2012, the road to Damascus was shut down. In April 2013, civilians bringing supplies into the city were arrested. The strict military cordon was followed by several days of artillery shelling. Around Damascus, Hajar al-aswad, Babila, Yelda, Hujeira, Asali, Tadamon, Buweida, Yarmouk, and Husseiniya were placed under a similar blockade. 63 At the end of 2012, the regime embarked on a campaign of bulldozing neighborhoods in Damascus, including Qadoun, Tadamoun, and Mezzeh. The regime s strategy aims to wear out the population, preventing it from joining the insurgency by capitalizing on fear and tying their survival to fighting coming to an end. It also has a deterrent effect on the rebel groups, in that they cannot enter a city without the risk of heavy shelling on the population. They must take this into account before entering an urban area Isabel Nassief and Valérie Szybala, The Starvation until Submission Campaign, Syria Updates, Institute for the Study of War, 7 February, Valérie Szybala, Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for Syria s Capital, art. cit., p Joseph Holliday, op. cit., p. 23. Cahier du RETEX Research March

44 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war A district in Homs (November 2012) IV.1.2 Propaganda, a pillar essential to the survival of the State La population est le centre de gravité de The population is the center of gravity of both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. For the loyalist forces, the population serves primarily as a means of maintaining the existing system; a tool for achieving victory and control. For the insurgents, it is more than that: it is a tool for achieving victory but it is also, and above all, both the cause and the purpose of their action. Insurgents have a closer relationship with the population as usually they were formerly part of it. Nonetheless, the population s support is not necessarily needed for winning, but it should clearly not have overriding support for the adverse side. Bashar al-assad has fully understood the key role of the population for his regime s survival. As such, fear acts as an efficient instrument, enforced by heavy shelling, sustained sieges, and executions. The Syrian regime uses the propaganda of threats to intimidate its enemies and the population. 65 Resorting to ethnic cleansing, forced displacement and media manipulation to portray the insurgents as Islamists coming solely from outside Syria constitutes wearing propaganda. The regime also applies dividing propaganda 66 in order to deepen divisions not only within the population but also within the opposition. Bashar al-assad managed to accentuate the rebel divide by favoring emerging jihadist groups (including by freeing terrorist group leaders). In addition, one must note the internal propaganda aimed at galvanizing the troops. The regime s propaganda media are primarily Syria TV (satellite channel), Syrian New Channel, Syrian Drama TV, and Addounia TV, controlled by Rami Makhlouf, a businessman and cousin of the Assad family. Bashar al-assad also capitalizes on new social networks such as Instagram, Twitter and Facebook to feed speeches and images to Syria s population, but also to influence foreign public opinion. 65 Hugues Esquerre, Dans la tête des insurgés, Paris, Éditions du Rocher, 2013, p IbIbid. 44 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

45 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war Facebook is also used to identify and arrest opponents. A full-fledged cyberwar is being waged between hacker teams from the various factions to hack rival Internet websites. The maintenance of public services is also used for the regime s propaganda, as it seeks to be deemed as essential for the survival of the population. In the areas where he has control, Bashar al-assad has endeavored to maintain the State and related services, with the civil service thereby playing a major role. On the whole, civil servants care about maintaining the State, which is often confused with Bashar al-assad. He also tries to prevent the insurgents from doing the same by cutting their supply lines, targeting public buildings in insurgent areas and inflicting siege campaigns. In February 2014, armistices were signed in most districts around Damascus to restore public services and supply food to a population weakened by hunger. Here, Assad s strategy had proved somewhat successful; the population had been subjugated by hunger and the regime had become essential to their survival. In March 2014, 40% of the Syrian public hospitals were no longer functional and one in five schools had been damaged or occupied by people driven from their homes by fighting. 67 Militia groups therefore had to reinforce troops. The decentralization of Syrian Army command and control in replaced the long centralized tradition inherited from Soviet doctrine. As well as improving the regime s operational flexibility, decentralization has added to the convergence between the Syrian Army and the militias, as they have been acting in an increasingly manner from the summer of As an example, 10,000 militia members joined the Homs offensive in early The Iranian Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah played a major role in the training of this popular force (Jaysh al- Sha bi ), estimated at 50,000 fighters. 70 In early 2013, Assad took steps to formalize the process by grouping the militias in the National Defense Forces. Equipment, uniforms (in both cases, wearing civilian clothing, ill-fitting and slovenly outfits, civilian kits, etc.) and operational capabilities have become almost identical. This confusion creates a problem in identifying the parties to the conflict; it is difficult to know if it is Syrian forces or militia who have operated in such or such an area or to point out those responsible for any abuses. In addition, some 200,000 members of the regime s security apparatus have been heavily committed alongside militia groups since the beginning of the conflict. IV.2 INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITIAS IV.2.1 The growing confusion between militias and Syrian armed forces To compensate for a lack of troops, Bashar al-assad has to rely on paramilitary and militia groups to support his operations and secure his supply lines. 68 In September 2012, thousands of reservists were called up as reinforcements, mainly from the Alawi regions in northwestern Syria. Only half reported for duty. They were sent to the 416 th Special Forces battalion. 69 IV.2.2 The role of militias in the regime s operations When incorporated into the regime s operations, militias most often play the role of Syrian Army auxiliaries. As an example, in the fall of 2012, bulldozers were used by the Syrian military to raze buildings to the ground in Damascus suburbs, with the militias ensuring population displacement by expelling or even slaughtering the last remaining inhabitants. 71 Due to the decentralization of command and the lack of professional troops, militias most often act autonomously or even independently. Armed groups receive instructions, before it being up to them to operate on the ground in complete autonomy. The key is to drive 67 Francetvinfo.fr, 8 March, Here, we will only deal with Syrian militias; foreign militias will be addressed in another part of this study. 69 Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency To Civil War, art. cit., pp Ibid. 71 Stéphane Mantoux, This is Syria. L armée syrienne, Alliance Géostratégique, 12 September, accessed on 13 November, Cahier du RETEX Research March

46 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war the populations out of cities and suburbs by using terror, and go insurgent-bashing (or assimilated insurgent), without going into detail. 72 Deemed to be poorly disciplined, militias do have two advantages. First of all, they do not require great leaders or general officers for them to act. They can therefore continue to operate under the authority of local commanders, even when a senior official is killed. As such, destroying Syrian Army command centers will not fundamentally destabilize these groups. On the other hand, Syrian powers cannot be accused of crimes committed by gangs that mainly operate outside a centralized chain of command. The National Defense Forces militias, set up from the former Popular Committee militias, were mainly formed by Christian, Druze and Alawite minorities fearing persecution from insurgent Sunnis, who have been systematically presented as jihadi terrorists by the regime propaganda. The Ba ath Party militia is also armed and takes part in fighting. These are the Battalions of the Ba ath Party, established in Aleppo in 2012 and controlled by the Party. The Ba ath party saw the conflict as the opportunity to reassert its position. These battalions number between 5,000 and 7,000 men, although they have seen little combat. The much older, criminal Shabiha militias are almost exclusively made up of Alawites and are closely associated with the Assad clan. The movement appeared when trafficking was organized with Lebanon during the war that engulfed the neighboring state in the 1980s. The Shabiha subsequently prospered through racketeering, drug trafficking and smuggling between the two countries. As it was led by members of the Assad clan, the Mafia-type organization had the protection of Hafez al-assad, who already used it for doing dirty work. Frédéric Encel, a lecturer at the political science school Science-Po in Paris, explains that, the regime does not want to use its well-trained soldiers to go after civilians. Either the Shabiha are sent alone to a rebel-held city where there is no armed resistance or, should the rebels be heavily armed, tanks and military helicopters pound the city before leaving the militias to finish off the job with their handguns, their batons and their edge weapons. 73 This fear also serves as a dissuasive force within the Syrian armed forces to prevent any attempts at desertion. The Shabiha, for example, were responsible for watching over the regiments, including those made up of non-alawites. These militias are committed to upholding the regime, as its members would be hunted down should it fall. The regime also provides them with a substantial income, in addition to which must be counted the wealth resulting from looting. Their average salary is around 2,000 Syrian pounds (30 euros) per day, in a country where the average monthly income might be 150 euros. This is why it also attracts many non-alawite people. 74 Pro-Assad militias thus include a variety of actors who actively contribute to upholding the regime. Their buildup, improved tactical effectiveness, equipment and collaboration with regime forces have enabled them to fulfil their role as Syrian Army auxiliaries. It should be noted, however, that fighting between pro-assad militias is known to have taken place. IV.3 THE PRIMARY ROLE OF FOREIGN PLAYERS IN THE FIGHTING The Assad regime s survival is largely sustained by foreign players. Having appeared during the stalemate in the conflict, their increasing presence is a sign of the conflict s sectarization. IV.3.1 Iranians in Syria Syria has longstanding relations with Iran, as the two countries have been in strategic partnership since the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy in February 72 Laurent Touchard, Interventions en Syrie : que valent les défenses militaires de Bachar el-assad?, Blog Défense Jeune Afrique, 30/08/ /, accessed on 15 July, Quoted in Christophe Rauzy, Les Chabbiha, miliciens de la sale guerre en Syrie, Francetvinfo.fr, 27 July, Hala Kodmani, Syrie : les chabbiha, ces hors-la-loi qui font la loi, Libération.fr, 27 September, Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

47 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war This privileged relationship is based on a shared commitment to continue fighting against Israel, a common will to resist American influence in the Middle East and a joint interest in curbing Iraq s and Turkey s influence. It is also based on a Shiite alliance, with Assad seeking recognition of the Alawi community as a full-fledged branch of Shiism. 75 During the Iran-Iraq War, Syria supplied weapons and war materiel to Iran, including ground-to-air missiles and antitank rockets. Iranian pilots were also authorized to land on Syrian airbases in case of emergency. Groups of Iraqi Kurdish dissidents were also trained by the Syrian Army. 76 In return, Iran supplied oil to Syria at a very low price. Although this relationship turned sour during the war in Lebanon in 1982, and then the rapprochement of Syria and the United States during the first Gulf War, at the end of the 1990s, Syria s relationship with Iran picked up again. Iran in particular provided significant support to Syria s chemical weapon programs. Iran has provided assistance to the Assad regime since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Quds Force (QF) was sent to act as a fighting force on the ground, espionage services or even law enforcement forces. The first part of the support provided by Iranian forces is an advisory mission. 77 QF Commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani plays a prominent role. Iran s involvement in Syria became clearer in February 2013, when Iranian Brigadier General Hassan Shateri was assassinated in the Damascus countryside. The Quds Force is based in the Syrian Special Forces training complex in al-dreij, between Damascus and Zabadani. Its best prepared troops for counterinsurgency were sent to Syria. These men provided military training, mainly to the 416 th Special Forces Battalion. Assistance was also given to the Shabiha militias. They played a role in a string of major offensives mounted in the first quarter of 2012 between Damascus and Zabadani. Some of the Syrian counterinsurgency practices may also reflect Iranian advice, such as building a wall around the former 75 Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, Mohammed Al-Dbiyat, La Syrie au présent, Paris, Sindbad, Actes Sud, 2007, p Ibid, p Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday and Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, AEI s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, p. 10. We will follow them for the entire paragraph. rebel stronghold in Homs. The Assad regime has not always been a perfect partner, however. The Iranians also issued strong criticism after the Houla massacre on May 25, 2012 and have been often frustrated with Assad s disproportionate responses. Intelligence support is the second part of Iranian aid. Syria s General Security Directorate is supported by Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and the major defense contractor Iran Electronics Industries (IEI). These designations shed some light on the relations between Syrian and Iranian state security agencies. Military (resupply) support makes up the third part of Iranian aid. Aerial resupply has been most critical for the regime forces, which were threatened by the rebels blocking roads. 117 cargo and passenger planes operated by Yas Air, Iran Air, and Mahan Air were listed in September Iranian Air Force Ilyushin-76s were also employed. Iraq, it should be noted, has no capability to protect its airspace. The road between Baghdad and Damascus remains the main ground corridor for Iranian aid. The primary crossing points on the Syria-Iraq border have included Rabia-Yaarabiya in the north, Sinjar, the Euphrates River between Al Qaim-and Abu Kamal. Since the end of 2012, only the Al Walid-At Tanf border crossing near Jordan has seemed to be the only border crossing point to have remained viable. Iran has also deployed naval vessels through the Suez Canal to Syrian ports, demonstrating the so far limited plausibility of a sea supply line. Finally, the Iranians participate in the training of the 50,000 militia members called Jaysh al-sha bi, or the People s Army, modeled on the Iranian Basij militia. Iran can have them capitalize on its previous years experience in the training of Iraqi and Afghan groups. This is part of Iran s longer-term strategy in Syria; should the Assad regime fall, these militias and the remnants of the security institutions will have no other choice but to turn to Iran so that they could ultimately lead an uprising against the new regime and bring to power the Islamic Republic Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, art. cit., p. 21. Cahier du RETEX Research March

48 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war IV.3.2 The role of the Lebanese Hezbollah Hezbollah has been in Syria in significant numbers since the end of Their 5,000 elite commandos are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and have trained the Syrian Army in urban warfare. They reportedly protect Bashar al-assad. 79 The conflict in Syria has put Hezbollah on the defensive to protect its supply routes from Syria into Lebanon. 80 Hezbollah also aims to protect an air and ground corridor through which the weapons and ammunition necessary for fighting against Israel are shipped. It is essential for the Syrian regime to prevail, at least in the Alawi coastal strip, so that Hezbollah can potentially route MANPADS procured in Europe or the United States and land them in Tartus, then to be used against Israeli aircraft. 81 Hezbollah is not committed in its entirety; instead members from Shiite villages in Lebanon come of their own volition. They are reservists, although first and foremost they are members of elite units trained by the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. These men have been hardened in the fight against Israel, with leaders who allegedly trained 50,000 militia members. In early 2012, Hezbollah snipers were deployed in the Battle of Zabadani, a key city on the supply route from Damascus to Lebanon. Hezbollah escalated its combat role in February 2013 when it launched an offensive against villages near al-qusayr. Hezbollah troops are said to have been involved in 80 clashes in Syria, from the Aleppo province to Homs province through Damascus and the Ghouta area. 82 They arrived at the end of 2012, although today Hezbollah fights almost exclusively with elite units of the 4 th Division, the Special Forces or the Republican Guard, recalls a source close to the party quoted by G. Malbrunot. Hezbollah has trained Army leaders in counterinsurgency warfare in collaboration with the Iranian Quds forces. Iran and Hezbollah are closely linked; Iran played an important role in establishing the party in Hezbollah drafted the party constitution still in effect, including elements of the Iranian Constitution. 83 Hezbollah regularly receives aid from the Islamic Republic, with Syria as the crossing point. Sometimes, Hezbollah also fight in Syrian Army uniform, becoming indistinguishable from them, and operating under Syrian command. 84 Infighting sometimes occurs as Hezbollah men sometimes take issue being alongside the less pious Alawites. Hezbollah demanded that the Mafia-type criminal elements be put aside. Tensions also arose over the use of chemical weapons or when a close associate to Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, had to go to Damascus to convince Bashar al-assad not to respond to Israeli strikes in May Four hundred men have allegedly been killed and a thousand others wounded. Among those killed in a rebel offensive in the Ghouta areas in late November 2013 were leaders such as Wissam Sharafeddine, along with 26 others. After several days, thousands of insurgents who had come from Jordan and broken through the regime s defensive lines and Hezbollah then had to bring in reinforcements from Lebanon to recapture the lost positions, with Syrian Army support. Hezbollah troops are usually organized in six-man assault teams and issued with American machine guns fitted with a biometric scanner, a Russian piece of equipment for detecting shadows through a building or identifying human forms behind foliage up to 200 meters away. 85 These teams have stand-off support from Syrian tanks and, unlike the Iranians, fight alongside Syrian soldiers. Finally, Hezbollah allegedly gather intelligence: a list of 80 Syrian soldiers who had provided rebels with information was reportedly submitted to Bashar al-assad. 86 Hezbollah have allegedly been protecting Assad since the end of August There have always been internal power struggles within Hezbollah. The resistance of the Party of God is based on the fight against Israel and not on lending 79 Georges Malbrunot, Le Hezbollah en sauveur d Assad, Le Figaro, Tuesday, 21 January, Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, art. cit., p Stéphane Mantoux, La bataille d Al-Qusayr (15 May-5 June 2013). Historicoblog.com, accessed on 21 November, Georges Malbrunot, Le Hezbollah en sauveur d Assad, art. cit. 83 Interview with Amal Saad Ghorayeb, Le Hezbollah : résistance, idéologie, politique, Confluences Méditerranée, 2007/2 N 61, pp Georges Malbrunot, Le Hezbollah en sauveur d Assad, art. cit. This has been questioned by other sources. 85 Georges Malbrunot, Le Hezbollah en sauveur d Assad, art. cit. 86 Ibid. 48 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

49 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war support to a repressive dictatorial regime. Moreover, it cannot afford to commit all of its forces in Syria. The party base, located in Lebanon, has long expressed doubts about a massive intervention in Syria but now describes the commitment as an existential struggle 87 in order to confront Sunni radicals beyond their borders, to prevent them from waging war within Lebanon. The Syrian regime would like to create a Syrian Shiite Hezbollah to avoid long-term dependency on the Lebanese Hezbollah, but will probably take time. The battle of al-qusayr (15 May 5 June, 2013) The battle of al-qusayr marked the beginning of a major campaign from the regime to retake Syria s strategic areas. It also reflected the ever-increasing overlapping between Syrian Army soldiers, militias and foreign fighters, with Hezbollah playing a special role at al-qusayr. Al-Qusayr had a population of 30,000 predominately Sunni inhabitants, located 10 km from Lebanon and 25 km from Homs. The Syrian regime tried to regain control over the entire province following its offensive on Homs in February Most rebels in al-qusayr were local people, mainly in the Farouq Battalions, the most powerful unit in the city. This formation belongs to the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Fifteen units are thought to have taken part in the defense of al-qusayr, involving a few thousand fighters (perhaps 2,000). The al-qusayr Military Council was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Mohieddin al-zain, AKA Abu Arab, but the chain of command remained unclear. The presence of Jabhat al-nusra had evidently been exaggerated by the media, the regime seeking to present all defenders as jihadists. The rebels were reasonably well equipped with arms and ammunition, salvaged in particular from the Dabaa Military Airport: AK-47s, RPG-7 rocket launchers, PK machine guns, 23-mm twin-barreled guns, mortars, and 107-mm and 122-mm rockets. The fighters divided the city into sectors to better organize defense preparations. Tunnels were dug and underground bunkers built. Barricades blocked streets, buildings were booby-trapped and roads mined Ibid. 88 Stéphane Mantoux, La bataille d Al-Qusayr (15 mai-5 juin 2013), Historicoblog, 21 November, accessed on 22 November, Remote-controlled hand-made explosive devices positioned in belts under the roads were ready to destroy vehicles. Meanwhile, Hezbollah divided the city in 16 areas of operations, assigning code numbers to key points and objectives, a procedure well known to the party for protecting radio communications. With 1,200 to 1,700 men, Hezbollah exercised tactical control of the battle, giving orders to Syrian officers. The movement had apparently divided its forces into 17 groups of 100 men. However, during fighting, the basic pawn was the 3-to-5 man squad. The fighters were relieved weekly, and then every 20 days. Detailed reconnaissance was conducted, and then Hezbollah engineers began to demine buildings. Supported by Syrian artillery and aviation, Hezbollah fighters used RPG-7s, 107-mm modified rockets (IRAM, Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions), and Dragunov sniper rifles. 89 On 3 June, 2013, 14 rebel commanders out of 17 voted to withdraw from al-qusayr. Some managed to get to Arsal, in Lebanon s Bekaa Valley, which had been a logistics node of the rebellion until Yabroud was captured by the regime. The fight for al-qusayr was longer and fiercer than expected: 70 to 120 Hezbollah fighters were killed. The rebels, meanwhile, published the names of 431 of their soldiers killed in action, although the overall number is undoubtedly higher. 90 The rebels were isolated and faced forces far stronger than them who were able to capitalize on how near they were to Lebanon. Hezbollah showed it was capable of fighting in urban areas and sent a strong message to Israel. It then moved to the Daraa, Idlib and Aleppo provinces and the Damascus suburbs. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. Syrian soldiers a few kilometers from al-qusayr (May 2013) Cahier du RETEX Research March

50 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war Al-Qusayr Campaign: March 2013 Ar-Rastan Jessica Lewis and David Y. Stephenson FSA Talbisa x Homs xx 11 xx 104 RG x 105 RG 45 SF Dabaa 18 Shinshar 47 SF Lebanon Bekaa Valley L Hermel LH Al-Qusayr x FSA Shamsin 53 SF x UNK 4* L LH** * Unknown elements within the 4th Armored Division were among the stay-behind force in Homs city after the Bebruary 2012 assault. ** Lebanese Hezbollah forces are depicted here as two regiments because the total number of forces estimated in Syria presently total to 2,000. Regime force disposition in Homs City in Marc 2013 is based upon ISW report, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, by Joseph Holliday. Opposition units are represented as task forces comprised of multiple rebel groups and represented for their estimated total strength. Estimated pro-regime unit available strength is represented as a proportion of the whole in red. Source: Institute for the Study of War, Al-Qusayr Campaign: June 2013 Ar-Rastan Jessica Lewis and David Y. Stephenson Talbisa Homs FSA xx 11 xx FSA x 104 RG x 105 RG x FSA Dabaa Shinshar 18 x UNK 3 x 45 SF 47 SF Lebanon Bekaa Valley Hermel L NDF* LH Al-Qusayr L LH** NDF 53 Shamsin SF UNK 4 x UNK x UNK 4 RG Lebanese Hezbollah and National Defense Forces are represented with reduced available strength based upon estimates of high casualties in Al-Qusayr. Opposition forces have been displaced from Al-Qusayr and are isolated at Dabaa military base, which is regime-controlled. Source: Institute for the Study of War, The northwestern city of Talkalakh, which had been besieged for two years, fell as a result of that operation. The regime then turned against Homs and captured the central Khaldiya district on 29 July, as the rebellion had chosen to sacrifice this area to better preserve the northern Aleppo province and positions in Damascus. The rebels also gathered in the Qalamoun Mountains, between Damascus and Homs, north of the capital, in particular around the town of Yabroud. It was indeed in Danha, in the Qalamoun 50 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

51 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war Mountains, that rebels seized three Syrian Army arms depots with numerous antitank missiles on 2 August. Nevertheless, with the Qalamoun Mountains lying close to the Lebanese border, they were a prime target for a regime and Hezbollah offensive; this got underway on 15 November, The battle for the Qalamoun Mountains Hezbollah also played a crucial role in the battle for the mountainous area of Qalamoun, located northwest of Damascus and crossed by the M5 highway, linking Damascus and Homs. Hezbollah also focused on cutting off supply lines between Arsal, Lebanon, and rebel-held areas in Qalamoun. The fall of al- Qusayr in June 2013 was part of the large-scale campaign completed in March 2014 when the regime took Yabroud. During the campaign, the key objective was the contested section of the M5 highway between Qara and Yabroud. The offensive against Qara began on 15 November, with heaving shelling and regime helicopter bombardments. 92 Pro-regime forces encircled the town, modelled on the strategy that had been implemented since the summer of Four days later, the town fell, causing large-scale displacement as 2,200 families fled across the border into Lebanon. The regime then increased operations in the towns of an-nabek and Jarajir which lie on the M5. The rebels seized control of Deir Attiyah while the regime continued heavy shelling throughout Qalamoun, particularly on the towns of Deir Attiyah, an-nabek, and Yabroud. Both rebel and pro-regime fighters (both sides) demonstrated an understanding that mountainous terrain would require a shift in fighting tactics. The regime focused on disjoining rebel-held towns in the area and besieging towns with heavy rebel concentrations. Meanwhile, rebels relied on heavy reinforcements and rearmament from other regions, as well as irregular tactics such as car bombs which became a specialty of al-qaeda affiliated groups such as the Jabhat al-nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham (ISIS). Having demonstrated its commitment alongside the Syrian Army during the battle of al-qusayr, Hezbollah then conducted reconnaissance operations in the Qalamoun area. Hoping for a decisive victory, the regime concentrated its forces in Aleppo, Damascus and the Northern provinces. For the regime, Qalamoun was not the priority, but it was for Hezbollah, given its location along the Lebanese border. Hezbollah employed guerrilla tactics, operating in small squads, damaging the logistical connections between Arsal and the rebel towns around Qalamoun, rather than clearing and holding territory as they did in al- Qusayr. 93 In addition, according to rebel groups, Hezbollah was said to hold eight villages near the northern Lebanon border, in an effort to disrupt the rebel supply line to Homs. The capture of Yabroud by the regime in March 2014 marked the success of this campaign. The regime can now benefit from substantial supplies from Lebanon and connect Damascus and Homs without much danger. This victory could prove decisive in the continuation of the conflict. IV.3.3 Shiite militias in Syria Shiite militiamen, including 2 to 3,000 Iraqis, are not as disciplined as Hezbollah fighters. They have maintained ties to Iran since the counterinsurgency in Iraq and are partly helped by them. In Syria, they are duplicating the strategy employed in Iraq and are likely to protect Iranian interests in Syria even if Assad falls. Iranians reportedly used Hezbollah fighters to train them. 94 Fighters were first sent by Kata ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa ib Ahl al-haq (AAH). They have been clearly identifiable since the end of 2012, as this was when they formed the Abu al-fadl al-abbas Brigade (AFAB), made up of Syrian and foreign Shiite fighters who are members of Hezbollah and Shiite Iraqi militias. It includes some 500 fighters. In April 2013, both Kata ib Hezbollah and Asa ib Ahl al-haq confirmed their involvement in Syria by publishing pictures acknowledging that four of their fighters had been killed 91 Stéphane Mantoux, La bataille d Al-Qusayr (15 mai-5 juin 2013), art. cit. 92 Isabel Nassief, Hezbollah and the Fight for Control in Qalamoun, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 26 November, 2013, p Ibid, p Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, AEI s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, p. 23. Cahier du RETEX Research March

52 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war while defending Shi ite shrines in the Damascus suburb of Sayyeda Zeinab. 95 The Abu al-fadl al-haq Brigade stated that its primary task was to protect the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab in southeast Damascus (where the remains of the daughter of the first Shiite Imam are entombed). This is also key terrain for both Assad and Iran in the defense of Damascus because it leads to Damascus International Airport. The various paramilitary forces fighting in Syria benefit from Iranian support as they are pursuing their mutual objectives in Syria. They share a common interest in protecting themselves against the threat of al- Qaeda affiliates, as well as a potentially hostile Sunni majority potential government in Syria. These movements will keep up the fight to keep Assad in power as long as possible. Out of all of them, the shabiha have the most to lose and are prepared to fight to the end. IV.3.4 Russian supply Russia has provided Bashar al-assad s regime with unwavering support since the beginning of the conflict. Russian aid even increased in 2013, with deliveries of armored vehicles, surveillance equipment, radars, electronic warfare systems, and guided bombs for planes, shipped to Latakia and Tartus. 96 Russia s attitude in Syria is mainly defensive, primarily with a view to maintaining a line of defense to prevent Islamist groups from moving northward, towards the Caucasus and Chechnya. Historically, Russia also plays the role of protector of the Eastern Christians; an increasingly viable option as there is a union between Church and State currently asserted in Russia, between the executive power and the Orthodox Church. Finally, on a symbolic level, Russia is seeking to assert its presence within its only Arab ally state after the concessions made in 2011 concerning the Western intervention in Libya. Russian Federation in Syria since the agreement reached in 1971, which was part of a wider policy of military aid to Arab countries, such as Egypt, Algeria, and Libya. This is the only Russian military port outside of the former Soviet republics and Russia s only direct access to the Mediterranean. Tartus is classified as a deep-water commercial port which can process giant tankers up to 120,000 tons, but also military vessels. In 2008, the Port of Tartus processed 2,776 merchant vessels carrying 12.9 million tons of cargo. 97 Officially designated as a Navy Sustainment Center, the port facility can support all the ships of the Russian fleet except the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. 98 It includes ammunition depots; basic repair capabilities are also provided through the (regular) limited presence of the Russian repair ship PM-138. However, there is no command and control facility nor military hospital facilities or barracks. Despite Russian pledges to improve Tartus, the naval base is in no better condition than it was thirty years ago and only offers basic support functions. Nonetheless, Tartus is described as essential in Russian official speeches. Interest in Tartus is primarily geopolitical since it highlights Russian influence in the Mediterranean and the Arab world against NATO. The Russian fleet has been in decline since the end of the Cold War but is gradually improving, as shown in 2008 when the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko transited the Panama Canal, marking the first time a Russian ship had gone through it since WWII. Finally, Russia seems more committed to maintaining cooperation with a client state rather than with a regime or with Assad. 99 Its support to the regime could become jeopardized should the rebels make significant progress, even though this support has been robust since the beginning of the conflict. However aid continued in 2014 and is crucial to the regime. The naval base of Tartus is located in the coastal area of northwestern Syria. A stronghold of the regime, it has been one of the major interests of the 95 Quoted in Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, p Isabel Nassief, The campaign for Homs and Aleppo, Middle East Security Report, 17, ISW, January 2014, p Christopher Harmer, Russian Naval Base Tartus, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 31 July, 2012, p Ibid, p Ibid. 52 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

53 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war IV.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIME S OPERATIONS AND OF THE GEOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IV.4.1 Assessment of operations conducted by the regime since summer 2012 Deemed to be ossified and as fielding obsolete armed forces at the beginning of the conflict in 2011, the Syrian regime has nonetheless held on to power and has even gradually gained the upper hand over the rebellion. To the surprise of many observers, it has shown a degree of adaptability that recalls the wide range of means available to a dictatorial regime fiercely attached to power. The progressive decentralization of the Army s chain of command has allowed for greater flexibility and responsiveness. The integration of external elements, militiamen and foreign fighters has also been well conducted. The Syrian Army knows how to incorporate them and has sometimes accepted foreign officers taking charge of the conduct of operations. Gradually what has emerged is a government hybrid force, made up of a regular Army that can appropriate unconventional methods to fight an irregular enemy. These factors maintain the hope of a final victory for the regime, as they enable it to fight simultaneously on several fronts. This has been the case since May-June 2013, a first since the beginning of the conflict. The regime has shown adaptability, particularly in its employment of armor in urban areas. Armor is not considered well suited to cities as it is allegedly vulnerable to antitank teams taking advantage of building fronts and the infinite avenues of approach offered by urban architecture. These weak points, however, were turned into strengths. The tank remains the only vehicle capable of moving over ground it has made unusable for other vehicles, making it the only vehicle able to control terrain. Syrian tanks operate by masking mobility corridors, i.e. firing heavily and brutally against building fronts and attached rooms. The internal blast is particularly devastating and expels the occupants as it is channeled through the maze of rooms, corridors and staircases. The exterior blast releases a cloud of debris that may disorient people escaping along the building front. This effect is heightened by the narrow streets of Syrian cities that for the most part are very old. This principle is also being implemented by the BMP-2 IFVs with their 30-mm guns during movement phases. Tanks roll in a very tight disposition, armor against armor, to ensure individual and collective self-protection (the tortoise principle) of the column of armor and dismounted infantry. It also allows an optimized response by cross-checking the areas covered by active and passive systems used for positioning and assessing the threat. The area of action is methodically identified to deny firing corridors (redoubts, recesses). Each tank then fires in the priority areas of the firing corridor it has been assigned, then moves on to another corridor at the same time as other tanks. The Achilles heel of Soviet and then Russian-designed tanks is the circular ammunition feeding system located in the turret well. Contingency armor was therefore added to tanks (Kontakt tiles, bags of sand, garden bricks, steel rebars). In Syria, all hit or damaged tanks are towed away for immediate repair or to ensure they do not fall into rebel hands. Rehabilitation is facilitated by the ruggedness of equipment. Syrian tanks also faced IEDs, although these do not represent the main threat in urban areas. Field Artillery Simulation Systems (FASS) can deal with this rebel course of action. Counter-IED is a skill mainly entrusted to dismounted infantry and engineers who focus on drainage networks under avenues, streets and alleys. 100 These methods have allowed the Syrian Army to regain control over urban areas from the rebellion. The latter has therefore had to be capable of tactical discipline and innovation in order to prevail. From summer 2012 until the end of 2013, the Syrian regime went from defending a few strategic locations, to avoid dispersing limited forces, to largerscale offensives to cut off rebel centers from their surroundings and their logistical supply routes. This was the major campaign of besieging insurgent cities, enabled by the growing role of elements external to the Syrian Army in the fighting. The success of this campaign was based on Bashar al-assad taking risks. He gambled on combining his main assets, i.e. elite units from Damascus, and even from the province of Daraa, aircraft and the elite infantry of Hezbollah, to pull off major coups. This course of action allowed him 100 Chars et antichars en Syrie. 5 e partie : Les blindés, Focus hebdomadaire, EM9, BIMa/BRRI. Cahier du RETEX Research March

54 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war to achieve success in, among others, Homs, al- Qusayr and the Qalamoun Mountains. Success led his Iranian allies and Hezbollah to provide increased support. On the other hand, insurgents were more divided than ever and blamed each other for their failures. 101 Assad, however, did not seem to have enough assets to achieve final victory. To fill the gap, he used illegal means such as chemical attacks, barrel-bombs, and organized famine. Urban centers were not always entirely under his control; Kurdish areas, a large part of the eastern desert, the southern region between Damascus and Daraa as well as cities such as al-raqqah and the northern border area were abandoned for the time being. The regime was then busy maintaining its presence in Aleppo and regaining or maintaining control primarily over Damascus, then Homs and Idlib. Death toll of victims of the conflict From the beginning of the conflict in March 2011 until June 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) recorded 160,000 people killed. Among them, 40,000 were rebels. On the Syrian regime s side and the militia fighters supporting it, the SOHR recorded 58,000 deaths. There were 364 killed among Hezbollah s Lebanese fighters and 605 among other foreign Shiite fighters. 18,000 people also went missing after being arrested by the security forces. 8,000 others were in the hands of the rebel forces or had been kidnapped. 102 The remaining 50,000 victims were civilians. On the military side, the Syrian Arab Army is no longer a single entity. From all the former units, there remain only two or three task forces resembling mechanized brigades according to their composition, mobility and firepower. 103 The core is made up of former elite units. Syrian forces therefore mix with the militiamen of the National Defense Force and Iranian, Iraqi and Hezbollah fighters, forming a hybrid force. The Syrian Air Force, meanwhile, has not lost a lot of fighter bombers (15 MiG-21, Su-22, MiG-23BN and Su-24 as of 101 Stéphane Mantoux, La bataille d Al-Qusayr (15 mai-5 juin 2013), art. cit. 102 Syrie : morts en près de trois ans, Lefigaro.fr with Reuters, 1 April, Stéphane Mantoux, La guerre civile syrienne : interview de Tom Cooper, 10 December, Quoted in December 2013), although on the other hand it has lost more than half of its Mi-8/17 helicopters. The Air Force Academy had to be closed down. The regime also lost much of its armored or mechanized units (equipment wear and defection) and suffers from fuel shortages. 104 Syria s military is therefore nearly exhausted and its survival is due to its allies. IV.4.2 Assessment of the geographical evolution of the conflict In March 2011, the conflict began in Daraa, in southern Syria, a province relatively neglected by the regime. It then spread rapidly to other urban centers, and later to Syria s two major cities, Aleppo and Damascus. Due to the stalemate situation in the current conflict, the dynamics in Syria s various provinces have differed. Syria is not entirely a war zone, although most regions have been subjected to violence. Each front has its own characteristics and, as time goes on, has gone through changes. Northern Syria was quickly held by insurgents. The regime preferred to concentrate its forces on the Damascus-Homs- Aleppo axis, and then in the south. Besides ISIL, the opposition is dominated by multiple armed groups from the conservative lower classes, who fight amongst themselves to obtain often sporadic Turkish, Saudi and Qatari support. Islamist groups have gradually prevailed in northern Syria, predominantly financed by Gulf donors and private Islamist networks, or even al-qaeda. As an example, jihadis led the operation to take al-raqqah. Fighting then took place between secular, Islamist and jihadist groups. Northern Syria is mainly held by insurgents, but the area remains fragile and is not secure. The rebels also continued to push toward Aleppo, Idlib and Latakia. Northeastern Syria is held by the Kurds, who do not trust Islamists or Arab nationalists and clashes between them have reportedly taken place. Turkey plays a major role in northern Syria, allowing rear bases to be set up by the insurgents and weapons and fighters to get through. Overall, the northern front is a lawless area occupied by competing armed groups, with criminal and radical tendencies. Rebel military victories are therefore far and few between. 104 Ibid. 54 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

55 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war In eastern Syria, the regime lacks social support and a military bedrock, as it does in the north. It is also an area influenced by Iraq, with deep-set tribal structures and places of jihadi culture. This isolated area offers freedom of movement to the Iraqi groups that are establishing increasing continuity with western Iraq. This desert area is still largely not taken into account. The dynamics in southern Syria are different yet again. The birthplace of the insurgency, it is a rural, but densely populated area that is home to one of the toughest fronts in the country. Given its proximity to Israel, many of the regime s military bases are located in this area, with strong ties to Damascus. The opposition has shown great resilience, conducting sophisticated and coordinated operations. Jabhat al-nusra is quite influential in this area and has demonstrated a genuine ability to work with civilian governance structures. Saudi Arabia is very influential in countering the Turkish presence in northern Syria. The regime is gradually gaining the upper hand in the region, especially following the capture of Khirbet Ghazaleh in May Strikes so far have been primarily conducted to limit the advance towards Damascus, while the end of 2013 saw an increase in the amount of shelling and air raids on cities which likely set up rebel supply lines. Damascus, the capital, crystallizes an existential struggle for both sides. The city has seen continuous shelling and fighting since the beginning of the conflict. After rebel advances in supposedly impenetrable areas in July 2012, the regime stepped up its efforts. In early 2013, the regime set conditions for future operations in the city by seizing key terrain to open its own supply lines and isolate rebel support zones (sieges, blockades). The rebels repelled many offensive operations during summer 2013 and conducted counteroffensives for re-establishing supply lines in eastern Ghouta: the al-furqan counteroffensive led by a coalition of rebel brigades and the Jabhat Fatah al-asima coalition at Jawbar. On 20 August, 2013, the regime launched its biggest offensive in Damascus with Operation Capital Shield. The chemical attack on 21 August was part of the preparation for the operation. Artillery bombardments took place before ground troops moved in. The operation continued into September and October, with a campaign using improvised barrel-bombs that had replaced chemical weapons. The rebels were able to reorganize ( the Front to Conquer the Capital around the FSA) and retain most of their areas. In central Syria, the opposition was able to take of the porous Lebanese border for some time (with the support of the Sunnis from northern Lebanon), until there was heavy commitment of the Lebanese Hezbollah, allowing the regime to retake the Qalamoun area and al-qusayr. The regime also occupies Mt Qasioun where a large complex of military bases is located (Mazzeh 86, Masakin, Haras, Hay al-wurud and Ish al-warwar) at the center of an Alawi neighborhood. Although there remain some pockets of resistance in Homs, the regime has gradually regained control over central Syria. Even before the fall of al-qusayr, the regime, with the support of Hezbollah and grassroots and Iraqi militia fighters, sent troops to Aleppo as part of Operation Northern Storm which began on 9 June, This marked the transition from defense to offense, mainly in the western part of the city, with the storming of rebel areas. Military logic would have called for a sustained effort in central Syria, towards Homs. By attacking Aleppo in June 2013, the regime apparently wanted to capitalize on the momentum of al-qusayr and exploit rebel weaknesses following their defeat. Another alternative assumption is that the rebel progress on Menagh airbase, close to Aleppo, as well as their progress in the city and in Idlib, called for swift action on Assad s part. 105 This operation was a failure and the rebels remained entrenched not only in eastern and southeastern Aleppo, but also in the western part of the city. At the same time, the regime stepped up its efforts in the Khaldiyeh district in Homs, which had been disputed since March Troops who had pulled out of Aleppo and northern Syria arrived as reinforcements at the end of June. The rebels were mainly entrenched in the city center (the Old City, Khaldiyeh, al-qusour, Hamadiyeh, etc.) and were shelled continuously. The largest part of the city was held by the regime, with the areas held corresponding mainly to Alawite-populated neighborhoods. 106 At the end of 2013, the regime took the city of as-safira, located southeast of Aleppo, which was essential for securing the Hama-Aleppo supply route. The regime used 25 T-72 tanks, armored attack vehicles, and support helicopters. Rebel coordination, on the other hand, was weak. The regime then continued its offensives towards Aleppo, Base 80 and the 105 Isabel Nassief, The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo, Middle East Security Report, 17, ISW, January 2014, p Ibid, p. 25. Cahier du RETEX Research March

56 Chapter IV Assad s new strategy: ethnic cleansing and civil war road between as-safira and Nayrab military base. The offensive was primarily designed to isolate rebel-held areas, secure supply lines and air and military bases. A barrel-bombing campaign (explosives and shrapnel mostly delivered by Mi-8 and Mi-7 helicopters) targeting Aleppo began in mid-december 2013, in order to clear the civilian population from the city. Soon afterwards, the regime took complete control over the Naqqarin, Zarsour, Taaneh and Subeihieh areas. 107 Now capable of simultaneously fighting on several fronts, at the beginning of 2014, the regime continued its efforts in the area of the Qalamoun Mountains, south of Homs. Capturing Yabroud marked the success of this campaign, thanks to the heavy commitment of the Lebanese Hezbollah. The battle for Homs was finally won by Assad in May The regime s progress, however, has some limitations: it remains dependent on Hezbollah in many areas, raising the issue of which objectives to pursue, as Hezbollah is in a position to impose its views on the regime based on its own interests. Moreover, the regime has proved unable to retake Aleppo and northern Syria largely remains in rebel hands. 107 Ibid, p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

57 CHAPTER V THE SECOND REVOLUTION : THE SURGE OF JIHADIST GROUPS AND THE FRACTURE OF THE REBELLION Already plagued by multiple divisions, the Syrian rebellion has gradually had to face the rise of jihadist groups. They are, for the most part, better armed and better trained, having spotted the opportunity during the Syrian conflict to make a lasting mark in the Middle East. From 2013, the FSA, which had no more than 15,000 troops in 2014, was supplanted by Islamist groups, now the largest and most active part of the rebellion. They include, at the forefront, Ahrar al- Sham (20,000 fighters), the al-tawhid Brigade (12,000 fighters), and Jaysh al-islam (15,000 fighters). They face competition from fast-expanding jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The future of the rebel groups in Syria, however, is far from certain because they enjoy very little popular support. Elizabeth O Bagy, On the Front Lines of Syria s Civil War, The Wall Street Journal, 30 August, V.1 AN EMERGING JIHADIST REBELLION V.1.1 The increased number of jihadist groups in Syria Ahrar al-sham near Damascus in 2013 The first jihadist groups appeared on the Turkish- Syrian border right at the beginning of the uprising in March Their number then increased rapidly. Indeed, several factors combine to these groups Cahier du RETEX Research March

58 Chapter V The second revolution : the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion benefit. Historically, the regime has lent support to terrorism (Syria has been on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1979), primarily providing them with strong logistical networks, operational experience, and a detailed inside knowledge of Syria s security and intelligence agencies. The Assad regime has mainly supported Palestinian movements such as al-saiqa (1966), the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Hamas, mainly to put pressure on Israel. Ties were also maintained with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to put pressure on Turkey and Iraq. More recently, the Syrian regime provided support to foreign fighters in Iraq during the 2003 Iraqi insurgency. In the same vein, in February 2012, the regime released Abu Musab al-suri, an important jihadist ideologue and a top al-qaeda operative. As the alleged mastermind of the 2005 London Bombings, he had been in Syrian custody. Dozens of other known militants were also released. 108 These groups then had a large stock of weapons received from the Syrian Army in the previous decades. In February 2012, al-zawahiri, the current al-qaeda leader, called upon every Muslim and every honorable and free person in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to go to Syria. Assad s strategy then became clearer: fostering the emergence of jihadist groups within the rebellion to divide it while also deterring the Western powers from intervening in Syria. Doing so has also galvanized Assad s support base. The Christian and Alawi communities massively rallied to the regime against the jihadist threat. Finally, this was also intended to discourage the Sunni middle and upper classes from joining the rebellion. 108 Elizabeth O Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Middle East Security Report, 6, Institute for the Study of War, September 2012, p Ibid, p. 19. Most rebels are practicing Sunni Muslims, who tend to be more conservative to the north of the country. Many are fighting for the Syrian nation as revolutionaries and could be classified as religious-nationalists. 109 Although they are inspired by Islam, they are also fighting for Syria. They make up the bulk of the FSA battalions. They are different from the Salafists and jihadists. Islamism covers a wide spectrum, denoting the political manifestation of Islam, as this should drive politics and serve as the foundation of society. Islamists generally believe that modern democratic institutions are compatible with Islam. As an example, the FSA promotes a secular and democratic agenda, but many of its battalions are Islamist, such as Suqour al-sham in Jebel al-zawiyah, in northern Syria, or the Umma Brigade. Salafism is a Sunni school of jurisprudence which refers to the Salaf, the earliest Muslim community in history. Shiites and Alawites are considered enemy sects which must be fought. According to Salafism, the Sunnah, which includes the Quran and the Hadiths (the collected teachings and practices of the Prophet) provides sufficient guidance for establishing governance and a social framework. The Salafists reject democracy and the concept of statehood and seek to establish an Islamic caliphate that would encompass the entire Umma, or Muslim community. The Arab Springs led some Salafists to consider taking part in free elections in Tunisia and Egypt, creating an internal division between the Salafi- Islahi (reformists) and Salafi-Jihadi, who refuse voter participation and are now a minority. They are the ones using violent means in Syria and elsewhere. V.1.2 The jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war Until April 2013, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, along with the FSA, were trying to form alliances with the jihadists in the fight shared against Assad. At that point, violent fighting between jihadists and Kurds broke out, including in Ras al-ayn, near the Turkish border, and around the oil fields in the Hasakah province. The fact that the FSA then relied on a number of units with conservative Islamic tendencies did not aid in the conduct of a clear and unified strategy towards jihadist groups; in fact it counted as another factor favoring their growing influence. In summer 2013, the number of jihadist fighters in Syria was estimated at 6,000. By May 2014, there could have been as many as 10,000. Most were trained in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Jihadist groups quickly managed to form alliances and coalitions to increase their influence. Led by Hassan 58 Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

59 Chapter V The second revolution : the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion Aboud, Ahrar al-sham ( The Free Men of the Levant ) was established by prisoners who had been released by the regime. Ahrar al-sham allegedly counted between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters in This movement has proved highly effective in the provinces of Idlib, Hama, al-raqqah and Aleppo and forms the main component of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). Created in December 2012, the SIF is made up of around ten Salafist brigades, demonstrating how jihadist and Islamist groups are willing and able to get organized. The case of Ahrar ash-sham demonstrated that it is possible to be a member of the SIF and cooperate with the FSA. 110 More violent and more conservative, the al-qaedaaffiliated Jabhat al-nusra ( the Front of Victory ) is the most powerful jihadist group in eastern and northwestern Syria. Counting between 5,000 and 8,000 fighters, it receives weaponry from the Gulf countries. Jabhat al-nusra first appeared in January It stands out from other jihadist groups in that it efficiently runs the areas it controls. Boasting a humanitarian branch, Qasim al-ighata, it strives to provide aid to the population. As such, it is one of the few jihadist groups to enjoy some popularity, although this has been undermined by its coercive enforcement of Sharia law. Abu Mohammed al-golani s movement achieved a significant milestone on 9 May, 2012 when it launched a bomb attack against military intelligence buildings in Damascus, killing 55 people. Jabhat al-nusra does not resort to suicide bombings but instead uses car bombs in urban centers. Some aspects of its combat tactics are directly inherited from the regime s Mukhabarat, a legacy of its past allegiances. 111 Al-Qaeda, whose direct involvement in Syria has often been exaggerated, also relies on a network of smaller units including elements of al-qaeda in Iraq, Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Fatah al-islam and the Jordanian groups, providing them with operational support, trainers and bomb makers. ISIL in the area of Azaz The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) first appeared in January Following an attempt to merge with Jabhat al-nusra, an offer which was refused in April 2013, ISIL asserted its rights, seizing control of the capital of al-raqqah province, where it began to establish a state within a state. Abundant funds allow it to provide transportation, public and social services, as well as the production and distribution of bread. 112 ISIL then garnered support from tribes that had not been known for religious extremism, such as the Afadila tribe, who had been longstanding supporters of the regime. 113 ISIL was able to count on support from the Muhajirin wa-ansar forces, mainly made up of Chechens and North-Caucasians, from May This support played a part in ISIL taking control of Minnagh military airport in August 2013 and defeating the 66 th Brigade in Hama Province in September In June 2014, ISIL controlled large areas in northeastern Syria and remains known for its violence. It lacks the population s support, especially given that it demands payment of a protection tax in the areas under its control. ISIL counts 10,000 mostly foreign fighters, who are often seasoned veterans of Iraq and Syria and seem to enjoy a certain protection from Bashar al-assad. This is especially the case in al-raqqah, enabling Bashar al-assad to heighten tensions within the rebellion and fuel the jihadist threat, as this fits his agenda. 114 Besides, the increased number of Western hostages taken by ISIL has led to indepen- 110 Barah Mikaïl, Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie : une réalité aux déterminants multiples, Moyen-Orient, Numéro spécial Djihad. Du Coran à la guerre en Syrie, October-December 2013, n 20, p Elizabeth O Bagy, Jihad in Syria, art. cit., p Stéphane Mantoux, Bas les masques. Ce qui se joue derrière le combat contre l EIIL en Syrie, Histricoblog.fr, accessed 7 January, Ibid. 114 Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Baghdadi, l émir djihadiste dont la tête est mise à prix, Rue89.fr, Les Blogs, accessed on 23 April, Cahier du RETEX Research March

60 Chapter V The second revolution : the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion dent observers deserting combat zones, thereby leaving Assad in sole charge of information. As such, ISIL benefits from many factors favoring its rise and that have quickly resulted in clashes with other rebel groups. ISIL s breakthrough came in June 2014, as it became the Islamic State in Iraq, showing the fighting power of the movement. Early in July 2014, its leader, al-baghdadi, proclaimed himself Caliph, or leader of all Muslims, controlling vast territories in northeastern Syria and northern Iraq, including Mosul. The other main jihadist groups are Liwa al-haqq, engaged in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Homs and a member of the SIF, and Liwa al-islam, engaged in the Damascus area, which has ties to Jabhat al- Nusra and is also a member of the SIF. Finally, groups that are members of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) are distinct from the groups that are members of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF): supporters of a more moderate Islam who maintain stronger ties to the FSA and the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups include the al-farouq Brigades (15,000 fighters), which operated in Baba Amr and Homs in 2012; the al-tawhid Brigade (12,000 fighters), which set itself apart during the battles of Aleppo in August 2012 and al-qusayr in June 2013; Suqour al-sham (6,000 fighters), committed in the regions of Aleppo and Idlib; Liwa al-umma (6,000 fighters), controlled by the FSA and mostly made up of Libyans; and the al-fatah Brigade. 115 V.1.3 An unprecedented influx of foreign fighters The importance of the part played by foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict is unprecedented. Different categories should be listed. Many are young revolutionaries from the region looking to extend the Arab Estimated number of rebel foreign fighters (end of 2013) France 700 Saudi Arabia 600 to 1,000 Morocco 77 to 91 Kosovo 4 to 150 Germany 200 Tunisia 800 to 1,000 Kuwait 54 to 71 Ireland 11 to 26 United Kingdom 200 to 300 Lebanon 65 to 890 Afghanistan 12 to 23 Albania 9 to 140 Belgium 100 to 300 Libya 336 to 556 Qatar 15 Finland 4 to 20 Spain 51 Turkey 63 to 500 Bahrain 12 Australia 23 to 205 Denmark 65 Egypt 120 to 360 Oman 1 Canada 9 to 100 Bosnia 60 Pakistan 7 to 330 United Arab Emirates 14 United States 17 to 60 Austria 57 Algeria 70 to 120 Israel 15 to 20 Russia 40 to 600 Netherlands 50 to 100 Palestinian Territories 74 to 114 Iran 3 Macedonia 3 to 20 Italy 45 to 50 Yemen 15 to 110 Mauritania 2 Kazakhstan 14 to 150 Norway 30 to 40 Somalia 6 to 68 Bulgaria 1 Kyrgyzstan 9 to 30 Sweden 30 to 40 Iraq 60 to 250 Luxembourg 1 China 6 to 100 Jordan 2,000 Sudan 2 to 100 Switzerland 1 to 8 Serbia 3 Source: Stéphane Mantoux, Et combattez-les jusqu à ce qu il ne subsiste plus d association, et que la religion soit entièrement à Allah. Un portrait des combattants étrangers de l insurrection en Syrie, Historicoblog.fr, 19 December, Barah Mikaïl, Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie, art. cit., p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

61 Chapter V The second revolution : the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion Spring to their Syrian neighbors; others are fighting for Islam, considering it their religious duty to protect their Muslim brothers in Syria, but not seeking to destroy Syrian society. This is the case of the Umma Brigade, led by the Libyan-Irish fighter Mahdi al- Harati, a supporter of the democratic process. 116 Finally, many foreigners are Salafi-jihadists, grouped under ISIL (composed of 70% of foreigners), the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and other Jordanian groups. While most fighters are from Libya, Tunisia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 17% of the jihadists in Syria in the summer of 2013 came from outside the Arab world. It is rare to see groups where Syrians fight alongside foreigners, since Syrians are generally reluctant to see foreigners interfere in their revolution and often consider them to be spies. When they are associated, it means that there was no other choice. Apart from the veterans of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Yemen and Libya, most foreign fighters have little combat experience and first go through training camps. They hold relatively junior positions. Of note, Ansar al-sharia has set up training camps in Libya. These fighters have helped strengthen the most radical factions of the insurgency, but have also revitalized the radical communities in their country of origin. The fact that they are likely to return home is of major concern to several governments. Access to Syria is facilitated by certain states lending their support to the Syrian rebellion; they are thus reluctant to regulate the flow of fighters. On the other hand, the rebels control most of the Turkish-Syrian border and can easily help foreign volunteers pass through, with Turkey s complicity. This goes some way to explain the fact that the number of European volunteers tripled between June 2013 and January V.2 THE SYRIAN INSURGENCY AGAINST JIHADIST GROUPS: COMBAT OPERATIONS AND COALITIONS Although certain alliances exist between the rebels fighting for a democratic transition, the Islamists and the jihadists, tensions run very high between the different movements and a lot of fighting has already taken place. As early as summer 2013, after breaking with Jabhat al-nusra, ISIL encroached upon other movements territories in northeastern Syria. In September 2013, it took control of the border post of Azaz and the number of skirmishes rose. The Syrian Islamic Front, which includes seven of the major armed groups such as Ahrar al-sham, the al- Tawhid Brigade (very involved in Aleppo) and Jaysh al- Islam (very engaged in Damascus and openly opposed to ISIL), rapidly clashed head-on with ISIL. Clashes also took place between ISIL and Jabhat al- Nusra. Fighting with Ahrar al-sham was especially deadly in the town of Maksana, east of Aleppo. 118 Since January 2014, the fight against ISIL has mainly been led by the Syria Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and the Army of Mujahedeen. The SRF was created on 9 December, 2013, by merging 14 mostly local groups and former powerful entities such as the Farouq Battalions. It claims to have 10 to 15,000 fighters, partly issued from the Military Council of Idlib. The Army of Mujahedeen, created early in January 2014, includes eight armed groups, i.e. 6 to 8,000 fighters. This movement was explicitly formed to prevent ISIL from taking over northern Syria. It declared war on ISIL from its inception, rapidly gaining support from the Syrian Islamic Front. On 13 January, 2013, after ten days of fighting, ISIL had lost many strongholds in the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib but still held onto the province of al-raqqah. ISIL retook the villages of Haritan and Basraton, among others. The death toll was said to stand at 700 people, mainly due to suicide and ISIL-conducted attacks Elizabeth O Bagy, Jihad in Syria, art. cit., p Stéphane Mantoux, Et combattez-les jusqu à ce qu il ne subsiste plus d association, et que la religion soit entièrement à Allah. Un portrait des combattants étrangers de l insurrection en Syrie, Historicoblog.fr, accessed 19 December, Stéphane Mantoux, Bas les masques, art. cit. 119 Ibid. Cahier du RETEX Research March

62 Chapter V The second revolution : the surge of jihadist groups and the fracture of the rebellion For its part, Jabhat al-nusra condemned ISIL choices prior to the fighting. Nonetheless, its attitude towards ISIL can vary depending on its local components and between becoming involved in the fighting (al-raqqah) and providing tacit support to ISIL (Aleppo). The situation has not quite reached a second revolution in which rebels are consistently united against ISIL. ISIL still controls many strongholds and is far from defeated. However, the movement was weakened by the departure of the predominantly Chechen Shishani group, following combat operations. Finally, it should be noted that the renewed fighting between late 2013 and early 2014 was linked to the Geneva II Conference on Syria, held on 21 January, In fact, the Syrian opposition wanted to prevent the regime from using the jihadist threat in the country as an argument. The various alliances and oppositions are therefore not clearly defined. The FSA command in Turkey is trying to distance itself from Salafi groups, but alliances are being formed on the ground, particularly in northern Syria. Indeed, FSA-affiliated groups are looking to benefit from these groups which are often better equipped and better trained, as well as being effective and keeping a low profile. For instance, FSA groups became allies with Ahrar al-sham and sometimes Jabhat al-nusra, which attempts to appear as moderate. The FSA refuses, however, to join the Mujahedeen in Syria, a group of Salafijihadists. Alliances between Salafist groups are also forged. For example, the Muhajirin wa-ansar group led a combined operation with ISIL, al-nusra and Ahrar al-sham against the YPG Kurdish militias. First and foremost, this division in the Syrian rebellion serves Assad s strategy, as the jihadist threat fuels his propaganda and weakens the opposition. Nonetheless, these jihadist groups have become powerful and remain well established in Syria. As such, they are a major enemy for the regime unless, as some analysts claim, Assad has reached a lasting agreement with these groups over the partition of Syria. V.3 OUTLOOK: WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR JIHADISTS IN SYRIA? Syria does not have a jihadist tradition. Memories of the violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 are still raw, and the population appears unwilling to support an Islamicization of society. Even if they secure victory against the Assad regime, Islamist and Salafist groups will struggle to build up solid grassroots support. The establishment of an Islamic Caliphate must simply be ruled out. Should the regime hold onto power, which now looks likely, the future of these groups will be difficult: they are likely to experience violent repression. However, with the jihadists scattered throughout the so-called liberated zones, they will prove very difficult to eradicate. During these years of war, these groups have brought Salafist and jihadist radicalism into stark relief in Syria. Whatever the outcome, society will bear the scars. This is an issue raised, for example, by areas destroyed by fighting, especially the city of Homs. With resettlement could come religious radicalization, building on the anger and frustration of the population. 120 Syria s talibanization seems unlikely, but an increased communitarization, with informal social and sectarian lines, is a realistic assumption for the future of the country. 121 In any case, Syria will have to address an economy in tatters that is already marked by an industry left weakened by war, poverty affecting half of the population, as well as an unprecedented structural unemployment. 120 Barah Mikaïl, Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie : une réalité aux déterminants multiples, Revue Moyen-Orient, Djihad. Du Coran à la guerre en Syrie, October-December 2013, Number 20, p Mikaïl Barah, Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie, art. cit., p Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

63 CONCLUSION Since its beginning in 2011, the Syrian civil war has killed 150,000 people in three years. It is primarily a humanitarian disaster, although it also shows how complex it is, for a government, to carry out a strategy of counterinsurgency on its own territory. The Syrian conflict is also an opportunity to once again observe the frail geopolitical balance in the Near and Middle East regions In 2011, the Syrian regime was close to defeat. Since then, it has been able to remain in power by using all available means and demonstrating how it can adapt to an extreme situation for which it was unprepared. After his victory in Homs, Bashar al-assad even seemed ready to take over most of Syria again. His willingness to hold presidential elections in June 2014 pointed to a return to normality, as did the general amnesty on 9 June 2014, which, as it applied to those prosecuted for terrorism, was the broadest since the conflict began. However, neither this false leniency nor his worthless landslide victory at the polls should mean that the huge challenges still facing the Syrian dictatorship can be overlooked. Indeed, at the time of writing in summer 2014, Aleppo, Syria s business capital, is still resisting and northeastern Syria is in the hands of powerful rebel groups. The most dominant of these are the Islamist and jihadist groups, such as the Islamic State led by Abu Bakr al-baghdadi, which also controls part of northern Iraq. Sunni jihadism is taking hold in Syria, recalling how al-qaeda was established in Iraq in the wake of the 2003 American intervention. War unleashes fanaticism; it exploits the misery and injustice experienced by victims of conflicts. This is where the essence and the rationale of doctrine lie: preventing and responding to conflicts as effectively as possible. By doing so, we defend and advocate an approach to people and peace. Cahier du RETEX Research March

64

65 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Xavier Baron, Aux origines du drame syrien , Paris, Tallandier, Souhaïl Belhadj, La Syrie de Bashar el-asad. Anatomie d un régime autoritaire, Belin, Paris, Baudouin Dupret, Zouhair Ghazzal, Youssef Courbage, Mohammed al-dbiyat, La Syrie au présent. Reflets d une société, Arles, Actes Sud, Sindbad, Hugues Esquerre, Dans la tête des insurgés, Éditions du Rocher, Collection Lignes de feu, 8 November, Barah Mikaïl, La Syrie en 50 mots clés, Comprendre le Moyen-Orient, L Harmattan, Paris, Newspaper articles Fabrice Balanche, Comment les inégalités sociales et spatiales alimentent la révolte anti-assad, L Orient Le Jour, 25 November, Maher el-assad, le bras armé du régime syrien, Le Figaro, 1 March, Interventions en Syrie : que valent les défenses militaires de Bachar el-assad?, Jeune Afrique Blog Défense, 30 August, Interview with Thomas Pierret, Conflit syrien: quelle morphologie des forces insurgées?, DSI, n 94, July-August C.R., Le cavalier seul des Kurdes en Syrie, Orient XXI, 27 March, Joseph Hoyakem, Radioscopie de la crise syrienne (¾). Les Forces en présence, Tribune n 257, Revue de Défense Nationale. Romain Mielcarek, Armes, médicaments, argent : qui livre quoi à Damas ou aux rebelles?, RFI, 29 September, Hospitals are a high-value target, The Wolrd Today, October&November Alexandra Geneste, Syrie, L ONU confirme l utilisation d armes chimiques dans cinq sites, Le Monde, 13 December, Stéphane Mantoux, This is Syria. L armée syrienne, Alliance Géostratégique, 12 September, Christophe Rauzy, Les Chabbiha, miliciens de la sale guerre en Syrie, Francetvinfo.fr, 27 July, Georges Malbrunot, Le Hezbollah en sauveur d Assad, Le Figaro, Tuesday, 21 January, Cahier du RETEX Research March

66 Bibliographie Interview with Amal Saad Ghorayeb. Le Hezbollah : résistance, idéologie, politique, Confluences Méditerranée, 2007/2, n 61. Hala Kodmani, Syrie : les chabbiha, ces hors-la-loi qui font la loi, Libération, 27 September, Syrie : morts en près de trois ans, Lefigaro.fr avec Reuters, 1 April, Barah Mikaïl, Djihadisme et salafisme en Syrie : une réalité aux déterminants multiples, Revue Moyen-Orient, numéro spécial Djihad. Du Coran à la guerre en Syrie, October-December 2013, n 20. Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Baghdadi, l émir djihadiste dont la tête est mise à prix, Rue89.fr, Les Blogs, 23 April, Specialized publications Wladimir Glasman, Les ressources sécuritaires du régime en Syrie, Institut de Recherche et d Études sur les Monde Arabe et Musulman, (IREMAM), 19 January, CIA, World Factbook. Joseph Holliday, The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle, Institute for the Study of War, February Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime. From Counterinsurgency To Civil War, Middle Est Security Report,8, Institute for the Study of War, March Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, AEI s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War, May Corentin Brustlein, Étienne de Durand, Guillaume Garnier, Marc Hecker, Élie Tenenbaum, Syrie : l option militaire reste-t-elle ouverte? Note de l Ifri, September Valérie Szybala, Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for Syria s Capital, Middle East Security Report, 16, Institute for the Study of War, January Isabel Nassief et Valérie Szybala, The Starvation until Submission Campaign, Syria Updates, Institute for the Study of War, 7 February, Valérie Szybala, Assad Strikes Damascus. The Battle for Syria s Capital, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, No. 16, January Isabel Nassief, Hezbollah and the Fight for Control in Qalamoun, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 26 November, Isabel Nassief, The campaign for Homs and Aleppo, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, No.17, January Christopher Harmer, Russian Naval Base Tartus, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War, 31 July, Elizabeth O Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, No. 9, March Elizabeth O Bagy, Jihad in Syria, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, No. 6, September Cahier du RETEX Research March 2015

67 Bibliographie Stéphane Mantoux, L armée syrienne. (2/2) Dans la guerre civile ( ), Lettre du RETEX- Recherche, n 1, 20 September, Stéphane Mantoux, La guerre civile syrienne : interview de Tom Cooper, lautrecotedelacolline. blogspot.fr, 10 December, Stéphane Mantoux, La bataille d Al-Qusayr (15 mai-5 juin 2013), Historicoblog.com, 21 November, Stéphane Mantoux, Bas les masques. Ce qui se joue derrière le combat contre l EIIL en Syrie, Historicoblog.fr, 7 January, Stéphane Mantoux, Et combattez-les jusqu à ce qu il ne subsiste plus d association, et que la religion soit entièrement à Allah. Un portrait des combattants étrangers de l insurrection en Syrie, Historicoblog.fr, 19 December, Chars et antichars en Syrie. 5 e partie : Les blindés, Focus hebdomadaire, EM9/BIMa/BRRI. Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency, German Army Office, Division I - Army Development, Cologne, June Enseignements des opérations des dernières campagnes, 3 e bureau de l état-major de l Armée, Ministère de la guerre, Paris, October Guillaume Rolland et Antonin Tisseron, L emploi des hélicoptères en contre-insurrection. Quels enjeux pour quelles menaces? Cahier de la Recherche Doctrinale, Centre de Doctrine d Emploi des Forces, 2012 (online on the CDEF website, anciennes publications ). Programme chimique syrien. Cas d emploi passés d agents chimiques par le régime. Attaque chimique conduite par le régime le 21 août 2013, Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié, 2 September, Cahier du RETEX Research March

68

69

70

71 Directeur de la publication : Général de Division Antoine WINDECK CDEF - 1 place Joffre Case PARIS SP 07 Téléphone du secrétariat : Fax du secrétariat : Rédacteur en chef : Colonel Lionel JEAND HEUR, commandant la division Recherche et Retour d expérience. Téléphone : Éditeur rédactionnel : Capitaine Soraya AOUATI Traducteur : Lieutenant-colonel (R) Rémy REVENANT Réviseur : Lieutenant-colonel Aleksandar STEFANOVIC, Mlle Emma PHILLIPS Crédits photos (Couverture) : Reuters Maquettage : Sonia RIVIÈRE/CDEF/DAD/PUB Infographie (Couverture) : Nanci FAUQUET/CDEF/COM Impression - Routage : EDIACA - 76 rue de la Talaudière - CS SAINT-ÉTIENNE CEDEX 1 Téléphone : ou Tirage : 1121 exemplaires Diffusion : CDEF/DAD/PUB. Téléphone : Dépôt légal : ISBN (Version imprimée) Mars 2015 ISBN (Version électronique) Mars 2015 ISSN de la collection Cahier du RETEX La version électronique de ce document est en ligne sur les sites Intradef et Internet du CDEF à l adresse htpp://

72