CENS Distinguished Visitor Programme. Seminar Series by Professor Farhad Khosrokhavar

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1 CENS Distinguished Visitor Programme Seminar Series by Professor Farhad Khosrokhavar Is Global Jihadism a Spent Force? (5 November 2013) Radicalisation in French Prisons (7 November 2013) The Future of the Arab Spring and the Geopolitical Implications (8 November 2013) The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs. Address: Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore Tel No: cens@ntu.edu.sg Website:

2 About Professor Farhad Khosrokhavar Professor Farhad (Cavard) Khosrokhavar is Director of Studies at the EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) and researcher at the CADIS-EHES (Centre for Sociological Analysis and Intervention-EHESS). Farhad Khosrokhavar is Professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Cadis, Paris (France) since He was previously associate professor at EHESS-Cadis ( ) and Rockefeller Fellow ( ). His research interests include political sociology, sociology of religion, contemporary Islam, Iran. His research focuses on the sociology of contemporary Iran, the social and anthropological issues of Islam in France but also the philosophy of the social sciences. The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs. Address: Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore Tel No: cens@ntu.edu.sg Website:

3 Is Global Jihadism a Spent Force? 5 November 2013 Farhad Khosrokhavar started the seminar with a forecast of how jihadism would continue to pose a credible threat over the next ten years. He argued that global jihadism was not a spent force; rather it had found new impetus in the wake of the failure of the recent Arab revolutions to entrench political reforms. Khosrokhavar framed jihadism as the ideology that had motivated an international terrorist movement. Various iterations of the movement could be found in conflict areas around the world; jihadism had an ability to find resonance in a wide variety of localities as the narratives could fit into pre-existing conflicts. A key characteristic of jihadism was how it combined aspects from the extreme left and extreme right of the political spectrum. Muslim extremists, for instance, use the narratives of world arrogance usually found in Marxist thought alongside with the patriarchal worldview of right-wing nationalist discourse. As a social movement, jihadism went through six phases of development. The first period, Qotbism codified a revolutionary discourse that owed its origins to the Muslim Brotherhood. Specifically, the book Milestones set the stage for both Sunni and Shiite revolutionaries to emerge. The second period of jihadism saw the prominence of the Shiite groups, owing to the events of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This Iranian-Shiite jihadism period introduced the concept of martyrdom as a key facet of revolutionary Islam. The third phase, the Afghan period, saw the emergence of defensive jihad. Alongside the emergence of theological leaders, the period was also marked by practical jihad as mujahideen from various countries around the world converged to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. For Khosrokhavar, the apogee of jihadism was in the immediate post-9/11 period. The attacks on America provided impetus and a symbolic victory for extremists worldwide. 9/11 exemplified the type of devastating attack that would offset the decades of perceived powerlessness of Muslims against the purportedly arrogant West. This period also led to the globalisation of jihad and inspired the emergence of Al Qaeda franchises. What followed though was a period of fragmentation. Jihadists under the assault of security and intelligence operations reorganised into a leaderless movement, with small autonomous cells launching their attacks. Khosrokhavar described this period as the time of amateurish jihad. Contrary to threat assessments of the ability of lone actor terrorists, Khosrokhavar pointed out that violent acts required practical capability (i.e. bomb-making skills) that online jihadist resources could only partly fulfil. The sixth and final period, which Khosrokhavar described as a watershed event, was the Arab revolutions. Initially, the fall of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was met with optimism discrediting the jihadist notion that only violence could lead to political change. However, the failure of successor governments in the wake of the uprisings had led to the ascendance of jihadists, as exemplified in three archetypes. First, jihadists had become entrenched in failed states like Yemen and Libya. In the latter, the Libyan state had descended into disparate factions and a general tendency towards 3

4 warlordism. That had emboldened militants in the broader MENA region as weapons from the Gaddafi s Libyan regime had fallen into the hands of jihadist groups. The second archetype was exemplified by the Syrian conflict, with a strong regime locked into a protracted civil war. Khosrokhavar stressed that Syria had the makings of becoming this generation s Afghanistan, where extremists were provided a venue to learn how to fight. Coming home, these fighters would likely infuse professionalism and military capability to the amateur jihadists of the previous decade. Finally, Khosrokhavar pointed to the recent takeover of the military in Egypt as the re-emergence of new authoritarianism in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. Khosrokhavar then spoke about overarching trends that had shaped the development of jihadism. Farhad argued that the Arab revolutions had a paradoxical effect of weakening jihadists in the interim but letting them emerge stronger. Khosrokhavar also remarked on the Africanisation of jihad, as seen in Mali, where jihadists had been able to leverage upon the tensions between the minority Tuareg and the Malian state. Khosrokhavar also forecasted greater challenges for European state as deepening economic disparities and intercultural tensions among immigrant populations provided fertile ground for violent extremism. Discussion To a question regarding the current relevance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it was pointed out it was the very failure of the Morsi regime to deliver on the promises of the revolution and bring about tangible improvements to the everyday concerns of the masses that had caused the Brotherhood to fall. It was also pointed out that instability in Egypt opened the possibility for more conservative Islamic educational institutions such as those based in Saudi Arabia to gain more prominence at the expense of the Cairo-based Al Azhar University. There were also discussions about which states could help champion the cause of moderate Islam. While the United States had the necessary global reach to lead such an initiative, it was deemed counterproductive owing to prevailing perceptions of Washington s pro-israel policies. Instead of falling into the trap of promoting government-sponsored Islam, states should focus its attention on grassroots initiatives. Bottom-up approaches led by actors from civil society and non-government organisations would have greater legitimacy and would foster more impactful initiatives to promote moderate Islam. Finally, it was reiterated that Internet-induced jihadism had been overestimated. Jihadists schooled solely through online networks tended to be amateurish. While not totally discounting the role of social media and the Internet in radicalisation, it was also recommended that governments also focus on the other aspects driving jihadism. That would include looking at the anthropological and historical factors that had lead to terrorism. 4

5 Radicalisation in French Prisons 7 November 2013 Professor Farhad Khosrokhvar shared with the audience some research findings on radicalisation in French prisons. The research was conducted over two different periods: the first between 2000 and 2004, and the second, between 2011 and He addressed three key trends related to radicalisation: (i) how prison-specific factors could facilitate radicalisation among inmates; (ii) how broader sociological factors in Europe could play contributory roles in the radicalisation of Muslim inmates; and (iii) how patterns of in-prison radicalisation (as observed from his first round research and his second) were changing over time. In the case of French prisons, there were at least two prison-specific factors that facilitated radicalisation. First of all, the fact that Muslims constituted the majority of prison inmates made for prisons to be a strategic location for jihadi recruitment. Secondly, the physical architecture of the prison could also facilitate radicalisation. For instance, the dark corners of prison facilities that could not be reached by CCTV made for perfect spots for radicalisation activities. Further, the availability of places to socialise such as the libraries and sport facilities could also ease extremists gatherings and communications. In addition to in-prison factors, frustration also served as a key driver of radicalisation in general. Khosrokhavar explained that European Muslims suffered from two kinds of frustration: general and religious frustration. The source of general frustration lied in their sense of a torn identity and self-victimisation. North African immigrants in France provided a typical example of a torn identity phenomenon. In France, they were labelled dirty Arabs while their native society called them dirty French. The lack of positive identity and denial of dignity subsequently created a sense of self-victimisation a feeling that society had rejected them and left them with no choice but to resort to total aggressiveness. Hence the end result was the internalisation of violence among European Muslim immigrants. Religious frustration stemmed from the apparent clash between Islamic religious logic and French logic of secularism (laïcité). Such manifested in, for example, the issue over the veil. To some French Muslims, total veiling was framed as a means to protect women in the public sphere. But French secularism dictated that religious symbol was only allowed in the private sphere, hence the banning of the Islamic veil in public. Such policy had been perceived by some French Muslims as intolerance and thus pushed them further towards radicalisation. Khosrokhavar then pointed out the changing patterns of in-prison radicalisation. In the first period of his research, he found a close relationship between fundamentalism and jihadism. Khosrokhvar differentiated between fundamentalists i.e., individuals who believed in the literal interpretation of religion and jihadists i.e., individuals who believed in the literal interpretation of religion and justify the use of violence in the name of religion. While not all fundamentalists were jihadists, those inmates who had been radicalised into becoming jihadists used to overtly appear like the fundamentalists in the ways of dressing and religiosity. They also tended to show aggressive attitude towards the authorities in an attempt to attract sympathisers. In the second period of his research however, Khosrokhavar found 5

6 that the jihadists tended to scale back on overtly expressing themselves as the fundamentalists would in order to avoid being identified by the authorities. In addition, while previous cases of in-prison radicalisation occurred in large groups, small groups made up of two to three individuals were becoming more prevalent. This was because small groups supposedly attracted less attention from the authorities compared to large groups. These news patterns should be taken into consideration when developing effective ways to identify possible high-risk individuals in prisons. First of all, the profiling system needed an update as it currently would still confuse the fundamentalists and the jihadists. Secondly, it should also take into account that psychological abnormality was becoming increasingly common in small group settings. While psychologically unstable individuals were often excluded from larger groups due to their perceived inefficiency, they could become more actively involved in small groups. Discussion An audience member asked whether the banning of the use of the veil in public in France stemmed from French society s misunderstanding or disapproval of veil. The opinion was that both had played a role. On one hand, French society misunderstood the veil as a form of patriarchal symbol and denial of individuality despite the fact that many Muslim women don the veil voluntarily. French society s disapproval of the veil, on the other hand, was linked to their apprehension regarding the wearer s citizenship loyalties. More specifically related to inmate radicalisation, another audience member asked whether separate or communal cells were better in preventing radicalisation. In response, it was explained that acknowledging and recognising the dignity of the inmates was a key principle in such cases. Overcrowding, for instance, could lead to frustration, and thus the tendency to become radicalised. The provision of individual cells that respected an inmate s dignity was a way to prevent radicalisation. 6

7 The Future of the Arab Spring and the Geopolitical Implications 8 November 2013 Professor Farhad Khosrokhavar began by noting some key ideas he had expounded in his book The New Arab Revolutions That Shook the World (2012). He posited that revolutions in the Arab world were a result of major changes that occurred in the last three decades. These changes included: (i) unsettling economic changes which had put into question the authoritarian bureaucratic system and token economic liberalisation that prevailed in the Arab world; (ii) an increase in education standards, particularly among females; and (iii) the new prominence of social activists and street-based revolutions that had received a boost from emerging online and social media platforms. Erstwhile models of revolutions in the Arab world included the failed authoritarian nationalistic model by Egypt s Gamal Abdel Nasser as well as social movements based on Islamic radicalism, a movement that was considerably successful with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. That said, although Islamic radicalism possessed some form of political legitimacy, its public achievements had been rather meagre. The current wave of secular revolution, however, finds its root in the Quran. Based on the notion of karam, i.e. dignity, it held that God had bestowed dignity unto men so that they could become his agents on earth. As such, for the first time, Arab youths could protest against the establishment with dignity and without feeling like they had been intoxicated by foreign Western ideals or values. Unfortunately, the Arab Spring aftermath had seen endless protests and social movements, the re-emergence of authoritarian regimes in new guises, the outbreak of civil wars like in Syria, and failed states like Yemen. Still, there remained room for cautious optimism. Khosrokhavar compared the Arab Spring to the European revolutions of 1848 and argued that time was ultimately needed for the many problems to be ironed out. The key development of the current revolution was a notion of individual dignity that no longer ran counter to the idea of Islam-ness, and of that identity vis-à-vis modernity. Additionally, with the rise of online and social media, Arab regimes could no longer disregard how the youths were becoming increasingly conscious of their rights as citizens. These trends would only mean more change in the future. Discussion There was a discussion regarding the continued significance of ideology in sustaining the Arab revolution in light of the fact that notions of civil society, embracing diversity and power sharing had hardly been part of Arab cultural history. However, given that there was no such thing as an essentialised Arab culture, what was crucial would be the adoption and/or practice of what would be politically most appropriate across different contexts. It was also pointed out that a sense of fighting fatigue would one day creep in and everyone would come to the realisation that the Other would exist regardless. That would help pave the way towards tolerance and co-existence. 7

8 Further discussions regarding cultural revolutions taking place alongside broader political reforms saw to opinions that Saudi women demands for driving rights meant that positive changes were on the horizon. Such changes were not merely supported by Western countries but by Arab women as well as the wider middle class population. The role of online and social media was also discussed. It was acknowledged that social media did not cause the revolutions to happen but it certainly played a big contributory role. Central to the revolutions were the demonstrations, protests and violence that took place in the streets. 8

Issue Overview: Jihad

Issue Overview: Jihad By Bloomberg, adapted by Newsela staff on 10.05.16 Word Count 645 TOP: Members of the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad display weapons while praying before walking through the streets