Integration as a means to prevent extremism and terrorism

Transcription

1 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution Integration as a means to prevent extremism and terrorism Typology of Islamist radicalisation and recruitment bfv series of topics

2 2 I m p r i n t : Editor: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) Press and Public Relations Department Merianstraße Köln pressereferat@verfassungsschutz.de Date of information: January 2007 This text is being published in the framework of the public relations work of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. It must not be used in a way which might suggest that the Bundesamt is taking sides with individual political groups. Its distribution during election rallies, at information desks of parties and its use for any other purpose of election advertising is prohibited. The parties are allowed to pass on this text to their own members for their information. The quotation of extracts is permitted by specifying the source.

3 3 Integration as a means to prevent extremism and terrorism. Typology of Islamist radicalisation and recruitment When conversation in Germany turns to immigrants and integration problems, it is usually about the more than three million Muslims living here. Many of them live and work in densely populated regions or big cities. In many districts or quarters with a high percentage of immigrants, a specific infrastructure has developed that corresponds to the needs of migrants: shops, associations, educational institutions and leisure facilities, mosques and houses or rooms of prayer. Cramped housing conditions and the ethnic concentration of Muslim immigrants in more or less secluded areas can turn into a socio political problem if they grow into an ethnic religious isolation (segregation) and provoke tensions and disputes within the quarters or the community. The media have regularly reported about social and ethnic conflicts in such social hot spots for quite some time. These developments are the focal point of the current debate about integration. In this context, the difficult life situation and the aggressive or violence prone attitude of adolescents with a migratory background are frequently discussed. A term that is increasingly used in public is the one of secluded Islamic parallel societies whose members, i.e. the inhabitants of certain quarters, have almost completely lost contact with the German majority society. This can result in a social and economic isolation of immigrants that affects several generations, with all the negative consequences for the people involved, but also for the German host society. However worrying these developments, they do not per se call the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution into action. Neither the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution nor its federal state counterparts monitor Muslim milieus as such, they neither deal with Muslims nor with Islam, but with Islamism as a form of political extremism and with Islamist terrorism. The only relevant aspects are Islamist efforts or activities of Islamist organisations. Only about 1% (c. 32,000) of the Muslims living in Germany have joined Islamist organisations. It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that the vast majority of the Muslims living in Germany practice their belief in the framework of our legal order.

4 4 Integration deficiencies and Islamist milieus = factors of Islamist radicalisation processes However, the problems described above become relevant for the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution when researches into the causes of extremist and terrorist efforts on a pan European level clearly indicate the significance of social factors. All the pieces of intelligence and research results gained so far show that integration deficiencies are among the most important motivating factors of Islamist radicalisation and recruitment processes, i.e., they are relevant for the road to political extremism or even terrorism. As a matter of fact, the seclusion of immigrant quarters can cause the development of countercultures opposing the concept of an open society. Under such circumstances, spheres of action for Islamist organisations can develop, and under their influence, Islamist milieus furthering radicalisation can evolve. The scenes of radicalisation and recruitment processes have moved, i.e., radicalisation and recruitment also take place in Germany, usually at different places. Among the more than 2,000 mosques, Islamic Centres and prayer rooms in Germany, there are some that are frequented by Islamists, that can be assigned to Islamist groups and/or are ideologically influenced by them. Other possible scenes of radicalisation are prisons or asylum seekers accommodations, but also universities. The security agencies are aware of the fact that feelings of humiliation, experiences of social discrimination, failures at school and at work etc. are common among young Muslims belonging to the second or third generation offspring of immigrants. While frustration, rage and even hatred of the German society are no one way road to Islamist radicalisation, such individual motives can be a starting point for an extremist politicisation. Islamist propaganda can get a foothold there, with Islamist protagonists and organisations using the existing attitudes for their own ends. Their message is clear and easy to understand, the spectrum of propaganda enormous. Their thoughts are spread through various channels: via educational offers of Islamist organisations, written and audio visual material, programmes of mainly Arab TV stations that are also broadcast in Europe and media transmissions of sermons of radical Imams. Another factor of increasing importance is the Internet. Via this network, that is almost impossible to check, the simple ideology of hatred often presented in a consumer friendly way, i.e. suited for addressing adolescents reaches young people s heads: anti Semitism, hatred of the state of Israel, the USA and the West. An alarming number of conspiracy theories has been circulating since the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, conveying a homemade Jihadism that is propagated in videos showing acts of violence.

5 5 Islamist radicalisation = renunciation of the host society and integration into subculture groups For a number of years, the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution have been dealing with processes of Islamist radicalisation and recruitment in Germany. The security agencies, too, are expected to answer the questions why people become susceptible to Islamist indoctrination, which protagonists and factors foster their indoctrination, at which point they join extremist or terrorist milieus, which stages of development can be made out, and not least, what is the role of integration deficiencies in this context. The analyses of the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution have not produced a definite profile of the Islamist or the Islamist terrorist. However, the available intelligence allows to derive a typology of the radicalisation and recruitment processes. For the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, Islamist radicalisation is defined as the complex process of a socialisation that is usually guided by Islamist protagonists (individuals or organisations). This development has a social and an ideological component: Under the influence of Islamist ideology, an integration of varying intensity into subculture groups takes place. This process is based on the renunciation of the German majority society and its values and rules, one of the core messages of Islamist ideology. Under the influence of Islamist protagonists, an individual negative attitude towards German society can grow into an ideologically based renunciation of the institutions of the democratic state and social system during the process of politicisation, and it can result in a willingness to join extremist organisations and to support their aims. If the radicalisation process comes to an end at this stage, it can be referred to as an integration into the legalistic/political Islamism. Legalistically (i.a. allegedly legally) acting Islamist organisations do not carry out recruitment activities for the purpose of the violent Holy War (Jihad). They might rather claim to immunise young Muslims against Jihadist indoctrination by presenting to them an alternative offer of identification. However, one has to critically ask whether their activities that are strongly directed at preserving an Islamic identity intensify disintegration and contribute to the development of Islamist parallel societies and to a radicalisation in the sense of an integration into political extremism (Islamism). Such a development may well contribute to open hostility towards society and its legal system and result in the willingness to fight the rejected system by violent means, i.a. to participate either actively or by giving support in the violent Jihad. In this phase, readiness to be recruited for the Jihad has been achieved and violence prone variations of Islamism become relevant. The candidate has matured to be recruited by Islamist talent spotters who are striving for a consolidation of the Jihadist ideologisation and who are establishing resp. arranging contacts with terrorist networks resp. with the theatres of the Holy War.

6 6 Processes of Islamist radicalisation do not necessarily have to lead to a phase of radicalisation. This will most likely depend on the decisive question, which actors resp. which forms of ideology (violence prone terrorist or legalistic) especially young Muslims and/or converts get into contact with at an early stage. Recruitment for the Jihad = Integration into the community of the like minded The terrorist variant of such developments can be illustrated by the example of homegrown terrorism in particular. The European intelligence services have increasingly been dealing with this phenomenon since the Madrid attacks and the murder of the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the London attacks in 2005 and also in view of the thwarted attacks against several airliners in Great Britain in summer Homegrown terrorists are radicalised individuals who were born and/or who have grown up in Europe, but who disapprove of its system of values due to religious, cultural and socio psychological factors. Radicalised converts also belong to this category. Homegrown terrorists are inspired by the pan Islamic ideology of Al Qaeda but, if at all, it can only indirectly be proven that they are linked with international terrorist groups. Especially individual circumstances such as a lacking integration into society, high unemployment and consequently lacking prospects or an image of Islam felt to be negative in the public opinion of the respective host country can lead to an identity crisis, which can be solved from these individuals point of view by turning towards a purist Islam. The Islamist distortion of Islam is marked by simple explanations and answers to complex political contexts together with clear and understandable rules for the individual lifestyle. The feeling of belonging to an elitist religious group leads to a strengthening of self confidence. In the course of their radicalisation, the candidates are passing through a psychological process of change and are gradually integrated in sub cultural social groups the networks which follow the allegedly true Islam. Their supposedly only correct interpretation of Islam can justify the use of violence against heterodox individuals and give reasons for the alleged duty to participate in the violent Jihad. Terrorist networks are characterised by the lack of formal hierarchical structures. Solidarity within these networks is nourished by personal relationships and the joint objective of supporting the Jihad no matter in which form. Young Muslims or converts mainly get into contact with Jihadist interpretations of Islam via their personal environment (e.g. circles of friends, Islamist actors in mosques or in Islamic organisations) and not least via the Internet. The integration into the community of the like minded offers emotional security, simple behavioural standards, a cohesive system to explain the sense of life and the world as well as clear guidelines on how to act. Following this logic, the Islamist ideology can also hold great attraction for individuals who do not have any Islamic background.

7 7 Successful integration= Prevention of extremism and terrorism A simple causal chain of integration deficiencies parallel society Islamism/Islamist terrorism cannot be deduced from the aforementioned statements. However, structures of parallel societies may be starting points for the development of Islamist environments; integration deficiencies have to be counted among the motivational factors of radicalisation. Therefore, also from the point of view of the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, a successful integration is a substantial contribution to the prevention of extremism and terrorism. Likewise, measures ensuring interior security (preventive intelligence collection, severe pressure exerted by police searches, bans imposed on Islamist organisations, expulsion of preachers inciting hatred etc.) also contribute to integration: The reactions within the host society are also part of the effects of Islamist terrorism. However, extremism and terrorism are threatening or blocking the willingness of German society to approve of integration; feelings of insecurity and fears of the population are reducing its openness towards migrants and promoting a hostility towards Islam that is full of resentments and lacking in substance and has long lasting consequences for social harmony. Therefore, successful measures taken by the law enforcement and security authorities also protect the interests, the rights and the reputation of the law abiding Muslims living in Germany, who have nothing to do with extremism and terrorism. Therefore, since 2005, the security authorities have been engaged in a dialogue with Muslim associations. Confidence building measures have been agreed upon in numerous dialogues with the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.v. (ZMD / Central Council of Muslims in Germany reg. ass.) and the Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.v. (DITIB / Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion reg. ass.). The concept includes concrete proposals for a co operation on a federal, federal state and as far as possible also on a local level. Among others, it has been agreed upon that on the basis of their fundamental religious convictions the imams/prayer leaders and the chairs of the religious communities of both umbrella associations will be taking a clear stand against the use of violence and that they will be using all the means available to them to take action against extremism motivated agitators and radicalisation tendencies in mosques and in other Muslim institutions. A successful integration is and continues to be a long term task to be fulfilled by society as a whole. However, relevant measures can only be efficient if they are introduced on the spot, i.e. in the municipalities and parts of the towns, and if they activate the Muslim immigrants as equal partners on the basis of a common idea of integration, for the realisation of which the acceptance of the fundamental values of our Constitution and the legal order founded on it are absolutely essential.