Forms of Relativism. Wong [1993] recognises two forms of relativism:

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1 Can moral relativism be defended against the charge that it is possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy (Williams)? Williams, from whose [1972] the quotation in the question comes, has a strict view of relativism, and I will briefly review Williams s [1999] account before addressing the issues Williams raises by reference to his own and others writings. Williams thinks relativism faces a dilemma. Either the concept is incoherent or it ceases to be true to its relativistic spirit. A society that merely tolerates local variations isn t relativistic, since its morality contains an absolute principle of toleration. In fact, relativism aims at not even seeing the other s morality as wrong, whereas toleration is extended to attitudes one thinks are wrong. For relativism we need two moral outlooks and two societies each holding one of these outlooks. Relativism claims that each outlook binds only its own society and the key question is the proper attitude of each society to the other. Williams claims that, in defining its attitude to others, relativism must offend against its own principles by lapsing into normativity. Relativism between societies or individuals may pass for peaceful coexistence, as though it was the absence of an attitude, but this dissolves as soon as one side threatens the other. What relativism is importantly trying to say is that we should modestly restrain our comments on other societies in the light of the fact that we are only one society amongst many, with our morality one contingent product amongst others. To make room for this aspect of relativism, we note that encountering is ambiguous. There are real encounters, in which there are real questions to be answered, though relativism has nothing to offer. Then, there are notional encounters where the two societies have heard of one another but don t have to live together. In that case relativism the relativism of distance can coherently say that we should question and learn, rather than judge and instruct. We must address two issues. Firstly, what varieties of relativism are there? Secondly, we must consider further the problem of inter-societal conflict and toleration. Forms of Relativism Wong [1993] recognises two forms of relativism: Normative relativism: because other value systems are equally valid as one s own, it is wrong to pass judgement on them or seek to impose your own. Meta-ethical relativism: denies universal validity to any moral code & asserts that any moral justifiability is contingent on historical and cultural factors. To this, we should add a third form, Harman s semantic relativism : theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 1 of 7

2 Semantic relativism: ought-statements have as part of their semantic content the society to which the statement is relativised. Normative Relativism Williams s [1972] takes normative relativism, in its vulgar and unregenerate form, to be equivalent to: 1. Right means right for a given society. 2. This is to be understood in functionalist 1 terms. 3. It is therefore wrong for one society to criticise the values of another. This formulation is inconsistent because non-interference and tolerance are non-relative principles, so proposition (3) is disallowed by proposition (1). All that the three principles of vulgar relativism strictly allow is that it s functionally valuable for our society not to interfere in others, not that it s functionally valuable for other societies that we keep out, which is what motivates normative relativism. The problems with (3) are its universal nature and the claim that it s deductive. If it was an extra premise and only applied to our society, there would be no inconsistency, though our resolve would be tested were other societies to meddle in ours. Meta-Ethical Relativism Meta-ethical relativism is motivated by the impressive variation of ethical customs, which it claims to explain without alleging universal error and to accommodate without disquiet. Additionally, it has anti-imperialist advantages; there s no incentive to impose alien values on cultures that are quite happy without them. Williams in his [1972] accepts that exposure to other cultures will show up some of our reactions as parochial, leading us to change or abandon some of our adverse reactions. We may realise a trait isn t a moral matter, or else recognise differences in the moral situation. This doesn t force us into relativism, but to sensitive evaluation. However, when we ve made a correct like for like comparison, and accounted for mere cultural differences, we will often be left with a residue of moral disagreement. Williams s example is institutional polygamy, which we must distinguish from bigamy, yet may still object to as presupposing inequality between men and women. We need to focus on what relativism adds to diversity. Diversity doesn t argue for relativism in any simplistic way. We re complex beings who make mistakes, so diversity is consistent with naturalism or moral realism. Some beliefs may be better than others, since societies differ in wisdom, perspective and freedom from evaluative distortion. Semantic Relativism 1 What is right for a society is what works for it. theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 2 of 7

3 Harman thinks that a judgement of the form it would be morally wrong of P to D has to be understood as elliptical for one of the form in relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D. There is no single true morality, but many different moral frameworks, none of which is more correct than another. However, morality should not be abandoned and relative moral judgements can continue to play a serious role in moral thinking. Moral statements can be true or false, but these truth-conditions only apply within a particular moral framework; the same statement can be true in one framework but false in another. Harman views moral rules as conventions, much like judicial laws, arrived at by bargaining. The strong usually defeat the weak, though their victory is not complete because of the nuisance the weak can cause if their needs are not accommodated. For Harman, moral judgements are inner judgements, part of the logical form of which is that the person so judged has entered into a tacit agreement to do (or refrain from) certain things, and has the tacit intention of doing (or not doing) them. It is also part of an inner judgement that the judge and his interlocutors share in these agreements, or at least share motivational attitudes. Where these conditions don t apply, we can treat people as enemies or criminals, or classify them as evil, but we are abusing language to say that they ought not to have acted as they did; unless we are using ought in a non-moral sense of expediency, rationality or expectation. When Harman uses the term evil he s not using a non-relative concept, but means evil from the perspective of my society. It is not just that the term will have different extensions in different societies, whose catalogues of heroes and villains will differ, but any identity of meaning will be purely contingent. Moral argument is still possible. I can try to get you to see that a particular moral statement is, after all, true in your system. Alternatively, I can try to get you to adopt my system. However, there is no reason to expect that our moral systems will converge, and normally we will reach a compromise. In Harman s view, where the person making the judgement does not share the principles of his interlocutor (but is pointing out an inconsistency), the speaker does not use ought in a moral sense, but in invertedcommas. Harman asks us to imagine aliens who have no concern whatsoever for human life. We mean nothing to them, so they have no reason to avoid injuring us. While we might strenuously resist them, it makes no sense to say that they ought not to injure us. However, Harman s second example seems less convincing. This is where a band of cannibals has eaten a shipwreck survivor. Harman thinks that while we would treat them as savages with a primitive morality, we won t say that they ought not to have eaten their victim. This sounds counter-intuitive. Williams in his [1972] gives an example of the conquistadors genuine horror at Indian human sacrifice. This wasn t self-righteous indignation, but indicated that the conquistadors treated the Indians as fellow human beings with a common psychology, and thereby subject to moral claims that apply theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 3 of 7

4 universally to human beings. We will consider this later when we discuss our moral intuitions. The Problem of Inter-societal Conflict and Toleration Williams sees the fundamental problem with relativism to be how one society handles another while staying true to relativistic principles. We will further consider real and notional confrontations, the interrelationship of relativism and the definition of a society, and the portability of our moral values. Real and Notional Confrontation In his [1981b], Williams 2 envisages two systems of beliefs that, by their own lights, give different answers to at least one yes/no moral question. These systems can be in either real or notional confrontation. For there to be real confrontation, it must be possible for a person to convert from one system to the other, without succumbing to self-delusion or insanity. The system must be a real option, one in which one could live. Otherwise, there is only notional confrontation; the distance between the cultures is too great for moral appraisal to have any substance. For Williams, there can only be moral relativism where there is notional confrontation. For Harman, however, relativism arises wherever there is failure of shared tacit agreement. This occurs with hardened criminals in our own society. The inability morally to condemn them appears problematical for Harman, since any moral theory that doesn t recognise as immoral the paradigm cases of immorality seems objectionable. In fact, Harman can divert energy wasted in pointless moral harangues towards effective opposition. Relativism and the Scope of Society Williams raises in his [1972] the difficulty for relativism of defining the scope of a society. Is a particular group a society or just a subgroup within a society to which it is integrally related? Societies have factions so which faction, if any, represents the society? In his [1999] Williams worries that societies that come into real confrontation will merge. For Harman, the problem evaporates as he allows relativism to apply even within societies whenever there is a failure of shared motivation. This leaves a lot of divisiveness about Harman s vision of moral discourse. We start from confrontation in moral bargaining and, treating people who don t share our moral motivations as enemies, end in confrontation. Since societies can collapse into units with each person living as he pleases, there is nothing to prevent morality itself from collapsing. 2 This seems a different definition to Williams s [1999]. theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 4 of 7

5 Harman thinks there is room for differences about the scope of the moral community. Some societies may include outsiders or even non-human animals as those for whom they have moral obligations. Others may allow differential treatment of anyone outside the clan. Harman does, however, see that universalisation can be brought about either by the outworking of consistency within an ethical system and the abandonment of myths or else by new rounds of moral bargaining. The Portability of Moral Values Williams is correct to say in his [1972] that we don t feel able to leave our morality at the frontier. Moral motivations are internalised and can t just be dropped when an agent happens to be in a foreign society. Part of the difference between different moral outlooks is their attitudes to other societies. All moralities have a universalising tendency in that their moral principles are seen to apply to persons as such. This isn t a problem for semantic relativism, which claims that moral obligations are claims on those who accept them, so it s appropriate that we take them with us. That these have no bite on those who don t accept them may be a frustration, but according to Harman is to be resolved by bargaining or confrontation. Some Residual Issues Ethical naturalism and the appearance of moral progress might undermine the motivation for moral relativism, which may also conflict with our moral intuitions. Naturalism Does naturalism undermine relativism? Wong [1993] considers relativism consistent with naturalism because the complexity of human nature allows variable prioritisation. He considers individual rights versus the good of the community, either of which could reasonably be the focus. The range of human goods is too diverse to expect a unique prioritisation. The Chinese assumption is that individuals find their realisation as human beings in promoting the common good, which explains the reduced focus on individual rights in Chinese society. Morality regulates between individuals and within an individual, and has evolved to meet social needs. This places constraints on the sorts of moralities there can be, but different moralities might perform equally well. While there is no single true morality, some are worse than others depending on how well they perform their regulative function. We can have a substantive relativism, while still placing constraints on what counts as an adequate morality, since any morality must promote the production, via upbringing and inter-personal relations, of people capable of considering the interests of others. Moral Progress theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 5 of 7

6 How is moral progress accommodated by relativism? Harman considers the element of consistency in moral systems as a vehicle for moral change, albeit forestalled somewhat by conservatism and self-interest. People need not be aware of all the consequences of the agreements they have entered into. Consistency also has a tendency to widen the scope of the moral community from the clan out to the species and maybe beyond. This represents Harman s attempt to accommodate the universalising tendency within moral thought. Moral Intuition A problem for relativism is that most of us do have intuitions that some moral acts are not just conventionally different but wrong in some absolute sense. Harman s views lead to counter-intuitive claims such as his [1975] that it s a misuse of language to say that it was wrong of Hitler to order the extermination of the Jews. However, we saw that, even for Harman, the explosion of myths can lead to moral progress. We can say that Hitler ought not to have ordered the extermination of the Jews, because he knew that the myths he had spun about them were untrue, though even if they had been true, this wouldn t have justified genocide. There are certain facts that are necessary for human flourishing in all societies, and societies or individuals that fail to recognise these facts are not so remote that they cannot be argued with. They ought to recognise such facts because they are extrapolations consistent with their own moral systems and factual understandings, corrected for erroneous myths. Wong, while agreeing with this, argues that there are many ways of achieving human flourishing, leaving scope for relativism. Conclusion We were asked whether moral relativism can be defended against the charge of extreme absurdity. It seems plain that it can. Williams thinks relativism absurd because he considers the particularly weak and self-contradictory form of normative relativism. A more robust form, such as Harman s or Wong s, provides an answer to the failure of moral convergence and the facts of moral diversity. There may be too much readiness for confrontation in Harman, but he is correct to recognise that moral discord ultimately leaves us nowhere else to go 3. 3 Word count 2,669, including Bibliography (130), question (25) & this footnote (14) = 169. theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 6 of 7

7 Bibliography Grayling, Anthony Philosophy, A Guide through the Subject. OUP. Harman, Gilbert Moral Relativism Defended. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84, Issue 1. Harman, Gilbert Explaining Value, Chapter 1 Moral Relativism. OUP. Singer, Peter (Ed.) A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. Williams, Bernard Morality. Chapter Interlude: Relativism. Harper & Row. Williams, Bernard. 1981a. Moral Luck. CUP. Williams, Bernard. 1981b. The Truth in Relativism. Chapter 11 of his [1981a]. Williams, Bernard. 1985a. Ethics & the Limits of Philosophy. Fontana. Williams, Bernard. 1985b. Relativism & Reflection. Chapter 9 of [1985a]. Williams, Bernard. 1995a. Making Sense of Humanity. CUP. Williams, Bernard. 1995b. Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame. Chapter 3 of his [1995a] Williams, Bernard Relativism. Chapter 3.3 of Grayling [1999]. Wong, David Relativism in Singer [1993]. theotodman@lineone.net 29/03/07 11:38 Page 7 of 7